JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS,
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

Facts:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square
meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left
behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a
notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulina Vargas’ heirs, namely Ester
Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo,
Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina
Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating
unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting
a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and
Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester,
Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it.
The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive
wee0s.
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the
same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 33 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner
herein. Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement
cannot bind them for it was executed without their consent
and participation.

Issue:
Whether or not the said Settlement would bind the
respondents who did not give their consent.

Held:
No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the
following reason. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule
74 is an ex parte proceeding. The Rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice
of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first
deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
 PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
VS
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

Facts:
Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted serviceman in the U.S.
Navy. He married Paula Llorente in 1937. Later on, he left for
the US where he became a naturalized citizen of the said
country.
Subsequently, he returned to the Philippines to visit his
wife. It was then when he discovered that Paula was already
living with his own brother and have begotten a child. The
child was registered as legitimate although the name of the
father was left in blank. Lorenzo thereafter filed for a divorce.
When the divorce became final, he married Alicia and
they lived together for 25 years. They had three children. He
later on made a Last Will and Testament disposing all of his
properties in favor of his heirs in the second marriage. The
will was probated and Alicia was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. Before the proceeding reach its
finality, however, Lorenzo died.
Paula then filed for appointment as administrator over
the estate. The trial court ruled in favor of Paula. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was eventually dismissed.
The action was elevated to the Court of Appeals who
likewise affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification, declaring Alicia as co-owner over the properties
she and Lorenzo may have acquired during their 25 years of
living together.

Issue:
Whether or not the form of the will is valid under
Philippine laws

Held:
The case was remanded to the court of origin for the
purpose of determining the intrinsic validity of the will and the
determination of the successional rights of the parties to the
case, allowing proof of foreign law.
The Court ruled that Lorenzo was already an American
citizen not only at the time of the divorce with Paula but also
during the celebration of marriage with Alicia. he was also an
American citizen at the time of the execution of the Last Will
and Testament.
 The divorce obtained by Lorenzo is therefore valid since
the law that governs him is not Philippine laws but his National
Law since the divorce was contracted after he has acquired a
different citizenship.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam
and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners,
VS
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 168156 December 6, 2006

Facts:
Spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan were the
registered owner of two properties situated in Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan which was the subject of a case of unlawful
detainer.
In a Deed of Confirmation, the heirs of the spouses
conveyed the ownership over said property to their two
children, Irene and Isabel, both with surname Cuntapay. In
another instrument, a Partition Agreement between the heirs,
the two properties were divided between the two children.
The heirs of Rosendol Lasam file the case of unlawful
detainer, alleging that they are the owners of the property
subject to the action. They further allege that Rosendol was
the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel
Cuntapay. The heirs alleged that possession of the property
by Vicenta Umengan was only by mere tolerance.
In their defense, Vicenta alleged that they have a better
right because they inherited the property from their father,
showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been
probated.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of
Rosalinda and directed the ejectment of Umengan. The RTC,
upon appeal, affirmed the decision of the first level court. Both
courts ruled that the will is to be respected.
The case was raised before the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the order on the ground that the will has not yet
been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.
The case was thereafter raised before the Supreme
Court where both parties were claiming to have better right
of possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there
was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence,
claiming a better right of possession following the law on
succession. In upholding the CA’s ruling the SC

Issue:
Whether or not the will is void due to its failure to be
submitted to a probate proceeding.
Held:
The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to
establish the right of possession without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the
source of any right.
The court cited Article 838 of the New Civil Code which
provide that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
The court also cited the case of Cañiza v. Court of
Appeals wherein it ruled that: “a will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may
be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.’”
Before any will can have force or validity it must be
probated. To probate a will means to prove before some
officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last
will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been
executed, attested and published as required by law, and that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceeding to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the
presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a
matter of public policy.
Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect
whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any
right of possession. The defendants have a better right of
possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by
the owner in favor of the children, the defendants herein.
 DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD,
PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, petitioners,
VS
ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent.
G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent
Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde
Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the
owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677,
680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died,
his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent.
The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held
that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. By Decision
of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such
it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will.
Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by
only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not
in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation
mortis causa and have complied with the formalities of a
will.

Held:
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The
donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observed but they were not, as it was
witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following
Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation
clause the execution of which clause is a requirement
separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of
signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.
 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
VS
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN
PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

Facts:
The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land in San Pedro, Laguna. She
had two children, Francisca and Beatriz (she died before her
mom; mother of Private Respondent). When Margarita passed
away, Francisca executed a deed of self-adjudication claiming
that she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The
deed of was based on a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' allegedly
executed by Margarita.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment
of the deed. A decision was rendered and the deed was
declared null and void. During the trial, Francisca filed an
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots. The NHA
granted the application. The PR appealed to the Office of the
President. The NHA resolution was affirmed. When Francisca
died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her
estate which they submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights
was approved by the NHA. The heirs of Francisca directed PR
to leave the premises that she was occupying. Feeling
aggrieved, PR sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a complaint in the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked her 40-year
occupation of the property and re-raised the fact that
Francisca's declaration is a nullity because the other heirs
were disregarded.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
CA reversed the decision and remanded the case for further
hearing. The RTC rendered a decision setting aside the
resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the
President. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but
a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death.
It then held that the said document must first be submitted
to probate before it can transfer property. The NHA and the
heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which were
both denied. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” was a will.

Held:
After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of
Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings
taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense that the
document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect
after her death. Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right
over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should
have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA
or to Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA
after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even
prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she
intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and
not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution
would want to make it appear.
The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by
Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on
August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she
is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was
questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita
Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca
Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and
presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed
of assignment of rights.