Espano vs.
Court of Appeals officers were not armed with a search warrant at
Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat.
Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera,
and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw
Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached Espano, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana .
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied
that there was more in his house. The policemen
went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Espano was
brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On
24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial
court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991.
On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged.
Espano appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15
January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search of Espano’s home after
his arrest does not violate against his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule
113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust
operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal
trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
Espano handing over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two
cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the
crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana
found at Espano's residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from
Espano during his arrest were valid under the
doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The warrantless search made in his house,
however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became unlawful since the police
the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and
control of Espano. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purposes shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his
arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall
under the said exceptions.
People vs. Del Rosario
FACTS:
A search warrant was issued authorizing the
search and seizure of an “undetermined quantity”
of shabu and its paraphernalia in the premises of
appellant’s house. An entrapment was planned
that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the
seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .
22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the seizure of the firearms was
proper.
RULING:
NO. The raiding party was authorized to seize
only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof
and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake
a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime. The search warrant was no authority for
the police officers to seize the firearm which was
not mentioned, much less described with
particularly, in the search warrant.
Umil vs. Ramos
Facts: On 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible
for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of
this verification, Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of
the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and
fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the
car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC
Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this
positive identification, Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon
Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case
C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February
1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court
on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and
Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V.
Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.
Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander
Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February
1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15
February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however,
Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly
released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested
without any warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not
arrested while in the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after
the commission of the said offense for his arrest
came a day after the said shooting incident.
Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but
in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities.
Webb v. De Leon
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of
Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80
W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro
Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between
her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn
statements. They criticize the procedure followed
by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de
Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary
examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely
abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and
Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination
before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention
because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not
gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases,
there must be a probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply
provides that “upon filing of an information, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges
should have conducted “searching examination of
witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest
against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on
the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of the courts and beyond executive
and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of
this power is the right to prosecute their violators
(See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for
legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn
statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes
that these have been sufficiently explained and
there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the
prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing
in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the
DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.
People vs. Sucro
Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a
member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed
by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander
of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities
of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered
by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As
planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat.
Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a
certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street.
Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters
away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio
saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel,
and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while
Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out
with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio
radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity
going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30
P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that
point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the
area and while the police officers were at the
Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told
P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/
Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with
Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma
Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon
seeing the police, Macabante threw something to
the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily
admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in
front of the chapel. The police team was able to
overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to
the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens
were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment,
Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a
judgment of conviction was rendered, finding
Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and
costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the
accused is lawful and consequently, whether the
evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered lawful.
The rule states that "A peace officer or private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;" An
offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure
of the police officers to secure a warrant stems
from the fact that their knowledge acquired from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.
What is paramount is that probable cause existed.
Still, that searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among
the exceptions granted by law is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant. Herein,
police officers have personal knowledge of the
actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of
transactions) there existed probable cause for the
arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact
selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements
of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained
from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.

