CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
G.R. No. 192828
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. v. HON.
JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ
Summary of Doctrine:
Civil Procedure; Actions; Special Proceedings; Special
Proceeding distinguish from ordinary civil action; A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or particular fact; It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong; To initiate a special proceeding, a petition
and not a complaint should be filed.—An action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of
a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action
where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a
special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be
filed.
REYES, J.:
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FACTS:
The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and
Stroghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc.
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources
Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and
all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance,
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a]
Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." In the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1)
they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact,
adopted and his birth certificated merely simulated; (2)
Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior
to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an
inventory of the formers estate and illegally transferred to his
name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked
respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a Certificate of
Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the
TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons name; (4)
Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged
document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the
prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's
two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part
of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena
Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to
restrain Ramon or his representatives from disposing or selling
any property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2) that
Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio
Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made
by Ramon.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to
Dismiss with regard to the issues which could only be resolved
in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action
HELD:
No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA
when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second
motion to dismiss was proper.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
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advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while
the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was
ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of
a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of
Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the
nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that
there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon
exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by
Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said
affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a
resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of
the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
determinative of which court shall properly exercise
jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of
the documents subject of the civil case could be achieved in an
ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts
of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant
the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of
the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was not
instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the
administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate,
hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-
91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the
RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to
recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained
from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers
indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out
in a special proceeding.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners'
(a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit
Substitution of Party; and (b) Manifestation through counsel
that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.
Paglaum Management & Development Corp. and Health
Marketing Technologies, Inc. v. Union Bank of the Philippines,
et al.,
GR. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
SERENO, J.
Doctine:
Rule 4, Section 1 states that: Venue of real actions. Actions
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Sec. 3. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Facts:
On 3 February 1994, respondent Union Bank extended
HealthTech a credit line in the amount of ₱10,000,000. To
secure this obligation, PAGLAUM executed three Real Estate
Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union
Bank. It must be noted that the Real Estate Mortgage, on the
provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out
of or in connection therewith, originally stipulates:
Section 9. Venue. The venue of all suits and actions arising out
of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Makati,
Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged
Properties is located, at the absolute option of the
Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.
However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages dated
February 11, 1994, it stated that the venue shall be in Cebu City,
Metro Manila or in the place where any of the mortgaged
properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee.
Meanwhile, the same provision in Real Estate Mortgage date
April 22, 1998 contains a blank space for the venue or in the
place where any of the mortgaged properties is located.
HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent
renewals and increases in the credit line, with the total amount
of debt reaching ₱36,500,000. Unfortunately, according to
HealthTech, the 1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affected its
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business and caused it difficulty in meeting its obligations with
Union Bank. Thus, on December 11, 1998, both parties entered
into a Restructuring Agreement, which states that any action or
proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other
venue. Despite the Restructuring Agreement, HealthTech failed
to pay its obligation, prompting Union Bank to send a demand
letter dated 9 October 2000, stating that the latter would be
constrained to institute foreclosure proceedings, unless
HealthTech settled its account in full. Since HealthTech
defaulted on its payment, Union Bank extra-judicially
foreclosed the mortgaged properties. The bank as the sole
bidder, was then issued a Certificate of Sale. Consequently,
HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles
with Damages and Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Injunction, which the RTC ruled in favor of them and
issued the said writ. Thereafter, Union Bank filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which the RTC granted and resulted to the dismissal of
the case, as well as the dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. It likewise denied the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. PAGLAUM
and HealthTech elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the
decision of the trial court and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the
foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage.
Ruling:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
The Supreme Court rules in the affirmative. According to
the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the
court that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is
situated. In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located
in the Province of Cebu. Thus, following the general rule,
PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu,
and not in Makati. However, the Rules provide an exception, in
that real actions can be commenced and tried in a court other
than where the property is situated in instances where the
parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the
exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim
that such an agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the
venue that should be followed is that contained in the Real
Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the
Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and
HealthTech. This Court rules that the venue stipulation in the
Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.
The said provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the
later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of
the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which
applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the
mortgages. The phrase waiving any other venue plainly shows
that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising
out of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and
the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly
defined as such, is exclusive.
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Title: G.R. No. SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P.
BELEN, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact NERY B.
AVECILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 87,
Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his
orders and SPS. SILVESTRE N. PACLEB and PATRICIA A.
PACLEB, represented herein by their attorney-in-fact
JOSELITO RIOVEROS, Respondents.
Ponente: DANTE O. TINGA
Summary of Doctrine:
Rule 4: VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. (2[b]a)
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of
the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the
court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found. (2[c]a)
FACTS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Respondents were permanent resident of California,
USA which was ordered by the Superior Court of the State of
California to pay petitioners $56,204.69 representing loan
repayment, share in the profits plus interests and cost of suit.
The summons was served on petitioners’ addressed in San
Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna. Corollary thereto, private
respondents filed for an action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgement with RTC-Rosario, Batangas.
On 5 Dec. 2000, Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his
appearance as counsel for the petitioners which he asserted
that the relatives of the petitioners availed of his services. In his
answer, Atty Alcantara averred that respondents’ allegations as
to the residency of petitioners as they are actually residents of
California, USA. Likewise, he moved for the dismissal of
the case as the foreign judgment has already been dismissed.
An amended complaint was filed by respondents with
prayer for the satisfaction of petitioners’ obligation to private
respondents amounting to Php2,810,234.50. Atty. Alcantara
died causing for his non-appearance to the rescheduled pre-
trial conference. RTC rendered a decision in favour of the
respondents, said decision was sent through mail to Atty.
Alcantara, however, the same was returned with a notation
“addressee deceased.” Thereafter, copy of the order was sent
to petitioners’ address in Laguna which Leopoldo Avecilla
received the same.
The RTC granted for respondents’ ex parte motion for
preliminary attachment leading to the issuance of the writ of
execution against the real properties of the petitioners.
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Atty. Carmelo Culvera appeared for petitioners moving
for the quashal of the writ of execution. RTC denied Atty
Culvera’s motion to quash the writ of execution. Atty Culvera
filed a Rule 65 petition to the CA for RTC’s lack of jurisdiction
over the persons because of improper service of summons,
copy of the decision was not properly served to the petitioners,
issuance of the writ prior to finality of order, and denial of
quashal despite of sufficient legal bases. CA dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is an action in personam.
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendants.
RULING:
Yes, the action is an action in personam as private
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under
the judgment of Superior Court of California. In an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the defendants is acquired through the service
of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance
in court and their submission to its authority. If he cannot
cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be made in accordance with
Section 8 of Rule 14. If he is temporarily out of the country, any
of the following modes of service may be resorted to: 1.
Substituted service; 2. Personal service outside the country,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
with leave of court; 3. Service by publication, with leave of
court; or 4. Any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In this case, the petitioners are established to be a
permanent residents of California, USA. Nevertheless, the
appearance of Atty. Alcantara is sufficient to vest jurisdiction
over the persons of the petitioners as he was impliedly been
authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf through the
act when Atty. Alcantara attached to his motion to dismiss the
authenticated copy of the judgement dismissal of the Superior
Court of California and the identification page of Domingo
Belen’s US passport. Thus, petitioners voluntary submitted
themselves through Atty. Alcantara.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE CHANDUMAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
REYES, J.:
Doctrine: Where the action is in personam and the defendant
is in the Philippines, service of summons may be made through
personal service, that is, summons shall be served by handing
to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant
cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, it is then that substituted service may be made. Personal
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service of summons should and always be the first option, and
it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a
reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.
Facts: PDB questions the Decision of the CA, as well as its
Resolution, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82861. The assailed decision nullified the of
the RTC in Civil Case No. LP-99-0137.
BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a
parcel of land. BF Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and
interests over the contract. Chandumal defaulted in her
payments. On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation
of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by
PDB against Chandumal, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-99-0137.
PDB alleged that despite demand, Chandumal failed and/or
refused to pay the amortizations as they fell due; hence, it
caused the rescission of the contract by means of notarial act.
Consequently, summons was issued and served by deputy
sheriff Roberto T. Galing (Sheriff Galing). According to his
return, Sheriff Galing attempted to personally serve the
summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it
was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said
dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of
summons on August 5, 1999 by serving the same through
Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period,
PDB filed on April 24, 2000 an ex parte motion to declare
Chandumal in default.
Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She maintained that
she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the
same.
RTC denied Chandumal’s motion. On July 27, 2010, the CA,
without ruling on the propriety of the judicial confirmation of
the notarial rescission, rendered the assailed decision nullifying
the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective substituted
service of summons.
Issues: (1)Whether or not there was a valid substituted service
of summons; and (2)whether or not Chandumal voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Ruling: 1. No valid substituted service of summons. In this case,
the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to
his failure to serve it personally. The requisites for a valid
substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1)
impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on
substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must
describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of
suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant
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is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters must be
clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons;
and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons.
According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not
specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of
efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process
server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the
defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts
of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the
sheriff’s return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to cause
personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no
indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her
specific whereabouts except that she was "out of the house",
where she can be reached or whether he even tried to await
her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not
suffice to justify substituted service and his failure to comply
with the requisites renders such service ineffective.
2. Yes, despite that there was no valid substituted service of
summons, Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
that “the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.”
When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively
submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the
filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is
equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with
jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered
voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, as well as
its Resolution dated February 16, 2011, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 82861 are AFFIRMED in so
far as there was no valid service of summons. Further, the
Court DECLARES that there was no valid rescission of contract
pursuant to R.A. No. 6552. Accordingly, the Decision dated May
31, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 255
in Civil Case No. LP-99-0 137 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
is therefore, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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SPS. ERNESTO and ELSIE YU vs BALTAZAR PACLEB
G.R. No. 172172. February 24, 2009
PUNO, C.J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: The character of a proceeding is
determined by its aim and object. Whether a proceeding is in
rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. An
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person while an action quasi in rem is a
proceeding to subject the defendant’s interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property and deals with the
status, ownership and liability of the property.
FACTS:
Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita
Chan, are registered owners of Langcaan Property. On 1992,
they allegedly executed an Absolute Sale with Angelita Chan
and Rebecca Del Rosario who entered another Deed of
Absolute Sale with Ruperto L. Javier who then transacted the
same property in a Contract to Sell with petitioner spouses
Ernesto and Elsie Yu. Javier undertook to deliver possession of
the Langcaan property and to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale 30
days from execution of the contract. These aforementioned
sales were not registered. On 1993, Spouses Yu filed a
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Javier
compelling the latter to deliver the ownership and possession,
as well as title to the Langcaan Property. They contended that
they had no knowledge that the property was tenanted by
Ramon Pacleb and was only assured there was agreement to
vacate the same. Javier did not appear in the proceedings
hence the case was decided in default.
On 1995, respondent Pacleb filed a complaint for the
Annulment of Deed of Sale contending that the sale executed
with Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures were forged
and the action was dismissed. On 1996, respondent Pacleb filed
an instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages
alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife
could not have been executed on the date appearing thereon
as he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first
wife died. On 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and
the petitioners were held to be purchasers in good faith. The
trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific
performance against Javier was already final. Upon appeal by
the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision.
Petitioner spouses then argue that the decision of the court as
to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and
binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party
thereto since it involved the question of possession and
ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in
personam but an action quasi in rem.
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ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance is not merely
an action in personam, but an action quasi in rem.
RULING:
NO. The action in the case at bar, being one for specific
performance and damages to compel Javier of his undertakings
under the Contract to Sell - to accept full payment and execute
the absolute sale, is an action in personam and does not burden
the Langcaan Property. Thus, it only binds parties impleaded
therein and was duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard
who is Javier. Hence, the case does not bind respondent Pacleb
since he was not a party therein neither a privy thereto as their
signatures were forged. With this, it was held that respondent
as a true owner has a better right over the Langcaan Property.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem
for that matter, is determined by the aim, object or purpose of
the same. An action in personam is said to be one which has for
its object a judgment against the person. The purpose of which
is to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. It is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based
on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or
seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. On the other hand, an action
quasi in rem is one which has for its object the property of a
person in order to discharge him of the claims assailed. The
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
purpose of which is to subject the interest of the defendant to
the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in
rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the
parties who joined in the action.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs
against petitioners.
Goodland Company Inc. v. Asia United Bank, et. al.
G.R. No. 195561/195546 March 14, 2012
Ponente: Justice Villarama Jr,
Doctrine: Rule 2 Sec. 4 : If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others.
Facts:
Sometime in July 1999, petitioner Goodland Company, Inc.
(petitioner) mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 321672 and 321673 ("Laguna Properties"). The Third
Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) secured the loans extended
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by respondent Asia United Bank ("AUB") to Radio Marine
Network (Smartnet), Inc. (RMNSI), doing business as Smartnet
Philippines,[3] under the latter's Php250 million Omnibus Credit
Line with AUB.
In addition to the aforesaid collaterals, petitioner executed a
Third Party REM over its 5,801-square meter property located
at Pasong Tamo St., Makati City ("Makati Property") covered
by TCT No. 114645. The REMs, both signed by Gilbert G. Guy,
President of Goodland Company, Inc., were duly registered by
AUB with the Registry of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna and
Registry of Deeds for Makati City, and annotated on the said
titles.
Subsequently, however, petitioner repudiated the REMs by
claiming that AUB and its officers unlawfully filled up the blank
mortgage forms and falsified the entries therein. Smartnet
defaulted on its loan obligation which prompted AUB to extra
judicially foreclose the REM and then was issued a Certificate
of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds. Goodland files
another case seeking for the annulment of the foreclosure
sales. AUB moved to dismiss both cases on the ground of forum
shopping and litis pendentia. RTC dismissed the case in favor of
AUB but on appeal, the CA reversed.
The same case was filed for the Makati Properties but this time
including in the suit the President of AUB and the notarizing
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
lawyer whose signature was falsified. The same was
contradicted by AUB on the same grounds – forum shopping,
non-payment of docket fees and litis pendentia but RTC denied.
On appeal, the CA held Goodland guilty of forum shopping for
failing to inform AUB and RTC of the other case while the case
on the REM is pending.
The Laguna properties were the subject of two suits filed by
petitioner to forestall their imminent foreclosure, and similar
actions were likewise instituted by petitioner involving the
Makati property which is the subject of the present case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling : mortgagee.
Yes. There is forum shopping when the following elements are
present: "(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites
[are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant
or lis pendens."[23] The essence of forum shopping is the filing
of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
12 | P a g e
of obtaining a favorable judgment, through means other than
by appeal or certiorari.[24]
All the foregoing elements are present in this case.
There can be no dispute that the prayer for relief in the two
cases was based on the same attendant facts in the execution
of REMs over petitioner's properties in favor of
AUB. Undeniably then, the injunctive relief sought against the
extrajudicial foreclosure, as well as the cancellation of the new
title in the name of the creditor-mortgagee AUB, were all
premised on the alleged nullity of the REM due to its allegedly
fraudulent and irregular execution and registration the same
facts set forth in the first case. In both cases, petitioner
asserted its right as owner of the property subject of the REM,
while AUB invoked the rights of a foreclosing creditor-
There is also identity of parties notwithstanding that in the first
case, only one bank officer (Co), the notary public (Pelicano)
and the Register of Deeds were impleaded along with AUB as
defendants, whereas in the second case, AUB and its two
officers (Chan and Del Mundo), along with the RTC Clerk of
Court (Escasinas, Jr.), Sheriff (Magsajo) and the Register of
Deeds of Makati City (Ortile) were the named defendants. The
parties in both cases are substantially the same as they
represent the same interests and offices/positions, and who
were impleaded in their respective capacities with
corresponding liabilities/duties under the claims asserted.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are
With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same
defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or issues.
omission by which a party violates the right of another. This
Court has laid down the test in determining whether or not the The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the
causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the
wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of
present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery the action.
is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former
action.[25]
The Court need not say more. Petitioner's brazen and
deliberate acts of repeated forum shopping in all stages of
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged
litigation are written all over this case, as well as in the two
nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious
other identical cases already decided by this Court. No
nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland's right to the
reversible error was thus committed by the CA when it affirmed
mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the
the RTC's joint order of dismissal with prejudice.
nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the same
cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the
195546 and 195561 are both DENIED. The Decision dated
extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against
September 15, 2010 and Resolution dated January 31, 2011 of
consolidation of title. While the main relief sought in the
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90418 are hereby
Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly
AFFIRMED.
different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case
(nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction
With double costs against the petitioner.
against consolidation of title), the cause of action which
serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same the
SO ORDERED.
alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the
third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
Perlas-Bernabe,* JJ., concur.
prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA
LOPEZ, respondent.
G.R. No: 138497 Date: January 16, 2002
Ponente: Justice Pardo
Brief Summary doctrine:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.
The Facts:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial
courts order denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case
against her inclusion as party defendant therein.
On September 15, 1993, private respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez filed a petition for the appointment as sole administratrix
of conjugal partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc., against
defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, in a
Special Proc. with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime
in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private
respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate
children, and arrogated to himself the control of their conjugal
properties, for his sole benefit therefore depriving the private
respondent and their children of its benefits. After abandoning
14 | P a g e
his family, he maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited
with the petitioner since 1976.
Private respondent alleged that defendant Lopez and
petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since
1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations,
residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments
and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts
and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their
dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not
solely through the actual contribution of money, property and
industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio.
On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was
filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her.
An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein
respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucios motion to
dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject properties are
registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her
name.
Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied
on February 10, 1994.
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts denial of her
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
motion to dismiss. On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision denying the petition. Motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The Issues:
W.O.N. the elements of for cause of action are present as the
petitioner was impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party
to the case.
Ruling:
The court grant the petition.
Whether a cause of action exists against petitioner. A cause of
action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in
violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of a cause
of action are:
(1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created.
(2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right.
(3) An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action the court
tested the allegations:
15 | P a g e
1. In the complaint filed, there is no relief sought against
the petitioner.
2. The Judicial appointment as administratrix of the
conjugal properties as per Art 128 of the Family Code
refers only to spouses.
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely
between them, to the exclusion of all other
persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto
J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and
respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact,
none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and reverses the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court dismissed Special
Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch
141 as against petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. ET. Al. vs. Fil-
Estate Land Inc.
G.R. no. 152272, March 5, 2012
Justice Ruben T. Reyes
Brief Summary of Doctrine: Cause of Action
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
An act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.
Facts
On January 20, 1999 Juana Complex I Homeowners Association
Inc. together with the individual residents of Juana Complex I
and other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for
damages in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the
regular commuters and motorist of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of use of the La
Paz road against the Fil- Estate Land, Inc. It was alleged in the
complaint that, JCHA Inc. were all regular commuter and
motorist who constantly travelled towards the direction of
Manila and Calamba, that they used the entry and exit toll gates
of SLEX by passing through the right of way public road known
as La Paz road for 10 years, that the Fil- Estate excavated the
said road which deprived the motorist from passing such road
and the said road was restored by the residents to make it
passable and then excavated again by the JCHA, and that the
matter was forward to the Municipal Government and Office of
the City Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make
it passable and safe to motorist and pedestrians, that the act of
Fil- Estate cause damage, inconvenience, prejudice , annoyance
and loss of precious hours to them , because the traffic was
rerouted to narrow roads which caused terrible traffic jams and
hazards , and finally that it would cause them great damage and
irreparable injury.
Issue
16 | P a g e
Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action?
Ruling
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action
is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed
by the defendant. Hence, it must contain a concise statement
of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s
cause of action. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. In the
present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.’s
averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La
Paz Road. These are: a.) their right to use the road on the basis
of their allegation that they have been using the road for 10
years. b.) an easement of right of way has been constituted
over the said road. Second, there is an alleged violation of such
right committed by Fil- Estate, when they excavated the land
preventing the motorists and commuters to use such road.
Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid
judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the
relief sought therein.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE RULING
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July
31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE INC.,
vs.
VIRGILIO S. DAVID,
G.R. No. 129928, August 25,2005
Tinga, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of complaint.
FACTS:
The private respondent Virgilio David is an electrical
hardware supplier while the petitioner Misamis Occidental II
Cooperative Inc. (MOELCI II) is a rural electric cooperative in
Misamis Oriental. Both the parties entered into a contract,
where the former would deliver a transformer with accessories
to the latter. However, after the delivery of such, the petitioner
failed to pay the consideration for the same. Thus, the private
respondent filed a case for specific performance and damages
against the petitioner as predicated on a document attached as
Annex A to the Amendment Complaint.
17 | P a g e
The petitioner filed its answer to Amended Complaint,
invoking the dismissal of the same on the ground of lack of
cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract
between them under the Statute of Frauds and improper
venue. It also alleged that the attached document was only a
quotation letter and not a contract as alleged by private
respondent. Thereafter, the latter contended that the
quotation letter cannot be inquired because it is merely an
attachment to the complaint.
MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it
asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its
annexes; hence the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must consider
the complaint's annexes. However, the RTC denied the said
motion and ruled in favor of the private respondent.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the orders. But, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no error in the ruling
of the Court of Appeals. To determine the existence of a cause
of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly
considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of
external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
In the case at bar, it has been hypothetically admitted
that the parties entered in a contract of sale. However, the
petitioner failed to comply with its obligation to pay the
consideration for the same as well as the custom duties and
incidental expenses despite the demands made by the private
respondent. With the foregoing facts, the cause of action is
sufficiently laid out.
Contrary to the latter's assertion, Annex A is not an
“undisguised quotation letter.” The presence of the signature
of both General Manager and the Chairman of the Committee
of Management immediately below the word “Conforme”
appearing on the document lends credulity to the private
18 | P a g e
respondent's assertion that the was a meeting of mind
between him and the petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 March 1997 and
its Resolution dated 14 July 1997 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
GATEWAY PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 181485, February 15, 2012
LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: There is an act of splitting a single
cause of action, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed when the GPHI filed a Complaint
with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Injunction against PNB before the RTC of Trece Martires City.
Respondent was a subsidiary company of Gateway Electronics
Company (GEC), the latter obtained long term loans from the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in the amount of
₱600,000,000.00. The loans were secured by mortgages
executed by GEC over its various properties. Subsequently, LBP
offered to provide additional funds to GEC by inviting other
banking institutions to lend money therefor. The PNB later
became part of this consortium of creditor banks.
The GEC allegedly encountered difficulties in paying its
obligations to the banks, including those owed to PNB. GEC
then requested PNB to convert its long-term loans into a
Convertible Omnibus Credit Line. As part of the conversion
requirements of PNB, GPHI was made a co-borrower in the
agreement and was obligated to execute in favor of PNB a real
estate mortgage over two parcels of land, provided that the
real estate mortgage "shall be registered with the Registry of
Deeds in an event of default."
The PNB purportedly demanded from GEC the full
payment of the latter’s obligations. Thereafter, GPHI learned of
PNB’s supposedly underhanded registration of the real estate
mortgage with intent to foreclose the same. GPHI filed a
complaint alleging that the GPHI Property was never
contemplated at any time as collateral for GEC’s loan
obligations to PNB, and that the latter had no legal right to
affect the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. GPHI, thus,
prayed for the issuance of the temporary restraining order
(TRO) to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the properties of GPHI,
as well as from registering the fact of foreclosure or performing
19 | P a g e
any act that would deprive GPHI of its ownership of the said
properties.
The RTC did not issue a TRO in favor of GPHI. The PNB
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
properties, and being the sole bidder, they were able to acquire
the properties.
Thereafter, a year later, GPHI filed a Petition for
Annulment of Foreclosure of Mortgage with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Trece Martires City,
alleging that, in conducting the foreclosure proceedings, the
sheriff failed to observe the requirement of Section 4 of Act No.
3135 that the "sale shall be made at public auction." The PNB
on the other hand filed a Motion to Dismiss, and contended
that there was another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action. The RTC ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case stating therein that the first complaint for
Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and the second
complaint for Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale, practically
involved the same parties, substantially identical causes of
action and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts. Ironically, these cases are now both filed in this
Court.
The GPHI appealed with the CA, and granted the same
holding that the real estate mortgage does not preclude an
action predicated on or involving an issue questioning the
validity of the foreclosure. In this respect, the test of identity
fails. The judgment in the Annulment of the Real Estate
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Mortgage would not be a bar to the prosecution of the present
action for the Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON causes of action in the Annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage and Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale are
identical as to constitute act of splitting a single cause of action.
RULING:
YES.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of
action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another." Section 3 of Rule 2 provides that "a party may not
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action." Anent
the act of splitting a single cause of action, Section 4 of Rule 2
explicitly states that "if two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others."
In the case at bar, a perusal of the allegations in the
Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Annulment of the
Foreclosure Sale, reveal that the said cases invoke the same
fundamental issue, i.e., the temporary nature of the security
that was to be provided by the mortgaged properties of GPHI.
The cause of action of GPHI in both cases is the alleged act of
PNB of reneging on a prior agreement or understanding with
GEC and GPHI vis-à-vis the constitution, purpose and
20 | P a g e
consequences of the real estate mortgage over the properties
of GPHI.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated September 28, 2007 and the Resolution
dated January 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75108 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
dated December 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. TM-1108 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
G.R. No. L-2246 January 31, 1951
JOVITO R. SALONGA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WARNER, BARNES AND CO., LTD., defendant-appellant.
Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Summary of Doctrine:
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires an action
to be brought in the name of the real party in interest; and a
corollary proposition requires that an action shall be brought
against the persons or entities which are to be bound by the
judgment obtained therein. xxx Actions must be brought by the
real parties in interest and against the persons who are to be
bound by the judgment obtained therein. The real party in
interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

judgment, or the "party entitled to the avails of the suit" (1
Sutherland, Court Pleading Practice and Forms, p. 11).
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila ordering the defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire
Insurance Company of New York, to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P727. 82 with legal interest thereon from the filing of
the complaint until paid, and the costs.
Tina J. Gamboa entered into a contract with Westchester Fire
Insurance Company of New York whereby the latter insured
one case of rayon yardage which said Tina J. Gamboa shipped
from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to
Manila, Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff
herein. Upon examination, it was discovered that the said
shipments incurred shortages in the amount of Php 1,732.12.
American President Lines, agent of Clovis Victory, agreed to
partially pay the amount of Php 1,021.25. Hence, the remaining
balance of Php 717.82 was sued against defendant Warner
Barnes and Co., Ltd., the alleged ‘adjustment and settlement
agent” of Westchester. Counsel for the defendant contends
that the principal Westchester should have been impleaded
for being the party to the abovementioned contract, hence,
the real party in interest.
ISSUE:
WON or not Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd is personally liable?
HELD:
NO. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires an
action to be brought in the name of the real party in interest;
and a corollary proposition requires that an action shall be
brought against the persons or entities which are to be bound
by the judgment obtained therein. xxx Actions must be brought
by the real parties in interest and against the persons who are
to be bound by the judgment obtained therein. It clearly
appears that the scope and extent of the functions of an
adjustment and settlement agent do not include personal
liability. His functions are merely to settle and adjusts claims in
behalf of his principal if those claims are proven and
undisputed, and if the claim is disputed or is disapproved by the
principal, like in the instant case, the agent does not assume
any personal liability. The recourse of the insured is to press his
claim against the principal.
Dispositive Portion:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed.
The complaint is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
appellee.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Fortich vs. Corona
G.R. No. 131457
April 24, 1998

21 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

Ponente: Martinez, J. are those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for
Approval. In other words, movants are merely recommendee
Doctrine: Real party in intetest
farmer-beneficiaries.
Facts:
Issue: WON the farmers-beneficiaries are real party in interest
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the
Held:
Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which No.
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a
hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is
area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
Win-Win Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final
consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants interest over
and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of
the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of
real parties in interest.
forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one
hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
A motion for intervention was filed by alleged farmer-
ANTONIO (ANTONINO) SAMANIEGO, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, JOHN
beneficiaries. In their motion, movants contend that they are
SAMANIEGO, ERNESTO SANTOS, MACARIO DE LA CRUZ,
the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real
ANDRES PASTORIN, BENETRITO DE LA CRUZ, JESUS BATAC and
parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in
RODOLFO LAGUISMA, petitioners, vs. VIC ALVAREZ AGUILA,
their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently,
JOSEPHINE TAGUINOD and SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
the alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution
which directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine G.R. No. 125567. June 27, 2000
who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
MENDOZA, J.
However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants

22 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
Section 3 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action without that party
being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without
their presence. “Interest,” within the meaning of this rule,
should be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma
party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not
because such party has any real interest in the subject matter
or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the
technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party
on the record.
FACTS:
Petitioners are tenants in a landholding owned by Salud
Aguila, whose children are private respondents. The subject
land was identified by the DAR-Region 2 as covered by the
Operation Land Transfer Program of the government. Salud
Aguila on behalf of the respondents filed a petition for
exemption from the coverage of PD 27 (Land Reform Program),
which petitioners opposed alleging that the application for
respondents’ mother transferring the title of the lands to
respondents is in violation of the rules and regulations of the
23 | P a g e
DAR. The application for exemption was granted by the
Regional Director. Petitioners filed an appeal to the DAR which
affirmed the Regional Director’s decision, however, on motion
of petitioners, reversed its ruling and denied private
respondents’ application for exemption and declared
petitioners as the rightful farmerbeneficiaries of the land.
Respondents appealed to the Office of the President
which set aside the decision of the DAR and reinstated DAR’s
prior decision. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
their petition was dismissed for failure to implead the Office of
the President (OP) as an indispensable party. It held that the
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and failure to
implead such was fatal to the plaintiffs’ cause. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration citing Administrative Circular No.
195, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Office of the President was an indispensable
party and had to be impleaded.
RULING:
NO.
When petitioners brought their case to the Court of
Appeals, the procedure governing appeals to said court from
quasijudicial agencies was embodied in Revised Administrative
Circular No. 195. It provides that “6. Contents of petition.—The
petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either
as petitioners or respondents . . . .” Therefore, it is clear that
petitioners’ failure to implead the Office of the President does
not warrant the dismissal of the case as it is in accordance with
this circular. Moreover, in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a
party in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action without that party being impleaded.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.
“Interest,” within the meaning of this rule, should be material,
directly in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is
one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such
party has any real interest in the subject matter or because any
relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of
pleadings require the presence of such party on the record.
In the case at bar, the Office of the President is merely
a pro forma party, in the same way that a respondent court is a
pro forma party in special civil actions for certiorari.
Furthermore, the issue in the petition before the CA is whether
a private land should be exempted from the coverage of P.D.
No. 27 wherein the government will not be prejudice nor gain
anything whatever happens to that case and whoever wins for
the only participation of the Office of the President, in this case,
is its role as the office which entertains appeals from decisions
of the DAR. Indeed, the very reason that the appellate court
24 | P a g e
excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a
comment is that it deemed that the case involved “purely
private interests.”
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated January 25, 1996, and its resolution, dated July 5, 1996,
are hereby REVERSED and the Court of Appeals is ORDERED to
decide the case on the merits with deliberate speed. SO
ORDERED.
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE
MARVIN B. ACERON, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM
ANG, Respondents. G.R. NO. 186993 - August 22, 2012 REYES,
J.
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: There is nothing in Section 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court that expressly allows, much less
implies that an action may be filed in the city or municipality
where either a representative or an attorney-in-fact of a real
party in interest resides. Sec. 3 of Rule 3 merely provides that
the name or names of the person or persons being represented
must be included in the title of the case and such person or
persons shall be considered the real party in interest. In other
words, the principal remains the true party to the case and not
the representative.
FACTS: By virtue of the Special Power of Attorney
executed between the petitioners, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of case and such person or persons shall be considered the real
money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents. party in interest. In other words, the principal remains the true
The latter moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the party to the case and not the representative. DISPOSITIVE
petitioners on the grounds of improper venue and prescription. PORTION:
The respondents asserted that the complaint against them may
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
only be filed in the court of the place where either they or the
disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August
petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City
28, 2008 and Resolution dated February 20, 2009 rendered by
while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101159 are AFFIRMED.
Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint
against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper. The
Regional Trial Court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of
SIMNY G. GUY, GERALDINE G. GUY, GLADYS G. YAO, and the
Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue. HEIRS OF THE LATE GRACE G. CHEU, petitioners, vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aceron is the real party in GILBERT G. GUY, respondents
interest and thus, his residence is material to the venue of the
G.R. No. 189486. September 5, 2012
filing of the complaint.
G.R. No. 189699. September 5, 2012
RULING: NO. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides: “Representatives as parties. Where the action is Nuisance and Harassment suit
allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or
PONENTE: PEREZ,J.;
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real property in interest. xxx” As may be unerringly gleaned
FACTS:
from the foregoing provisions, there is nothing therein that
expressly allows, much less implies that an action may be filed Gilbert G. Guy son of spouses Simny and Francisco Guy, claims
in the city or municipality where either a representative or an to own 80% of their multi-million family corporation GoodGold
attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest resides. Sec. 3 of Rule Realty Development Inc, stating that he owns 519, 997 shares
3 merely provides that the name or names of the person or (fully paid upon incorporation) out of the 650,000 subscribed
persons being represented must be included in the title of the capital stock. His mother Simny however contends that it was

