G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014 - FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner, v.

THE
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL

REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders1 dated October 7, 2010
and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by
petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.

The antecedent facts follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth
before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Piñas City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of
his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate
stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother’s first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the
following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his December 23, 1983 Not married
parents - Bicol
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of
entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the
proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature
and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that
the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city
civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles
376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on
December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises four issues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that
the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that
correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof
that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.

Petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial correction
of entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial
changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be
presented during the trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of
entries.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC
correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first
names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative
proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not
married” is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt
with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his
mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the
RTC’s ruling on this point.4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of
first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a
judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first nameor nickname, the day and month in the date of
birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we
said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of
this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and
convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we
held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceedings.9cralawred

On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling
that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the
city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer
that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC be reinstated since the
same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.

We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said,

petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mother’s first name. He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the
alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City:10cralawred

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x
xx

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are
not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the
status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however,
are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied
with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil

register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar,
as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly
ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliancewith the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his
new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties
since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last

issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents
were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the
purpose.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7,
2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial
Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library

Carpio,* Acting C.J., Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 206023, April 03, 2017

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LORENA OMAPAS

SALI, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to annul and set aside the February 11, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which affirmed in toto the February 23,
2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte,
granting the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules filed by
respondent Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali).

The CA narrated the undisputed factual antecedents.

Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition, dated November 26, 2008, for
Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC with the
following material averments:

1. Petitioner is a Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident [of] 941 D. Veloso
St.[,] Baybay, Leyte;

2. The respondent is located in Baybay City, Leyte and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court where it can be served with summons and other processes of this
Honorable Court;

3. All parties herein have the capacity to sue and be sued;

4. Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay

who was born on April 24, 1968 in Baybay, Leyte. A copy of the Baptismal
Certificate issued by the Parish of the Sacred Heart, Sta. Mesa, Manila is hereunto
attached as Annex "A";

5. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay, Leyte[,] thru inadvertence and mistake[,] erroneously entered
in the records the following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY"
instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as "June 24,
1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." A copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of
Dorothy A. Omapas issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) and Certification
from the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte are hereunto attached as Annex "B"
and Annex "C" respectively.

6. The petitioner has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of
birth as "April 24, 1968" for as long as she (sic) since she could remember and is
known to the community in general as such;

7. To sustain petitioner's claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth
pertaining to her first name and date of birth should be corrected so that it will now
read as "LORENA A. OMAPAS" and "April 24, 1968" respectively, attached
hereto are: the Certificate of Marriage of Morsalyn [D.] Sali and Lorena A. Omapas,
and a photocopy of the Postal Identity Card of the petitioner as Annex "D" and
Annex "E" respectively; [and]

8. This petition is intended neither for the petitioner to escape criminal and/or civil
liability, nor affect the hereditary succession of any person whomsoever but solely
for the purpose of setting the records of herein petitioner straight.

[Sali] then prayed for the issuance of an order correcting her first name from
"Dorothy" to "Lorena" and the date of her birth from "June 24, 1968" to ["]April 24,
1968."

After [Sali] proved her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, reception of
evidence followed. The Clerk of Court was then appointed as a commissioner to
receive the evidence in support of the petition. Subsequently, she rendered a
Report relative thereto.

On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued the assailed Decision in favor of [Sali],
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court, hereby resolves to GRANT this petition for correction of
the erroneous entries in the Birth Certificate of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, specifically
her first name from "DOROTHY" to "LORENA" and her date of birth from "JUNE 24,
1968" to "APRIL 24, 1968", and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay City,
Leyte, and the National Statistics Office to effect the foregoing correction in the
birth record of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, upon finality of this decision, and upon
payment of the proper legal fees relative thereto.
Furnish copy of this decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the petitioner
and her counsel.

SO ORDERED.2
On March 24, 2010, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a
quo because the title of the petition and the order setting the petition for hearing
did not contain Sali's aliases.

The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication
that Sali is known by a name other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to
compel her to indicate any other alias that she does not have; (2) Sali not only
complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial
proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity
to timely contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first
name of Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as to her identity and there is no
showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it would prejudice public
interest.

Now before Us, the grounds of the petition are as

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT APPLIED RULE

108 INSTEAD OF RULE 103, THEREBY DISPENSING WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF
STATING THE RESPONDENT'S ALIASES IN THE TITLE OF THE PETITION.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT

THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.3
The Republic argues that although Sali's petition is entitled: "IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH
OF DOROTHY A. OMAPAS," it is actually a petition for a change of name. The first
name being sought to be changed does not involve the correction of a simple
clerical, typographical or innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but a
substantial change in Sali's first name. This considering, the applicable rule is Rule
103, which requires that the applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the
title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing, and that the petition can be
granted only on specific grounds provided by law. Further, assuming that a petition
for correction of entries under Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy, the petition
should not have been granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048.

The petition is partially granted.

Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the
Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction
of clerical errors which were committed in the recording of her name and birth date.
This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined
under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule
108.4The evidence5 presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the
name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her
name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first
name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.6
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in
effect.7 Section 1 of the law states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis ours)
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the
new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
or she has been publicly known by that first name in the community.8 The local city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may
either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.9 We stressed in Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines:10
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.11
Recently, the Court again said in Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Piñas City:12
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that
under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative
remedy for the correction of his and his mother's first name.13
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name,
was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy
should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil
registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should
have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.

