MICHAEL PADUA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 168546

July 23, 2008

FACTS:

This is a petition for review regarding the decision assailed by the Court of Appeals.

On June 16, 2003, in Pasig City, Michael Padua (petitioner) and Edgar Allan Ubalde delivered and gave
away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, a folded newsprint that contained and concealed
4.86 grams of dried marijuana.

During the arraignment, Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not
guilty in order to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165.
The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. He was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of
P500,000.00. Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (P.D. No.
968), otherwise known as “The Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further
alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying
the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion on its decision
denying Padua’s petition for probation.

2) Whether or not the petition for probation filed by Padua, a minor, should be granted?

RULING:

No, the RTC acted with proper jurisdiction and without grave abuse of discretion. It merely applied the law
and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.

Under Section 24 of Republic Act 9165, it is clear that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail
of the privilege of probation:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail
of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

Here the law is clear and in no need of interpretation. The intention of the legislators

In Section 24 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishments for those convicted of drug trafficking or
pushing.
LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS.

G.R. NO. 127327

February 13, 2009

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the province of Iloilo
namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and the Rural Bank of
Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were the owners of Casette
Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged in procuring farm implements
intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said banks. The spouses Ambito obtained
their supply of farm implements and spare parts from the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star Inc. (PSI) which
was then engaged in selling ‘Yanmar’ machineries and spare parts.

On several occasions in 1979, the spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito transacted business with
Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar machineries and spare parts from the said company
allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of their banks. In these transactions, the spouses Ambito made
down payments in their purchases either in case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the
Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.

On three separate occasions, Liberata Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn
Traje, to sign several blank certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she
needed the said certificates in connection with some transactions involving the bank. The same thing
happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was asked by
the spouses Ambito as well as the manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito, to sign and give blank
certificates of time deposit to them.

The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the spouses Basilio
and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit and the name of the
Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the purchase price of the
machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc.

The said certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when
presented for redemption by Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence, Pacific
Star, Inc. (PSI) suffered actual damages in the amounts representing the total value of the machineries
and spare parts sold and delivered by the complainant to the Ambitos and the latter failed and refused to
pay the same despite demands on them.
Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of, among others, Falsification
and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.

The main argument of the Petitioners before the Supreme Court is that they could not be convicted of the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents because PSI was not deceived by
their issuance of the credit certificates of time deposit (CCTD).

Petitioners Liberata Ambito, Basilio Ambito were convicted of the crime of multiple charges of the complex
offense of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, defined and penalized in Articles 48,
171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents?

RULING:

Yes. In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is indispensable that the
element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made
prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.

In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay
the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners’ banks, the Rural Bank of
Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would
be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon.
It is established that petitioners employed deceit when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to
pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through down payments paid either in cash or in the
form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSI’s name with interest thereon. It
was later found out that petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI.

As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations were outright
distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-
petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever made
with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not
intend to deposit any amount to pay for the machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit,
machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus,
confirming the lower courts’ finding that petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents.

The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by petitioners is
proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another
crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO BARLAAN y ABION.

G.R. NO. 177746

August 31, 2007

FACTS:

On or about the 10th day of February 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, Alex Esquillon, George Domingo and Arturo Barlaan were charged with the crime of
murder over one Marvin Suetos. By taking advantage of superior strength he was unlawfully and
feloniously stabbed with a blade, thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, and as a result thereof,
the said Marvin Suetos died.

These were the facts found by the trial court:

