Unga Disec Background Guide

INDIA HARVARD
MODEL UNITED NATIONS
INDIA 2015
A Background Guide for the

Disarmament and International
Security Committee
Harvard Model United Nations India
August 13 - 16, 2015

Table of Contents
Letter from the Secretary-General................................................................................ 3

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General.................................................................... 4
Letter from the Director.............................................................................................. 5
Introduction................................................................................................................ 6
History of the Committee........................................................................................... 6
Topic Area: National Sovereignty and Asymmetric Warfare......................................... 7

Statement of the Problem............................................................................................ 7
History of the Problem................................................................................................ 8
Current Situation...................................................................................................... 15
Relevant UN Actions................................................................................................ 20
Proposed Solutions.................................................................................................... 23
Questions a Resolution Must Answer........................................................................ 26
Bloc Positions............................................................................................................ 26
Suggestions for Further Research............................................................................... 28
Closing Remarks....................................................................................................... 28
Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 29
Endnotes................................................................................................................... 32
A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Dear Delegates,
It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to the fifth session of Harvard Model

United Nations India, to be held August 13-16, 2015 in the beautiful city of
Cyndia B. Yu
Secretary-General
Hyderabad. I hope that you are excited to embark on your preparations for
conference, and even more excited to begin working together in one of fifteen
challenging, creative, collaborative, solutions-oriented, and above all substan-
tively enriching committees.
Délany D. Sisirucá
Director-General
The United Nations as a body and Model UN an activity stress diplomacy, in-
novation, and cooperation. It is through becoming substantively engaged and
deeply knowledgeable about these topics that you may proceed to develop your
Angela Jiang own solutions and work with your fellow delegates in discussion, promotion,
Under-Secretary-General
and hopefully even resolution about the challenges facing your committee. We
Administration
encourage you to take this background guide as a starting point for your re-
search and use it as inspiration in your own preparation as well as in your
Colin A. Mark everyday thinking. As a conference, HMUN India delegates will tackle issues
Under-Secretary-General spanning the centuries from 1740 to 2017, topics pertinent to every inhabited
Finance
continent, and ideas that are capable of nothing short of changing the world.
The opportunity to discuss and develop innovative approaches to the world’s
Mallika A. Snyder most pressing global questions with 1400 peers from around the world is an
Under-Secretary-General unparalleled one, and I hope you seize it to its full extent.
Committees
Your Directors are among the most brilliant, passionate, and dedicated stu-
dents at Harvard, and we look forward to meeting each and every one of you
in Hyderabad this August to take on this adventure together. For now, allow
this background guide to be your starting point on your HMUN India 2015
journey. We hope it will be a memorable one.
Sincerely,
Cyndia B. Yu
Secretary-General
59 Shepard Street, Box 205
Cambridge, MA 02138
Harvard Model United Nations India 2015
Email: info@hmunindia.org secgen@hmunindia.org
www.hmunindia.org
Harvard Model United Nations India is co-produced by the Harvard International Relations Council and MUNCafé, a
brand of Worldview Education Services, Ltd.
A LETTER FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR COMMITTEES
Dear Delegates,
It is my honor to welcome you to Harvard Model United Nations India 2015. My name is
Mallika Snyder, and I am the Under-Secretary-General for Committees, responsible for en-
Cyndia B. Yu suring that your experience in committee is the best it can be. I am a sophomore at Harvard
Secretary-General studying Economics, and, aside from Model United Nations, I am particularly involved in
theater and community service on campus. I also spent my high school years in Mumbai,
India, so I’m very excited to return this summer to the country that I consider my second
home.
Délany D. Sisirucá HMUN India represents one of the most enriching opportunities available for high school
Director-General
students from around the world to engage with some of the most complex challenges hu-
manity faces today. Over the course of four days in Hyderabad this summer, delegates like
you will work together in fifteen committees to craft policy on the Aadhar Biometric scheme
Angela Jiang
in the Rajya Sabha, consider the interplay of international politics, environmental issues,
and economics that is the shipbreaking industry in the United Nations Environment Pro-
Administration
gramme, work as the European Commission to save a futuristic 2017 Europe from complete
disaster, and so much more.
Colin A. Mark
Each of you brings a unique perspective to this conference, and it is through the creative and
Finance practical solutions that you and the delegates you interact with develop over the course of
this conference that seemingly intractable problems may come a little closer to being solved.
It is also through your time spent bonding with other delegates over draft resolutions, work-
Mallika A. Snyder ing papers, and chats about your backgrounds outside of committee that you will emerge
Under-Secretary-General from conference not just a better citizen of this world, but also a member of the HMUN
Committees India family.
The staff and I cannot wait to learn from you at conference in August, and we look for-
ward to working to ensure that this conference is as special as the talent and commitment
that you bring to it. In the months ahead, please do not hesitate to contact any member of
the HMUN India staff if you have any questions at all. I can be reached at committees@
hmunindia.org, and like your Directors and Secretariat members, I would be delighted to
hear from you.
All the very best, and see you at conference!
Warm Regards,
Mallika Snyder
59 Shepard Street, Box 205 Under-Secretary-General for Committees
Cambridge, MA 02138 Harvard Model United Nations India 2015
Email: info@hmunindia.org
www.hmunindia.org committees@hmunindia.org
A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
Dear Delegates,
As your director for the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Disarma-
ment and International Security (DISEC), it is my honor to welcome you to the General
Assembly at the fifth session of Harvard Model United Nations India. My name is Colin
Cyndia B. Yu Mark, and I hail from the edge of northern New Jersey, just close enough to New York City
Secretary-General
to feel like a New Yorker and just far enough away from it to not count as one. I am currently
a third year student concentrating in Social Studies.
The MUN General Assembly has been my second home since I discovered MUN in my first
year of high school. My teammates on Harvard’s traveling MUN team joke that my life is
Délany D. Sisirucá
a constant search for signatories for my draft resolution (if you do not get that joke yet, I
Director-General
promise that you will soon!). Four years ago, I was in your shoes, as a delegate in DISEC at
HMUN’s 58th session. Having the opportunity to serve as your director is my Model UN
dream come true. As a former HMUN delegate, there is nothing I want more than to make
Angela Jiang
your HMUN experience as incredible as it can be! To that end, please feel welcome and
Administration
encouraged to email me at disec@hmunindia.org to introduce yourself and ask me anything
you want about committee, Harvard, or life in general.
Colin A. Mark On campus, I am an active member of the International Relations Council, the umbrella
Under-Secretary-General organization that includes HMUN. Last fall, I served as Co-President of Model Security
Finance Council 2014, Harvard’s one-day MUN conference for prospective members of our Inter-
national Relations Council. I directed DISEC at HMUN 2015, directed United Nations
Security Council at HMUN China 2015, and crisis directed the Futuristic Commission on
Mallika A. Snyder Space Development at HNMUN 2015. Moreover, in addition to directing DISEC, I am
Under-Secretary-General HMUN India’s Under-Secretary-General for Finance, and in that capacity I oversee confer-
Committees ence budgeting, financial aid, and money management.
Our topic represents one of the most disruptive threats to the modern nation state system.
The stakes are high. But if there is anything that six years of model UN has taught me, it
is that students are up to any challenge, no matter how many policymakers have tried and
failed to address it. I am so lucky to have the privilege of guiding you through these chal-
lenges, and I look forward to meeting you in August.
Sincerely,
Colin Mark
Disarmament and International Security Committee, Director
Harvard Model United Nations India 2015
59 Shepard Street, Box 205 disec@harvardmun.org
Cambridge, MA 02138
Email: info@hmunindia.org
www.hmunindia.org
6 Disarmament and International Security Committee
Introduction History of the Committee

