DERRIDA AND PHENOMENOLOGY

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY
IN COOPERATION WITH
THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY

Volume 20

Editor:

William R. McKenna , Miami University

Editorial Board:

David Carr, Emory University

Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University
J. Claude Evans , Washington University
Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University
Joseph J. Kockelmans, The Pennsylvania State University
Algis Mickunas , Ohio University
J. N. Mohanty , Temple University
Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat, Mainz
Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University

Scope

The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy

through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in
culture generally, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that
call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has
provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly
successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and
methodological innovations.
 DERRIDAAND
PHENOMENOLOGY
edited by

WILLIAM R. McKENNA
Miami University,
Oxford , Ohio, U.S.A.
and

J. CLAUDE EVANS
Washington University,
St. Louis, Missouri , U.S.A.

Springer-Science+Business Media, B.Y.

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-90-481-4616-1 ISBN 978-94-015-8498-2 (eBook)

DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-8498-2

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
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retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner .
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface vii

Chapter 1. RUDOLF BERNET / Derrida and His Master's Voice . .. .

Chapter 2. DALLAS WILLARD / Is Derrida's View ofIdea1 Being

Rationally Defensible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 3. 1. CLAUDE EVANS / Indication and Occasional

Expressions 43

Chapter 4. BURTC. HOPKINS / Husserl and Derrida on the

Origin of Geometry 61

Chapter 5. JOHN SCANLON / Pure Presence: A Modest Proposal 95

Chapter 6. ALAN WHITE / Of Grammatolatry: Deconstruction

as Rigorous Phenomenology? ..... . ..... . .. ... 103

Chapter 7. NATALIE ALEXANDER / The Hollow Deconstruction

of Time . .. .. ... .. . . ...... . . .. . . . ... . ... .. . 121

Chapter 8. LEONARD LAWLOR/ The Relation as the

Fundamental Issue in Derrida .. . .... . .... ... . . 151

Chapter 9. THOMAS M. SEEBOHM / The Apodicticity

of Absen ce .... ....... ... . ...... . . ....... . . 185

Chapter 10. MANODANIEL / A Bibliography of Derrida

and Phenomenology . .. . ... . . . .... ...... ... .. 201

Index 213

v
 PREFACE

The essays in this volume give a sample of the spectrum of reactions which
Jacques Derrida's writings on Edmund Husserl's philosophy have elicited.
The volume grew out of a set of papers that were given at a symposium on
"Phenomenology and Deconstruction" that was held in conjunction with
the 1989 meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical
Association. This symposium was organized in order to provide a forum for
discussing some of the concerns which those sympathetic to Husserl's
philosophy have had about Derrida's representation and critique of
Husserl's thought. Participants in the symposium were Natalie Alexander,
William McKenna, Thomas Seebohm, Alan White, and Dallas Willard.
When these papers were being gathered together into a volume for
publication the decision was made to supplement them with other essays,
some of which furthered the purpose of the symposium, and others which
did more to highlight the strengths of Derrida's approach to the issues. In
this way the contributions by Rudolf Bernet, J. Claude Evans, Burt
Hopkins, Leonard Lawler, and John Scanlon were included. The result is
a collection of essays that express a wide range of views on both Derrida's
handling ofthe issues and his interpretation ofHusser I. There has also been
added a bibliography ofthe relevant literature composed by Mano Daniel.
Rudolf Bernet's "Derrida and His Master's Voice," which opens the
volume, presents a critical summary ofDerrida's "Speech and Phenomena"
which notes its weaknesses but also stresses those places where Derrida's
analysis poses genuine problems that should provoke further phe-
nomenological inquiry. Bernet expresses the belief that "Speech and
Phenomena" can contribute to a "rethinking of what is fundamentally at
stake in Husserlian phenomenology" (p.19).
In "Is Derrida's View of Ideal Being Rationally Defensible?" Dallas
Willard focusses on a specific part of Derrida's discussion of Husserl. He
finds that Derrida holds a view about the existence and nature of ideal
being (specifically, universals) which is mostly the same as the view that
he (Derrida) attributes to Husser!. Willard asks whether this view is

vii
Vlll PREFACE

rationally defensible. After laying out Derrida's view he argues that it is not
coherent and that it is not Husserl's position .
If Derrida's texts, when held up to a logical standard, are found wanting,
as Willard argues , how then do they manage to produce their
"demonstrations?" J. Claude Evans, in "Indication and Occasional
Expressions," argues that this is done through a variety of identifiable
"misreadings" of Husserl. Evans explains this claim using the crucial case
ofDerrida's discussion of Husserl's distinction between the expressive and
indicative function of signs. He finds the insinuation of a "rhetoric of
threat" into Husserl's texts to be what advances the "demonstrations."
In Chapter Four, "Husserl and Derrida on the Origin of Geometry," Burt
Hopkins registers appreciation to Derrida for having raised and pursued the
question of a "transcendental language," for this problem strikes at the
heart of phenomenological method insofar as the latter claims to disclose
the origin of sense . Hopkins explores such issues as the relation of
language to intuition (especially reflective intuition) and of the un-
thematized presumptions about language that phenomenology employs. He
is largely critical ofDerrida's reading of Husserl , especially readings that
are decisive for Derrida in the advancement of his critique of phe-
nomenology.
In being critical ofDerrida, Willard , Evans, and Hopkins take Derrida's
writings seriously. John Scanlon , in "Pure Presence: A modest Proposal,"
however, advances the surprising thesis that Derrida's "Speech and
Phenomena" is not to be taken seriously, for it is either a satire or a parody,
"a satiric distortion of Husserl's text" or "a parody of a serious but flawed
exegesis of that text." In either case, the proper response is not to seriously
argue that it misrepresents, but rather to take it lightly and enjoy its play.
Alan White would probably disagree with this recommendation. He finds
that deconstruction is worth discussing. The thesis which he examines in
"Of Grammatolatry: Deconstruction as Rigorous Phenomenology" is that
"the move from Husserl in phenomenology to Derridean deconstruction
is made when the demand for philosophical rigor leads to the abandonment
of the dream for a philosophical science." He investigates what rigor might
mean in deconstruction and presents Derrida as being a logical thinker,
although holding out the possibility that his reading of Derrida's texts may
be a caricature.
 PREFACE IX

Different views on the logical status of Derrida's texts like those

mentioned above raise the question of how to read Derrida's writings on
Husser\. Natalie Alexander focusses directl y on this question in "The
Hollow Deconstruction of Time. " Her essay gives us a way to understand
and put into perspective the variety of critical readings one encounters.
Using two key examples, she finds that as philosophical argument "Speech
and Phenomena" fails, yet when read as one would interpret literature a
more sympathetic view emerges. Taken in this latter way, Derrida's text
"only masquerades as philosophical argument," but "provides a strong,
rhetorically effective misreading of Husser\'''
Leonard Lawler defends the philosophical integrity of Derrida's writings
on Husser\. In "The Relation as the Fundamental Issue in Derrida" he finds
that Derrida's critics have neglected the context of Derrida's interpretation
ofHusserl, both the context of the entirety of Derrida's writings on Husserl
and of Derrida's other works. Lawler claims that Derrida's entire thought
is an attempt to conceive the relation of the parallelism between the
empirical and the transcendenta\. He argues that Derrida respects the
difference between the empirical and the transcendental but conceives of
it in his own original way, ultimately as differance.
In "The Apodicticity of Absence," Thomas Seebohm takes seriously the
contention that Derrida has attempted to forge a stronger constitutive role
for absence in the constitution of presence than Husserl seems to allow. He
finds, however, that the views of the two are not as different as they may
appear to be. In fact, Seebohm argues, in works that were written later than
those which Derrida has relied upon, Husserl has worked out a more radical
role for absence than that allowed by Derrida, and in ways that do not
threaten phenomenology. Nevertheless, Derrida's work is to be credited
with pointing phenomenological research in an important direction.

William R. McKenna
Miami University
 CHAPTER ONE

DERRIDAAND
HIS MASTER'S VOICE·

RUDOLF BERNET

Jacques Derrida's Speech and Phenomena has met with a strange destiny .
Greeted from its publication in 1967 as a remarkable work, its influence
has nevertheless suffered because of the simultaneous appearance of two
other books which were more varied in composition and were without
doubt more easily accessible: Of Grammatology and Writing and Dif-
ference. Whereas an earlier work, namely the long and profound
"Introduction" to Husserl's Origin of Geometry (1962), had hardly been
noticed with the exception of a small circle of initiates, Speech and
Phenomena has done much to consecrate the international fame of Jacques
Derrida. Sustained by new publications at an ever increasing rate, this fame
has not ceased to grow, to the point of becoming, in the United States at
least, a media and cultural phenomenon. This is not the place, however, to
ask about the complex links that tie the joyful deconstructionist horde to a
thinker who works in solitude and whose voice becomes more and more
anguished. This new intellectual vogue which claims to take its inspiration
from Derrida concerns us nevertheless in that it has distorted or even
prevented, with few exceptions, a reading of Speech and Phenomena that
would match the richness and ambitions of the text. I would briefly like to
mention two kinds of approach that, although opposing each other, have in
common that they misunderstand totally the key question of Speech and
Phenomena, namely : how to listen to the voice of one's master.

'Originally published as "Derrida et la voix de son maitre" in Revue philosophique de la

France et de I'etranger (Paris: PDF, 1990-91), 147-166. Translated by Nadja P. Hofmann
and William R. McKenna. Translation published with the permission of the publisher.
1
W. R. McKenna and J. C. Evans ieds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 1-21.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers .
2 RUDOLF BERNET

The first kind of reading takes this text as a mere illustration of what one
calls "the thought" of Derrida. It brings together, for example, this "intro-
duction to the problem ofthe sign in the phenomenology of Husserl" with
contemporary texts of Saussure, Freud , Hegel, etc. and it uses these com-
parisons in order to find in them some anticipations of subsequent work of
Derrida. Speech and Phenomena is presented as the first milestone in the
evolution of an autonomous thought which has used the philosophy of
Husserl only to better adjust its aim on the whole metaphysical tradition
which is guilty ofthe same attachment to presence. Proceeding in this way,
the reader claims to be interested in a postmodern reading of philosophical
texts that was inaugurated by Derrida and at the same time one ignores
Speech and Phenomena as a text to decipher. This is how "the" thought of
dissemination, of undecidability, and of "difference" is recaptured by a
hasty systematization which brings along all the prejudices of the history
of traditional philosophy while giving up its rigor.
The second type of reading is the one proposed by some Husserlians who
are frightened by the style as much as by the thought of Derrida. Often they
started reading Speech and Phenomena late, on the basis of insistent and
disquieting rumors about its author who became famous thanks to other
writings thought to be more frivolous. To judge Derrida on actual evidence
means for them to verify if his listening to the voice of Husserl has been
faithful or not. Consequently Speech and Phenomena is read and ap-
preciated as a commentary or as an interpretation of the first chapter of the
first of the Logical Investigations which is entitled "The Essential Distinc-
tions." This way of reading gives very little importance to Derrida's con-
cerns such as they are seen in his other texts. And above all it ignores the
explicit warning ofthe author who points out that Speech and Phenomena
wants to put forward a reading ofHusserl "which can neither be simply the
one of a commentary nor the one of an interpretation." In this way one is
interested in the deconstruction of the Husserlian distinction between
"expression" and "indication" without realizing that it implies also the
impossibility of an expression and of an understanding that is absolutely
faithful to Husserl's thought. And one ends up by criticizing Speech and
Phenomena by claiming to attain an immanent comprehension of the
meaning of Husserl's work about which Derrida had very correctly shown
the following : 1) that it was inhabited by the infinite return of exteriority;
2) that it was contaminated within itself by the emergence of an irreducible
 DERRIDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 3

alterity; and 3) that it confessed to the finitude of all understanding by

promoting phenomenology as an infinite task.
Our approach to Speech and Phenomena would like to avoid the pitfall of
treating this text on the basis of prejudices that this same text wants
precisely to shake off. But it would like also to facilitate the reading of a
text known for its difficulty. This is due in great part to the fact that Derrida
pursues very diverse objectives within a work of only 100 pages . He dis-
mantles in minute detail the Husserlian distinction between expressive and
indicative signs and he uses this micro-phenomenology of the sign as a
springboard for leaping into the interrogation offundamental concepts such
as the phenomenological reduction, transcendental consciousness, constitu-
tion, and the language of phenomenology. The rigor and ambition of this
analysis should nevertheless not deceive us about the fact that they serve
principally to start a much more general debate which concerns the whole
philosophical tradition and notably the repression of the exteriority of the
written sign, of the alterity of a non-originary present, of the heteronomy
of a subject caught in the unforeseeable web of intersubjectivity, and ofthe
finitude of a life that is constantly confronting death . This opens into a
philosophy named "fa difference" which jostles the received ideas and
established values of traditional philosophy while confirming their impor-
tance and even their primacy. We would like to show that these different
concerns are held together in a structure or order which is certainly not of
an axiomatic nature, but where each element echoes all the others and
where the voice of Derrida is amplified and becomes clearer by dint of
being reflected by ever new representations.
What this voice ofDerrida proclaims, or rather what its multiple echoes
repeat, is that there is no voice without representation, no origin without the
supplement of repetition, no life without death, no presence without
absence. The meaning springs out from the gap ofthe "difference" between
the interiority of thought and the exteriority of the sign, between the
presence of an identical meaning and its changing representation, between
the private and inexpressible presence to oneself and its alienation in the
language of us all. The thought of "differance" contests the philosophy of
presence in the name not of absence but of the indissoluble "entanglement"
of presence and absence, of essence and fact, of time and space, of mind
and body, of meaning and sign, of perception and imagination, of speech
and writing. The clear analysis of each of these multiple figures of
4 RUDOLF BERNET