On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24,
1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15,
2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No. 9048.14 As
modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of birth and sex of
a person, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 10815 is the appropriate
remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil registry. Under the Rules,
the following must be observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.
The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from "June 24,
1968" to "April 24, 1968." In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the
requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding were satisfactorily complied
with. The appellate court found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

Here, [Sail] filed with the court a quo a verified petition for the correction of her
first name from "Dorothy" to "Lorena" as well as the date of her birth from "June
24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968." In the petition, she aptly impleaded the Civil
Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte as respondent. Thereafter, the trial court issued an
Order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition. The Order for
hearing was then published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province to notify the persons having or
claiming any interest therein. Moreover, said Order was posted in four public and
conspicuous places within the locality. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar, Solicitor
General and Assistant Provincial Prosecutor were furnished copies of the Petition
and Order to give them the opportunity to file their respective oppositions thereto.
x x x.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
February 11, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442,
which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Petition
for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with
respect to her first name is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with
the local civil registrar concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Martires, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L.

TIPAY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2013 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) that denied the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) from the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao
Oriental. The trial court, in turn, granted respondent Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay's
(Virgel) petition for the correction of certain entries in his birth certificate.4

Factual Antecedents

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several
entries in his birth certificate. Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth
certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office5 (NSO). Both copies
reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears
that the month and day of birth in the local civil registrar's copy was blank, while
the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976.6 Virgel
alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth
certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name,
from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25,
1976."7

The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to
trial. Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay,
testified that she gave birth to a son on February 25, 1976, who was baptized as
"Virgel." The Certificate of Baptism, including other documentary evidence such as
a medical certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male, were also presented
to the trial court.8

Ruling of the RTC

There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered its
Decision9 dated July 27, 2010 granting Virgel's petition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued: 1. Directing the

Local Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to cause the appropriate
change in the Certificate of Live Birth of VIRGIE L. TIPAY upon payment of the
required legal fees, particularly:

First Name : From: VIRGIE

To: VIRGEL
 Sex : From: Female
To: MALE

Date of Birth of Child : From: no entry

To: FEBRUARY 25,
1976

SO ORDERED.10

From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
course by the trial court.11The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) argued that the change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been made
through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This
argument was premised on the assumption that the summary procedure under Rule
108 is confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes
one's name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed
pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.12

Virgel refuted these arguments, alleging that changes of name are within the
purview of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He further disagreed with the position of
the Republic and asserted that substantial errors may be corrected provided that
the proceedings before the trial court were adversarial. He also argued that the
proceedings before the RTC were in rem, which substantially complies with the
requirements of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.13

Ruling of the CA

The CA denied the Republic's appeal in its Decision14 dated October 9, 2013, the
dispositive of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The July 27, 2010 Decision of the [RTC],
11th Judicial Region, Branch No. 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, in Special Proceedings
Case No. 243-09 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.15

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the
correction of the entry on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The CA also held that the petition filed with the trial court fully complied with
the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 108 because notices were sent to the
concerned local civil registrar and the OSG. Since Virgel was able to establish that
he is indeed male, a fact which remains undisputed, the CA upheld the trial court's
decision.16

As to the change of Virgel's name from "Virgie" to "Virgel," the CA did not find any
reason to depart from the decision of the RTC because it was more expeditious to
change the entry in the same proceeding. The CA found that the correction of
Virgel's name was necessary to avoid confusion, especially since his correct gender
is male. In the same vein, the CA ruled that even if the petition with the RTC was
considered a Rule 103 proceeding, the requirements under Rule 108 are
substantially the same as that under Rule 103. Thus, the CA already deemed these
requirements complied with.17 Finally, regarding the month and date of Virgel's
birth, the CA found the documentary evidence credible enough to establish that he
was indeed born on February 25, 1976.18

Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, the Republic appealed to this Court insisting
that the entries sought to be corrected are substantial changes outside the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The Republic also reiterated its earlier arguments,
adding that the CA should not have equated the procedural requirements under
Rule 103 with that of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petition. However, this Court finds that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry.

It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary
procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors
that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered
substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule.20

Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of
substantial errors. The Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial
alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate
adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting the application of the summary
procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.21 The Court's ruling
in Republic v. Valencia,22 explained the adversarial procedure to be followed in
correcting substantial errors in this wise:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the
opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the
use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding."

xxxx

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(l) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled
to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
"summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.23 (Emphasis
Ours)

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is limited to changes in entries
containing harmless and innocuous errors.24The cited cases in the petition
were already superseded by much later jurisprudence.25 Most importantly, with the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 904826 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or
the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of a judicial order.27 This law provided an administrative
recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving the
substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.28

The RTC was correct in taking cognizance of the petition for correction of
entries in Virgel’s birth certificate.

R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in.
the performance of clerical work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to the
understanding.29 It was further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 1017230 was
passed to expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to
make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded
sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or
mistake in the entry.31

Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC in
2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous
gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy was
to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.32 The changes in the entries
pertaining to the gender and date of birth are indisputably substantial corrections,
outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that may be corrected
administratively.