The United Nations General Assembly (GA)
It is the seventieth birthday of the United was established after World War II by the UN
Nations, and it is a tough time to be a nation- Charter, which entered into force on 24 October
state. In West Africa, the largest ever epidemic of 1945. The GA is a global forum for international
ebola hemmorhagic fever has reminded the world cooperation built on the principle of “one
that only humans obey borders. What’s more, in nation, one vote.” All UN members participate
the Middle East, a jihadi group has conquered in the General Assembly, and each nation’s vote
broad stretches of territory, publicly bulldozed is weighed equally, unlike in the UN Security
an international recognized national border, Council where the five Permanent Members
and declared all the territory under its control a hold veto power. There were 51 initial Member
new Islamic caliphate. Meanwhile, belligerent States of the GA, making the initial GA slightly
non-state-actors in South and Central Asia are smaller than its forebear, the Assembly of the
starting to turn against their state sponsors, and League of Nations, which at its largest included
some of them have designs on weapons of mass all 58 members of the League. Since 1945, the
destruction. UN and the GA have expanded to 193 Member
Faced with these challenges to the international States, including nearly all of the world’s people.
system, it is important to critically examine the The Holy See and the State of Palestine hold non-
United Nation’s continued commitment to the member observer state status.
primacy of the nation-state. The United Nations The GA is divided into six Main Committees.
is famous for maintaining global peace and Disarmament and International Security
security by serving as a forum for “one nation, one (DISEC) is the First Committee, and the powers
vote.” But the very notion of a nation is a modern directly accorded to the GA in the UN Charter
phenomenon, no more than a few hundred years most closely align with the current responsibilities
old, and an evolving world is calling into question of DISEC. Article 11 of the Charter reads: “The
some of the most basic assumptions underlying General Assembly may consider the general
the United Nations’ organizational structure. principles of co-operation in the maintenance
To that end, the Disarmament and International of international peace and security, including
Security Committee is tasked with a topic area the principles governing disarmament and
that challenges the very notion of “international” the regulation of armaments, and may make
security. This committee has been called upon recommendations… to the Members or to the
to write the rules of cross-border asymmetric Security Council or to both… Any such question
warfare — i.e., how do nations go about fighting on which action is necessary shall be referred to
an Islamic caliphate that is still technically on top the Security Council.” Until the late 1970s, the
of nations with sovereign prerogatives? Such wars First Committee was known as the Political and
challenge the basic rules of the United Nations Security Committee (POLISEC), and it was
system, which grew out of the rubble of World supported by the Special Political Committee.
War II in 1945. At that time, a union of all of Today, DISEC forwards political matters that
the world’s nation-states in a peacekeeping body it does not address to the Fourth Committee,
may have been the most reasonable vehicle for Special Political and Decolonization, the merger
preserving global security. In 2015, can we still of the Special Political Committee with the former
say the same? Fourth Committee, the Special Committee on
Decolonization.
Harvard Model United Nations 2015 7
As DISEC, the First Committee is concerned with Topic Area: National Sovereignty and
“disarmament, global challenges and threats to Asymmetric Warfare
peace that affect the international community.”1
DISEC works closely with the UN Disarmament
Commission, a subsidiary of the GA; and the Statement of the Problem
Conference on Disarmament, the forum in which
disarmament treaties are debated. Major topics On June 9, 2014, Sunni Muslim jihadis fighting
that DISEC has addressed include arms trade, in Syria crossed the Syrian border into Iraq and,
prevention of an arms race in outer space, and as part of a broader campaign to establish a Sunni
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.2 Islamist state in Greater Syria, began an offensive
against Iraq’s Shiite-led government. Within days,
As noted in the Charter, DISEC and the other the militants seized Iraq’s second-largest city,
committees of the GA do not have authorization to and today they pose the greatest threat to Iraq’s
pass binding resolutions. Instead, DISEC focuses stability in over a decade. Iraqi Vice President and
on building consensus and passing resolutions that former Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi has
set guidelines for the international community. If called the campaign a “foreign invasion of Iraq,
DISEC wishes for action be taken, it must forward carried out by terrorist groups from different
its recommendations to the Security Council, countries.”3 However, the militants are part of an
which is mandated to pass binding resolutions insurgent group known as the Islamic State of Iraq
and authorize direct action by UN members, UN and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Islamic
peacekeepers, etc. DISEC resolutions pertaining State or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/al-
to disarmament often set the parameters that Sham [ISIS]), a non-state actor (NSA) that is not
guide the drafting of disarmament treaties in the controlled by any state or group of states.4 Still,
Conference on Disarmament. ISIL controls territory in both Iraq and Syria and
is partially financed by its control of Syrian oil
The United Nations and DISEC were born
fields.5 As a result, Iraq and its partners cannot
out of the only two uses of nuclear weapons
defeat ISIL without expanding their use of force
against humans, the atomic bombings of Japan’s
into Syria, violating Syria’s territorial integrity.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki that ended World War
II. It is deeply ironic that this catastrophic sacrifice Article 2, Section 4 of the UN Charter states that
of human life is remembered for ending the most “all Members shall refrain in their international
deadly war of all time. DISEC works to preserve relations from the threat or use of force against
the post-war peace by preventing the proliferation the territorial integrity or political independence
of weapons, by preventing the “scourge of war” of any state.”6 If this clause is interpreted literally,
from crippling the sprit of cooperation that has then any campaign to defeat ISIL in Syria without
helped the international community prosper for Syria’s approval would be an illegal use of force.
seven decades. I hope you feel the significance of On the other hand, since Syria failed to prevent
your work as you simulate DISEC this August. its territory from becoming a launchpad for ISIL’s
invasion of Iraq, Syria arguably bears responsibility
for ISIL’s violation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. In
light of this, does Iraq have the right to violate
Syrian sovereignty to target ISIL, Article 2,
Section 4 notwithstanding? After all, Article 51 of
the Charter reads, “nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations,”7 which
clearly grants Iraq and its defenders the legal right community has failed to establish the degree to
to use armed force against ISIL. It is less clear, which sovereignty may be contingent in cases
however, that Article 51 gives these states the right where a state is unwilling or unable to prevent
to use armed force against Syria in retaliation NSAs from abusing its territory. Moreover, state
against Syria’s failure to control its borders. policies are not necessarily consistent across all
Unfortunately for Iraq, even though it has the cases; for example, while the United States invaded
right to defend itself against ISIL aggression, it Afghanistan as part of its War on Terror following
cannot do so without violating Syrian sovereignty. the 11 September, 2001 terror attacks on US soil,
Thus, it is ultimately unclear whether Iraq has the United States condemned Russia’s counter-
any right under international law to adequately terror incursions into Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as
defend itself against ISIL’s invasion. violations of Georgian sovereignty. It is the task of
this committee to produce a resolution that defines
Iraq’s dilemma is a widespread paradox in the rules the parameters of the “Responsibility to Control”
of modern warfare. NSAs—including terrorist state borders and territory. This resolution will
organizations, insurgent movements, and other regulate interventions that are staged when one
autonomous militias—often have little regard for state fails to meet its responsibility to protect other
borders. As a result, when states defend against states from attacks originating within its territory.
NSAs, the victim states are often forced to violate
other states’ sovereignty. On the other side of the
same coin, while rival states today rarely engage History of the Problem
one another in conventional warfare, NSAs can
serve as proxies, fighting on behalf of a state yet Early Legal Precedents
impossible for the target state to label as agents
The first significant dispute between two states
of its enemy. For example in 2006, Hezbollah,
caused by the independent actions of a non-state
a Lebanese militant group, used Lebanon as a
actor was the 1837 Caroline affair. During the
base for attacks against Israel, prompting Israel to
Canadian Rebellions of 1837, a group of rebels
invade. Lebanon insisted that Hezbollah did not
fighting to liberate Canada from British rule set
act on behalf of Lebanon and that Israel’s invasion
up a base on Navy Island in Canadian territorial
was an illegal use of force against Lebanon that
waters near the US border. While stationed at
punished a third party for a crime it did not
Navy Island, the rebels recruited Canadian and
commit. Israel argued that Lebanon’s failure to
American reinforcements and amassed a supply of
prevent Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese territory was
arms. Soon after the establishment of the Navy
equivalent to an attack on Israel, and therefore
Island base, the rebel militia began attacking the
Israel’s right to self-defense superseded Lebanon’s
Canadian mainland and British vessels on the
right to sovereignty.
Niagara River. Britain demanded that the United
In recent years, the inviolability of national States crack down on all rebel activity on American
sovereignty in international relations has been soil. On December 29, 1837, when the American
challenged. Genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia crackdown was not immediately forthcoming,
during the 1990s spurred the development of Britain deployed fifty-six Canadian militiamen to
a new norm: sovereignty as responsibility. This destroy the Caroline, a steamboat that the rebels
emerging norm has already transformed the rules used to ferry arms and men between New York and
of humanitarian intervention, leading in 2005 Navy Island. However, the British discovered that
to the adoption of the international doctrine of the Caroline was not docked at Navy Island, but
the Responsibility to Protect, which states that was instead at port in New York—US territory.
leaders lose sovereignty if they fail to protect their Nonetheless, the British boarded the Caroline,
people from atrocities. Thus far, the international killed two Americans on board, and sent the
burning ship careening over the Niagara Falls.8 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed
The United States denounced the attack. In 1841, down a landmark decision on the relationship
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster argued that between state support of NSAs and the right of
a nation may only exercise self-defense by means self-defense, including collective self-defense, in
that are necessary and proportionate to ensuring Nicaragua v. United States (1986). In 1979, the
the defense of the threatened state. The “necessary Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a
and proportionate” standard for self-defense, socialist revolutionary organization, led a leftist
often called the Caroline test, has since become a revolution against Nicaraguan president Anastasio
touchstone of international law.9 Somoza Debayle, a staunch anti-communist
whose family had ruled Nicaragua for forty-six
The right of hot pursuit—a state’s right to pursue years.12 The United States initially supported the
fleeing criminals past national borders— was new Sandinista government, providing economic
codified in 1958 in Article 23 of the Convention aid to Nicaragua. However, US policy toward
on the High Seas, which reappeared with minor Nicaragua shifted dramatically in 1981. The
changes as Article 111 of the 1982 UN Convention ICJ writes, “According to the United States, the
on the Law of the Sea. These articles only apply reason for this change of attitude was reports of
to ships fleeing a state’s territorial waters, and any involvement of the Government of Nicaragua in
extension of this right to criminals fleeing across logistical support, including provision of arms,
a land border cannot be rooted in these texts for guerrillas in El Salvador.”13 In response to
alone. In both forms, the article stipulates that these actions, the United States began a policy
hot pursuit is only permitted in cases where “the of actively opposing the Sandinista government,
competent authorities of the coastal State have providing aid to counterrevolutionaries in
good reason to believe that the ship has violated Nicaragua known as contras. The US justified
the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit these actions as part of its right of collective self-
must be commenced when the foreign ship or one defense with El Salvador (as well as Honduras and
of its boats is within” the territory of the pursuing Costa Rica, states the US claims were also victims
state.10 Only military vehicles or vehicles specially of Sandinista aggression), granted by Article 51 of
authorized by the government are permitted the UN Charter and Article 21 of the Charter of
to exercise the right of hot pursuit on behalf of the Organization of American States.14 The US-
a state. “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon sponsored contras perpetrated well-documented
as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of human rights violations in Nicaragua, and
its own country or of a third State.”11 Although Nicaragua sought to impute these crimes to the
there have been no new treaties governing the United States.
right of hot pursuit since 1982, state practice—
and thus, international law—has evolved to leave The ICJ ruling established a number of key
the possibility of a right of hot pursuit on land as precedents. First of all, the ICJ made clear that
an open question for this committee to address not every use of force by one state on another is
(a full explanation of the sources of international severe enough to constitute an “armed attack.”
law is included in the Relevant UN Action section In particular, providing support for a rebel group
below). The right of hot pursuit on land and the does not constitute an armed attack. As Article
right of self-defense are sometimes conflated in 51 of the UN Charter only grants the right of
discussions of national sovereignty and asymmetric self-defense in cases of armed attack, states do not
warfare because they permit similar state actions. retain the right to retaliate against violations of
While these two rights affect this topic in related sovereignty that do not reach the threshold for an
ways, they have distinct legal underpinnings and armed attack. Therefore, the United States could
should be considered separately. not invoke the right to collective self-defense
because Nicaragua had not launched an armed
11 September,
2001 Attacks and
the Erosion of
the Nicaragua
Judgement
Laws of war in the
fight against NSAs
were significantly
altered by the 11
September, 2001
terror attacks on the
United States. Global
militant Islamist
organization al-
Qaeda hijacked four
commercial airliners
Contra militants in Nicaragua during the 1980s and rerouted them
toward major US
attack against El Salvador. Moreover, the ICJ structures. Two of
found that US support for the contras failed the the planes crashed into the World Trade Center
Caroline test. However, the United States could in New York City, killing 2,763 people, including
not be held responsible for the human rights the hijackers. Another plane crashed into the
violations of the contras because US support of Pentagon (the headquarters of the US Department
the contras did not reach the point at which the of Defense), killing 189. The fourth plane, aimed
contras could be equated for legal purposes with at Washington, D.C., was crashed into an open
US armed forces.15 field after passengers attempted to retake control
of the plane, killing the 44 people onboard.16
In summary, according to these early precedents,
the right to self-defense against NSAs can only The 11 September attacks led to a global campaign
be invoked if self-defense is overwhelmingly to gut NSA terrorism, most notably the US-
necessary for the protection of the state, and led War on Terror against al-Qaeda and related
steps taken in self-defense are proportionate to organizations. Following the attacks, the UN
the threat. That right does not justify violating Security Council unanimously passed Resolution
another nations’ sovereignty unless the actions of 1373, which holds nations accountable for
the NSA are effectively actions of the state that terrorist operations within their territory. UNSCR
would have its sovereignty violated. Meanwhile, a 1373 reaffirms “the inherent right of individual or
state has the right to pursue criminals that leave its collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter
territory, but that right ends when those criminals of the United Nations” and compels nations to
reach the territory of another state. These early “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan,
conceptions of the right of self-defense and support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe
the right of hot pursuit give states very limited havens; prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate
options for combatting NSAs that cross borders. or commit terrorist acts from using their respective
As we will see, state practice since Nicaragua has territories for those purposes against other States
not been in concert with these rules. or their citizens;” and “prevent the movement of
terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls.”17 Within weeks of UNSCR 1373, the
United States and the United Kingdom began Tutsi government of Rwanda. The militants also
a bombing campaign against the Taliban, an terrorized Tutsi refugees and Zairian Tutsis.20
Islamic fundamentalist movement that controlled In the fall of 1996, Tutsi-led Rwanda incited a
Afghanistan during the 11 September attacks and rebellion by the Zairian Tutsis against the Rwandan
harbored al-Qaeda leaders. As emphasized by Hutus occupying east Zaire. Soon thereafter,
Theresa Reinold in the Journal of Intervention Rwanda invaded Zaire to assist the Tutsi rebels in
and Statebuilding, “the vast majority of states did their fight against the Hutus. This invasion sparked
not challenge America’s … right to self-defense the First Congo War, which quickly grew in scope
against both the actual perpetrators of the attacks from a campaign to end genocidaire control of East
and the state providing safe haven to the terrorists. Zaire to a war to depose Mobutu Sese Seko, who
Significantly, governments around the world not had been President of Zaire since 1965. Under
only offered rhetorical support but also provided Mobutu, Zaire served as a safe haven for rebel
crucial resources” for the war against Taliban- groups fighting against Uganda, Burundi, and
ruled Afghanistan.18 UNSCR 1373 and the US- Angola, all of which moved to support Rwanda’s
led intervention in Afghanistan challenged the campaign to oust Mobutu. These four states
Nicaragua precedent, and post-11 September fostered the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
state practice has lent credence to the contingency Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), a union of four
of sovereignty in cases where states fail to meet the anti-Mobutu rebel groups under the leadership
Responsibility to Control. of Laurent Kabila. The AFDL, primarily aided
by Rwanda and Uganda, successfully conquered
Rwandan Genocide and the Congo Wars, Zaire, deposed Mobutu, and installed Kabila as
1994-2003 President of the renamed Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) on May 17, 1997.21
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan
President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian Kabila did not remain in Rwanda’s or Uganda’s
President Cyprien Ntaryamira, both members good graces for very long. Following the war,
of the Hutu ethnic group, was shot down over Rwandan troops continued to occupy the
Rwanda. Within hours of the joint assassination, Congolese capital, Kinshasa.22 Uganda continued
Hutu militiamen took over the streets
of Kigali and began a hundred day
genocide against the Tutsi minority
group, whom they blamed for the
assassinations.19 800,000 Tutsis and pro-
peace Hutus were killed in the Rwandan
Genocide before the Tutsi Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) captured Kigali
and took control of the country. During
and after the genocide, approximately 2
million refugees, the majority of them
Hutus fleeing possible Tutsi retribution
for the genocide, streamed out of
Rwanda, primarily into neighboring
Zaire. The Hutu genocidaires regrouped
within Zairian refugee camps. Eastern
Zaire became a safe haven for Hutu
militants, who launched a series of
cross-border attacks against the new Map of the anti-Mobutu offensive during the First Congo War.
conducting military operations against anti- in 1963 on the principles of non-intervention

Uganda rebels operating out of the DRC.23 and state sovereignty, was disbanded in 2002
The presence of foreign forces, particularly the after it failed to effectively address the Rwandan
Rwandans in Kinshasa, became very unpopular Genocide, the Congo Wars or the Somali Civil
with the Congolese public. Faced with mounting War. It was replaced with the African Union
pressure to expel the foreign armies, Kabila (AU), which prizes the security of the continent
ordered the Rwandans and the Ugandans to leave over the sovereignty of individual states.27 The
the DRC. Rwanda and Uganda not only refused establishment of the African Union and state
to leave, but expanded their military operations practice on the continent show that many African
in the DRC, beginning another campaign of countries have accepted the Responsibility to
regime change. However, Kabila did not share Control as a prerequisite for sovereignty.
his predecessor’s diplomatic isolation. Rwanda
and Uganda, supported by Burundi and a host It should be noted that in 2009, the DRC once
of NSAs, found themselves squaring off with pro- again permitted Uganda to conduct military
Kabila forces, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, operations against NSAs in Congolese territory.
and Zimbabwe. The Second Congolese War, also This policy change points to the fact that the
known as the Great War of Africa, raged from DRC became a safe haven for belligerent NSAs
1998 until 2003, killing millions and crippling not because it was unwilling to control its
the DRC for years to come. territory, but because it was unable to. Uganda’s
1998 actions and its countersuit in DRC v.
In 1999, the DRC sued Burundi, Rwanda Uganda show that Uganda believed an inability
and Uganda before the ICJ for “acts of armed to control territory is just as much a forfeiture
aggression perpetrated by [those States] on of sovereignty as an unwillingness to do so. As
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Reinold notes, this sentiment is echoed in the
the Congo, in flagrant violation of the United AU Non-aggression and Common Defence
Nations Charter.”24 The cases against Burundi and Pact, which defines aggression broadly enough
Rwanda were eventually dropped, but the case that “a state’s mere incapacity to prevent attacks
against Uganda was not. The DRC requested the by irregulars operating on its territory may thus
court to rule that Uganda had illegally violated constitute aggression.”28 The AU’s policies show
Congolese sovereignty, and to compel Uganda a disconnect between the ICJ’s conceptions of
to pay reparations. Uganda filed a countersuit sovereign responsibility and developing norms in
claiming that “since 1994, it has been the victim state practice.
of military operations and other destabilizing
activities carried out by hostile armed groups based Pankisi Gorge Crisis
in the DRC and either supported or tolerated by
successive Congolese governments.”25 In 2005, in Upon regaining independence after the dissolution
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia failed to
(DRC v. Uganda), the ICJ ruled that Uganda did establish complete control over its territory. In
not have the right to violate Congolese sovereignty particular, Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, to the south of
to fight NSAs because those NSAs were not under the Russian republic of Chechnya, became a safe
Congolese control. This ruling was a reaffirmation haven for terrorists following the second Chechen
of Nicaragua, privileging the sovereignty of war in 1999 and the expulsion of Al-Qaeda from
the host state over the security concerns of its Afghanistan in 2001. From the outset of the
neighbors.26 However, by the time the ruling was second Chechen war, Russia called for Georgia
handed down, African states had made it clear to recognize the Russian right to pursue Chechen
that their conceptions of sovereignty had evolved. separatist rebels across the border into Georgia,
The Organization of African Unity, established but Georgia insisted that it could police its own
borders. Even when Georgia finally admitted that Few nations took an explicit stand on Russia’s
the Pankisi Gorge had become a safe haven for interventions in the Pankisi Gorge.33 The United
terrorists and Chechen rebels, Georgia refused to States rejected the legitimacy of Russia’s usurpation
participate in joint counterterrorism operations of Georgian territorial integrity, in spite of the fact
with Russia. In response, Russia launched a series that the “unable or unwilling” to control standard
of air raids against targets in the Gorge, attacks for loss of sovereignty was borrowed from the
that killed and wounded civilians. Russia wrote United States.34 The Parliamentary Assembly
to the UN Secretary-General claiming that of the Council of Europe declared that UNSC
it had acted in self-defense against the NSAs counter-terrorism resolutions did not permit
operating on Georgian territory. Furthermore, Russia to use force on Georgian territory and
Russia accused Georgia of failing to meet its called on Russia to “to refrain from any action or
responsibility to control its territory, in violation declarations which might interfere in the internal
of UNSCR 1373. Russia insisted that this failure affairs of Georgia or violate its sovereignty or
ought to discredit Georgian claims to territorial its territorial integrity, and in particular from
integrity, and Russia’s right to self-defense under launching any military action on Georgian
Article 51 of the UN Charter ought to permit territory.”35 Other actors declined to comment
attacks on Georgian territory against NSAs.29 on the crisis; according to Reinold, this lack of
response “could be interpreted as an indicator of
Georgia rejected Russia’s claim to self-defense on legal uncertainty or as tacit acquiescence.”36 At
grounds similar to those upon which the DRC minimum, the crisis did not concretize norms
rejected Uganda’s claim to self-defense: “[Note] of sovereign responsibility and the right of hot
the unaptness of the reference to article 51 of pursuit or self-defense.
the United Nations Charter, which allows the
attacked State to render armed resistance in order
to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2006 Lebanon War
The Russian Federation has not been subjected Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist political party and
to armed aggression by Georgia.”30 Here Georgia militant group based in Lebanon, considered
emphasizes that Russia could not have the right by many states to be a terrorist organization.37
to violate Georgian sovereignty in self-defense The group was established in 1982 with Iranian
unless the attacks by NSAs in Pankisi Gorge backing to end Israeli occupation of Lebanon,
could be imputed to Georgia. Unlike the Taliban, following an Israeli invasion to drive Palestinian
Georgian authorities readily cooperated with the militants out of southern Lebanon.38 In 1985, the
international community’s efforts to eradicate group published its founding manifesto, swearing
terrorism, requesting aid from the United States to loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader and vowing to
train its military to fight terrorists and conducting destroy Israel: “Israel… is the hated enemy that
a significant counter-terrorism campaign in the must be fought until the hated ones get what
Gorge. Thus, there is good reason to believe that they deserve… [O]ur struggle will end only when
Georgia, like the DRC, was unable to control this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty
its territory but was not willingly providing safe with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements.”39
haven to terrorists.31 Although Russia occasionally Hezbollah successfully drove the Israelis out of
intimated that Georgia was effectively attacking Lebanon in 2000 and continued to shell northern
Russia through NSA proxies by insufficiently Israeli population centers. During this period,
policing the Gorge, the general theme of Russian Israel repeatedly denounced Lebanon for not
rhetoric points to Russia’s exercising of self-defense only failing to prevent Hezbollah from attacking
against the NSAs at the expense of Georgian Israelis, but deliberately harboring Hezbollah and
territorial integrity, not Russia’s exercising of self- enabling the group to wage a proxy war against Israel
defense against Georgia for waging a proxy war.32 on behalf of Iran and Syria.40 Indeed, Hezbollah
was well
entrenched in
Lebanon; the
Amal Party/
Hezbollah
coalition
held 35 of
128 seats in
the Lebanese
Pa r l i a m e n t
after the 2005
elections.41
Is ra el i-
Hezbollah
tensions came
to a head in
2006, when
the group
kidnapped
two Israeli
soldiers and
killed three
others.42 Israel
responded
with an Map of 2006 Israeli campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
enormous these grounds, Israel not only violated Lebanese
air, ground, and sea counter-offensive, including territorial integrity, but attacked Lebanon itself,
attacks on infrastructure across southern Lebanon holding the country accountable for the actions
and into Beirut.43 Hezbollah in turn stepped of Hezbollah, whose paramilitaries are ostensibly
up its shelling of Israeli towns with powerful, an NSA.
presumably Iranian-supplied, weaponry.44
Ultimately, the month-long conflict decimated The Lebanese government denied responsibility
Lebanese infrastructure and led to thousands for the attack. Lebanon argued that the actions
killed or wounded, most of them civilians.45 taken by Hezbollah were not taken with any
involvement from the Lebanese government
Israel defended its campaign in Lebanon as an and that they therefore did not constitute an
exercise of Israel’s right to self-defense under armed attack on Israel by Lebanon. Accordingly,
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel not only Lebanon denounced Israel’s counterattack as an
claimed a right of self-defense against Hezbollah, illegitimate invocation of self-defense.47
but a right of self-defense against Lebanon, on the
grounds that the “ineptitude and inaction of the Although the international community initially
Government of Lebanon has led to a situation in supported Israel’s right to self-defense, Israel
which it has not exercised jurisdiction over its own found its support eroding as the humanitarian
territory for many years.”46 In other words, Israel and economic toll of the conflict mounted.
accused Lebanon of not just inability to control Reinold notes that “Israel’s strikes… triggered
its territory, but unwillingness to do so. On international condemnation not because Israel’s
right to self-defense was being called into Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or the Pakistani
question, but because its exercise of this right Taliban.52
resulted in excessive collateral damage.”48 This
case study shows that not only is there dispute in In 2008, the Washington Post described the FATA
the international community about the extents as “ the most ungoverned, combustible region in
of the right of hot pursuit and the sovereign the world.”53 In response to the threat of Islamist
Responsibility to Control, but there is also dispute militants in the FATA, the United States began
about the appropriate ways in which a state may to conduct drone strikes on Pakistani territory
exercise its rights of hot pursuit or self-defense. in 2006 and significantly escalated the program
under President Barack Obama, who took office
in 2009. Furthermore, the United States has
Current Situation authorized ground assaults from Afghanistan
on targets in Pakistan. In one such attack in
US Drone Strikes and Raids in Pakistan September 2008, twenty people were killed,
most of them women and children.54 Although
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in
often complicit in the attacks on its territory, in
2001, remnants of al-Qaeda’s network found safe
many cases Pakistan (or at least certain Pakistani
haven across Afghanistan’s eastern border in the
officials) has denounced these raids as violations
semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal
of Pakistani sovereignty. According to Reinold,
Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.49 Although the FATA is
incursions in 2008 led to a “severe diplomatic
a part of Pakistan, it is administered primarily by
backlash: the Pakistani government reportedly
the leaders of the ethnically Pashtun tribes based
signaled its willingness to cut the coalition force’s
in the region. Under the Pakistani constitution,
supply lines running through Pakistan and even
no Acts of Parliament apply in the FATA unless
threatened to shoot down U.S. helicopters, should
the president of Pakistan consents.50 The FATA’s
ground operations continue.”55
anarchic nature allowed Afghan fighters to use the
region as a refuge. According to the Council on
Foreign relations,
“[s]upporters
of the Afghan
Taliban who
sought refuge in
Pakistan’s tribal
areas morphed
into a distinct
entity following
the Pakistani
army’s initial
incursion into the
semiautonomous
region in 2002.”51
By 2007, the
disparate Islamist
militant groups
in the FATA had
coalesced into the
Anti-American protestors in Pakistan, 2006
US drone attacks on Pakistani targets, as well as in March of 2008, the Colombian air force fired
on targets in Yemen and Somalia, continue to US-made smart bombs into an Ecuadorian FARC
this day.56 As recently as July 16, 2014, the US camp, killing major FARC leader Raul Reyes and
conducted a drone strike against militants in the two-dozen others.63 The raid, launched without
FATA that Pakistan condemned as a breach of Ecuadorian consent, spurred a diplomatic crisis,
sovereignty.57 The ease with which drones allow with Ecuador and Venezuela moving troops to the
states to violate each other’s airspace makes them Colombian border and threatening retribution for
a critical part of the debate over sovereign rights what Ecuador described as a “transgression of the
in asymmetric warfare. principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”64
Colombia defended its actions as necessary self-
Colombian Guerillas defense, noting that it had repeatedly called
upon Ecuador to meet its sovereign obligations,
Since the 1960s, Colombia has been locked in yet Ecuador had consistently failed to meet its
civil war between left-wing guerrilla rebels, right- responsibility to control its territory.65 With the
wing paramilitary organizations, crime syndicates, exception of the United States, the Americas sided
and the Colombian government. The two-largest against Colombia’s incursion, but the raid failed
guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed to attract much of a response from outside of the
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Americas.66
Liberation Army (ELN). In 2013, the larger
FARC was estimated to have had approximately The FARC and ELN are both currently in peace
8,000 fighters, while the ELN was estimated to talks with the Colombian government. However,
have had between 1,500 and 2,000.58 According to fighting between the government and the rebels
the Council on Foreign Relations, both the FARC has continued with little respite, as the government
and the ELN claim to “represent the rural poor has insisted that a ceasefire would simply enable
against Colombia’s wealthy classes and oppose the rebels to recuperate.67 According to InSight
U.S. influence in Colombia, the privatization of Crime, an investigative journalism organization
natural resources, multinational corporations, and specializing in organized crime in Latin America,
rightist violence.”59 The protracted war has had the FARC may continue to have a significant
a devastating impact on the Colombian people, presence in Ecuador (although Ecuador claims that
10% of whom are internally displaced persons, FARC operations on its territory have ceased)68
effectively refugees within their own country. and the ELN and the FARC each have a presence
in Venezuela.69 The peace talks have yet to end
Although the FARC and ELN are listed as a the violence in Colombia, and with the FARC
terrorist organizations by Canada, Colombia, the and ELN continuing to operate form outside of
European Union, and the United States, many Colombia’s borders, cross-border attacks are still
Latin American states consider these guerrilla possible in this conflict.
groups to be freedom fighters.60 As a result,
these groups have found sponsors in leftist Latin
American governments opposed to Colombia’s The ISIL Conflict
conservative government.61 In particular, the Over the last year, the conflict surrounding the
FARC has taken advantage of the porous 365- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has
mile long border between Colombia and Ecuador escalated beyond all expectations. On 29 June,
and used Ecuadorian territory as a safe haven 2014, the first day of Ramadan, ISIL published
in its continuing war against the Colombian its manifesto, titled “This is the Promise of
government. In the mid-2000s, Colombia Allah.” The manifesto officially established a
launched a series of hot pursuit raids into Sunni Muslim caliphate and declared Abu-Bakr
Colombian territory to target the FARC.62 Finally, al-Baghdadi as its caliph, naming him “Caliph
Ibrahim.” For months in 2014 and early 2015, ISIL On 4 October, the United States designated
continuously expanded its territorial holdings, ISIL leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi as a Specially
capturing key locations such as Mosul, Raqqa, Designated Global Terrorist under an executive
and the al-Omar oil field, among countless other order, meriting a USD$10m reward for
towns and villages.70 In the process, the group information leading to his capture or death.76
wreaked havoc in Iraq and Syria. According to a After an airstrike in the city of Mosul, there were
United Nations report released in October 2014, reports of the ISIL leader’s injury or death.77
the ISIL conflict had caused 9,347 civilian deaths, To the dismay of Western nations, a purported
17,836 civilian casualties, and the displacement recording of al-Baghdadi surfaced days later,
of 1.8 million Iraqis; countless others had been presenting a defiant anti-Western speech declaring
subjected to atrocities including looting, slavery, the Mosul airstrike and other international efforts
rape, and forced child recruitment.71 ISIL has also as failures.78 As of 19 November, the status of al-
destroyed many cultural and religious sites that Baghdadi is unconfirmed, but most substantial
do not align with its religious doctrine. evidence indicates that he is still at large.
The ISIL conflict has become truly international Sunni militant groups throughout the Islamic
since its outbreak last June. ISIL’s direct threats world have pledged allegiance to ISIL,
to the West, first stated in its manifesto and demonstrating ISIL’s burgeoning leadership of
later reinforced by the beheadings of Western the global jihadist movement. Perhaps the most
journalists and aid workers, have elicited foreign notable of these is Nigerian Islamist militant
intervention in the conflict. Humanitarian aid, group Boko Haram, which has seized vast tracts
mainly in the form of food and water airdrops, of territory in Nigeria in its brutal insurgency
has been delivered by the United States, United against the Nigerian government.79 Boko Haram
Kingdom, and Australia.72 Western nations have has also conducted operations in neighboring
been performing targeted airstrikes on ISIL Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as Nigeria has been
territory; the United States has contributed the unable to control its borders to prevent cross-
most on this front, executing over 240 airstrikes border attacks by the group. These four nations
by September 2014.73 NATO members and allied have been conducting joint military operations
Middle Eastern countries have also supplied Iraqi against the group, and they reported significant
Kurds with ammunition, weaponry, military gear, victories in the aftermath of the group’s pledge of
and logistical support to combat ISIL in Iraq.74 allegiance to ISIL.80
International action has been more limited in The trans-boundary nature of the ISIL conflict
Syria, given that the Assad regime has been means that international actions against ISIL
resistant to foreign intervention. There have been will set key precedents. The world has seen many
airstrikes by foreign nations, but not to the same non-state actors (NSAs) cause war and strife, but
extent as in Iraq. International action against ISIL none of them have claimed to be an independent
in Syria has mostly been indirect, and builds on state as ISIL has. Therefore, there are few legal
efforts from the Syrian Civil War – for example, foundations upon which potential international
the United States has maintained its training reactions can be established; this committee needs
programs and arming of Syrian rebels, this time to to fill this void by creating a clear and effective
fight ISIL rather than Syrian state forces.75 While international legal framework.
there is some potential for cooperation between
foreign powers and the Syrian government, the ISIL has achieved groundbreaking successes for
shaky relationship between Syria and the West is a militant NSA. Unlike its predecessors, ISIL is
a major obstacle to progress. not just a terrorist group, but a terrorist state.
Therefore, it has governing elements typical of a
regular state. These include the Military Council, States has targeted ISIL-controlled oil fields, oil
the Consultative Council, the Judicial Authority, processing facilities, grain silos, and the like.86
the Defense, Security and Intelligence Council, While these operations marginally hinder ISIL’s
and the Islamic State Institution for Public funding mechanisms, only one head of the ISIL
Information.81 Less credible intelligence suggests hydra is cut off; as long as ISIL has the capacity
that there may be an executive branch of ISIL, to tax its territorial holdings, it will have a stable
parallel to a cabinet, which oversees day-to-day revenue flow.
administrative issues. This structure protects ISIL
against typical anti-terrorist measures, conduces It should be noted that ISIL also receives donations
to strong leadership, and further demonstrates from wealthy sympathizers in Qatar, Saudi
that ISIL constitutes a new breed of NSA. Arabia, and Kuwait.87 However, such resources
are not integral to ISIL’s funding system, as they
While most NSAs rely on external support for are not sustainable or high in value, and they are
manpower, funding, or other resources, ISIL therefore relatively negligible in the analysis of
is a self-reliant, closed system. ISIL’s degree of ISIL strategy.
self-sufficiency is unprecedented for an NSA.
Senior intelligence officials worldwide assessed According to former senior defense intelligence
ISIL’s assets to total US$875m prior to the 10 officer Jeffrey White, ISIL “thrives on weakness.”
88
June capture of Mosul. The additional value of ISIL seizes opportunities to control zones where
supplies and money looted from Mosul increased host country forces are inadequately present rather
ISIL’s assets by US$1.5b in mid-June 2014.82 It is than engaging armies where they are dominant.
believed that in the year that has passed since this ISIL’s successful campaign in the Syrian province
event, ISIL’s finances have grown significantly. of Raqqa best exemplifies this strategy. On August
Looting captured territories is evidently a 24, ISIL ended a two-month engagement in Raqqa
primary revenue stream for ISIL. Additionally, by capturing the al-Taqba military airfield. This
ISIL extracts money from its captured territories event confirmed their hold over the entire region.
through means such as enforcing high taxes and Prior to the conflict, Syrian forces were present
tolls.83 Faced with the threat of violence, citizens in three main areas within Raqqa: headquarters
under ISIL control have no option but to pay, outside Raqqa City, a garrison at Ayn Essa, and
thereby providing ISIL with a reliable and easily the al-Taqba military airfield. These positions
manipulated income source. ISIL also gains were distant from one another and isolated
much of its funding from the economic activities from rapid resource delivery; furthermore, they
within its controlled territories. Especially in had been under attack by rebel forces for some
economically thriving regions such as Raqqa, time. ISIL was able to capture Raqqa by directly
profits from the sales of local cotton, wheat, and attacking these weak spots, eliminating the Syrian
other goods contribute to ISIL’s assets.84 Most state’s presence, and claiming the region for itself.
importantly, ISIL’s territories, particularly those Raqqa is now being used as the heart of ISIL
in Iraq, contain valuable oil fields. As a result, operations in Syria, and is an ideal position from
ISIL is able to make an estimated US$1m+ per which further attacks can originate.
day of oil profit. The effectiveness of this strategy Thus far, international military actions against ISIL
is augmented by the relatively high price of oil in Iraq have been in compliance with international
in neighboring Turkey; ISIL has been able to law. Airstrikes by Iraq’s allies, including the United
smuggle oil into southern Turkey to gain increased States and the United Kingdom, have constituted
profits.85 collective self-defense under Article 51 of the
Foreign attempts to cut off ISIL’s funding UN Charter. Because the Iraqi government
89
have proven unsuccessful thus far. The United gave formal consent to foreign intervention,
90
these actions have been valid under Article 20 of While ISIL may seem like an outlier, it is arguably
the International Law Commission’s articles on a child of today’s international context. The
the Responsibility of States for Internationally organization has capitalized on international
Wrongful Acts.91 Accordingly, such actions have tensions born out of years of historical conflict,
not required Security Council authorization. from Cold War-era anticommunist movements to
the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Years of
On the other hand, international intervention in international intervention in the Middle East have
Syria has been far more controversial. Western bolstered ISIL’s cause. Technological advancement
powers cannot legally be categorized as Syrian and the international media network have also
allies, as Assad has not granted explicit permission facilitated ISIL’s growth.
for foreign military intervention. Western actors,
particularly the United Kingdom, have justified The current norms of national sovereignty and
their actions on the grounds that the Assad asymmetric warfare were crafted at a time when
government is illegitimate; if there is no legitimate non-state actors posed no real threat to the global
government to speak on behalf of the state, there system of nation-states. Today, organizations
is no way that state sovereignty can be breached, like ISIL challenge the principle assumption of
rendering action in Syria legal.92 This argument the United Nations: that nation-states are the
has not received widespread acceptance by the chief actors on the global stage, and that state
international community or international legal sovereignty is its chief rule. However, the General
scholars. Assembly continues to speak on behalf of the
world’s nation-states. Accordingly, these states
There are two primary means by which foreign must rewrite the rules of the nation-state system
military action in Syria could gain legitimacy. to protect themselves against a new generation of
The first would be an Iraqi call for intervention NSAs that seek to destroy the nation-state system
in Syria – by Article 51 of the UN Charter, itself.
international allies would be allowed to defend
Iraq across borders if an explicit request were
made.93 The second would be proof that Syria is The Situation in Kurdistan
unwilling or unable to prevent ISIL from using Amid the chaos of the ISIL invasion of Iraq,
Syrian territory as a safe haven.94 While there is Iraqi Kurdistan, an autonomous region in Iraq
already evidence that Assad’s government has that is home to much of the country’s Kurdish
been unwilling and unable to act against the ISIL minority, seized control over disputed territory
threat, Assad has expressed Syria’s willingness in northern Iraq, including the oil-rich city of
to collaborate with the United States to combat Kirkuk.96 The Kurds are a mostly Sunni Muslim
ISIL, so it is unclear whether or not Syria is in people with a distinctive language and culture.
fact violating its responsibility to control its They inhabit a region known as Kurdistan, which
territory. Syria continues to assert its sovereign includes parts of north-western Iran, northern
prerogatives, stating that “[a]ny strike which is Iraq, north-eastern Syria, and eastern Turkey.
not coordinated with the government will be For decades, Kurdish aspirations for a sovereign
considered as aggression.”95 However, the laws of nation have been crushed in each of these states,
foreign military intervention are still ambiguous although Iraqi Kurdistan is currently recognized
enough to invite opposition to uninvited attacks as an autonomous region within Iraq. As Iraq’s
on Syrian soil regardless of the applicability of government in Baghdad finds itself increasingly
collective self-defense or the Responsibility to unable to control its territory, Iraqi Kurdistan
Control. is moving toward secession from the rest of the
Iraq.97
In addition, because Kurdistan encompasses conflicts demonstrate that borders as recognized

territory in multiple states, Kurdish rebels are able by the UN are ultimately arbitrary, and borders
to move freely across state borders by crossing that are not secured will not be respected.
them from within Kurdistan. This has led enemies
of these rebels to violate Iraqi territorial integrity
Relevant UN Actions
in hot pursuit of rebels seeking safe haven in Iraqi
Kurdistan. In particular, since 1984, Turkey has
fought against a Kurdish insurgency led by the Sources of International Law
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), a left-wing rebel This topic draws heavily on international law, or
group widely labeled as a terrorist organization.98 “law that deals with the relationships between
Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan states, or between persons or entities in different
gained autonomy and became a safe haven for states.”106 According to David Rice of Strategic
the PKK. Turkey conducted a series of offensives Policy Concepts, it is a collection of “norms,
against the Kurds in Iraq throughout the standards, treaties, agreements, customs, and some
remainder of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in rules” that govern international relations. Private
Iraq, most notably a major ground offensive in international law concerns the rights and duties
1995 including an invasion force of over 35,000 of persons affected by overlapping jurisdictions.
troops.99 After viciously anti-Kurd Hussein Public international law includes the principles,
was deposed in the 2003 Iraq War, the Kurds rules, agreements, and customs that states and
were incorporated into the Iraqi government.100 other international actors consent to as law in their
Tensions between Iraq and Turkey escalated when relations. International law is derived from four
Turkey launched a series of airstrikes against PKK sources: treaties, customs, authority, and reason,
targets in Iraq in December, 2007, followed by a generally in that order.107 Treaties and customs are
ground invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in February, by far the strongest, and they will be the primary
2008. Although Iraq condemned these incursions, sources of international law discussed below.
Turkey justified them as legitimate exercises of its Much of international law is unenforceable and
right of self-defense.101 However, Turkey stopped operates under the the principle of reciprocity, i.e.
short of accusing Iraq of being directly responsible the principle that states are compelled to follow
for the PKK’s attacks.102 Turkey characterized its international law if they wish to see that law
incursions as attacks against the PKK, not against followed by other states.108
Iraq.
Treaties are written contracts or agreements
Cross-border fighting between Turkey and the between two or more parties that are binding in
PKK continued after the 2008 invasion. Turkey international law.109 The principle of pacta sunt
launched airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2009 and servanda (that treaties must be kept) is considered
2011.103 Although Turkey and the PKK sought a a peremptory norm (also called jus cogens), a
ceasefire in March 2013 that called for the PKK to principle of international law so sacrosanct that
leave Turkey for Iraqi Kurdistan (a move that Iraqi no nation may opt out of it. Other peremptory
Kurdistan supported, but the central government norms include bans on slave trade and genocide.110
of Iraq denounced),104 the Turkish military and
PKK clashed in late July, 2014 in a skirmish that Peremptory norms are the strongest form
left eight dead.105 of customary international law, defined by
international legal scholar Shabtai Rosenne as
Taken together, the ISIL conflict and the situation “rules of law derived from the consistent conduct
in Kurdistan show that asymmetric warfare is of states acting out of the belief that the law
challenging conventional notions of sovereignty required them to act that way.”111 In other words,
in the Middle East. These interlocking asymmetric when many states continue to follow a certain
for war crimes,

genocide, and
crimes against
humanity.
UN Documents
The prerogatives
of national
sovereignty
are enshrined
in Article 2,
Section 4 of the
UN Charter,
which states: “All
Members shall
refrain in their
international
relations from
the threat or use
Most UN action on counter-terrorism has been authorized by the UNSC. of force against
principle out of a sense of obligation and when the territorial
few other states reject this principle, that principle integrity or political independence of any state.”114
becomes a part of customary international law, and According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua opinion,
states are obligated to abide by it. An illustrative this clause is reinforced by the obligation under
example of customary international law is the customary international law not to intervene in
Caroline test, the “necessary and proportionate” the affairs of another state.115 Sovereign protections
standard for self-defense. Although Webster’s are further reinforced by the 1970 UNGA
initial articulation of the Caroline test had no Declaration on Principles of International Law
force of law, over time, it has become accepted concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
as custom to apply the standard, so the standard among States in Accordance with the Charter
has become customary international law.112 of the United Nations, passed in recognition of
Customary international law is developed through the UN’s 25th anniversary and reinforcing the
state practice. In international relations, silence is international community’s commitment to the
considered consent; if a nation does not explicitly spirit of the Charter. However, these protections
object to a principle that other states accept, that are abridged by Article 51 of the Charter, which
nation is assumed to accept the principle as part reads:
of customary international law.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
Under the UN system, much of international law is the inherent right of individual or collective
developed by the General Assembly. Legal disputes self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
between member states can be referred to the ICJ Member of the United Nations, until the Security
for adjudication. International organizations and Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
agencies may also seek the ICJ’s advisory opinion international peace and security. Measures taken
on other questions of international law.113 Note by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
that the ICJ is different from the International defence shall be immediately reported to the
Criminal Court, which prosecutes individuals Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security that states are likely to claim to be victims of
Council under the present Charter to take at any terrorism whenever they are attacked by NSAs.119
time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and The 2001 Responsibility of States for
security.116 Internationally Wrongful Acts, drafted before the
11 September attacks but adopted by the General
While this clause ensures the right of self-defense, Assembly at the end of 2001, established the
it explicitly subordinates unilateral defensive current compass for holding states responsible for
measures to UNSC action. However, the UNSC breaches of international law. According to this
has the ability to authorize Member States to resolution, a state can only be held accountable
take military action and need not rely on UN for actions taken by direct representatives of the
peacekeepers to resolve all issues of international state or those “acting on the instructions of, or
security. under the direction or control of, that State in
carrying out the conduct.”120 In the event of a
The most important UNSC resolution pertaining breakdown of normal governance, the state can be
to this topic is UN Security Council Resolution held accountable for actions taken by those actors
1373 on counter-terrorism. This resolution holds who fill the role of a government. Moreover, if
states accountable for providing safe haven to an insurgent movement establishes a new state or
terrorists, requiring them to: takes control of an old state, the actions of that
Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, group are considered actions of the state the group
support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe comes to lead. States may be held accountable for
havens; Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate failing to meet a responsibility to prevent an event
or commit terrorist acts from using their respective from occurring, and acts taken in self-defense
territories for those purposes against other States can never be internationally wrongful.121 While
or their citizens; …[and] Prevent the movement this resolution does allow states to engage in
of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border “countermeasures” if they are injured by another
controls.117 state’s wrongful act, “countermeasures shall not
affect… the obligation to refrain from the threat
While this resolution does not explicitly authorize or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the
individual states to usurp the sovereignty of those United Nations.”122 In other words, this resolution
who fail to meet these obligations, the resolution reemphasizes the principle that armed force is
diminishes the Nicaragua standard for attributing only permitted in self-defense.
the acts of NSAs to their state sponsors. By
making states who fail to control their territory The notion that a state’s sovereignty may
responsible for acts of terror that originate from be invalidated if it fails to meet a sovereign
their territory, UNSCR 1373 has led states to responsibility is best encapsulated in the
invoke Article 51 against states that serve as safe Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The 2005 World
havens for terrorists. Notably, UNSCR 1373 does Summit Outcome Document states:
not define terrorism, and the United Nations Each individual State has the responsibility to
has thus far been unable to settle on an official protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
definition.118 While the 1994 UNGA Declaration ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…
on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism The international community… also has the
suggests that terrorism can be defined as “criminal responsibility… to help protect populations from
acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
terror in the general public, a group of persons against humanity. In this context, we are prepared
or particular persons for political purposes,” the to take collective action… through the Security
absence of an official definition of terrorism means
Council… should peaceful means be inadequate asymmetric warfare. This committee is tasked
and national authorities manifestly fail to protect with balancing sovereign prerogatives against the
their populations.123 security needs of other UN Member States. This
section is dedicated to helping you think about
The first international military intervention what your country might want to propose in a
authorized by R2P was the North American position paper or resolution. It will not explore
Treaty Organization (NATO)’s campaign during all possible or all valid solutions to this problem,
the Libyan Civil War to oust longtime dictator and you are very much encouraged to propose
Muammar Gadaffi, authorized by UNSCR 1973 solutions that are not hinted at here.
in 2011.124 Although NATO was specifically
mandated to establish a no-fly-zone, the operation
ultimately led to regime change in Libya, leading Unwilling versus Unable to Control
some states to oppose intervention in future There is an important distinction between a state
situations, most notably the ongoing Syrian Civil that is unwilling to control its territory—i.e., a
War.125 While R2P establishes that sovereignty is state that is complicit in being a safe haven for
contingent on meeting sovereign responsibilities, an NSA that is attacking another state—and
its controversy indicates that there remains a state that is unable to control its territory
considerable debate about the violability of — i.e., a state that is trying in earnest to control
sovereign prerogatives. its territory but does not have the ability to do
so. For example, there is evidence that Ecuador
The Responsibility to Control can be implicitly was in communication with FARC bases on its
understood in UNSC resolutions that call for territory and had given secret permission to the
individual states to control their territory. For FARC to continue to operate unmolested.127 In
example, UNSCR 1583, UNSCR 1614, and contrast, while ISIL does use Syrian territory as
UNSCR 1655, all from the year before the 2006 a base for attacks against Iraq, ISIL is a group
Lebanon War, call upon Lebanon to “exert control fighting to overthrow the Syrian government, and
over the use of force on its territory and from it” if Syria had the capabilities to destroy the group’s
(UNSCR 1583).126 However, these resolutions bases in Syria, it would do so.128
do not authorize any state to use force against
Lebanon for failing to meet its Responsibility to Should the international community treat these
Control. two situations differently? On one hand, it is
unclear whether or not a state that tries and fails
These are not the only UN actions that are to deny safe haven to an NSA is really a sponsor
relevant to this topic, and you are encouraged to who can be penalized. On the other hand, if an
use other resolutions, ICJ decisions, and previous NSA is able to continue to jeopardize the security
state actions as reference points for your positions of another state, these security concerns do not
papers and resolutions. Remember that the turn on the degree of complicity of the harboring
precedents listed here do not all work in concert state. Such a distinction is likely to appeal to
with one another, as the UN has yet to establish a states that are unable to control their territory, as
clear rulebook for asymmetric warfare. it would protect them from losing their territorial
integrity.
Proposed Solutions
How might the international community
While the UN has passed a number of resolutions distinguish between the two cases? In one proposal,
that point toward a changing conception of suggested by Reinold’s analysis of Georgia’s
sovereign prerogatives, there is no consensus on response to terrorism in the Pankisi Gorge, a state
what is and is not acceptable state practice in that is willing but unable to control its territory does
not lose its sovereign prerogatives but is required certainly raised the possibility that preventive
to seek aid from the international community to attacks against NSAs are a legitimate part of the
reestablish control. In the Pankisi Gorge crisis, new laws of asymmetric warfare.131 If so, the role
Georgia invited US military aid to fight terrorists of the UNSC in these new laws is uncertain.
in the Gorge but denounced uninvited Russian
attacks on Georgian soil.129 In contrast, if Georgia If there is no imminent or ongoing threat to
were intentionally enabling Chechen terrorists to international peace and security, the UNSC
use the Gorge as a safe haven, Georgia would have does not need to take measures to maintain
sacrificed its sovereign prerogatives, and Russia international peace and security, so the Article
would have had a legitimate claim to self-defense 51 license for self-defense never expires. On one
against Georgia because the Chechens would have hand, if unwanted attacks against NSAs lead to
been a Georgian proxy. Note that this is just one an escalation between states, as was the case in
way to distinguish between the two cases, and the the Colombian raid, the UNSC can take steps to
UN has not explicitly drawn this distinction. reduce those tensions. On the other hand, before
the Pankisi Gorge crisis, the UNSC did not see
Reinold emphasizes that it is often very difficult to Chechen terrorists in the Gorge as a problem
determine whether a state is unwilling or unable requiring the UNSC to maintain international
to oppose NSAs. In many cases, a state will have peace and security, and Russia’s actions on
an incentive to claim inability to control to avoid Georgian territory during the crisis may well have
accountability for crimes committed by the NSA. made Russia and others more secure, especially
As a result, proposals that hinge on the distinction given that Georgia had more interest in fighting
between unwilling and unable states will have to terrorists on its territory than in fighting Russia.
include measures to overcome this incentive. In such a case, what role does the UNSC play in
regulating self-defense?
The Role of the Security Council If actions that violate the Caroline test are still
Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly emphasizes illegal in contemporary asymmetric warfare,
that acts taken in self-defense must be immediately then the UNSC’s response to such attacks would
reported to the UNSC and are only appropriate likely be to condemn them and possibly to
until the UNSC “has taken measures necessary penalize their perpetrators. But if these actions
to maintain international peace and security.”130 are now permissible, the UNSC will need to
However, the defensive actions implied by the adopt a new approach or relinquish oversight of
UN Charter are those that pass the Caroline test such attacks. One possibility is for the UNSC
— i.e., actions taken in response to an imminent to decide whether or not a state may continue
or ongoing threat. In contrast, several of the a given operation against NSAs operating from
case studies examined in this guide concerned another state’s territory, similar to how the UNSC
attacks against NSAs that posed a future threat handled the 2006 Lebanon War. Irrespective
but were not currently in the process of attacking. of the permissibility of attacks that fail the
For example, while the attack on Raul Reyes’ Caroline test, the UNSC could be responsible
compound in Ecuador was an important step for mandating steps to control territory that has
in the Colombian government’s fight against become a safe haven for NSAs. For example,
the FARC, it did not serve to prevent or end an states may be encouraged to petition the UNSC
imminent or ongoing attack against Colombia. to pass resolutions calling for a state to control
Ostensibly, such attacks would be illegal under its territory and calling for the international
common international law because they violate the community to act in some manner to ensure that
Caroline test (there is no necessity for immediate the territory is controlled if the state is unwilling
armed action), but evolving state practice has or unable to establish control by itself.
Any attempt by the UNSC to regulate states’ hot pursuit while denying that other states have
defensive actions will need to have teeth if states the same right.
are expected to take these attempts seriously. Hot pursuit has implications for crime fighting
Retrospective condemnation for attacks perceived and is an aggressive alternative to the extradition
to be vital to a state’s national security will not deter process. Supporting the right of hot pursuit
states from taking such actions. If the UNSC is to significantly lessens a state’s right to grant asylum
be the body that regulates defensive use of force, it to those fleeing arrest in other countries. As
must be prepared and expected to penalize states fugitives need not pose a threat to the security of
that violate the new laws of asymmetric warfare. a pursuing state for hot pursuit to apply (since hot
pursuit need not be carried out as part of the right
Hot Pursuit of self-defense), codifying the right of hot pursuit
Current state practice may imply the emergence may diminish international security more than it
of a right of hot pursuit on land.132 Under such enhances it.
a norm, cross-border incursions to fight NSAs It should be reemphasized that the ideas suggested
would be acceptable if the NSAs are pursued in this section are meant to guide you as you
from one state that supports combatting the develop your policy proposals for committee. This
NSAs into another that does not. For example, is not a problem that has been solved, nor is it
Turkey’s attacks against the PKK in Iraq could be a problem that the international community has
justified on the grounds that the PKK fled Turkey come to any sort of consensus on how to solve.
and Turkey’s attacks in Iraq amount to chasing the Delegates are encouraged to research and develop
PKK across the border. Furthermore, hot pursuit their own proposals for reconciling the security
would allow the United States to pursue Taliban needs of UN Member States, the sovereign
fighters who became criminals in post-Taliban- prerogatives of states unable to control their
rule Afghanistan, on the grounds that the United territory, and the confines of the UN system. Be
States is helping Afghan law enforcement efforts. creative! Do not be afraid to propose something
Here it is worth new.
reemphasizing
the principle of
reciprocity in
international law.
The Strategic Policy
Institute argues that
“under international
law, an accuser
engaging in the
same conduct as
the accused shall
be disqualified
from asserting a
legal violation.”133
In other words, it
stands to reason
that a state cannot
claim the right of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discusses US-led strikes against
ISIL targets. Iran insists these incursions violate Syria sovereignty.
Questions a Resolution Must Answer on others will be imposed on them. For example,
each state must balance its interest in the ability
Any resolution submitted in response to this to pursue criminals across borders with its interest
topic must answer the questions below. These in not having other states pursue criminals into
are not the only questions that a good resolution its territory.
will answer, but every complete resolution must
answer all of these questions to be admissible for While there are many important dimensions to
introduction to the committee. any viable resolution on this topic, blocs will
likely fall somewhere between two extremes: pro-
• How should the international community sovereignty and pro-security. The tradeoff between
respond to states who fail to control their sovereignty and security is the fundamental
territory? point of contention underlying Topic A, and
• Is there a right of self-defense against NSAs? each bloc will need to propose solutions that
• If an NSA based in one state attacks another balance between these two in a way that favors
state, when, if ever, should the international the members of the bloc. The two extremes are
community hold the first state accountable described below:
for an attack against the second?
• Is there a right of hot pursuit on land? Pro-Security
• What steps should the international States in the pro-security camp favor a resolution
community take to prevent actions by NSAs that authorizes the use of unilateral force in
from leading to escalated conflict between retaliation to cross-border attacks by NSAs. Pro-
two or more states? security states either have a demonstrated history
of self-defense or hot pursuit incursions against
• How should the international community NSAs or a clear interest in the existence of a
hold states accountable for actions taken in right to launch such incursions. Critically, these
self-defense against or in hot pursuit of NSAs? are states that believe they are far more likely to
be attacked by an NSA than to be attacked for
Bloc Positions harboring an NSA. The strongest pro-security
states have complete control over their territory
Country policies on Topic A are deeply rooted
and lose nothing if sovereignty is contingent on
in each country’s individual security needs. In
the responsibility to control.
general, neighboring countries with similar
demographics and governments tend to hold Pro-security states will favor an unhindered
similar positions on UN agenda items. However, right of self-defense and right of hot pursuit. As
almost all of the conflicts discussed in this guide these states believe they will be exercising these
concerned countries that are not only from the rights far more than these rights will be exercised
same region, but that share a border. As a result, against them, significant UN oversight amounts
when determining your state’s policies, it is critical to significant oversight of their actions, which
not only to know prevailing attitudes toward hinders their abilities to exercise these rights.
sovereign prerogatives in your state’s region, but Accordingly, this camp will favor rules that give
also to know the specifics of your state’s border states considerable flexibility when acting to
security needs. protect themselves.
States should form blocs with other states that An archetypical example of a pro-security state
seek similar rulebooks for asymmetric warfare. is the United States. While the United States
Under the principle of reciprocity, states should is the leader of the Global War on Terror—a
expect that whatever rules they wish to impose conflict that has led the United States to usurp
the territorial integrities of Afghanistan, Pakistan, attacks on Syrian soil that diminish the Assad
Yemen, Somalia, and others—the US government regime’s claim to sovereign prerogatives. States
has a virtual monopoly on violence within that are currently serving as safe havens for NSAs
national borders, making it highly improbable launching cross-border attacks will fall into this
that an NSA would be able to find safe haven camp.
on US territory. Even if an NSA were to use the
United States as a launchpad for attacks against Certain states have control over their own
another state, the United States’ sheer military territory but use NSAs in other states as proxies
might would deter any attempt at challenging US for attacking their enemies. These states gain
territorial integrity.134 when their NSA proxies gain. For example, Iran
sponsors Hezbollah in Lebanon as a proxy for
Note that not all states that would choose security waging war on Israel. A pro-sovereignty resolution
over sovereignty have shared interests. Soon after would afford Hezbollah greater protection from
the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the United Israel in Lebanon, furthering Hezbollah’s—and,
States condemned Russian incursions into by extension Iran’s—ability to fight Israel.135
Georgia to fight Chechen terrorists. Further note
that the pro-security camp includes states that States accused of failing to meet the Responsibility
benefit from their allies’ being able to exercise to Protect or other sovereign responsibilities
the rights of self-defense and hot pursuit, even identified by the international community will
if they themselves would be unlikely to invoke have an incentive to fight against any recognition
these rights. Pro-security states should support of contingent sovereignty. These states seek
resolutions that maximize their and their allies’ to minimize the legitimacy of international
securities while hindering their enemies from interventions of any kind so as to shield
taking threatening actions. themselves from interventions that challenge
their sovereignty. Early on in the Syrian Civil
War, before the rise of extremist Islamist NSAs
Pro-Sovereignty like ISIL, the Assad regime espoused this policy.136
The pro-sovereignty camp is composed of states
that have every reason to fear that strengthening Many states have policies that fall somewhere
the rights of self-defense and hot pursuit will between these two extremes. For example, states
undermine their sovereignty or their geopolitical like Georgia, which are committed to fighting
interests. This camp includes states that are terrorism but want to do it on their own terms,
unwilling or unable to control their territories, may call for a strong distinction between unwilling
states that routinely sponsor belligerent NSAs, and unable to control.137
States like China, which
and states that are failing sovereign responsibilities want to have leeway when fighting NSAs but also
other than the responsibility to control. These have partnerships with states that are threatened
states will oppose any resolution that enables by contingent sovereignty, may prefer a resolution
intervention in their or their allies’ territories, that interprets the rights of hot pursuit and self-
and they will favor a resolution that reinforces the defense very narrowly, perhaps restricting the
inviolability of sovereignty. ability of states to target an NSA’s host country
when targeting the NSA.
States that fail the responsibility to control do not
want to see their sovereignty become contingent Note that the UN is not explicitly discussing
upon meeting this responsibility. For example, codifying the rules of National Sovereignty and
although Assad’s Syria is a bitter enemy of ISIL, Asymmetric Warfare, so most states will not
Syria does not want its inability to defeat ISIL to have clearly articulated policies on what those
empower the international community to launch rules ought to be. You will need to research your
state’s security needs and your state’s historical
responses to the cases of self-defense and hot essay “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and
pursuit discussed in this guide to determine what the Right to Self-Defense Post 9/11” by Theresa
policies your country would most like to see in a Reinold, published in 2011 by the American
resolution. Journal of International Law. This essay is the
backbone of this guide, and while it is more
technically complex than what is written here, it
Suggestions for Further Research
provides an excellent analysis of the evolution of
National Sovereignty and Asymmetric Warfare is a norms in asymmetric warfare. Reinold presents
multifaceted topic concerning issues ranging from numerous opinions by international legal scholars,
border security to international law to counter- state foreign offices, and policymakers on the
terrorism. All of these dimensions are important to significance of each of the case studies discussed
understanding the difficulties that modern warfare in this guide.
presents to the nation-state system upon which the
These are far from the only sources that will be
United Nations is built. This background guide
valuable to you as you write your position papers
should help you to appreciate the major issues at
and prepare for committee. Please do not feel
play in this debate and to familiarize yourself with
limited to these few sources or to the solutions
the most important historical and contemporary
already suggested by this background guide. On
case studies. Use this guide is a jumping off point
the other hand, if you are feeling stuck in your
for your individual research.
research, please feel free to reach out to me. As a
First of all, it is critical for you to understand what MUN delegate myself, I know how hard it can be
your country’s policy is on this issue. Since this to find the information you need to prepare for
is not a topic that is actually on the docket for committee, and I would be more than happy to
the UN General Assembly, you will probably have help you.
trouble finding an explicit policy statement about
this topic by representatives of your country.
However, you should be able to determine your Closing Remarks
country’s stance by researching your country’s
policies regarding the case studies in this guide Congratulations! You have completed the first,
and looking for a pattern. For example, a state critical step toward being prepared for committee.
that consistently condemns other states for failing I hope this guide has made you feel well acquainted
to control their territory is likely to lean toward with the major issues within the topic area, some
the pro-security camp. You can often find such important opinions on how these issues might be
statements on your country’s embassy website. resolved, and the biggest sources of disagreement
There are no hard and fast rules here, since the in the international community. With any luck,
security realities facing every state are contingent this guide has gotten you excited about grappling
upon the state’s neighbors, the existence of NSAs with some of the greatest challenges to the
that wish harm upon the state, and the state’s contemporary world order.
geography. For example, an island nation like
New Zealand is unlikely to be pursuing criminals I would like to reemphasize that this guide is a
over a land border. A great source for this sort jumping off point. While I have tried to include
of background knowledge about the security as much key information as possible to maximize
situation of your country is the CIA World your ability to participate in committee, there
Factbook, which is available online. is still important work to be done if you are to
truly advocate for your country’s best interests.
The source I personally relied upon most when First of all, it is imperative that you go on to study
compiling the Topic A background guide is the your country’s policies in depth. The better you
understand your country’s interests, its allies, hmunindia.org. As a former HMUN DISEC
and its needs, the more convincingly you will be delegate myself, I am here to help. Although it
able to argue on behalf of your country and its can be daunting to walk into a committee room as
people. Remember, the United Nations is built large as DISEC, I promise you that I already value
on the principle of one nation, one vote, so every the contribution you will make to committee, and
country’s opinion is valued and essential to debate. I know that your fellow delegates will, too.
On the other side of the same coin, remember that
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4
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---. “A/RES/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome.”