"difference" confirms that it does not let itself be restored to the form of a
relation of dual opposition, which in its turn lends itself to "reduction," the
deriving of one of these terms from the other. For Derrida, "difference" is
irreducible. There is no philosophical or phenomenological reduction
which would lead to a primitive self-same unity, identical to itself, and only
yielding an Other by excess and the force of a negation of itself.
It is in following the trace of such irreducible "difference" or "un-
decidable" that Derrida approaches each of the "essential distinctions" of
Husserl: the one between the expressive sign which gives meaning and the
indicative sign which lacks it, between the intuitive representation of an
ideal object and its imaginary or linguistic representation, the one between
an immediate presence to oneself and the loss of oneself in discourse, the
one between the now and its "after-effect" (apres-coup), the one between
the interiority of intuitive thought and the exteriority of its inscription in
language. Each step of this demonstration counts as a defense and illustra-
tion of the same argument. None of these "distinctions" of Husserl can be
understood as concerning two separate and autonomous essences of which
one could be derived from the other. If this double movement of an "esse-
ntial distinction" and of its subordination under the main idea of a primitive
unit is supposed to represent the operation of the "phenomenological
reduction," one understands why Derrida wants to show the "impossibility"
of such a reduction. But one should not overlook that a philosophy of the
"difference" cannot claim to substitute itself purely and simply for a philo-
sophy of essential distinctions, since "differance" manifests itself only
through the failure or rather the indefinitely deferred outcome the pheno-
menological reduction to presence.
The "essential distinction" on which Speech and Phenomena mainly
insists is the one that Husserl introduces from the start of the first of his
Logical Investigations and which concerns the difference between
expression and indication. It is a question of two kinds of signs whose
difference is defined in terms of presence or absence of meaning repre-
sented by these signs . An expressive sign shows its meaning and forms
with it an intimate unity that one can compare to the one between soul and
flesh, between seeing and the eye, between listening and the ear, between
touching and the hand. The expressive sign is the organ rather than the
simple representation of meaning. The indicative sign, on the contrary,
offers more to belief than one can see, it puts one on the trail of a meaning
 DERRIDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 5

rather than capturing it, it calls rather than gives . More or less, the
expressive sign is the linguistic sign which says what it wants to say and
which erases itself before its meaning, whereas the indicative sign is an
autonomous object of perception which in addition makes you believe,
reminds, or warns you. The indicative signs are sometimes natural objects
such a fossils which make us believe the existence of prehistoric animals.
But they are most often objects that have been constructed of several pieces
such as the road sign which warns you against an unexpected tum, or the
knot in the handkerchief which Husserl says he used to remind himself to
become a better man. There is no point here to go further into the detail of
this semiotic of Husserl, although it is not without merit.'
What interests Derrida most of all is first the criterion in whose name this
"essential distinction" occurs between expression and indication, and
secondly the particular case ofthose speech acts where, as Husserl himself
confesses, the same linguistic sign functions at the same time as expression
and indication. While letting himself be guided step by step by Husserl's
analysis, Derrida pursues a completely different end. For Husserl, what
distinguishes expression from indication is its proximity to the thought of
a subject who knows what he wants to say and who says what he knows.
The entanglement (Verjlechtung) of the expressive function and the
indicative function of the same sign is for Husserl only an accidental
contamination which one has to get rid of as quickly as possible when one
wants to keep language entirely expressive. Derrida on the contrary holds
this entanglement of the expressive and indicative function of signs to be
essential, because it puts on display how every sign is worked through by
"differance" It is in the name ofthis essential or originary "difference" that
Derrida will deconstruct the idea of presence which serves as a foundation
to the distinction between expression and indication . In this way he will
press the text of Husserl until it confesses to the impossibility of a pure
expression. Derrida will conclude from this that the condition of the
possibility of the appearing of something therefore cannot be found on the
side of the consciousness of a subject that is present to itself, but rather
precisely from the side of the entanglement of the play of difference

, Cf. Rudolf Bemet, "Husserl's Theory of Signs Revisited," in Robert Sokolowski (ed.),
Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition. Essays in Phenomenology, (Washington. DC:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 1-24.
6 RUDOLF BERNET

between the expressive and indicative sign. The phenomenon does not
depend upon an interior voice in which the subject addresses itself in the
secret of its consciousness, but on the contrary it finds its condition of
possibility in the sign understood as "trace" or as "originary supplement."
The first step in this demonstration which decides all the following,
concerns, therefore, the foundation of the distinction between expression
and indication. For Husserl, an expression is endowed with a meaning, with
Bedeutung, which indication lacks. Indication cannot however be deprived
of meaning, since it is a sign (Zeichen) and all signs signify, that is, refer
to (zeigen) something that is beyond themselves. The Bedeutung of
expression is therefore a meaning of a particular type. Its particularity
consists in the fact that the referring of the Bedeutung depends upon a
mental activity of intentional nature, and that the expressive sign is nothing
else but the bodily wrapping of this Bedeutung. In expressive speech the
sounds uttered are infinitely close to their Bedeutung, they make it present
and form with it a indissoluble phenomenal unity. The gestures with which
I accompany involuntarily my words, on the other hand, are far from
coinciding with the content of my thought, and Husser! holds them
consequently as indicative signs . Derrida is therefore right in saying that
what distinguishes expression from indication is its proximity to the pre-
expressive layer of thought as well as to its voluntary and explicit
character. The Bedeutung which manifests itself in the expressive sign is
a "wanting to say" (vouloir-dire) and the expressive sign is the effective
saying of a meaning which precedes language.
According to Derrida this definition of expression is based upon a two-
fold idea of presence: presence to itself of the thinking subject and
presence of the intentional object to the thought. The expressive sign
conforms to the demands of this double presence: It gets as close as
possible to the meaning (vouloir-dire) of the thinking which it expresses,
and it anticipates the intuitive presence of the intentional object of this
thought. The idealization and spiritualization ofthe expressive sign have
to be understood in light of this proximity to the ideal Bedeutung: the
concrete presence ofthe sign in empirical reality (token) is only a particular
representation of the ideal and immutable form of the sign (type); the
spiritualization of the materiality of the sign is the reason for the priority
of voice over writing. In its ideal form the voiced sign is infinitely close to
the ideality of the Bedeutung: the latter makes itself "heard" (entendre) in
 DERRlDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 7

the double meaning of the word "entendre" (audible and understandable).

It is true that the Bedeutung of the expression must not be confused with
the object or state of affairs to which it refers in virtue of its intentionality.
But it is no less true that to understand an expression well is also to grasp
the reality at which it aims . Even if false speech is not deprived of
Bedeutung there is no doubt that for Husserl the purpose of speaking is to
say and to make audible and understandable the truth of the real. Derrida
strongly distinguishes himselffrom HusserI's thought on this specific point
by maintaining that there is no true speech that does not run the risk of
falling into falsehood , and that there is no expression whose loyalty to the
Bedeutungen excludes all misunderstanding. Once uttered, the meaning of
an expression is detached from the speaking subject. It escapes from the
subject as does the object spoken about, and whose originary presence will
be from now on supplanted by its linguistic representation, that is, by what
has been said about it. Derrida emphasizes in this way the fact that there is
no presence without representation and without the threat of loss which the
latter causes to hang over the originary presence. This applies to the
presence of the object as well as to the presence of the subject to itself or
the instantaneous presence of the present-now.
The play of "differance" between presence and representation whose
trace Derrida pursues in Husserl's text appears more clearly under the guise
of the "entanglement" (Verjlechtung) of the expressive and the indicative
functions of the same linguistic sign. Husserl acknowledges that this hap-
pens "in fact" every time one of my expressions is used to communicate
my thought to others. In this case the same utterance which is used as an
expression of my thought is apprehended by my interlocutor as a simple
indication of what I want to say. If for me what I say and what I want to say
are in principle identical, this does not apply to others who hear what I say
without my thought being given to them as such originarily. What for me
is an expression of my thought is for others only an indicative manifesta-
tion (Kundgabe) of what I want to say. Husserl does not really worry
excessively about this entanglement "de facto" between expression and
indication because according to him it does not threaten the essential
distinction, that is "de jure," between the nature of the expressive sign and
the nature of the indicative sign. Husserl thinks that the entanglement
between expression and indication which is proper to communication does
not change anything about the fact that, to the one who speaks and hears his
 8 RUDOLF BERNET

own voice, the latter remains a pure expression of his meaning. The
soliloquy seems therefore to be a unique phenomenon capable ofexhibiting
the nature of expressive signs in all their purity.
It is at this specific point in Husserl's reasoning, that is before the critical
analysis of the soliloquy as a prototype of a pure expression, that for the
first time the polemical aim of Derrida's interpretation surfaces. First
Derrida seems to defend the view that an "essential distinction" which is
not found as such at the level of concrete phenomena would be contrary to
the principles of phenomenology and therefore inapplicable and reprehen-
sible. Husserl would betray in some way the phenomenon of entanglement
"de facto" to the advantage of distinctions "de jure" whose principles
would follow from prejudices of the metaphysics of presence. But is it not
also true that a phenomenology which would confine itself to being a
simple description of phenomena such as they present themselves "in fact"
would quickly exhaust itself and in any case would never account for all
the richness of the concrete given? Is there really good reason to chose bet-
ween phenomenology and a science of essences when it is known that it is
the essences which properly give direction to the analysis of phenomena
and which prevent in this way the dispersal of the phenomenological gaze?
Even if an example of a pure expression in fact could not be found, the
essential distinction between expression and indication would remain valid
and would constitute a valuable means for analyzing the multiple forms of
their phenomenal entanglement. The "essential distinctions" remain there-
fore an indispensable presupposition of the phenomenology of "differance"
and it would be surprising if this had escaped Derrida.
In order to better understand Derrida's putting of "essential distinctions"
into question, one has to call upon a second moment of his critical inter-
pretation . This no longer concerns the eidetic reduction but rather Husserl's
phenomenological reduction. Derrida presents this as a change of the look
which leads the phenomenologist to tum away from the empirical existence
of things in the world in order to devote himself, in the form of an inner
reflection, to the examination of the life of the transcendental conscious-
ness which gives meaning to these things, which "constitutes" them .
Derrida's interpretation owes its great originality to the fact that it deals
with the phenomenological reduction "superimposed" on the "essential
distinction" between expression and indication. What is at stake in this
move consists of giving a linguistic form to the phenomenological
 DERRJDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 9

reduction, or rather to show its rootedness in (or in a certain idea of)

language. However, by drawing too exclusively from the "essential
distinctions" which were developed in the first paragraphs of the first of the
Logical Investigations, Derrida barely gives himself the means to carry this
enterprise through to a successful conclusion. The result of his analysis is
doubly problematic: On the one hand Derrida rejects the phenomenological
value of the distinction between expression and indication because he has
the rejection bear all the weight of his grievance against the phenomenolo-
gical reduction; on the other hand by understanding the phenomenological
reduction too closely in relation to the priority which Husserl gives to
expression over indication, he distorts the basic idea and ends up by
deconstructing a reduction that is more phantasmatical than phe-
nomenological. If the phenomenological reduction depends upon the search
for an example of pure expression, and if for Husserl the soliloquy seems
to be the only example which realizes such purity of expression, it follows
that the reduction to transcendental consciousness would be a reduction to
solipsism or to a "voice that keeps the silence. " Every reader of Husser!
knows nonetheless what the informed reader, which is Derrida, could not
ignore, and that is that the transcendental consciousness disclosed by the
phenomenological reduction is in no way cut off from the wor!d and from
commerce with other subjects.
Although the conclusions formulated by Derrida on the nature of the
phenomenological reduction are certainly too hasty and even improper
concerning the whole ofHusserl's work, this does not apply to the premises
of his interpretation. There is no doubt that Husserl privileges expression
over indication, and it is certain that expression is distinguishable from
indication by its proximity to intentional consciousness. Derrida is also
right to emphasize the fact that indication relies on the empirical reality of
the sign and on a signifying relation which functions by means of a
causality which comes under empirical psychology. Nothing like this is
true on the side of the pure expression, which, in the case of the soliloquy
does without the physical existence of the sign and carries out a spir-
itualization and idealization of it, and also refers to its object in virtue of an
intentional consciousness which knows itself as thinking and knows what
it thinks well before confiding in a linguistic expression. The passage from
indication to expression is therefore a figure of the return to pure con-
sciousness and it is not improper to talk about "a phenomenological proto-
10 RUDOLF BERNET

