JACKIRI P. NUMOS JR.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
I INTERPLEADER

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA vs DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.
548 SCRA 273
March 14, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners and Respondent entered into Contract of Lease. Petitioners agreed to

lease several unit of the respondent. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt
with Francis Pacheco, then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco
was replaced by Roswinda Bautista. Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until
May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused
to pay the stipulated rent.
Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in
turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals. Because
petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private
respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista.
One of the arguments posited by petitioners was that their refusal to pay was
justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person
authorized to receive payment.
The MTC dismissed the complaint but the RTC reversed and the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners refusal to pay the monthly rentals is justified?

HELD:
No. What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-
payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be
made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they
were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he
may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
litigate their several claims among themselves.
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO vs LEONORA TIRONA
455 SCRA 62
April 6, 2005

FACTS:

Ocampo bought a parcel of land from Rosauro Breton. Ocampo then possessed and
administer the subject land although the TCT is not yet in his name. Ocampo notified
Tirona, who was a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land, about the sale. Tirona
religiously paid her rents to Ocampo. However, when the subject premises were declared
under area for priority development, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal and refused
to pay her rent until the NHA processed her papers. Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer. In her Answer, Tirona‘s asserted that Dona Yaneza was the owner of the land and
not Ocampo. She likewise reiterated that she has the right of first refusal over the land as it
was included in the area of priority development under PD 1517. The MTC ruled in favor of
Ocampo.
In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory and disclosed that Alipio Breton is the
registered owner of the subject land. When Alipio Breton died, his children, Rosauro Breton
and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject land. Tirona claims she has
never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes. Tirona also stated that Rosauro could not
transfer ownership to the subject land to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of
conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC.
The CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to
Ocampo’s action; hence, it dismissed the case.

ISSUES:

1. Has Ocampo the right to eject Tirona from the subject land?
2. Is the issue of ownership essential in a suit to eject a person illegally occupying a land?
3. Is the CA correct in holding that unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the
partition proceedings?
4. What should have been filed by Tirona when she does not know the person to whom to
pay the rentals due?

HELD:

1. Yes. Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and
resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its
terms. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present.
Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s
continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms.
However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

2. No. The issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The
fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The
defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected party
should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de
facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
set forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to change the nature of the
original action.

3. Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error for the appellate court
to include the issue of ownership. Had the appellate court limited its ruling to the elements
to be proved in a case of unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his ownership.
When the appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results
of the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case. The
issue of ownership opens a virtual Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor,
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.

4. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing
the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit
by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is
proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation,
be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to
one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the
court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new
action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which
initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE
AGGREGATES, INC.
27 SCRA 401
March 25, 1969

FACTS:

Tanjuatco entered into a construction contract with MDC. Before making the final
payment of the consideration agreed upon. MDC inquired from the suppliers of the
materials any unpaid bills of Tanjuatco with them. CAI made a claim of Php 5, 198.75
representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco.
With Tanjuatco’s consent, MDC withheld said amount from the final payment made
to him in view of Tanjuatco’s failure to settle the issue with CAI.
MDC filed with Court of First Instance against Tanjuatco and CAI to compel them to
interplead their conflicting claims.
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less
than Php 10,000.00. CFI granted Motion to Dismiss.
MDC contends that the subject matter of the litigation is not the aforementioned
sum of Php 5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants “to litigate among themselves”
in order to protect the plaintiff “against a double vexation in respect to one liability.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Plaintiff’s claim should be upheld.

HELD:

No. MDC relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the
procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which,
unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those
made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion
drawn therefrom by plaintiff therein.
To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject matter of justiciable
controversies is governed by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which
municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases “in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy”, amounts to not
more than “ten thousand pesos.”
Secondly, “the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts” belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule power making of the Supreme
Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law”.
Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make
it Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are
not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto
the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
II DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs SEC. OF DILG LINA, ET. AL.

574 SCRA 462
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner, a registered political party, filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Sec. Lina for the proper construction of Section 90 (a) of LGC which provides:
“All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any other occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.”
The DILG, thru OSG, moved for the dismissal arguing that (1) petitioner had no legal
standing, (2) there is no judicial controversy, (3) declaratory relief is not the proper
remedy.
RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. Hence the petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for Declaratory Relief will prosper.

HELD:

No. Petition is denied

In the petition filed with the trial court, petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts
which satisfy the requisites. Not only that, as admitted by the petitioner, the provision the
interpretation of which is being sought has already been breached by the respondents.
Declaratory Relief cannot thus be availed of.
The Court agrees that petitioner has locus standing; however, the action for
declaratory relief is an inappropriate remed to enforce compliance with Section 90 of LGC.
The appearance of incumbent city or municicapl mayors and provincial governors
who are actors in movies and TV programs enhances their income but reduces
considerably the time they should devote their constituents. This in violation of Section 90
of LGC and Sec 7 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. Their appearance further gives them undue advantage in future elections over
their opponents who are not actors.
Indeed, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under
a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
For the action to prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable
controversy, (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (3) the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (4) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO vs HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ
628 SCRA 1
August 11, 2010

FACTS:

The instant cases are consolidated petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and
Prohibition. The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the
Tala estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City.

December 11, 1996, Respondent Segundo Bautista, registered owner of a parcel of

and, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property with
the RTC of Caloocan against the occupants, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo.

December 27, 1996, a separate but related action was initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands before the Quezon City, RTC Branch
85. The complaint was for the Annulment of Title/ Reversion against Biyaya Corporation
and the Register Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon City, and the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving Tala Estate.

The case sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the
name of Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to revert
the land as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and awarded to the actual
occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay of
which Petitioners are members.

Quezon City RTC issued a Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases
involving the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City. Believing
that the Injunction issued can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case, spouses Matienzo
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case but denied.

June 25, 1997, spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl filed an ejectment complaint
against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC. July 8, 1997, the Spouses Perl filed an
ejectment action against Sergio Abejero with Caloocan City MeTC. The cases were
consolidated.

Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and for the dismissal of
these cases citing the Injunction issued in the RTC of Quezon City. The motion was not
entertained. Eventually, the court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the
contested property.

Petitioners joined in filing directly with the Supreme Court the instant petition
denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly assailing the denial
of their respective motions for suspension. They asked that the proceedings in the
Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the
Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. That the refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases is
tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong

remedy. He argues that the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute,
deed, or contract has not been violated. Since the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC
had already been violated before the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court would not lie.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Declaratory Relief is a proper remedy.

HELD:

No. The first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be
inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract of other written
instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. Any
other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of
Expressio Unius Est Exclussio Alterius.

In a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized that a petition for declaratory
relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter for the simple reason that
the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful
decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient
prescribed by Rule 66 (now Rule 64).

The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial
of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to filed a motion for
reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a
special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the
denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to the
RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of Matienzo is
dictated by the principle of hierarchy of courts.
SPOUSES ALEXANDER AND ADELAIDA CRUZ vs ELEUTERIO LEIS, ET.AL.
327 SCRA 570
March 9, 2000

FACTS:

Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her
name, with the description that she was a “widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without
executing a will.
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a
mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts
in favor of Cruz: an Deed of Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale.
Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the
ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then
filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been
purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case was
appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a
judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply
with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to
the rules on co-ownership?