The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural requirements
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He impleaded the local civil registrar of
Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, the Solicitor General, and the Provincial
Prosecutor of Davao Oriental as parties to his petition for correction of
entries.33 The RTC then issued an order, which set the case for hearing on July 10,
2009. In compliance with Rule 108, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the order was
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Davao Oriental. Additionally, the local civil registrar and the OSG
were notified of the petition through registered mail.34

The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Mati, Davao City for purposes of the proceedings before the RTC.
Accordingly, the prosecutor assigned to the case was present during the hearing
but opted not to cross-examine Virgel or his mother after their respective
testimonies. There was also no opposition filed against the petition of Virgel before
the RTC.35
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties who have a claim or whose interests
may be affected were notified and granted an opportunity to oppose the petition.
Two sets of notices were sent to potential oppositors—through registered mail for
the persons named in the petition, and through publication, for all other persons
who are not named but may be considered interested or affected parties.36 A
hearing was scheduled for the presentation of Virgel's testimonial and documentary
evidence, during which time, the deputized prosecutor of the OSG was present, and
allowed to participate in the proceedings. While none of the parties questioned the
veracity of Virgel's allegations, much less present any controverting evidence before
the trial court,37 the RTC proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature. It
dutifully complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court
were adversarial, but merely insists on the erroneous premise that a Rule 108
proceeding is limited to the correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors
in the civil registry.38 Having established that the proper recourse for the correction
of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the
Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. The Court has long
settled in Republic v. Olaybar39 that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
108 were observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil registry, such
as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be
effected, viz.:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since
the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled
that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition
filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be

dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who
may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also
requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any;
and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings,
it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.40(Emphases Ours)

Since the Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cite a specific
rule of procedure that Virgel failed to follow, the Court has no reason to depart from
the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, in the absence
of evidence refuting Virgel's assertion that he is indeed phenotypically male, the
correction of the entry on Virgel's sex in his birth certificate, from "FEMALE" to
"MALE," was correctly granted.
With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel" the Court does not agree with
the CA that the requirements under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court may be
substituted with that of Rule 108. These remedies are distinct and separate from
one another, and compliance with one rule cannot serve as a fulfillment of the
requisites prescribed by the other.41 Nonetheless, the Court has settled in Republic
v. Mercadera42 that changes in one's name are not necessarily confined to a petition
filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the civil register that
may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie" may be corrected to
"Virgel" as a necessary consequence of the substantial correction on Virgel's
gender, and to allow the record to conform to the truth.

With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagrees with the CA that
the alleged date (i.e., February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The NSO copy of Virgel's
birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976, a date obviously
different from that alleged in the petition for correction.43 As a public document, the
date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is presumed valid and prima facie evidence
of the facts stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of proving its supposed falsity.44

Virgel failed to discharge this burden. The police clearance presented to the trial
court corroborates the entry in the NSO copy, indicating Virgel's date of birth as
May 12, 1976.45 The Court is also unconvinced by the other documentary evidence
supposedly showing that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976 because the
information indicated in the identification card from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Member Data Record from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
were all supplied by Virgel.46These are self-serving information, which do not suffice
to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the date of birth reflected in
the NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 9, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02286 is AFFIRMED, only insofar as the corrections of
the following entries in the birth certificate are concerned: (a) first name, from
"Virgie" to "Virgel;" and (b) gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE."

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on official business.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 159966. March 30, 2005]

 IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN
LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA
LISA WANG,Petitioners, v. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly
represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a

minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458

CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20,
1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child's name was changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang'.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore

for a long time because they will let him study there together with
his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore'.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate that
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of
his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and
his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister
since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R"
but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that
the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed
to Julian Lin Wang.1

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the

petition.2 The trial court found that the reason given for the change
of name sought in the petition that is, that petitioner Julian may be
discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his
middle name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the
name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now
be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor.
The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping his middle name.3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this

was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court
maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle
name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a
legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of
the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to
or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law
which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice
public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is
itself not reasonable.5

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under

Rule 45)6arguing that the trial court has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether
or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith
globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme
Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to
adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among
siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child."8 It
is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and
others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will
cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges
that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for
change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to
decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases9 decided by this
Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.10

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to

comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that
the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The
OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and
mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of
dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing
that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to
support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of
entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any
compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of
the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner's allegation that the
continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and
difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates
its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the
child's middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries
regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner
Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion
since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming
that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has
also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law.13

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be

denied.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has
an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry,
he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.14

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be

'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is sought.15 To
justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.16

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of

proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts.17

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name,

as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor
petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle
name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving
petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change
of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for
change of the given name18 and none on requests for changing or
dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the
middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the
negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant

at this point. We quote, thus:

'For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the

designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or
proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is

absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused
with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can
be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at
least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or
mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this
does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal
significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others
who may have the same given name and surname as he has.

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and

legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear
the surnames of the father and the mother,21 while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's
surname.22

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not

recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as
his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such

individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his
middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and
integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he
cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which,
however, are not apropos both.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino

mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu
Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to
Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also
elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mother's
surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there
still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated
by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del

Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who
filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes
Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C.
Calderon, her mother's husband. The Court held that a petition for
change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is
clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to
avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of
the State or of other people.

Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article

174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use
the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such
that the child could use only one family name, even the family
name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate
daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change
her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name
as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the
name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and
in her voter's registration). The trial court denied her petition but
this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the
Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally
use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to
choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled.
In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to
grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his
name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his
contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say
the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases

are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is
clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the
petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for
change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have
exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of
their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably
observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of
name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the
tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the
Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of
therein petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known
since childhood by a name different from her registered name and
she had not used her registered name in her school records and
voter's registration records; thus, denying the petition would only
result to confusion.

Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of

name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child.
Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not
have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name.
However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the
petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the
best interests of the minor petitioner therein.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such
change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it
from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous

foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.26 As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may
just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188829, June 13, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON.
ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, HON. ARTHEL B. CAROÑONGAN,
HON. TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, HON. JOSE D. CABOCHAN, AND
HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, v. DAVONN MAURICE C.
HARP, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 16 July
2009 in C A-G.R. SP No. 87272. The CA nullified the Summary Deportation
Order3 issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) against respondent Davonn Maurice Harp.

Petitioners Republic of the Philippines, Hon. Raul S. Gonzalez, in his capacity

as Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ); Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez,
in his capacity as Commissioner of the BI; and Hon. Arthel B. Caroñongan;
Hon. Teodoro B. Delarmente, Hon. Jose D. L. Cabochan, and Hon. Franklin
Z. Littaua, in their capacities as members of the Board of Commissioners of
the BI (petitioners) seek the reinstatement of (a) the DOJ Resolution4 dated
18 October 2004 revoking the Order of Recognition and Identity Certificate
issued to respondent;5 and (b) the BI Summary Deportation Order dated 26
October 20046 issued after the revocation. Petitioners emphasize that there
is substantial evidence to support the finding that respondent is not a
Philippine citizen7 and, therefore, his summary deportation was
warranted.8chanrobleslaw

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Respondent Davonn Maurice Harp was born and raised in the United States
of America to Toiya Harp and Manuel Arce Gonzalez (Manuel) on 21 January
1977.9 While on a visit to the Philippines,10 he was discovered by basketball
talent scouts. He was invited to play in the Philippine Basketball
League11 and was eventually drafted to play in the Philippine Basketball
Association (PBA).12chanrobleslaw

Sometime in 2002, respondent was among those invited to participate in a

Senate investigation jointly conducted by the Committee on Games,
Amusement, and Sports; and the Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws. The Senate inquiry sought to
review the processes and requirements involved in the acquisition and
determination of Philippine citizenship in connection with the "influx of
bogus Filipino-American (Fil-Am) or Filipino-foreign (Fil-foreign) basketball
players into the PBA and other basketball associations in the
Philippines."13chanrobleslaw

In the course of the inquiry, it was established that respondent had

previously obtained recognition as a citizen of the Philippines from the
BI14 and the DOJ15 upon submission of the following documents:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) Respondent's birth certificate;

b) A certified true copy of the birth certificate of respondent's father,

Manuel;

c) A Certification from the Consulate General of the Philippines stating

that Manuel became a citizen of the United States of America only on
10 November 1981;

d) An affidavit affirming Manuel's Filipino citizenship at the time of

respondent's birth;

e) Respondent's passport;

f) The passports of respondent's parents; and

g) The marriage contract of respondent's parents.

The Senate committees, however, found reason to doubt the Philippine

citizenship of respondent. After a scrutiny of the documents he had
submitted and its own field investigation of his purported background, they
concluded that he had used spurious documents in support of his Petition
for Recognition. In Committee Report No. 256 dated 7 August 2003, the
Senate committees explained:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COMMITTEES' FINDINGS
The Committees have the honor to submit the following findings of said
inquiry to the Senate after conducting seven (7) public hearings and
thorough field investigations.16chanrobleslaw

xxxx

D. Devonn Harp presented before the BI and the committees a certified true
copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of his father, Manuel Arce Gonzales, to
prove his claim for Philippine citizenship.

It appears, however, that the above certificate of birth is simulated, if not,

highly suspicious.

First, the certified true copy of Manuel Arce Gonzales, in photocopy form,
appears to have alterations on its face since the entries therein look to be
superimposed. Some of the entries as printed in the Certificate of Live Birth
appear light while the others dark, not to mention the traces of erasures
thereon.

Second, Devonn Harp in his affidavit of Philippine citizenship executed in

January 2000 deposed that his father is a certain Manuel S. Gonzales. The
discrepancy is in the middle/initial name as the record of birth of his father
indicates Manuel Arce Gonzales.

Third, upon field investigations, the marriage of Manual Arce Gonzales'

parents, Devonn's alleged grandparents, namely Ernesto Prudencio
Gonzalez and Natividad de la Cruz cannot be established. Certifications by
offices concerned in this regard were issued and obtained by the field
investigators.

Lastly, Ms. Liza T. Melgarejo, barangay secretary of Barangay Alicia, Bago

Bantay, Quezon City, certified that 'as per record existing in this office
(voters list 2002) there is no person registered/existing under the name of
Manual Arce Gonzalez.

She further stated that Block 24, Bago Bantay, Quezon City exists.
However, despite efforts exerted by the field investigators, they were not
able to find lot 14, the alleged address of Devonn's
relatives.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the report, the Senate committees also directed the BI and the DOJ to
examine thoroughly the authenticity of the documents submitted by certain
PBA players, including respondent, and to determine if they were indeed
citizens of the Philippines.18chanrobleslaw

Pursuant to this directive, the DOJ issued Department Order No. 412
creating a special committee to investigate the citizenship of the PBA
players identified in the report.19 As part of the investigation, respondent
and the other players were required to submit their position papers to the
special committee for consideration. Respondent filed his Position Paper20 on
14 October 2004.