reduction." Even if the thought which directs expression is not yet the
transcendental consciousness, nevertheless it displays the same fascination
for a consciousness which is totally present to itself. It follows that if a pure
expression would tum out to be impossible from the fact ofthe impossibil-
ity of a pure and immediate presence of the speaking subject to itself, this
would also affect the project of the phenomenological reduction to
transcendental consciousness and especially the Cartesian formulation of
this project. Derrida is not completely convincing when he wants to
persuade us of the impossibility ofthe phenomenological reduction, but he
is certainly not wrong to stress the phenomenon of the soliloquy and to
make it at the same time the pivot of the argument about the distinction
between expression and indication and something revealing a difficulty that
affects the phenomenological project in its entirety.
Derrida summarizes the argumentation that Husserl puts forward in favor
ofthe soliloquy as a type of pure expression by reducing it to two distinct
assertions: 1) In the soliloquy the expressive sign reaches automatically, so
to speak, the status of an ideal object, that is of an identical object which
no longer has any essential link with the world of empirical things; 2) The
soliloquy is the expression of a presence of the subject to itself, and this
presence not only precedes the expression, but it can also be realized
without the aid of this expression. The subject experiences its life and
knows its thought well in advance of signifying them to itself by means of
an expression. The two arguments can also be summarized as follows: 1)
In the soliloquy the subject does not need the physical existence of the
expressive sign, it is content most often with imagining this sign; 2) The
soliloquy, that is the voice which hears itself speak, is only an unproductive
layer of the life of a subject who has an immediate reflexive consciousness
of its intentional acts. Derrida subjects these two arguments to a rigorous
test: he will first of all try to prove that the ideal identity of the expressive
sign, which is acquired thanks to imagination and which is secured through
repetition, remains precarious because it is always at the risk of being
compromised by empirical reality. Secondly, he will try to prove that the
subject never has a full and immediate consciousness of itself because the
representation that the subject has of itself in "speech," far from being a
pure auto-affection, implies necessarily an alienation . As we can see, the
two arguments question the possibility of a pure presence, that is, of a
presence fully intuitive and ideal, on the basis of its inevitable contamina-
 DERRJDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 11

tion by an impure representation. It follows that all presence is dependent

upon an empirical exteriority which involves indication or "the trace."
The first argument resumes the extensive analyses which Derrida had
devoted to the presence of the ideal object in his Introduction to Husserl's
Origin ofGeometry: and he applies them to the case of thought which is
expressed either by means of an actually uttered word or an imagined word.
For Derrida, the actual physical presence of a word in the empirical world
never occurs without the spirituality of its meaning being contaminated,
and without the ideal identity, the univocity, and the intuitive presence of
its meaning being jeopardized. The expressive sign once uttered or written
is irreversibly swept along toward the troublesome route of indication. That
which is mentioned by Husserl as a simple fact, that is, that in solitary
discourse "we content ourselves normally with represented words rather
than real words," is understood by Derrida as a necessity: the one who
wants to protect the purity of expression, that is to prevent its sliding
toward being compromised by indication, has to refrain from actually
speaking. The expression is defined by the fact that within it the sound
becomes a transparent representation of the presence of meaning. The pure
expression lends itself, therefore, to an indefinite repetition without the
clarity of its meaning suffering, without its meaning being modified or lost.
It is only as ideal object that the expression acquires this unchanging purity ,
because all of what is empirical is impure, changing, tom apart by space
and worn out by use. The representation of words by means of imagination
(Phantasie-Vorstellungen) with which, according to Husserl, one can be
satisfied in solitary discourse, is interpreted by Derrida as an essential
means of purifying signs, that is of the constitution of the word as an ideal
object. The apprehension of an ideal object, for example the identical
voiced (sonore) form (type) of the word " lion" is realized in fact most
easily by means of an variation in imagination: I imagine different people
pronouncing that word with different accents, intonations, and intensities,

2 Jacques Derrida, "Introduction" in Edmund Husserl's L'origin e de la geometr ie (Paris:

PUF, 1962); English translation by John P. Leavey, Edmund Husserl's Origin a/Geometry:
An Introduction (New York: Nicolas Hays Ltd, 1978). See also Rudolf Bernet, "On
Derrida's ' Introduction' to Husserl's Origin 0/ Geometry" in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.),
Derrida and Deconstruction (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 139-153,234-235.
12 RUDOLF BERNET

in order to bring to light the type common to the multiple tokens of the
word " lion."
The Introduction to The Origin ofGeometry had already pointed out that
what contributes in a decisive manner to assure the unchanging presence
of an object, such as, for example, the meaning of a geometrical theorem,
is at the same time that which risks the loss of that ideality. For this
"sedimentation" of the ideal meaning in writing, the following reversal is
particularly striking: once fixed in writing the meaning remains constantly
available, but it risks at the same time being frozen and lost in the blind
repetition of a same expression as it is indefinitely recopied. It is precisely
in this context that Derrida had for the first time spoken about "difference."
Ifthere is no repetition of the same without distortion, then neither is there
an ideal object whose identity would be maintained through its multiple
representations. One must conclude that the presence of the ideal object is
indefinitely "deferred" by the representations which it nevertheless could
not do without. The ideality of the ideal object does not lend itself to an
accomplished presence, it is an "Idea in the Kantian sense. " Instead of
assuring the maintenance of the same , the repetition therefore introduces
difference and contributes in this way to defer ad infinitum the unchanging
presence of the same. A repetition is always impure because it brings about
the separation between the presence of meaning and its re-presentation
rather than overcoming it. The repetition which represents the ideal object
remains essentially dependent on a real object such as the written sign.
The reason Derrida takes up this analysis of the constitution of the ideal
object again, using the example of solitary discourse where the speaker
would be satisfied with using imagined words to speak to himself, is above
all to show that this appeal to imagination does not suffice to guarantee that
we have here the rare example of a pure expression. A pure expression is
an ideal expression that would lend itself to an infinite repetition without
the presence of its meaning suffering from it. That this repetition of the
same expression is made by an actual or by an imagined discourse is,
however, not important for the ideality of this expression. The difference
between the actual perception of a word and its imaginary representation
is erased precisely in front of the ideality of the word. In each of the two
cases it is a matter a distinct representation (token) of a same ideal
expression (type). The argument must therefore be sharpened by insisting
on the fact that what counts is not so much the difference between the
 DERRlDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 13

representation of the same type by a perceived token or by a imagined

token, rather the necessity to represent a type by a token (whichever one it
is). The presence of the ideal form of the sign is therefore far from being
autonomous, because its representation depends on tokens, that is, on
concrete and variable occurrences. The phenomenon of the sign implies a
reciprocal exchange between presence and representation, and it will not
therefore ever be able to be reduced to a pure presence. Derrida under-
stands this reciprocal exchange between presence and representation of the
sign as a further example of the inextricable entanglement between
expression and indication. The fact that Husserl appeals to the soliloquy as
an example of a pure expression is supposed to confirm this argument: if,
despite all that has just been said, a purely expressive, univocal, and
objective language would be possible, it would be annihilated because it
could only be realized in the form of a monologue or a "a voice that keeps
silent."
It is best, however, for the reader to reserve judgement before agreeing
too quickly to this argument. Is Derrida in his crusade against a philosophy
of presence too quickly gathering together under the same banner different
forms of representation, that is, imagination, repetition, the concrete
instantiation of a generality, and the representation by means of a sign?
Also, is not the identifying ofthe search for a pure expression in the solilo-
quy with the search for a perfectly univocal and unchanging language too
hasty?
These reservations seem justified, but one has to add immediately that
Derrida has not yet said his last word. We still have to examine his main
argument, that is, the deconstruction of the idea of an immediate and fully
intuitive presence of the subject to itself. According to Derrida it is this
presence to itself which provides the ultimate basis for the ideal of a purely
expressive language and which thus explains Husserl's propensity to use
the example of monologue. Husserl says that to talk about indication in
relation to monologue has no meaning, since in this case the words and
their meaning are lived by the subject "in the same instant" making in this
way any representation by the subject through the mediation of indications
"useless" (zwecklos) . IfDerrida considers pure expression to be impossible,
it is up to him, therefore, to disprove these two claims: first, that an
"instantaneous" presence of the present exists; and second, that the subject
is present to itself and there is no need of an appeal to an indicative
14 RUDOLF BERNET

representation through which it would come to inform itself about itself,

from the outside so to speak.
The analysis ofthe first claim leads Derrida to examine Husserl's lectures
On the Phenomenolgy ofthe Consciousness ofInner Time more closely.'
According to Husserl, the time of the things of the world must be under-
stood by the time of the consciousness in which these things are ap-
prehended. This consciousness is a temporal flow that is composed of lived
intentional experiences which last a certain time and which succeed one
another. When looked at more closely, consciousness is split still within the
temporal flux and in the "inner consciousness" of this flux. This inner
consciousness of the temporality of lived intentional experiences is a
consciousness of their succession as well as of their duration. A lived
experience lasts as long as it is present in consciousness. One of the
greatest discoveries of Husserl is precisely that this present of the lived
experience is not limited to an instantaneous point, to a punctual now, and
that the duration of the lived experience is more than a simple addition of
separate instants. Husserl says that the apprehension of the present now of
a lived experience is always complemented by the apprehension of its
elapsed present and of its present to come. In Husserl's terminology this
means that the apprehension of the present extends beyond the "originary
impression" of a punctual now, that it encompasses also the "retention" of
the elapsed duration and the "protention" ofthe future duration of the lived
experience. For Husserl this "retention" of the past in the present must
nevertheless be clearly distinguished from a "repetition" or "recollection"
of a past present. In retention the past is apprehended as an integral part of
the present (Husserl compares it to the tail of a comet), whereas recollec-
tion makes live again a past in the present without integrating it into the
present act of memory . The retained past is part of the perception of the
present, that is, of an act of "presentation" (Gegenwiirtigung). Recollection,

