● Jan Irvin J.

Initan
A.M. No. 90-11-2697- CA
June 29, 1992
Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno of the Court of Appeals
dated 14 November 1990.
Ponente: ​PADILLA, ​J.

Facts:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of
Appeals, wrote a letter to the Supreme Court seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
Associate Justice Puno was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals on June 20, 1980. He was then appointed Appellate Justice in the
First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court on
November 7, 1984 when the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled
“An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes”.
The aftermath of EDSA revolution brought about the reorganization of the
entire government, including the Judiciary, to effect the reorganization of the
Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, screening committee
was created. The screening committee recommended the return of
Associate Justice Puno and was ranked number eleven (11) in the roster of
the Appellate Court Justices. When the appointment were signed by
President Corazon Aquino, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed from
number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno’s request directing the presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to correct the seniority ranking.
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc was filed
by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of
the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction.

Issues:
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be
attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33. Which reads:
“SEC. 2. Organization. — There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which
shall consist of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be
so designated in his appointment and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when
the appointment of two or more shall bear the same date, according to the
order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any Member
who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position
in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled
under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purposes be considered as continuous and uninterrupted”.
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to
comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction
of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as
well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of
constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court).
The motion for reconsideration filed by the two (2) Associate Justices
contends that the present Court of Appeals is a new court with fifty one (51)
members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior
court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the
courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date
of his last appointment.
It is to be noted that, at the time of issuance of Executive Order No. 33,
President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such that
she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg.
129 or her own Executive Order No. 33.

The question arises is whether or not the appointment made by President

Corazon Aquino that alters and disregard the seniority ranking of the
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, including two (2) justices who were also
affected, regardless if it was in accordance with Executive order No. 33 or
the President itself is just exercising her power did not violate Article 2,
Section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution that states: “The State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
Held:
The Supreme Court en banc GRANTED the motion for reconsideration and
the seniority ranking of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner
at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are
recognized and upheld.

Question during recitation:

What is the type of government did President Aquino created? Is it de facto
or de jure?
Answer: de jure, because the power is from the sovereign filipino people
vested upon her (yan ang pagka gets ko)
Norhanifa Ragundo's assigned case:

Hannah Eunice D. Serana v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.

Facts:
Hannah Eunice D. Serana, a government scholar, was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP.

One of the projects she discussed with President Estrada is the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. But it failed to materialize even after the President gave Fifteen
Million Pesos as financial assistance for the proposed renovation.

A complaint filed then against the petitioner together with her brother JADE IAN D.
SERANA, before the Sandiganbayan, an estafa case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a public officer.

Ruling:
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

● The petitioner argued that she does not receive any salary or remuneration as a
UP student regent. On that ground, the Petitioner contends that she is not a
public officer.

The court countered that, as a member of the Board of Regents, she had the general
powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP and is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws
to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, petitioner undoubtedly falls
within the category of public official.

Based on Mechem's definition of a public office, petitioner's stance that she was not
compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.

The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: "A
public office is the right, authority, and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."
TAÑADA vs ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295
May 2, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Generally, this case was raised by the petitioners by questioning the
constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
particularly when President Fidel V. Ramos signed the instrument of ratification and the
senate concurring the said treaty.
To hasten the worldwide recovery from devastation wrought by the World War II, the
global financial leaders planned to establish three multilateral institutions, which were the
World Bank(WB), International Monetary Fund(IMF), and International Trade
Organization(ITO). However, for a variety of reasons, including the non-ratification by
United States, the ITO never took off. What remained is the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After half a century, the world gave birth to WTO. Thereupon,
just like other developing countries, the Philippines joined the said organization.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution
mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and
"national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement.
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of
the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of
the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by
Filipinos."
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of WTO agreement contravene the Art. 2 sec. 19 of the
1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No. The WTO agreement did not violate Art. II, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. 23They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in
the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws.
Therefore, there was no violation of Art. II, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution with
regard to the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization.

STARE DECISIS:
In this case, the court also cited these cases:
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato
Basco vs. Pagcor
And mentioned " Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa
vs. Factoran, Jr
Diwani A. Sidic’s Case

BACANI, et. al v. NACOCO

G.R No. L – 9657
November 29, 1956

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts:

On January 19, 1953, National Coconut Corporation’s Auditor General required the plaintiffs,
Bacani and Matoto, stenographers, to reimburse the 714 – peso amount NACOCO had paid for
its counsel’s request for transcript of the stenographic notes during the pendency of the Civil
Case No. 2293, on the strengths that the NACOCO was expressed as a government entity on a
circular of the Department of Justice and was exempt from payment of the said fees.

On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General had issued an order directing the Cashier of the
Department of Justice to deduct the fees every payday from the plaintiffs’ salaries starting
March 30, 1954. To prevent the deduction from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the
NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Defendants set up a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which states the “Government of the
Philippine Islands” is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity throughout the
Philippine Islands, including save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in said islands, whether pertaining to the
Central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
governance, and, hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether NACOCO is a government entity and is exempt from the stenographic notes’
payments.

Ruling:

No, NACOCO is not a government entity and is not exempted from the stenographic notes’
payments because the term “Government of the Philippines” in ​section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code 1917 refers to the legislative, executive, and judicial department, through
which the power and functions of government are exercised. The functions of government are
classified as constituent which constitutes the very bonds of society and ministrant which are
intended for achieving a better life for the community. Though under section 2 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 518, NACOCO was organized for the purpose of adjusting the coconut
industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the united states and providing
facilities for better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut products, which
may fall under the constituent function of government, still, the ​Government of the Philippines
does not include government entities which are given corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law​. In which under
section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 518​, it states that ​NACOCO shall be subject to the
provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as the same are compatible with the provisions of
this Act, and it shall enjoy the general powers mentioned in said Corporation Law in addition to
those herein specified. It may sue or be sued in the same manner as any private corporations.