The DOJ special committee submitted its findings and recommendations in a

Memorandum to the Secretary of Justice dated 15 October 2004.21 With
regard to respondent, the committee concluded that there was "substantial
evidence to conduct summary deportation proceeding x x x for
'misrepresentation as a Filipino citizen' in applying for recognition before the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice."22 The Committee
relied, in particular, on the findings of the Senate committees and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the apparent alterations made in
the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent's
father:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x While we recognize the evidentiary rule that entries in public records
like Certificate of Live Birth are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein, it is worthy to mention that the pieces of information adduced
during the Senate Committee investigation have produced clear, strong and
convincing evidence to overcome the positive value of the said document.

This Committee further considers the probability that the document itself
may have been fraudulently tampered. We concur with the observations of
the Senate Committee on the patent alterations appearing on the face of
the Certificate of Live Birth of Manuel Arce Gonzales.

Incidentally, the National Bureau of Investigation thru the Questioned

Documents Examination Section came up with its own findings that some of
the entries in the "Certificate of Live Birth of Manuel Arce Gonzales" have
been substantially altered. The summary of the NBI findings are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryLaboratory analysis of the specimen submitted

under magnification using stereoscopic microscope, magnifying lens, varied
lighting process and with the aid of photographic enlargements, reveal
evidence of alteration by mechanical erasures (scraping off), obliteration
and superimposition on the following areas of the questioned Certificate of
Live Birth, as shown by fiber disturbance, differences in type design of
typewriter used, typewriter ribbon, tint/shade of writing instrument, and
traces of outlines of the original entries could be deciphered as:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- On item no. 3 - in the now appearing typewritten name "Manuel" in
Name of Child: Manuel Arce Gonzalez. Traces of the original entry
could be deciphered as "N-erto".

- On item no. 6 - in the now appearing typewritten entry "Aug. 11" in

Date of Birth: Aug. 11, 1957. The original entry could possibly be
"Aug. 13, 1957".

- On item no. 12 - in the now appearing typewritten middle name "Dela

Cruz" and the last name "Arce" in Name of Mother: Natividad Dela
Cruz Arce. The original entry could partially be deciphered as Natividad
Cab-as Breva.

- On item no. 14 - in the now appearing typewritten figure "7" in Age of

Mother (at the time of his birth): 37. The original entry could be
deciphered as "3".

- On item no 17a - in the handwritten middle initial "A" and last name
"Gonzalez" in Informants Signature written as Natividad A. Gonzalez.
The original entry could not be deciphered as portions of it had been
covered by the new superimposed entry.

- On item no. 18b - in the handwritten last name "Gonzalez" appearing

below the typewritten name Natividad A. Gonzalez. The original entry
could not be deciphered due to extensive erasure.
 - On the three (3) now appearing handwritten surnames "Gonzalez" in
Affidavit To Be Accomplished in Case of An Illegitimate Child (dorsal
side of the Certificate of Live Birth). The original entries underneath
the three (3) Gonzales signatures could be deciphered as
"Breva."23 (citations omitted; underscoring in the original)
Acting on the basis of the special committee's findings, DOJ Secretary
Gonzalez issued a Resolution dated 18 October 200424 revoking the
recognition accorded to respondent and five other PBA
players.25cralawredSecretary Gonzalez also directed the BI to undertake
summary deportation proceedings against them.

On 20 October 2004, respondent and another PBA player, Michael Alfio

Pennisi, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for a 72-hour
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City.26 The petition sought to enjoin the DOJ and the BI
proceedings for the revocation of citizenship and the summary deportation
of respondent and Pennisi.27chanrobleslaw

On 26 October 2004, the BI ordered the summary deportation of

respondent. It noted that the recognition previously accorded to him as a
Filipino citizen had been revoked by the DOJ because of the spurious
documents submitted in support thereof.28 Consequently, the BI considered
him an improperly documented alien subject to summary deportation
proceedings pursuant to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-
01-035.29chanrobleslaw

Upon receipt of the Summary Deportation Order, respondent withdrew his

petition for prohibition before the RTC.30 He thereafter filed a Petition for
Review with an application for injunction before the CA31 to seek the
reversal of the DOJ Resolution and the BI Summary Deportation Order.

In a Decision dated 16 July 2009,32 the CA granted the Petition and set
aside the deportation order. It held that respondent, who was a recognized
citizen of the Philippines, could not be summarily deported;33 and that his
citizenship may only be attacked through a direct action in a proceeding
that would respect his rights as a citizen:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Concomitant to his status as a recognized Filipino citizen, petitioner,
therefore, cannot just be summarily deported by the BI. The BI no longer
has jurisdiction to revoke the order of recognition it had granted to
petitioner as the same order had already become final and executory
pursuant to Book VII, Chapter 3, Section 15 of the Administrative Code of
1987. It must be noted that the order of recognition was issued 18 February
2000 and IC No. 018488 was issued on 24 October 2000. The Summary
Deportation Order, on the other hand, was issued on 26 October 2004 or
more than four years after petitioner was conferred recognition of his
Filipino citizenship.