25 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
she and her husband who established the corporation and only
placed the bulk of the shares in Gilbert’s name because being
their son, they had entrusted to him the future of their
corporations. She further claims that during the incorporation
of GoodGold, they were advised by their lawyers to issue the
stock certificates with corresponding blank endorsements
signed by Francisco as President and Atty. Paras as Corporate
Secretary.; including Stock Certificate Nos. 004-014 under
Gilbert’s name.
In 1999, Francisco gave instructions to redistribute the shares
of the corporation evenly among his children while maintaining
a proportionate share for himself and Simny. Hence,
GoodGold’s certificates were cancelled and new ones were
issued showing that the 4 siblings had 65,000 shares each while
the spouses had 195,000 shares each.
Five years after the redistribution, Gilbert brought an action
against his mother Simny and his sisters for the annulment of
the said transfers of shares along with some corporate
documents, alleging fraud and that his signatures at the back of
the stock certificates which purportedly endorsed the same
were forged and must be nullified. NBI reports on the
examination of signatures however showed them to be
authentic. Gilbert withdrew his complaint. Three years
thereafter, a new action was filed by Gilbert with the caption
“Intra-corporate Controversy: For the Declaration of Nullity of
Fraudulent Transfers of Shares of Stock Certificates, Fabricated
Shares of Stocks, Falsified General Information Sheets, Minutes
of Meetings, etc…” against his mother and sisters.
26 | P a g e
Gilbert claims that he is “unaware of any document signed by
him that would justify and support the transfer of his shares to
herein petitioners. Simny and daughters filed their
manifestation that the action filed by Gilbert was a mere
nuisance and harassment suit under Sec 1(b), Rule 1 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies.
RTC dismissed the case as a nuisance and harassment suit, CA
reversed RTC.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals; and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is a nuisance and harassment suit.
RULLING:
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law
that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the
allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective
cause of action.
Tested against established standards, we find that the charges
of fraud which Gilbert accuses his siblings are not supported by
the required factual allegations.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or
perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the
special commercial court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this
jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus showing that the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

corporation’s nature, structure, or powers, were used to certificate,” so that upon its face the holder is entitled to
facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. demand its transfer to his name from the issuing corporation.
Failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts in intra- With Gilbert’s failure to allege specific acts of fraud in his
corporate controversies is indicative of a harassment or complaint and his failure to rebut the NBI report, this court
nuisance suit and may be dismissed motu proprio. pronounces, as a consequence thereof, that the signatures
appearing on the stock certificates, including his blank
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent
endorsement thereon were authentic. With the stock
acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such a
certificates having been endorsed in blank by Gilbert which he
defect can be cured by a bill of particulars.
himself delivered to his parents, the same can be cancelled and
A bill of particulars may be ordered as to a defense of fraud or transferred in the names of herein petitioners.
mistake if the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake are
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
not stated with the particularity required by the rule.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
The above-stated rule, however, does not apply to intra-
189486 and 189699 are hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
corporate controversies… In cases governed by the Interim
27 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106405
Rules of Procedure on Intra-corporate Controversies, a bill of
and its Resolution dated 03 September 2009 are REVERSED and
particulars is a prohibited pleading… This is because fraud in
SET ASIDE. The Court DECLARES that SEC-MC08-112 now
intra-corporate controversies must be based on “devises and
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211,
schemes, employed by, or any act of, the board of directors,
Mandaluyong City, is a nuisance suit and hereby ORDERS it to
business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or
IMMEDIATELY DISMISS the same for reasons discussed herein.
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of
the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of SO ORDERED.
any corporation, partnership, or association,” as stated under
Rule 1, Section 1 of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or
misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in LIVING @ SENSE vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or
G.R. No. 193753 September 26, 2012
within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a
nuisance suit. When a stock certificate is endorsed in blank by
the owner thereof, it constitutes what is termed as a “street

27 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

FACTS: Petitioner Living @ Sense, Inc. sub-contracted to Dou

Mac, Inc. (DMI) its underground open-trench work for the RULING: No, DMI is not an indispensable party in this case.
Network Project of Globe Telecom in Mindanao. As required, Article 1216 of the Civil Code on solidary obligations allows
DMI gave surety and performance bonds which it secured from petitioner, as creditor, to proceed against any of the solidary
respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan) which debtors. Since respondent Malayan bound itself "jointly and
bound itself jointly and severally liable with DMI. The bonds will severally" with DMI under the surety and performance bonds,
answer for the loss and damage to petitioner if DMI fails to it is considered a solidary debtor and is therefore not an
perform its obligations under the subcontract. indispensable party. This is because petitioner can claim
indemnity directly from respondent insurance company who
The excavation and restoration works by DMI was later stopped has bound itself solidarily with DMI for the obligations under
by the government after it found DMI's work unsatisfactory. the bonds.
Eventually, petitioner terminated the subcontract and
demanded from respondent insurance company An indispensable party is defined as "a party-in-interest
indemnification in the amount of P1.04 million. Respondent without whom no final determination can be had of an action,
Malayan denied petitioner's claim arguing that the liability of and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant."
its principal, DMI, should first be determined before Malayan Without it, the court cannot act on the case not only as to the
can be held liable. Thus, petitioner sued Malayan for specific absent party but also as to those present.
performance and breach of contract.
Even if assuming that DMI was indeed an indispensable party,
Respondent Malayan claimed that the suit should be dismissed the Regional Trial Court should not have dismissed the case but
because petitioner failed to implead DMI as an indispensable should have ordered the petitioner to implead the
party. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that respondent is indispensable party, which can be done on motion of the party
a surety who is directly and primarily liable to indemnify or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action.
petitioner, and that the bond is "callable on demand" in the
Accordingly, the Court finds that the RTC erred in holding that
event of breach of obligation. The Regional Trial Court ruled for
DMI Is an indispensable party and, consequently, in dismissing
the respondent, and the case was elevated to the Supreme
the complaint filed by petitioner without prejudice.
Court on a pure question of law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed April 8, 2010 and August 25, 2010
ISSUE: Is DMI an indispensable party in this case? Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraque City, Branch

28 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
257 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner's complaint is ordered
REINSTATED and the case remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Philip L. Go Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim vs Distinction
Properties Development and Construction, Inc
G.R. No. 194024; April 25, 2012
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Summary of doctrine:
An indispensable party is defined as one who has such
an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring
or affecting that interest. Failure to implead an indispensable
party is a ground for dismissal of the case.
Facts:
The petitioners are owners of condominium units in
Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC).
Respondent Distinction Properties Development and
Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is engaged in the development of
condominium projects. Petitioner Pacifico Lim executed a
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of
Phoenix Heights Condominium filed with the Registry of Deeds.
Meanwhile, petitioner Pacifico Lim, filed an Application for
29 | P a g e
Alteration of Plan pertaining to the construction of 22 storage
units in the parking area, but the same was disapproved.
Petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint
before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices
and violation of the MDDR. They alleged that DPDCI committed
misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to
the facilities that would be available in the condominium. In
defense, DPDCI denied the allegations and also questioned the
petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative
suit. The HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. On
appeal for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Court of
Appeals reversed the HLURB and held that it erred in not
dismissing the complaint amidst the fact that PHCC, an
indispensable party, was not impleaded in the case. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, the petitioners brought the case before the
Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that PHCC is an indispensable party in the case.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that an indispensable party
is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. From all
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have
been impleaded, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant as it
would be directly and adversely affected by any determination
therein. To belabor the point, the causes of action, or the acts
complained of, were the acts of PHCC as a corporate body. In
the case, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC.
Petitioners cannot exercise the same except through a
derivative suit. Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final
adjudication of the HLURB’s judgment. The Court of Appeals
was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for
failure to implead an indispensable party.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
VICTORIANO BORLASAS, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
G.R. No. 22909. January 28, 1925
STREET, J. :
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
In an action against the officers of an association, it is
not necessary to make all members of the association parties
to the action. One or more may sue for the benefit of all.
30 | P a g e
FACTS:
Victoriano Borlasas and others filed a complaint against
Vicente Polistico and others for the purpose of securing the
dissolution of a voluntary association named Turnuhan
Polistico & Co., and to compel the defendants to account for
and surrender the money and property of the association in
order that is affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied
according to law.
In an amended answer the defendants raised the
question of lack of parties and set out a list of some hundreds
of persons whom they alleged should be brought in as parties’
defendant. The court made an order requiring the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint so as to include all of the members of
the association either as plaintiffs or defendants. The trial judge
appears to have supposed that all the members of the
Turnuhan Polistico & Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs
or defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial judge erred in sustaining to
make all members of the association parties to the action.
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule with reference to the making of
parties in a civil action requires, the joinder of all necessary
parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those
latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
However, a class suit contemplates an exceptional situation
where there are numerous persons all in the same plight and
all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the
litigation is absolutely indispensable to the administration of
justice. Here the strict application of the rule as to
indispensable parties would require that each and every
individual in the class is sufficiently represented to enable the
court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all
other interests involved in the suit. In the class suit,
representation of a class interest which will be affected by the
judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to make
each member of the class an actual party.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The order appealed from is reversed, the demurrer of
the defendants based upon supposed lack of parties is
overruled, and the defendants are required to answer to the
amended complaint within the time allowed by law and the
rules of the court. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the
defendants. So ordered.
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y
PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC.,
ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE
31 | P a g e
GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE
SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO
YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
FERIA, J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where
one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where
the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or
decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a
case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or
general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
FACTS:
Private respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a case in their
own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane
planters in the province against Newsweek Inc. and two of their
non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and
Barry Came.
The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel
against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear"
in their magazine. The article supposedly portrayed the island
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters
who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and
brutalized and killed them with impunity. They claim that the
article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted
presentation and misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a
bad light.
Petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint
failed to state a cause of action because the complainant made
no allegation that anything contained in the article referred
specifically to any one of them and libel can be committed only
against individual reputation OR, if is claimed to be directed at
a group, there is defamation only if the libel can be said to reach
beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific,
individual group member's reputation.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, likewise its
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari with the appellate court seeking the annulment of the
trial court's orders for having been issued with such a grave
abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and
praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. However, the appellate court affirmed the
trial’s court decision, hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the said article can be subject of class suit for libel.
RULING:
NO.
32 | P a g e
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where
one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where
the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or
decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a
case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or
general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this
Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772,
November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be
named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared
that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity
of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no
ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel
could have Identified the personality of the individual
defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil.
760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital
importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in
the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident
that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the
individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply
to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No.
15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,
224 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
TOPICS:
 Class Suit; All the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present.—The parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
FACTS: In this case, several minors, represented and
joined by their parents, filed a class suit for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generations.
33 | P a g e
Aiming to stop deforestation, they asserted that the permits
granted by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to Timber License Agreement (TLA) holders to cut
tress in the country’s remaining forests were violative of their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Hence,
they prayed that the Secretary be ordered to cancel all existing
TLAs in the country and to desist from granting and renewing
new ones. Sec. Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the (1) plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him; and that (2) the issue raised by plaintiffs is a political
question. Petitioners duly filed their Opposition to the Motion,
but the judge granted the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners may sue the Sec. of the
DENR
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that minors
could, for themselves and for others of their generation, and
for the succeeding generations to come, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
This right carries with it the obligation to preserve the
environment for future generations.
The Supreme Court further ruled that the said civil case,
is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are
so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, being impressed
with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, ET AL.
GR NO. L-33952 MARCH 9, 1987
PARAS, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about a class suit filed by herein respondents
before the CFI of Rizal challenging the certificates of title of
Ortigas and Company, and each of them claims ownership over
their separate and distinct landholding.
34 | P a g e
FACTS:
Ortigas & Company (Ortigas) is the duly registered
owner of several adjacent parcels of land containing an area of
162 hectares, more or less. Said parcel is a portion of the
Mandaluyon Estate over which Ortigas, thru its predecessor-in-
interest has been in continuous possession since 1862 or 125
years ago as confirmed by the Supreme Court in a case decided
in 1906
Inocencio Bernanrdo and 5 others for and in their own
behalf and in behalf of 37 others, in a class suit, files a case
against Ortigas concerning a portion of Mandaluyon Estate
containing an aggregate area of 1, 923, 454 sq. meters. In the
said complaint, Bernanrdo, et al. seeks to declare certain
certificates of title in favor of Ortigas as null and void for lack of
publication in the land registration proceedings and that they
be declared as lawful owners and possessors of their respective
landholding.
Ortigas challenge the class suit and argue that the same
is not proper because a class suit presupposes a common and
general interest by several plaintiffs in a single thing but as to
Bernardo, et al., they all have special or particular interest in
the specific thing completely different from another thing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the class suit is properly filed.
RULING:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not a case where
one or more may sue for the benefit of all or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or
decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party. In the case at bar, a class suit would not lie because
each of the respondent in this case has an interest only in the
particular portion of the land he is actually occupying, and not
in the portions individually occupied by the other respondents.
They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the restraining order issued by
the lower court is hereby SET ASIDE; Civil Case No. 678-M
(15043) is dismissed; and the injunction issued by this Court in
the resolution of October 12, 1971 is hereby made
PERMANENT.
Armand Nocum and the Philippine Daily Inquirer Inc.,
vs. Lucio Tan
Summary of the doctrine:
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between
the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d)
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the
35 | P a g e
parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the
parties.
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL
ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a
procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place
of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the
court It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather
than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place
of trial. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that
venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of
jurisdiction
Facts: On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a
complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo
Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news
article.
Petitioners filed an answer alleging that venue was
improperly laid as it appeared that the complaint failed to state
the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous
article was printed and first published.
RTC Ruling: The Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an
Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint
without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent
Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999,
seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the
amended complaint. In the amended complaint, it is alleged
that This article was printed and first published in the City
of Makati. The lower court, after having the case dismissed for
improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and
deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
CA ruling: Denied for lack of merit. Petitioners contend
that the lower court does not have jurisdiction over the case on
the basis of the original complaint.
Issue: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the
civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
Ruling: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar,
after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed
before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which
is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
36 | P a g e
provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the
Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were
printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to
the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional
allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor
would respondents failure to include the same in the original
complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the
lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
Petitioners argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege
the place where the libelous articles were printed and first
published would have been tenable if the case filed were a
criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain
such information would be fatal because this fact involves the
issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil
action where venue is not jurisdictional.
Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the foregoing
considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April
2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
(G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969)
SANCHEZ, J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g.
only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save,
particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is
merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the
stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in the
rules.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Polytrade Co. brought four (4) causes of action
to recover the purchase price of rawhide against Defendant
Victoriano Blanco in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Plaintiff has its principal office located in Makati, Rizal while
defendant Victoriano Blanco resides in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Prior to the case filed by the plaintiff, both parties made a
written stipulation, a part thereof provides “that the parties
agree to sue and be sued inthe Courts of Manila”. Blanco moved
to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, invoking
Section 3, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which states that “venue
may be stipulated by written agreement.” Hence, Blanco said
that because of this covenant he can only be sued in the Courts
of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him, favoring the
plaintiff corporation.
ISSUE:
WON the Venue is properly laid.
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RULING:
YES.
Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of
personal actions triable by courts of first instance—and this is
one—provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff." The Supreme Court applied the
above-mentioned, as general rule, because no such stipulation
appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements
covering the third and fourth causes of action.
Therefore, the stipulation that "the parties agree to sue
and be sued in the courts of Manila," does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under
Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying
or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that
Manila alone is the venue agreed upon by the parties. That
agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of
Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
FOR THE REASON GIVEN, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed, except that interest granted, in reference to
the fourth cause of action, should start from March 24, 1965.
Costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis
Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO
TIRO, respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This is an original action for Prohibition with Pre Injunction filed
October 3, 1973 to restrain respondent Judge from proceeding
further with Civil Case No. 4091, entitled Leovigildo D. Tandog,
Jr. and Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc." after he denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, and the Motion
for Reconsideration of said order.
Facts:
Respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought
tickets for Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch
office of petitioner, Sweet Lines Inc.,a shipping company
transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan
de Oro City. Tandog and Tiro were to board Sweet Lines’ vessel,
M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of
Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to
38 | P a g e
Bohol, Tandog and Tiro, per advice, went to the branch office
for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said
vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree
"to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers
of the Philippine Coastguard." Tandog and Tiro alleged that
they were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the
dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits during the trip
and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for
Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay
for other tickets. Hence, they sued Sweet Lines for damages
and for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of
P10,000.00 before CFI of Misamis Oriental. Sweet Lines moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
based on the condition printed at the back of the tickets: “14.
It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions
arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket,
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent
courts in the City of Cebu.” The motion was denied. Motion for
reconsideration was filed but was also denied. Hence, this
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction,
'alleging that the respondent judge Teves has departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding" and had
acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in
gross abuse of discretion.
Issue:
May a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping
stipulate thru a condition printed at the back of passage tickets
to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the contract
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

of carriage should be filed only in a particular province or city, dealing is restricted by law for the good of the public. Clearly,
in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all others? Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public
good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases,
actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus placing
Held: petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons,
who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. The said
No. Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of
condition should, therefore, be declared void and
venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will
unenforceable, as contrary to public policy — to make the
prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers from
courts accessible to all who may have need of their services.
different places of the country who, under Condition No. 14,
will have to file suits against Sweet Lines only in the City
of Cebu. For, although venue may be changed or transferred
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. The
from one province to another by agreement of the parties in
restraining order issued on November 20, 1973, is hereby
writing, based on Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such
LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.
an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates
the action of the claimants. The philosophy underlying the
provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of
the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan
of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim CORONA, J.
in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file Doctrine:
the action at all. The condition will defeat the ends of justice.
A negative pregnant is a denial pregnant with the
On the other hand, Sweet Lines has branches or offices in the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in
which are not squarely denied, in effect an admission of the
any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of averments it was directed at; A negative pregnant is a form of
Misamis Oriental will not cause inconvenience or prejudice negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
Sweet Lines. Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a party.
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good
... Under this principle" ... freedom of contract or private

39 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss
denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs
they rely upon in support of such denial. in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met x x x. The Sandiganbayan initially
Facts:
granted Republic's motion for summary judgment on the
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the ground that there is no issue of fact which calls for the
PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, presentation of evidence. However, it later reversed itself and
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that
pursuant to RA 1379. In said case, petitioner sought the the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and
declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million, which their authenticated translations have not been submitted to
is now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of the court.
interest, deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent raised any genuine issue
The funds were previously held by five account groups, using
of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment.
various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. In addition,
the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 Ruling:
million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples
The Court ruled that that respondent Marcoses failed to
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at
motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take
the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
place as a matter of right.
Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo, summary
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
judgment was described as a judgment which a court may
and the Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993
render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon
assets of the Marcos family. The General
the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported
Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify,
also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after
collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
the court summarily hears both parties with their respective
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.
conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses

40 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its
Dispositive Portion:
face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated
by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred
petitioner Republic. to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National
Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under
as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is
favour of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The
question, however, is whether the kind of denial in
respondents’ answer qualifies as the specific denial called for PHILTRANCO SERVICES ENTERPRISES, INC.
by the rules. We do not think so. If an allegation directly and VS.
specifically charges a party with having done, performed or
committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS INC., AND HON. COURT
perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be OF APPEALS
made.
FACTS:
The denial of respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer
is in the nature of a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant

41 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Felix Paras was a passenger of the bus owned and
operated by Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland) driven by Calvin
Coner.
While traversing Maharlika Highway, Tiaong, Quezon,
the bus of Inland was bumped by another bus owned and
operated by Philtranco Services Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco)
resulting for the Inland bus to be pushed forward and smashed
into a cargo truck parked along the outer right portion of the
highway. Consequently, the accident brought damages to the
vehicles and caused physical injuries to the passengers and
crew of the 2 buses including the death of Coner.
Paras after an emergency treatment at San Pablo
Medical Center, was brought to National Orthopedic Hospital
where he was diagnosed with various fractures and damages
which thereafter cause for the 2 operations.
Paras filed a complaint for damages against Inland
based on breach of contract of carriage. In the answer of Inland,
they invoked that Coner had observed an utmost and
extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of the
passenger. The Police Investigation Report supported the same
where it established that it was the bus of Philtranco who
caused for the accident.
Inland, filed with leave of court, a third-party complaint
against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles where Inland sought
for exoneration of its liabilities to Paras, asserting that the
latter’s cause of action should be directed against Philtranco
42 | P a g e
considering that the mishap was caused by Mirrales’ lack of
care, negligence and reckless imprudence.
The trial court rendered a decision only against
Philtranco and Mirrales and ordered both of them to be jointly
and severally liable for actual and moral damages, and
attorney’s fees and costs.
Issue:
Whether or not that only third-party defendant-
appellant Philtranco is liable for damages suffered by Paras.
Ruling:
Yes, under Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that: “Third-party complaint --- A third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the
third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief in respect of his opponent’s claim.”
The aforementioned rule authorizes a defendant to
bring into a lawsuit any person “not a party to the action . . . for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in
respect of his opponent’s claim. The impleader of new parties
under this rule is proper only when a right to relief exists under
the applicable substantive law and that the same is merely a
procedural mechanism.
In addition, the claim against the third-party defendant
must be based upon plaintiff’s claim against the original
defendant which the crucial characteristics of a claim is that the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

original “defendant is attempting to transfer to third-party join as third-party defendants those who may be liable to him
defendant the liability asserted against him by the original in tort for the plaintiff’s claim against him, or even directly to
plaintiff.” the plaintiff. The third-party claim need not be based on the
same theory as the main claim and there need not be any legal
The requisites for a third-party action are: 1. That the
relationship between the third-party defendant and any of the
party to be impleaded is not yet a party to the action; 2. That
other parties to the action. Impleader is also proper even
the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the
though the third party’s liability is contingent, and technically
original defendant; 3. The claim of the original defendant
does not come into existence until the original defendant’s
against the third-party defendant must be based upon the
liability has been established. In addition, impleader is proper
plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and 4. The
even though the third-party defendant’s liability is not
defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party
automatically established once the third-party plaintiff’s
defendant the liability asserted against him by the original
liability to the original plaintiff has been determined.
plaintiff.
In this case, Inland filed a third-party complaint against
Philtranco and its driver in order to establish in this action that
they, instead of Inland, should be directly liable to Paras for the
FELIX MARTOS, ET AL., Petitioners
physical injuries he had sustained because of their negligence.
vs.
Philtranco argue that since plaintiff filed a complaint for
damages against the defendants on a breach of contract of NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC., Respondent
carriage, they cannot recover from the third-party defendants
G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012
on a cause of action based on quasi-delict. Likewise, Philtranco
alleged that they are never parties to the defendants for MENDOZA, J.:
indemnification, subrogation, contributions or other reliefs.
Doctrine: The verification requirement is significant, as it is
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
Paras’ cause of action against Inland (breach of contract pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
of carriage) did not need to be the same as the cause of action imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
against Inland against Philtranco and is driver (tort or quasi- filed in good faith. Verification is deemed substantially
delict) in the impleader. A defendant in a contract action may complied with when, as in this case, one who has ample

43 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the by respondent and partially granting that of the other
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters petitioners.
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the July
and correct. The absence of a proper verification is cause to
30, 2008 Decision and the October 28, 2008 Resolution of the
treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.
NLRC and reinstating the May 23, 2003 Decision of the LA.
Facts: Questioned in this Petition for Review is the Decision of
The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution, which reversed
discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their
and set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision and October 28, 2008,
failure to verify the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC);
Martos verified the position paper and his counsel never
and reinstated the May 23, 2003 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
offered any explanation for his failure to secure the verification
(LA).
of the others. The CA also held that the NLRC gravely abused its
Three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims discretion when it took cognizance of petitioners’ appeal
were filed before the NLRC against petitioner, subsequently, because Rule 41, Section 1(h) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
petitioner denies that private respondents were illegally Procedure, as amended, which is suppletory, provides that no
dismissed, and alleged that they were project employees, appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action
whose employments were automatically terminated upon without prejudice.
completion of the project for which they were hired. On the
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the
other hand, private respondents claim that petitioner hired
complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to verify their
them as regular employees, continuously and without
position papers.
interruption, until their dismissal on February 28, 2002.
Ruling: Yes. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
The Labor Abiter held that petitioner Felix Martos (Martos) was
has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true
illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay, backwages
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
and other monetary benefits; and dismissing, without
records.
prejudice, the complaints/claims of the other complainants
(petitioners).. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge,
Both parties appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. On July 30,
information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be
2008, the NLRC resolved the appeal by dismissing the one filed
treated as an unsigned pleading.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to

secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in
this case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. The absence
of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible.
The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the
pleading as unsigned and dismissible.
The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient if he
was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them.
Unfortunately, petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was
so authorized.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with
the Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but
they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to
make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was
constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier
resolution.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Georgia T. Estel v. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., et al.
G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2012
Peralta, J:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and
Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
alleging that they had entered in a contract of sale with
petitioner and the latter had delivered possession of the
property after paying the down payment thereof. Since then,
the respondents had been in actual, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot. However,
petitioner uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot,
after which they entered its premises and then cut and
destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Hence,
respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession and
injunction against the petitioner.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
The court ruled in favor of the respondents. Among others,
respondents contended that the complaint states no cause of
action because the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as
such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading.
As to the verification, petitioner contends that it should be
based on respondent’s personal knowledge or on authentic
record and not simply upon “knowledge, information and
belief.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the verification is defective.
RULING:
No. There was no procedural defect as there is compliance with
the requirement regarding verification.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in
the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. As stated in
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-10-SC: “A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
46 | P a g e
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on “information and belief” or
upon “knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
Respondent’s verification complied with the procedural rules
provided as it confirmed that they had read the allegations in
the Complaint which were true and correct based on their
personal knowledge. Thus, there was no violation of said
requirement.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE
TRAMO WAKAS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
GR No. 14480 Nov. 17, 2004
Ponente : Justice Carpio-Morales
Doctrine : Rule 7 Section 5 : Certification against forum
shopping
FACTS:
The Director of the Land Managment
Bureau (LMB) granted the petition of respondent, The
Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(TRAMO WAKAS) which prayed for the grant of ownership over
3 parcels of land situated in Paranaque City. The same property
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

is being claimed by petitioner Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI
appealed the said decision to higher adjudicatory bodies but
was denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise dismissed the petition on the
ground of Infirm Verification and Certification of Non-forum
Shopping for the same does not show proof that the persons
who signed therein were duly authorized by the corporation.
The Court further ruled that the petition has not been filed on
time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the persons who executed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to PSI‘s petition
were authorized to do so
HELD:
Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court mandates that a petition for review shall contain
a sworn certification against forum shopping in which the
Pascual and Santos Inc. shall attest that he has not commenced
any other action involving the same issues in this Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding,
he must state the status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.
For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43
provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof.
The Court has ruled that the subsequent submission of proof of
authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation justifies
the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its
petition to be given due course.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless
the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus
defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of
forum shopping.
ELSA D. MEDADO, Petitioner,
- versus -
HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING, as represented by DR.
SOLEDAD CONSING,
Respondents.
G.R. No: G.R. 186720 Date: February 12, 2008
Ponente:
Associate Justice Reyes

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Brief Summary doctrine:
Sec. 4, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court, A defect in the
verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.
The Facts:
Sometime in 1996, petitioner Spouses Medado and the estate
of the late Antonio Consing, as represented by Soledad Consing,
executed deeds of sale with assumption of mortgage for the
former's acquisition from the latter of the property
in Cadiz City identified as Hacienda Sol.
Subsequent to the sale, the Estate of Consing offered the
subject lots to the Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) program. On November 22, 2000, the Estate
of Consing also instituted with the RTC, Branch 44 of Bacolod
City an action for rescission and damages, against Spouses
Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the
conditions in their agreement.
In the meantime while the rescission was pending, Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) issued in favor of the Estate of Consing
a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as
compensation for the lots covered by the VOS. Spouses
Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds
thereof to the Estate of Consing. They claimed to be the ones
entitled to the proceeds considering that they had bought the
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properties through the Deeds of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage which they and the Estate of Consing had earlier
executed. This caused Spouses Medado to institute a Civil Case
action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, with the RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz
City. They asked that the following be issued by the trial court:
(a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from
releasing the remaining amount of the VOS proceeds to
the estate of Consing, and restraining the estate of
Consing from receiving these proceeds.
(b) writ of mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the
remaining amount of the VOS to the spouses.
On March 9, 2007, the RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order
granting Spouses Medado's application for the issuance of writs
of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
The heirs questioned the RTC's order via a petition
for certiorari filed with the CA, they sought, among other
reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for
violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping.
In their comment on the petition, Spouses Medado questioned,
among other matters, the authority of Soledad to sign the
petition's certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of her
co-petitioners.
On September 26, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed
decision. The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 797-C for
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
injunction during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for
rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum
shopping.
Spouses Medado's motion for reconsideration of the decision
of September 26, 2008 was denied by the CA via its
resolution dated January 21, 2009.
The Issues:
W.O.N. a defective verification and a certification against forum
shopping signed by only one of the petitioner instead of all the
petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals is an immediate
ground for dismissal of a case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court emphasized verification requirement is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. The court rule that there was no deficiency
in the petition's verification and certification against forum
shopping filed with the CA.
In any case, the supreme court reiterate that where the
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common
interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only
one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification
of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding
with the action.
49 | P a g e
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature
of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule
of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of
strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification
of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under
justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
The court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the
rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct. It was based on this principle that this
Court had also allowed herein petitioner, via our
Resolution dated April 22, 2009, a chance to submit a
verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Court, as amended, instead of us dismissing the petition
outright.
Dispositive portion:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is hereby denied. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals decision dated September 26, 2008, which reversed
and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
60, Cadiz City, dated March 09, 2007, is perforce affirmed.
So ordered.
ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR
vs.
CONSTANTINO ANGELES substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES
G.R. No. 171219; September 3, 2012
Peralta, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by
one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not
deemed filed; hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and
the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Angeles is one of the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in Sampaloc, Manila. The subject parcel of land
was occupied by Jelly Galiga, as a lessee with a lease contract.
Subsequently, the subject land was allegedly bought by Fe
50 | P a g e
Salvador from Jelly Galiga, who represented that he was the
owner of the lot. Thereafter, Salvador remained in possession
of the said lot from November 1993 to the present. However,
the registered owner of the lot, Angeles sent a letter to Salvador
to demand the latter to vacate the property, which was not
heeded by the Salvador. Consequently, Angeles thru Rosauro
Diaz, filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC of Manila.
The said court ruled in favor of Angeles and order Salvador to
vacate the property.
Salvador filed an appeal with the RTC and alleged that
Diaz, had no authority from Angeles at the time of filing the suit.
The trial court denied the appeal. The petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals but the same was subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the trial
court on the ground that the the person to whom the subject
lot was bought was only a lessee of the respondent, hence the
same cannot be validly transferred to the petitioner. Thereafter,
the latter filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
RULING:
No, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the complaint
before the MeTC was filed in the name of the Salvador, but it
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
was Diaz who executed the verification and certification
alleging that he was the attorney-in-fact of the former.
However, there was no copy of any document attached to the
complaint which may prove Diaz's authority. Thus, it was only
after 1 year from the complaint was filed, that a Special Power
of Attorney was executed and notarized by one Robert
McGuire. However, the court cannot give full credit on the same
because it was not certified by the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California, USA. Therefore, there was nothing
on record to show that Diaz had been authorized by the
Angeles to initiate the action against Salvador.
The Court reiterated the ruling in Tamondong vs. Court
of Appeals which stated that, “if a complaint is filed for and in
behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does
not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.”
Pursuant to the said ruling, therefore, the MeTC never
acquired jurisdiction over the case and all proceedings before it
were null and void.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated
March 12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The
51 | P a g e
complaint filed by respondent before the Metropolitan Trial
Court is hereby DISMISSED.Ï
SO ORDERED.
CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139539, February 5, 2002
PARDO, J.
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: The test of sufficiency of the facts
found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof; If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
assessed by the defendants.
FACTS:
This is an appeal via certiorari1 from the decision of the
Court of Appeals2 dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the order3
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, which
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages and injunction
with preliminary injunction, as well as its resolution 4 denying
reconsideration.
Plaintiff filed with the RTC of Quezon City, a complaint
against defendant (Santiago), for "damages and injunction,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
with preliminary injunction." In the complaint, plaintiff prayed
that defendant and his agents be enjoined from - claiming
possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate
Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-90200; that
the defendant and his agents be prevented from making use of
the vacant lot as a jeepney terminal; that the defendant be
ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P650.00 daily as lost
income for the use of the lot until possession is restored to the
latter; and that the defendant be directed to pay plaintiff
Ceroferr moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees, plus expenses of litigation.
The defendant on the other hand alleged that the
vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of
the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110;
that he was not claiming any portion of Lot No. 68 claimed by
the plaintiff; that he had the legal right to fence Lot No. 90 since
this belonged to him, and he had a permit for the purpose; that
plaintiff had no color of right over Lot No. 90 and, hence, was
not entitled to an injunction to prevent Santiago from
exercising acts of ownership thereon; and that the complaint
did not state a cause of action. He furthermore, filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention
that the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages
without passing over the conflicting claims of ownership of the
parties over the disputed portion.
Later on, the trial court issued the order dismissing the
case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The
plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which
could not be done in the case for damages and injunction
before it. Furthermore, it concluded that it could not proceed
52 | P a g e
to decide plaintiff’s claim for damages and injunction for lack of
jurisdiction because its judgment would depend upon a
determination of the validity of defendant’s title and the
identity of the land covered by it.
When the case reached the CA, the latter rendered a
decision dismissing the appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s complaint states sufficient facts that
would warrant to a cause of action.
RULING:
YES.
The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint
as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
facts alleged the court can render a valid judgement upon the
same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical
admission extends to the relevant and material facts well
pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that
may be assessed by the defendants.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff owned Lot 68
covered by TCT No. RT-90200. plaintiff used a portion of Lot 68
as a jeepney terminal. The complaint further alleged that
defendant claimed the portion of Lot 68 used as a jeepney
terminal since he claimed that the jeepney terminal was within
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Lot 90 owned by him and covered by TCT No. RT-781 10 issued
in his name. It was even alleged in the complaint that defendant
was preventing plaintiff and its agents from entering the
property under threats of bodily harm and destroying existing
structures thereon. A defendant who moves to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, as in this
case, hypothetically admits all the averments thereof.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the
petition. We REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals20 and
the order of the trial court21 dismissing the case. We remand
the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, for
further proceedings. No costs.
SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS
vs.
LOLITA ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 183034 March 12, 2014
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine: The rule that the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse
party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to
parties to such instrument.
Facts:
Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC),
instituted a Complaint for sum of money against spouses
53 | P a g e
Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint
and construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC
which remained unpaid despite written demand. Alcazar’s
cause of action is based on a document entitled
“Acknowledgment” executed by hand by Fernando. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of Alcazar which ordered Sps.
Santos to pay the former. Sps. Santos appealed to said decision
and contended that the genuineness of the “Acknowledgment”
is in question since the original copy was not able to offer
during trial and further argued that Ma. Elena should not be
held liable since she was not a party to the instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Sps. Santos should be given
due course
Held:
As to the first contention;
Fernando failed to deny specifically under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their
Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and due
execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted
pursuant to Rules of Court.
As to the second issue;
The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party
specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to
the document. In the case at bar, it only applies to Fernando
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

because he is a party to the “Acknowledgment”. Hence, Ma. determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which,
Elena should not be held liable. the entire cause of action rests.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2007 FACTS:
Decision and May 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
On 31 July 1987, a case was filed by the PCGG against the
in CA-G.R. CV No. 87935 are AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in
Marcoses and Tantuico. The latter was included as defendant
that petitioner Ma. Elena Santos is held liable for the principal
on the theory that he had taken undue advantage of his
and interest only to the extent of ₱600,000.00.
position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with
grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman, acting and aided with defendants Ferdinand E.
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated in concealing the ill-
PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD gotten wealth.
GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS, AND THE
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. G.R. No. 89114 December 2, of documents was denied by respondent court, Tantuico filed a
1991 motion for a bill of particulars alleging that he is sued for acts
allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of
PADILLA, J.:
the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in
both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms
and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed
directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought
defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative therein so that he can intelligently prepare his responsive
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material pleading and prepare for trial. The Solicitor General opposed
elements are to be established. It refers to principal, the motion saying that the matters sought by Tantuico are
evidentiary in nature and that the complaint was sufficient as it