3 Edmund Husserl, Vorlesung zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins,

Husser!iana X (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 1-134; English translation by John B.
Brough, On the Phenomenology ofthe Consciousness ofInternal Time (Dordrecht-Boston-
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 1-108. See also RudolfBemet, "Is the Present
ever Present? Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence," in John Sallis (ed.)
Husser! and Contemporary Thought (Atlantic Highlands , NJ : Humanities Press , 1983),85-
117.
 DERRIDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 15

in contrast, is a "reproduction" and thus a "representation" (Ver-

gegenwartigungy of the past in the present. Far from weakening the
possibility of the direct apprehension of a present now, retention extends
the field of this immediate grasp of the present beyond the now . "The inner
consciousness of time," according to Husserl, is thus a form of the presence
of consciousness to itself.
Derrida's interpretation destabilizes this neat construction, first of all by
emphasizing the link of dependence which joins the originary impression
to retention, and second by having retention slip over to the side of
representation, to the side of the indicative sign, of "the trace," and of
"differance" Far from prolonging the rapture of an absolute presence of
consciousness to itself, retention would thus hinder it and would defer it ad
infinitum. Derrida offers as proof of this that the originary impression and
retention while being indissociable do not form a simple unity but a unity
of essentially different givens. From the beginning, the present now is
composed of the not-now which in the case of retention is an elapsed now .
If the present were reduced to the simple and absolute unity ofthe now, one
could not see in effect how this now could become a not-now and how one
would manage to attain the phenomenon of the flow and ofthe passage of
time from the given of the instant. Of course this had not escaped Husserl,
and Derrida shows how Husserl was for this reason led to give up the idea
of a time whose origin would be located in an absolute now. Husserl
therefore arrived at the conception of a time which, while saving a
privileged link with the present, would nevertheless be understood as an
originary difference between the now and the not-now. In effect the
irreducible link between originary impression and retention causes the now
from its first appearance to be haunted by the alterity of the no-longer-now.
The present appears therefore as the result of an originary entanglement
between the now and the not-now. It follows that no simple and instanta-
neous presence of consciousness to itself exists and that the flux of
consciousness presents itself in the form of a difference between what is
now and what. is no longer (or not yet) .
As one would have expected , Derrida goes a step further and understands
this entanglement of the originary impression and retention as another form
of the entanglement of expression and indication . If expression is found on
the side of the originary impression, that is of the presence of conscious-
ness to itself "in the same instant," retention must inevitably be a matter of
16 RUDOLF BERNET

indication. Retention comes closer to the differential repetition which

constitutes the presence of the ideal object while losing it. Retention
becomes an example of the indicative representation which Derrida claims
causes interference to all expressive presentation of thought. The link
between originary impression and retention is cited as proof of the need to
resort to the alterity of indicative representation even within the subject's
presentation of itself to itself. The logic of this demonstration thus leads to
pushing retention over to the side of representations such as repetition or
reproduction. Where Husserl maintains an "essential distinction" between
retention, on the one hand, which he considers as being a form or a moment
of presentation, and recollection, on the other hand, which is a matter of
representation, Derrida finds two forms of representation whose "common
root" would be "the trace" or "the movement of differance" which
"inhabits the pure actuality of the now."
It is up to the reader to judge for himself how far he wants to follow
Derrida in the liberty he takes with Husserl's text. Nevertheless, no reader
who has followed the demonstration up to here can yet claim a full enough
understanding of Husserl's thought to justify his refusal to follow along
with Derrida's interpretation. If Derrida has made us understand one thing,
it is precisely that no purely expressive language exists, and therefore, no
means exists either to assure us that an interpretation coincides with the
meaning ofthe author. It is not even certain that the author can faithfully
reproduce his own thought, or that he is in full possession of his thought
while he thinks. It is in this last assertion that Derrida's argument reaches
its peak. What Derrida wants to show above all is that the manner in which
the subject grasps its own thought or hears and understands its own voice
is not thinkable without the detour through the alterity of the indicative
sign. The subject behaves therefore towards itself as if it were an other.
In this last stage of the argument, the presence of the subject to itself is
analyzed as a privileged phenomenon which Derrida calls the voice. The
privilege given to the voice as being the prototype of every expression goes
back to Aristotle. The Stagirite already opposed the "signifying voice"
(phone semantikev; which expresses the logos , to the sounds devoid of
signification (psophoi) that animals make.' Already with Aristotle, the
voice becomes therefore an accomplice in the "Iogocentric" understanding

4 Aristotle , De interpretatione, 16b.

 DERRJDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 17

of human language. Derrida determines the privilege of this "voice" not

any longer by opposing it to the sounds of animals, but to other forms of
expression of logos such as, notably, writing. Whereas the "living voice"
accompanies thought like its shadow, writing enters the scene when this
vital link between sound and meaning has already been broken, when
meaning is already on the verge of effacement and of sliding into forgetful-
ness. In writing, logos no longer lives, it lives on in the shape of a
mnemonic trace, of a testament, of a funerary inscription, etc. Voice allows
a subject to say, and to hear and understand its own signifying intention in
an immediate way, whereas writing moves thought away from its author.
Ifwriting breaks definitely, therefore, with the thinking subject's presence
to itself, voice on the contrary accomplishes and celebrates the life of
reflexive consciousness . To hear oneself speak is to hear beat the pulse of
one's own thinking, and this is worth infinitely more than to touch or see
oneself. In touching and in seeing, the resistance and opacity of the body
still conceal the inner life ofthe subject, whereas speech is effaced in front
of what it makes intelligible . In "voice" the body of the expressive sign
becomes mind, and the mind grasps itself in a pure auto-affection. "Voice,"
which hears itself, is, therefore , the linguistic equivalent or rather the
foundation of reflexive consciousness. It is the sign as established through
the phenomenological reduction: pure phenomenon in which the transcen-
dental subject appears to itself and appears as constituting, that is, as giving
meaning, to the world. "Voice is the phenomenon" of transcendental
subjectivity.
When Derrida deconstructs the possibility of this voice as a phenomenon
of pure auto-affection, it is therefore also a certain notion of phenomenon
and consequently of phenomenology which is put into question. The idea
of a pure auto-affection which would be realized in voice presupposes that
the subject which hears its own voice grasps "in the same instant" the life
of its thought which is expressed in this voice. If however this present
"instant" is impure by being produced from the gap between the now and
the not-now, between the same and the other, then the purity of the auto-
affection by means ofvoice is equally compromised. The subject who hears
its own voice hears and understands itself, but it hears and understands
itself at least doubly, because the subject's live thought is already doubled
by its retentional echo which spreads itself and repeats itself indefinitely.
This retentional splitting in two cannot be pure because, for Derrida at
18 RUDOLF BERNET

least, all retention surpasses the limits of a simple presentation. This first
argument has value only so far as one is also ready to consider retention as
an indicative representation caught in the web of the empirical space of the
world.
A second form of impurity is added to voice from the fact that voice, in
order to be heard, that is, in order to be understood, is forced to adapt itself
to a linguistic code. By submitting itself to a transindividual code, voice
loses mastery of itself and recognizes itself only by means of a detour
through anonymity. Derrida established this point by appealing in
particular to the example of the personal pronoun "I" which a speaker uses
in order to refer himself. It is indeed not doubtful that even in the privi-
leged case of monologue, where the subject refers in this way to itself by
itself, the expression "I" introduces a separation within presence to itself.
The meaning of "I" within the act of enunciation, and of "I" within the
utterance, never coincide.
Finally, and this is the third argument of Derrida, a voice which would
remain purely expressive, and which would attempt in this way to remain
faithful to the idea of a pure auto-affection, would be a voice "which would
keep silent." A voice which hears and understands itself must make itself
intelligible in the world-even if it is believed that the voice makes itself
intelligible as "not being of this world. "
It is surely not accidental that a meditation on the pure auto-affection of
transcendental consciousness in the voice awakens associations of a theolo-
gical kind. But these associations should not make us believe that the voice
could effectively keep silent without the life of thought suffering thereby.
There is no pure auto-affection in voice, but neither is there an autos which
would precede an impure auto-affection. The transcendental subject needs
to represent itself in order to be, and the consciousness that it has of itself
can only come from a representation which separates it from itself and
which the subject lives through in the form of an alienating affection. If
Derrida is right in saying that this auto-affection is necessarily impure and
that the impure auto-affection is a necessity , this sounds the knell of many
accepted ideas. The first victim of such a conception, which makes con-
sciousness of itself dependent on the alterity and exteriority of the indica-
tive sign, is of course the idea of a purely expressive language. This implies
that there is neither immediate consciousness of itself which is fully
intuitive and purely internal, nor an unchanging presence of an ideal object
 DERRIDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 19

which would remain identically the same throughout its multiple repeti-
tions and representations.
If it is true that Speech and Phenomena is something other and much
more than a book on Husserl, this work can nevertheless fruitfully con-
tribute to a rethinking of what is fundamentally at stake in Husserlian
phenomenology. Among what is at stake one must mention in the first
place that which is rightly called "the system" or "the order" of presence.
This order is organized around the privileged phenomena of self-conscious-
ness and the iterablity of ideal objects. It is affirmed as order by
distinguishing itself-in the form of exclusion-from the empirical world.
Such a "metaphysics" has indeed left a deep impact, especially in Husserl's
first writings. Think only about the presentation of the phenomenological
reduction in Ideas which ends with the hypothesis of a "world annihila-
tion"! But it is also clear that the Husserlian analysis, for example of the
perception of a spatial object by a bodily subject, can be integrated only
with difficulty into such a system of pure presence. Even ifDerrida is right
to consider the opposition between "presentation" and "representation"
as the basis of every Husserlian analysis of intentionality and of constitu-
tion, his conclusions here seem too hasty. Not only are there "present-
ations" which are incapable of being assimilated into the system of the
metaphysics of presence, but Husserl also describes "representations," such
as imagination, which do not redouble or repeat any previous presentation.
And while it is no doubt true that the indicative representations which are
employed by ordinary language threaten the sovereignty of intentional
thought that would use only purely intuitive presentations, this does not
justify going as far as making the indicative sign the root of every form of
representation.
It can be said more generally that both the novelty and the weakness of
Derrida's reading of Husserl stem from the attention given to the phenome-
na of language. One can hardly claim that the ultimate meaning of the
phenomenological reduction is revealed already in the opposition between
expression and indication, but Derrida's interpretation has the great merit
of showing that the meaning of this reduction is inseparable from a certain
conception of language . The difficulty, for example, of establishing a
language which would be the proper idiom for transcendental phenomenol-
ogy is a symptom of the rootedness of this phenomenology in the empirical
world. The phenomenological reduction, therefore, does not deport trans-
20 RUDOLF BERNET

cendental consciousness to a separate world; the phenomenon is never a

pure voice, and the history of transcendental consciousness is written, as
Merleau-Ponty says, in the "prose ofthe world." One can wonder neverthe-
less if this exclusive centering of the whole interpretation on language is
not also the sign of a new "linguocentrism" to which Husserl had been
resolutely opposed. It is possible, but trivial, to say that the Husserlian
conception of the ideal language of logic is "logocentric;" it is difficult, on
the other hand, to say the same about his project of a "genealogy of logic,"
which gives particular attention to prepredicative experience. Moreover,
this experience is not limited just to pre logical phenomena like passive
synthesis, it inquires also into nonlogical phenomena such as the essential
facticity of the course of history, the ethical responsibility for the state of
the world, the project for a rational foundation of social institutions, and the
revelation of a God who is the guarantor of the theology of reason. Here is
a pretty long list of phenomena to which Husserl would not have heard the
insistent call ifhe had only listened to his own "voice"!
But it is true that Speech and Phenomena is more than a simple inter-
pretation of Husserl, and that this book can also be read as an "introduction
to the problem of the sign in the phenomenology of Derrida." The sign,
understood no longer as the supplement of an origin, but as an "originary
supplement," is the phenomenon which guides Derrida's pen far beyond his
first writings. "Writing" is the name of a new signification of a sign which
is "neither real nor ideal" and which no longer expresses any"transcenden-
tal signified." From that point on it becomes difficult to make an "essential
distinction" between literal and figurative meaning, and the "double ges-
ture" of the "deconstruction" of the "metaphoric" language of metaphysics
threatens to go on indefinitely. It is thus to infinity that this philosophy of
the originary representation is sent, a philosophy which follows the trace
of presence by wandering, as Husserl's text which Derrida quotes says,
"through the rooms and stopping before a painting by Teniers which
represents a picture gallery." Sent back into infinity from one representa-
tion to another, the subject is caught in the web of "fa differance" The
subject tests in this way its "finitude" and its "facticity." With its life con-
stantly confronting it with the death of presence, the subject "survives"
only by means of its fascinations, each one of which nevertheless shows the
subject's "lack of being." In order to apprehend the truth of its being, the
subject must put itself on stage and on this stage its voice signs at the same
 DERRIDA AND HIS MASTER'S VOICE 21

time its death sentence: like Poe's Mr. Valdemar quoted at the beginning
of Speech and Phenomena, he will say what he will already no longer know
how to hear and understand: "Yes;-no;-I have slept.-and
now-now-I am dead."

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

 CHAPTER TWO

IS DERRIDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING

RATIONALLY DEFENSIBLE?

DALLAS WILLARD

Certainly, there be that delight in giddiness;

and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affect-
ing Freewill in thinking as well as in acting.
And though the sects of philosophers of that
kind be gone, yet there remain certain dis-
coursing wits which are of the same veins,
though there be not so much blood in them as
was in those of the ancients.

(Of Truth, Francis Bacon).

Promise me that all you say is true. That's all

I ask of you.

(Phantom a/the Opera, a musical).