HELD:

Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, the
conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis’ half of the
property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the
ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance
with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is
merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens System.
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION vs MAXIMO BONIFACIO,
ET.AL.
651 SCRA 327
June 8, 2011

FACTS:

In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it was
served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties.
Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order
which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession
issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioner’s complaint is captioned as Quieting of
Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for is for the court to uphold the validity of its
titles as against that of respondents’.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA judgement is consistent with the nature of the relief in an
action fordeclaratory relief.

RULING:

Yes, since judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the
parties to pay damages or to perform any act. An action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach
or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory
relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action
that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO vs THE HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO
541 SCRA 479
December 27, 2007

FACTS:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased, were the registered owners
of a parcel of land located. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the
children of the spouses and the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs
of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a
Private Deed of Donation "docketed as Petition Case No. U-920.
No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were
posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition. After the RTC
ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993.
This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and
issuance of anew Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners’
predecessors.
On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in
the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for
the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject
deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and
void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled.
However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-
920 had already become final as it was not appealed.

ISSUE:

Can respondents be bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 even if they
were not made parties in the said case?

HELD:

Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a
shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to
petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title. In other words, it is a case for
declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are
not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against
the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Thus, respondents
are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in
the said case. The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit
to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That
respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after
the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final
without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the
ground of finality of the decision.
GEORGIA ADLAWAN, ET. AL vs THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
170 SCRA 165
February 9, 1989

FACTS:

Two cockpits were operating under license in the municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu,
to wit.: (1) the Minglanilla Junior Coliseum, owned and operated by private respondents;
and (2) the Gallera Bagong Lipunan, owned and operated by Catalino Villaflor who was
succeeded by several operators and eventually by herein petitioners.
P.D. No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974) was promulgated, which provided for the
"one cockpit for every municipality".
The Provincial Command rendered a decision upholding the Coliseum as the
municipal cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu.
The Municipal Council recommended the retention and certification of the Gallera,
as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla.
R.A. No. 1224 determined the distance limit of cockpits from certain public
structures. On the basis of the actual distances of the two cockpits from the aforesaid public
structures, the committee concluded that the Coliseum failed to meet the required distance
limit. Hence, maintaining Gallera as the rightful municipal cockpit.
The committee agreed that R.A. No. 1224 prohibits the retroactive application of any
municipal ordinance, which may subsequently be passed pursuant thereto, to a licensed
cockpit already existing at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.
The committee observed that Municipal Ordinance No. 4 adopted by the Municipal
Council provided for only a 50 meter limit. It contended that said ordinance could not be
properly invoked by private respondents because the same is invalid and enforceable for
lack of approval from the Provincial Board of Cebu.
Subsequently, Resolution No. 40, Series of 1973, was passed. The municipal council
contended "BAGONG BULANGAN" Cockpit as the Municipal Cockpit.
Private respondents Nicolas Enad and Abelardo Larumbe filed an action for
declaratory relief with injunction, praying for a judicial interpretation of their rights under
all pertinent laws governing cockpits, against the municipal council, the mayor of
Minglanilla and Catalino Villaflor, owner of Gallera, before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
A Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners.
Ma. Luz Rosete Diores, who had acquired the Gallera cockpit from Catalino Villaflor,
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Diores
executed a deed of absolute sale, ceding and transferring all her rights and interests over
the Gallera cockpit to petitioner Georgia Adlawan.
Thereafter, Diores filed a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss her appeal.
Respondent appellate court granted the same and considered the appeal withdrawn. Said
resolution became final.
Petitioner Georgia Adlawan, filed a motion for the reconsideration alleging that
Diores acted with malice and bad faith in moving for the withdrawal and/or dismissal of
the appeal, since the latter was no longer the owner of the Gallera cockpit. The
Intermediate Appellate Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground
that entry of judgment had already been made on September 13, 1985.

ISSUE:

May private respondents’ filing of an action for declaratory relief with injunction be
granted?

HELD:

No. Private respondents’ filing of an action for declaratory relief with injunction may
not be granted. This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a
declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances
involved therein or invoked by them. Consequently, in such special civil action the
judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a
declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in
ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, the Court has held that
although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are
sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims
for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the
remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may
be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar.
III PETITION FOR REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF COA OR COMELEC

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT

748 SCRA 286
January 27, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a

memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay
secretaries, treasurers and tanon, the former obligating Php 4,393,593.60 for the premium
payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA
Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under
Republic Act No. 7160. Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. COA
denied the petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local
Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power
to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to
comply with requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184.
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed
its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion,
the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the
petition for certiorari was dismissed on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the
petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. Hence this Motion
for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the “fresh period rule” applies on Rule 64

2. Whether or not the remedy of Certiorari is proper

HELD:

Motion for Reconsideration is without merit.

1. The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64
petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence,
conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be
reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the
motion for new trial.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the
judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and
law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court
committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged
judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is
not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact
cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former,
the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
2. The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA
proper; (2) the COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a
year in resolving the motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate
of the Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was made up
of only two sentences; (4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an
interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing
the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear
that they knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel
who offered an opinion on the matter.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
LUIS LOKIN JR. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
621 SCRA 385
June 22, 2010

FACTS:

The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list

organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes.
However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the
petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was
substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as
second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of
nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved
the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim
him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for
certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in
fact or law and after the close of polls.

HELD:

The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the defeated
and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who obtained the higher number of votes entitling them to hold the office. On
the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions the ineligibility of the
winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek
the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for
certiorari and the action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the
reliefs they sought were different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an
administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge,
alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where
the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which
case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite
meaning, there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application.
Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of
nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three
instances in which an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee
whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general
rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding, “nomination is withdrawn by the
party” as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to
expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain
consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR
adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR,
the law prevails.
IV CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS

JELBERT GALICTO VS H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

667 SCRA 150
February 28, 2012

FACTS:

President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial

management of the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National Power
Corporation and the National Food Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the matter
of activities of GOCC and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives
and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCC’s and government financial
institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7 strengthening the supervision of
compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of excessive salaries,
allowances and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions the constitutionality of E.O 7
in his capacity as a lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he allegedly
stands to be prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant
of salary increase and other benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he
claims interest in making sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally
issued and implemented.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the petition before
the Court.

HELD:

No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is simply
concerned about his entitlement to future salary increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued. Salary
increases are a mere expectancy volatile and dependent on various variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase in
petitioner’s compensation will only depend on usual factors considered by proper
authorities was misleading and incorrect due to the concept of injury as an element ofLocus
standi. He only points out the denial of a reasonable expectation which is not a subject of
harm to go against the law.
His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to clothe
his legal standing. Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible minimum condition to
trigger the exercise of judicial power.
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
728 SCRA 1
July 1, 2014

FACTS:

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a
stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program
called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if
a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth
was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming
that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting
in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed
that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds
were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers
to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless
there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved
in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned
because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects
may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is
without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
4. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP
has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm
than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
GLENN CABALLES VS COURT OF APPEALS
452 SCRA 312
February 23, 2005

FACTS:

Caballes was charged with rape. During the trial, he was denied bail, the judge
inhibited himself, and the trial suffered from numerous delays. As a result, invoking his
right to speedy trial, he filed a “petition for habeas corpus and/or certiorari” to appeal.
The CA and SC both dismissed the case. Habeas corpus is not the proper remedy. Its
only purpose is to inquire into the propriety of detention, not to impute error on the part of
the court.
Glenn Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the RTC of Malabon City.
Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. He was
arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The petitioner filed a petition for bail. The trial was marred with many
postponements for various reasons, most prominently the continued failure of Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez to appear as a witness. Caballes then filed a motion seeking an earlier trial
date, invoking his right to speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, as well as a
motion for urgent resolution of his petition for bail.
The court issued an Order declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its
resolution and denying the motion for an earlier trial date. It then issued another order
denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner
was strong. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Caballes then filed an MTD invoking his right to speedy trial, claiming that the trial
now lasted close to 400 days, far longer than the 180 day reglementary period but it was
denied. The judge then inhibited himself.
Caballes thus filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and/ or Certiorari and Prohibition.
The CA required him to inform the court of his choice of remedy. In compliance therewith,
he filed a manifestation that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for
habeas corpus without prejudice “to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court
considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus.”
The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for being the wrong.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decision had already become final and executor
2. Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy
3. Whether or not the writ should issue

HELD:

1. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from
the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be 48 hours from notice of the
judgment appealed from. While that provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the
said Rules, provides that appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Thus, Caballes should have appealed from the CA’s denial of his petition rather than
filing a petition for certiorari. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the
availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was
already final and executory.
2. A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial
of the MTD, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held
that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, even if the act and the immediate purpose
to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a
criminal prosecution and secure freedom.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for
the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The
writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge
in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The
only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has
authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner
fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a “palladium of liberty” is a
prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the
court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof.
Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto
the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is
relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to
bring before the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ
of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the
body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the
record. However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
to bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to
provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a
writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding.
3. Caballes failed to establish his right to the writ of habeas corpus. He was charged
with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge. He
failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to
establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
A petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of bail; a
petition for certiorari is. That is also the correct remedy from the voluntary inhibition of a
judge.
Finally, as to a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the
prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as
implemented by Rule 119. Section 8 of the said Rule provides that a private counsel, the
public attorney, or a prosecutor, who allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing
that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial, files a motion solely for delay which
he knows is totally frivolous and without merit, makes a statement for the purpose of
obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification is to be punished with
a fine not exceeding P20,000, and denying him the right to practice before the court trying
the case for a period not exceeding 30 days. Thus, habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.
Once more, certiorari is.
While a petition for habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of
his right to due process, first of all, the delays in this case were not the fault of the
prosecution, and secondly, Caballes only invoked this right in his petition for habeas corpus
before the CA.
THE CITY OF MANILA VS HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO
715 SCRA 182
February 4, 2014

FACTS:

Petitoner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed
taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private
respondents. In additin to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to
Sections 14-17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered
the local business taxes. Private respondents were constrained to pay the Php
19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the
complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied. Petitioners then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’
petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled
that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which
was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its
expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282. It follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution
hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutor order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

HELD:

The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among
others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to
the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as
is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that, “if a case may be
appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial
tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that“, a court may issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC
295 SCRA 494
September 16, 1998

FACTS:

Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter.
There being no employer-employee relationship between the two, petition was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC cotending errors of the labor arbiter. On
June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit

ISSUE:

Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over NLRC appeals?

HELD:

No, the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. First established in
1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be appealable to the Secretary of labor and,
ultimately to the President. But under the present state law, there is no provision for
appeals from NLRC decisions. The court held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though not right of review is given by statute, that the purpose of jurisdiction review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of
the parties; and that is part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust jurisdictions.
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial review
over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses
by declaring that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals
from NLRC to SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as appropriate forum for the relief desired.
ERDITO QUARTO VS THE HON. OMBUDSMAN
658 SCRA 580
October 5, 2011

FACTS:

The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous

transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles
with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS
discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and
paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of
approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. The committee then filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents,
who are officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who
purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions. The Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and employees with
plunder,estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of
Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondent's'
request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution
of the cases filed.

ISSUE:

Does the Ombudsman have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to
witnesses?

HELD:

Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any
hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority,
in the performance or in the Furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives."In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the
same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved

Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty

imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it
cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised.
NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION VS MARIO ABAYARI ET.AL.
602 SCRA 242
October 2, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Makati City. to compel
petitioner to pay them meal, rice, medical, dental, optical and children's allowances, as well
as longevity pay, which allegedly were already being enjoyed by other NHMFC employees
as early as July 1, 1989 pursuant to RA No. 6758. The trial court ruled favorably and
ordered petitioner to pay respondents the allowances prayed for, retroactive to the
respective dates of appointment.

Petitioner timely filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals where the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling. No appeal was taken from the decision and upon its finality
respondents moved for execution. However, the motion for execution was withdrawn
when petitioner and respondents executed a Compromise Agreement in which petitioner
bound itself to comply with the decision rendered in the case, except that the payment of
the allowances adjudicated in favor of respondents would be made in four installments
instead.

Conflict arose when the DBM sent a letter to NHMFC disallowing the payment of
certain allowances, including those awarded by the trial court to respondents. A reading of
the letter reveals that the disallowance was made in accordance with the 2002 NHMFC
Corporate Operating Budget previously issued by the DBM. petitioner then issued a
memorandum stating that effective August 2003, the grant of benefits to its covered
employees, including those awarded to respondents, would be curtailed pursuant to the
DBM letter. his eventuality compelled respondents to file for the second time a motion for a
writ of execution. the trial court found merit in respondents motion; hence, it directed the
execution of the judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribed grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court in ordering the execution of the judgment. It pointed out that
the trial court disregarded the fact that the DBMs issuance amounted to a supervening
event, or an occurrence that changed the situation of the parties that would make the
continued payment of allowances to respondents impossible and illegal, and disregarded
the DBMs exclusive authority to allow or disallow the payment of the benefits in question.
Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Did the trial Court exceed the scope of its judgment when it awarded the benefits
claimed by respondents?

HELD:
 A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed, or from operation of law.

It is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty[37]

which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.

A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the

nature of a special judgment. As such, it requires the performance of any other act than the
payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution of
which is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Decision of the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed by
respondents, it by no means ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and instead
merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the benefits under R.A. No. 6758 and
its implementing rules. Being a special judgment, the decision may not be executed in the
same way as a judgment for money handed down in an ordinary civil case governed by
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules Court which sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to
satisfy a monetary award. Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is
one for payment of a sum of money. It cannot be employed to implement a special
judgment such as that rendered in a special civil action for mandamus.

