PCIB V.

ESCOLIN

Short Summary:
Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that
upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by
the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and
alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas
property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the
estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who
predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no
liquidation of Mrs. Hodges’ estate, the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate
that they could inherit.
, PCI VS. ESCOLIN
56 SCRA 266

FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to
her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of
Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see
whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent
and necessary to know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must
be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law
makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas
law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during
the death of Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges

inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear
that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2)
whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and
effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the
record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position
to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of
these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for
further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the
court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however,
that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at
this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil
that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused
to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less
than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of
the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as
contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of
her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.