It appears that in the evening of February 10, 2001, Jose Dasalla and Marvin Suetos were walking
downtown Baguio when they came upon the group of accused Arturo Barlaan, Alex Esquillon and George
Domingo who invited them for a round of drinks. At around 11:00 p.m., they all entered the Ledsay Eatery
along Otek Street, Baguio City. During their drinking session, they conversed and sang on videoke until
around 1:00 a.m. of the following day, February 11, 2001. When they were about to leave the place, there
ensued an argument as to who will pay their bill of about P200.00. Initially, the group asked Marvin
Suetos to pay the bill but the latter refused and was offering only to contribute a certain amount. After
some exchanges, the group pointed to Esquillon to pay the bill for which reason the latter got mad and
brought out his fan knife. At this juncture, Dasalla and Suetos scampered out of the establishment for
their safety and proceeded towards the direction of the nearby Orchidarium. Forthwith, the three accused
chased them. When Dasalla and Suetos were running infront of the gate of the Orchidarium, Suetos
stumbled and fell on the pavement face down. While Suetos was lying down on the pavement face down,
the three accused caught up with him. Esquillon stabbed him at the back several times in rapid succession
while Barlaan was preventing him from getting up and escaping by holding his legs. Domingo also lifted
the body of Suetos and stabbed him in front. All these were witnessed by Dasalla from a distance of 4 to 5
meters away. Dasalla attempted to help Suetos but Esquillon attacked him with the fan knife. However,
Dasalla swiftly moved backwards and so only his cheek got caught by the blade of Esquillon’s weapon.
Dasalla ran but was chased by the three accused. While chasing him, Esquillon again attempted to stab
him but only his shirt got caught by the knife. Dasalla was chased up to Rizal Park at Burnham Park,
Baguio City. He went directly to the Baguio City Police Office and reported the incident but was told that
there is no available mobile car. He then went back to the crime scene but Suetos was no longer there. He
learned from the security guard of the nearby Benguet Pine Hotel that the body of Suetos was rushed to
the hospital.

At the Baguio General Hospital, Suetos expired.

On February 15, 2001 Jose Dasalla gave a sworn statement narrating the events that had led up to
Suetos’ stabbing and death. He likewise complained against the three for making an attempt on his life
when he tried to assist Suetos which resulted to the filing of an Information for Attempted Homicide
against said accused in another court.

For his part, Barlaan denied the charges against him. He claimed to have attempted to stop his
companions from killing Suetos but after Esquillon attempted to stab him in turn, he had gone home and
was informed by his neighbor George Domingo that Suetos was taken to the hospital and died there.

The trial court found the version of the prosecution more credible. It held that Barlaan conspired with
Esquillon and Domingo in killing Suetos; that the testimony of Dasalla was corroborated by the autopsy
report of Dr. Tinoyan; that treachery attended the killing; and that the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery.

The court found Barlaan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder, qualified by treachery,
and defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua; an
additional fine of P500,000 to the heirs of Marvin Suetos as indemnity for his death; P67,806.00 as actual
damages, P2,040,000.00 as unearned income and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the pain and anguish
suffered by his heirs by reason of his death.

The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision with amendments; they did not find conspiracy to be present
as the crime had been committed after a heated argument. On the other hand it appreciated the presence
of abuse of superior strength because the aggressors took advantage of the fact that the victim had been
lying prone. As a result, the CA likewise sustained the awards of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and
moral damages and P2,040,000.00 as lost earnings, but reduced the amount of actual damages awarded
by the trial court to only P43,306.50 as the same was the amount duly supported by official receipts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy when the accused participated in the commission of the crime by
holding the legs of the victim.

RULING:

No. While it was established during the hearing that the accused had in fact participated by holding the
victim’s legs down while the other assailants were stabbing him, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there
was no conspiracy as the act was spontaneous following an argument and no evidence could be found
that suggested conspiracy. The stabbing had also followed an altercation. The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the findings of the RTC as factual findings of the lower courts are accorded great weight and respect and
are deemed final, with few exceptions. There was no merit in Barlaan’s contention that the trial court and
CA had erred in construing his role in the crime scene as proof that he acted in conspiracy with Esquillon
and Domingo.
MARILYN C. SANTOS vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON T. CASTRO

G.R. No. 127899

December 2, 1999

FACTS:

Marilyn C. Santos (petitioner) issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine
Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10) Pesos, all of which
checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank.

On October 12, 1993, the petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 ("BP 22") in fifty-four (54) separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
102009 to 102062, respectively, before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. During t he
arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the accusations. After trial, she was found guilty in a
Decision promulgated on December 20, 1994, sentencing her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years
and to pay P3,989,175.10 to Corazon T. Castro, private respondent.

Petitioner therefore, filed an application for probation, which was referred by Presiding Judge Umali to the
Probation Officer of Marikina, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Private respondent opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the petitioner is not
eligible for probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years,
and she failed to pay her judgment debt to the private respondent.

On January 6, 1995, private respondent presented a "Motion for a Writ of Execution", which motion was
granted by Judge Umali in an Order dated January 11, 1995. Thus, the corresponding writ of execution
issued for the implementation and satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the said Decision. Thereafter, the
sheriff prepared and signed a Notice of Levy on Execution over several properties belonging to the
petitioner.