In this paper I shall inquire to what extent there may be good reasons for
holding (or rejecting) Derrida's view on the existence and nature of ideal
being or universals. That is, is his view true or is it false? And are there
considerations which can be stated in the form of propositions (indicative
sentences) that can be known to be true and that logically entail, or render
significantly probable, either the view of ideal being which Derrida
23
W. R. McKenna and J, C. Evans (eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 23-41.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers .
24 DALLAS WILLARD

maintains or its negation? What would be the results of an appraisal of

Derrida's position on this matter from the viewpoint of standard logic? I
share Newton Garver's ".. . worry . . . that Derrida may not have left
himself any ground on which to stand and may be enticing us along a path
to nowhere. . . ."1

I do not mean to suggest that this is the only interesting question which
might be raised about his views-on ideal being or on anything else. Con-
ceivably there could be some justification for asserting what he asserts on
various topics even ifhis assertions were not rationally defensible in terms
of standard logic. But it must be of some interest to him, as well as to
others, if we were to find that his views were not rationally defensible in
the sense explained. And I cannot help thinking that to establish the rational
indefensibility of his views on ideal being must have a significant effect on
whatever roles they might have in the arenas of philosophical discourse, of
life and of history.
I am aware that "standard logic" does not by any means coincide with
"rationality." Yet it seems to me that a position which fails at the level of
standard logic has significantly failed with regard to rationality, and that
whatever aspirations it may have to be rational would then face a very
heavy burden of proof. No position could be rational if, after careful
examination, it doesn't have a logical leg to stand on, and especially if it
turns out to be logically incoherent.

II

What, exactly, is Derrida's position on the existence and nature of ideal

beings or universals? I should at the outset express my opinion that he does
hold ideal beings or universals to exist and to have a specific nature, and
that his view is, with relatively minor deviations, the view which, in Speech
and Phenomena and elsewhere, he attributes to Edmund Husserl. Many of
his readers will disagree with me about this, and it may be possible later on

I In his "Preface" to the English edition of Jacques Derrida Speech and Phenomena,
translated by David B. Allison, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), xxviii .
Hereafter cited as "SP ."
 DERRlDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 25

to see why they would. But a person's views have to be determined by what
they say. Let us see what Derrida says.
To begin with, which are the ideal beings according to Derrida? He
would, I believe, accept the re-identifiable correspondents to grammatical
predicates and names as ideal beings. In terms of consciousness, any
ob-ject of consciousness, anything singled out as an identity for the flow
of consciousness, will be an ideal being, precisely because of its repeatabil-
ity in identity. The main element in " identity" for Derrida is identifiability,
not some non-epistemic element that constitutes identity regardless of
consciousness and language. (Similarly as Quine, in his slogan, "No entity
without identity," is really referring with "identity" to criteria of identifica-
tion, hence to re-identifiability, and not to some metaphysical "fact about"
entities in themselves-which may be why pronouns (quantifiers)
involving cross-references to the same object , and not nouns, bear
existential commitment for him.)
A consequence of this general description of ideal beings for Derrida is
that what are commonly regarded as individuals, as impredicable subjects
of predicates, tum out to be ideal beings. Indeed he embraces the view that
"The ideal object is the absolute model for any object whatever, for objects
in general."? This will not be surprising to anyone who has read her Bradley
or Quine well, and perceives the profound kinship in fundamental ontology
enjoyed by these three thinkers. However, in this paper we shall not pursue
issues concerning individuals and their ideality. Rather we shall deal with
those entities or objects classically understood to be universal, and with
their being and ideality.
Cases of ideal being in this narrower sense will surely include the ones
discussed in his first major publication, his lengthy "Introduction" to his
French translation of Husserl's L'origine de la geometrie. There are the
properties and relations dealt with in geometry, such as point, line , plane,
angle, side, opposite, adjacent, intersection, triangle, and so forth . His
discussions also suggest that numbers and their properties and relationships
fall among ideal beings. And there can be no doubt from his later writings
that non-mathematical properties and relations of all sorts , which can be

2 SP 99 and 1. Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans lated

by John P. Leavey, Jr., (Stony Brook, NY : Nicolas Hays, Ltd, 1978),66, hereafter cited as
"lOG."
26 DALLAS WILLARD

singled out and asserted as the same in differing contexts, all fall among
ideal beings in the narrower sense of universals . Properties such as red,
vanilla, difficult, oviparous, and so forth, all fall here, though they may
differ in characteristic ways among themselves as well as from mathemati-
cal properties.
A very special class among universal ideal beings, for Derrida, is
constituted by meanings, significations, or senses . At this point we need
not, as later, go into the question of how significations or senses are related
to universal ideal beings which are not significations: whether the
signification is or is not the same as the ideal being which it is "of,"
whether there are any ideal beings which aren't significations or senses, and
so forth. For now it suffices that both triangularity (as the property of a
certain figure or thing), and the sense, signification or concept of tri-
angularity (as a determination or component of a given act of speech or
consciousness), are ideal beings on Derrida's view .
With this indication of what ideal beings are in extension, let us now
tum to some of Derrida's essential characterizations of ideal beings, and
especially to his view of what it is for a being to be ideal.

1. Ideal objects do not exist in self-contained completeness in a topos

ouranios (OG 75, SP 6, WD 157-158).3

2. Ideal objects are "free," and therefore can be normative, with regard
to all "factual subjectivity." That is, the cessation of an individual act
cognizing them does not destroy them, for they can be cognized in
other, perhaps infinitely repeated, acts, which also can be criticized
in terms of how they cognize them and therefore must be developed
in terms of what those objects are (WD 158).

3. 1 and 2 imply that ideal objects derive from "a transcendental sub-
jectivity," that is, a mind-like producing and reproducing of ob-
jects/senses which is, however, not any particular mind, but
expresses itself through particular minds (WD 158, SP 82).

3 " WD" refers to J. Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, (Chicago :

University of Chicago Press, 1978).

 DERRlDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 27

4. It also follows that ideal objects are essentially and intrinsically

historical (WD 158, SP 85).

5. Ideal entities are essentially and only objects of consciousness. They

depend for their existence or being upon being cognized. "The
mathematical object is ideal ... is only what it appears to be ..
. is already reduced and its being is, from the outset, to be an
object for a pure consciousness" (OG 27) . "The sense of sense in
general is here determined as object: as something that is accessible
and available in general and first for a regard or gaze" (OG 64). "To
constitute an ideal object is to put it at the permanent disposition of
a pure gaze (OG 78). "Ideality ... does not exist in the world and
does not come from another world" (SP 6, 52).

6. The being of ideal entities (universal or particular) is presence: " ..

. the absolute proximity of self-identity, the being-in-front of the
object available for repetition, the maintenance of the temporal
present, whose ideal form is the self-presence oftranscendentalliJe,
whose ideal identity allows idealiter of infinite repetition" (SP 99; cf.
6). By contrast, differance is the mark of the non-ideal. Differance
does not exist (MF 21)4 and has no essence. Likewise for the trace (G
167, MP 25).5

7. The origin of an ideal object "will always be the possible repetition

of a productive act" (SP 6). The ideal object "depends entirely on the
possibility of acts of repetition. It is constituted by this possibility"
(SP 52).

8. Repeatability of the ideal is possible " . .. in the identity of its

presence because of the very fact that it does not exist, is not real or

4 "MP" refers to the English edition of 1. Derrida, Margins ofPhilosophy, translated by

Alan Bass , (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

5 " (J' refers to the English edition of1. Derrida, OfGrammatology, translated by Gayatri
C. Spivak, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976).
28 DALLAS WILLARD

is irreal-not in the sense of being a fiction, but in another sense, .

. . whose possibility will permit us to speak of nonreality and
essential necessity, the noema, the intelligible object, and in general
the non-worldly" (SP 6; cf 55 & 74-75).

9. Language is the medium in which transcendental subjectivity

produces objects, ideal objects, senses (SP 73-75 & 30). "Is it not
language itself that might seem to unify life and ideality" (SP 10).
Without language there would be no ideal beings.

10. Absolute objectivity, repeatability in its highest degree, is only

achieved in the written language and symbolisms of science (SP 30,
80).

III

To provide a contrast with the above, we consider Edmund Husserl's views

on being and ideal being. This is especially important in view of the fact
that many now regard the view of being and ideality expressed in the
previous paragraphs as Husserl's view. But for Husserl, to exist or have
being (which are one and the same thing) is simply to possess qualities or
relations. In the case of specific types of beings, certain qualitative
structures must come together in joint predication for beings ofthose types
to exist, or for things which exist to be things of those types. Such
qualitative structures are the essences of the relevant entities, and,
considered from the standpoint of how the entities are to be given if "they
themselves" are present, they determine the "Sinnsein," the sense of the
being, of those entities (Ideas I, subsection 142 [396]).6 But what it is for
them to be, the being of such beings, is the same in every case: a univocity
extending across all ontological chasms, including the real and ideal, the
reelle and the irreelle.

6 Page references to Ideas I are to the Boyce Gibson translation, (London : George Allen
& Urwin Ltd, 1931).
 DERRJDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 29

Special questions about being in Husserl have been raised by what he

says about the noema. The noema was introduced by Husserl to account for
those differences between acts of consciousness which fall in the dimen-
sion of appearance. Concretely considered, the noematic consists of certain
"nonindependent" particulars, the noematic "moments," which, "idealiter
gefasst," are universals (qualities, relations) that make up the qualitative
structures of, precisely, appearances. Thus, HusserI introduces the noematic
as a distinctive domain of entities on the basis of characters, qualities,
"predicates" which belong to "the object as such" and nothing else, by
means of which it uniquely is to be described (Ideas 1,258,260,283-284,
289) . He remarks: "These predicates [of "the object as such"] .. . are
evidently not given though such reflection [on our acts of consciousness].
We grasp what concerns the correlate [of the act] as such through the
glance being turned directly on the correlate itself. We grasp the negated,
the affirmed, the possible, the questionable, and so forth, as directly
qualifying the appearing object as such" (305). "These are characters which
we find as inseparable features ofthe perceived, fancied, remembered , etc.,
as such" (266). They can belong, as properties, neither to the real object nor
to the reelle act, and hence must be part of another domain , that of the
irreelle. Yet for the irreele, the noematic, as well as for all else that is, to
be is simply to be subject to, to actually have, relevant properties or
relations.
This view ofthe being of beings, ofthe univocity of being, is essentially
the same as that ofHermann Lotze, from whom Husserl most likely learned
it. 7 In the Twentieth Century essentially the same view has been held by
Bertrand Russell and C. J. Ducasse. It is the indispensable keystone to a
viable ontology, in my view. It correctly preserves the ancient dictum:
Diversum est esse et id quod est. That which exists is not identified with its
own being. But, on the other hand, the having of qualities remains
"something" in its own right, a characteristic type of relational structure.
Moreover, it can (indeed must!) be discussed in its own right-as the
"Being of beings" will in any case most certainly be, as is proven by who
better than Heidegger and Sartre and Derrida-without endless caveats,

7 See, for example, his Microcosmus, Part IX, chapter 1, subsection #3.
30 DALLAS WILLARD

through "X'd out" terms and otherwise, to the effect that one can't really do
what one is doing.
More importantly, the being of beings is regarded, on Husserl's view, as
logically independent of independence, as well as of "thinglikeness"
generally. That an entity is dependent or non-thinglike has no implication
for its being or not-being as such, or for the "degree" to which it is or is
not. This includes dependence upon consciousness. Whatever is dependent
on consciousness exists-though that does not settle any of the difficult
questions as to what does or does not depend on consciousness (or
language, if that is not the same thing)-and there is no reason in the nature
of being, as Husserl understands it, that requires all that exists to be known
or cognized or mentally intended . Objects of all kinds are, for him,
"relative" to knowledge or consciousness, in the sense that their essences
include how they are to be known, if they are known, whereas there is no
similar relativity of consciousness to the world or to realms of non-worldly
objectivities such as numbers. But, except for the obvious exceptions in the
cultural or "spiritual" realm, the world and other realms of which we are
conscious might well be, and be what we know them to be, if consciousness
were in fact totally eliminated from reality or being.
For our present discussion it is most important to say that being as
Husserl understands it has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
presence. Neither spatial, temporal nor intentional ("mental") presence is
required for being in general-though in the specific case of noematic
moments (not their qualities, however) Husserl does hold that to be is to be
perceived, which is yet not the same as saying that the being of the
noematic moment is identical with its being perceived. For Husserl,
something can be and yet be present in none ofthese senses. It may be that
all entities are present in some or several senses, but that will not follow
from what it is for them to be.
The famous Husserlian "Principle of all Principles" has to do with the
knowledge of being and beings, not with being; and the HeideggerlDerrida
interpretation of it as a principle of being merely reflects their own commit-
ments with regard to intentionality and being, and possibly their own
confusions. But it has nothing essentially to do with being as Husser!
himself understood it. (While the being of X is for Husserl [Ideas I,
subsections 142 & 144] equivalent with the possibility of evident judg-
ments about X, the possibility of evident judgments involves much more
 DERRJDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 31

and other than the being of X, which of course [partially] grounds that
possibility, but not conversely. The possibility of evident judgments does
not ground the being of the relevant objects.)
If "presence" means simply identity, then the discussion with regard to
Husserl becomes more difficult, but I suspect that Husserl's view of being
can accommodate what Derrida has to say on this point also. (See SP 99 on
the meanings of "presence.") I have not yet been able to work my way
through the issues on this point, and will not comment further.
The definitive passage on Husserl's view of being occurs in the lInd
"Logical Investigation," which, I must say, seems to be sedulously avoided
by the now triumphant historicist/nominalist interpretation of his views-to
which, no doubt, it is an acute embarrassment. In subsection 8 of that
Investigation he is contrasting ideal being with (both mental and ex-
tram ental) real being, for which "temporality is a sufficient mark" (351),
and with fictive being, which "does not exist at all" (352) .8 In contrast,
"Ideal Objects" exist genuinely. Evidently there is not merely a good sense
in speaking of such objects (e.g., of the number 2, the quality of redness,
ofthe principle of contradiction, etc.) and in conceiving them as sustaining
predicates: we also have insight into certain categorical truths that relate to
such ideal objects. If these truths hold, everything presupposed as an object
by their holding must have being. If I see the truth that 4 is an even
number, that the predicate of my assertion actually pertains to the ideal
object 4, then this object cannot be a mere fiction, a mere facon de parler,
a mere nothing in reality" (352-353).
In the immediately following paragraph Husser! allows

the possibility that the sense of this being, and the sense also of this
predication, does not coincide exactly with their sense in cases where a
real (reales) predicate, a property is asserted or denied of a real subject.
We do not deny, but in fact emphasize , that there is a fundamental
categorial split in our unified concept ion of being (or, what is the same,
in our conception of an object as such); we take account of this split when
we distinguish between ideal being and real being ; between being as
Species and being as what is individual. The conceptual unity of