54 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
contains the essential elements of a cause of action.
Respondent Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the Solicitor
General’s contention. Petitioner moved for a motion for
reconsideration but it was subsequently denied by
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed
resolutions.
RULING:
YES.
A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action. Its
office or purpose is to inform the defendant clearly and
definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be
prepared to meet the issues at trial. The complaint should
inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the
plaintiff relies to support his demand. It should state the theory
of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiffs’
claim of liability.
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: first is the
“ultimate facts”, and second is the “evidentiary facts.” The term
“ultimate facts” as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner's
55 | P a g e
acts in execution of the alleged "systematic plan to accumulate
ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant
breach of public trust", "gross and scandalous abuse of right
and power", and "violations of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines". The complaint does not even allege what duties
the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he
abused.
In like manner, the allegation that petitioner "took undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as
such Chairman," and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, "facilitated and made possible the
withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of
government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, to the
grave and irreparable damage and injury of plaintiff and the
entire Filipino people", are mere conclusions of law. Nowhere
in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such duty
came about, or what petitioner's duties were, with respect to
the alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how petitioner
facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or
conversion of public funds and properties, nor an allegation
from where the withdrawals and disbursements came from,
except for a general allegation that they came from the national
treasury. On top of that, the complaint does not even contain
any factual allegation which would show that whatever
withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions were made, were
indeed subject to audit by the COA. The Chairman of the COA
does not participate or personally audit all disbursements and
withdrawals of government funds, as well as transactions
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
involving government property. The averments in the particular
paragraph of the complaint merely assume that petitioner
participated in or personally audited all disbursements and
withdrawals of government funds, and all transactions
involving government property. Hence, the alleged
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds could not have been, as held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, "within the peculiar and intimate knowledge of
petitioner as Chairman of the COA."
The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining
to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely
articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by
factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in
petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading
and for trial. Where the complaint states ultimate facts that
constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a
cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a
motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of
action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are
vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper
recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a
bill of particulars.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
56 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolutions
dated 21 April 1989 and 29 May 1989 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The respondents are hereby ordered to
PREPARE and FILE a Bill of Particulars containing the facts
prayed for by petitioner within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice,
and should they fail to submit the said Bill of Particulars,
respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered TO EXCLUDE the herein
petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035. SO ORDERED.
D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION vs. UNIVERSITY
OF SANTO TOMAS
DOCTRINE: Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the
complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of
applying the test.
FACTS: Petitioner and University of Santo Tomas Hospital, Inc.
(USTHI) entered into a Project Management Contract for the
renovation of a building. Petitioner demanded from USTHI the
payment of the construction costs. However, the UST wrote a
letter informing petitioner that its claim for payment had been
denied, because the Project Management Contract was
without the required prior approval of the board of trustees.
Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money, breach of
contract and damages against herein respondent UST and
USTHI when the latter failed to pay petitioner despite repeated
demands. In impleading respondent UST, petitioner alleged
that the former took complete control over the business and
operation of USTHI, as well as the completion of the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
construction project. It also pointed out that the Articles of
Incorporation of USTHI provided that, upon dissolution, all of
the latter’s assets shall be transferred without any
consideration and shall inure to the benefit of UST. It appears
that USTHI passed a Resolution dissolving the corporation by
shortening its corporate term of existence. Finally, petitioner
alleged that respondent verbally assured the former of the
payment of USTHI’s outstanding obligations.
Thus, petitioner posited in part that UST may be impleaded in
the case under the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil,"
wherein respondent UST and USTHI would be considered to be
acting as one corporate entity, and UST may be held liable for
the alleged obligations due to petitioner. Respondent filed its
Motion to Dismiss. It alleged that the Complaint failed to state
a cause of action.
This was granted and the court dismissed the Complaint insofar
as respondent UST was concerned. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the RTC Order and asserted that only
allegations of the Complaint, and not the attached documents,
should have been the basis of the trial court’s ruling, consistent
with the rule that the cause of action can be determined only
from the facts alleged in the Complaint. This was denied. Upon
Petition, the CA issued the assailed Resolution and dismissed
the Petition. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action.
RULING: YES.
It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined
57 | P a g e
by the allegations in the complaint.1âwphi1 In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the
complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of
applying the test.
In support of its position, petitioner alleged that (1) UST and
USTHI are one and the same corporation; (2) UST stands to
benefit from the assets of USTHI by virtue of the latter’s Articles
of Incorporation; (3) respondent controls the business of
USTHI; and (4) UST’s officials have performed acts that may be
construed as an acknowledgement of respondent’s liability to
petitioner.
These issues would have been best resolved during trial. The
trial court relied on the contract executed between petitioner
and USTHI, when the court should have instead considered
merely the allegations stated in the Complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
GRANTED. Branch 76 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
is hereby ordered to REINSTATE respondent University of Santo
Tomas as a defendant in C.C. No. 0862635.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND G.R. No. 176949 FACTS:

DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Vs
LOURDES K. MENDOZA
Promulgated: June 27, 2012
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Summary of Doctrine:
Section 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an
action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or document shall
be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading.
Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, a Complaint for a sum of money, against petitioner, for the
unpaid purchase price of construction supplies amounting to
P1,206,177.00. The supplies were allegedly delivered by the
former to the latter, as evidenced by charge invoices duly
presented and proved by the testimony of Respondent’s
employee.
RTC ruled in favor of Respondents and affirmed by the CA.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on
certiorari, alleging among others that the charge invoices are
not actionable documents, thus, petitioners failure to deny
under oath its genuineness and due execution does not
constitute an admission thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said charge invoices are actionable
documents.

Based on the foregoing provision, a document is actionable HELD:

when an action or defense is grounded upon such written
No.
instrument or document. In the instant case, the Charge
Invoices are not actionable documents per se as these only The petition was partly meritorious.
provide details on the alleged transactions. These documents
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an
need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these are
action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondents cause of action is not
document, the substance of such instrument or document shall
based on these documents but on the contract of sale between
be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof
the parties.
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be

58 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like LA MALLORCA, petitioner, vs.
effect be set forth in the pleading.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Based on the foregoing provision, a document is actionable
MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
when an action or defense is grounded upon such written
instrument or document. In the instant case, the Charge G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739
Invoices are not actionable documents per se as these only
TOPIC: Contract of Carriage
provide details on the alleged transactions. These documents
need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these are PONENTE: BARRERA, J.:
evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondents cause of action is not
FACTS:
based on these documents but on the contract of sale between
the parties. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor
daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old
But although the Charge Invoices are not actionable
and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando
documents, we find that these, along with the Purchase Orders,
Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is
are sufficient to prove that petitioner indeed ordered supplies
owned and operated by the defendant.
and materials from respondent and that these were delivered
to petitioner. They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage
containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the b us
It bears stressing that in civil cases, only a preponderance of
issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and
evidence or greater weight of the evidence is required. In this
their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and
case, except for a bare denial, no other evidence was presented
Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged in
by petitioner to refute respondents claim. Thus, we agree with
accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.
the CA that the evidence preponderates in favor of respondent.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The
stopped to allow the passengers bound therefore, among
assailed Decision dated April 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated
whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano
March 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69180
Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of
down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led
attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00 is hereby
his companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of
DELETED.
the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter
followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano
Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off
while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor
was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano
Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a
complete stop, it had traveled about 10 meters from point
where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately
jumped form the running board without getting his bayong
from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board
in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his
children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather
around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her
skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than
his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she
rode earlier together her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit
against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the
bus involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of
carriage was already terminated?
RULLING:
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which
was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier
between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The
relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s
servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease the moment the passenger flights from the carrier’s
vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier’s premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggage’s which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel
must have followed her father. However, although the father
was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the
conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to
run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle.
It was that this instance that the child, who must be near the
bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that the carrier’s agent had exercised the “utmost
diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers.
The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put
off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the
conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was
still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran
and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered
still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection
under their contract of carriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for
the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of
P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So
ordered.
LEDDA vs. BPI
G.R. No. 200868 November 21, 2012
FACTS: As one of BPIs valued clients, Anita Ledda
(Ledda) was issued a pre-approved BPI credit card. Thereafter,
Ledda used the credit card for various purchases of goods and
services and cash advances. Ledda defaulted in the payment of
her credit card obligation. Consequently, BPI sent her demand
letters but to no avail. Thus, BPI filed an action for collection of
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sum of money against Ledda. The RTC gave due course to BPIs
complaint and ordered Ledda to pay her obligation.
On appeal to the CA, Ledda argued that the document
containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the
BPI credit card is an actionable document contemplated in
Sec.7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the document should
have been set forth in and attached in BPIs complaint. Ledda
also averred that since there was no written agreement to pay
a higher interest, the interest rate to be imposed is only 6%
pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code. The CA rejected
Leddas arguments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the document containing the
Terms and Conditions governing the use of credit card is an
actionable document.
RULING: The document containing the Terms and
Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an
actionable document.
BPIs cause of action is primarily based on Leddas (1)
acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of the BPI credit
card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash
advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such
credit card transactions, despite demands. In other words, BPIs
cause of action is not based only on the document containing
the Terms and Conditions accompanying the issuance of the BPI
credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document
containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the
BPI credit card is not an actionable document contemplated in
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.As such,
it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to
the complaint.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition IN PART.
Petitioner Anita A. Ledda is ORDERED to pay respondent Bank
of the Philippine Islands the amount of .P322, 138.58,
representing her unpaid credit card obligation, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from 2
October 2007, until full payment thereof. The award of
attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.
MA. MERCEDES L. BARBA v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN
UNIVERSITY G.R. No. 193857
November 28, 2012 Ponente:
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Doctrine: Rule 10 : Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba (Barba) was the Dean of
the College of Physical Therapy of respondent Liceo de Cagayan
University, Inc. (Liceo).
In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy
suffered a dramatic decline in the number of enrollees from a
total of 1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only
29 students in the first semester of school year 2003 to 2004.
Due to the low number of enrollees, Liceo decided to freeze the
operation of the College of Physical Therapy indefinitely.
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Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased operations
and Barba went on leave without pay.
Subsequently, Liceo sent Barba a letter dated April 27, 2005
instructing Barba to return to work on and report to Ma. Chona
Palomares, the Acting Dean of the College of Nursing, to receive
her teaching load and assignment as a full-time faculty member
in that department. Barba did not report to Palomares and
requested for the processing of her separation benefits in view
of the closure of the College of Physical Therapy. Another letter
was sent to Barba but the latter still refused to return to work.
Hence, Liceo sent Barba a notice terminating her services on
the ground of abandonment.
Barba filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal, payment of separation pay and retirement benefits
against Liceo. She alleged that her transfer to the College of
Nursing as a faculty member is a demotion amounting to
constructive dismissal.
The LA ruled that Barba was not constructively dismissed. The
NLRC reversed the LA. Liceo went to the CA and filed a
Supplemental Petition raising for the first time the issue of lack
of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC over the case.
Liceo claimed that a College Dean is a corporate officer under
its by-laws and Barba was a corporate officer of Liceo since her
appointment was approved by the board of directors. Thus,
Liceo maintained that the jurisdiction over the case is with the
regular courts and not with the labor tribunals.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

In its original Decision, the CA reversed the NLRC resolutions.

The CA did not find merit in Liceos assertion in its Supplemental However, an assiduous perusal of these documents does not
Petition that the position of Barba as College Dean was a convince us that Barba occupies a corporate office position in
corporate office. The CA further found that no constructive the university. In Liceos by-laws, there are four officers
dismissal occurred nor has Barba abandoned her work. specifically mentioned, namely, a president, a vice president, a
secretary and a treasurer. In addition, it is provided that there
Unsatisfied, both Barba and Liceo sought reconsideration of the shall be other appointive officials, a College Director and heads
CA decision. Thereafter, the CA reversed its earlier ruling. of departments whose appointments, compensations, powers
Hence,Barba filed the present petition. and duties shall be determined by the board of directors. It is
worthy to note that a College Dean is not among the corporate
ISSUES: officers mentioned in Liceos by-laws. Barba was not directly
I. Whether or not the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over elected nor appointed by the board of directors to any
Barbas complaint for constructive dismissal? corporate office but her appointment was merely approved by
II. Whether or not Barba was constructively dismissed? the board together with the other academic deans of
respondent university in accordance with the procedure
HELD: The petition is granted. prescribed in Liceos Administrative Manual. Though the board
of directors may create appointive positions other than the
MERCANTILE LAW: corporate officers positions of corporate officers, the persons occupying such
positions cannot be deemed as corporate officers as
FIRST ISSUE: Labor tribunals have jurisdiction over Barba’s contemplated by Section 25 of the Corporation Code. Thus,
complaint. petitioner, being an employee of respondent, her complaint for
illegal/constructive dismissal against respondent was properly
Corporate officers are elected or appointed by the directors or within the jurisdiction of the LaborArbiter and the NLRC.
stockholders, and are those who are given that character either
by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws. LABOR LAW: constructive dismissal
Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate On the issue of constructive dismissal, we agree with the Labor
officers as the president, the secretary, the treasurer and such Arbiter and the appellate courts earlier ruling that Barba was
other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. in the By- not constructively dismissed. Barbas letter of appointment
Laws in order to be considered as a corporate office. The rest specifically appointed her as Dean of the College of Physical
of the corporate officers could be considered only as Therapy and Doctor-in-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic "for
employees of subordinate officials." a period of three years effective July 1, 2002 unless sooner

63 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
revoked for valid cause or causes." Evidently, Barbas
appointment as College Dean was for a fixed term, subject to
reappointment and revocation or termination for a valid cause.
When Liceo decided to close its College of Physical Therapy due
to drastic decrease in enrollees, Barbas appointment as its
College Dean was validly revoked and her subsequent
assignment to teach in the College of Nursing was justified as it
is still related to her scholarship studies in Physical Therapy.
Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive
dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer
is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee.
FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION vs. FORBES PARK
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 133119; August 17, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Summary of doctrine: Failure to plead a compulsory
counterclaim- A compulsory counterclaim cannot be the
subject of a separate action but it should instead be asserted in
the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence,
which gave rise to it.
Facts:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter, USSR)
was the owner of residential lot in Makati City. The USSR
engaged the services of Financial Building for the construction
of a multi-level office and staff apartment building. Forbes Park
authorized its construction and work began thereafter.
64 | P a g e
Financial Building submitted to the Makati City Government a
second building plan for the construction of a multi-level
apartment building, which was different from the first plan for
the construction. Forbes Park discovered the second plan of the
project violated the deed of restrictions. Thus, it enjoined
further construction work and suspended all permits of entry
for the personnel and materials of Financial Building. The
Financial Building filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with a
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against Forbes Park. The latter
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Financial Building
had no cause of action because it was not the real party-in-
interest. the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
against Forbes Park. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
dismissing the counterclaim filed by respondent even if it has
been barred by prior judgment
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a compulsory
counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim. If it is within the
jurisdiction of the court and it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is
barred if it is not set up in the action filed by the opposing party.
Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a
separate action but it should instead be asserted in the same
suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
rise to it. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or not, we have devised the following tests: (1) Are the issues
of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely
the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and (4) Is there
any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the existence
of a compulsory counterclaim.In the case, the claim is barred
due to Forbes Parks failure to set it up as a compulsory
counterclaim in Civil Case, the prior injunction suit initiated by
Financial Building against Forbes Park.
Dispositive portion: The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Magdiwang Realty Corporation, Renato P. Dragon and
Esperanza Tolentino v. The Manila Banking Corporation,
substituted by First Sovereign Asset Management [SPV-AMC],
Inc..
G.R. No. 195592. September 5, 2012
REYES, J. :
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
Where defendants before a trial court are declared in
default, they thereby lose their right to object to the reception
of the plaintiff’s evidence establishing his cause of action.
65 | P a g e
FACTS:
The case stems from a complaint for sum of money
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City by respondent
against herein petitioners, after the latter allegedly defaulted
in the payment of their debts despite of several demands under
the five promissory notes they executed in favor of respondent.
In the trial court, the petitioners filed its responsive pleading
beyond the fifteen (15)-day period allowed by the Rules of
Court. The respondent asked that the petitioners be declared
in default and it was affirmed by the trial court. The petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied and ordered
respondents move ex-parte for presentation of evidence. The
Court of Appeals, likewise affirmed the trial court decision.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s failure to file their answer
made them lose their right to object to the reception of the
evidence.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners default by their failure to file their
answer led to certain consequences. Where defendants before
a trial court are declared in default, they thereby lose their right
to object to the reception of the plaintiff s evidence establishing
his cause of action. This is akin to a failure to, despite due
notice, attend in court hearings for the presentation of the
complainant s evidence, which absence would amount to the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
waiver of such defendant s right to object to the evidence
presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine the
witnesses presented therein
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 176628 March 19, 2012
BRION, J.
. answer, but despite the RTC’s liberality of granting two
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in
actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition of
cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply
invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed,
would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every
party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any
liability. The rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique,
and unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming
party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had
been the latter’s acts.
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FACTS:
On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of
Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote
tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc.
(AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course
Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-
Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred
Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).
On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit
against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight Hundred Twenty
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos
(P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf
course.
PTA twice filed a motion for extension of time to file
successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer
the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a
judgment of default. On July 11, 2005, PTA filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The petition for annulment of judgment was premised on the
argument that the gross negligence of PTA’s counsel prevented
the presentation of evidence before the RTC. The CA dismissed
the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit.
Hence, the present case at bar.
ISSUE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Whether or not that since PTA is a government entity, it
should not be bound by the inactions or negligence of its
counsel.
RULING:
NO.
The PTA was acting in proprietary character. PTA also
erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a
government entity. The application of state immunity is proper
when the proceedings arise out of a sovereign transactions and
not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The
State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level
of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued. Since the said project partakes of a proprietary
character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot
avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from
suits.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS
the petition for certiorari. No costs.
Diona vs Balangue, et al.,
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G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE: The courts cannot grant a relief
not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party.
FACTS: Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue
and Esteban Balangue Jr., secured a loan from Leticia Diona at
the amount of P45,000.00 payable in six months and secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage their property in Marulas,
Valenzuela. Respondents failed to pay the petitioner hence, a
case was filed before the court. However, respondents failed to
file any responsive pleading, thus, the trial court declared them
in default. It rendered a judgment in favor of Diona where she
can claim the 12% interest rate per annum she stated in her
Complaint. Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion to
Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale,
claiming that the parties did not agree in writing or in any rate
of interest. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest
(or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. In
an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents’
motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded
from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.
Displeased, petitioner elevated its case before the Court of
Appeals where it ruled that the judgment of the RTC should be
partially annulled for exceeding its jurisdiction when it granted
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing
the rate of interest to 12% per annum. Hence, the petitioner
claimed that the CA erred in partially annulling the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can grant a relief not
prayed for by the petitioner
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the award of 5%
monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence,
the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. A Petition
for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances
where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it
is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due
to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due
process. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed
for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining
the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court.
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The reason in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted
is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file
an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he
known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than
or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No
doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due process against
unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and June
26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
85541 are AFFIRMED.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
LUISON AND JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents
GR No. L-75919 MAY 7, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about the proper determination of filing fee
based on either the original complaint or the amended
complaint.
FACTS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Petitioner Manchester contends that the filing fee must
be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint by citing
the case of Magaspi vs Ramolete, and contends that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint.
In the case of Magaspi, the action is for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages.
The complaint was considered a primarily an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The
damages stated were treated as merely an ancillary to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00
for the Sheriff’s fee were paid. However, the trial court ordered
the plaintiff therein to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did
not consider the damages merely an ancillary or incidental to
the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. An amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff with
leave of court to include the government of the Republic as the
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney’s fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing fee should be assessed on the
basis of amended complaint as what the Court said in the case
of Magaspi.
RULING:
69 | P a g e
No. The Supreme Court considered the difference of the
present case to that of the case of Magaspi vs Ramolete.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered
not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages,
so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of
assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held
that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee"
the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence,
as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint,
the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should
be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.
In the present case there can be no such honest
difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of
the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an
action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee
paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totaling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the
basis of assessment of the filing fee.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that
a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Go vs. Johnson Tong
Summary of the doctrine:
Docket fees: Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed
docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment
at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal
of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment.
Facts: Petitioner Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a
cashiers check dated September 13, 1996 from the Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Lavezares, Binondo Branch in
70 | P a g e
the amount of P500,000.00, payable to Johnson Y. Tong
(private respondent). On petitioner Juanas instruction, the
cashier’s check bore the words Final Payment/Quitclaim after
the name of payee private respondent allegedly to insure that
private respondent would honor his commitment that he
would no longer ask for further payments for his interest in the
informal business partnership which he and she had earlier
dissolved. Respondent deposited the check without the
indication that it was a final claim, thus it was not honored.
Respondent requested that the check be reissued. FEBTC
denied such request prompting the respondent to file a
complaint against petitioner and FEBTC for collection of sum of
money, the amount of the check. Petitioner argued that such
removal of the indication of final payment/quitclaim was the
ploy of the respondent to collect more from spouses Go.
Eventually, the petitioners deposited the amount of the check,
subject to the condition that it shall remain deposited until
the disposition of the case.
Assailed RTC ruling: public respondent judge, acting on the
verbal manifestation/motion of private respondents counsel,
allowed the release of petitioners P500,000.00 deposit and
allowed private respondent to first deposit P25,000.00 on or
before December 15, 1999 and P20,000.00 every month
thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and only
then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket
fees.
CA ruling: Denied for lack of merit. Petitioners failed to assail
within the prescribed period the February 1999 order and that
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

the respondent is entitled to the deposit as it was money owed duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in
to him. As to the allowance of the staggered payment of docket contemplation of law. These conditions are absolutely wanting
fees, respondent judge was correct in allowing such as it is in the present case.
permitted that the payment of the prescribed docket fee is
Dispositive portion: the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
allowed within a reasonable period but in no case beyond the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
applicable prescriptive or regular period.
petitioners.
Issue: Did the respondent judge erred in allowing staggered
payment of docket fees?
Ruling: No. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket
fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the G.R. No. 94677. October 15, 1991
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION
or reglementary period; more so when the party involved CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.While the cause of action of private respondent
was supposed to prescribe in four (4) years, he was allowed to Civil Procedure; Docket Fee; Fact that the complaint did not
pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year’s time. We do state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the
not see how this period can be deemed lower court to compute for docket fees payable and left to the
unreasonable. Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any judge "mere guesswork" as to these amounts is fatal.
pattern or intent to defraud the government of the required
docket fee. We sustain the CAs findings absolving respondent PARAS, J.:
judge of any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment FACTS:
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Original Development and Construction Corporation
Ruled the appellate court: To be sure, for certiorari to lie against
(ODECOR) sued Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed must be
(HIGC), and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by
(NHMC) for breach of contract and for damages. ODECOR
reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must
accused the two of divesting its customers which resulted to
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive

71 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
massive losses for the corporation. In ODECOR’s claim for
damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential,
exemplary and moral damages, “the amount of which will be
proved at the trial”; that for actual damages it’s claiming
P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to be unspecified amount
of damages which the trial court could not assess. ODECOR paid
the docket fee for the claim for the actual damages specified as
well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.
HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.
The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather
directed the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of reassessment
of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency ODECOR
should pay the same. In the assessment, the Clerk of Court
determined that the claim for attorney’s fee which was stated
in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the PRAYER
of the complaint hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could
not have included payment for the fees for the claim of
attorney’s fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its
complaint.
In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated
substantially all its allegations in the first complaint except that
72 | P a g e
it specified its claim for attorney’s fees as equivalent to 25% of
the total monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court
from hearing the case. ODECOR then filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the case
HELD:
No. The claims for the other damages (other than
actual) are vague. The terms used by ODECOR in its claims i.e.
“the amount of which will be proved at the trial” and the
demand for attorney’s fees as “equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of
this suit” are not definite enough to be the basis of the
computation of the proper docket fees. While it is not required
that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain,
in his estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to
determine the amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it
is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and
sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the docket fees payable and left to the judge “mere guesswork”
as to these amounts, which is fatal.
The court may allow amendment of a pleading (in
complaints purely for money and damages) if such does not
specify the amount of claims. When amended, the pleader shall
pay the appropriate docket fees. Where the amount of claim is
specified but the docket fees paid were not sufficient, the
pleader is allowed to cure the defect by paying the deficiency,
provided, that in both cases prescription has not set.
If the action involves real property and a related claim
for damages and the prescribed fees for an action involving real
property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the court undeniably has jurisdiction
over the action on the real property but may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Accordingly, the court may expunge the claims for damages or
allow the amendment of the complaint so as to allege the
precise amount of each item of damages within the prescriptive
period.
Re: In the Matter of Exemption From Payment of All Court and
Sheriff's Fees of Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance
with RA No. 9520
A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012
73 | P a g e
PEREZ, J.
Doctrine:
The term “all court fees” under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic
Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of “legal fees” imposed under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an
action in court.
Facts:
In a Petition dated October 24, 2011, Perpetual Help
Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel, requests for
the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the
exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and
sheriffs fees pursuant to RA No. 6938, as amended by RA No.
9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of
2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the
exemption provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of RA No.
9520, which states that the Cooperatives shall be exempt from
the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions
brought under this Code, or where such actions is brought by
the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative. It claims that
this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of RA No. 6938,
and was made basis for the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-
01-0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
Circular No. 44-2007. It avers that despite the exemptions
granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees
whenever it files cases in court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive
Judge of the MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion
to implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment
of court and sheriffs fees in cases filed before the courts in his
jurisdiction, but the Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of
national concern and should be brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and
uniform system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC has
continued the assessment of filing fees against cooperatives.
Records reveal that on September 21 2011, Executive
Judge Estoconing, issued an Order treating the motion filed by
PHCCI as a mere consulta considering that no main action was
filed in his court. Executive Judge Estoconing submits that he
had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of
the guidelines laid down in the Rules. He reported that many
cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8
of the Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is required to pay
docket fees and other related costs unless he is allowed to
litigate the case as an indigent hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of
court and sheriffs fees?
Ruling:
The term “all court fees” under Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of “legal fees”
imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of
instituting an action in court. These fees include filing or docket
fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies,
mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and
commissioner’s fees.
74 | P a g e
With regard to the term sheriffs fees, this Court, in an
extended minute Resolution dated 1 September 2009, held
that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2,
paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do
not cover the amount required to defray the actual travel
expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and
other court processes issued relative to the trial of the case,
which are neither considered as court and sheriffs fees nor are
amounts payable to the Philippine Government.
As decided in the case of Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, this Court reiterated its
ruling in the GSIS case when it denied the petition of the
cooperative to be exempted from the payment of legal fees
under Section 7(c) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to
fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure. With the
foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court,
it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment
of court and sheriffs fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no
longer invoke RA No. 6938, as amended by RA No. 9520, as
basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the
petition of PHCCI requesting for this Court to issue an order
clarifying and implementing the exemption of cooperatives
from the payment of court and sheriffs fees is hereby DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue
a circular clarifying that cooperatives are not exempt from the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
Ricardo Rizal, Potenciana Rizal, Saturnina Rizal, Elena Rizal,
and Benjamin Rizal, petitioners
Vs.
Leoncia Naredo, Anastacio Lirio, Edilberto Cantaviaje, Gloria
Cantaviaje, Celso Cantavieja, and the Heirs of Melanie
Cantavieja
Facts:
The petitioners commenced a civil case against Matias
Naredo (Matias), Valentin Naredo (Valentin), and Juana de
Leon (Juana) involving the accretion of 2 hectares of land to Lot
No. 454 of the Calamba Estate where the CFI rendered
judgement favoring the petitioners. The CFI awarded the
ownership of the 2-hectare accretion and ordered the
defendants to vacate the said land to pay Php500.00 per year
from 1943 as reasonable rent.
To satisfy the money judgement, the provincial sheriff
of Laguna levied upon Lots 252 and 269 of the Calamba Estate
together with the house erected thereat. Lot 252 was
registered in the name of the “Legal Heirs of Gervacia
Cantillano”.
The auction sale was conducted and the petitioners
were declared the highest bidder.
75 | P a g e
Marcela, Leoncia, Matias, Valentin, and Juana instituted
a civil case questioning the validity of the auction sale of Lots
Nos. 252 and 269 and the house of mixed materials thereat
because they are exempt from execution, however, the CFI
declared that the auction sale is valid. The sale of the house of
mixed materials in Lot 252 was set aside because there is a
waiver in favor of Juana. Matias and Valentin were ordered to
be ejected while Marcela and Leoncia was not evicted since
they were not parties to the civil case.
Petitioners entered into a Compromise Agreement with
Marcela and Leoncia where 3/5 of Lot 252 belongs to the
petitioners while the 2/5 belongs to Marcela and Leoncia. Said
compromise agreement was approved by the CFI Branch VI of
Laguna.
The compromise agreement provides, among others:
that the plaintiffs and defendants agree that the subject land
be actually partitioned as they have so caused the survey and
the partition of the same; the plaintiffs and defendants
acknowledged that 2/5 pertains to defendants while the 3/5
pertains to the petitioners which the same shall be covered by
independent and separate certificates of title in their respective
names.
After 10 years or on 11 August 1981, Marcela and
Leoncia instituted civil case assailing that the compromise
agreement was a forgery and that the lawyer thereto was not
authorized which the court later dismissed without prejudice to
the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
On 26 September 1984, Marcela and Leoncia instituted
a civil case for the enforcement of judgment, partition and
segregation of shares with damages, which was dismissed by
the court on the ground of prescription.
The petitioners instituted a civil case, which was similar
to that of the civil case filed by Marcela and Leoncia on 26 Sept.
1984, which the court dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, however, the same was
dismissed as the CA found that the appellants’ brief neither
contained the required page references to the records, nor was
it specified, both in the prayer and in the body of the complaint,
the specific amounts of the petitioners’ claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and compensatory damages.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the
ground of failure to pay docket fees
Ruling:
No, failure to pay the correct docket fees is fatal to the
appeal in which case, jurisdiction did not vest in the trial court.
In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint
that they suffered actual loss from their deprivation of the 3/5
of the land by the respondent, as well as moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. However, the
only claims they specified is for the attorney’s fees.
76 | P a g e
The court explained that the rule requires for the
amount of damages claimed to be specified not only in the body
of the pleading but also in the prayer portion. Said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case.
The court laid the following rules on the payment of
filing fees, to wit:
1. payment of the filing fee vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of docket fees, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period;
2. the same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period;
3. where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgement awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN
and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., * respondents.
G.R. No. 89070 May 18, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:
Doctrine: The established rule is that the date of delivery of
pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be
considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such
cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date
of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of
that pleading.
Facts: Private respondent Peter Cosalan (Cosalan) was the
General Manager of Petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative,
Inc. ("Beneco"), having been elected as such by the Board of
Directors of Beneco, with the approval of the National
Electrification Administrator, Mr. Pedro Dumol, effective 16
October 1982.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Beneco's principal
contentions are two-fold: first, that the NLRC had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course to
respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal had
been filed out of time; and second, that the NLRC had acted
77 | P a g e
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in holding petitioner alone liable for payment of the backwages
and allowances due to Cosalan and releasing respondent Board
members from liability therefor.
Respondent Board members, however, insist that their
Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time because it was
delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the Garcia
Communications Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The
Board members in effect contend that the date of delivery to
Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal
memorandum.
Issue: Whether or not the appeal was filed on time.
Ruling: The established rule is that the date of delivery of
pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be
considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such
cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date
of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of
that pleading.
There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial
justice and the prevention of serious miscarriage of justice that
might have justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day
reglementary period for perfection of an appeal by the
respondent Board members. Accordingly, the applicable rule
was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal
is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an
appeal within the reglementary period renders the assailed
decision final and executory and no longer subject to
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
review. 7 The respondent Board members had thus lost their
right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC should have forthwith dismissed their appeal
memorandum.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
GIVEN DUE COURSE, the comment filed by respondent Board
members is TREATED as their answer, and the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 21 November 1988
in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84 is hereby SET ASIDE and the
decision dated 5 April 1988 of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen
hereby REINSTATED in toto. In addition, respondent Board
members are hereby ORDERED to reimburse petitioner Beneco
any amounts that it may be compelled to pay to respondent
Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T.
Adquilen. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Salvador O. Mojar, et al., v. Agro Commercial Security Service
Agency, Inc., et al.
G. R. No. 187188. June 27, 2012
Sereno, J:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: If a party to a case has appeared by
counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
78 | P a g e
is specifically ordered by the court. While an affidavit of service
is required merely as proof that service has been made on the
other party, it is nonetheless essential to due process and the
orderly administration of justice.
FACTS:
Petitioners who were employed as security guards by
respondent were relieved of their respective posts in
Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur and were directed to
report to their new assignment in Metro Manila. They failed to
report thereto prompting respondent to send them a letter
requiring them to send a written explanation why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them, but it was not
heeded. Petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
against respondent before the NLRC. Petitioners claimed,
among others, that their reassignment was a scheme to sever
the employer-employee relationship and was done in
retaliation for their pressing their claim for salary differential,
which they had earlier filed against respondent and the Bank of
Commerce before the NLRC. They also contended that the
transfer to Manila was inconvenient and prejudicial, since they
would incur additional expenses for board and lodging.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners. The
respondents appealed and had also filed a Motion for Extension
to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which was granted. The CA found the transfer as a valid
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
exercise of the management prerogative. However,
respondent failed to observe the due process requirements in
terminating them thus the decision favoring the petitioners is
reversed and the complaints for illegal dismissal were
dismissed. Mojar filed a Manifestation before the CA, stating
that he and the other petitioners had not been served a copy
of the CA Petition and alleged that there was no proof of service
attached to the same and had omitted their addresses to the
said petitions. He also contended that they were not aware
whether their counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C. Espinas,
was served a copy thereof, since the latter had already been
bedridden until his demise. Neither could their new counsel,
Atty. Mario G. Aglipay, enter his appearance before the CA, as
petitioners failed to get the documents which can no longer be
found. With this, they filed a Motion to Annul the proceedings
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid service of the CA
Petitions.
RULING:
Yes, there was valid service of pleadings.
Where the petitioner clearly mentioned that the parties may be
served with the courts’ notices or processes through their
respective counsels whose addresses have been clearly
specified as in this case, this act would constitute substantial
79 | P a g e
compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. Said
notice required is notice to counsel if the party has already
appeared by counsel, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, there was substantial compliance
therein.
As to the other allegation, Section 3, Rule 46 provides that the
petition for certiorari should be filed together with the proof of
service thereof on the respondent. Under Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, if service is made by registered mail, as in
this case, proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
While an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that
service has been made on the other party, it is nonetheless
essential to due process and the orderly administration of
justice.
In the files recorded, it was revealed that Atty. Espinas was duly
served with the CA Resolutions. Such service to Atty. Espinas,
as petitioners counsel, was valid despite his death. If a party to
a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and
judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the
court. Hence, it is the duty of party litigants to be in contact
with their counsel to be informed of the progress of their case.
It is likewise the duty of parties to inform the court of the fact
of their counsels death. Thus, said failure tantamount to their
negligence to the protection of their cause and should not
rather pass the blame upon the court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 July 2008 and
Resolution dated 16 March 2009 in CAG.R. SP No. 102201 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on
behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: The court’s jurisdiction over a
defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a
valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it.
Proper service of summons is used to protect one’s right to due
process.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case for Filing,
Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment.
Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s
judgment that was rendered by the United States District Court
of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled
Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee
Marcos, for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano
committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
allegedly under the command, direction, authority,
80 | P a g e
supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of
defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of
the then Revised Rules of Court. The trial court issued Summons
addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium
Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the
Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit.
When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court
declared her in default.
Thereafter, petitioner, by special appearance of
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the
motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence,
or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in
the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident
of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on
personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4)
defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever
judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
However, the trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss
on the strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes
of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court
relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such
presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Petitioner Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter
rendered a decision , the CA rendered the assailed Decision,
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
adopted the court a quo findings of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid substituted service of summons
on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon
a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing
a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If
defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the
summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service
can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is
permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of
the usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and
81 | P a g e
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance
with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs
published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,”
which should be made in the proof of service.
In the case at bar, there is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of “on
many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons x x x personally,” “at reasonable hours during the
day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.”
Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict
compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule
14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid
substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court
perforce must be annulled.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the assailed March
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.No costs.
G.R. No. 163584 December 12, 2006
REMELITA M. ROBINSON, petitioner,
vs.
CELITA B. MIRALLES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Doctrine:
The statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict
application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter
of the procedural rules, that governs.
Facts:
On 2000, Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a
complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson. The
sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security
guard, assigned at the gate of the subdivision where
Robinson lived, refuse to let the sheriff go inside the
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subdivision. The security guard alleged that he was instructed
by Robinson not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is
not around. Despite the sheriff's explanation, the guard still
refused admittance. The sheriff returned the second time to
serve the summons. The same thing happened. So, the sheriff
served the summons by leaving a copy thereof together with
the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of
A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original
copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the
defendant.
Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and judgment
was rendered ordering her to pay US$20,054.00. A copy of the
decision was sent to her by registeredmail. On 2003,
she filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She
claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus,
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all
its proceedings are void. She contends that the service of
summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her
or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized
to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the
substituted service of summons is not valid and that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
On 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution denying
the petition for relief. The Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, the appeal.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Issue:
Whether or not the summons was properly served.
Held.
Yes. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and
fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by
the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon
an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather
than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused
entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter
informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing
anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out.
Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or
substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that
she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she
deny having received the summons through the security
guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard,
she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial
court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner
and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and we AFFIRM the
assailed Orders of the RTC, Branch 274, Parañaque City, in Civil
Case No. 00-0372. Costs against petitioner.
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UNITED PULP AND PAPER CO., INC., petitioner versus
ACROPOLIS CENTRAL GUARANTY
CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No.
171750; January 25, 2012 MENDOZA, J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement, which
was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for
the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to
grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to
meet the arguments interposed therein. Where a party has
been given the opportunity to be heard, the time to study the
motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule.
FACTS:
On May 14, 2002, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of
the amount of P42,844,353.14 against Unibox Packaging
Corporation and Vicente Ortega. UPPC also prayed for a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against the properties of Unibox and
Ortega for the reason that the latter were on the verge of
insolvency and were transferring assets in fraud of creditors.
RTC issued the Writ of Attachment after UPPC posted a bond in
the same amount of its claim. By virtue of the said writ, several
properties and assets of Unibox and Ortega were attached.
Unibox and Ortega filed their Motion for the Discharge of
Attachment, praying that they be allowed to file a counter-
bond and that the writ of preliminary attachment be discharged
after the filing of such bond. Although this was opposed by
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
UPPC, the RTC granted the said motion to the condition that
Unibox and Ortega file a counter-bond. Thus, respondent
Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation (Acropolis) issued the
Defendant’s Bond for Dissolution of Attachment in the amount
of P42,844,353.14 in favor of Unibox. Subsequently, Unibox,
Ortega and UPPC executed a compromise agreement, wherein
Unibox and Ortega acknowledged their obligation to UPPC
inclusive of the principal and the accrued interest, and bound
themselves to pay the said amount in accordance with a
schedule of payments agreed upon by the parties.
Consequently, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.
For failure of Unibox and Ortega to pay the required amounts
for the months of May and June 2004 despite demand by UPPC,
the latter filed its Motion for Execution to satisfy the remaining
unpaid balance. RTC acted favorably on the said motion and
issued the requested Writ of Execution. The sheriff then
proceeded to enforce the Writ of Execution. It was discovered,
however, that Unibox had already ceased its business
operation and all of its assets had been foreclosed by its
creditor bank. Moreover, the responses of the selected banks
which were served with notices of garnishment indicated that
Unibox and Ortega no longer had funds available for
garnishment. The sheriff also proceeded to the residence of
Ortega to serve the writ but he was denied entry to the
premises. Despite the sheriff’s efforts there was no satisfaction
of the remaining unpaid balance by Unibox and Ortega. On the
basis of the said return, UPPC filed its Motion to Order Surety
to Pay Amount of Counter-Bond directed at Acropolis. RTC
issued its Order granting the motion and ordering Acropolis to
84 | P a g e
comply with the terms of its counter-bond and pay UPPC the
unpaid balance of the judgment. Thereafter Acropolis filed its
Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that it could not be made to pay the amount of the
counter-bond because it did not receive a demand for payment
from UPPC. Furthermore, it reasoned that its obligation had
been discharged by virtue of the novation of its obligation
pursuant to the compromise agreement executed by UPPC,
Unibox and Ortega. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit and for having been filed three days after the
date set for the hearing on the said motion. Aggrieved,
Acropolis filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which
granted the petition and absolved and relieved Acropolis of its
liability to honor and pay the amount of its counterattachment
bond. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON UPPC failed to make the required demand and
notice upon Acropolis.
RULING:
NO.
UPPC complied with the twin requirements of notice and
demand. On the recovery upon the counter-bond, the Court
finds merit in the arguments of the petitioner. UPPC argues that
it complied with the requirement of demanding payment from
Acropolis by notifying it, in writing and by personal service, of
the hearing held on UPPC’s Motion to Order Respondent-
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

Surety to Pay the Bond. Moreover, it points out that the terms The three-day notice rule is not a hard and fast rule and
of the counter-attachment bond are clear in that Acropolis, as substantial compliance is allowed. Every written motion
surety, shall jointly and solidarily bind itself with Unibox and required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
Ortega to secure the payment of any judgment that UPPC may be served in such a manner as to insure its receipt by the other
recover in the action. party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. The
It is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to secure the
law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy
payment of a judgment becomes liable for the payment of the
of the written motion at least three days before the date set for
amount due upon: (1) demand made upon the surety; and (2)
its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice
notice and summary hearing on the same action. After a careful
requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the
scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court is of the view that
movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises
UPPC indeed complied with these twin requirements. This
upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the
Court has consistently held that the filing of a complaint
motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed
constitutes a judicial demand. Accordingly, the filing by UPPC of
therein. It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party
the Motion to Order Surety to Pay Amount of Counter-Bond
has been given the opportunity to be heard, the time to study
was already a demand upon Acropolis, as surety, for the
the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule. In
payment of the amount due, pursuant to the terms of the bond.
the case at bench, the RTC gave UPPC sufficient time to file its
In said bond, Acropolis bound itself in the sum of P
comment on the motion. On January 14, 2005, UPPC filed its
42,844,353.14 to secure the payment of any judgment that
Opposition to the motion, discussing the issues raised by
UPPC might recover against Unibox and Ortega. Furthermore,
Acropolis in its motion. Thus, UPPC’s right to due process was
an examination of the records reveals that the motion was filed
not violated because it was afforded the chance to argue its
by UPPC on November 11, 2004 and was set for hearing on
position.
November 19, 2004. Acropolis was duly notified of the hearing
and it was personally served a copy of the motion on November DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
11, 2004, contrary to its claim that it did not receive a copy of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 17, 2005
the motion. Acropolis was given the opportunity to defend
Decision and the March 1, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
itself. That it chose to ignore its day in court is no longer the
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 89135, are hereby REVERSED and
fault of the RTC and of UPPC. It cannot now invoke the alleged
SET ASIDE. The November 30, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial
lack of notice and hearing when, undeniably, both
Court, Branch 148, Makati City, ordering Acropolis to comply
requirements were met by UPPC.

85 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
with the terms of its counter-bond and pay UPPC the unpaid
balance of the judgment in the amount of P27,048,568.78 with
interest of 12% per annum from default is REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-
heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY
FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO
G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D.
FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS.
MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS
DOCTRINE: Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Section
1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may
motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata ; and
(d) prescription of action.
FACTS: Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had
seven children. When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis took Juana as
his common-law wife with whom he sired one child. When Dr.
Favis and Juana got married, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit
acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Dr.
Favis died intestate leaving several properties. Dr. Favis
allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’
children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for
annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and
partition of property against Juana, Spouses Mariano and
86 | P a g e
Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents. In a Decision,
the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the
corresponding tax declarations. Respondents interposed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial court’s
nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of
Donation in favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals
ordered the dismissal of the petitioners’ nullification case.
However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by herein
respondents as appellant. The Court of Appeals motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners
to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family
Code. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely and
seriously erred in dismissing the complaint
RULING: YES.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from
the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the
court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res
judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a
compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the
exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Regional Office
No. 3, petitioner, vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA, respondent.
G.R. No. 192975. November 12, 2012
SAMAHANG KABUHAYAN NG SAN
LORENZO KKK, INC.,
represented by its Vice President
Zenaida Turla, petitioner, vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA, respondent.
G.R. No. 192994. November 12, 2012
Jurisdiction
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
87 | P a g e
FACTS:
On January 30, 2007, petitioner Republic filed a complaint
before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, for cancellation of
titles and reversion against respondent RCAM and several
others. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that RCAM appears as
the registered owner of eight (8) parcels of land, Lot Nos. 43 to
50, with a total area of 39,790 square meters, situated in
Panghulo, Obando, Bulacan under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 588 supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on November 7, 1917. OCT No. 588 allegedly emanated
from Decree No. 57486 issued on October 30, 1917 by the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to a decision
dated September 21, 1915 in Land Registration Case No. 5,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9269 in favor of RCAM. A reading, however,
of the said decision reveals that it only refers to Lot Nos. 495,
496, 497, 498 and 638 and not to Lot Nos. 43 to 50. In 1934,
RCAM sold the said eight (8) parcels of land to the other named
defendants in the complaint resulting in the cancellation of OCT
No. 588 and issuance of transfer certificates of title in the
names of the corresponding transferees. Subsequently, the
Lands Management Bureau conducted an investigation and
ascertained that the subject lots are identical to Lot No. 2077,
Cad-302-D and Lot Nos. 1293, 1306 and 1320, Cad-302-D with
a total area of 22,703 square meters. These parcels of land
were certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January
17, 1983 as falling within the unclassified lands of the public
domain and it was only on May 8, 1984 that they were declared
alienable and disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1776, with no public land application/land patent.
On April 16, 2007, petitioner Republic received a copy of a
motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
intervention filed by the Samahang Kabuhayan ng San Lorenzo
KKK, Inc. (KKK), occupants of the subject property, which was
subsequently granted by the RTC. Thenceforth, answers and
various other pleadings were filed by the appropriate parties.
During the course of the pre-trial, RCAM filed a motion to
dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint.
It alleged that the action for reversion of title was essentially
one for annulment of judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, acting as a Land Registration Court,
hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to act upon.
RTC denied RCAM’s motion to dismiss for being premature. In
its assailed Decision, the CA held that while reversion suits are
allowed under the law, the same should be instituted before
the CA because the RTC cannot nullify a decision rendered by a
co-equal land registration court.
Before the Court are two separate petitions filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the April 22, 2010
Decision and July 19, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84 of
Malolos, Bulacan to grant the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and
to dismiss the complaint of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).
On November 22, 2010, respondent RCAM filed a motion for
consolidation of the two (2) cases on the ground that they
involve a common issue, have the same parties and assail the
same Decision and Resolution of the CA which was granted by
the Court in its January 12, 2011 Resolution.
ISSUE:
88 | P a g e
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action filed by
the Republic.
RULLING:
The petitions are meritorious.
Petitioners insist that they do not seek the annulment of
judgment of the RTC (then CFI) acting as Land Registration
Court but the nullification of the subject OCT No. 588 and the
derivative titles over Lot Nos. 43 to 50. They claim that these
parcels of land could not have been validly titled in 1917
because they were not the subject of Land Registration Case
No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9269. Moreover, these lots were not
yet classified as alienable and disposable at that time, having
been declared as such only on May 8, 1984. On the other hand,
the respondent maintains that petitioners’ suit essentially
seeks the annulment of judgment of the RTC, hence,
jurisdiction lies with the CA under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the RTC was correctly ordered by the CA to grant
the motion to dismiss.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order
which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial
of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for certiorari which is a remedy to correct errors of
jurisdiction not errors of judgment. However, when the denial
of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Respondent’s motion
to dismiss assails the jurisdiction of the RTC over the nature of
the action before it. Hence, to determine whether the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
it is pertinent to first ascertain whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the
tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined
from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force
at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief
sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the
complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
In the present case, the material averments, as well as the
character of the relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint
before the RTC, show that their action is one for cancellation of
titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of the RTC.
The complaint alleged that Lot Nos. 43 to 50, the parcels of land
subject matter of the action, were not the subject of the CFI’s
judgment in the relevant prior land registration case. Hence,
petitioners pray that the certificates of title of RCAM be
cancelled which will not necessitate the annulment of said
judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment
of judgment finds no application in the instant case.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which
do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a
89 | P a g e
Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and
reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that
“involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein” and where the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in denying
RCAM’s motion to dismiss.
Moreover, it should be stressed that the only incident before
the CA for resolution was the propriety of RCAM’s motion to
dismiss, thus, it was premature for the CA at this stage to apply
the doctrine of equitable estoppel as the parties have not
presented any evidence that would support such finding.
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. (Emphasis supplied)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed April 22,
2010 Decision and July 19, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 84 of Malolos, Bulacan is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
GO vs. CRUZ
G.R. No. L-58986 April 17, 1989
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
FACTS: On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(hereinafter, simply, California) brought an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of
unfair competition. The gravamen of California's complaint
was that Dante Go, doing business under the name and style of
"Sugarland International Products," and engaged like California
in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta was
selling his products in the open market under the brand name,
"Great Italian," in packages which were in colorable and
deceitful limitation of California's containers bearing its own
brand, "Royal." Its complaint contained an application for
preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately
cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale and
distribution of said products, and to retrieve those already
being offered for sale.
About two weeks later, however, or on November 12, 1981,
California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court. Four days
afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by
registered mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim
dated November 6, 1981, which had been filed with the Court
on November 9, 1981. On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out
at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the sala of
Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including
that filed by California against Dante Go.
On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint
asserting the same cause of action against Dante Go, this time
with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City. On December
3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order
90 | P a g e
directing "the defendant ... to immediately cease and desist
from the further manufacture, sale, promotion and distribution
of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products contained in
packaging boxes and labels under the name 'GREAT ITALIAN,'
which are similar to or copies of those of the plaintiff, and ...
recall ... all his spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products
using the brand, 'GREAT ITALIAN.'"
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order,
Dante Go filed the present petition for certiorari, etc. with this
Court praying for its nullification and perpetual inhibition. On
December 11, 1981, this Court, in turn issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the
City Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining
order of December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said
Civil Case No. C-9702. The scope of the injunction was
subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of April
14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby
restrained from proceeding with the case of unfair competition
filed in his office by California against Dante Go.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
applies in the present case.
RULING: No. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to
cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of
the defendant's answer with the Court (either personally or by
mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit
message of the Rules. "The filing of pleadings, appearances,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court,
"according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the
delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by
registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of
the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party
himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in
the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or
substituted service.
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the
Manila Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer butbefore
service thereof. Thus having acted well within the letter and
contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal
of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need
of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The
dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or
motives California might have had for bringing it about, and
was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without
prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the
notice" and it being the first time the action was being so
dismissed.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the
second action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on
the same claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with
jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In
truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously
believes, even if the first action were still pending in the Manila
Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the
91 | P a g e
Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first
action would merely give the defendant the right to move to
dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action
pendant or litis pendentia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against
petitioner. The temporary restraining order of December 11,
1981, and the amendatory Resolution of April 14, 1982 are SET
ASIDE.
REAL BANK, INC., Petitioner v. SAMSUNG MABUHAY
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175862. October 13, 2010
PEREZ, J. :
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
Meditation is part of pre-trial and failure of the plaintiff
to appear thereat merits sanction on the part of the absent
party.
FACTS:
Conpico Trading a regular dealer of Samsung in Davao
City, issued five post-dated checks payable to the order of
Samsung Mabuhay Electronics Corporation (Samsung). The
three of the five checks were not remitted by Reynaldo Senson
to Samsung. Instead, Senson, using the alias of Edgardo Bacea,
opened an account with petitioner Real Bank under the account
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
name of one Mabuhay Electronics Company (Mabuhay), a
business entity in no way related to Samsung. Due to the
negligence of petitioner, Senson indorsed the checks and
deposited all of the three checks in the account of Mabuhay
and subsequently able to withdraw. The checks were
negligently credited by Real Bank to the account of Mabuhay
although the check was payable only to Samsung. Despite
Samsung’s demand, Real Bank ignored and refused to
reimburse them with the value of three checks. Thus, Samsung
constrained to hire the legal service of the law firm of V.E. Del
Rosario and Partners.
Real Bank filed its Reply and the Samsung filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial. The trial court issued
an order requiring both parties to appear in mediation. The said
order was sent to respondent former counsel, V.E. Del Rosario,
which had at the time already filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance which was accepted by the Samsung.
The mediation proceedings took place but Samsung
failed to appear. The case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 20. The
case was dismissed for failure of Samsung to appear in
mediation conference previously scheduled. Samsung’s new
counsel challenged the Order alleging that the dismissal was
improper and inappropriate as it was not notified of the
scheduled mediation conference and the notice was sent to the
previous counsel. The Court of Appeals rendered decision in
favor of Samsung and reversed trial court order.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the trial court acted properly in
dismissing case due to the failure of respondent Samsung and
its counsel to appear on the scheduled mediation conference
RULING:
No. In Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, the Supreme Court
accentuated that mediation is part of pre-trial and failure of the
plaintiff to appear thereat merits sanction on the part of the
absent party. Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that
failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. However, the above-
cited ruling will not resolve the present case where the basic
issue is whether or not respondents Samsung non-appearance
at the mediation proceedings is justifiable from the records.
Under Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, the
withdrawal of the counsel with the conformity of the client is
completed once the same is filed in court. No further action is
needed other than the mechanical act of the Clerk of Court of
entering the name f the new counsel in the docket and of giving
written notice thereof to the adverse party.
In this case, it is uncontroverted that the withdrawal of
respondent Samsung’s original counsel was with client’s
counsel. Thus, no approval thereof by the trial court was
required because a court’s approval is indispensable only if the
withdrawal is without the clients consent.
It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of
respondent Samsungs original counsel was sufficient as the
same carried the stamp of approval of the client, the notice of
mediation sent to respondent Samsungs original counsel was
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
ineffectual as the same was sent at the time when such counsel
had already validly withdrawn its representation. Corollarily,
the absence of respondent Samsung during the scheduled
mediation conference was excusable and justified. Therefore,
the trial court erroneously dismissed case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and the Resolution of the same court
are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the RTC
Manila, Branch 20 for continuation of proceedings until its
conclusion with utmost dispatch
NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES GENEROSA GONZALES AND
RODOLFO FERRER, SPOUSES FELIPE GONZALES AND
CAROLINA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES LOLITA GONZALES AND
GERMOGENES GARLITOS, SPOUSES DOLORES GONZALES AND
FRANCISCO COSTIN, SPOUSES CONCHITA GONZALES AND
JONATHAN CLAVE, AND SPOUSES BEATRIZ GONZALES AND
ROMY CORTES, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
AND CO-PETITIONER NENITA GONZALES, Petitioner.
Vs.
MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA
BUGAAY AND FELIPE BARCELONA, CONEY CONIE BUGAAY,
JOEY GATAN, LYDIA BUGAAY, SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA BUGAAY
AND REY PAGATPATAN AND BELEN BUGAAY Respondent.
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G.R. No. 173008 February 22, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
A demurrer to evidence is a motion
to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence and is presented after the
plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection
by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The
evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the
merits of the case.
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents in this case were heirs of
the late Sps. Ayad. Said Sps., having left several agricultural and
residential properties, the petitioners filed a complaint for
partition and annulment of documents with damages against
the respondents. Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico
executed fraudulent documents covering all the properties
owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and
respondents, completely disregarding their rights. Thus, they
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's
estate, the nullification of the documents executed by Enrico,
and to award damages. As affirmative defense, respondents
claimed that petitioners had long obtained their advance
inheritance from the estate of the Spouses Ayad, and that the
properties sought to be partitioned are now individually titled
in respondents' names.
The Trial court then rendered a decision awarding the
one-fourth pro indiviso share of the petitioners as heirs of Sps.
Ayad, and directed the parties to submit a project of partition
30 days after the finality of the decision. Respondents then filed
a motion for reconsideration/ for new trial, which the court
granted on the specific purpose of receiving the documents
sought to be nullified. However, the respondent then demurred
petitioner’s complaint, which the court denied, to which the
respondent appealed the case via petition for certiorari. The CA
then granted the petition and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the demurrer to evidence
was proper?
RULING:
NO.
Being considered a motion to dismiss, a demurrer to
evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its
judgment.
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In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners'
evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While
respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering
for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed
a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed
abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in
granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended
Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to
evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to
respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had
correctly done.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the Orders
of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer are
REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC dated November 24,
1995 STANDS.
Acosta vs COMELEC
293 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 131488
Ponente: ROMERO, J.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE: Due process dictates that
before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the
following safeguards must be met: (a) the court or tribunal
must be clothed with judicial authority to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) it must have jurisdiction over the
person of the party or over the property subject of the
controversy; (c) the parties thereto must have been given an
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf, and (d) such
evidence must be considered by the tribunal in deciding the
case.
FACTS: Espirita N. Acosta and Raymundo Rivera were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Bgy. Sobol,
Pangasinan. By a winning margin of four votes, petitioner was
proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay. Rivera filed
an election protest with the MCTC of San Fabian, alleging that
the votes cast for him in some precincts were not duly and
properly accounted for due to "misreading, non-reading,
mistallying, and misappreciation of ballots/votes," and praying
for a recount of the votes. The following day, the
court summoned Acosta, filed a Motion for Time to File
Answer, but the court denied said motion and concluded that
the election protest was sufficient in form and substance.
Furthermore, considering that from the allegations in the
protest revision of ballots was necessary, the court also ordered
the COMELEC Election Registrar and/or the Municipal
Treasurer of San Fabian to bring to court the ballot boxes of
Bgy. Sobol. Consequently, it was determined that Rivera won
the election. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which was
granted by the judge. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued an en
banc Resolution in SPR No. 13-97 dismissing the petition for
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lack of merit, and affirming the assailed order, as well as the
trial court's decision. Thus, the case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exceeded the bounds of
its authority when it affirmed the trial court’s decision when
said judgment was not the subject of a special civil action
assailing an interlocutory order of the same lower court
RULING: Yes. The fact that the decision was eventually elevated
to the COMELEC on appeal does not cure the defect since said
appeal was not consolidated with SPR No. 13-97. In fact, it was
still undocketed at the time and the parties had not yet
submitted any evidence relating to the election protest.
Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly
rendered in a case, the following safeguards must be met: (a)
the court or tribunal must be clothed with judicial authority to
hear and determine the matter before it; (b) it must have
jurisdiction over the person of the party or over the property
subject of the controversy; (c) the parties thereto must have
been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf,
and (d) such evidence must be considered by the tribunal in
deciding the case. While the COMELEC cannot be faulted for
resolving the issue raised by petitioner in SPR No. 13-97,
namely, the propriety of the lower court's order dated May 21,
1997, it exceeded its authority and thereby gravely abused its
discretion when, in the same resolution, it affirmed said
court's decision dated May 30, 1997, which was the subject of
petitioner's appeal, UNDK No. 5-97.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and the
records of this case are ordered REMANDED to a Division of the
COMELEC for proper disposition of SPR No. 13-97 and UNDK
No. 5-97. No pronouncement as to costs.
EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA,
JR., WILLARD DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA, and JOSELITO DE
LUNA, petitioners
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Branch IX, and LUZONIAN
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., respondents
GR No. 57455 January 18, 1990
Medialdea, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about when a judgment on the pleadings can
be made as provided under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square
meters of Lot No. 3707 to Luzonian University Foundation, Inc.
Said donation is subject to a terms and conditions and provided
for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated
property in case of violation or non-compliance. Thereafter, the
foundation failed to comply but it was subsequently revived by
96 | P a g e
Prudencio on April 9, 1971. Among the conditions set forth in
the contract is that the done shall construct at its own expense
a chapel, a nursery and kinder garden school.
On August 18, 1980, Prudencio died and the petitioner-
heirs herein filed on September 23, 1980 a complaint before
the RTC of Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions of the
donation were not complied with by Luzonian. In its answer,
Luzonian claimed that it had partially and substantially
complied with the conditions of the donation and that the
donor has granted the foundation an indefinite extension of
time to complete the construction of what have been agreed
upon. It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of
action and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners then brought an instant petition for
review before the Supreme Court and stated, among others,
that the RTC erred in not rendering judgment on the merits by
way of judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings can be
made.
RULING:
No. Judgment on the pleadings cannot be made in this
case. The Supreme Court ruled that considering that the
allegations in the complaint on the matter of the donee’s non-
compliance with the conditions of the donation have been
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
contested by Luzonian who claimed that improvements more
valuable than the donated property had been introduced, a
judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the
absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court
cannot motu proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule
19 provides: “Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading.” (Emphasis Ours)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No.
8624 is hereby ordered reinstated. Respondent judge is
ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the
propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.
Development bank of the Philippines vs. Guarina Agricultural
and Realty Development Corp.,
Summary of the doctrine:
Law of the case: The doctrine of law of the case simply means,
therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the
law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case
even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule
thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For
practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has
issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it
with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the
97 | P a g e
parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of
the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to
determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law
of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions
or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
Facts: In July 1976, Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from
DBP to finance the development of its resort complex situated
in Trapiche, Oton, Iloilo. The loan, in the amount of
₱3,387,000.00, was approved on August 5, 1976. Guariña
Corporation executed a promissory note. Guariña Corporation
executed a real estate mortgage over several real properties in
favor of DBP as security for the repayment of the loan. Guariña
Corporation executed a chattel mortgage over the personal
properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be
acquired out of the proceeds of the loan, also to secure the
performance of the obligation. .The loan was released in
installments. Guariña Corporation demanded the release of the
balance of the loan, but DBP refused. Instead, DBP directly paid
some suppliers of Guariña Corporation over the latter's
objection. DBP found upon inspection of the resort project, its
developments and improvements that Guariña Corporation
had not completed the construction works. Unsatisfied with
the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Guariña
Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific
performance of the latter's obligations under the loan
agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages (Civil
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Case No. 12707). However, DBP moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, stating that the mortgaged properties had already
been sold to satisfy the obligation of Guariña Corporation at a
public auction. Due to this, Guariña Corporation amended the
complaint to seek the nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of sale. In
the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of
possession by the RTC. At first, the RTC denied the application
but later granted it upon DBP's motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Guariña Corporation assailed the granting of the
application before the CA on certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP
entitled Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development
Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines). After the
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, DBP sought the
implementation of the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession. Over Guariña Corporation's opposition, the RTC
issued the writ of possession.
RTC Ruling: RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. In its
decision, said court ordered the petitioner to give back to the
respondent the possession and enjoyment of the foreclosed
properties.
CA ruling: RTC Ruling affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling in CA GR 12670-SP
(interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of
possession)constitutes as law of the case for CA GR. CV 59491?
(the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was
valid and effectual)
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Contention of Petitioner: DBP insists that the decision of the
CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already constituted the law of the
case. Hence, the CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 59491 differently.
Respondent’s argument: Guariña Corporation counters that
the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not constitute the law
of the case because C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP concerned the issue
of possession by DBP as the winning bidder in the foreclosure
sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues
presented in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491.
Ruling: No. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically,
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for
the issuance of the writ of possession was entirely
independent from the judicial demand for specific
performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the
interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of
possession while the main case was pending, was not at all
intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and litigated in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to determine
whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And,
secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
question of law involved herein because this case for specific
performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP
(which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ
of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
Dispositive portion: the Court AFFIRMS the CA decision and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 131445, May 27, 2004
CORONA, J.
Doctrine:
It is the nature of the case that determines the proper remedy
to be filed and the appellate court where such remedy should
be filed by a party aggrieved by the decisions or orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman. If it is an administrative case, appeal
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. If it is a criminal case, the proper remedy is to
file with the Supreme Court an original petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Facts:
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga
Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.,
instituted two complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman
against several respondents, one of whom was then Mayor
Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA 3019 also known as Anti-
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Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondents allegedly
destroyed the doors of the KBMBPM office while serving on
petitioners the Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM management
dated October 28, 1998 issued by then Agriculture Secretary
Carlos G. Dominguez.
In disposing of said complaints, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution excluding respondent Bunye
from the criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the
exclusion in the CA through an original petition for certiorari
and mandamus. The CA, however, dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction supposedly in accordance with Section 27 of RA
6770 also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Citing Yabut
vs. Ombudsman, Alba vs. Nitorreda and Angchangco vs.
Ombudsman, the CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the
petition for certiorari and mandamus?
Ruling:
Yes. The CA was correct in dismissing the petition for
certiorari however, it erroneously invoked as ratio decidendi
Section 27 of RA 67709 which applies in administrative cases
only, not criminal cases, such as the graft and corruption charge
at bar. In an en banc decision of the Supreme Court in Fabian
vs. Desierto, which is still controlling, the Court held that
Section 27 applies only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary
action. Nevertheless, the Court declared Section 27
unconstitutional for expanding the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction without its advice and consent. It was held that all
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case,
the petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in
the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs.
Ombudsman and Mendoza-Arce vs. Ombudsman, requiring
that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s
orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the
Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the
prevailing rule. But even if the petition for certiorari had been
filed in this Court, it would have dismissed it just the same. First,
petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing a
petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme Court. Second,
the Office of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ombudsman
resolution.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Blvd, Inc., petitioner
Vs.
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Far East Bank & Trust Company, now BPI and Hector I. Galura,
respondents
Facts:
Bonier de Guzman, then the President of the petitioner
corporation executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioner’s 517 square meter parcel of land situated in Pasay
City in favor of Far East Bank. Due to failure to pay the
obligation, the bank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of
the subject parcel of land.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, Pinausukan,
represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman brought against the
bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate
mortgages averring that Bonier obtained the loans in his
personal capacity.
Due to failure to prosecute, the action for the
annulment of real estate mortgage was dismissed and
thereafter attained finality.
On 24 June 2003, the sheriff issued a notice of
extrajudicial sale concerning the property of the petitioner.
Said notice was received by Pinausukan after a week.
Surprised, Pinausukan inquired from the court about
the turn of events and learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor,
its councel of record, did not informed about the finality of the
dismissal of the action.
On 24 July 2003, Pinausukan brought the petition for
annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the Order-
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
dismissal of the court where its petition, under the verification
of Roxanne de Guzman-San Pedro, who was one of its
Directors, and concurrently its Executive Vice-President for
Finance and Treasurer, stated that the counsel had been guilty
of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the
case he was handling.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an extrinsic fraud when the petitioner
was not informed of the finality of the dismissal of the case.
Ruling:
No, there are two remedies available under the rules of
procedure at the time to a party aggrieved by a decision of the
Court of First Instance that had already attained finality,
namely: that under Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which was akin to the petition for relief from judgement under
Rule 38, Rules of Court; and that under Sec. 513, Code of Civil
Procedure, which stipulated that the party aggrieved under a
judgment rendered by the CFI upon default and who had been
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the CFI had finally adjourned so that no
adequate remedy exists in that court could present his petition
to the Supreme Court within 60 days after he learns of the
rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth
the facts and praying to have judgment set aside.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting, and only if judgement, final
101 | P a g e
order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by
a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The court
instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment
to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud and by prescribing in
Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that petitioner should
show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in
the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment
and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
The action, if based on extrinsic fraud must be filed
within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud and
if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is
barred by laches or estoppel.
The petition should be verified, and should allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment,
as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