On February 13, 1995, petitioner and her husband executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" deeding out in
favor of Teodoro S. Dijamco ("Mr. Dijamco") for P264,570.00 a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet
("Benguet Property"), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18721 ("TCT No. T-18721"). On the
same day, the sheriff annotated the Notice of Levy on Execution on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-
18721.

On March 29, 1995, Mr. Dijamco filed an "Affidavit of Third-Party-Claim" over the same Benguet property
on the strength of the said previous sale but averring already a consideration of P3,000,000.00. Attached
thereto are the checks he allegedly paid for subject property. In the Order he issued on June 30, 1995,
Judge Umali granted petitioner’s application for probation for a period of six (6) years. Private respondent
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Her motion was also denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to probation.

RULING:

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted.8 [Francisco
v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384.] The primary objective in granting probation is the reformation of the
probationer. Courts must be meticulous enough to ensure that the ends of justice and the best interest of
the public as well as the accused be served by the grant of probation. [Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 189
SCRA 304.]

Probation is a just privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before granting probation,
the court must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the demands of justice
and public interest, along with other relevant circumstances. [Bernardo v. Balagot, 215 SCRA 526.] The
courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or recommendation of the probation officer,
which is at best only persuasive.
Her failure to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability is not a ground for the denial of the application for
probation of accused. Moreover, the court had earlier issued a writ of execution to satisfy the money
judgment in an order dated January 11, 1995 and the sheriff of this court had issued a notice of levy on
execution on the properties of accused. The petition of accused for probation was hereby granted.
SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 191913

March 21, 2012

FACTS: On February 20, 2003 SPO2 Nacnac the accused-appellant, the victim and together with other
police officers were on duty. SPO2 Nacnac had a heated argument with SPO1 Espejo which led to a violent
scenario, killing SPO1 Espejo. SPO2 Nacnac was found guilty of homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioner’s acts constitutes a valid self-defense.

RULING: Yes. The refusal of the victim to follow a lawful order from petitioner, his superior, considering
also the negative words uttered by the victim in response to SPO2 Nacnac, his drunken situation, his
profession as being a police officer and the warning shot fired by the petitioner justifies the acts done as
mere defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague.The lone wound inflicted on the
victim supports that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. It was a
reasonable means chosen by the petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed
victim, his drunken state, disobedience on lawful order and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELO ALETA, FERDINAND ALETA, ROGELIO ALETA,
MARLO ALETA, JOVITO ALETA

G.R. No. 179708

April 16, 2009

FACTS: A witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a
serious offense. While the deceased Acob‘s mother Marina was at the community center of Barangay
Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, she heard a commotion at the yard of Marcelo Aleta, et al. (the Aletas).
Soon after returning home, she told Acob that there was a quarrel at the Aletas’ compound. Against his
mother’s pleas, Acob repaired to the Aletas’ compound. Marina followed and upon reaching appellants’
compound, she saw her nephew appellant Rogelio striking her son Acob twice at the left cheek and at the
back of his head with a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground.

She thereafter saw Rogelio striking Acob‘s father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face drawing his eyes to
pop up, and again on the head causing him to fall on the ground. Rogelio then ran towards the family
house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Rogelio‘s brothers-co-appellants Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand
and their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and Duldulao with pieces of wood, mainly on the
face and head, as well as on different parts of their bodies. Even while the victims were already lying
prostrate on the ground, Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and Ferdinand continued to hit them. When Rogelio
emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood and again clubbed the victims.

Ferdinand and Marlo interposed self-defense and defense of relative, respectively. Additionally, Marlo
invoked voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito invoked alibi.
Crediting the prosecution version, the trial court found the Aletas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder in both cases. The trial court held that although what triggered the incidents was never explained,
Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on them, qualified by abuse of superior strength and
cruelty. The Aletas moved for a reconsideration of the trial court‘s decision which was denied. Hence, the
present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial and the appellate courts erred in giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

RULING:
As in most criminal cases, the present appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witness and of
testimony. As held in a number of cases, the trial court is best equipped to make the assessment on said
issue and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal, unless:

1. the testimony is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded;

2. some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was
overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or

3. the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion.

As held in a catena of cases and correctly applied by both lower courts, Marina‘s positive identification of
the Aletas as the assailants and her accounts of what transpired during the incidents, which were
corroborated on all material points by prosecution witnesses Loreta Duldulao (Loreta) and Willie Duldulao
(Willie), as well as the findings of the medico-legal officer, carry greater weight than the Aletas‘ claims of
self-defense, defense of relative and alibi. More particularly, that Marina‘s narration was so detailed all the
more acquires greater weight and credibility against all defenses, especially because it jibed with the
autopsy findings. Respecting the defense’s questioning of Loreta‘s testimony that Willie had told her that
Duldulao was already dead, but was later to claim that on reaching the scene of the crime, Duldulao was
still alive, lying on the ground and being clubbed by Aleta, et al., the same deserves scant consideration.

Far from being inconsistent, the same is in sync with the other witnesses’ claim and Marlo’s own admission
that Aleta, et al. continued to club the two victims even as they lay motionless and helpless on the ground.
At any rate, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details,
such as whether Duldulao was still alive or not, cannot destroy Loreta’s testimony. Minor inconsistencies in
fact even guarantee truthfulness and candor. A witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where
there exists no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely
against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious offense. That the prosecution
witnesses are all related by blood to the Aletas should a fortiori be credited, absent a showing that they
had motive to falsely accuse the Aletas.
MARCIAL SIENES, BENITO SIENES, RICO SIENES and ROGER BANAYBANAY v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

G.R. NO. 132925

December 13, 2006

On or about the 15th day of May, 1981, at Barangay Kabulacan, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with the use of canes long bolo and jungle knife with which said accused were then armed and
provided, left multiple wounds which caused the death of their victim Felipe de la Cruz, Sr. immediately
thereafter.

When arraigned on October 12, 1984, all four (4) petitioners, as accused, individually pleaded not guilty.
On August 20, 1990, the trial court found all four (4) accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder as charged, and sentenced them accordingly, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and of the fact that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the four (4)
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court hereby finds the accused Marcial Sienes, Benito Sienes (alias
Baby Sienes), Rico Sienes, and Roger Banaybanay (alias Boboy Sienes) guilty of the crime of murder, as
charged. The accused, Marcial Sienes is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor, with no aggravating circumstance to offset the same and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Fourteen (14) years, Eight
(8) months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months. With regards to the three (3)
other co-accused, namely: Benito Sienes (alias Baby Seines), Rico Sienes and Roger Banaybanay (alias
Boboy Seines), there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, to offset each other, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Seventeen
(17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day to Twenty (20) years. All the four (4) accused shall
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased-victim, Felipe de la Cruz, the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as jurisprudential damages, plus the actual damages/expenses suffered in
the sum of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos, representing Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos for
embalming costs, One Thousand (P1,000.00) for tomb-making expenses and Three Thousand Pesos for
wake and vigil expenses, with an additional Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.

Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, all the four (4) accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals through its 12th division modified the decision of the trial court by ruling out the
presence of conspiracy among the four (4) accused and the attendance of treachery and evident
premeditation in the commission of the offense. Accordingly, the CA found the crime committed to have
been merely Homicide, not Murder, with only the father, Marcial Sienes, sentenced as principal while his
three (3) sons were adjudged as mere accomplices.
A motion for consideration was filed and denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA had erred in not considering as mitigating circumstance the defense of the
barangay captain, as the victim was in the act of assaulting a person in authority.

RULING:

When an accused invokes self-defense, as Marcial Sienes did in this case, the onus probandi to
substantiate such assertion rests on him. He must prove clearly and convincingly the three elements of
self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.6

Going by Marcial's testimony, it would appear that after he grabbed the microphone from the victim, the
latter boxed him, hitting him on his right jaw below the ear. Thereafter, the two of them boxed each
other, and, while wrestling with one another, the victim tried to grab a hunting knife, as if to kill him,
compelling him to repel the aggression by struggling for the possession of said knife and thrusting it upon
the victim himself.

Marcial's account, however, was belied by prosecution witness Cresencio Tablo who categorically stated
that the hunting knife in question came from Marcial himself who was already carrying it in his waist when
Marcial entered the dance hall. The very testimony of Roger Banaybanay and Boboy, no less a son of
Marcial, shows that the victim was not the aggressor when attacked by Marcial, but was even making a
frantic attempt to evade Marcial's assault.

What is more, Marcial himself never claimed self-defense when he gave his sworn statement to the police
authorities or during the preliminary investigation of the case. As it is, it was only during trial that he
raised for the first time his theory of self-defense. Persons who act in legitimate defense of themselves
describe fully and in all candor at the first opportune time all that has happened with a view to justify their
acts. The Court is, therefore, inclined to believe that the idea of self-defense was a mere afterthought on
the part of Marcial.

Marcial therefore cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of self-defense.