8 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, two volumes, translated by J. N. Finlay , (New

York : Human ities Press, 1970). All page references are to this edition.
32 DALLAS WILLARD

predication likewise splits into two essentially different sub-species

according as we affirm or deny properties of individuals, or affmn or
deny general determ inations of Species. This difference does not,
however, do away with a supreme unity in the concept of an object, nor
with the correlated concept of a categorialpropositional unity. In either
case something (a predicate) pertains or does not pertain to an object (a
subject), and the sense of this most universal pertinence, together with the
laws governing it, also determines the most universal sense of being, or
of an object,as such; exactlyas the more specialsense of genericpredica-
tion, with its governing laws, determines (or presupposes) the sense of an
ideal object (353).

This point is carried over to Ideas I and elsewhere where object, in the
sense of an entity or being, is "defined as anything whatsoever, e.g., a
subject ofa true (categorical, affirmative) statement" (subsection 22), and
where the view that ideal, "non-temporal," beings such as the number 2 are
"mental constructs" is starkly branded as "an absurdity, an offence against
the perfectly clear meaning of arithmetical speech which can at any time
be perceived as valid and precedes all theories concerning it. If concepts
are mental constructs, then such things as pure numbers are no concepts.
But if they are concepts, then concepts are no mental constructs" (Ideas I,
90). There can be no doubt whatsoever that Husserl would still make this
claim if we were to replace "mental constructs" with "constructs of
transcendental historicity." The being of ideal, non-temporal, objects has
essentially nothing to do with being made or developed in time, but rather
is presupposed in all temporal making and development.
It was this view of ideal being as simply a subject of appropriate predi-
cates , also provided by Lotze, that opened the way to Husserl's resolution
of what I have elsewhere? called the "Paradox of Logical Psycholo-
gism"-the oddity that the laws of logic govern mental events in certain
respects, but are not justified by facts about mental events. This resolution
was achieved through the integration of the Bolzanian concepts and
propositions "an sich" into his own theory of logic. As he tells us in his

9 My "The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl's Way Out ," American Philosophi-

cal Quarterly , 9.1 (January 1972), 94-100 ; and my Logic and the Objectivity ofKnowl edge ,
(Athens, Ohio: Oh io University Press , 1984), 143-66.
 DERRlDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 33

1903 review of a book by Palagyi, "concepts and propositions merely have

the ideal being or validity of general objects .. ., not the real being of
things ... of temporal particulars.':" a point repeated in chapter II of Ideas
1.
This same point is strongly made in subsection 32 of the 1st "Logical
Investigation":

Meanings constitute, we may say further, a class of concepts in the sense

of "universal objects." They are not for that reason objects which, though
existing nowhere in the world, have being in a topos ouranios or in a
divine mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd. If
one has accustomed oneself to understand by "being" only real being, and
by "objects" only real objects, then talk of universal objects and of their
being may seem basically wrong; no offence will, however, be given to
one who has first used such talk merely to assert the validity of certain
judgments, such in fact as concern numbers, propositions, geometrical
forms, etc" and who now asks whether he is not evidently obliged, here
as elsewhere, to affix the label "genuinely existent object" to the correlate
of his judgment's validity, to what it judges about. In sober truth, the
seven regular solids are, logically speaking, seven objects precisely as the
seven sages are: the principle of the parallelogram of forces is as much a
single object as the city of Paris (330).

It must be emphasized that the view asserted here is no mere in rebus or

post rem doctrine of universals. To deny that universals exist in some place
apart from their instances-which would be to treat them as peculiar sorts
of individuals or realities, and thus to commit a "metaphysical hy-
postatization" (see above) or a "Platonic hypostatization" (Ideas I,
subsection 22 [88])-is not at all to hold that they exist only (or at all) in
their instances or in minds which have beheld their instances in the
appropriate fashion . Nor is it to say that they in any way depend , for their
being or being known, upon their instances-though that would be left
open as a possibility. It is simply to point out as irrelevant certain problems
about how universals relate to their instances or to knowledge thereof,

10 Edmund Husser), Aufsatze und Rezensionen (1890-1910), Husserliana XXII, (The

Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 156-57.
34 DALLAS WILLARD

problems based on "distance." To be, entities do not, in general, have to be

some where.
Accordingly, the inference repeatedly drawn by Derrida (OG 75 and
elsewhere) that, for Husserl, ideal objects must be created and developed
in history, since they do not "descend from heaven"(from atopos ouranios)
is just an astonishingfaux pas. Like certain other of his claims, e.g. that the
being of the ideal mathematical object is, "from the outset, to be an object
[entre-object] for a pure consciousness" (OG 27; cf. SP 53 & 76), or that
"The ideal is always thought by Husserl in the form of an Idea in the
Kantian sense (SP 100), it is simply never brought over against Husserl's
explicit arguments and denials (all ofthe lInd "Investigation," in the former
case, and subsection 32 of the 1st "investigation," in the latter). Perhaps
what operates here in order to, supposedly, make such a confrontation
unnecessary, is the image of Husserl the chameleon, whose last and
therefore (?) genuine position was that of a quasi-Hegelian historicist; or
perhaps it is the idea that any text can be "deconstructed" to make it say,
the exact opposite of what it explicitly says.
Concepts and propositions-and significations (which are but concepts
and propositions expressed in language)-are simply one sub-class of
universals. (1st "Logical Investigation," subsection 33) They are no more
created or developed by thought or language than are other universals. All
universals alike share the independence from time that marks ideal being,
as noted. There are many "meanings" (concepts, propositions) which never
find expression in consciousness or language.

We cannot therefore say that all ideal unities of this sort are expressed
meanings. Wherever a new concept is formed , we see how a meaning
becomes realized that was previously unrealized. As numbers-in the
ideal sense that arithmetic presupposes-neither spring forth nor vanish
with the act of enumeration, and as the endlessnumber seriesthus consists
in an objectivelyfixed set of generalobjects, sharply delimited by an ideal
law, which no one can either add to or take away from, so it is with the
ideal unities of pure logic: the concepts, propositions, truths, and hence
the "meanings," which make up its subject matter. They are an ideally
closed set of general objects, to which being thought or being expressed
are alike contingent. There are thereforecountlessmeaningswhich, in the
common,relational sense, are merely possible ones, since they are never
expressed, and since they can, owing to the limits of man's cognitive
 DERRJDA'8 VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 35

powers, never be expressed" (Ist "Logical Investigation," subsection 35,

333) .

But as concepts they really are, have being, and are "possible" only as
linguistic significations.
In reflecting upon the viability ofthe historicist/nominalist interpretation
of Husserl, we at least will have to acknowledge that he never explicitly
discusses to reject his own earlier realist version of ideal being or
universals (including significations) and the arguments and analyses upon
which he based it. We then have to ask ourselves : .lfHusserl forsook his
realism , how did he do it? Could he have overlooked this change? That
seems highly unlikely, since it would require him to be incredibly dense as
a philosopher. But if not, are we to believe him to be the sort of thinker
who could, in advancing his catastrophically modified theory, just ignore
the task ofrefuting the arguments, previously validated at such excruciating
lengths, which were earlier taken to refute, with such utter decisiveness, the
new view now, allegedly, adopted? Again, it seems highly unlikely. Or did
he just pass over the change in silence, hoping it wouldn't be noticed ,
perhaps? Preposterous idea! But then surely the burden of explaining how
Husserl underwent the transition from Realist to Nominalist, given the fact
that he nowhere explicitly works it through, would lead one to suspect that
it never occurred, as far as he was concerned-no matter what might be
done to "deconstruct" his texts. If the intentions of an author has no
authority over the meaning of a text, the deconstruction of a text has no
authority over the views of the author.
The ideality of cultural entities, as discussed in Formal and Transcen-
dental Logic and elsewhere, is not in the least inconsistent with what we
have just said, though they require a treatment in their own right. They
have a certain "ideality" in virtue of their repeatability as "the same," e.g.,
two performances ofthe same string quartet, two enunciations of the same
English sentence, but they indeed are "real," not ideal, in terms of their
temporal-and indeed historical--eharacter, in Husserl's sense of the real.
36 DALLAS WILLARD

IV

Having clarified Husser!'s views on ideal being, and contrasted them with
Derrida's, we now take up the question of whether or not Derrida's view of
ideal being is based on good reasons or is rational. We will especially focus
on his claim that ideal beings are "products" of historical acts and
processes.
First, we note that the reason given by him for saying that ideal objects
originate and develop in history through acts of consciousness does not
seem to imply this conclusion. That reason is that they do not exist
elsewhere-in a heavenly place or divine mind. Curiously, it is Derrida, not
Husserl who seems to think that what exists must have a "place" if it is to
exist. Perhaps because of his own emphasis on "presence." Not there, so
only here. That seems to be his inference. Presence (here or there) is not a
requirement for existence if Husserl is correct. He clearly saw that
existence does not require a repository, a place for that which ex-
ists-unless, of course, the existent in question--e.g., a horse-is of a
specific sort that does so. This is one of his most basic insights. Arriving
at it, in his early study of Lotze, was an epoch-making event in his mental
history, We have commented on this above and elsewhere.
Further, although I cannot find any explicitly stated argument, as we
have in the case just cited, I am sure that Derrida considers his view of
ideal objects as necessary in order to account for the historical development
of scientific theories and techniques, as well as of other cultural/spiritual
objects . He assumes "the philosophical nonsense of a purely empirical
history and the impotence of an ahistorical rationalism" (OG 51). The latter
is a term for the realist theory of ideal objects and concepts which, I
maintain , Husser! held to the end. Derrida's view seems to be that ifideal
objects do not originate in and are not transformed in "history" in his
special non-fact sense, they cannot be active agents in history, and we are
left only with logical deduction or empirical causality to account for or
illuminate historical-therefore human-process and reality. Such alone
cannot illuminate history--especially as sense history. Therefore ideal
objects must originate in history and be transformed through, history-a
line of thought that we certainly find in earlier thinkers such as Mer-
leau-Ponty.
 DERRJDA'S VIEW OF IDEAL BEING 37

But this line of thought seems to depend upon the same type of assump-
tion as the previous one. Namely, that the "effects" or powers of ideal
objects on historical processes, including the conscious ones, depend upon
those objects not existing "apart" from the processes , meaning indepen-
dently of the processes. As indicated above, however, location is irrelevant
to ideal objects or universals on the Husserlian (and I think correct)
alternative, both as to their effects and their existence. Proximity is relevant
only to the efficaciousness of particulars; and to transfer such a condition
to ideal objects is what HusserI marks as a "metaphysical" or as a "perverse
'Platonic hypostatization'," without in any sense surrendering his realism.
On HusserI's view, the terms and subjects of logical relations and
predicates--concepts and propositions-are dynamic when instanced in
conscious or linguistic acts (and hence in history) , under the form of
motivation, which he described as "fundamental law-form in the mental
life" (Ideen II, subsection 56). Of course motivation reaches far beyond
logical relations, on the one hand, and beyond causation on the other. It is
in terms of motivation that these and other ideal objects and components
of consciousness actualize a coherent and developmental "sense history"
such as we see discussed in HusserI's Origin of Geometry and Crisis.
Motivation, in its manifold specific manifestations in consciousness and in
history, provides the "third way" rightly insisted upon by MerIeau-Ponty,
Derrida and others, without in the least supporting the nominalist/historicist
interpretation of ideal objects which Derrida maintains.
Perhaps there are other reasons which Derrida gives for his view of ideal
objects, but I have been unable to find them . His mode of exposition does
not make it easy to identify arguments he may be giving for his views.