5
Andreas Becker, “Who finances ISIS?,” Deutsche Welle,
24 Oct. 2005. Web. 19 Jun. 2014, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available:
http://www.dw.de/who-finances-isis/a-17720149.
---. “Resolution 1373 (2001).” 28 Sept. 2001.
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6
United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter
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---. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 7 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter
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UN General Assembly Hall. Digital image. 22 Oct. 2014., Available: http://www.un.org/en/
Wikimedia Commons. Wikimedia, 17 Sept. documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
2008. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.
8
James Dever and John Dever Jr., “Making Waves: Refitting
UN News Centre. “Afghanistan & the United the Caroline Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century,”
Nations.” United Nations. N.p., 2002. Web. Quinnipiac Law Review 31.1 (2013): 165–193.
Wells, Miriam. “No FARC In Ecuador: Foreign 9 Anthony C. Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive
Minister.” InSight Crime. N.p., 12 June 2013. Use of Military Force,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2
Web. 22 Oct. 2014. (2003): 89–103, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014.
Williams, Christopher. “Explaining the Great War 10 United Nations, “1958 Convention on the High Seas,”
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Yuxia, Jiang. “Regional Tensions Rise as Venezuela, 11
Ibid.
Ecuador Send Troops to Border with Colombia.”
Xinhua 3 Mar. 2008. Web. 12
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Sandinista
(political and military organization, Nicaragua),”
Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d., online, Internet, 22 Oct. 25