It is worth stressing that when the BI acknowledged petitioner's Filipino

citizenship through the issuance of the order of recognition (with the
affirmation of the DOJ) and IC No. 018488, the same is the last official act
of the government which granted petitioner the rights of a Filipino citizen,
the right to due process included. x x x.

xxxx

Moreover, the Summary Deportation Order collaterally attacks the Filipino

citizenship of petitioner. 'This cannot be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack
on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity.' A Filipino citizen has the right to be secure in the enjoyment of the
privileges accorded to him attendant to his citizenship. He has the right to
live peacefully without perturbation from the authorities. Should he be
disturbed by deportation proceedings, like in the instant case, he can resort
to the courts for his protection. x x x34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA, however, refused to settle the main controversy involving the
citizenship of respondent.35 Citing his incorrect resort to a Rule 43 petition
to assail the DOJ Resolution, the appellate court opted to resolve only the
issues pertaining to the Summary Deportation Order.36chanrobleslaw

ARGUMENTS RAISED

Petitioners assert that in granting the Petition for Review filed by

respondent, the CA erred for the following reasons: (1) his appeal was
rendered moot and academic by his voluntary departure from the
Philippines;37 (2) the CA had no jurisdiction over his appeal because the
petition had been filed out of time;38 and (3) the appellate court used his
Philippine citizenship as a basis to set aside the Summary Deportation Order
despite the DOJ's valid revocation of the recognition accorded to
him.39chanrobleslaw

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he is a recognized natural-

born Philippine citizen, who cannot be deprived of his rights and summarily
deported by the BI.40 He alleges that his citizenship was duly established
when he filed his petition for recognition before the DOJ and the BI,41 and
that the recognition they granted to him cannot be overturned merely on
the basis of the "unfounded conjectures and baseless speculations" of the
Senate committees, the DOJ and the NBI.42chanrobleslaw

OUR RULING

We DENY the Petition.

Respondent's appeal was not rendered moot and academic by his

voluntary departure from the Philippines.

Petitioners allege that it is no longer necessary to resolve the appeal of

respondent because he has voluntarily departed from the Philippines and is
now beyond the legal processes of the country.43 They argue that pursuant
to the ruling in Lew in v. The Deportation Board,44 his voluntary departure
has rendered his appeal moot and academic.

We find this argument unmeritorious. As explained by this Court in Gonzalez

v. Pennisi,45Lewin involved an alien who entered the Philippines as a
temporary visitor and eventually left without any assurance that he would
be allowed to return to the country. For obvious reasons, the ruling in that
case cannot be applied to others whose Philippine citizenship has also been
previously recognized and whose intention to return to the country has
likewise been manifested. In Gonzalez, this Court
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, we agree with respondent that the factual circumstances
in Lewin are different from the case before us. In Lewin, petitioner was an
alien who entered the country as a temporary visitor, to stay for only 50
days. He prolonged his stay by securing several extensions. Before his last
extension expired, he voluntarily left the country, upon filing a bond,
without any assurance from the deportation board that he would be
admitted to the country upon his return. The court found that he did not
return to the country, and at the time he was living in another country. The
court ruled that Lewin's voluntary departure from the country, his long
absence, and his status when he entered the country as a temporary visitor
rendered academic the question of his deportation as an undesirable alien.

In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation, was recognized as a

Filipino citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country because his
Filipino wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the
petitions before the Court of Appeals and before this court showed his
intention to prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error
committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He
was precisely questioning the DOJ's revocation of his certificate of
recognition and his summary deportation by the BI.46chanrobleslaw

Therefore, we rule that respondent's deportation did not render the present
case moot.
Like the respondent in Gonzalez, respondent herein is also a recognized
citizen of the Philippines. He has fought for his citizenship and clearly
demonstrated his intent to return to the country.47 Consequently, we hold
that his departure has not rendered this case moot and academic.

The filing of respondent's Petition before the CA was not

unreasonably delayed.

Petitioners also argue that the Petition of respondent before the CA should
have been dismissed on the ground of late filing.48 They allege that he only
had until 3 November 2004 to file an appeal of the DOJ Resolution, since he
received a copy thereof on 19 October 2004.49 Petitioners contend that
because his Petition was filed only on 4 November 2004, the DOJ Resolution
had already become final and executory, and the CA no longer had the
authority to modify it.50chanrobleslaw

In his Comment,51 respondent explained that he was able to file his appeal
with the CA only on 4 November 2004, because he had to wait for the RTC
to grant him leave to withdraw his pending Petition.52 He asked the Court to
consider the fact that the one-day delay in filing the appeal was not caused
by his thoughtlessness, but by the need to ensure that he would not violate
the rule against forum shopping.53chanrobleslaw

We rule for respondent. The one-day delay in the filing of the Petition is
excusable.