On this score, not only did the trial court exceed the scope of its judgment when it
awarded the benefits claimed by respondents. It also committed a blatant error when it
issued the February 16, 2004 Order directing the garnishment of petitioners funds with the
Land Bank of the Philippines equivalent to P4,806,530.00, even though the said amount
was not specified in the decision it sought to implement.
MMDA VS CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY
574 SCRA SCRA 661
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
On 29 January 1999, concerned citizens of Manila Bay (respondents) filed a
complaint before the RTC of Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay.
Respondents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by Presidential Decree No. 1152 (PD 1152) of the Philippine
Environment Code. The continued neglect of the petitioners in abating the pollution in
Manila Bay constitutes a violation of numerous environmental laws. Thus, respondents
pray that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and to submit a concrete plan of
action for the purpose. The RTC ordered petitioners to clean up and rehabilitate Manila
Bay. Before the CA, petitioners contend that the provisions of the Environment Code relate
only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Also, cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Is the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act of
petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus?
HELD:
No. Petitioners argue that MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal system necessarily involves policy evaluation and the
exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. On the other hand, respondents
alleges that the statutory command for the petitioners is clear and their duty to comply
with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of
discretion The petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDAs duty in the area
of solid waste disposal, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty is one that allows
a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any suggestion
that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related
duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
The Petitioners’ enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical,
and complete as to their obligations and mandate. The Court need not belabor the issue
that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
V QUO-WARRANTO

SALVIO FORTUNO VS HON. MERCIA PALMA

156 SCRA 691
December 18, 1987

FACTS:

Fortuno and Abante were candidates for the position of director of CASURECO.
Alleging that Fortuno failed to comply with the residence requirement, Abante filed a
petition to disqualify him. The District Election Committee (DEC) found that Fortuno was
qualified. DEC then proclaimed Fortuno as director after the election. Thus, a quo warranto
petition was filed by Abante in the RTC, which was granted. Fortuno was enjoined from
continuing as director. Fortuno filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed the Court wherein
petitioners seek to set aside said orders of March 16 and 18, both of 1985 of the trial court
and that a restraining order be issued against the trial court taking further action on the
case until further orders.

ISSUE:

Does RTC have jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving the
qualification for membership of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative.

HELD:

Yes. A quo warranto proceeding may be instituted to determine the right to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the dispute is
on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a
quo warranto is the proper action.

The Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with
the Regional Trial Court in the province in which the defendant or one of the defendants
reside, or when defendant is a corporation, in the province in which it is domiciled or has a
place of business; but when the Solicitor General of the Philippines commences the action,
it may be brought in a Court of First Instance in the City of Manila or the Supreme Court.
The conclusion is inescapable that the quo warranto proceeding filed in the RTC
questioning the qualification of Fortuno is within the jurisdiction of said Court. Nowhere in
the law can be found any provision that exempts the electric cooperatives from its
coverage.
CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ VS EUFROCINO CODILLA, JR.
668 SCRA 600
March 20, 2012

FACTS:

On 30 November 2009, Richard I. Gomez filed his Certificate of Candidacy for

representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party of the
Philippines. Private respondent Codilla. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the same
position under Lakas Kampi CMD. On 6 December 2009, Buenaventura O. Juntilla, a
registered voter of Leyte, filed a Verified Petition for Gomez’s disqualification with the
Commission on Elections First Division on the ground that Gomez lacked the residency
requirement for a Member of the House of Representatives. COMELEC First Division
granted Juntilla’s Petition and disqualified Gomez. The latter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, which dismissed it six days before the May
2010 national and local elections. Gomez filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC En Banc,
alleging that, without necessarily admitting the allegations raised by Juntilla, he was
accepting the aforementioned Resolution with finality, in order to enable his substitute to
facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution.

Petitioner Torres-Gomez filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute for the

position of representative of the Fourth Congressional District for the Province of Leyte.
Juntilla filed a Counter-Manifestation with the COMELEC En Banc alleging the invalidity of
the proposed substitution of Gomez by petitioner. COMELEC En Banc approved and
adopted the recommendation of its Law Department to allow petitioner as a substitute
candidate for Gomez. Codilla filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the Proclamation
of Substitute Candidate Petitioner. Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the
pending Motion for Reconsideration to suspend the proclamation of petitioner as a
Member of the House of Representatives. private respondent Codilla filed a Petition with
public respondent HRET against petitioner. the HRET ruled that the protest cannot be
considered insufficient in form.

ISSUE:

Was public respondents guilty of grave abuse of discretion for upholding

Petitioner’s candidacy invalid?

HELD:

No. No grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the HRET on this score. An
election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. The issues raised in
Codillas Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is within the jurisdiction of the
HRET. Codillas Election Protest contests the counting of 101,250 votes in favor of
petitioner. He claims that the denial of the Certificate of Candidacy of Gomez rendered the
latter a non-candidate, who therefore could not have been validly substituted, as there was
no candidacy to speak of.

It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This
exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear
and determine the controversy presented; and the right to decide whether there exists that
state of facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising from the case
legitimately before it. Accordingly, the HRET has the power to hear and determine, or
inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction both as to parties and as to subject matter;
and to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, the decision of which is necessary to
determine the question of jurisdiction. Thus, the HRET had the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine its authority and to take cognizance of the Election Protest filed before it.
VI EXPROPRIATION

MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN VS HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA

180 SCRA 576
December 22, 1989

FACTS:

The expropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceeding was commenced by

complaint of the Municipality of Biñan, Laguna filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna
and City of San Pablo, presided over by respondent Judge Jose Mar Garcia. The complaint
named as defendants the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan with an
aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2) hectares. The land sought to be
expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and the
acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan. One of the
defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss" dated August 26, 1983, on the following grounds; (a)
the allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural; (b) the complaint violates the
constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence on eminent domain; (c) it is oppressive;
(d) it is barred by prior decision and disposition on the subject matter; and (e) it states no
cause of action. her motion to dismiss" was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court:

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the summons, each
defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for
other appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff
to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such
objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be
served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with the proof of
service.

Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.

Defendant filed a "Motion for Separate Trial," invoking Section 2, Rule 31. she had, among
other defenses, "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved
Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C." Until this clearance was revoked, Francisco
contended, or the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the
lots in question," it was premature for it to "file a case for expropriation. The Court granted
the motion. The Municipality filed on August 17, 1984 a Motion for Reconsideration. the
Court issued an Order declaring the Municipality's motion for reconsideration dated
August 15, 1984 to have been "filed out of time.

ISSUE:

Was the Municipality able to timely file the motion in accordance with the Law?
HELD:

Yes. The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was
timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefore; and it was
error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought
to be considered had become final and executory.
As already observed, the Municipality's complaint for expropriation impleaded
eleven (11) defendants. A separate trial was held on motion of one of them, Erlinda
Francisco, it appearing that she had asserted a defense personal and peculiar to her, and
inapplicable to the other defendants, supra. Subsequently, and on the basis of the evidence
presented by her, the Trial Court promulgated a separate Order dismissing the action as to
her, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reading as follows: Several
judgments in an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment
is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed
against the others.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. HENRICK GINGOYON
478 SCRA 474
December 19, 2005

FACTS:

NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.
Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through
expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere
deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is
enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).
However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is
issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities,
citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).

ISSUE:

Can expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the
property.

HELD:

No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only

after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of
fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest
expropriation law.
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before
any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not
particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it
unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner
before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees
compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner
the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such
payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974,
one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
TERESITA YUJUICO VS HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR.
474 SCRA 463
October 12, 2005

FACTS:

On 8 December 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance authorizing

the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for
utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. Failing to acquire the land
by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner of the
property.
On 30 June 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in the expropriation case in favor of
the City. n 6 June 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus against the members of the
CSB, the same respondents in the petition for contempt of court, seeking to compel them to
pass a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to pay the balance of the just
compensation awarded to petitioner in the expropriation case
In a Decision dated 9 October 2002, the lower court granted the petition for
mandamus. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution
appropriating the necessary amount and the corresponding disbursement thereof for the
full and complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due
petitioner
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied

ISSUE:

Is Respondent justified in not paying the petitioner Just Compensation.