People v. Rodrigueza
Facts: [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July
1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi
City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC
Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding
officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that
there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem
formed a team to conduct a buybust operation,
which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were
treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt.
Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted
as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a
certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the
road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where he could find Don and where he could buy
marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he
returned, he was accompanied by a man who was
later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza.
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100
grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle
driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and
left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back,
Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a
plastic" which was later identified as marijuana,
and received payment therefor. Thereafter,
Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a
report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered
a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the
suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC
Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to
Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested
Rodrigueza, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel
Segovia. The constables were not, however,
armed with a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the three accused. The arrests were
brought to the headquarters for investigation.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father. Taduran did
not go with them. During the raid, they were able
to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe, among others. The search, however, was
not authorized by any search warrant. The next
day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from
detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained.
[Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on the other hand,
claimed that on said date he was in the house of
his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed
there overnight and did not leave the place until
the next day when his brother arrived and told
him that their father was taken by some military
men the preceding night. Rodrigueza went to
Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around
8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
incident, to which question he answered in the
negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a
P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination. From that time on, he
was not allowed to go home and was detained
inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to
make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale
of marijuana.
On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel
Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for possession of
100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in
a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00.
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded
not guilty to the charge against them. The
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10,
found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
6425, as amended) and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however,
acquitted Segovia and Lonceres. Rodrigueza
appealed.
Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodrigueza’s
arrest is material in determining his culpability in
the crime charged.
Held: As provided in the present Constitution, a
search, to be valid, must generally be authorized
by a search warrant duly issued by the proper
government authority. True, in some instances, the
Court has allowed government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the
premises waives his right against such incursion;
when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws; when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
or in cases of inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations, a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant. Herein,
however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM
agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was
not authorized by any search warrant. It does not
appear, either, that the situation falls under any of
the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodrigueza's
right against unreasonable search and seizure was
clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not
have justified their act by invoking the urgency
and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal
that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time. Further, the
inconsistencies made by prosecution witnesses
give more credibility to the testimony of Don
Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodrigueza's
defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the
weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there
are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects
pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the
Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he was not among those who were
arrested on the night of 1 July 1987. His co-
accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza
was not with them when they were apprehended
by the NARCOM agents. Hence, Rodrigueza is
acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure
of the prosecution to establish its cause.
Go vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving
his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y
Tambunting entered Wilson St., where it is a one-
way street and started traveling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J.
Abad Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Go alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go
then boarded his car and left the scene. A security
guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down Go's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and
there retrieved an empty shell and one round of
live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa
Ang Go. The following day, the police returned to
the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that
Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
Go from the cashier of the bake shop. The
security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of Go and he positively identified him as
the same person who had shot Maguan. Having
established that the assailant was probably Go, the
police launched a manhunt for Go. On 8 July
1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied
by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified
Go as the gunman. That same day, the police
promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
against Go with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed Go, in the Presence of his lawyers. that
he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such
waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was
still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim,
Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor,
instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder before
the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information,
the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's
counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. On 12 July
1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
special raffle in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was
raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo
(Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on the
same date, approved the cash bond posted by Go
and ordered his release. Go was in fact released
that same day. On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor
filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the
court be suspended. On the said date, the trial
court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the
arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the
prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, the
Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1) recalling
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail:
petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the
Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and
cancelling the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
leave to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation: (3) treating Go's omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a petition for
bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. On 19
July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. Go also
moved for suspension of all proceedings in the
case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
his petition: this motion was, however, denied by
Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go surrendered to
the police. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991,
the Supreme Court remanded the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court
of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, Judge Pelayo
issued an order in open court setting Go's
arraignment on 23 August 1991. On 19 August
1991, Go filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991,
Judge Pelayo issued a Commitment Order
directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit
Go into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail.
On the same date, Go was arraigned. In view,
however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial
court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial
court then set the criminal case for continuous
hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11
and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. On 27 August 1991. Go filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued
the writ of habeas corpus. The petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one
hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the
other, were subsequently consolidated in the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2
September 1991, issued a resolution denying Go's
motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground
that motion had become moot and academic. On
19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case
commenced. On 23 September 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered a consolidated decision
dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Go's
warrantless arrest was valid and Go's act of
posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest, among others. On 3 October
1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more
witnesses at the trial. Go's Counsel also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" with the trial court,
with Go's conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go
filed the present petition for Review on Certiorari.
On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a
Resolution directing Judge Pelayo to held in
abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below
until further orders from the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Go was arrested legally without
warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus not
entitled to be released pending the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.
Held: Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does
not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be created has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Go's
"arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of
Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at
the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that Go
was the gunman another was able to take down
the alleged gunman's car's plate number which
turned out to be registered in Go's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court
that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of Go
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is
clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not
applicable. Indeed, Go was not arrested at all.
When he walked into the San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities.
He did not state that he was "surrendering"
himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan
or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When
the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should
have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging Go in court for the
killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier,
the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required Go to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for Go
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and
that right should have been accorded him without
any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not been
arrested; with or without a warrant, he was also
entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
While conducting a surveillance, the two
policemen spotted petitioner carrying a “buri” bag
and acting suspiciously. He attempted to flee
when the policemen approached him and
identified themselves but his attempt was
thwarted. Found inside the “buri” bag were one
(1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, a smoke
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) rounds live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. Petitioner
failed to show the necessary license or authority
to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession. He was subsequently prosecuted for
and found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was probable cause to justify
the warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner.
RULING:
YES. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers
to inspect the same.
People v. Mengote
Facts:
a telephone call was by Western Police
district that here were three suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team
of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place.
They saw two men “looking from side to side”
one of whom is holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried
to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them, who turned out
to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in
the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The
weapons were taken from them.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure is
violated
Ruling:
The Supreme court held that par(a) section
5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person
be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he
is actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense 2 In the presence of the
arresting officer.
These requirements have not been
established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of
the arrest in question, the accused was merely
“looking from side to side” and “holding his
abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that
has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote
in their presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no
less stringent requirements have not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTED
In the present case, from the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And
from the information they have received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was a
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team had
determine on his own authority that a search
warrant was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be

People v. Aminnudin determined by a judge and not law enforcement
Facts: agents.

The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer ACQUITTED

received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo
City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited
for him in the evening and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer
pointed at him. They detained him and inspected
the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained
three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner.
On the basis of the finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional

right against unreasonable serach and seizure is
violated

Ruling:

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless

arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court
not justified unless the accused was caught in
flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or
had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless

searches and seizures for violation of the customs
law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.