In Heirs of Crisostomo v. Rudex International Development Corp.,54 the

Court explained that the limited period of appeal was instituted to prevent
parties from intentionally and unreasonably causing a delay in the
administration of justice. The dismissal of a petition is unwarranted if the
element of intent to delay is clearly absent from a case.55 Here, it is
apparent that the delay in the filing of the Petition was for a valid reason,
i.e. respondent had to wait for the RTC Order allowing him to withdraw his
then pending Petition. It is likewise clear that he did not intend to delay the
administration of justice, as he in fact filed the appeal with the CA on the
very same day the RTC issued the awaited Order.56chanrobleslaw

We also note that in Gonzalez,57 a case involving exactly the same

circumstances, the Court ruled that the one-day delay in filing the Petition
for Review with the CA was justified:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A one-day delay does not justify the appeal's dismissal where no element of
intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to the
petitioner. The Court has ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and
failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be
reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses
are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the
reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The
purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid
an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to
controversies.
Respondent had a valid excuse for the late filing of the petition before the
Court of Appeals. It is not disputed that there was a pending petition for
prohibition before the trial court. Before filing the petition for review before
the Court of Appeals, respondent had to withdraw the petition for
prohibition before the trial court. The trial court granted the withdrawal of
the petition only on 4 November 2004, the date of filing of the petition for
review before the Court of Appeals. Under the circumstances, we find the
one-day delay in filing the petition for review excusable. (Citations omitted
and capitalized in the original)
We find no reason to depart from the above ruling. All things considered, a
liberal construction of the rules of procedure is in order. The ends of justice
would be better served by a review of this case on the merits rather than by
a dismissal based on technicalities.

The DOJ erroneously revoked the recognition accorded to

respondent.

Before proceeding to resolve the central issue in this controversy, we first

clarify the parameters of this ruling. The Court is aware that respondent has
failed to appeal the CA's dismissal of his Petition insofar as it refers to the
DOJ Resolution. While we affirm the doctrine that the resolutions of the DOJ
cannot be challenged via a petition for review under Rule 43, the Court
believes that the Summary Deportation Order is necessarily intertwined with
the DOJ Resolution. The propriety of the deportation proceedings against
respondent cannot be determined without passing upon the DOJ's findings
on his citizenship.

In the interest of putting an end to the entire controversy, we shall resolve

all issues raised by the parties in relation to the DOJ Resolution and the
Summary Deportation Order, in particular: (a) the finality of the recognition
accorded to respondent as a citizen of the Philippines; (b) the validity of the
DOJ Resolution; and (c) the legality of the Summary Deportation Order.

a) Finality of the Recognition Accorded to Respondent

As the agency tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory

services" and "implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission
and stay of aliens,"58 the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of
citizens of the Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino parent is a citizen
of the Philippines59 and is entitled to be recognized as such.60 Recognition is
accorded by the BI and the DOJ to qualified individuals, provided the proper
procedure is complied with and the necessary documents are
submitted.61 In this case, respondent was accorded recognition as a citizen
on 24 February 2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued Identification
Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his
entitlement to all the rights and privileges of citizenship.62chanrobleslaw

Petitioners, however, are correct in saying that the recognition granted to

respondent has not attained finality. This Court has consistently ruled that
the issue of citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion demands.63Res
judicata only applies once a finding of citizenship is affirmed by the Court in
a proceeding in which: (a) the person whose citizenship is questioned is a
party; (b) the person's citizenship is raised as a material issue; and (c) the
Solicitor General or an authorized representative is able to take an active
part.64 Since respondent's citizenship has not been the subject of such a
proceeding, there is no obstacle to revisiting the matter in this case.

b) Validity of the DOJ Resolution

As in any administrative proceeding, the exercise of the power to revoke a

certificate of recognition already issued requires the observance of the basic
tenets of due process. At the very least, it is imperative that the ruling be
supported by substantial evidence65 in view of the gravity of the
consequences that would arise from a revocation.

In this case, the DOJ relied on certain pieces of documentary and

testimonial evidence to support its conclusion that respondent is not a true
citizen of the Philippines: (a) the findings of the Senate committees66 and
the NBI67 that alterations were made in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Manuel; (b) the discrepancy between the middle initial found in Manuel's
birth certificate and that which appears in respondent's affidavit of
citizenship;68 (c) the results of the Senate's field investigations of
respondent's relatives;69 and (d) a Certification from the Secretary
of Barangay Alicia, Bago Bantay, Quezon City, stating that "Manuel Arce
Gonzalez" was not included in the 2002 list of voters in
that barangay.70chanrobleslaw

The Court finds these pieces of evidence inadequate to warrant a revocation

of the recognition accorded to respondent.

We note that respondent was earlier recognized as a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines on the strength of the documentary evidence he presented.
He has established that (a) he is the son of Manuel, as indicated in his birth
certificate;71 and (b) Manuel was a Filipino citizen when respondent was
born, as shown by the former's Certificate of Live Birth72 and Naturalization
Certificate,73 as well as a Certification74 issued by the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Francisco. In its Resolution, however, the DOJ decided
to attach more importance to the "clear and convincing" rebuttal evidence
from the Senate committees and the NBI, which supposedly outweighed the
probative value of these authenticated documents.

We are not convinced.

First, the reports relied upon by the DOJ as evidence of the alleged
alterations made in Manuel's Certificate of Live Birth are far from conclusive.

From Senate Committee Report No. 256 dated 7 August 2003, it appears
that the supposed discovery of alterations was based on a mere photocopy
of Manuel's Certificate of Live Birth.75 Since the original document was not
inspected, the committees could not make any categorical finding of
purported alterations. They were only able to conclude that Manuel's birth
certificate appeared to be "simulated, if not, highly suspicious."76 The Court
cannot rely on this inconclusive finding. In the same way that forgery
cannot be determined on the basis of a comparison of photocopied
instruments,77 the conclusion that a document has been altered cannot be
made if the original is not examined.