There is a procedural defect in the petition for COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO MABANAG, JR. and
annulment of the petitioner when its failed to submit together RICHARD GO KING, respondents.
with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents
G.R. No. 129713 December 15, 1999
supporting the cause of action. It is true that the petition, which
narrated the facts relied upon, was verified under oath by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Roxanne, however, the submission of the affidavits of
Doctrine: Execution under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
witnesses together with the petition was not dispensable for
is a remedy afforded by law for the enforcement of a judgment,
that reason. CA is correct in dismissing the petition for
its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which
annulment to the effect that Roxanne’s verification related only
the writ is issued. It issues by order of the court a quo, on
to the correctness of the allegations in the petition and was not
motion of the judgment obligee, upon finality of a judgment or
the same or equivalent to the affidavit of witnesses that the
order sought to be enforced, and is directed to an officer
above-cited Rule requires. The true office of the verification is
authorizing and requiring him to execute the judgment of the
merely to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading
court.
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or
a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good Facts: In this petition for review, petitioner Cagayan de Oro
faith. Coliseum, Inc. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 43782 which reversed and set aside the decision
Pinausukan’s failure to include that affidavits of
dated August 5, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment. Extrinsic fraud
Cagayan de Oro City in two consolidated cases, Civil Case No.
cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but
89-098 and Special Civil Action No. 6811.
needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.
In 1977, petitioner Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc., a domestic
The mistake of Atty. Villaflor cannot be equated to the
corporation domiciled in Cagayan de Oro City, obtained from
extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for
one Santiago Maceren a loan in the amount of P149,253.73. As
annulment of judgement. Extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that
security for the loan, petitioner executed a promissory note and
is collateral in character.
a mortgage over all its assets and properties, including a parcel
of land situated in the poblacion of the City and registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3383.
CAGAYAN DE ORO COLISEUM, INC., petitioner,
vs.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
The loan, together with the promissory note and the mortgage,
were later assigned by Maceren to the Commercial Credit
Corporation of Cagayan de Oro (Commercial Credit). Petitioner
failed to pay the loan when it became due, hence, the
Commercial Credit commenced foreclosure proceedings on the
said parcel of land.
Herein respondent Sheriff Mabanag issued an Amended
Sheriffs notice of sale setting the sale of the property at public
auction on February 13, 1987, or on the same day the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision. At the Auction Sale the
property was sold to the highest bidder, herein respondent
Richard Go King, for the sum of P170,000.00.
During the pendency of G.R. No. 78315, on August 17, 1988,
respondent Sheriff issued to respondent Go King a Final Deed
of Conveyance over the subject property. TCT No. T-3383 of
petitioner was cancelled and TCT No. T-51704 was issued in the
name of respondent Go King.
On April 11, 1989, after finality of the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 78315, petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 89-
098 against herein respondents Sheriff Mabanag and Richard
Go King for "Remedies from Falsification and Damages." The
case was filed before Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court,
Cagayan de Oro. In its amended complaint, petitioner alleged
that (1) the execution proceedings were null and void for failure
to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court; (2) the
cancellation of petitioner's title and the issuance of another in
the name of respondent Go King was made in violation of the
Court of Appeals' Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 10888; and (3)
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assuming that the auction sale was valid, petitioner was
exercising his right of redemption by consigning with the court
the purchase price of P170,000.00 plus interest in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the execution proceedings were null and
void for failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
Ruling: To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to
do two specific things: (1) file with the register of deeds a copy
of the order of attachment or execution, together with the
description of the attached property and notice of attachment
or execution; and (2) leave with the occupant of the property
copy of the same order, description and notice. These are
prerequisites to a valid levy, non-compliance with any of which
is fatal.
In the instant case, the execution sale of the subject property
was made pursuant to the order of execution of November 26,
1986 and the writ of execution of December 4, 1986. The
November 26, 1986 execution order and the corresponding
writ of execution were not filed with the Register of Deeds
before the auction sale of February 13, 1987. The order of
November 26, 1986 was filed and inscribed on petitioner's title
only on December 7, 1988 — exactly one (1) year and
ten (10) months after the execution sale of February 13, 1987.
This is clear from the annotation in TCT No. T-3383 of petitioner
corporation.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

The March 9, 1983 order was rendered ex-parte. The trial court
issued the order of execution for the amount prayed for by
Commercial Credit, i.e., P70,152.68, excluding sheriff's fees and
expenses in its motion for execution. On reconsideration by
petitioner, the court, on November 26, 1986, reduced the
amount of the principal debt to P64,956.19 but added the
monthly penalty of 3% and additional attorney's fees of 5%.
With these charges, the judgment debt increased to
P167,367.40, which amount was more than double than that
stated in the first execution order.
The order of November 26, 1986 did not supplement the March
9, 1983 order. It amended the original. The substantial increase
in the amount of debt necessarily affected the kind and number
of property that was to be levied upon and sold, and the price
the property was to command at the public auction sale. The
amendment was of such proportion that it superseded that
which it
amended and gave rise to an entirely new order. The March 9,
1983 order was therefore extinguished and the one of
November 26, 1986 became the new order of execution.
It was on the basis of the November 26, 1986 order that the
execution sale actually took place on February 13, 1987. Since
this order was not filed with the Register of Deeds prior to the
execution sale, it follows that the levy was not effected and the
execution sale of February 13, 1987 proceeded without a
levy. A lawful levy on execution is indispensable to a valid sale
on execution. In other words, a sale, unless preceded by a valid
levy, is void, and the purchaser acquires no title to the property
sold. Without a proper levy, the property is not placed under
the authority of the court. The court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the property subject of execution, hence, it
could not transmit title thereto at the time of the sale. Where
in the instant case no jurisdiction was acquired over the subject
property, the execution sale was void and of no legal
effect. And the trial court did not err in so ruling.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
the Decision and Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43782 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City in Civil Case No. 89-098 and Special Civil Action No. 6811 is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that execution
proceedings may henceforth issue, unless petitioner fully
discharges its indebtedness under the execution order of
November 26, 1986.
SO ORDERED.
Ventura B. Ayo v. Violago-Isnani
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1445. June 21, 1999
Mendoza, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is the life of law. A judgment that is left unexecuted is
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
FACTS:
Petitioner Ventura B. Ayo, representative of Aquino and her
minor children in a civil case for indemnity and damages, filed
a complaint against several court employees including Sheriffs,
Clerks of Court, and Judge Lucia Violago-Isnani. Ayo alleged:
1. as to Clerk of Court Jaime M. Luy and Sheriff Jadi I.
Hatab, that it took the two an unreasonably long time,
from July 15, 1997, when the writ was issued, to
December 17, 1997, to enforce the writ of execution;
2. as to Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Erlinda M.
Perez, that Perez refused to receive and enforce the writ
of execution;
3. as to Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Joey A.
Astorga, that for one month since complainant
personally delivered to Astorga, the same did nothing to
cause its enforcement; and
4. as to Judge Lucia Violago-Isnani, that Judge showed her
partiality toward Atty. Natividad and Tensuan by
subjecting Ayo to humiliation, telling him that he was
not a lawyer, and prevented him from speaking when
he tried to state the grounds for his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a delay in the procedure of
execution.
RULING:
105 | P a g e
The Court found the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator well taken.
1. As to Clerk of Court Luy, he was held to be not too
diligent and careful which unduly delayed the
enforcement of the writ causing prejudice to the rights
of the complainant.
The excuse of respondent Luy that it was only after five
(5) months that complainant made a follow-up regarding the
writ is not tenable because it is incumbent upon him to act with
considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice. His defense that the required fees
should be paid first is not available to him because payment of
the same should be made in Bataan and not in Makati.
As to Sheriff Hatab, the complaint against him was
dismissed.
His defense was given merit as he indeed cannot be
blamed for the delay being complained since he had nothing to
do with the subject writ considering that he was not the
addressee thereof.
2. As to Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Perez, the
complaint against her was also dismissed.
She cannot be held liable for Abuse of Discretion and
non-feasance merely because she refused to receive and
implement the subject writ.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
3. As to Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Astorga, the
complaint against him was also dismissed.
The alleged delay in his table was not substantiated,
nonetheless, fifteen (15) days of delay is not extraordinarily
long as to show deliberate delay as suggested by the
complainant.
4. As to Judge Violago-Isnani, he is not liable for grave
abuse of discretion and partiality.
Her actions clearly expressed to aim for fair play and
due process. The alleged order to refrain from talking cannot
be faulted as the judge conducting a trial is not a mere
moderator but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of
assuring its proper conduct and the fair and impartial
administration of justice between the parties to the litigation.
Freedom of expression cannot be invoked by complainant as
purely private matters do not come within the guaranty.
Hence, it was only Clerk of Court Jaime M. Luy who was
held to have failed to comply with the responsibility in the just
implementation of a writ of execution without delay.
As officers of the court are duty-bound to use
reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of their
officially designated duties. Luy has fallen short of this standard
as he gave no reason to the cause of the 5-month delay on the
delivery to the proper Court in Bataan. It would appear that had
not complainant followed up the matter with respondent, the
106 | P a g e
writ would not have been sent to the RTC of Bataan. Worse,
when he finally issued the writ, respondent Luy endorsed it to
the Balanga branch of the RTC of Bataan which does not have
the territorial jurisdiction to enforce the writ. With this
undiligent conduct, Luy had delayed the administration of
justice to the affected parties thereto. Execution is the fruit and
end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment that is left
unexecuted is nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing
party.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to
SUSPEND Atty. Jayme M. Luy, Clerk of Court V, RTC, Branch 59
of Makati City, for one month and one day with WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. As recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator, the complaint, with respect to the other
respondents, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF RETERTA v. SPS. MORES
G No. 159941 August 17, 2011
Doctrine: Certiorari can be the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal or other remedy if warranted by
exceptional reasons such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial
judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where
the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
FACTS:
Teofilo Reterta was granted a friar land in Tanza, Cavite, by
virtue of his open, exclusive and continued occupation for more
than 30 years. He died in 1983 leaving behind the land to his
heirs, the petitioners. The petitioners discovered in 1999 that
there was an affidavit purportedly executed by their father
waiving his rights and interest over the land, and by virtue of
such affidavit, a Sale Certificate and TCT was issued in favor of
the respondents.
The petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance alleging that such affidavit was a forgery and the
sale certificate and TCT were procured fraudulently. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC
had no jurisdiction on the ground that the Director of Lands had
the exclusive power to the propriety of grant of friar lands, and
to determine whether or not there is fraud in procuring the
sales certificate. Agreeing with the ground, the RTC granted the
Motion to Dismiss.
Receiving the Order of Dismissal on Nov. 16, 2001, the
petitioners filed an MR on Nov. 26. However, the RTC denied
the MR in its order, which was received by the petitioners on
March 20, 2002, thus, prompting them to file a petition for
107 | P a g e
certiorari with the CA on May 15, 2002. The CA dismissed the
petition, holding that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute
for the lost remedy of appeal, considering that the order
granting the Motion to Dismiss was a final order against which
the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Hence, the
appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari was proper.
Held:
YES, Certiorari was proper. At first, the SC held that the
contention of the petitioners that their proper remedy was
certiorari by virtue of Rule 41 was misplaced. According
tosSec.1, Rule 41 (not yet amended by AM7-7-12 during the
decision of the CA) an Order denying a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration is one of the cases where no appeal may be
taken from and the proper remedy is to avail of Certiorari under
Rule 65. However, in this case, what the petitioners really
wanted to obtain relief from was the Oder of Dismissal which
finally disposed of the case, and not the denial of their MR. The
general rule is that certiorari is precluded as a remedy against
the final order when appeal is available.
Nonetheless, the SC considered Certiorari as the proper
remedy despite the availability of appeal or other remedy if
warranted by exceptional reasons such as (a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised
his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f)
where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
G.R. No. 139020. October 11, 2000
PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
CO., Inc., respondent.
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban
Brief Summary of doctrine:
Litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of
justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the
prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the
same parties.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any
attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly
struck down. The system of judicial review should not be
misused and abused to evade the operation of final and
executory judgments.
Facts:
On July 31, 1985 Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc.,
the respondent in the present recourse, filed a complaint
against Paquito B. Buaya, branch manager for Cebu and the
petitioner in the present recourse, for the collection of the
108 | P a g e
principal amount of P678,076.83, representing his unremitted
premium collections owing to the respondent. For failure of the
petitioner and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial,
the petitioner was declared in default, and the respondent was
allowed to adduce its evidence, ex parte. On the basis of the
evidence of the respondent, the Court a quo promulgated a
Decision, dated September 17, 1987, in favor of the
respondent.
The petitioner appealed, from said decision, to the CA,
On March 30, 1990, this court promulgated a decision in favor
of the petitioner annulling the decision of the court a quo and
remanding the case to the lower court for further
proceedings. Accordingly, the court a quo issued an order
setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1990. The
petitioner himself filed a Motion for Postponement of the
hearing. Petitioner's motion was granted by the court hearing
was reset to February 15, 1991. However, the hearing was reset
to March 14, 1991 on motion of the respondent. The petitioner
himself filed a Motion for Postponement of the hearing set on
March 14, 1991 on the ground that his counsel, Atty. Bartolome
A. Avancena, had died and petitioner needed time to engage
the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16,
1991. However, the petitioner filed another motion for the
resetting of said hearing on the ground that he needed more
time to secure the services of new counsel. The hearing was
reset to July 26, 1991. But then, the petitioner filed another
motion for the postponement of said hearing on the ground
that he was weak and sickly. Nevertheless, the court reset the
hearing to November 29, 1991, but subject to the condition
that if, for any reason, the petitioner still failed to appear on
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
said setting, such failure shall be deemed a waiver of his right
to present evidence. On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel
Maranga, the new counsel of the petitioner, filed a Motion to
Postpone. The respondent opposed petitioner's motion. On
December 19, 1991, the court issued an order denying
petitioner's motion and declaring the petitioner to have waived
his right to adduce evidence in his behalf.
The respondent filed a motion praying to reinstate its
decision, dated September 17, 1987. The court granted
respondent's motion. The petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, assailing the orders of the court. The CA
promulgated a Decision dismissing the Petition for lack of
merit. On motion of the respondent, the court an order, dated
October 29, 1993, directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
order, the court issued an order denying motion. The
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from said order. However,
the court issued an order declining to give due course to the
appeal of the petitioner considering that the decision of the
court had already become final and executory. On June 2, 1995,
the court issued a writ of execution. The petitioner filed a
Petition for Relief from order. On November 13, 1995, the
court issued an order denying the petition for relief.
The order of the trial court reinstating its September 17,
1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA and the
Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of
petitioner for resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal
was solely designed to further derail the execution of the lower
court's decision.
109 | P a g e
Issues:
I - Petitioner question of law which is believed or which appears
to be one of first impression, namely: Can a decision of a
Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals
be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or
any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its
execution?
II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the
Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice
to the petitioner of the pre-trial and subsequent remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the
jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the
presentation of evidence for the petitioner and without
anymore requiring the presentation of respondent's
evidence for cross-examination by the petitioner?
I- The Supreme Court doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim
that the September 11, 1987 decision of the trial court was
annulled by the CA, because his appeal brief stated that it had
merely been set aside. He merely alleged that the aforesaid
judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment by default so
that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by petitioner, in its
decision rendered on March 30, 1990, set aside the judgment
and ordered the case to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings. This allegation shows that the trial court's
Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the
appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable
petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing
wrong with the order of the trial court reinstating its original
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample
opportunity given him to present evidence.
II- Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court
when it ruled that he had waived his right to submit evidence,
when it should have merely ordered plaintiff to present its
evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that both
parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present
their respective sets of evidence.
The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further
hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an
appeal. Plaintiff (herein respondent) had rested its case long
before the September 11, 1987 Decision was rendered. In fact,
the evidence adduced by herein respondent became the sole
basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987.
Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987
Decision of the trial court become final and executory on June
28, 1993. A Writ of Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of
the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987 Decision was
issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment
becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of
Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. The
February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354
barred not only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the
Petition, but also any other issues that might have been raised
therein. An existing final judgment or decree -- rendered upon
the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is
conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies. This
110 | P a g e
ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the
points or matters in issue in the first suit.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any
attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly
struck down. The system of judicial review should not be
misused and abused to evade the operation of final and
executory judgments.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Vlason vs. CA
Doctrine:
Execution; Execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the
expiration of the period to appeal it, if no appeal has been
duly perfected.
Facts:
Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become
final and executory, the Court of Appeals ordered the RTC to
take appropriate action on the urgent ex parte motion for
issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent.
Pursuant, thereto, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
writ of possession thus placing private respondent in
possession of petitioner’s barge lawin.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent entitled to a writ of
execution?
Held:Yes. Section 1 of Rule 39 provides that execution shall
issue only upon a judgment that finally disposes of the action
or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of right
upon the expiration of the period to appeal it, if no appeal has
been duly perfected. In the present case, however , the court
already shown that the trial court’s decision has not become
final and executory against the petitioner. In fact, the judgment
dies not even bind it.
Dispositive Ruling :
Wherefore the appeal is hereby granted, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are Reversed
and Set Aside insofar as they affect petitioner. The levy and
the sale on execution of petitioner’s properties are declared
NULL and VOID. Said properties are ordered RESTORED to
petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
FEDERICO PALLADA, PACIFICO PALLADA, LOURDES PALLADA
and CONSOLACIONPALLADA DELGADO, assisted by her
husband, RIZAL DELGADO, PURIFICACION PALLADA, LOVELLA
DELA CRUZ, DIOCESS PALLADA, NORBERTO PALLADA, and
DELFA PALLADA,
111 | P a g e
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KALIBO, AKLAN, BRANCH 1,
SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN OR ANY OF HIS
DEPUTIES, SPOUSES MELDA MERCEDITO NATAL and
CRESENCIO NATAL, SPOUSES EDITHA MERCEDITA SONGCANG,
SPOUSES ELMA MERECEDIO SAPINIT and ERNESTO SAPINIT,
SPOUSES WENINA MERECEDIO LIM and CONSEI LIM, SPOUSES
CELMENCIA MATIONG SAN MIGUEL and APOLINARIO SAN
MIGUEL, SPOUSES MERCEDES MATIONG TOLENTINO and
ENRIQUITO TOLENTINO, SPOUSES GLORIA PASTOR and
HELDERICO PASTOR, RENEE MERECEDIO, FIDELINO
MERECEDIO, RUSTICO MATIONG, SALVADOR MATIONG, JR.,
and ARTURO MATIONG,
G.R. No. 129442; March 10, 1999
Purisima, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
A motion that does not comply with the requirements
of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless
piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive
and which the court has no authority to act upon.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the
adverse party.
FACTS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
In 1976, the private respondents instituted a civil case
for recovery of possession and ownership of land with the RTC
of Aklan. The said case was subsequently ruled in favor of the
petitioners. However, it was subsequently reversed and set
aside by the Court of Appeals and
declared that the private respondents are the possessors and
lawful owners of the parcel of land. The petition for review filed
by the petitioners was likewise denied by the Supreme Court
and the same became final and executory.
In 1997, the private respondents filed an Ex Parte
Motion for Execution with the RTC-Aklan and it was granted by
the said court. When the Writ was partially satisfied, the
petitioner assailed the validity and seeking non-
implementation of the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of execution is invalid on the
ground that it did not contain a notice of hearing to petitioners.
RULING:
The Court did not invalidate the Writ of Execution issued
by the trial court.
The requirements provided by Section 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Revised Rules of Court that the notice shall be
112 | P a g e
directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place for the hearing of the motion are mandatory and if not
religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A
motion that does not comply with the said requirements is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right
to received and which the court has no authority to act upon.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the
adverse party --
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the
lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought
to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
However, in the case at bar, the Court ruled that the
petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of the
petitioners, designed to prevent the final disposition of the
case. In People v. Leviste, it was held that: While it is true that
any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule
15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled
to judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a
rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as
possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for
want of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
URBANO JACA and BONIFACIO JACA, petitioners,
vs.
DAVAO LUMBER COMPANY and HONORABLE MANASES
REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-25771 March 29, 1982
FERNANDEZ, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: “Good reasons” for execution of
judgment pending appeal. As provided in Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the
New Rules of Court, the existence of good reasons is what
confers discretionary power on a court of first instance to issue
a writ of execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing
execution must constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage should the
losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the CFI of Davao a complaint for
Accounting, Return of Price Differentials and Damages against
113 | P a g e
the Davao Lumber Company. The complaint alleges that the
petitioner Urbano Jaca has been, and still is, a licensee of a
logging concession located in the City of Davao, and together
with his co- petitioner, Bonifacio Jaca, engaged in the logging
business of producing timber and logs for export and/or
domestic purposes; that the defendant is a business
corporation with which plaintiffs had business dealings
covering the sale and/or exportation of their logs. The herein
parties-litigants entered into an agreement whereby
petitioners may secure, by way of advances, either cash or
materials, foodstuffs, and/or equipment's from the defendant
corporation. The payment of such account was to be made
either in cash and/or by plaintiff's turning over all the logs that
they produce in the aforesaid concession to the defendant, and
in the latter case, the current prices, either export or domestic,
of the logs at the time of their delivery was to be considered.
While the aforesaid business relationship between the parties
was subsisting, defendant made petitioner Urbano Jaca
execute in its favor a chattel mortgage. The primary conditions
of such chattel mortgage were that petitioners would turn over
to defendant corporation all the logs they may produce from
the aforesaid concession the same to be priced either as export
or domestic and their value to be applied by defendant to, and
be credited for, the account of petitioner’s indebtedness, and
further that in case of need, petitioners may secure, by way of
advances, either cash, foodstuffs, materials or equipment's,
under an "open credit account".
Petitioners made repeated demands on the defendant
for a formal accounting of their business relationship from 1954
up to August, 1963, but that the defendant failed and refused,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
and still fails and refuses, to effect such formal accounting,
asserting that it had no time as yet to examine into all the
details of the accounting. The herein petitioners have been
constrained to file this case in Court in order to compel
defendant to have a formal accounting between them, and that
it is the desire of plaintiffs that pending the formal hearing of
this case, three commissioners, constituting accountants be
judicially appointed for the purpose of examining all the books,
pertinent papers and documents and all other data in relation
with their business transaction, in order to protect their
interest and to litigate this case. The defendant Davao Lumber
Company filed its Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim, alleging that Petitioners Urbano Jaca and
Bonifacio Jaca are the ones indebted to the defendant in the
sum of P756,236.52 and P91,651.97, respectively, and that, the
plaintiff Urbano Jaca executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
the defendant to secure the payment of any and all obligations
contracted by him in favor of the defendant covering several
chattels. That said obligation of Urbano Jaca totalling
P756,236.52 is overdue and unpaid despite repeated formal
demands for settlement thereof made by defendant.
The respondent Judge rendered a decision against the
petitioners and in favour the respondent, dismissing
petitioners’ complaint for accounting and ordering them to pay
the defendant’s claim.
Thereafter, the Davao Lumber Company filed a motion
for execution pending appeal and the same was granted. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
114 | P a g e
WON there are good reasons justifying the issuance of
an order granting premature execution.
RULING:
NO.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that on
motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even
before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed
thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be included
therein. The discretionary power of the Court of First Instance
to grant or deny a motion for execution before the expiration
of the time to appeal will not be interfered with by the
appellate court, unless it be shown that there has been an
abuse thereof or a subsequent change of conditions. 12
As provided in Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court,
the existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary
power on a court of first instance to issue a writ of execution
pending appeal. 13 The reasons allowing execution must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which
will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate.
It will not immediately relieve petitioners from the injurious
effect of the order granting execution. The slow and
inexpensive remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent
judge from executing his decision requiring petitioners to pay
the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to dismiss the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
petition on the ground that petitioner has already availed of the
remedy of appeal will only aggravate the patent injustice
already inflicted on petitioners.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of
certiorari is granted and the orders granting execution pending
appeal dated November 29, 1965 and the order denying the
motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution
pending appeal dated January 10, 1966 are nullified and set
aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 89265. July 17, 1992.
ARTURO G. EUDELA, RENATO TUAZON, FRANCISCO S.
PANGILINAN and LEO GUEVERRA, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. FILEMON H. MENDOZA, as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCIV (94),
NIZA SORIANO VERGEL DE DIOS, RICHARD NG, NATIVIDAD
MALLARI-NG, and SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
Advocates Circle Lawyers for Petitioner.
P.M. Castillo for Private Respondent.
Doctrine:
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS; GENERAL RULE; EXCEPTION;
REQUISITES FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. — The general
rule under Sec. l of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is that a
judgment can be executed only after it has become final and
115 | P a g e
executory, that is, when it "finally disposes of the action or
proceeding." Such execution shall issue as a matter of right
upon the expiration of the period for appeal if no appeal has
been perfected. By way of exception, however, execution
pending appeal is allowed under Sec. 2 of the same Rule as
follows: Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may,
in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter,
the motion and the special order shall be included therein.
Execution pending appeal requires observance of the following
requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there
must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
This case arose from two complaints filed by the private
respondents against the petitioners for injunction, specific
performance and damages, in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. These complaints were consolidated and, after
trial, decided against the petitioners on December 16, 1987.
The petitioners were found to have defrauded the private
respondents and held solidarily liable to them in the amount of
P450,000.00 plus 15% interest and P30,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

On motions for reconsideration filed by both parties, the
decision was amended on February 1, 1988, to specify the
respective months due each of the two complainants. 2 On that
same date, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal of the
original decision. The private respondents received a copy of
the amended decision and six days later filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. After considering the same and the
opposition filed by the petitioners, then Judge Filemon H.
Mendoza issued an order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal on the following grounds:
1) The case at bar had been filed way back on May 26,
1984 and only decided, after a long Court battle, on December
16, 1987 and February 1, 1988 and in view hereof, the court is
uncertain whether the individual private defendants may
satisfy the awards granted in favor of the plaintiffs and thus will
render this judgment a mere paper judgment, in the event the
questioned Decision is affirmed by the higher court.
2) The defendant bank is presently under receivership as
they are under the state of insolvency and thus its assets might
not be sufficient to pay the plaintiffs as there are many
creditors of said banking institution.
3) The fact that defendant Renato Tuazon and his family
are already and in all possibility they will stay abroad
permanently and real properties are being sold.
4) The court will likewise order the plaintiffs to post a bond
to answer for whatever damages the individual defendants
might suffer by virtue of the issuance of the writ should the
decision in question be reversed by the higher court.
A petition for certiorari was filed by defendant, but was denied
by the CA. It is now faulted in this petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the decision of the
RTC in granting the motion for execution pending appeal by
way of exception to the general rule under Sec. 1 Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No.
The general rule under Sec. 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is
that a judgment can be executed only after it has become final
and executory, that is, when it "finally disposes of the action or
proceeding." Such execution shall issue as a matter of right
upon the expiration of the period for appeal if no appeal has
been perfected.
By way of exception, however, execution pending appeal is
allowed under Sec. 2 of the same Rule as follows:
Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may,
in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be

116 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
stated in a special order. if a record on appeal is filed thereafter,
the motion and the special order shall be included therein.
Execution pending appeal requires observance of the following
requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good
reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason
must be stated in a special order.
The Court finds that the justification given by the trial court in
its challenged order constitutes the "good reasons" required by
Section 2 of Rule 39 for authorizing execution pending appeal.
It is noted that the decision under appeal held the petitioners
solidarily liable to the private respondents for what it described
as "the fraudulent combination of the defendants against the
plaintiffs."
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
ROLANDO TING, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO,
namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO,
ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and
JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, respondents.
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
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The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to
be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment.
An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases. It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation
and registration.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted
an application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of a certain parcel of land. A certificate
of title was thereafter issued to Spouses Lirio. On February 12,
1997, Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu an application for registration of title over the same lot.
The respondents file an opposition to petitioner’s application
arguing that the decision in favour of them barred the filing of
petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. The
RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on the ground of res judicata.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for land registration
should be barred for being res judicata.
RULING:
YES.
In a registration proceeding instituted for the
registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in
his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole
world. It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment
of confirmation and registration.
In the case at bar, the land registration proceedings
being in rem, the land registration court‘s approval in LRC No.
N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s application for
registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on
the whole world including Ting.
With regard to Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of, a final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the
December 10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest
to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same
does not lie. The court ruled that this provision of
the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because
a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
118 | P a g e
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding
to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED. Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting. SO
ORDERED.
PABLITO T. VILLARIN AND P.R. BUILDERS DEVELOPERS &
MANAGERS, INC. vs CORONADO P. MUNASQUE
DOCTRINE: The present rule now requires the sheriff to first
make a demand for payment, and it prescribes the procedure
for and the manner of payment as well as the immediate
turnover of the payment by the sheriff to the clerk of court.
Levy as a mode of satisfying the judgment may be done only if
the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check, or other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for collection of
sum of money filed by respondent Munasque against
petitioners. Petitioners managed to pay only P250,000.00 of
their total obligation. Thus, respondent filed a motion for
execution. The motion was granted and the writ of execution
issued. The following day, Deputy Sheriff Mendoza, issued a
notice of levy and had the same annotated at the back of thirty-
four (34) transfer certificates of title (TCTs) in the name of
petitioners. Several notices of levy were issued against all rights
and interests of petitioners on his properties. Thereafter,
Deputy Sheriff Mendoza issued "Notice of Deputy Sheriff’s Sale
on Execution." After the raffle was conducted by the clerk of
court (ex officio deputy sheriff) of the RTC of Makati City, the
notice of sale on execution was published in a newspaper of
national circulation. Later, the law firm of Oben Ventura Abola
entered its appearance as collaborating counsel with
petitioners’ counsel of record. The firm sent via registered mail
to respondent’s counsel and Deputy Sheriff Mendoza a letter
complaining of procedural lapses in the enforcement of the writ
of execution. The firm claimed that the deputy sheriff did not
comply with Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which, according to it, requires first a personal
demand for payment of the full amount of the obligation before
levy on the properties could be made; that when levy was
made, petitioners were not given the option to choose what
property should be levied; and that levy should have been
made first on petitioners’ personal properties. Petitioners then
identified eight (8) parcels of land registered with the Register
of Deeds of Tanauan City which they claimed should be the
subject of levy. On that basis, they requested that the
119 | P a g e
appropriate correction be made in the notice of levy.
Petitioners filed a motion to recall the notice of levy and cancel
the scheduled deputy sheriff’s sale, alleging the same grounds
but it was denied. Thus, Deputy Sheriff Mendoza conducted an
auction sale of the levied properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the deputy sheriff to first
demand of the judgment obligor payment of the judgment
debt before levying the judgment obligor’s real properties
without allowing him to exercise his option to choose which
of his properties may be levied upon, and without first levying
on his personal properties, constitute a fatal procedural
defect resulting in the nullity of the levy and the subsequent
execution sale
RULING: NO.
Based on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the present
rule now requires the sheriff to first make a demand for
payment, and it prescribes the procedure for and the manner
of payment as well as the immediate turnover of the payment
by the sheriff to the clerk of court. Levy as a mode of satisfying
the judgment may be done only if the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or
other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that Deputy Sheriff
Mendoza failed to first demand of petitioners the immediate
payment in cash of the full amount stated in the writ of
execution. However, it is also extant in the records that
petitioners never disputed the admissions of their counsel that
they had no funds to pay even a month’s interest and that they
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
agreed to the levy so long as the auction sale would not be set
earlier. The admissions provide reasonable basis for the deputy
sheriff to forego prior demand on petitioners for payment in
cash and proceed to levy on the properties right away.
Furthermore, while petitioners, in their letter, complained of
procedural defects in the enforcement of the writ, they at the
same time also actually "exercised their right to choose which
properties may be levied upon in satisfaction of their aforesaid
obligation." It should be noted that nowhere in the letter did
they offer payment of their obligation in cash. They did not
even allege any willingness and ability to do so. They also did
not offer personal properties that may be subject of levy.
By such acts, petitioners may be said to have overlooked the
procedural lapses, acceded to the execution by levy, and
effectively exercised their right to choose which of their
properties may be levied on.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 31 March 2005 and Resolution dated 11
August 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
LEACHON vs. PASCUA
YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ vs.
SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. MTC in Trece Martires City,
Cavite
A.M. No. P-11-2972September 28, 2011
Execution of judgment
120 | P a g e
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 for violations of BP 22 were
instituted against Juanito Corpuz (spouse of Yolanda) before
the MTCC by a certain Alicia Panganiban. A judgment was
rendered based on the compromise agreement made by the
parties in which Juanito promised to pay Panganiban the sum
of P330,000.00. When Juanito failed to comply with his
obligations under the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban
filed Motions for Execution. MTCC acted favorably on
Panganiban’s Motions and issued a Writ of Execution
addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC.
Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda’s office and demanded that
Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah registered in
Yolanda’s name. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Yolanda
surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua.Yolanda
was compelled to file the present administrative complaint
against Sheriff Pascua.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Before the Court is an administrative case for grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law filed by Yolanda
Leachon Corpuz (Yolanda) against Sergio V. Pascua (Pascua),
Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires
City, Cavite.
ISSUES:
Whether Sheriff Pascua is guilty of simple misconduct in levying
upon Yolanda’s vehicle even though the judgment and writ he
was implementing were against Juanito?
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
RULLING:
YES. Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of simple
misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT
PAY. Despite the undisputed facts that the MTCC Judgment and
Writ of Execution in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 were
against Juanito only, and the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate
No. 471 was registered in Yolanda’s name solely, Sheriff Pascua
proceeded to levy upon the vehicle, invoking the presumption
that it was conjugal property. The power of the court in
executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. The
duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debt
or not that of a third person. Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the
presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito
and Yolanda.
Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.” However, for this presumption to
apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is
material.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found
GUILTY of simple misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2)
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MONTHS WITHOUT PAY, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014
REYES, J. :
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment postulates that ''when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them..
FACTS:
Petitioner LZK obtained a loan from respondent and
secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot
located at La Union, which was sold at a public auction after
respondent extra judicially foreclosed the property due to
petitioner’s failure to pay its loan. Respondent emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale and its certificate of sale
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
was registered. Petitioner filed before RTC-Makati a complaint
for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract,
promissory note and damages. Planters Bank filed an ex-parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-
San Fernando. Three days before the expiration of LZK
Holdings' redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO
effective for 20 days enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating
its title over the property. Then, the RTC-Makati ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the same
purpose but the writ was issued only upon LZK Holdings'
posting of a P40,000.00 bond.
Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership
over the property. However, the proceedings for its ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was
suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC Makati.
Planters Bank moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied by the RTC-San Fernando.
Upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null
and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank. Such ruling was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Planters Bank also appealed
the Order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in abeyance the
resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and
annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San Fernando
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, the right of Planter's Bank to a writ of possession as
adjudged in their previous case is binding and conclusive on
the parties.
RULING:
Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
the right of Planter’s Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged
in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties. The
doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment
postulates that ''when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when
an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of
the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case.
The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the
Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions
and rulings of the Court of Appeals. It was a judgment on the
merits of Planters Banks’s right to apply for and be issued a writ
of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the
same parties involved in the present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter
Bank’s right to a writ of possession over the subject property
because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of such particular issue
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. So ordered.
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however,
under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
123 | P a g e
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for
such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
FACTS:
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., is a foreign
corporation based in Singapore, engaged in the manufacture,
repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand
International Airways, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged
in airline operations. Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and
respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and
Modification of Airbus of the respondent. The parties agreed
on the mode and manner of payment by respondent of the
contract price, including interest in case of default. They also
agreed that the "construction, validity and performance
thereof" shall be governed by the laws of Singapore. They
further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement
to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
After petitioner delivered to the respondent the
repaired aircrafts, respondent failed to pay despite demand.
Petitioner then filed with the High Court of the Republic of
Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18, including
interest and costs, against respondent. The court issued a Writ
of Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore
upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff
of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon
respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent
failed to answer the claim. Subsequently the respondent was
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
declared in default. Petitioner filed with the RTC, Pasay City, a
petition for Enforcement of Judgment.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
two grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment
sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in
violation of its right to due process. On October 30, 1998, the
RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss, holding that
"neither one of the two grounds (of Grand) is among the
grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure."
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the RTC in its Order. CA reverses RTC’s decision.
Hence, the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not decisions of foreign court are
enforceable in Philippines?
RULING:
YES.
The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in Section
48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
thus:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. – The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
124 | P a g e
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment
sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons
is void and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction
over it. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which
in this case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for
leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside
Singapore.
This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance
with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore,
which provides.
xxx
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that
country for service of any originating process issued by that
country.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
And under our rules of procedure, one of the modes in
acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is by a
valid service of summons. Which in the instant case was validly
done, thus, jurisdiction was conferred and judgment of default
against respondent was valid.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51134 are set aside.
The RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City is hereby DIRECTED to
hear Civil Case No. 98-1389 with dispatch.
Ma. Carminia Calderon, etc. vs. Jose Antonio F. Roxas
G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE: Orders on the matter of a
provisional remedy are interlocutory, hence, cannot be subject
of an appeal. The proper remedy for which is a special civil
action under Rule 65.
FACTS: Ma. Carminia Calderon and Jose Antonio Roxas were
married and have four children. Calderon filed a declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Pending to the judgement of the main case, are the
application for support pendente lite and support for
arrearages where there has been a series of asking of an
additional support from the petitioner while the respondent
125 | P a g e
asked that it be decreased. RTC ruled in favor of respondent
Roxas for valid reasons, one of them is that his monthly salary
of P20,800.00 is not sufficient for the P42, 292.50 support
initially fixed by the court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the same on the
ground that they should not disturb anymore the decision of
the RTC and also noted that the petitioner failed to avail of the
proper remedy to question an interlocutory order. Hence, the
case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal is a proper remedy from an
order of support pendent lite and support in arrears
RULING: No. The assailed orders relative to the incident of
support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case
nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of
petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity
and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any
time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, the
Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders17 which shall
govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency
of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of
voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation
rights, hold departure, protection and administration of
common property.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during
the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed of during
the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they
are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the
main action. The subject orders on the matter of support
pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having
chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject
interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was
correctly dismissed by the CA.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated
September 9, 2008 and Resolution dated December 15, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85384 are AFFIRMED.
126 | P a g e
SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES,
petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAMASO HERRERA as Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna PROMINENT
LENDING & CREDIT CORPORATION, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
LAGUNA and Sheriff IV ARNEL G. MAGAT, respondents
GR No. 144755 June 8, 2005
Austria-Martinez, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about the nature of provisional remedies like
a writ of preliminary injunction and the requirements to be
established in order to avail the said remedy.
FACTS:
On January 12, 1998, Spouses Eliseo and Rosanda
Estares obtained a loan from Prominent Lending & Credit
Corporation for an amount of P800,000.00 which was secured
by a real estate mortgage. On May 21, 1991, the Spouses filed
a complaint for Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction against Prominent alleging that the promissory note
and the mortgage were falsified and that the monthly interest
is different from what they have agreed upon. In the interim,
they prayed for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to enjoin Prominent from taking possession of the
mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale
scheduled on January 13, 1999.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
After hearing on the application for writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied the same holding that the
Spouses failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction
to be issued. Its motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Thereafter, the Spouses filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of
discretion upon the trial court in denying their prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration.
The CA dismissed the petition of the Spouses for lack of
merit holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
rendering the case. Before the Supreme Court, the Spouses
contends that the CA erred in not granting their writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction must
be granted.
RULING:
NO. The writ of preliminary injunction cannot be
granted. The Supreme Court ruled that generally, injunction is
a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights
or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling
reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ
is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing
127 | P a g e
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation. The application
of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or
of a special reason for such an order before the case can be
regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such
temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts
which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it
appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff
pending the litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to
establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to
injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected;
and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of such right. To be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there
is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to
establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that
they are indebted to Prominent but only question the amount
thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a
real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which
was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is
properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2000 and July 7, 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56123 are AFFIRMED in all
respects. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
Equitable Banking Corporation, Inc vs Special Steel Products
G.R. No. 175350 June 13, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: "[A] writ of preliminary attachment
is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on
mere abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for
the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and
concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the debtor
practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution
of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan
or intention not to pay the creditor.
Facts: Petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable or
bank) is a private domestic corporation engaged in banking and
is the depository bank of International Copra Export
Corporation (Interco) and Jose Isidoro Uy. In 1991, SSPI sold
welding electrodes to Interco. In payment for the above
welding electrodes, Interco issued three checks payable to the
order of SSPI on July 10, 1991, July 16, 1991, each check was
crossed with the notation “account payee only” and was drawn
128 | P a g e
against Equitable. The records do not identify the signatory for
these three checks, or explain how Uy, Interco’s purchasing
officer, came into possession of these checks. The records only
disclose that Uy presented each crossed check to Equitable on
the day of its issuance and claimed that he had good title
thereto. He demanded the deposit of the checks in his personal
accounts in Equitable which the latter acceded to Uy's demands
on the assumption that Uy, as the son-in-law of Interco's
majority stockholder, was acting pursuant to Interco's orders.
The records do not disclose the circumstances surrounding
Interco's and SSPI's eventual discovery of Uy's
scheme. Nevertheless, it was determined that Uy, not SSPI,
received the proceeds of the three checks that were payable to
SSPI.
SSPI and its president, Pardo, filed a complaint for damages
with application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Uy
and Equitable Bank. In support of their application for
preliminary attachment, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants are guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation upon
which the action was brought and that there is no sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced in this action.
The bank counter-claimed that SSPI is liable to it in damages for
the wrongful and malicious attachment of Equitable's personal
properties. The bank maintained that SSPI knew that the
allegation of fraud against the bank is a falsehood. Further, the
bank is financially capable to meet the plaintiffs' claim should
the latter receive a favorable judgment. SSPI was aware that
the preliminary attachment against the bank was unnecessary,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
and intended only to humiliate or destroy the bank's
reputation.
Issue: Whether or not the attachment of Equitable's personal
properties was wrongful.
Held: Yes. We believe that such preliminary attachment was
wrongful. "[A] writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a
provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of
fraud. Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there
must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual
circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud
upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their
agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay the creditor."[74] No proof was adduced
tending to show that Equitable had a preconceived plan not to
pay SSPI or had knowingly participated in Uy's scheme.
That the plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment in their favor
does not detract from the wrongfulness of the preliminary
attachment. While "the evidence warrants [a] judgment in
favor of [the] applicant, the proofs may nevertheless also
establish that said applicant's proffered ground for attachment
was inexistent or specious, and hence, the writ should not have
issued at all.
Peroxide Philippines Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
129 | P a g e
Summary of the doctrine: Discharge of attachment or its
suspension requires a due notice and hearing, their absence
does not discharge the attachment: We likewise affirm the
findings and conclusion of respondent court that the order of
Judge Acosta, dated May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of
attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order,
having likewise been issued ex parte and without notice and
hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could not have
resulted in the discharge of the attachment. Said attachment
continued unaffected by the so-called order or suspension and
could not have been deemed inefficacious until and only by
reason of its supposed restoration in the order of December 16,
1987 of Judge Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex
parte discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice
to the orderly administration of justice and nullifies the
underlying role and purpose of preliminary attachment in
preserving the rights of the parties pendente lite as an ancillary
remedy.
Facts: On December 6, 1982, herein private respondent Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) sued herein petitioners Peroxide
Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman Chemical
Industries, Inc. (Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua
and Rose U. Mapua (Mapuas) in Civil Case No. 48849 of the
then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila for the
collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and
the Mapuas bound themselves to be solidarily liable. Upon the
filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by Judge
Gregorio G. Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was actually done on January 7,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
1983 after BPI filed an attachment bond in the amount of
P32,700,000.00. Petitioners' properties were accordingly
attached by the sheriff. On January 11, 1983, Eastman and the
Mapuas moved to lift the attachment, which motion was set for
hearing on January 14, 1983. On January 17, 1983, Judge Pineda
issued two (2) orders, the first, denying BPI's motion for a
hearing, and, the second, lifting the writ of attachment as
prayed for by Eastman and the Mapuas. BPI filed a motion for
reconsideration but, consequent to the then judiciary
reorganization, the case was re-raffled and assigned to the sala
of Judge Pastor Reyes.
RTC Ruling: Judge Reyes granted the motion for
reconsideration saying that the attachment was proper as the
petitioners had their properties disposed in fraud of BPI.
CA ruling: RTC Ruling affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA were correct in adjudging
that the suspension of writ of attachment was improper.
Ruling: Yes. The suspension order of the writ of attachment is
tantamount to discharge of the said writ having been issued ex
parte. Section 13 of Rule 57 requires that due notice and
hearing be complied with before the issuance of the discharge
of the writ attachment. In the foregoing circumstances, the
suspension order of Judge Pineda of the said writ in ex parte
was is in essence a discharge and was issued without the
aforementioned due notice and hearing. Thus, the writ of
attachment remained valid.
130 | P a g e
Dispositive portion: For all the foregoing considerations, the
petition at bar is denied and the judgment of respondent court
of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.
Doctrine:
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to
preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits
of the case can be heard.
Facts:
Miriam College has found its school paper Chi-Rho, and
magazine Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho contents of
the September-October 1994 issue obscene, vulgar, indecent,
gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid
of all moral values. Following the publication of the paper and
the magazine, the members of the editorial board, and Relly
Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received
a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College
Discipline Committee to inform them that there were letters of
complaint filed against them by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student which
were forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and
investigation. The said letter also required them to submit a
written statement in answer to the charges on or before the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994 at the
DSA Conference Room but none of the students submitted
their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports which under Rule XII of DECS
Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over
the case. In a Letter dated November 21, 1994, Dr. Sevilla again
required the students to file their written answers.
In response, Atty. Valmonte, lawyer for the students,
submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his
clients position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over
them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was trying
to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having
written articles and poems in their capacity as campus
journalists. Hence, he argued that what applies is Republic Act
No. 7079 also known as The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations. He also questioned the
partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly had
already articulated their position against his clients. The
Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte.
Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline
Committees report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the
students. The students were suspended, expelled, dismissed,
and one was not allowed to attend her graduation.
The students thus filed a petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over
them. Thereafter, the judge in the RTC Branch III issued an
order denying the plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary Restraining
131 | P a g e
Order. The students thereafter filed a “Supplemental Petition
and Motion for Reconsideration.” The RTC issued an Order
granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Both parties moved
for a reconsideration of the order. On the matter raised by both
parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, the RTC
dismissed the case and all orders it issued are recalled and set
aside. The Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining Miriam
College from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension, but it
eventually declared the RTC Order, as well as the students’
suspension and dismissal, void.
Issue: Whether or not the case is moot in character.
Ruling:
No, the case is not moot. It may be rod that what the court
issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not a
preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA
ever issued a preliminary injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to
refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an
extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case
can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it is
dissolved or until the termination of the action without the
court issuing a final injunction.
Dispositive Portion:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to
READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has
long lapsed. SO ORDERED.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ET AL. vs. FORERUNNER MULTI
RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 199324 January 7, 2013
Carpio J:
Facts:
On 12 December 2002, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued and Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) which imposes a
partial ban on the importation of used of motor vehicle. The
ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate
the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the
Philippines.
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. a
corporation engaged in the importation of used vehicle via the
ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando La Union, sued the
government in RTC of Aparri, Cagayan trial court to declare
invalid the EO 156 impleading petitioner public officials as
respondents. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been
issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and
(3) having been superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO
132 | P a g e
418), issued by President Arroyo on 4 April 2005, modifying the
tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent
sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia,
the enforcement of EO 156.
RTC granted the relief sought by the respondents and
initially issued a temporary restraining order followed by a writ
of preliminary injunction. On petitioners’ motion, the trial court
reconsidered its Order and lifted the injunctive writ on 7 July
2010. The trial court anchored its ruling on Southwing case
which considered as negating any "clear and unmistakable legal
right" on the part of respondent to receive the "protection of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
in a certiorari petition. The CA granted the certiorari and set
aside the 7 July 2010 Order of the trial court and reinstated its
Order dated 27 November 2008.
Petitioner then went to the Supreme Court challenging
the ruling of the CA. they argue that Southwing controls the
case, precluding the Court of Appeals from recognizing a clear
legal right of respondent to import used motor vehicles.
On the other hand, respondents counters that the
doctrinal import of Southwing was weakened by the
subsequent issuance of EO 418, allegedly repealing EO 156
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary injunctive
relief to respondent to enjoin enforcement of EO 156.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
RULING:
The CA erred in granting the preliminary injunctive relief
to respondent.
A preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only
upon a showing of the applicant’s "clear legal right" being
violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. "Clear
legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right
"clearly founded in or granted by law."Any hint of doubt or
dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of
laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the
applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added
burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in
such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the
issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while,
at the same time, restricting the course of action of the
defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against
them.
we find no merit in respondent’s submission that EO
418 repealed EO 156, removing the legal bar to its importation
of used motor vehicles. The question of whether EO 418
repealed EO 156 was already settled in our Resolution dated 22
August 2006 denying reconsideration of our ruling in
Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used
motor vehicles via the Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory
133 | P a g e
presently advanced by respondent. We rejected the proffered
construction of the two issuances:
The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import
duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of the
executive department to prohibit the importation of said
vehicle. x x x There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which
expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of
the President in this case, is presumed to know the existing
laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add
a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal previous administrative issuances.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Decision dated 27 June 2011 and the Resolution dated 14
November 2011 of the Court of Appeals. The Order dated 7 July
201 0 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 10,
is REINSTATED. The temporary restraining order issued on 16
January 2012 is made PERMANENT.
TML GASKET INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 188768 January 7, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
Doctrine: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the
commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a
person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. The
requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and
its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation
against that right must be shown.
Facts: This petition for review on certiorari to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81932 which, in turn, reversed the Orders, respectively dated
22 August 2003 and 27 November 2003, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 104, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 02-
0504. The assailed Orders issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of petitioner TML Gasket Industries, Inc.
(TML), enjoining respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.'s
(BPI's) extra-judicial foreclosure of TML’s mortgaged
properties, and denied TML’s motion for reconsideration
thereof.
134 | P a g e
Sometime in September 1996, TML obtained a loan from the
Bank of Southeast Asia, Inc. (BSA), which TML can avail via a
credit facility of P85,000,000.00. As security for the loan, TML
executed a real estate mortgage over commercial and
industrial lots located at Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81278 and
81303 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City. For additional
security, BSA required TML to execute a promissory note for
each availment from the credit facility.
During the period of the loan, BSA changed its corporate name
to DBS Bank Phils. (DBS), which eventually merged with BPI
under the latter’s corporate name.
TML defaulted in the payment of its loan leading BPI to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
On 24 October 2002, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC, Parañaque
City issued a Notice of Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale of the
mortgaged properties.
Because of the imminent foreclosure sale of its mortgaged
properties, TML, on 21 November 2002, filed a "Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, Accounting, Declaration of Nullity of Notice
of Extra-Judicial Sale, Increased (sic) in Interest Rates, Penalty
Charges Plus, (sic) Damages, with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" against BPI and DBS before the RTC, Branch 194,
Parañaque City. The Writ was issued in favor of TML.
BPI filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul and set
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
aside the twin Orders of the trial court respectively dated 22
August 2003 and 27 November 2003 which granted the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of TML and enjoined the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties.
The CA subsequently reversed and set aside the decision of the
trial court, and the writ of preliminary injunction lifted.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred when it
reversed and set aside the twin Orders of the trial court and
lifted the injunctive writ.
Ruling: We subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling. A writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing
of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency
of the principal action. The requisites of a valid injunction are
the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations.
Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be shown.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within
the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is
generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be
proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought
to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a
writ of injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
135 | P a g e
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it revoked its
previous order and subsequently issued a writ of preliminary
injunction simply on the following grounds: "(a) that TML’s
mortgage debt is unliquidated; (b) that TML stands to suffer
great and irreparable damages if it wins the case but, in the
process, loses its mortgaged properties to BPI, or even worse,
to third parties; and, (c) that, considering, the brief redemption
period under the General Banking Act, TML’s chance to redeem
its properties would be next to impossible."
Petitioners do not have any clear right to be protected. As
shown in our earlier findings, they failed to substantiate their
allegations that their right to due process had been violated
and the maturity of their obligation forestalled. Since they
indisputably failed to meet their obligations in spite of repeated
demands, we hold that there is no legal justification to enjoin
respondent from enforcing its undeniable right to foreclose the
mortgaged properties.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81932 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village
Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 143870. September 30, 2005
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

Tinga, J.: Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Injunction is a preservative remedy
and NHA. Said petition sought to restrain MIAA from
aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ
implementing the Conceptual Development Plan insofar as
of preliminary injunction is issued by the court to prevent
Rivera Village is concerned and to compel NHA to order the
threatened or continuous irreparable injury to parties before
disposition of the property in favor of the members of the
their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole
homeowners association. MIAA filed an answer alleging that
objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
the petition fails to state a cause of action.
case can be heard fully.
FACTS:
The Court denied the petition for the issuance of writ of
The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with
preliminary injunction and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
the administration, operation, management, control,
It was on the ground that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a
maintenance and development of the Manila International
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
Airport (MIA), now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. CAA
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
entered into individual lease contracts with its employees for
involving infrastructure projects of the government or any
portions of land known as Rivera Village. The leases were for a
public utility operated by the government. The court also
25-year period. Thereafter, EO No. 778 was issued creating
declared that the subject property has been reserved by MIAA
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) transferring to
for airport-related activities and, as such, is exempt from the
the same the assets of MIA. MIAA then stopped issuing accrued
coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban
rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the
Development and Housing Program. Said decision was reversed
lessees. Respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners
by the CA and it was held that a writ of preliminary injunction
Association, Inc., representing the lessees, requested MIAA to
is issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from
sell the subject property to its members, invoking PD No. 1517
evicting the members of petitioner Rivera Village Association
or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD No. 2016. MIAA denied
from their respective lots in the Rivera Village.
such request and stated that the subject property is included in
its Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related
activities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

136 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

association’s entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is

already moot and academic. Further, the right of the members
RULING:
of the homeowners association to possess and purchase the
subject property is still uncertain considering that they have not
completed the process for the acquisition of their lots as
No, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
outlined in PD 1517.
injunction should be denied.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30,
substantive rights and interests. The writ of preliminary
2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the
injunction is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.
continuous irreparable injury to parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
AUTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, AND
heard fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of two
LYDIA MARCIANO,
requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; vs.
and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BAsAS PROVINCE
a clear legal right, as in the case, the issuance of the injunctive G.R. No. 183367; March 14, 2012
relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not Sereno, J.:
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) may be issued only if it
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on
Preliminary injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot
the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
stand separately or proceed independently of the main case.
heard.
Having declared that the petition filed before the trial court was
correctly dismissed, the determination of the homeowners

137 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
FACTS:
In 1993, the public market of the respondents
Municipality of Padre Garcia was destroyed by fire. Thereafter,
the respondent through its then mayor executed a
Memorandum Agreement with the petitioner Australian
Professional Realty wherein the latter shall acquire the
exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a
period of 25 years. However, after Victor Reyes was elected as
a new mayor of the municipality, the respondent initiated a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the MOA with the RTC.
The said court issued summons to petitioner requiring them to
file their Answer but the same was returned unserved, as
petitioners were no longer holding the same office. Thereafter,
the RTC granted the motion of the respondent to effect the
service by publication. After such, the RTC declare the
petitioners in default and render judgment in favor of the
respondent. The court issued a Writ of Execution for the same
after the period to file an appeal has lapsed.
The petitioner later filed before the Court of Appeals a
Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo and Motion for Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. However, the appellate court denied the said
petitions on the ground that the matter is not extreme urgency
and that there is no clear and irreparable injury that would be
suffered by the petitioners. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
138 | P a g e
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo and
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. A write of preliminary injunction and a TRO are
injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection
of substantive rights and interest .The existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage is
essential. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) may be issued only if it
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on
the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
heard. Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners
must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act
sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage.
A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its
accompanying Affidavits filed before the CA shows that the
petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and faithful
execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of the
writ of execution which would nullify the implementation of the
MOA, is manifestly prejudicial to petitioners' interest, they have
failed to establish in their petition that they possess a clear right
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
that merits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Their right under the MOA have already been declared
inexistent in relation to respondent in the RTC case, under a
judgment that has become final and executory.
Hence, there is not grave abuse of discretion. The CA did
not exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or
exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated 26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 are AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals is
directed to proceed with dispatch to dispose of the case
before it.
SO ORDERED.
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his
daughter DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO
FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008
PUNO, C.J.
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: The court’s jurisdiction over a
defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a
valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
139 | P a g e
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it.
Proper service of summons is used to protect one’s right to due
process.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case for Filing,
Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment.
Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court’s
judgment that was rendered by the United States District Court
of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled
Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee
Marcos, for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano
committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
allegedly under the command, direction, authority,
supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of
defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of
the then Revised Rules of Court. The trial court issued Summons
addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium
Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the
Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit.
When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court
declared her in default.
Thereafter, petitioner, by special appearance of
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the
motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in
the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident
of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on
personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4)
defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever
judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
However, the trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss
on the strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes
of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court
relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service
was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such
presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Petitioner Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter
rendered a decision , the CA rendered the assailed Decision,
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
adopted the court a quo findings of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid substituted service of summons
on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO.
140 | P a g e
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon
a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing
a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If
defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the
summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service
can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is
permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of
the usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance
with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs
published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,”
which should be made in the proof of service.
In the case at bar, there is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of “on
many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons x x x personally,” “at reasonable hours during the
day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.”
Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict
compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule
14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid
substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court
perforce must be annulled.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the assailed March
17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.No costs.
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA
TIRONA, respondent.
[G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005]
CARPIO, J.
Summary of Doctrine:
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who
has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
141 | P a g e
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and
asks that the persons who claim the said property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order
to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect
of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants
litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action
and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the
pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
Facts:
Ocampo bought a parcel of land from Rosauro Breton. Ocampo
then possessed and administer the subject land although the
TCT is not yet in his name. Ocampo notified Tirona, who was a
lessee occupying a portion of the subject land, about the sale.
Tirona religiously paid her rents to Ocampo. However, when
the subject premises were declared under area for priority
development, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal and
refused to pay her rent until the NHA processed her papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. In her Answer,
Tirona‘s asserted that Dona Yaneza was the owner of the land
and not Ocampo. She likewise reiterated that she has the right
of first refusal over the land as it was included in the area of
priority development under PD 1517. The MTC ruled in favor of
Ocampo.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory and disclosed that Alipio
Breton is the registered owner of the subject land. When Alipio
Breton died, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject land. Tirona claims she
has never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes. Tirona also
stated that Rosauro could not transfer ownership to the subject
land to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of
conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes. The RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTC.
The CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a
prerequisite to Ocampo’s action; hence, it dismissed the case.
Issues:
1. Has Ocampo the right to eject Tirona from the subject land?
2. Is the issue of ownership essential in a suit to eject a person
illegally occupying a land?
3. Is the CA correct in holding that unlawful detainer had to wait
for the results of the partition proceedings?
4. What should have been filed by Tirona when she does not
know the person to whom to pay the rentals due?
Held:
1. Yes. Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The
elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases
are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. All
the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper
are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the
subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued
142 | P a g e
occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to
Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay
rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
2. No. The issue of ownership is not essential to an action for
unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its
term are the only elements of the action. The defense of
ownership does not change the summary nature of the
action. The affected party should raise the issue of ownership
in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title cannot be
the subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the main
issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth
in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to change the
nature of the original action.
3. Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error
for the appellate court to include the issue of ownership. Had
the appellate court limited its ruling to the elements to be
proved in a case of unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even
prove his ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the
case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the
partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main
issue in the case. The issue of ownership opens a virtual
Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor, Maria
Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
4. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference
for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending
claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual
institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due
to conflicting claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who
has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and
asks that the persons who claim the said property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order
to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect
of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants
litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action
and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the
pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition for review. The
Decision dated 27 June 1996 of Branch 110 of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 96-0209, which affirmed the Decision dated 29
December 1995 of Branch 47 of the MTC in Civil Case No. 754-
95, is REINSTATED. The Decision dated 29 November 2000 of
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 41686, and its Resolution
dated 16 April 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are SET ASIDE.
143 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-
appellant, vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
CASTRO, C.J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has
personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes
to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one
or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person
not against double liability but against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
FACTS:
Wack Wack Golf is a civic and athletic Philippine corporation.
Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack
Wack Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a civil case, he was
issued such certificate. But a certain Tan also claims ownership
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
over such certificate pursuant to an assignment made by the
alleged true owner of the same certificate. Thus, Wack Wack
Golf filed a complaint for interpleader against Won and Tan
who both claim ownership over the membership fee certificate.
Wack alleged that it has no means of knowing who the lawful
owner is and that it claims no interest in the certificate. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of res judicata
and failure to state a cause of action. Hence this appeal. ISSUE:
WON the remedy of interpleader is proper and timely.
RULING:
The subject matter of the present controversy which is the
membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader
suit. Conversely, Wack Wack may not properly invoke the
remedy of interpleader this is for the reason that the latter had
already been made independently liable in the previous civil
case wherein Won had established his rights to the certificate
and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in
effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the civil
case.
An interpleader is a remedy available to a person who
possesses property or has an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right to either, wherein the court
will require the claimants to litigate among themselves who
really is entitled. A stakeholder should, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, file an interpleader within a reasonable
time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either claimant. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or
144 | P a g e
undue delay. He must be prepared to show, among other
prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to
any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit
filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to
proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case
26044 to proceed to final judgment. It was aware of the
conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the
membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present
interpleader suit. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to
proceed with the litigation and to defend itself therein. As a
matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said
judgment has already been executed. It is therefore too late for
it to invoke the remedy of interpleader. To now permit the
Corporation to bring Won to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the
membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of
an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter
would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot
be done because having elected to take its chances of success
in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the
Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his
defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to
prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. One
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

of the purpose of an interpleader is to diminish the number of
suits. If Wack were allowed to file an interpleader now, it would
go against this purpose.
Therefore, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing
the complaint, is affirmed, at appellant’s cost. Wack Wack Golf
& Country Club, Inc. vs. Won, 70 SCRA 165, No. L-23851 March
26, 1976
SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS et al vs. TERESITA D. RAMOS
et al
DOCTRINE: When a party represents merely an inchoate
interest, such party had no standing in court with respect to
actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was
represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was
no need to implead such party inasmuch as the estates of the
deceased co-owners had already been made parties.
FACTS: Petitioners are children of the late Paulino V.
Chanliongco Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel of land. It
was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario
and Antonio. By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed
by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter had sold the
lot to herein respondents. Because of conflict among the heirs
of the co-owners as to the validity of the sale, respondents filed
a Complaint for interpleader to resolve the various ownership
claims. The RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa
was concerned. On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. This CA Decision was not appealed, became final and was
entered in favor of respondents. After three years, petitioners
filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision. This was
however denied on the ground, among others, that the
movants did not have any legal standing. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
RULING: NONE.
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an
interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property
in question. Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest
in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which
of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve
the ownership of the land and was not directed against the
personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a
real action, because it affected title to or possession of real
property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the
deceased registered co-owners.
Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land,
but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of
Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions
over a property of the estate, because the latter was
represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was
no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch
as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been
made parties.