v
On the other hand I think there are some substantial reasons for thinking
that his view of ideal beings is false. One must mention, in the first place,
those arguments stated and explained to exasperating lengths in HusserI's
second "Logical Investigation," especially in Chapter One. Here we shall
be able only to mention them, not examine them in detail, as I have done
38 DALLAS WILLARD

elsewhere." There is an argument from predication, one from similarity,

one from the character of mental acts, and one from the unity of classes or
extentions of concepts. Only the one from mental acts is peculiar to
Husserl, so far as I know. The others have been advanced and criticized by
many people throughout the history of philosophy. Husserl was convinced
that any ofthe four was sufficient to establish his "realistic" view of ideal
beings.
Now these arguments must all be wrong if Derrida's view of ideal being
or universals is to be right. Yet he does not even attempt to criticize them.
This is perhaps due to his assuming that Husserl himself"later" saw them
to be wrong and deserted realism. Or possibly he assumes that all such
arguments are unsound or somehow useless because based on logocentric
presuppositions, which are false, about the nature of being itself. There is
no doubt that Derrida profoundly disagrees with Husserl (and all 10-
gocentricist) about the nature of being itself, what it is to be; and this
disagreement well may be one so fundamental that they could never meet
on the field of argument to settle questions of existence or of its indepen-
dence or dependence upon consciousness and history, transcendental or
otherwise. Reasoning for and against Derrida's view of ideal being would
then seem to be irrelevant, and so might all evaluations in terms of
rationality.
Still , I think that this is not the end of the question as to the rationality
of Derrida's view of ideal objects. He does make statements about them, in
large quantities. And in those statements there are certain claims made
which, I suspect, are inherently incoherent ifnot incompatible. If that is so,
then there remains an importance sense in which his view cannot be
regarded as rational. Mystical , perhaps, but not rational.
Derrida's central claim, with regard to ideal objects, is that they are
made, or brought about. Moreover, that they are brought about by concrete
acts of consciousness, though, to be sure, acts which presuppose activity on
the part of transcendental historical subjectivity-whatever that really
amounts to in the details. For every ideal object, there is a point in cosmic
time when it does not exist, and then at some later point it does exist. It
comes to exist as a result of specific acts of specific persons, both acts and

II See my Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge , 186-193.

 DERRIDA'S VIE W OF IDEAL BEING 39

persons formed somehow by transcendental subjectivity-which, I gather,

itself has not always existed. (Or has it?) It also seems, that, on Derrida's
view, some ideal objects (perhaps all will) come to a point where they
cease to exist, even if they do not cease at a point. Perhaps even by now
many ideal objects have gone out of existence, but I am unable to
determine under what precise conditions, according to him, they do so.
Perhaps it is only a matter of a certain segment of language disappearing;
and this, we know, certainly does happen.
(He holds that the phenomenological and eidetic reductions are impos-
sible because essences-including those of mental acts, of course-have
inherent in them the worldly reality of language." It would seem that a
universe with no languages would be a universe with no ideal beings, and
hence with no objects. According to the familiar scientific story, then, the
universe for most of its "history" (but we can't say that) was one with no
kinds of things in it. How there could be now a scientific theory of such a
world, or what it would mean for anything to happen in it, is surely very
puzzling .)
But whatever we are to make of such things, I think it is entirely
accurate and fair to say that Derrida gives us no information at all on
exactly what goes on in the " interchange" between transcendental
subjectivity, the prior state of affairs , the individual person, that person's
act, and the ideal object (to be refined in its ideality through the progression
toward the written language of science) produced or "made" as it emerges
into history.
Are we to think ofthe object-say triangularity or vanilla or the proposi-
tion that 4 is an even number-as being produced ex nihilo by the act or
historical sequence of acts? Exactly how, then, could an act of conscious-
ness , being what it is, possibly produce ex nihilo vanilla or triangularity,
being what they are. And not only so, but how could it produce the entire
range, infinite no doubt, of ideal objects, while yet remaining the specific
sort of thing it is as an act of consciousness or sequence of such acts? The
supposition that it could do this is surely very close to rationally incoher-
ent, especially when one realizes that the act of consciousness itself, as well

12 OG 66fT.
40 DALLAS WILLARD

as the individual subject, bears the essential marks of presence and

therefore ideality?
I believe that the difficulty is partly hid by Derrida's failure or unwilling-
ness to provide any detailed account of the contents and structures of the
individual act of consciousness. It is at this point that his work most
radically departs from phenomenology as Husserl so carefully developed
it. A few things like signifier and signified, voice, differance and presence
do not an analysis of the act of consciousness or language make. Rather,
when that alone is offered, we should suspect that, instead of description
of how things are, we are receiving von oben the results of an a priori
ontological framework. This is rendered no less unhelpful, to me, if! am
told that "the living presence" and its "movement" cannot be analyzed in
terms of attributes. We are still left with the fact that Derrida provides no
analysis or account of the act of consciousness, and hence not of how it
could produce ex nihilo-even with the help oftranscendental subjectivity,
in the absence of details a mere deus ex machina-the ideal objects which
there have been, are and will be.
The difficulties are hardly less severe if we take the act of consciousness
(with transcendental historical aid) to make ideal objects from what already
exists. Some of Derrida's language suggests that this is the way it happens.
(See point #9 above.)
If the process of "production" is interpreted merely as one of disregard-
ing associated objects or entities, then the point of making, or bringing into
existence, is lost. But if the process really is one of "carving out" or
extracting or "leaving out" (as suggested by the passage under #9), then
that also suggests that the object pre-exists the "carving" action, while it
simultaneously raises the question of how the act of consciousness or
language, being what it is, could do that. What would "carving" mean?
How could the act (or history) produce vanilla or triangularity, being what
they are, from preconceptualized being?-the same question as emerged
above.
Now it seems to me that Derrida's response to all of this really comes
down to saying that what goes on between language, the subject, her
conscious acts and ideal objects is ineffable; ineffable because the living
present can't be presented in concepts and propositions, names and
predications. But it is rationally incoherent to insist, as he surely does, that
the living present is of such a nature that it, and its manifestations in
 DERRIDA'S VIE W OF IDEAL BEING 41

history and consciousness (through differance and trace) are ineffable .

Natures surely are not ineffable.
Derrida's fundamental ontology is heir to the problems of Bergson's
fundamental ontology, which it so largely replicates. Bergson wanted to
treat concepts (understood as indistinguishable from qualities and relations)
as derivative from the movement of the elan vital. But "movement,"
whether of that elan or of Derrida's differance, is always in a specific
"direction." Its direction can only be understood in terms ofthe qualities
and relations embedded in it, relating before to after. This shows, I believe,
the fundamental incoherence of any effort to locate "force" prior to
signification (to meaning or to ideal objects in general).
So I, tentatively, conclude that Derrida's view of ideal objects is not
rationally defensible, and this in the three-fold sense that it is unsupported
by true premisses, that the arguments against it (Husserl's) are conclusive,
and that its main thesis ("production" of ideal beings by conscious acts or
"history") is logically incoherent. Whether it has some importance other
than as a rational position, I do not contest.

University of Southern California

 CHAPTER THREE

INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL

EXPRESSIONS

J. CLAUDE EVANS

In the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl argues that a proper under-

standing of logic requires that one distinguish between the indicative
function which signs, including linguistic signs, can have from the
expressive function which only linguistic signs can have. This is important
for a proper understanding of logic, since that discipline is concerned only
with the meanings expressed by linguistic signs. While linguistic signs can
exercise both functions, and indeed in communication they exercise both
functions simultaneously, Husserl argues that even when both are present,
the two functions can be distinguished from one another, and he thinks that
in soliloquy we find the expressive function unaccompanied by the
indicative function.
In Speech and Phenomena, Jacques Derrida argues that Husserl's
attempt to separate the expressive from the indicative function necessarily
fails. Derrida has a number of strategies which he employs to make this
argument and in this essay I shall examine two of them. 1) Derrida argues
that , against Husserl's explicit intentions, his actual arguments show that
expression is a species of the genus "indication." 2) This conclusion is
confirmed when one sees that in Husserl's analysis of what he calls
"essentially occasional expressions," indication turns out to play an
essential role in the expressive function itself. On Derrida's reading,
Husserl is committed to conflicting positions, and this leads Husserl to

43
W. R. McKenna andJ. C. Evans (eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 43-60.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
44 CLAUDE EVANS

draw conclusions which accord with his explicit program, although

"Husserl's premises should sanction our saying exactly the contrary."!

I. Derrida and the Rhetoric of Threat

In the First Investigation Husserl is clear as to the necessity of distinguish-

ing between the indicative and the expressive functions of linguistic signs.
But he also clearly realizes that "to mean [bedeuten]-in communicative
speech-is always interwoven [allzeit . . . verflochten ist] with such an
indicative function.'? In his discussion of this passage, Derrida takes great
pains to dramatize this situation. He first writes that the "two functions may
be interwoven or entangled [s'intrelacer, s'enchevetrer]" and speaks of "an
intimate involvement, an entanglement (Verflechtung) [d'intrication intime,
d'enchevetrement]" (SP, 20/20). Husserl's words "verflochten" and "Ver-
flechtung" are derived from the verb ''flechten,'' meaning "to braid, plait or
weave." "Verflechtung" can have the figurative meaning of "entangle-
ment," but its more literal meaning is "interlacing," and "verflochten"
would carry the more literal meaning of "interlaced" or "interwoven," and
it is clear from the context that this is the appropriate meaning.
Now to say, as Husserl does, that the two functions are "interwoven"
does indeed, as Derrida points out, go far beyond saying that a sign can
have a signitive function in addition to its indicative function . But to read
"Verflechtung" as signifying "entanglement" rather than "interlacing" or
"interweaving" is to import, under the guise of translation, the suggestion
that it may be impossible to untangle the two functions. This will indeed be
Derrida's thesis, but here it is being surreptitiously introduced as if it were
lurking in Husserl's text itself as a sort of fifth column . And Derrida is

I Derrida, Jacques. La Voix et Ie Phenomene (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,

1967), 107. Speech and Phenomena, translated by David Allison, (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973), 96. Further references to this text will be abbreviated as "SP"
folIowed by the French/English pagination .

2 Husserl, Edmund . Logische Untersuchungen (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,

1968),11.1,24/1. Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay (London : Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1970), 269, trans. altered). Further references to this text will be abbreviated
as "Ll" folIowed by the GermanlEnglish pagination.
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 45

quick to press the advantage which this translation gives him : "We know
already that infact the discursive sign, and consequently the wanting-to-say
[Ievouloir-dire'i, is always entangled [toujours enchevetre], always caught
up [pris] in an indicative system. Caught up is the same as contaminated
[Pris, c'est-a-dire contamine] " (SP, 21/20). In the course of only a few
sentences, Derrida has moved from Husserl's claim that the two functions
are "interwoven" in communicative discourse, through the insinuation that
such interweaving is entanglement, to the conclusion that meaning is
always contaminated by indication.
This conclusion is doubly misleading. In the first place, the word
"verflochten" does not have the connotation of contamination. In addition,
even if we stay with the relevant sense of "interwoven," Husserl does not
claim that the expressive sign is always interwoven with indication. It is
only in communication that this is the case. This insinuation of a rhetoric
of threat into Husserl's text, without argument and under the guise of
straightforward translation, sets up any reader who fails to notice what has
happened for the arguments to come . We can tum now to taking a closer
look at two of those arguments.

n. Indication and Expression

In §2 of the First Investigation, Husserl gives a succinct statement of his
analysis of indication.