HELD:

No. While the Court recognizes the power of LGU to expropriate private property for
public use, it will not stand idly by while the expropriating authority maneuvers to evade
the payment of just compensation of property already in its possession. The notion of
expropriation is hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give up his
property for the common weal. But to give it up and wait in vain for the just compensation
decreed by the courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts will not hesitate to
step in to ensure that justice and fair play are served.
VII JUDICIAL FORCLOSURE OF REM

BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA VS AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

321 SCRA 659
December 29, 1999

FACTS:

The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate

mortgage by the respondent. Upon the loan maturity, the corporation debtor failed to pay
and the petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong
Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an extrajudicial
foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate
mortgage and said was sold in a public auction. The respondent files action for damages
against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially
despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal loan.
Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before
the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign
courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines
unless a separate action is filed in the Phils to enforce such judgment and that under the
English law which is the law governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not
lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of money. The court rendered
judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection of a sum
of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal
debtors before foreign courts constitutes a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

HELD:

The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides
that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others.” A mortgagor creditor may pursue two remedies either to institute against the
mortgage debtor a personal action for collection of money or foreclosure of a mortgage but
cannot avail of both remedies. In Phil. jurisdiction these remedies are alternative and not
cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar to avail of the other remedy. Plaintiff
cannot split up a single cause of action by filing both remedies as expressly prohibited by
the rules on civil procedure.
On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should apply to the principal
agreements that states that the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply
filing civil actions for sums of money, the court held that a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded, the court will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.
 Granting however that the English law is applicable in the Phil. court, such law is
contrary to sound and established public policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting
of a single cause of action, thus still cannot be applied by the court in the case.
It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the country upon which
the case is filed. Therefore the filing of a collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is
a waiver for the remedy of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
MARIETTA BARRIDO VS LEONARDO NONATO
738 SCRA 510
October 20, 2014

FACTS:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner

Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City.
On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the
property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. On January 29, 2003,
Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 3. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject
property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,
the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Bacolod MTCC
rendered a decision applying Article 129 of the Family Code ordering the conjugal property
to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that
even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only
₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Does the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting
title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
HELD:

Yes. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides: Section 33. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00)or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely
8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of 20,000.00 for
civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
339 SCRA 534
September 1, 2000

FACTS:

In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction filed

on October 19, 1989, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5424 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, the herein private respondent sought the foreclosure of four (4) parcels of land
mortgaged by petitioner to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. Private respondent instituted Civil
Case No. 89-5424 as mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained by
petitioner from Intercon, in whose favor petitioner mortgaged the aforesaid parcels of land
as security for the said loan. In its answer, petitioner questioned the assignment by
Intercon of its mortgage right thereover to the private respondent, on the ground that the
same was ultra vires. Petitioner also questioned during the trial the correctness of the
charges and interest on the mortgage debt in question. The trial court, came out with its
decision granting herein private respondent SMGIs complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the case on June 29, 1993 on the ground of late payment of docket fees. SMGI
then filed with the trial court of origin a motion for execution of decision. Thus, a writ of
execution was issued. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash and set aside the writ of
execution. The dispute is principally is as to when the 150 period within which Huerta Alba
may exercise its equity of redemption be counted.

ISSUE:

Does petitioner only possesses the equity of redemption in respect of the subject
properties.

HELD:

No. The right of redemption exists in extra-judicial foreclosure, while equity of

redemption exists only in judicial foreclosure. In extrajudicial foreclosure, the mortgagor
may exercise his right of redemption within 1 year from the registration of the sale in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds, while in judicial foreclosure, the mortgagor may exercise his
equity of redemption during the period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days
from entry of judgment of foreclosure or even after the foreclosure sale but before the
judicial confirmation of the sale. There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, except only if the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or any banking
institution. Thus, in judicial foreclosure of mortgage where the mortgagee is the Philippine
National Bank or any banking institution, there exist both equity of redemption and right of
redemption
VIII PARTITION

MARIETTA BARRIDO VS LEONARDO NONATO

738 SCRA 510
October 20, 2014

FACTS:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner

Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City.
On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the
property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. On January 29, 2003,
Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 3. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject
property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,
the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Bacolod MTCC
rendered a decision applying Article 129 of the Family Code ordering the conjugal property
to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that
even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only
₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:

Does the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting
title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
HELD:

Yes. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides: Section 33. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00)or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely
8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of 20,000.00 for
civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
BETTY LACBAYAN VS BAYANI SAMOY JR.
645 SCRA 677
March 21, 2011

FACTS:

During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together with
threemore incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company, by which
they acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their names, ostensibly as husband and
wife.Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, Samoy
agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
Samoy. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused. Thus,
Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the Quezon
City RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation and said
that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution
from her.

ISSUE:

Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of ownership?

HELD:

No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on
the TCTs covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably,
therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the
complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties. A careful perusal of the contents of the so-
called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate
prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the
parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover,
to follow petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his
own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever
share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Petitioner herself admitted
that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same
to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
IX FORCIBLE ENTRY/ UNLAWFUL DETAINER

CHARLIE LIM VS SPOUSES LIGON

727 SCRA 223
June 25, 2014

FACTS:

In 1970, one Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas with an area 9,478 sq. meters.
After the death of Tomas Fernandez, his son Felicisimo pursued the application and on 25
April 1984, the survey plan was approved by the Bureau of Lands. In 1985, the spouses
Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo asked the assistance of the Office of the President and
requested investigation of their claim that a parcel of land containing 1,000 square meters
which they have been occupying since the 1950s was included in the approved survey plan
in the name of Tomas Fernandez. The Office of the President referred the matter to the
Bureau of Lands which in turn referred the same to the DENR-Region IVB for appropriate
action. On October 9, 1995, Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR Provisional Region
IV-A issued an order finding the protest of Spouses Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo to be
meritorious, the plan PSU-04-008565 approved in the name of Tomas Fernandez cancelled.
Plaintiffs Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon purchased the subject property
from Felicisimo Fernandez and introduced improvements thereon. Defendant Lim filed a
complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court of
Nasugbu, Batangas involving the subject property. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to vacate the subject land. Plaintiffs
appealed the adverse decision to the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas but the
same was affirmed. plaintiffs appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for review but it was dismissed. Meanwhile, as a result of the finality of the
judgment in the ejectment case, plaintiffs were evicted from the subject property. On 01
March 2000, they filed the instant suit before this Court, a complaint against defendant Lim
and his representative, Lilia Salanguit, for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages with prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, to restore them to their
possession of the subject property and to enjoin defendant Lim from demolishing their
beach house.

ISSUE:

Does the finality of the ejectment case determining the issues of possession and
prior possession serves as [res judicata] between the partie in as much as the case herein
involves the same parties, same issues and same property therein.

RULING:

No. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover physical
possession or possession de facto and not possession de jure. The use of summary
procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of the property and not to determine the actual
title to an estate.22 If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of
ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its
determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive. Detainer, being a mere
quieting process, questions raised on real property are incidentally discussed. In fact, any
evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of Rule 70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides:
"Evidence of title, when admissible. - Evidence of title to the land or building may be
received solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention.") except to resolve the question of possession. Thus, all that the
court may do, is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so
that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the
latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality. Neither will it affect
ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the
merits with respect to the issue of ownership.

Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:

SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership.– The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.

The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, however,
is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession
de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with
respect to who has title to the land in question. The final judgment shall not also be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action not involving possession.
MARCIANA SERDONCILLO VS SPOUSES BENORILAO
297 SCRA 448
October 8, 1998

FACTS:

The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising
of 1,806 square meters. Petitioner, who was occupying the western end and front portions
of the aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale by UCRTC.
Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiakos wife, Mrs. Rosario de
Jesus. Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June
30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for
consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The
consignation was granted by the trial court and was eventually affirmed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25, 1989. It is clear, therefore,
that plaintiff, not having been authorized in writing for the purpose, may not validly bring
an action to enforce a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the owners of Lots
666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima families.

ISSUE:

Is the case of ejectment proper?

HELD:

The defense that what should have been filed is an ejectment case and not recovery
of possession, is also correct. The filing of this case for recovery of possession, instead of an
ejectment case, is not altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos and Carisima became the
owners as early as May, 1989. Verbal and written demands had been ignored. There is an
immediate need for plaintiffs to use the right of way, which up to the present time is
obstructed,. At most, what surfaced is a technicality which should be abandoned. It is clear
on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing of this case on February 19, 1981,
the defendant was in possession, as tenant, of the premises. When plaintiffs counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on November 4, 1980 requiring defendant to vacate the
premises when this action was brought, the one (1) year period after the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is an
ejectment case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.
SPOUSES BAES VS LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES
475 SCRA 13
November 15,2005

FACTS:

On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines
(LCP) filed an action against its President, Thomas Batong, and six other members of the
Board of Directors,3 before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for accounting
and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and appointment of a management
committee. This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions, namely: the Batong/
Saguilayan group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan group which
includes herein respondents Almazan, et al. By virtue of said injunction, on August 13,
1993,6 herein respondents, with the aid of certain members of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, the Philippine National Police, and Sheriff Primo Alimurong of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, tried to dispossess petitioners, as previous clergymen
and occupants of the residential houses located at 4443 Old Sta. Mesa Street, Manila, owned
by LCP and form part of the compound where the principal office of LCP is located.
Petitioners however refused to leave the same. Thus, the main gate of the subject property
was padlocked by respondents, preventing the petitioners and their families from going in
and out of said place. Security guards were also stationed at the premises with an
instruction not to allow petitioners entry and exit.

ISSUE:
Is the case of forcible entry properly filed and complied by petitioners?

HELD:

Yes. All the elements necessary to establish a case for forcible entry were sufficiently
alleged by the petitioners. For the private respondents to enforce their legal right to
possession, they should have resorted to the proper action in law. The acts of the private
respondents as alleged by the petitioners in forcibly evicting them under the guise of a writ
of injunction issued by the SEC is not sanctioned by law. While among the acts sought to be
enjoined by the writ against the illegally constituted board and their representatives is the
holding of LCP properties, the said writ cannot be validly utilized herein
HUBERT NUNEZ VS SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS INC.
618 SCRA 134
April 12, 2010

FACTS:

The subject matter of the instant suit is a 635.50 square meter parcel of land
situated at Calle Solana, Intramuros, Manila and registered in the name of respondent
SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87556 of the
Manila City Registry of Deeds. Despite having acquired the same thru the 4 June 1999 Deed
of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng,2
it appears that respondent was constrained to leave the subject parcel idle and unguarded
for some time due to important business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection
conducted by respondent’s representatives revealed that the property was already
occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21 other individuals.3 Initially faulting one
Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its verbal demands to vacate the subject
parcel, respondent filed its 5 December 2003 complaint for forcible entry which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 177060 before Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Manila.

ISSUE:

Does the MeTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter?

HELD:

Yes. After an ocular inspection conducted on 9 June 2004, it appears that the MeTC
concluded that the crowding of the residential units on the subject parcel rendered the
determination of its exact metes and bounds impossible.9 Unable to present his lessor’s
title, petitioner also appears to have agreed to the use of TCT No. 87556 as basis for
determining the exact measurement of respondent’s property.10 With the parties’ further
failure to abide by their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial
surveyor from the Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, the record shows that
respondent submitted a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla who
determined that petitioner was, indeed, occupying a portion of the subject parcel.
FILOMENA DOMAGAS VS VIVIAN JENSEN
448 SCRA 663
January 17, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent

Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force, strategy and
stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and
thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter
portion of her property along the boundary line.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the
latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with
Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to
appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.
The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never
acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo,
Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and
the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar
Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her
behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject
premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint;
that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent
was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay.
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The
trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the
respondent considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in
her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision
with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an
action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was
temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served
via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior
leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was
followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of
summons and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the
respondent.
2. Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent
herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.

HELD:

The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the
petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the
petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks
to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New
Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it
is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments
are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking
to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and
complaint by the Sheriff:
 In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident
defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any
of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the
Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may
only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of
substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service
other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in
Hamilton v. Levy :
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence"
are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the
summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be.
Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that
must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
 As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the
Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein.
Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the
respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor,
Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals
from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not
considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place
at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a
resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of
Vicenta Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the
respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided
and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the
affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the
MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
DR. MA. WENDELYN YAP VS DR. VERGEL CRUZ
208 SCRA 692
May 8, 1992

FACTS:

Private respondent was the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five
years in the premises in question just before this controversy started. He religiously paid
the monthly rentals of P1,400.00, introduced several improvements and operated a
veterinary clinic. On July 1985, he offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and
some of its equipment to petitioners. During the period of negotiations, private respondent
introduced to the landlord petitioner Yap at the person interested in taking over the clinic.
However, the negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners managed to enter into a
contract of lease for the said premises at a monthly rental of P1,800.00 with the landlord.
As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with Damages"
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 against petitioners herein and the
landlord.
The MTC of Manila rendered its decision in favor of private respondent Cruz. The
RTC of Manila, affirmed the aforesaid decision of the MTC and, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for review of petitioners and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Is respondent guilty of forcible entry?

HELD:

No. When the petitioners and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the
lease of private respondent was still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private
respondent has not effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in
question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Clearly, the
transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the
condition is not complied with. True, the lease of private respondent is on a month-to-
month basis and may be terminated at the end of any month after proper notice or demand
to vacate has been given.
In the case at bar, however, the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the
private respondent is clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private
respondent continues to be in force and can not be deemed to have expired as of the end of
the month automatically. Neither can the non-payment of the rent for the month of August,
1985 be a ground for termination of the lease without a demand to pay and to vacate.
SALVACION ONQUIT VS JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA
297 SCRA 354
October 8, 1998

FACTS:

Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which the complainant and her
two brothers were co-defendants. Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that
said case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Respondent Judge denied all
motions raised by defendants ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent
Judge, the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would not automatically divest the
court its jurisdiction. Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond
which was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
against the defendants, including herein complainant. A seizure order followed which
directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay from the land in question. Complainant
details several allegations as follows: (1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is
an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court; (2) That the plaintiff’s
injunction bond was approved by respondent Judge without first serving a copy to the
complainant resulting in a violation of due process. Complainant avers that it left her no
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of the writ of injunction
was not served on complainant’s counsel;(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for
Issuance of Seizure Order was not served on the complainant thereby depriving her of a
chance to oppose it; (4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that complainant and
his co-defendants ought to leave the land because it is certain that they will lose their case;
(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the issuance of the seizure order, he
seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor, and
delivered the palay to the plaintiff

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority, bias and
grave misconduct;
2.Whether or not the Sheriff committed grave misconduct, misbehavior in the
performance of his official duties, and collusion.