145 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by Governor
Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; and
CITY OF NAGA, represented byMayor Jesse M.
Robredo,
respondents. G.R. No. 175064. September 18,
2009.
Territorial Jurisdiction
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The property subject of the instant case is a parcel of land,
known as Plaza Rizal, situated within the territory of herein
respondent City of Naga and with an aggregate area of 4,244
square meters, more or less. Plaza Rizal is located in front of the
old provincial capitol building, where the Provincial
Government of Camarines Sur used to have its seat, at the time
when the then Municipality of Naga was still the provincial
capital. On 18 June 1948, Republic Act No. 3055 took effect and,
by virtue thereof, the Municipality of Naga was converted into
the City of Naga. Subsequently, on 16 June 1955, Republic Act
No. 13366 was approved, transferring the site of the provincial
capital of Camarines Sur from the City of Naga to the barrio of
Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The Municipality of Pili was also
named as the new provincial capital.
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On 13 January 1997, the City of Naga filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title against Camarines
Sur before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Naga.
The City of Naga alleged that, for a considerable length of time,
Camarines Sur possessed and claimed ownership of Plaza Rizal
because of a tax declaration over the said property in the name
of the province. As a result, Camarines Sur had long exercised
administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, to the
exclusion of the City of Naga. The City of Naga could not
introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal, and its constituents
could not use the property without securing a permit from the
proper officials of Camarines Sur. The situation had created a
conflict of interest between the parties herein and had
generated animosities among their respective officials.
The City of Naga stressed that it did not intend to acquire
ownership of Plaza Rizal. Being a property of the public domain,
Plaza Rizal could not be claimed by any subdivision of the state,
as it belonged to the public in general. Instead, the City of Naga
sought a declaration that the administrative control and
management of Plaza Rizal should be vested in it, given that the
said property is situated within its territorial jurisdiction. The
RTC considered, is hereby interpreted and declared in this
Court to mean that the administrative control and
management of Plaza Rizal is within the City of Naga and not
with the Province of Camarines Sur.” Camarines Sur sought a
reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision, but the Court of
Appeals denied the same.
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks to annul and set aside the Decision dated 28 June 2004
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
and the Resolution dated 11 August 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56243. The assailed Decision of the
appellate court denied due course the Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by petitioner Province of Camarines Sur
(Camarines Sur), while the assailed Resolution denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier Decision.
VII. ISSUES:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it treated the petition for review under rule
45 filed by Camarines Sur as one for certiorari under rule 65
thereby denying due course and dismissing the petition and
even the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
petition was availed of as a substitute for the lost appeal and
for absence of grave abuse of discretion.
VIII. RULLING:
In the instant case, the controversy concerns the construction
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the Charter of the
City of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an
interpretation of Section 2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a
declaration of the rights of the parties to this case thereunder.
To recall, Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305 defines the
territory of the City of Naga, providing that the City shall
comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Naga. By virtue of this provision, the City of Naga prays that
it be granted the right to administratively control and supervise
Plaza Rizal, which is undisputedly within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City.
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Clearly, the interests of the City of Naga and Camarines Sur in
this case are adverse. The assertion by the City of Naga of a
superior right to the administrative control and management of
Plaza Rizal, because said property of the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Public domain is within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly
antagonistic to and inconsistent with the insistence of
Camarines Sur. The latter asserted in its Complaint for
Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title that it should
maintain administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal
having continuously possessed the same under a claim of
ownership, even after the conversion of the Municipality of
Naga into an independent component city. The City of Naga
further asserted that as a result of the possession by Camarines
Sur, the City of Naga could not introduce improvements on
Plaza Rizal; its constituents were denied adequate use of said
property, since Camarines Sur required that the latter’s
permission must first be sought for the use of the same; and it
was still Camarines Sur that was able to continuously use Plaza
Rizal for its own programs and projects. The City of Naga
undoubtedly has a legal interest in the controversy, given that
Plaza Rizal is undisputedly within its territorial jurisdiction.
Lastly, the issue is ripe for judicial determination in that, in view
of the conflicting interests of the parties to this case, litigation
is inevitable, and there is no adequate relief available in any
other form or proceeding.
Camarines Sur cannot claim that Plaza Rizal is part of its
patrimonial property. The basis for the claim of ownership of
Camarines Sur. the tax declaration covering Plaza Rizal in the
name of the province, hardly convinces this Court. Well-settled
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
is the rule that a tax declaration is not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land, when not supported
by any other evidence. The same is merely indicia of a claim of
ownership. In the same manner, the Certification dated 14 June
1996 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources–Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (DENR-CENRO) in favor of Camarines Sur, merely stating
that the parcel of land described therein, purportedly Plaza
Rizal, was being claimed solely by Camarines Sur, hardly
constitutes categorical proof of the alleged ownership of the
said property by the province.
Thus, being a property for public use within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Naga, Plaza Rizal should be under the
administrative control and supervision of the said city.
IX. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is hereby DISMISSED. The
administrative control and supervision of Plaza Rizal is hereby
vested in the City of Naga. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES INC.
G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008
FACTS: In May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries,
Inc. (lessee) entered into a contract of lease with petitioners
(lessors). Provisions of the contract of lease include:
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6th - Lessee shall pay an increased rent if there is
any new tax imposed on the property
7th - In case of supervening extraordinary
inflation or devaluation of the PHP, the value
of PHP at the time of the establishment of
theobligation shall be the basis of payment
Petitioners later demanded payment of VAT and 73% adjusted
rentals pursuant to the foregoing provisions. Respondent
refused and filed an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners
filed an action for ejectment.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is proper.
RULING: Yes. Petitioners insist that respondent was already in
breach of the contract when the petition was filed, thus,
respondent is barred from filing an action for declaratory relief.
However, after petitioners demanded payment of adjusted
rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied
with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of
lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the
pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that
respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the
subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from
instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory
relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not proper
because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the
construction of the subject contractual provisions should be
ventilated in the same forum.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed
in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. In this case, however, the trial court had not yet
resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the
rescission case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution
dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED.
BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. (Formerly International
Communications Corporation), Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161140 January 31, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
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A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.
FACTS:
A petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC of
Pasig City, by petitioner against respondents specifically sought
the suspension of the requirement, under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 7925, a public offering of 30% of the aggregate
common stocks of telecommunication entities with regulated
types of services within five years from the effectivity of the Act
or the entity’s first start of commercial operations, whichever
comes later. Petitioner claimed that it was impossible for it to
make a bona fide public offering at that time because its
financial condition, the Philippine economy, and the stock
market were not conducive for a successful public offering. It
also claimed that impossibility of performance was an implied
exception to the abovecited provision of Rep. Act No. 7925.
The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
petition for failure to state a cause of action. The Solicitor
General maintained that the provisions of Section 21of Rep. Act
No. 7925 are clear and free of any ambiguity, and that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as it did
not first ask for an exemption from the application of said
provision. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to
state a cause of action. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. It held that the elements of justiciable
controversy and ripeness for judicial determination were
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
absent as there was no showing that petitioner asked for an
exemption from or deferment of compliance with the
requirement of Section 21, from the NTC, and was refused
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements of an action for
declaratory relief have been met.
RULING:
No. For such an action for declaratory relief before a
trial court to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is a
justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking the relief has
a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is
ripe for judicial determination.
A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law. In the case at bar, petitioner
fears the risk of possible sanctions. However, a mere
apprehension of an administrative sanction does not give rise
to a justiciable controversy. Considering that the requirements
of an action for declaratory relief have not been met, the trial
court properly dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The appellate court did not err in affirming said dismissal
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
KAREN SALVACION minor, thru FEDERICO SALVACION, father
and Natural Guardian and Sps. Salvacion
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION AND GREG BARTELLI respondent.
Respondents.
G. R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for Declaratory relief. However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
should be resolved, it may be treated as one of mandamus.
FACTS:
The case arise from the rape committed by an American
tourist Greg Bartelli to minor Karen Salvacion, after luring such
child to come with him to his apartment and there detained the
said minor and raped her. After the minor was rescued, a case
for serious Illegal detention and 4 counts of rape was filed
against Bartelli. On the same day, petitioners filed with the RTC
of Makati a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
against Bartelli. The Court granted the application of the
petitioners in the civil case. The deputy sheriff of Makati then
served a Notice of garnishment on the China Banking Corp.,
however the bank invoked the Bank Secrecy law. This prompted
the petitioners counsel to inquire to the Central Bank on
whether Sec. 113 of C.B Circular No. 960 has any exception
since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right
of the plaintiff to claim sought to be enforced by the civil action
secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to plaintiff under rule 57 of Rules of Court.
The bank still invoked Section 113 of C. B Circular 960,
hence, the petitioner sought the relief of court through a
petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT MAY
ENTERTAIN THE INSTANT PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN PETITIONS FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF REST IN LOWER COURTS.
RULING:
YES.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The petitioner deserves to receive the damages
awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory
relief can only be entertained and treated as petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with
the writ of execution in Civil cases No. 89-3214.
151 | P a g e
The Supreme Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for Declaratory relief. However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
should be resolved, it may be treated as one of mandamus.
The present petition has far reaching implication on the
right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by
an alien who take refuge under the law and regulation
promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the
application thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically,
the petition raises the question against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes accorded to foreign
currency deposits by P.D No. 1246 and C.B Circular no. 960
applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or
investor but from a mere transcient or tourist who is not
expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
In view Whereof, the provisions of the Sec. 113 of C.B
Circular No. 960 and P.D No. 1246, insofar as it amends Sec. 8
of R.A 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby
REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in civil
Case No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion et al vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to
petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. So
ordered.
Mananquil, et al. vs. Moico
686 SCRA 123, G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE: An action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity; For an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
FACTS: Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil owned Lot 18 and
Lot 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas by virtue of an NHA project.
Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla
Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19, on the
other hand, was sold to Prescilla by its occupant. In 1991, both
spouses died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had
a child by a previous marriage – namely Eulogio. After the
spouses’ death, Iluminardo’s supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs)
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and
adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19. They took
possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third
parties, while Eulogio had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Roberto Moico. Moico evicted the Mananquils
and instituted a case for quieting of title and injunctive relief.
152 | P a g e
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Mananquils, but on
appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed because of
the possible violation of the terms and conditions of the NHA
grant committed by Iluminardo and Priscilla is closely related to
the issue of ownership and possession of Lots 18 and 19 and to
whoever has the proper right over it, as it rule said lots was still
under the ownership of the NHA. Hence, the case before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not title whether legal or equitable is
essential in an action for quieting of title
RULING: Yes. An action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. But "for an action to
quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
Contrary to petitioners’ stand, the issue relating to the grant of
rights, title or award by the NHA determines whether the case
for quieting of title may be maintained. If the petitioners are
legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his
death – under the certificate of title, award, or grant, or under
the special law or specific terms of the NHA program/project –
then they possess the requisite interest to maintain suit; if not,
then Civil Case No. 2741-MN must necessarily be dismissed.
From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the
petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA
program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant,
document or certification from the NHA or proper government
agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots
18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking
over Iluminardo’s rights after his death.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 13, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81229 is
AFFIRMED.
SPOUSES EROSTO SANTIAGO and NELSIE SANTIAGO,
petitioners
vs.
MANCER VILLAMOR, CARLOS VILLAMOR, JOHN VILLAMOR
and DOMINGO VILLAMOR, JR., respondents
GR No. 168499 November 26, 2012
Brion, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about the quieting of title being prayed for
by petitioners in this case due to a fact that they bought the
same in good faith and therefore entitled to own and possess
the same.
FACTS:
For non-payment of the loan that Spouses Domingo, Sr.
and Trinidad Villamor obtained from Rural Bank San Jacinto, the
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latter foreclosed the real estate mortgage and was thereafter
became the highest bidder at public auction and consequently
became the owner of the land. San Jacinto Bank then offered
the land for sale to any interested party.
Mancer Villamor, Carlos Villamor and Domingo
Villamor, Jr., together with Catalina Villamor-Ranshez, all sons
and daughter of the Spouses, decided to acquire the property
considering that they had been in possession and cultivating
the land. They made 4 installments which was thereafter
completed on June 8, 1994 and considered fully paid. But when
they requested for an issuance of deed of conveyance, the Bank
refused which led them to file a case for specific performance
on October 11, 1994.
Meanwhile, on July 19, 1994, the Bank issued a deed of
sale in favor of Domingo, Sr. and on July 21, 1994, the Spouses
Villamor sold the land to Spouses Santiago.
In refusing to issue the deed of conveyance, the Bank
claimed that it already issued a deed of repurchase in favor of
the Spouses Villamor because the payments made the children
of the Spouses were credited to the account of Domingo, Sr.
since the real buyers of the land were the Spouses Villamor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for specific
performance which was thereafter set aside by the Court of
Appeals and ruled that it was the children of the Spouses who
made the payment and not as a representative of the Spouses
Villamor.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
After the respondents herein and Catalina
refused to vacate the property, Spouses Santiago filed a
complaint on October 20, 1994 for quieting of title and recovery
of possession. The RTC ruled in their favor but the CA set aside
the same and ruled that Spouses Santiago failed to prove their
legal or equitable title to the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quieting of title should be granted.
RULING:
No. The quieting of title cannot be granted. The
Supreme Court ruled that quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. The plaintiffs must show not
only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject
real property, but that they have a valid title to it. Worth
stressing, in civil cases, the plaintiff must establish his cause of
action by preponderance of evidence; otherwise, his suit will
not prosper.
The Spouses Santiago anchor their claim over the
disputed land on the July 21, 1994 notarized deed of sale
executed in their favor by the Spouses Villamor who in turn
obtained a July 19, 1994 notarized deed of sale from the San
Jacinto Bank. On the other hand, the respondents and Catalina
claim title by virtue of their installment payments to the San
Jacinto Bank from November 4, 1991 to June 8, 1994 and their
actual possession of the disputed land.
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After considering the parties’ evidence and arguments,
the Court agree with the CA that Spouses Santiago failed to
prove that they have any legal or equitable title over the
disputed land.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition and ORDER
the DISMISSAL of Civil Case No. 201 before the Regional Trial
Court of San Jacinto, Masbate, Branch 50.
Costs against the petitioners.
Lokin Jr. vs. Comelec
Summary of the doctrine:
Certiorari not an election protest or quo warranto, is the
proper recourse to review a COMELEC resolution approving
the withdrawal of the nomination of its original nominees and
substituting them with others, even if the substitute
nominees have already been proclaimed and have taken their
oath of office: The controversy involving Lokin is neither an
election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns
a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest
may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking
to unseat another party-list organization to determine which
between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is
not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list
organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo
warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the
ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of
the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Facts: Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party
registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise
known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution
and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and
corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys
public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its
highest policymaking and governing body, the party
participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20
November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to
represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who
claimed to be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m.
of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by
herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose
as the partys vice-president and secretary-general,
respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447
giving due course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of the
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registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which
filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official
representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and
Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the
Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and
Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a
second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners
Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla
affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-
general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and
Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC
a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For
Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself
as acting secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and
other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the
party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was
duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be
expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction
as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance
with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the
controversy?
Respondent’s argument: the COMELEC posits that once the
proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to
the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses
herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action
for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for
certiorari in this Court.
Ruling: Yes. An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between
them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast
156 | P a g e
and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of
disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his
place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy
because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest
nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly
be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat
another party-list organization to determine which between
the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one
in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization
thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-
list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie,
considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines,
or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14,
2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of
the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and
the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review
is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be
filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against
the COMELEC.
Dispositive portion: the petitions for certiorari and mandamus
are granted.
The SC: We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid
and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it
has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Ordered the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative
representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 156822. October 18, 2004
ANGARA vs FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
157 | P a g e
FACTS:
Before the Court is petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution, dated April 2, 2003, which
denied his petition for review on certiorari for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any
reversible error in its Decision, dated September 26, 2002, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69776, dismissing his petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
On February 8, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for
Accion Reinvindicatoria and/or Quieting of Title against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas ,
claiming to be the rightful owners of the land currently
occupied by petitioner. They even conducted a relocation
survey. Petitoner on the other hand claimed that he is the
lawful owner of the said parcels of land and do not encroach on
respondent's property and assuming that there is such an
encroachment, he nevertheless had acquired title thereto by
virtue of acquisitive prescription. RTC ordered the constitution
of committee of three surveyors composed of geodetic
engineers representing the petitioner, respondent and the
DENR.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
On June 22, 2000, the RTC issued subpoena ad
testificandum to the three Geodetic Engineers who composed
the Board of Commissioners to testify in connection with their
individual reports. The RTC also reminded respondent that the
case was filed as early as February 8, 1996, the pre-trial was
conducted on January 20, 1999 and since then respondent has
not even commenced presenting its evidence on the merits.
On September 27, 2000, the RTC ordered the dismissal
of the case due to the failure of the respondent to prosecute its
case for an unreasonable length of time. However, upon
respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered
the order of dismissal. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
praying that judgment be rendered on the basis of the
commissioners' report and, alternatively, all other persons who
will be adversely affected by the relocation survey be
impleaded as parties.
RTC denied the said Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that
according to respondent there was no joint survey conducted
by the commissioners as ordered by it and as agreed upon by
the parties, hence the report of the commissioners cannot be
the basis of the judgment, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was rejected by the RTC. Petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. this too was rejected.
Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Court denied
158 | P a g e
the petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently
show that the CA committed any reversible error. Hence, the
present Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting
the appeal.
HELD:
No. According to petitioner, this is a "simple case of an
alleged 'encroachment' or 'overlapping' of property
boundaries." Considering that the issue involves principally a
factual and technical matter for which the RTC, at the instance
of the parties, created a Panel of Commissioners has done its
job and the chairman submitted his report on the basis of his
evaluation of the separate surveys conducted by the members.
The RTC, however, simply ignored the report on the technical
and lame excuse that the Panel of Commissioners did not
conduct a "joint survey." Petitioner submits that the RTC
cannot simply ignore the commissioners' report without
considering its merits simply because the parties agreed that
the same is not final and binding. Petitioner argues that the RTC
should have considered the merits of the report and acted on
its recommendation instead of rejecting it outright without any
cause or reason. As to the insistence of respondent that the RTC
ordered a "joint survey", petitioner submits that there is
nothing in the order of the RTC defining or specifying what a
"joint" survey is. Petitioner reiterates his arguments in the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

petition that a joint survey, as understood by respondent, grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
wherein the commissioners literally go out together, conduct a excess of jurisdiction.
survey in the presence of one another, and prepare one report,
In this case, the assailed orders of the RTC are but
could not have been contemplated by the RTC since the
resolutions on incidental matters which do not touch on the
commissioners nominated by the parties insisted on two
merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. They are
different methods or approaches for the survey.
interlocutory orders since there leaves something else to be
done by the RTC with respect to the merits of the case.
Consequently, the Court is perplexed that, in resolving the
A battle of semantics is principally being waged before
petition before it, the Court of Appeals chose to delve into the
this Court. Petitioner argues that undue emphasis was placed
wisdom and soundness of the orders of the RTC, overlooking
on the words "joint relocation survey, which literally means one
the nature of the petition before it. The supervisory jurisdiction
that is conducted physically together or in the presence of one
of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in
another." The order constituting the panel of commissioners,
order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its
however, does not define what a joint relocation survey entails
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the
nor does it lay out the steps or procedures in conducting the
case.
same. Petitioner submits that the term "joint survey" does not
rule out a survey that is coordinated and linked together Petitioner failed to demonstrate his claim that the RTC
resulting in a joint finding and recommendation. On the other acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
hand, respondent subscribes to the pronouncement of the RTC excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's prayer for
that the record is replete with explicit motion and orders of the rendition of judgment based on the commissioners' report. The
court calling for joint survey. Rules of Court clearly provides that the trial court is not bound
by the findings of the commissioners or precluded from
It must be emphasized that the petition before the CA
disregarding the same. It may adopt, modify, reject the report
is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
or recommit it with instructions, or require the parties to
of Court. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope
present further evidence.
and inflexible in character. It can be invoked only for an error
of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with Tan v. Antazo

159 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011
PEREZ, J.
Doctrine:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a
pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
Requirements are alleged in and established by the petition.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Apolinar and Genoveva Antazo are
the registered owners of two parcels of land, namely: (1) a
1,024-square meter lot identified as Lot No. 2190, Cad 609-D,
Case-17, AP-04-004442, situated at Barangay Pilapila,
Binangonan, Rizal and covered by an Original Certificate of
Title; and (2) a 100-square meter portion of a 498-square meter
lot identified as Lot 2175, Cad 609-D. An accion reinvindicatoria
suit with damages was filed by respondents against petitioner
for encroaching on their properties. On July 25, 2008, the RTC
rendered judgment favoring respondents. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was later denied by the RTC.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for adopting a wrong remedy or mode of
appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
subsequently denied in a Resolution.
Petitioner maintains that she rightfully filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. While
conceding that certiorari is available only if there is no appeal
160 | P a g e
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioner avers that her case presents an
exception to such general rule because the decision rendered
by the trial court is an example of an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. Petitioner justifies the mode of appeal she
adopted before the Court of Appeals in that under the Rules of
Court, no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion
for reconsideration. Petitioner now prays for a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the instant
petition deserves outright dismissal for being fatally defective
due to failure to show competent evidence of the identities of
the affiants who signed the affidavit of service and the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
Respondents also assert that certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the decision issued by the RTC. Being
improper, respondents argue that the filing of the certiorari
petition before the Court of Appeals did not toll the running of
the appeal period. Consequently, the RTC judgment had
already lapsed into finality. Respondents also emphasize that
petitioner raises questions of facts which are beyond the
purview of this Court to resolve.
Issue: Whether the correct remedy against the Decision and
Resolution of the RTC is a special civil action for certiorari
before the CA?
Ruling:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is a pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following
requirements are alleged in and established by the petition: (1)
that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Only the first requisite is here present. Petitioner correctly
impleaded the trial court judge in her certiorari petition.
Regarding to the second requisite, it is well-settled that a
petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over
a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove
not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave
abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue
where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party.
The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is
proscribed from assailing the decision or final order of said
161 | P a g e
court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because such recourse is
proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law. Furthermore, certiorari cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal. In this case, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court was clearly available to petitioner. She however
chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129368 August 25, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the proper recourse of the petitioner
for the reversal of the assailed decision and resolution of the
CA.
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.
The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be legally used for any other
purpose. Its function is only to keep the inferior court within
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements
are alleged in the petition and established: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Excess of
jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means
that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal,
board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to
the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are
wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal
power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or
causes, considered either in general or with reference to a
particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.
The general rule is that a cert writ will not issue where the
remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The
remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Hence,
the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy
is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Nor can it
be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s
162 | P a g e
own negligence or error in the choice of remedies. However,
there are cases where the cert writ may still issue even if the
aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary course
of law. Thus, where the exigencies of the case are such that the
ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in
point of promptness or completeness so that a partial or total
failure of justice may result, a cert writ may issue.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of
the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject
of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of
was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and ARTEMIA MAGTOTO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175792 November 21, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Doctrine: Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is not a remedy for a lost appeal.
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari assails the May 31, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85286
dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner spouses
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Ruben C. Magtoto and Artemia Magtoto (spouses Magtoto)
from the November 22, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 58, Angeles City, Pampanga in Civil Case
No. 10940. Said RTC Decision ordered the spouses Magtoto to
pay respondent Leonila Dela Cruz (Leonila) the amount of
P9,497,750.00 representing the former’s unpaid balance for
their purchase of three parcels of land from the latter, and
attorney’s fees.
On May 15, 2003, Leonila filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages and prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the spouses Magtoto.
On June 6, 2003, spouses Magtoto were served with summons
requiring them to file an Answer within 15 days from notice.
The said spouses, however, thrice moved for extensions of time
within which to file the same. In an Order dated July 25, 2003,
the RTC granted the spouses Magtoto a final extension until
August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer. On August 4,
2003 or two days after the last day for filing the Answer, the
spouses Magtoto instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. In an
Order dated September 11, 2003, the RTC denied the Motion
to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On January 23, 2004, Leonila filed a Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default and to Render Judgment Based on the
Complaint.
On June 25, 2004 or almost three months after they were
declared in default, the spouses Magtoto, through their new
counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and
163 | P a g e
to Admit Attached Answer, and their Answer. The RTC,
however, denied the said motion on the ground that there was
no showing of fraud, accident, mistake or inexcusable
negligence to warrant the grant of the very much belated
Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and admission of the
Attached Answer filed by defendants.
On appeal, spouses Magtoto averred that the trial court erred
when it denied their Omnibus Motion to lift the order of default
and to admit their Answer; that they have sufficiently explained
the reason behind their failure to timely file their Answer; that
they failed to secure the services of a new counsel because the
RTC did not act on the motion for withdrawal of appearance of
their former counsel; that Leonila was partly to blame for the
delay in filing their Answer since the Complaint was initially
dismissed for her lack of interest to prosecute; and that the RTC
erred in denying their right to present evidence based on
technicality. CA dismissed the appeal for being bereft of merit.
Spouses subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not the remedy the petitioners resorted to
was proper.
Ruling: No. The petition lacks merit. Petitioners availed of the
wrong remedy.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision
of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Certiorari. As such, this petition should have been dismissed
outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the petition
is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be
denied for late filing and there being no reversible error on the
part of the CA. Records show that petitioners received a copy
of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration
on October 30, 2006. They therefore had 15 days or until
November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed
their Petition for Certiorari on December 29, 2006, after the
period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
had expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not
allowed.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The May 31, 2006 Decision and the October 25, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85286, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Galang v. Geronimo
G.R. No. 192793. February 22, 2011
Peralta, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: In election cases involving an act or
an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
164 | P a g e
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Festo Galang, Jr. was proclaimed winner for the
mayoralty race during the 2010 Automated Elections for
Cajidiocan, Romblon based on the Certificate of Canvass (COC)
without the one “for Proclamation” (COCP) with the approval
of the Board of canvassers. Subsequently, private respondent
Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate requested
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual
reconciliation of the votes cast, which was granted. The manual
reconciliation was done but there was no correction made on
the COCP for the previously proclaimed mayoralty and vice
mayoralty candidates, the total number of votes for each of the
candidates remained the same even after the manual
reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to
read May 20, 2010 to correspond with the date of the manual
reconciliation.
Respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner
before the RTC. The Sheriff went to petitioner's residence to
serve summons with a copy of the petition by leaving the same
and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas,
who was then at petitioner's residence. Petitioner requested
for the copy of the summons and questioned its validity. The
Court found the service thereof valid. Petitioner filed petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 alleging that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in considering as
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
valid the Sheriff's Service of Summons on a person not residing
in petitioner's residence. Respondents then pointed out that
the petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but
with the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of the RTC in an electoral protest should be
filed with COMELEC.
RULING:
Yes, it must be filed before COMELEC. Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC provides
that “in election cases involving an act or an omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.”
Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the
Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, that if a case
may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or
body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction
to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. Since it is the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision
of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective
municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has
165 | P a g e
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
VANGIE BARRAZONA
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and SAN-
AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein
represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU
G.R. No. 154282; April 7, 2006
Sandoval-Guitierrez, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
The filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower
court’s ruling can be dispensed with before resorting to the
remedy of certiorari in exceptional cases, such as where the
question is purely of law, when public interest is involved,
where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may
cause great and irreparable damage, and where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction
FACTS:
The petitioner has been leasing a portion of the private
respondent building in locate in Baguio City since 2001. Starting
August of the same year, the former defaulted in payment of
the monthly rentals despite the repeated demands from the
latter. Consequently, the private respondent filed with the RTC
a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. The
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
petitioner thereafter filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
considering that the allegation therein clearly indicate that the
action is one for ejectment which is under the jurisdiction of the
MTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent and
dismissed the motion for lack of merit. The petitioner filed the
instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying her motion. On the other hand, the
private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
contending that the petitioner should have first filed a motion
for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of Barrazona should be
dismissed.
RULING:
No. The rule that before certiorari may be availed of,
petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the
lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such
rule is not without exception. The Court have, in several
instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a lower court's ruling, such as: where the
proceeding in which the error occurred is patent nullity; where
the question is purely of law; when public interest is involved;
166 | P a g e
where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may
cause great and irreparable damage; and where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction, as in this case.
With regard to the contention of the petitioner, the
Court held that while the complaint of the private respondent
is captioned “Collection of Sum of Money with Damages,” the
allegations therein show that respondent's action is for
ejecment. Therefore, the subject case is within the jurisdiction
of the MTC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated June
19, 2002 issued by the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case
No. 5238-R, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 162575 , December 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for
the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to
it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.
FACTS:
Petitioner is doing business under the name and style of
Able Transport. Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI)
entered in two Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and
Able Transport. Under the Agreements, respondent, as seller,
will sell, deliver or procure to be delivered petroleum products,
and petitioner, as distributor, will purchase, receive and pay for
its purchases from respondent. The two Agreements had a
period of one year, which shall continue on an annual basis
unless terminated by either party upon thirty days written
notice to the other prior to the expiration of the original term
167 | P a g e
or any extension thereof. Under Section 6.3 of the
Distributorship Agreement provides that respondent may
require petitioner to put up securities, real or personal, or to
furnish respondent a performance bond issued by a bonding
company chosen by the latter to secure and answer for
petitioner's outstanding account, and or faithful performance
of her obligations as contained or arising out of the Agreement.
Thus, petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by
several banks, and all these banks separately executed several
undertakings setting the terms and conditions governing the
drawing of money by respondent from these banks,
accordingly. However, petitioner failed to pay her obligations
to respondent despite demand, thus, respondent tried to
withdraw from these bank undertakings.
The petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City separate petitions against the banks for
declaration of nullity of the several bank undertakings and
domestic letter of credit which they issued with the application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ
of preliminary injunction. The RTC rendered an Order denying
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of injunction, even if the
evidence warranted the reasonable probability that real injury
will occur if the relief for shall not be granted in favor of
petitioner, will not serve the ends of justice.
The respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent Judge Pizarro and petitioner. The
CA issued a Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by
respondent after finding that it was apparent that respondent
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
has a legal right under the bank undertakings issued by the
several banks.
The petitioner argues that a petition for certiorari filed
without a prior motion for reconsideration is a premature
action and such omission constitutes a fatal infirmity. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before
the lower court was a fatal infirmity to a Petition for Certiorari.
RULING:
NO.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct
any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions,
such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
168 | P a g e
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were
ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.
In the case at bar, The CA brushed aside the filing of the
motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated October 17, 2003 and the Resolution dated
March 5, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 74629,
are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

Summary of Doctrine: On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda
A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
(Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint
The only law in force governing marriage relationships
with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for’ being
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married
exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
1993.
during its effectivity.

ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated
Tamano was bigamous.
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, HELD:
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita
Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083.
Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
initio.
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition
to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then,
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
The petition is DENIED.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLEY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents
G.R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VITUG, J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court defined by Sec. 4,
par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly
brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
FACTS:
On December 31, 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
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certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
August20, 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ
and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners:
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject. He alleged that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy The COMELEC
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Three days after,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition
challenged the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of presidential candidates being the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET).
RULING:
No.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and

Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
generally defined as being an action against a person who
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634,
office. In such context, the election contest can only
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
registered candidate who would have received either the
jurisdiction.
second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice- Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
presidency before the elections are held. 04-003.
With this, Comelec committed no grave abuse of No Costs.
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that SO ORDERED.
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA vs. CONSOLIDATED
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
SERVICE, INC.,
Code.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
DOCTRINE: It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to
the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to
assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or
otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury."
FACTS: Respondents are involved in the operation of radio
broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the
grantees of legislative franchises.
The provisions of the law granting them the franchise contain a
common provision stating that the grantee shall make public
offering through the stock exchanges of at least thirty percent
(30%) of its common stocks within a period of three (3) years
from the date of effectivity of the laws. It further appears that
following the enactment of these franchise laws, the NTC
issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6)
Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to install, operate
and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various
locations throughout the nation.
Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints with
the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS and CBS. He alleged
that he was a stockholder of the respondents corporations and
that despite the mandating of the public offering of at least
30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had
failed to make such offering. He thus prayed for the
cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and
CBS on account of the alleged violation of the conditions set
therein, as well as in its legislative franchises. The NTC issued a
consolidated decision dismissing both complaints on the
172 | P a g e
ground that the complaints actually constituted collateral
attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS. The NTC
ruled that the same is more properly the subject of an action
for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy is quo warranto
RULING: YES.
Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a
public office, position or franchise may be brought in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
position or franchise."
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise. It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to
the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to
assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or
otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury." A forfeiture of a
franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the
purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by
law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of
Government. Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy
if it is thought that a government corporation has offended
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered
voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. Claiming that he had
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months,
pronouncement as to costs. petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his
SO ORDERED. registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the
creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite
formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern
I. SHORT TITLE: FERMIN vs. COMELEC Kabuntalan.
II. FULL TITLE: MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION Thereafter, the COMELEC approved petitioner’s application for
ON ELECTIONS the transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter to
and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan.
DILANGALEN, respondents. Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
G.R. No. 179695. December 18, 2008 Northern Kabuntalan in National and Local Elections.
MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs. Private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification against
UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN, Fermin, before the COMELEC with the Office of the Provincial
respondents. Election Supervisor of Shariff Kabunsuan. The petition alleged
G.R. No. 182369. December 18, 2008. that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency
III. TOPIC: Disqualification of candidate required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC
IV. PONENTE: NACHURA ,J.: and in his application for transfer of voting record. COMELEC
2nd Division, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration
After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly that he is a resident of Barangay Payan in his oath of office
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a
passed Autonomy Act No. 205 creating the Municipality of resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.
Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new
municipality was constituted by separating Barangays Balong, VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P. Labio, These consolidated petitions provide a welcome avenue for
Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting from the the Court to dichotomize, once and for all, two popular
Municipality of Kabuntalan. remedies to prevent a candidate from running for an elective
position which are indiscriminately interchanged by the Bench

173 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
and the Bar, adding confusion to the already difficult state of
our jurisprudence on election laws.
For the Court’s resolution are two petitions for certiorari under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No.
179695, which assails the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 2nd Division in SPA No.
07-372, and the September 20, 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the said division resolution; and (2)
G.R. No. 182369, which challenges the February 14, 2008
Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division in SPR No. 45-2007, the
March 13, 2008 Order of the COMELEC En Banc denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and the March 26,
2008 Entry of Judgment issued by the Electoral Contests and
Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission in the said
case.
VII. ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under
Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC;
(2) Whether or not it was filed on time;
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion
when it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for
at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections; and
(4) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion
when it ordered the dismissal of Election Case No. 07-022 on
the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the protest.
VIII. RULLING:
(1)
Pivotal in the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen
petition is its proper characterization.
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As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the
Dilangalen petition was filed pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC;
while private respondent counters that the same is based on
Section 68 of the Code.
After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that
the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC under Section 7833 of the OEC. The petition
contains the essential allegations of a “Section 78” petition,
namely:
(1) The candidate made a representation in his
certificate;
(2) The representation pertains to a material matter
which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the
right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate);
and
(3) the candidate made the false representation with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for
public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.It
likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate’s
eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the
one-year residency requirement under the law.
At this point, we must stress that a “Section 78” petition ought
not to be interchanged or confused with a “Section 68”
petition. They are different remedies, based on different
grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed
before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned
a “Petition for Disqualification,” does not persuade the Court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
(2)
The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for
mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National
and Local Elections on March 29, 2007.58 It is clear therefore
that the petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermin’s CoC
was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary
period. The COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion,
much more gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition
outright.
(3)
However, the Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused
its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin was not
a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to
the said elections.
Obviously, the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to
support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of
Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office
subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal
Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident
of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However,
this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a
finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May
14, 2007 elections.61 Petitioner merely admitted that he was a
resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was
more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with
his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency
requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have
transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or
before May 14, 2006.
(4)
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In light of the foregoing disquisition, the COMELEC’s order for
the dismissal of Fermin’s election protest is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, considering that the same is premised on
Fermin’s alleged lack of legal standing to file the protest, which,
in turn, is based on Fermin’s alleged lack of residency
qualification. With our disposition herein that the Dilangalen
petition should be dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin has no
standing as a candidate would be reckless and improper.
IX. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari
are GRANTED.
The assailed issuances of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs. GOPUCO JR.
G.R. No. 158563 June 30, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995 square meters located in
the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13061-T.
The Lahug Airport had been turned over by the United States
Army to the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947
through the Surplus Property Commission, which accepted it in
behalf of the Philippine Government.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
In 1947, the Surplus Property Commission was succeeded by...
the Bureau of Aeronautics, which office was supplanted by the
National Airport Corporation (NAC). The NAC was in turn
dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA).
Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the owners of the various
lots surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein
respondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for
purposes of expansion.
Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No.
72 and its neighboring realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1881.
On 29 December 1961, the CFI promulgated a Decision,...
Declaring the expropriation of [the subject lots, including Lot
No. 72] justified and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent
domain
No appeal was taken from the above Decision on Lot No. 72,
and the judgment of condemnation became final and
executory.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport
commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed
by then President Corazon C. Aquino in a Memorandum of 29
November 1989.
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On 16 March 1990, Gopuco wrote[8] the Bureau of Air
Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport,
seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money
previously received by him as payment for the expropriation.
This letter was... ignored.
In the same year, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6958
creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) and in part providing for the transfer of the assets of
the Lahug Airport thereto.
On 06 August 1992, Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. filed an amended
complaint[11] for recovery of ownership of Lot No. 72 against
the Air Transportation Office[12] and the Province of Cebu with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch X,... docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-11914.
On 20 May 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision[15]
dismissing the complaint and directing the herein respondent
to pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses and
costs.
Aggrieved by the holding of the trial court, Gopuco appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which overturned the RTC decision,
ordered the herein petitioners to reconvey Lot No. 72 to
Gopuco upon payment of the reasonable price as determined
by it, and deleted the award to the... petitioners of exemplary
damages, litigation expenses and costs.
ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent has the right to reclaim ownership over the subject
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
expropriated lot based on the import of the December 29, 1961
Decision in civil case no. 1881.
RULING: We resolve to grant the petition.
In Fery, the Court asked and answered the same question
confronting us now: When private land is expropriated for a
particular public use, and that particular public use is
abandoned, does the land so expropriated return to its former
owner?
If, for example, land is... expropriated for a particular purpose,
with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then,
of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the
former owner reacquires the property so... expropriated.
If upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it
be the State, a... province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted
to a different use,... without any impairment of the estate or
title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
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Note that respondent has not shown that any of the
compromise agreements were in any way tainted with
illegality, irregularity or imprudence.
Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement
cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it.
Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements,
he cannot legally invoke the same.
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and
the adequacy of the compensation received have long become
final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment
granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines.
Neither has Gopuco, in the present case, adduced any evidence
at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.
The trial court was thus correct in denying Gopuco's claim for
the reconveyance of Lot No. 72 in his favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49898 dated 28 February
2001, and its Resolution of 22 May 2003 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA),
Petitioner
vs.
RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
LEOSA NANETTE AGDEPPA and MARCELINO VIERNES,
MARGARITA TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ,
represented by LINA ERLINDA A. ORTIZ and MARIO ORTIZ,
JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA MATAS. Respondents.
G. R. No. 185124 January 25, 2012
SERENO, J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey
thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is
considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one
who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government.
FACTS:
National Irrigation Authority (NIA) a GOCC created by a
special law, is primarily responsible for the irrigation
development in the country.
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NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of
constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08
September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a
Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels
of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters. The RTC
issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the
fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish
the just compensation to be paid to the owners. Then a second
committee was created when the first committee members
could not agree on the market value of the property.
The trial court then rendered a decision based on the
commissioner’s report, but the NIA through the OSG, appealed
the decision on the ground that the trial court erred in including
in the computation of just compensation the excavated soil
from the expropriated properties and its order to deliver the
payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the
defendant-intervenor. The CA, affirm with modification the
decision of the trial court, deleting the inclusion of excavated
soil, but maintaining that payment of just compensation shall
be deliver to the defendant-intervenor. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF JUST
COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS
THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
RULING:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
NO.
In the instant case, the SC affirms the appellate courts
ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose
properties were expropriated by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed
the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to
determine the just compensation for the expropriated
properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular
inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They
also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds
and the number of improvements on the properties. When the
members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and
the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another
batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of
determining the value of the land and the improvements. The
committee members based their recommendations on reliable
data and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered
various factors that affected the value of the land and the
improvements.
The Court also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the
inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for
just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value
of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties,
contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of
179 | P a g e
expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from
that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily
refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the
owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which
prevailed at the time of the taking.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12
August 2008 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding
just compensation to the defendants as owners of the
expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value
of the excavated soil, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of
evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080. No
pronouncements as to cost.
National Power Corp., vs. Sps. Dela Cruz
514 SCRA 56, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE: Commissioners, in their
proceedings, in addition to the ocular inspection are also
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just
compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1)
notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them;
(2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during
the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
argue their respective causes during the said hearings.The
absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on
the part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular,
petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.
FACTS: National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation. It decided to
acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land
within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the
construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-
Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. The amount of just
compensation was indeed a question for the herein parties. The
trial court now directed the Board of Commissioners to
determine the amount of just compensation with respect to the
subject property. The commissioners conducted an ocular
inspection over the property, and they submitted a report to
the trial court. Based on the analysis of data gathered and
making the proper adjustments, it is the opinion of the herein
commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real
properties is P10,000.00 per square meter, which was
approved by the trial court. NAPOCOR filed a Motion for
Reconsideration because of the fact that it was deprived of due
process because of the commissioners’ failure to conduct a
hearing to give them the opportunity to present their
respective evidence. However, such motion was denied as well
as its appeal. The CA rationalized that NAPOCOR was not
deprived of due process when it was able to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the commissioners denied due process
when it did not conduct any hearing nor give the petitioner
180 | P a g e
the opportunity to present evidence for the determination of
the amount of just compensation
RULING: Yes. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that
in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2)
appointed commissioners, they are also required to conduct a
hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to
provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings
and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and
(3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective
causes during the said hearings.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a
mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant
expropriation case, where the principal issue is the
determination of just compensation, a hearing before the
commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that
the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial
court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is
either grossly inadequate or excessive.
In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to
afford the parties the opportunity to present their own
evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the
commissioners’ findings. The absence of such trial or hearing
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court
because the parties’ (in particular, petitioner’s) right to due
process was violated. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the petitioner was not deprived of due process when it was able
to file a motion for reconsideration
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 Orders of the
Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002 Decision of the
CA are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the said trial
court for the proper determination of just compensation in
conformity with this Decision. No costs.
TERESITA M. YUJUICO, petitioner
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Chairman, City School Board of
Manila, DR. MA. LUISA S. QUIÑONES, Co-Chairman, City
School Board, and Schools Division Superintendent, ROGER
GERNALE, Member, City School Board of Manila, HON.
MANUEL M. ZARCAL, (in substitution of ARLENE ORTIZ),
Member, City School Board of Manila, BENJAMIN VALBUENA
(In substitution of MILES ROCES), Member, City School Board
of Manila, LIBERTY TOLEDO, Member, City School Board of
Manila, HON. FRANCESCA GERNALE (In substitution of
PERCIVAL FLORIENDO), Member, City School Board of Manila,
ISABELITA SANTOS, Secretary, City School Board of Manila,
VICENTE MACARUBBO (In substitution of ISABELITA CHING),
Assistant Secretary, City School Board of Manila, CITY SCHOOL
BOARD OF MANILA and JUDGE MERCEDES POSADA-LACAP, in
her capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 15, respondents
181 | P a g e
G.R. No. 164282 October 12, 2005
Tinga, J.
BRIEF SUMMARY:
The case is about the just compensation being
demanded by the petitioner-landowner herein against the City
Government of Manila who have been
FACTS:
After failing to acquire the land by negotiation, the City
Government of Manila filed a case for eminent domain before
the RTC of Manila against Teresita M. Yujuico to obtain the land
in order to be a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary
School, and on October 30, 2000, said court ruled the
expropriation case in favor of the City of Manila.
However, years passed but Teresita have not been fully
paid by the City even after a motion for execution of judgment
of the October 30, 2000 Decision and a petition for mandamus
had been ruled in her favor to immediately pass a resolution
appropriating the necessary amount and the corresponding
disbursement thereof for the full and complete payment of the
balance due to Teresita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita may recover the possession of
the expropriated land.
RULING:
No. Teresita may no longer recover the property. The
Supreme Court ruled the case by citing its decision in the case
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
of Republic vs Lim wherein the Court made the following
pronouncement: “. . . while the prevailing doctrine is that the
non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that ‘the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.’ To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all,
it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation.”
However, considering that the land cannot be turned
over to Teresita because it is neither convenient nor feasible
anymore to do so due to the construction of the school, the
Court deemed it best to award Teresita the full amount of her
expropriated property.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the
trial court dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents’ Petition
for Relief from Judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its
Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to
immediately pass a resolution for the payment of the balance
of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is
REINSTATED.
182 | P a g e
Figuracion-Gerilla vs Vda, De Figuracion
Summary of the doctrine:
Modes of Partition: There are two ways by which partition can
take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and
through commissioners when such agreement cannot be
reached, under Sections 3 to 6. Neither method specifies a
procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the
decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that
there shall be an accounting of the real property’s income
(rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition,
there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which
property belonging to the decedents estate may be
answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and
similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court.
Facts: Petitioner and respondents are siblings whom inherited
from their parents Leandro and Carolina Figuracion. As such,
both parties have respective shares in the properties their
parents left behind. Petitioner also acquired the eastern half
portion of lot 707 from Agripina Adviento through a quitclaim.
Agripina’s sister Carolina, upon the former’s death acquired the
whole property who later sold it to the petitioner’s sisters
Felipe and Hilaria. When a dispute arose from the parties,
Petitioner then filed a petition for partition of all properties
including that which was acquired by her through succession
from her parents in the RTC of Urdaneta.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

RTC ruling: RTC denied the petition for partition as there is no proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which
prior settlement proceedings on conducted on the inherited the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to
property. Moreover it also nullified Carolina’s self adjudication
petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take
and the deed of sale issued to Felipa and Hilaria over lot 707.
possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as
CA Ruling: CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in connection with long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the
the requirement of prior settlement proceedings but reversed
estates obligations.
the nullification of the self adjudication and deed of sale.
Dispositive portion: CA decision affirmed
Issue: Whether or not a prior settlement proceeding is required
before the property is partitioned?
Respondent’s argument: They claim that settlement G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011
proceedings must be done first as there should be an
LACBAYAN vs SAMOY
accounting due to the fact that they had spent for the care of
their parents until their deaths. Such expenses must come from
the inherited properties.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Ruling: Yes. In a situation where there remains an issue as to
FACTS:
the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is Petitioner and respondent met each other through a
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being
already married, their relationship developed. During their
are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute
illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with
the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those
three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been
services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired
properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents)
during the said period and were registered in petitioner and
have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the
respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action
for partition. In estate settlement proceedings, there is a

183 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and
they decided to part ways sometime in 1991.In 1998, both
parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned
to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner
wanted additional demands to be included in the partition
agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner
filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is
the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute.
Petitioner argued that the trial court’s decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack
contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended
that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an
action for partition. Her appeal was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement
on ownership
HELD:
184 | P a g e
No. The Court explained in the case of Municipality of
Binan v. Garcia that the determination as to the existence of co-
ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one
for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner
insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains
otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of
co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the
claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth
exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate
in question is in order. The second phase commences when it
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition” directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be
done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery
by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the
rents and profits of the real estate in question.
Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon
G.R. No. 161720, November 22, 2005
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Doctrine:
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property
does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof
by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership.
Facts:
In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight
children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores
Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-
Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria
Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar. In 1960, Restar’s eldest child,
Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit he executed
with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 66962 in Restar’s name covering the lot,
185 | P a g e
located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among
the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 11134 in his name. Flores died on June 10,
1989. Thereafter, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the
cancellation of Restar’s Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the
issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his
name. Consequently, the heirs of Flores’ sisters Dolores R.
Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the
meantime died, together with Flores’ surviving sisters Dominica
Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a
Complaint against Flores’ heirs for partition of the lot,
declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages
and preliminary injunction before the RTC of Aklan. Flores’
brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as
defendants, they being unwilling co-plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that during the
lifetime of Flores, they were given their shares of palay from
the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991; after Flores’
death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow
her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her
children, to which they agreed on the condition that after the
children had finished their education, it would be divided into
eight equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the
lot, the defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that
they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it
from Flores. By Answer, the defendants-herein petitioners
Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the
lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty years and have
been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they
denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot
or that upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia requested the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children’s
education, they contending that by 1977, the children had
already finished their respective courses. They further claimed
that after World War II and under the new Tax Declaration in
1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated
in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the
estate of their father Restar and an extrajudicial partition was
subsequently executed by Restar’s heirs, which was notarized
by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among
themselves four parcels of land. The defendant Adolfo Restar,
by separate Answer, alleged that the complaint did not state a
cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to
the partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar. The RTC of
Aklan stated that Flores and his heirs had performed acts
sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, and
have acquired the lot by prescription. The RTC dismissed the
complaint but the CA reversed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners acquired ownership over
the lot by extraordinary prescription?
Ruling:
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and
with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and
just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for
thirty years.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro
indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession.
186 | P a g e
Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less
asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they
filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s
death and exercised acts of dominion thereon—tilling and
cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying
the produce thereof. The statutory period of prescription,
however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores,
who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration
in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely
claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also
deemed to have been on said date become aware of the
adverse claim. Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership
through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years
in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New
Civil Code. While tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the
land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they
constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a
claim of ownership through prescription.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June
30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
LOURDES DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN TE, respondents.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Doctrine: Exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment
proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level
courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry
(detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of
any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3)
requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical
possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that
they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed
within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession
of the land or building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer
(desahucio), where one unlawfully withholds possession of the
subject property after the expiration or termination of the right
to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination
of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. The essential
requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by
virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or
termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3)
withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or
187 | P a g e
building after expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental
or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises;
and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date
of last demand received by the defendant. A person who wants
to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure which allows immediate execution of the judgment
under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant perfects an
appeal in the RTC and complies with the requirements to stay
execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial to the
interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of
possession.
Facts: This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999
Decision and the July 16, 1999 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which reversed the Decision
of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Civil Case
No. 98-89174, and reinstated the Decision of the Manila
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered
petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of
respondent Tan Te.
Respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages
before the MeTC of Manila alleging that: (1) the previous
owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control of the
contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to
Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the
property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner
unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent
sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate the
premises but refused to do so.
Petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from
petitioner’s forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant
protected by PD 20;2 (3) her lease constituted a legal
encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was subject of
expropriation. MeTC rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.
Petitioner appealed the judgment in the RTC Manila, RTC
reversed the decision of MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan
Te’s Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not the
MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. The RTC believed that since Tan Te’s predecessor-in-
interest learned of petitioner’s intrusion into the lot as early as
February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed
within the one-year prescriptive period which expired on
February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the ejectment
suit and respondent Tan Te filed the action only on September
8, 1997, then the suit had become an accion
publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of RTC Manila.
Issue: Whether or not, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has
jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit.
188 | P a g e
Ruling: Under Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts of B. P. No. 129, it provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings
(accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level courts. This is
clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry
(detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of
any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3)
requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical
possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that
they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed
within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession
of the land or building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer
(desahucio), where one unlawfully withholds possession of the
subject property after the expiration or termination of the right
to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination
of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.7 The
essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of
lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold
possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of
the land or building after expiration or termination of the right
to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the
rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the
premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year
from date of last demand received by the defendant.
However, two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real
property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the
plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession
(accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for more
than one year or when the action was filed more than one (1)
year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or
defendant; and (2) an action for the recovery of ownership
(accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of
possession.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The April 30, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC Decision in Civil Case
No. 156730-CV and the July 16, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49097 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmienta vs Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
G.R. No. 18295. October 11, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Section 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides two entirely distinct and different causes of
action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to
recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession
of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract
(express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when
he continued his possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.
FACTS:

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Respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
filed a complaint against AMARA alleging that MAHA is the
registered owner of the parcel of land which was entered by
AMARA through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and
stealth and the latter constructed therein temporary houses
and office building. MAHA demanded the latter to vacate the
land. AMARA pleaded that they be given one year to look for a
place to transfer, which request MAHA acceded. The said one-
year period, however, was repeatedly extended due to the
benevolence of MAHA’s members. Later on, petitioners came
up with a proposal that they become members of MAHA so
they can be qualified to acquire portions of the property by sale
pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). MAHA
again agreed and tolerated petitioners’ possession. Petitioners
nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus,
MAHA sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the
property. Upon the latter’s refusal to heed the demand, MAHA
filed the complaint for “Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer.
Petitioner contended in their answer that they owned the
subject lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof
for more than thirty years before MAHA intruded into the land.
The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action for
failure by the respondent to prove prior physical possession
which is required in a complaint for forcible entry. On appeal,
RTC reversed the MTCC decision stating that MAHA was able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioners’
occupation was by mere tolerance and their occupation
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became illegal after MAHA demanded that they vacate the
property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that
the cause of action was an unlawful detainer case.
ISSUE: Whether the proper action is a case for unlawful
detainer or forcible entry.
RULING:
The allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer.
What determines the nature of the action as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. In accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, a case for forcible entry is an action to
recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and a case for unlawful detainer is an action for recovery of
possession from the defendant whose possession of the
property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession
despite the termination of his right thereunder.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and deprived the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
These matters were alleged in the complaint of MAHA. In
addition, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the
property, possession was only due to the toleration of MAHA,
hence MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the
property as their right of possession had been terminated. Well
settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him which in the present case is an unlawful detainer case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050 are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners.
ROSA DELOS REYES,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES and ARWENIA ODONES, NOEMI
OTALES, and GREGORIO RAMIREZ,
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Complete Title:
G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011
ROSA DELOS REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES and ARWENIA ODONES,
NOEMI OTALES, and GREGORIO RAMIREZ,Respondents.
Ponente:
Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin
Brief Summary of doctrine:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real
property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession by the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over
which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year from the date of last
demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical
possession.
Facts:
A complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Injunction
was filed by Rosa delos Reyes against spouses Arwenia and
Francisco Odones, Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez before
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the MTC. Delos Reyes avert that she is the owner of the land in
contention and the spouse Odones were only allowed to stay
on the property by mere tolerance, and with the understanding
that they will vacate the premises upon notification.
The MTC favored Delos Reyes complaint and ordered Spouses
Odones to vacate the land, pay rent and attorney’s fee.
The Spouses appealed the case with the RTC, arguing the
complaint failed to allege how respondents entered the
property or when they erected their houses, it is an improper
action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the same.
The RTC set aside the MTC’s judgment and dismissed the
complaint. The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer since it did
not state how entry was effected or how and when the
dispossession started. Hence, the remedy should either be
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
Delos Reyes sought recourse with the CA, asseverating that the
RTC made an error in the allegations in the complaint and that
respondents were estopped from assailing the MTC’s
jurisdiction because they did not raise such issue in the
proceedings before that court. Petitioner insisted that, as the
registered owner of the lot, she has a preferential right of
possession over it. On February 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the
judgment of the RTC, adding that, as pronounced in Go Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, in order to justify an action for unlawful
detainer, the owner’s permission or tolerance must be present
at the beginning of the possession. Petitioner moved for
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reconsideration, but the motion was denied in a Resolution
dated May 22, 2007.
Issues:
W.O.N. the MTC has validly acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint.
Ruling:
Yes, the case is a complaint of unlawful detainer, the MTC has
original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real
property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession by the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over
which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year from the date of last
demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical
possession.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner’s
allegations in the complaint clearly makes out a case for
unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the
subject matter on the MTC. Petitioner alleges that she is the
owner of the lot, and respondents are occupying the lot by
virtue of Delos Reyes tolerance; and that petitioner sent a letter
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that they vacate
the property, but they failed and refused to do so. The
complaint was filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from
the time the last demand to vacate was made.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 19, 2007
Decision and the May 22, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 28,
2006 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
HERMINIA ACBANG
vs.
HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,
TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, AND SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ
AND HEIDI L. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 164246; January 15, 2014
Bersamin, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent
further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question
FACTS:
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The private respondents commenced an ejectment suit
against the petitioner. However, the latter did not file their
answer and the MTC rendered its decision in favor of the
former. The petitioner appealed before the RTC while the
private respondents moved for the execution of the decision
pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the petitioner did not
file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. Consequently,
the petitioner opposed the motion for execution pending
appeal, insisting that the failure of the private respondent to
move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their
right to the immediate execution and therefore, there was
nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond
unnecessary. The RTC granted the Motion for Execution of the
private respondents. Thereafter, the petitioner then brought
the petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court
submitting that Judge Luczon committed grave error in granting
the motion for immediate execution without first fixing the
supersedeas bond as prayed by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Luczon erred in
granting the motion for execution against the petitioner on the
ground that there was no supersedeas bond posted to stay the
execution.
RULING:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

No. The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals is instructive
on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment
in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent
further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the
said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing
provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1)
the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas
bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become
due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the
defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground
for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the
court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence,
if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file
a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment
would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if
the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas
bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an
ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to
stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2)
file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals
becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the
petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a
motion for execution pending appeal before the court may
issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment,
the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they
were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in
view of the Acbangs failure to comply with all of the three above
mentioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The
filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did
not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of
the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit of the accruing
rentals.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
prohibition for being moot and academic, without
pronouncement on costs of suit.
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER
LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO
LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Contempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial
body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto
as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to
such a body, while in its restricted and more usual sense,

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
contempt comprehends adespising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court; The two kinds, namely: direct contempt,
which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as
to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
FACTS:
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a
Letter-Resolution, advising respondent Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a
computation of the required freight rate adjustment by
MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially
considered or declared deregulated in accordance with
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153), of which
issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled
Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by
President Fidel V. Ramos.
The DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining
order challenging the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and
the Letter-Resolution, but the same was dismissed by the CA,
and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
Letter-Resolution. Upon appeal, the Court denied DMAP’s
petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to: (a)
take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section
5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners'
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motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the
deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total
amount of ₱202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule
45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised
Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."
Later on, the DMAP held a general membership meeting
(GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-
respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a
consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea
Transport Update, stating that the DMAP case was denied
based on technicalities and not on merits of the case; that,
Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness
of freight is not under their jurisdiction but with MARINA, and
the like.
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil
action for contempt against the respondents, insisting that the
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect
contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly
insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act,
and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme
Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo"9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed
itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the
respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued
in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months."10
They averred that the respondents’ purpose, taken in the
context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for
it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!"
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
ISSUE:
WON the statements contained in the Sea Transport
Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
NO.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad
sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules
or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of
its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in
its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or
to impair the respect due to such a body. Contempt of court is
of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in
the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect
contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful
process or order of the court.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update
was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the
respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In
this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to punish
for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court
invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
196 | P a g e
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for indirect
contempt is DISMISSED.Costs of suit to be paid by the
petitioner.
MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his
capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING
CENTER, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ELENA EMBANG, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Summary of Doctrine:
It has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a
contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a
subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same
manner, an attorneys conviction for contempt was not
collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment
proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially
the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been the
rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice ISSUE:
of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each
Whether or not the judgement has attained finality?
of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court
is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the HELD:
Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of
YES.
law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled
FACTS: and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to
enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to
The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not respect the courts verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate
appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:[18]
Quevedo filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration
of the NLRCs February 28, 2005 resolution.
For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired
executory judgment, we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
court. be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not
of the land.
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but
also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
impede the due administration of justice.[11] Under the Rules of
and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment
Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect
has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the
contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or
fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme
so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any
proceedings before the same.[12] Indirect contempt is one not
attempt to prolong the controversies.
committed in the presence of a court.[13] It is an act done at a
distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of
embarrass the court and justice.
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause

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no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of P30,000 is
imposed upon him, payable in full within five days from receipt
of this resolution.
MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S.
GO, respondent. G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in
some manner to impede the due administration of justice.
FACTS:
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The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of
illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein
respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc.
(EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose
E. Barin. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was
illegally dismissed from employment On appeal NLRC, EHSI,
Kunack and Barin employed the legal services of De Borja
Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where
herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate. NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declared that
respondent Go’s separation from employment was legal for it
was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by EHSI,
Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals which set aside the
ruling of the NLRC. After the promulgation of the CA’s decision
but prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies,
the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release
Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter.
The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by
the counsel for EHSI, Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty.
Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence and without
the knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer.
After the receipt of a copy of the CA’s decision, respondent Go,
through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the
ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same
motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved that
petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical
conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go without
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
the knowledge of his counsel. Acting on the motions, the
appellate court ordered petitioner Atty. Regalado to explain
why she should not be cited for contempt of court for violating
Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. For her part,
petitioner Atty. Regalado explained that she never took part in
the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the illegal
dismissal case with respondent Go which led to the execution
of a compromise agreement by the parties. The CA disregard
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s defenses and adjudging her guilty of
indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed error in holding that petitioner is
guilty for indirect contempt.
RULING:
YES.
Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings
for indirect contempt should be commenced, thus:
“SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
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therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision.” The
provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt
proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon
compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.
Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the complained acts of
Atty. Regalado would fall under paragraphs (a) and (d) of
Section 4, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt. But the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated
by respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion. It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the
appellate court issued a Resolution requiring petitioner Atty.
Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt. Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in
motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It
was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the
appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by
petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part
of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have
been initiated at all. We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge
without contradicting the factual findings made by the very
same court which rendered the questioned resolution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The indirect contempt proceedings before the Court
of Appeals is DECLARED null and void. SO ORDERED.
MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA vs. NATIONAL
BOOKSTORE, INC.
DOCTRINE: Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be
punished summarily without hearing.
FACTS: In the a Resolution, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T.
Calimag, counsel for a party, to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt of court for his participation in the
submission of a fake judicial decision to this Court. Counsel
explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of
Court and Petition-In-Intervention (to which was appended a
copy of the fake decision) on behalf of his clients to seek the
truth in order that justice will prevail. He reasons that he was
misled in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the
forged judicial decision) made available to him at the time of its
submission. At the same time, he asserts that there was an
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honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that
there was never any malice intended in the submission of the
questioned documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not counsel is to be cited in direct
contempt of court
RULING: YES.
Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, and can be punished
summarily without hearing.
It is insulting to assert a claim before the Supreme Court based
on an obvious and incompetent forgery and conceived by one
with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would
pass judicial muster. The court cannot accept counsel’s
declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed
to know better. Counsel’s act of filing the Motion and Petition-
In-Intervention based on a spurious judicial decision constitutes
direct contempt of court. A person found guilty of direct
contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days,
or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank. Under the circumstances, a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (₱2,000.00) would be appropriate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Atty. Ricardo T. Camilag is CITED
in DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT and ordered to PAY a FINE of
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) within ten (10) days form
notice, or to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) days in case he
fails to pay the fine.
CRUZ vs. GIGOYON
G.R. No. 170404 September 28, 2011
FACTS: This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint filed by
Ferdinan de Cruz against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr., for
abatement of nuisance. Cruz sought redress from the court to
declare as a nuisance the “basketball goal” which was
permanently attached to the second floor of Mina’s residence
but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right
of way. Mina was declared in default hence petitioner
presented his evidence ex-parte.
October 21, 2005, respondent judge Gingoyon, in his Decision,
declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed
the case on the ground that petitioner lacked “locus standi.” (
ruling that the action for abatement of nuisance should be
commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private
individual like the petitioner) Cruz filed an Motion for
Reconsideration on the Order dated 10.21.2005 alleging that
respondent judge has been secretly communicating with
Benjamin Mina. Cruz, requested the respondent court to hear
his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005.
Respondent judge set the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration on November 18, 2005 as per request by the
petitioner and directed him to substantiate his serious charge
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or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for
contempt.
On November 18, 2005, Cruz, however, did not appear. Judge
Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order in open court to
give petitioner another 10 days to show cause.
In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, Cruz maintained
that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to
stand on for the same were based on the circumstances of the
instant case.
On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order
finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. An Order
of Arrest was then issued against the petitioner on even date.
On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., Cruz filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest
contending the he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
On December 1, 2005, in his Order, the respondent court
denied the Ex-Parte Motion based on petitioner’s failure to
attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless
petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari,
he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
Hence, the filing of this petition.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent court properly
adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court; and Whether
or not abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court
in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.
RULING: On the first issue, the court finds it unmeritorious.
Contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the
court constitute direct contempt. “A pleading containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending has been
held to be equivalent to ‘misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same’ within the meaning of Rule 71, §
1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct
contempt.
The court agrees with the respondent judge that Cruz is guilty
of direct contempt of court. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Cruz with the respondent court contained a serious
allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with
the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave
offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of
factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the
allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly
argued that it is his “fair observation or conclusion.” Instead of
showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge
Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner
stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about
his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and
logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge
Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say
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that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge
Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.
On the second issue, the court finds it lack of merit.
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides: Remedy
therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any
court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the
remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court
which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide
by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.
In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied
petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he
already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte
Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1,
2005 at 10:00 A.M. and therein petitioner stated that he
already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However,
perusal of the records would show that the Petition for
Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day
but at 1:06 P.M. Clearly, when the motion was filed with the
respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition
for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court.
We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of
the hierarchy of courts. “A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’)
courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES
latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary
writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition.”For the guidance of the petitioner, “[t]his Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive.” Its jurisdiction is concurrent with
the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. “However, this
concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking
any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his
petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition.”Unwarranted demands upon this Court’s attention
must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, “where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented.”In consequence, the instant petition should have
been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or
compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court.
However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve
the controversy.
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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. SEVERINO
LISTANA, respondent.
G.R. No. 168105. July 27, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE:
There are only two ways a person can be charged with
indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and
(2) by order or formal charged initiated by the court moto
proprio.
FACTS:
Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561
ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the Department of
Agrarian Reform under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana
refused to sell at that price, thus the DARAB, in an
administrative proceeding determined the just compensation
of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank of the
Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was
issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not
complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by
Listana with the PARAD against LBP. PARAD granted the Motion
for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and ordered the
arrest of Alex Lorayes, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a
preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order
against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari
CIVIL PROCEDURE – COMPILATION OF CASES

with the Court of Appeals which was nullified the order of the
RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order for the arrest of Mr. Alex
Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
RULING:

No. The contempt proceedings initiated through an

unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the respondent with
the PARAD were themselves invalid. Said proceedings were
invalid because the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not
complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the
PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by
respondent. Furthermore, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB
have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the
power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the
proceedings that stemmed from respondents Motion for
Contempt specifically the Orders of the PARAD for the arrest of
Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. So ordered.

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