International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the
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2005, Summary, vols., December 19, 2005, Available:
13
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10457.pdf.
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(International Court of Justice 1986). 26
Reinold “State” pg 259.
14
Ibid. 27
Stephanie Hanson, “The African Union,” Council on
Foreign Relations, 1 Sep. 2009, online, Internet, 22 Oct.
15
Ibid.
2014. , Available: http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-
16
CNN Library, “September 11th Fast Facts,” CNN, saharan/african-union/p11616.
n.d., online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http:// 28
www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-
anniversary-fast-facts/index.html. 29
Ibid pg 252-3.
17
United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1373 30
[Letter from Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze],
(2001),” 28 Sep. 2001, Available: http://www. Annex to Identical Letters Dated 15 September 2002
un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/ from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the
United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20 United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and
Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf. the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/57/408
—S/2002/1033, at 2, 2–3 (2002).
18
Theresa Reinold, “The Sovereignty Dodge and the
Responsibility to Control: Should the US Do What Pakistan in
Reinold
Won’t Do?,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5.4
(2012), Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/175029
31
77.2011.625792. 32
Ibid pg 256.
19
Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 33
Ibid pg 256.
The Atlantic, Sep. 2001, online, Internet, 22 Oct.
2014., Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/ 34
Ibid pg 257.
magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to- 35
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
genocide/304571/.
Recommendation 1580, The Situation in Georgia and Its
20
Christopher Williams, “Explaining the Great War in Consequences for the Stability of the Caucasus Region,
Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Sept. 25, 2002, at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/
Crisis,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37.2 (2013): 86–7. Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/EREC1580.htm.
21
Ibid pg 87. in
Reinold
22
Ibid pg 88. 36
23
Theresa Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and 37
Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a.
the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11,” The American Journal Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah),” Council on Foreign Relations,
of International Law 105.2 (2011): 258. 3 Jan. 2014, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available:
http://w w w.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-
24
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155.
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (International Court of
Justice 2005). 38
Ibid.
39
Hezbollah, “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Jan. 1988, online, content/article/2008/03/28/AR2008032802973.
Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.cfr. html.
org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-
letter-hizballah-program/p30967.
54
Reinold “State” pg 277-8.
40
55
41
Esther Pan, “LEBANON: Election Results,” Council
56
Chase Madar, “Drone attacks undermine national security
on Foreign Relations, 20 Jun. 2005, online, Internet, 22 | Al Jazeera America,” Al Jazeera, 27 Jul. 2014, online,
Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/ Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://america.
lebanon-election-results/p8195. aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/drone-blowback.
html.
42
57
Reuters, “Turkish Military, Kurdish Rebels Clashes Kil
43
Anthony Shadid and Scott Wilson, “Hezbollah Raid 8,” Lebanon Daily Star, 22 Jul. 2014, Available: http://
Opens 2nd Front for Israel,” The Washington Post, 13 Jul. www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/
2006, sec. World, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: Jul-22/264737-turkish-military-kurdish-rebels-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ clashes-kill-8.ashx#axzz38c3eAZjn.
content/article/2006/07/12/AR2006071200262.
html.
58
BBC, “Profiles: Colombia’s armed groups,” BBC
News, 29 Aug. 2013, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. ,
44
Masters and Laub. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-11400950.
45
59
Obinna Anyadike, “Colombia’s internally displaced
46
Ibid pg 264.
people caught in corridor of instability,” The Guardian, 12
47
Ibid pg 265. Aug. 2013, sec. Global development, online, Internet, 22
Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.theguardian.com/
48
Reinold “Sovereignty.” global-development/2013/aug/12/colombia-
internally-displaced-people-instability.
49
60
50
Sahar Said, “The Unwanted Federally Administered
Tribal Areas | Foreign Policy Blogs,” Foreign Policy Blogs, 61
Stephanie Hanson, “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing
3 Sep. 2013, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: Guerrillas,” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 Aug. 2009,
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/09/03/the- online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.
unwanted-federally-administered-tribal-areas/. cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-
guerrillas/p9272.
51
Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,”
Council on Foreign Relations, 18 Nov. 2013, online, 62
Gabriel Marcella, “War Without Borders: The Colombia-
Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.cfr.org/ Ecuador Crisis of 2008” (Strategic Studies Institute
pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/ (U.S. Government), Dec. 2008), Available: http://
p15422. www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/
PUB891.pdf.
52
Ibid.
63
Dana Priest, “Covert action in Colombia,” Washington
53
Nicholas Schmidle, “Like the Wild, Wild West. Plus
Post, 21 Dec. 2013, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014.
Al-Qaeda.,” The Washington Post, 30 Mar. 2008, sec.
, Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
Opinions, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available:
sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in- world/middleeast/la-fg-us-iraq-weapons-20140811-story.
colombia/. html#page=1/>.
64
Jiang Yuxia, “Regional tensions rise as Venezuela, 75
Bowman, Tom and Fordham, Alice. “CIA Is Quietly
Ecuador send troops to border with Colombia,” Xinhua, Ramping Up Aid To Syrian Rebels, Sources Say.” NPR.
3 Mar. 2008, Available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ org. 23 Apr 2014. Web. <http://www.npr.org/blogs/
english/2008-03/03/content_7707811.htm. parallels/2014/04/23/306233248/cia-is-quietly-ramping-
up-aid-to-syrian-rebels-sources-say>.
65
76
“Caliph Ibrahim.” GlobalSecurity.org. Web. <http://
66
Ibid pg 273-4. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/abu-bakr-al-
baghdadi.htm/>.
67
BBC, “Colombian army kills ELN rebels,” BBC
News, 23 Jul. 2014, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , 77
“ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Wounded in
Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin- Airstrike, Iraq Officials Say.” Associated Press. 9 Nov
america-28455325. 2014. Web. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/isis-leader-
abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-wounded-in-airstrike-iraq-officials-
68
Miriam Wells, “No FARC In Ecuador: Foreign Minister,”
say-1.2829360>.
InSight Crime, 12 Jun. 2013, online, Internet, 22 Oct.
2014. , Available: http://www.insightcrime.org/ 78
Black, Ian. “Islamic State Leader Baghdadi Reportedly
news-briefs/no-farc-in-ecuador-foreign-minister. Resurfaces.” The Guardian. 13 November 2014. Web.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/13/
69
Geoffrey Ramsey, “FARC, ELN Use Venezuela as Base
islamic-state-audio-tape-baghdadi/>.
for Attacks: Report,” 26 Mar. 2012, online, Internet, 22
Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.insightcrime.org/ 79
BBC, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram pledges allegiance to
news-briefs/farc-eln-use-venezuela-as-base-for- Islamic State,” BBC News, 7 Mar. 2015, online, Internet,
attacks-report. 2 Apr. 2015. , Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-31784538.
“ISIS Fast Facts.” CNN. 17 Nov 2014. Web. <http://
70
www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/>. 80
Reuters et al., “Nigeria, Chad, Niger report success against
Boko Haram,” DW, 11 Mar. 2015, online, Internet, 2 Apr.
71
“‘Terrifying’ UN Report Details ISIS War Crimes in
2015. , Available: http://www.dw.de/nigeria-chad-niger-
Iraq.” Reuters. 2 October 2014. Web. <http://rt.com/
report-success-against-boko-haram/a-18308769.
news/192692-un-isis-war-crimes/>.
81
Neriah, Jacques. “The Structure of the Islamic State
72
“U.S. Conducts Another Humanitarian Airdrop in
(ISIS).” Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs. Jerusalem
Iraq.” United States Department of Defense. 8 Aug
Center For Public Affairs, 8 Sept. 2014. Web. <http://jcpa.
2014. Web. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/>.
aspx?id=122886>.
82
Cunningham, Isabel. “Five Things You Didn’t Know
73
Sisk, Greg. “Airstrike Agreement Keeps US Air Controllers
About ISIS.” GND News. 24 October 2014. Web. <http://
Away From Combat.” Military.com. 29 Sep 2014. Web.
www.gnd.com/five-things-you-didn-t-know-about-isis.
<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/29/
php>.
airstrike-agreement-keeps-us-air-controllers-away-from-
combat.html/>. 83
“Self-Funded and Deep-Rooted: How ISIS Makes Its
Millions.” CNN. N.p., n.d. Web. < http://www.cnn.
Cloud, David S. “U.S., Allies Rush Heavy Weapons to
74
com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding/>.
Kurds to Fight Militants in Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. 11
Aug. 2014. LA Times. Web. <http://www.latimes.com/ 84
Ibid.
85
Ibid. McClatchy DC. 25 Aug 2014. Web. <http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2014/08/25/237643/us-says-airstrikes-
86
Ibid. on-syria-are.html/>.
87
Windrem, Robert. “Who’s Funding ISIS? Wealthy Gulf 96
Tanya Goudsouzian and Lara Fatah, “Analysis: The Kurds
‘Angel Investors,’ Officials Say.” NBC News. N.p., n.d. take Kirkuk, now what?,” Al Jazeera, 16 Jun. 2014, online,
Web. < http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/
Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.aljazeera.
whos-funding-isis-wealthy-gulf-angel-investors-officials- com/news/middleeast/2014/06/analysis-kurds-
say-n208006>.
take-kirkuk-now-what-201461653255207327.
88
White, Jeffrey. “Military Implications of the Syrian html.
Regime’s Defeat in Raqqa.” Policy Analysis. The 97
Agencies in Irbil and Dubai, “Iraq: Kurdish president
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 Aug. 2014.
proposes independence referendum,” The Guardian, 3
Web. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ Jul. 2014, sec. World news, online, Internet, 22 Oct.
view/military-implications-of-the-syrian-regimes-defeat-in-
2014. , Available: http://www.theguardian.com/
raqqa>. world/2014/jul/03/iraq-kurdish-president-
“Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with
89 barzani-proposes-independence-referendum.
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and 98
Acts of Agression.” United Nations. Web. <http://www.
un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>. 99
Ibid pg 269.
90
“Iraq Formally Seeks US Air Strikes.” BBC News. 18 June 100
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Jalal Talabani
2014. Web. < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- (president of Iraq),” Encyclopedia Britannica, 3 Sep. 2014,
east-27905849>. online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1109944/Jalal-
91
United Nations. International Law Talabani.
Commission. Responsibility of States for Internationally
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legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20
articles/9_6_2001.pdf>.
102
Ibid pg 271-2.
92
Wintour, Patrick. “UK Could Launch Strikes against Isis
103
BBC, “Timeline: Iraqi Kurds,” BBC, 19 Apr. 2011,
in Syria without Assad’s Support, Says PM.” The Guardian. sec. Country profiles, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. ,
4 September 2014. Web. <http://www.theguardian.com/ Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
world/2014/sep/04/uk-launch-air-strikes-isis-syria-assad- country_profiles/2893067.stm.
support-pm>. 104
Agencies, “Baghdad opposes PKK armed groups in
Iraq,” Al Jazeera, 9 May 2013, online, Internet, 22 Oct.
93
Goodman, Ryan. “International Law on Airstrikes against
2014. , Available: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
ISIS in Syria.” Just Security. 28 Aug 2014. Web. <http://
justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-airstrikes-isis-
middleeast/2013/05/201359133815629930.html.
syria/>. 105
Reuters, “Turkish Military, Kurdish Rebels Clashes Kil
8,” Lebanon Daily Star, 22 Jul. 2014, Available: http://
94
United Kingdom. Parliament of the United
Kingdom. Library of the House of Commons. By Ben www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/
Smith, Claire Mills, and Rob Page. Parliament of the United
Jul-22/264737-turkish-military-kurdish-rebels-
Kingdom, 25 Sept. 2014. Web. clashes-kill-8.ashx#axzz38c3eAZjn.
David A. Rice, “A Primer on International Law” (Stragic