HELD:

Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as the pleadings
and exhibits submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and bias on
the part of respondent Judge. The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible
entry case did not taint her action with grave abuse of authority, even if defendant had
alleged that the land in question was under agricultural tenancy, and that there was an
issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be divested of
jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the
nature of an action and a court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the
plaintiff.
“Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint, which in this case is
for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the
court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a
party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties.”
It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of
allegations of tenancy.
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, ET. AL. VS CECILIA PALISOC, ET. AL.
476 SCRA 587
December 2, 2005

FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil
Case No. 11799, filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina
B. Mata. In a decision[4] dated February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the
rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It also ordered the petitioners to vacate the
premises and pay to private respondents the rentals.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274
while private respondents moved for execution pending appeal. On January 8, 2003, the
RTC affirmed the MeTC decision with the modification that petitioners must start paying
rentals from the date of the appealed decision.
On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition
to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. In an order dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied the
motion and granted private respondents motion for execution for failure of petitioners to
post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution pending
appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003, petitioners were served with the writ and notice to
vacate.
ISSUE:
Are the orders of the MeTC valid and proper?
HELD:
Under Section 19,[10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment
on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice
to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically
ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
appeal.[12] Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is
immediately executory under Section 21,[13] Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a
petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.[14]
However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show that
petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their motion for
reconsideration. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10,
2003. In said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the
instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the
judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision.
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
410 SCRA 318
September 3, 2003

FACTS:

Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate
of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case
No. 8550) against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons. who were occupying several
parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paranaque Subdivision IV,
Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer certificates of title.
The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private respondent.
On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 66. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their
petition was dismissed by the appellate court on December 12, 1994. After the dismissal
became final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78. The
writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the case was transferred to
Branch 77 of the same court. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC
of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition was denied and
subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC
Branch 77, the court of origin. The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this
time due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita
Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the
Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui.

ISSUE:

May petitioners be ejected even if they are not the parties to the unlawful detainer
case?

HELD:

Yes. We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is

an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone
who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the
defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or
occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente
lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the
defendant. In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or
squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does
not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that
the subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.
Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land
in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against
the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer
case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers or
squatters who are bound by the judgment. In the case at bar, the records show that
petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the
property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in
question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui,
mother of private respondent. Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle
its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like.
Petitioners only defense against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-
inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its
members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment.
X CONTEMPT OF COURT

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS MERLINO RODRIGUEZ

619 SCRA 176
April 23, 2010

FACTS:

On September 29, 2001, a shipment described as “agricultural product” arrived at

Subic Bay Freeport Zone. On October 23, the BOC issued a Memorandum stating that upon
examination the shipment was found to contain rice. The representative of the importer
then stated that there was a “misshipment” and manifested willingness to pay appropriate
duties and taxes. The BOC then issued a Hold Order on October 25, 2001. Despite several
certifications for its clearance, Petitioner SBMA refused to allow the release of the rice
shipment. Hence, on June 11, 2002, the respondent-importers filed with the RTC of
Olongapo City a complaint for Injunction and Damages against SBMA.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

NO. The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings and the regular courts can not interfere nor can it enjoin these proceedings.
This is the rule the moment the imported goods are in the possession or control of the
Customs authorities even if no warrant for seizure or detention had previously been issued.
The actions of the BOC are then only appealed to the CTA. The Court also said that this rule,
which is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the
government’s drive to prevent smuggling and fraud and to collect correct duties, is
absolute. Section 3 of rule 71 of the revised rules of civil procedure includes the grounds
for contempt including: disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order, judgement or
command of the court.
MEMORIA ENCINAS VS NATIONAL BOOKSTORE INC.
464 SCRA 572
November 19, 2004

FACTS:

Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of Court and
Petition-In-Intervention (to which was appended a copy of the fake decision) on behalf of
his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will prevail. He reasons that he was misled
in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the forged judicial decision) made
available to him at the time of submission of the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. At the
same time, he asserts that there was an honest mistake in the appreciation of the
documents and that there was never any malice intended in the submission of the
questioned documents. In fact, he even welcomes the referral of the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation so as to identify the mastermind of the production of the
fake decision.

ISSUE:

Is the explanation unsatisfactory and insufficient to cite counsel in contempt of

court?

HELD:

Yes. Counsels actuations may even constitute a violation of the lawyers oath. As an
officer of the court, he is reminded of his basic duties to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,[5] to do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice
LUCIANO LADANO VS FELINO NERI, ET. AL.
685 SCRA 134
November 12, 2012

FACTS:

This case originated from a Complaint filed by petitioner Luciano Ladano

(Ladano) before the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator against respondents Felino Neri
(Neri), Edwin Soto, Adan Espanola and Ernesto Blanco. Ladano alleged that on May 7,
2003, the respondents forcibly entered the two-hectare land, located in Manalite I,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which he and his family have been peaceably
occupying and cultivating since 1970. The said respondents informed him that the
property belongs to Neri and that he should vacate the same immediately. Not too
long afterwards, the respondents fenced the property and destroyed some of the trees
and kawayan planted thereon. Ladano prayed that he be declared the rightful
“occupant/tiller” of the property, with the right to security of tenure thereon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a tenant in a tenancy relationship entitled to reliefs
prayed for.
HELD:
No. A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to
the landholder, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land.” For a tenancy relationship, express or
implied, to exist, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent by the landowner;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant.
Independent and concrete evidence of the foregoing elements must be
presented by the party asserting the existence of such a relationship. They cannot be
arrived at by mere conjectures or by presumptions. “Unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure [nor is he]
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
The DARAB failed to consider that one’s occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make him a de jure tenant.
It should not have considered such occupation as a basis for assuming the landowner’s
consent, especially when the occupant himself never alleged that he obtained the
landowner’s consent. Petitioner did not even allege in his complaint that he is a tenant of
the landowner. Neither did he allege that he shared his harvests with the landowner.
Without such factual assertions from Ladano, the DARAB arrived at a conclusion that
is utterly bereft of factual bases. Petitioner is not a tenant on the land and is not
entitled to security of tenure nor to disturbance compensation. His Complaint was
properly dismissed for lack of merit.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SEVERINO LISTANA SR.
408 SCRA 328
August 5, 2003

FACTS:
Severino Listana (Listana) owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in Inlagadian,
Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. Listana
voluntarily sold the property to the government, through the Department of Agrarian
Reform, under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon
commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just
compensation for the property. In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount
at P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay
Listana the same.
On 18 June 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a writ
of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian Operations Center Head Alex A.
Lorayes (Lorayes) to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. Thus, on 2 September
1999, Listana filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes.
On 6 September 1999, LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 5,
Branch 52, Sorsogon City, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a petition for judicial
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP challenged the
amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the amount be fixed at P5,871,689.03.
The PARAD granted Listana's motion for contempt. In its 20 August 2000 Order, the
PARAD cited Lorayes for indirect contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he
complied with the DARAB's 14 October 1998 Decision.

ISSUE:
Was the charge of contempt and review on certiorari proper under rule 45?