Neither can the Court accord any probative value to the NBI report on the
questioned document. We note that not only did petitioners fail to submit a
copy of this report to the Court; the quoted portions of the report in the
Petition and the DOJ Resolution also failed to identify the specimen used by
the NBI for its examination.78 As an appellate court, we cannot look beyond
the record to affirm or reverse a ruling.79Because of the absence of these
crucial facts from the records of the case, the purported contents of the
report are unsupported assertions to which the Court can give very little
weight.

Moreover, the repeated allegations80 of respondent that the NBI examined

only a copy of his father's birth certificate, and not the original document,
remained uncontroverted. The only response of the OSG to this objection is
that it remains the responsibility of respondent to show proof that the
document he relies upon is genuine.81 It must be emphasized, however,
that Manuel's birth certificate, a public document and an official record in
the custody of the Civil Registrar, enjoys the presumption of regularity and
authenticity.82 To defeat these presumptions, the party making the
allegation must present clear, positive and convincing evidence of
alteration.83 For obvious reasons, this burden cannot be discharged by the
mere submission of an inconclusive report from the Senate Committee and
the presentation of an excerpt of an NBI report on the purported alterations.

Second, the Court is not convinced that the other pieces of evidence relied
upon by the DOJ sufficiently contradict the claimed Philippine citizenship of
respondent. The veracity of that claim is certainly not negated by the results
of the field investigation of the Senate, specifically its failure to obtain a
record of the marriage between the grandparents of respondent and its
inability to find any of his relatives. There are a number of possible
explanations for these circumstances - for instance, the marriage of his
grandparents may not have been properly reported or the record thereof
may have been lost or destroyed; his relatives, on the other hand, may
have died or transferred to another place of residence. Based solely on the
available pieces of evidence, it is impossible for us to conclude that he
deceived the DOJ and the BI about his citizenship.

As to the Certification issued by the Secretary of Barangay Alicia, Bago

Bantay, Quezon City, the Court finds it irrelevant. Since Manuel became a
naturalized American citizen on 10 November 1981,84 it is only logical that
his name no longer appears in the 2002 list of voters in the barangay.
Finally, the inconsistency between his middle initial in his birth certificate
and that which appears in the affidavit of citizenship submitted by
respondent has been adequately explained as a mere typographical error.

The evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is simply not enough to
negate the probative value of the documentary evidence submitted by
respondent to prove his Philippine citizenship. Without more, the Court finds
no reason to set aside the rule that public documents, particularly those
related to the civil register, are "prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained."85 Hence, we rely on these documents to declare that respondent
is a citizen of the Philippines.

c) Validity of the Summary Deportation Order

It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by

the BI against citizens of the Philippines.86 In Board of Commissioners v.
Dela Rosa,87 the Court reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to
courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding. Ifi that
case, we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at
least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the
claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the
deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of
citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question
in the affirmative, and We quote:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized
and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding,
he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection,
either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that
the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the
deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only
after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also
be protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-
meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this much
boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the
Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's
name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphases supplied)
Since respondent has already been declared and recognized as a Philippine
citizen by the BI and the DOJ, he must be protected from summary
deportation proceedings. We affirm the ruling of the CA on this
matter:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
True, "[t]he power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to
the public good and domestic tranquility of the people." However, in this
controversy, petitioner is not an alien. He is a Filipino citizen duly
recognized by the BI, the DOJ and the DFA x x x.88 (Citations omitted)
A final word. The Court is compelled to make an observation on the cavalier
way by which the BI, the DOJ and the Senate committee handled this
matter. The DOJ and the BI relied on inconclusive evidence - in particular,
on questionable reports based on photocopied documents - to take away
the citizenship of respondent and even justify his deportation. These acts
violate our basic rules on evidence89 and, more important, the fundamental
right of every person to due process.90chanrobleslaw

The Senate committee, for its part, did acknowledge that further
investigation of the citizenship of respondent and the authenticity of the
documents he submitted was necessary.91 However, it still proceeded to
conclude that his father's Certificate of Live Birth had been simulated and
altered.92 For evident reasons, it was unfair and careless for the committee
to make those statements, given the admitted fact that it had examined a
mere photocopy of the document. At the least, it cast aspersions on the
reputations of respondent and his family and placed the authenticity of
public records under suspicion. Even if an investigation later controverts the
contents of the report, the damage can no longer be completely undone.

The conduct of these three institutions is quite puzzling to the Court

considering that any one of them could have simply required the
appropriate agencies to present the original documents for inspection.
Alternatively, these agencies could have been asked to repeat their
examination of the documents using original specimens to determine
whether alterations had indeed been made. It is most unfortunate that they
failed to use their legal authority to make sure that there was sufficient
evidence before they revoked his citizenship.

Furthermore, considering the gravity of the allegation that respondent

submitted forged documents to support his claim, government institutions
and agencies cannot make this accusation irresponsibly. The detrimental
effects of one reckless allegation - on the right of a person to reputation and
livelihood, among others - are clearly exemplified in this case. We also
emphasize that what is at stake is the citizenship of an individual. This Court
will not sanction a revocation of this most basic of rights93 on frivolous
grounds.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Department of

Justice dated 18 October 2004 and the Summary Deportation Order dated
26 October 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration are hereby SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur