Republic of the Philippines Contention: The importation has not yet begun

SUPREME COURT and that the seizure was affected outside our
Manila territorial waters.

(En banc) Violation: Sec. 1363 (A) of the Revised

Administrative code.
G.R No. L- 24170, December 16, 1968
Rulings: The Court affirmed the decision of the
Petitioner: Illuh Asaali Court of Tax Appeals stating that “it is quite
Hatid Abdurasib irrational for Filipino sailors to sneak out of the
Ingkoh Bantala Philippines…and come a long way back laden
Basok Ingkin with highly taxable goods only to turn about
Mohammad Bantala upon reaching the brink of our territorial waters
and head for another country”.
Respondent: The Commissioner of Customs ( * Their course announced loudly their
Alfredo Jacinto) intention not merely to skirt along the territorial
boundary of the Philippines but to come within
FACT: our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi
towards which their prows were pointed. As a
September 10, 1950 (noontime) matter of fact, they were about to cross our
A customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST aquatic boundary but for the intervention of a
– 23 intercepted a 5 vessel sailing vessel customs patrol which, from all appearances,
(named: Iroc – Iroc, lahat – lahat, Liberal
was more than eager to accomplish its
wing III, Business, and Sulu Area Command)
mission.'
in question on the high seas, between British
The vessels are all Philippine registered and
North Borneo and sulu while they were
are therefore under the jurisdiction of the
heading towards tawi- tawi, Sulu.
Philippines as expressed in the Revised Penal
After ordering the vessel to stop, The customs
Code
officers boarded and found on board:
 181 CASES OF “HERALD”
The motion for reconsideration by the Petitioner
CIGGARETTES
was denied and the decision of respondent
 9 CASES OF “CAMEL” Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964, is
CIGGARETTES
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-
 SOME PIECES OF RATTAN CHAIRS appellants.
The sailing vessels are all of PHILIPPINE
REGISTRY, owned and manned by Filipino
resident of Sulu, and of not less than 30 tons
burden.
They came from Sandakan, Bristish North
Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the
Commissioner Of Customs to engaged in
importation of Merchandise into any port of Sulu
sea, as required by Sec 1363 (A) of Revised
Administrative Code. Their cargo were not
covered by the required Import License under
Republic act No. 426, otherwise known as
“Import Control Law”

Issue: the principal question raised by the

Petitioner is the validity of their interception and
seizure by Customs Officials on high sea.
 Republic of the Philippines that said "dwelling house may be entered and
SUPREME COURT searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
Manila justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefore, that except in the case of the
(En banc) search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968 effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of
Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila
Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U.
JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACT:

Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized,

when the truck transporting the goods was
intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity
of the search conducted by them since it was
made without any search warrant and whether
the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited
goods.

Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC

valid?

RULINGS:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code
does not require said warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29218 October 29, 1976
JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIAGO alias EDUARDO
BERTIAGO; and HON. ANDRES REYES, as
Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, respondents.
73 SCRA 553 (1976)
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
FACTS:
Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls
Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in the Port
of Manila on January 8, 1968. However, the
petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of
Customs of Manila, obtained reliable intelligence
that fraudulent documents were used by
Berdiago in securing the release of the car from
the Bureau of Customs, making it appear therein
that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966
one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much
lower customs duty.
There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the
payment of the sum to cover the deficiency,
respondent manifesting his willingness to do so
but failing to live up to his promise. As the car
was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut
Compound, two officials of the Customs Police
Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner,
applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to
search said dwelling house and to seize the
Rolls Royce car found therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search
warrant issued by the court based on lack of
probable cause to issue the warrant. Collector
Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could
not rely on the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure because it
was not shown that he owned the dwelling
house which was searched. Nonetheless,
respondent Judge in the challenged order
quashed such search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in quashing the
warrant
HELD:
The Court opined that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
There is justification then for the insistence on
the part of private respondent that probable
cause be shown. So respondent Judge found in
issuing the search warrant. Apparently, he was
persuaded to quash it when he noted that the
warrant for seizure and detention came later
than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent
Judge apparently overlooked that long before
the search warrant was applied for, to be
specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration
and underpayment was already noted and that
thereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent
himself agreed to make good the further amount
due but not in the sum demanded. As the car
was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through
two of his officers in the Customs Police Service
applied for and was able to obtain the search
warrant. Had there been no such move on the
part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined
on him by law assess and collect all lawful
revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling
and other frauds and to enforce tariff and
customs law would not have been performed.
While therefore, it is to be admitted that his
warrant of seizure and detention came later than
the search warrant, there were indubitable facts
in existence at that time to call for its issuance.
Certainly there was probable cause. There was
evidently need for the issuance of a search
warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter
quashed.