HELD:
The Court finds the Land Bank's Motion without merit inasmuch as the arguments
raised therein are specious. Contrary to Land Bank's conclusion, this Court holds otherwise
that the cash bond did not become moot and academic upon the finality of the Supreme
Court's decision dated August 5, 2003. This is so because the underlying reason for the
posting of the cash bond still remains despite the decision of the Supreme Court upholding
the unconstitutionality of the order of arrest issued by PARAD. And that reason is the
distinctive fact that the cash bond was put up in order to secure any damages that the
private respondent Listana may incur by reason of the issuance of the injunction order. The
damages being referred to, that is -- the legal right of Mr. Listana to be justly and promptly
paid of his expropriated property -- was not effectively extinguished by the mere decision
of the Supreme Court declaring the illegality of the order of arrest issued by the PARAD
against Mr. Alex Lorayes. In fact, the Court's ruling did not in any way, expressly or
impliedly, ordered [sic] the release of the cash bond in Land Bank's favor despite that the
latter's petition was upheld with finality by the Supreme Court.
FEDERICO ROBOSA, ET. AL. VS NLRC
665 SCRA 434
October 20, 2014

FACTS:

The NLRC issued a TRO and directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company
executives to cease and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from
implementing memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to
immediately reinstate them if the dismissals have been effected.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRC’s resolution. They instead
moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s petition for preliminary injunction.
Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction.The respondents
moved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the
responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and issued a resolution dismissing
the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed hearing the main case on the merits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.

HELD:

Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold
any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in
accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or
fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or
the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to
deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only
when there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of
the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to
hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. Robosa, et al., therefore,
have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before
the NLRC.
EDITA BURGOS VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
653 SCRA 512
June 22, 2010

FACTS:

Around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a
farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a chapter of the
militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and
abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag
Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. On his way out of the restaurant, Jonas told the manager, Maam
aktibista lang po ako! When a security guard tried to intervene, after he noticed that the
group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the restaurant, he was told, Pare, pulis!
The guard then backed off but was able to see that Jonas was forced into the rear portion of
a plain maroon colored Toyota Revo with plate number TAB 194. The guard then noted the
plate number and reported the incident to his superiors as well as to the police on duty in
the said mall. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO
verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by
employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that Mudlong
was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by Cpl. Castro
Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for
transporting timber without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees and officers of
the 56th IB, the vehicle with the license plate no. TAB 194 was impounded in the 56th IB
headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PNP exhausted all their efforts to bring the real culprits before the
bar of justice.
Whether or not contempt is proper
HELD:
Yes. the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human
Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human
Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. In light of the retirement of
Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all
been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from this
Court shall also be served on, and be directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the
impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall
continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and
accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.The dismissal of the
petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.
ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION VS CA
409 SCRA 515
June 29, 2005

FACTS:

On 1 August 1984, RMC Garments, Inc. (RMC) leased from Peter Pan Corporation
(Peter Pan) its properties (Leased Premises) located on Ortigas Avenue Extension, Pasig,
Metro Manila. The Leased Premises were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
144376 (7060), 144377 (7061), and 144460 (7062) issued in the name of Peter Pan by the
Rizal Register of Deeds. RMC, a garments manufacturing company, installed machinery on
the Leased Premises and brought in furniture, office equipment and supplies.
On 20 December 1986, Rosario Textile Mills Corp. (Rosario Textile) advised RMC in
a letter that it had acquired the Leased Premises, including the chattels found inside, from
GBC Corporation (GBC) through a Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests. GBC in turn,
bought the Leased Premises at a foreclosure sale by the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) on 15 August 1983. Rosario Textile demanded that RMC vacate the
Leased Premises within 10 days and warned that it would avail of its rights of ownership
either judicially or extra-judicially if RMC failed to do so. RMC replied that it neither
mortgaged to DBP nor sold to Rosario Textile the Leased Premises. RMC explained that
Rosario Textile may have mistaken it for Riverside Mills Corporation, another garments
corporation whose properties DBP had foreclosed.
Despite this letter, Rosario Textile proceeded to exercise its right of self-help.
Representatives of Rosario Textile entered the Leased Premises in the evening of 2 January
1987 and cut off RMCs power supply and communication lines. They barricaded the road
leading to the Leased Premises, padlocked the entrances and posted guards to prevent
entry. Subsequently, Rosario Textile removed the machinery, equipment, garments and
other chattels found inside the Leased Premises.

ISSUE:

(1) whether the order finding petitioners in contempt of court is valid

(2) whether complete restitution of the value of the sewing machines by petitioners in
their personal capacities is proper.
HELD:

Petitioners officers lament their citation for indirect contempt on the ground that
the trial court did not give them notice of the injunction order they supposedly violated.
Petitioners claim that the trial court merely presumed their knowledge of the injunction
order from its receipt by Rosario Textiles former counsel.
Whether petitioners officers had notice or knowledge of the injunction order is
patently a question of fact beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which mandates
that only questions of law be raised in the petition. In a petition for review on certiorari, the
Courts jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that the lower courts may have
committed
 We likewise reject the claim of petitioners officers that the trial court did not afford
them sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard in the contempt proceedings. To comply
with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
there must be (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed
by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his
conduct, and (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct
The trial court complied with these requirements in this case. When RMC filed
motions for contempt, the trial court gave petitioners officers an opportunity to explain
their side. Petitioners officers filed oppositions to the motions for contempt and even filed
motions to reconsider the orders of the trial court requiring them to return the sewing
machines.
IGNACIO PASCUA VS HEIRS OF SEGUNDO SIMEON
161 SCRA 1
May 2, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioners were among the defendants in Civil Case No. 3606 before the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch II, Judge Anacleto B. Alzate, presiding, while private
respondents are the heirs of the plaintiff in said civil case. On June 28,1969, judgment was
rendered in favor of respondents and against the defendants therein ordering the latter to
pay P19,720.00. The defendants appealed to the Court of A appeals but for failure of their
counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was dismissed and
the case was remanded to the trial court for execution of judgment. To satisfy the judgment,
twenty (20) parcels of land were levied upon and then sold at public auction in which the
highest bidders were the respondents. As the judgment debtors failed to redeem the
properties within the twelve-month period, the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac issued a
Certificate of Absolute Sale on February 20, 1972. On motion, Judge Alzate ordered on
January 21, 1973 the issuance of a writ of possession. However, the defendants/judgment
debtors would not vacate the premises. So, on May 23, 1973, respondents filed a motion
before the trial court to declare the defendants in contempt of court. Resolving the motion,
Judge Alzate issued an order dated January, 13,1978

ISSUE:

Was the declaration of Bruno Dugay, Pacifico Dugay, Ignacio Pascua and Ursula
Dugay in contempt of court valid?

HELD:

It may be stated, however, that the mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of
petitioners to relinquish the properties would not constitute contempt. The contumacious
act punishable under Rule 71, Section 3(b) is:
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person
who after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession,
or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
Note that the writ of possession was directed not to petitioners, but to the sheriff for
him to deliver the properties to respondents. As the writ did not command the petitioners
to do anything, they cannot be held guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of a court."
The proper procedure if the petitioners refuse to deliver possession of the lands is
not for the court to cite them for contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the respondents.
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF
DUMAGUETE
155 SCRA 421
November 5, 1987

FACTS:

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an

investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before
the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of,
alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP
such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the
power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

HELD:

No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and
for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to
be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies,
the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the
power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be
void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body.