October will the party finally, fall n step and march out at the head of the masses, not

for a demonstration but<br>

for a revolution. Chapter 18: The First Coalition ALL official theories, declarations and advertisements to the<br>
contrary notwithstanding, the power belonged to the Provisional government on paper only. The revolution,<br>
paying no attention to the resistance of the so-called democracy, was striding along, lifting up new masses of<br>
the people, Strengthening the workers. The -Soviets, and to a Limited extent even arming the local commissars of<br>
the government and the "social committees' created under them, In which representatives of bourgeois<br>
organisations usually predominated, were quite naturally and without effort crowded out by the soviets. In<br>
certain cases, when these agents of the central power tried to resist, sharp conflicts arose. The commissars<br>
accused the local soviets of refusing to recognise the central government. The bourgeois press began to cry out<br>
that Cronstadt, Schlusselburg or Czaritsyn had seceded from Russia and become t republics. The local soviets<br>
protested against this nonsense. The ministers got excited. The governmental socialists hastened to these places,<br>
persuading, threatening, justifying themselves before the bourgeoisie. But all this did not change the correlation<br>
of forces. The fatefulness of the processes undermining the two power system could be seen in the fact that these<br>
processes were developing, although at different tempos, all over the country. From organs for controlling the<br>
government the soviets were becoming organs of administration. They would not accommodate themselves to<br>
any theory of the division of powers, but kept Interfering In the administration of the army, in economic<br>
conflicts, questions of food and transport, even in the courts of justice. The soviets under pressure from the<br>
workers decreed the eight-hour day, removed reactionary executives, ousted the more intolerable commissars of<br>
the Provisional government, conducted searches and arrests, suppressed hostile newspapers, under the influen<br>
nually increasing food difficulties and a goods famine, the provincial soviets undertook to fix prices, forbid<br>
export from the provinces and requisition provisions. Nevertheless at the head of the soviets everywhere stood the<br>
Social Revolutionaries and Menshevik who rejected with indignation the Bolshevik slogan, Power to the<br>
Soviets! Especially instructive in this connection is the activity of the soviet in Tiflis, the very heart of the<br>
Menshevik Gironde which gave the February revolution such Leaders as Tseretelli and Cheidze, and sheltered<br>
them afterwards when they had hopelessly squandered themselves in Petrograd. The Tiflis Soviet, led by<br>
Jordania - afterwards head of independent Georgia - found itself compelled at every step to trample on the<br>
principles of the Menshevik Party in control of it, and act as sovereign power. This soviet confiscated a private<br>
printing establishment for its own uses, made arrests, took charge of investigations and trials for political<br>
offences, established a bread ration, a he prices of food and the necessaries of Life That contrast between official<br>
doctrine and real life, manifest from the very first day, only continued to grow throughout March and April. In<br>
Petrograd a certain decorum at least was observed - although not always, as we have seen. The April days,<br>
however had unequivocally lifted the curtain on the impotence of the (Provisional government, showing that it<br>
had no serious support whatever in the capital, in the last ten days of April the government was flickering and<br>
going out. "Kerensky stated with, anguish that the government was already non-existent, that it did not work<br>
but merely discussed its condition' (Stankevich). You might say in general about this government, that upto<br>
the days of October in hard moments it was always undergoing a crisis, and in the intervals between crises it<br>
was merely existing. Continually "discussing its condition,' it found no time for business. From the crisis<br>
created by the April rehearsal of future events, three outcomes were thy possible. The power might have gone over<br>
wholly to the bourgeoisie; that could have been achieved only through civil war; Miliukov made the attempt, but<br>
failed. The power should have gone over wholly to the soviets; this could have been accomplished without any
civil<br>
war whatever, merely by raising of hands - merely by wishing it. But the Compromisers did not want to wish<br>
it, and the masses still preserved their faith in the Compromisers, although it was badly cracked. Thus both of<br>
the fundamental ways out - the bourgeois and the proletarian - were closed. Thereremained a third possibility,<br>
the confused, weak-hearted, cowardly half-road of compromise. The name of that road was Coalition. At the end<br>
of the April days the socialists had no thought ofa coalition, in general those people never foresaw anything. By<br>