106
95
Gutman, Roy, Nancy A. Youssef and Jonathan S.
Landay. “U.S. Says Airstrikes on Syria Are Not Imminent.” Policy Concepts, 2006).
107
Ibid. United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/60/1 2005
123
World Summit Outcome” (United Nations, 24 Oct. 2005),

108
Ibid. Available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-
109
Ibid. RES-60-1-E.pdf.
110
Ibid.
124
International Coalition for the Responsibility to
Protect, “The Crisis in Libya,” International Coalition
111
Ibid. for the Responsibility to Protect, n.d., Available: http://
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/
112
Dever and Dever, Jr.
crisis-in-libya#violence.
United Nations, “Global Issues at the United Nations.,”
113
Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Revisiting ‘Responsibility to
125
United Nations, 2014, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014.
Protect’ after Libya and Syria,” E-International Relations,
, Available: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/
8 Mar. 2014, online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available:
internationallaw/.
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/08/revisiting-
114
United Nations, “Charter... Chapter I.” responsibility-to-protect-after-libya-and-syria/.
115
International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary
126
United Nations Security Council, “United Nations
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United Security Council Resolution 1583” (United Nations, 28
States of America) Summary of Summary of the Judgment Jan. 2005).
of 27 June 1986, Summary of Summary, vols., June 27, 127
Stephen Johnson, Americas Program Blog, 5 Mar.
1986, Available: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
2012, Available: http://csis.org/blog/farcs-unhappy-
php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5.
celebration.
116
United Nations, “Charter... Chapter VII.” 128
RT, “ISIS ‘beheads scores of Syrian soldiers’ after daring
117
United Nations Security Council. assault on army base,” RT, 29 Jul. 2014, online, Internet,
22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://rt.com/news/175884-
Angus Martyn, “The response to the terror attacks of
118
isis-syria-raqqa-beheadings/.
11 September,” Parliament of Australia, 12 Feb. 2002,
online, Internet, 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.
129
aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 130
United Nations, “Charter... Chapter VII.”
Depar tments/Parliamentar y_Librar y/
Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0102/02CIB08. 131
119
United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/49/60 132
Lionel Beehner, “Can Nations ‘Pursue’ Non-State Actors
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” (United across Borders?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 6.1
Nations, 9 Dec. 1994), Available: http://www.un.org/ (2011), Available: http://yalejournal.org/pastissues_
documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm. post/volume-6-issue-1-winter-2011/.
120
International Law Commission, “Draft articles on 133
Rice.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries” (United nations, 6 2001), Available: Jeremy Bender, “The 11 Most Powerful Militaries In The
134
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ World,” Business Insider, 23 Apr. 2014, online, Internet,

commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 22 Oct. 2014. , Available: http://www.businessinsider.
com / 11 - m os t- power f u l - m il ita r ie s- in - th e -
121
Ibid. world-2014-4.
122
Ibid. 135
Masters and Laub.
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect,

136
“The Crisis in Syria,” International Coalition for the

Responsibility to Protect, n.d., Available: http://www.
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/
crisis-in-syria.
137

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INDIA HARVARD

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

A Background Guide for the

Harvard Model United Nations India

August 13 - 16, 2015

Letter from the Secretary-General................................................................................ 3

Topic Area: National Sovereignty and Asymmetric Warfare......................................... 7

It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to the fifth session of Harvard Model

All the very best, and see you at conference!

Introduction History of the Committee

conducting military operations against anti- in 1963 on the principles of non-intervention

In addition, because Kurdistan encompasses conflicts demonstrate that borders as recognized

for war crimes,

United Nations. “1958 Convention on the High Endnotes

---. “A/RES/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome.”

Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d., online, Internet, 22 Oct. 25

David A. Rice, “A Primer on International Law” (Stragic

World Summit Outcome” (United Nations, 24 Oct. 2005),

http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ World,” Business Insider, 23 Apr. 2014, online, Internet,

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect,

“The Crisis in Syria,” International Coalition for the

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