Documenti di Didattica
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Ramirez
Facts: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow, Marcelle Ramirez, a
French. In the project partition, the property was divided into two (2) parts: 1st part to the widow
and the 2nd part to the grandnephews, the naked ownership. As to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3
was given to the widow and 2/3 was given to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The
grandnephews opposed on the ground that the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski is void because it
violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
Ruling: No. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski because
although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting
of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Facts: On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled
"Donacion Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of
unregistered land in Nueva Ecija. In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo
Cuevas.
On May 26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument purporting to set aside the
preceding conveyance. On August 26, 1952, she brought an action in the CFI to recover the land
conveyed on the grounds that: (1) the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked
by the donor and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a)
it was not properly accepted, (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her
own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to
support the donor. The CFI denied the recovery.
The CA forwarded the case to the SC. The crux of the controversy revolves around the following
provisions of the deed of donation:
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor reserves to herself
the "right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while
I am not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will
not take away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when, I die."
Issue: Whether it embodies a donation inter vivos or a disposition of property mortis causa
revocable freely by the transferor at any time before death?
Ruling: The SC stated that “We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the
present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will
not dispose or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving
it to him upon my death." By these words, the donor expressly renounced the right to freely
dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the
irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the donee.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she
should retain the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
"possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant
only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
Principle: Neither the designation mortis causa nor the provision that a donation is "to take
effect at the death of the donor" is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations.
3. Jutic vs. CA
Facts: During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned (1) a parcel of agricultural land described as
Lot No. 170, (2) a parcel of agricultural land described as Lot No. 172, (3) a residential house
erected on Lot 172; (4) rice and corn mills and their respective paraphernalia, and (5) five (5)
carabaos in the possession of the then defendants.
On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville, which
reads:
xxx
That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one to inherit all my properties
except my brother Melquiades Seville who appears to be the only and rightful person
upon whom I have the most sympathy since I have no wife and children;
That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights, interest, share and
participation over the above- mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case
of my death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to possess, enjoy and benefit
from the produce of my said land and that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I
shall be the one to enjoy it;
That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and desire as to the way the
above-mentioned property shall be dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve.
xxx
On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National Bank in
consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades
Seville. On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without any
debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville who are included
as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville.
Thereafter, Melquiades died and is survived by his children Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio,
Ravelo, Sonita, Lucy, Epifania, Naracy and Emmanuel, all surnamed Seville. Sisters
Encarnacion and Petra died later. Encarnacion is survived by her children Trinidad, Teresita,
Ulysses and Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan and her husband Vicente Sullan while Petra
Seville is survived by her children Orlando Manican and Pacifico Manican.
The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the properties and
improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of
Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots
Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time
of Arsenio Seville's death.
Issue: Whether there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?
Ruling: A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for their effectivity is
irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio
Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or
a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his
properties should go to Melquiades Seville.
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession; ("... in case I will die, I will
assign all my rights, share and participation over the above-mentioned properties and that he
shall succeed to me in case of my death ..."). Donations which are to take effect upon the death
of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules
established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as only donations are
accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could not have accepted something, which by
the terms of the supposed "donation" was not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not
transmit ownership except in clear and express terms.
Facts: Conchita Cabatingan, during her lifetime, executed four (4) Deeds of Donation in favor of
petitioners. The deeds provide, among others, that the donation will become effective upon the
death of the donor and the same shall be rescinded in case the donee predeceased the donor.
These deeds of donation contain:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the
DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way
of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect..”
After Conchita's death, respondents, heirs of Conchita, filed an action before the RTC of
Mandaue, seeking the annulment of the said four (4) Deeds of Donation. Respondents alleged
that the documents were void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code
regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that the deeds were donation mortis
causa.|||
The RTC favorably ruled for the respondents. Hence, this petition.||
Issue: Whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or
mortis causa?
Ruling: They are donations mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is
not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. In the present case, the nature of the
donations as mortis causa was confirmed by the fact that the donations did not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita's death.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Conchita did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor" did not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa
may also be made for the same reason.
Considering that the disputed donations were donations mortis causa and the same partakes of
testamentary provisions, the SC held that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in
declaring the subject deeds null and void for failure to comply with the requisites on solemnities
of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should
have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect.
Facts: Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of a land in favour of her niece Ursulina
Ganuelas containing:
“That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has
for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to
the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way
of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of
no further force and effect.”
Ruling: It is a donation mortis causa which should comply with the formalities of a will.
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-
testator.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be
executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis
causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,
otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation
is void and produces no effect.