A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to

indicate something to some thinking being. If we wish to seize the
pervasively common element here present we must refer back to such
cases of "live" functioning. In these we discover as a common cir-
cumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose
obtaining [Bestand] someone has current knowledge indicate to him the

3 Derrida translates Husserl's "bedeuten" with the French phrase "voulo tr-dire," which
does indeed mean "to mean," but more literally means "to want to say," and Derrida
deliberately appeals to this latter meaning (cf. SP, 17-18/17-18 and 35-36/33 ; also see J.
Claude Evans, Strategies ofDeconstruction: Derrida and the Myth ofthe Voice [Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991] Chapters 2 and 4).
46 CLAUDEEVANS

obtaining ofcertain other objects or states ofaffairs, in the sense that this
belief in the being [Sein] of the one is experienced as a motive (more
preciselyas a non-insightful motive)for the beliefor surmise in the being
ofthe other. This motivation brings about a descriptive unity among our
acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated states of affairs
become constituted for the thinker.... More lucidly put: the motivational
unity of our acts ofjudgment has itselfthe character of a unity of judging
and thus as a whole it has an appearing objectivecorrelate, a unitary state
of affairs which is meant in such a judgment, which appears as existing
in thatjudgement.Plainly such a state of affairs amounts to just this: that
certain things may or must obtain, since other things have been given.
This "because," taken as the expression of an objective connection [Zu-
sammenhang], is the objective correlate of the motivation taken as a
descriptively peculiarway of weavingacts of judgement into a single act
ofjudgment (LI ILl, 25/1, 270-271, translation modified).

Thus, Husserl defines indication in terms of the circumstance that

cognizance of the being or obtaining of one thing provides "a noninsightful
motive [ein nichteinsichtiges Motiv]" for the belief in or presumption of the
being or obtaining of something else. He then discusses cognitive
motivation in general terms, determining the objective correlate of
motivation as a connection between two things or states of affairs. This
connection may be taken as obtaining as a matter of contingent fact or it
may be taken as obtaining necessarily. This is a general account of
cognitive motivation and covers much more than the motivation which
functions in indication, since the account of indication contains a careful
qualification: the motive at work in indication is not based on insight (e.g. ,
into logical relations), so the objective correlate of the experience of
indication can never be the fact that something must be the case in any
strict sense, though indication can produce the (perhaps quite justified)
conviction that something does exist or is the case. Husserl notes this
generality in the first sentences of §3: "We have sketched the phe-
nomenological situation so generally that along with the pointing [or
indicative allusion: Hinweisent' of indication it includes the demonstration

4 Findlay translates both Beweisen and Hinweisen as "demonstration." I have followed

Dorion Cairns' suggestion of "pointing," though Derrida's suggestion of "allusion
indicative" or "indicative allusion" is elegant.
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 47

[Beweisen] of genuine inference and proof' (LI II.l , 25/1, 271, translation
altered). Coming as it does right after the sentences discussing motivation
and its objective correlate, it is clear that the sketch of "the phe-
nomenological situation" Husserl is referring to here is the discussion of
motivation and not the immediately preceding discussion of indication.
In his discussion of this passage Derrida does not follow the order of
Husserl text, preferring to begin his discussion not with the definition of
indication, but with the treatment of motivation. He rightly points out that
Husserl's account of motivation is very general, that the objects and states
of affairs in question must be understood in the broadest possible sense and
are not restricted to real things. While in his initial examples of indication
Husserl speaks of "existence [Existenz]"--eanals on Mars indicate the
existence of intelligent life, bones indicate the existence of prediluvian
animals(LIII.1, 24/1, 270)-in his general determination of motivation and
in his definition of indication he speaks ofSein and Bestand (Derrida writes
"l 'etre ou la consistance," which Allison translates as "being or subsis-
tence"), which cover both real and ideal objects, the existence of things and
the obtaining of states of affairs.' Derrida promises that the difference
between Sein and Bestand on the one hand, and Dasein, existieren and
Realitat (factual existence, existence and reality) on the other, will tum out
to be of great importance.
The German word Bestand can have several meanings. The only
suggestion made by Dorion Cairns in his Guide to Translating Husserl

S In order to make this clear, Derrida offers his own translation of Husserl's defin ition of
the indicative sign, since the French translation of the Investigations translates Bestand as
"realite" and this has led to some rather confusing moments in translations of La Voix et
Ie Phenomene. Allison's English translation quite properly has Derrida writing that "Husserl
intentionalIy uses very general concepts (Sein, Bestand), which may cover being or
subsistence .. ." (SP, English translation 28). "Subsistence" in this passage translates
Derrida's "consistance, which is Derrida's translation of Bestand. But when, just a few lines
later, Derrida offers his own French translation of Husserl's definition, using "consistance"
to translate "Bestand" Allison uses Findlay's translation, which has "reality" for "Bestand"
although Derrida has just pointed out (in an implicit criticism of the French translation
which would hit Findlay's translation equally) that in Husserl's text Bestand is to be carefully
distinguished from Realitat. The German translation of Derrida's text produces similar
confusion, translating Derrida's own phrase as "das Sein oder die Konsistenz;" and then
folIowing that with Husserl's original text, which has "Bestand"
48 CLAUDE EVANS

which is relevant in this context is "existence;" For the verb bestehen he

suggests "to exist, to be, to obtain," noting that "subsister" was used by
Suzanne Bachelard in her French translation of Formal and Transcendental
Logic (Ibid., 21). "Bestehen aus" means "to consist of, to be composed of,"
with "Bestand taking on related meanings. "To subsist" has been a
wide-spread translation of "bestehen," especially in discussions of the
Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong. In his use of the word "con-
sistance," Derrida clearly does not mean logical consistency. He is rather
working from "consister," "to consist, to be made of." Thus, consistance
would be the make-up or obtaining of a thing or fact.
Up to this point Derrida's discussion presents few real problems, but
now things take a curious tum. As we have seen, he begins not with the
definition of indication, but with what he calls the "definition" of motiva-
tion, noting, as does Husserl, its very general character. But when he then
moves on to Husserl's definition of indication, which in Husserl's text
preceded the account of motivation, he reads the definition of indication in
terms ofthe account ofmotivation and therefore assumes that the definition
of indication contains the same generality as the account ofmotivation. The
move is quite explicit. Immediately following his discussion of motivation
Derrida writes:

Husserl thus defines the essential character which most generally incor-
porates all of the indicative functions [my emphasis]:
In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain
objects or states of affairs ofwhose obtaining [consistance] (Bestand)
someone has actual knowledge indicate (anzeigen) to him the reality
ofcertain other objects or states ofaffairs, in the sense that his belief
in the being Sein) ofthe one is experienced as a motive (though as a
noninsightful motive)for the conviction or presumption ofthe being of
the other.
But this essential character is still so general that it covers the whole field
of indication and even more . Or rather, since it is certainly an Anzeigen
that is described here, let us say that this common character goes beyond
indication in the strict sens . . . . Thus we see why it was so important to
distinguish between Sein and Bestand, on the one hand, and Existenz,

6 Cairns, Dorion, Guideto Translating Husser! (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973),20.
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 49

Dasein, or Realitat, on the other. General motivation thus defmed is a

simple "because" which may just as well have the sense of indicative
allusion (Hinweis) as thatof deductive, evident, and apodictic demonstra-
tion (Beweis) (SP, 29-30/28-29, quoting LI 11.1, 25/1, 270; the translation
of Husser! has been modified).

Reading the generality of the account of motivation into the definition

of indication, which is facilitated by Derrida's silently reading them in
reverse order, distorts HusserI's text, since the definition of indication
refers not to motivation in general, but to noninsightful motivation, and the
insight in question is clearly insight into logical connections. Derrida's final
sentence in this passage is quite accurate, but the generality of the account
of motivation is not found in the definition of indication, which does not go
beyond "indication in the strict sense." Rather than relating HusserI's
reference (in the first sentence of §3) to the "generality" of his sketch ofthe
phenomenological situation to the immediately preceding sentences (at the
end of §2) on the "because" of motivation, which did indeed cover more
than indication, Derrida relates it to the definition of indication itself.
If one is taken in by Derrida's "reading," it will indeed seem that we now
have a definition of a genus, of what we might call indication in general,
but at a level of generality that would cover as its species indication in the
strict sense (i.e., what HusserI officially wants to call indication) along with
something else. Whatever this something else might be, on this reading it
will be a form of indication. And it is immediately clear what this
something else is: it is the demonstration [Beweis] oflogical proof, which
HusserI distinguishes from the pointing or indicative allusion [Hinweis] of
indication. Both function by means of a "because" of motivation, but only
demonstration involves insight into the necessity of the connection. On
Derrida's reading, such demonstration would be a species of indication in
general. Husserl, of course, would recognize what Derrida calls "general
motivation," but not the indication in general which would be the genus of
indication in the strict sense.
On Derrida's reading, it is this distinction between indication in general
and indication in the strict sense which is to explain the importance of
distinguishing between Sein and Bestand on the one hand, and Existenz,
Dasein and Realitdt on the other. The suggestion seems to be that
indication in general or "general motivation" concerns the broad range
50 CLAUDEEVANS

covered by Sein and Bestand, whereas indication in the strict sense

concerns Existenz, Dasein, and Realitat, which is to say, real as opposed to
ideal objects. We would thus have:

General motivation
(indication in general)
Sein, Bestand

1.
insightful motivation
demonstration [Beweis]
ideal necessities
ideal objects

2.
non insightful motivation
indication in the strict sense,
indicative allusion [Hinweis]
empirical and contingent relations
empirical existents, individuals
Existenz, Dasein, Realitdt

This set of classifications is immediately put to work in the following

paragraph. Alan White has pointed out a curious error in this paragraph":
Whereas for Husserl, in logical proof it is the ideal contents, the proposi-
tions, which are linked by logical relations, by ideal necessities, Derrida
attributes to Husserl the claim that in a proof, "the 'because' links together
the evident and ideal necessities which are permanent and which persist
beyond every empirical hie et nunc" (Sl", 20/29). In other words, according
to Derrida it is the propositions linked in a proof, the premises themselves,
which are ideal necessities, not the links between the propositions or the
syllogism as a whole. It remains to be seen whether this is a momentary
carelessness or points to a systematic misreading.

7 White, Alan. "Reconstructing Husserl : A Critical Response to Derrida's Speech and

Phenomena" Husserl Studies 4 (1987), 56-57. In his discussion White chooses to follow
Findlay in translating "Hinweis" as "demonstration."
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 51

This misreading is followed by a second. After quoting Husserl's

description of the ideal rule which governs logical proof, Derrida writes,

Motivations linking together lived experiences, as well as acts which

grasp necessary and evident idealities, ideal objectivities, may belong to
the contingent and empirical order of "nonevident" indication; but the
relations which unite the contents of ideal objects in evident demonstra-
tion are not cases of indication (Sl' , 30/29, translation modified).

This sentence is quite curious. What is linked by the "because" which is the
objective correlate of cognitive motivation is never the act, but either
something functioning as an indication and what it indicates, or something
functioning as premises and what they imply. In neither case is it the acts
involved. There is, as Husser! notes, a motivational relation between the
acts, but this does not mean that one act indicates or implies the other. The
distinction between the real and the ideal, or between the act and its
content, is not parallel to the distinction between indicative allusion and
proof. The lived experiences are properly described as being insightful or
noninsightful, and it makes no sense to say that the act of insightful, i.e.,
logically evidential thinking should "belong to the contingent and empirical
order of ' nonevident' indication."
It begins to appear that these are not isolated careless errors. Derrida's
interpretation of both the tradition of metaphysics in general and of
phenomenology in particular is dominated by a series of distinctions or
separations, the entire series being dominated by a basic distinction
between presence and absence. In approaching phenomenology Derrida
sees its entire framework as being governed and made possible by the
separation between expression and indication. In the passage we are
dealing with at the moment, he takes the distinction between proof and
indicative allusion to be the key to a series of other distinctions, in
particular to those between necessary/contingent and ideal/real. Thus,
wherever ideality is in question, we should find necessity and proof, not
contingency and indication. This set of dichotomies dominates this
paragraph (SP 30-31/29), and to it Derrida adds another: the distinction
between the ideal content of an act and the act of cognition itself. The
"because" of proof links together idealities; the rule governing this link
exhibits a "supraempirical generality" of proof (LI II.1, 26/1, 271) as
52 CLAUDE EVANS

opposed to indication. Therefore, if we follow out the logic of this system

of distinctions , it would have to be the case that the "because" of indication
links together realities, and the rule governing the link would have to be
contingent and empirical. But the acts which grasp ideal necessities are
real , not ideal, and thus "belong to the contingent and empirical order of
'nonevident' indication" (SP 30/29). This sets up a simple argument: Proof
concerns ideal contents and necessities. Proving is a matter of acts of
thought which are real, not ideal, and which thus belong to the order of
nonevident indication. Therefore, proof always involves indication.
If we are careless enough to accept this (mis)reading, it will indeed be
the case that indication might "seem to intervene in a demonstration ... on
the side of psychic motivations, acts, beliefs, etc" (SP, 31/29).

Indeed, we know now that for the order of signification in general, the
whole of psychic experience, with regard to its acts, even when they
intend idealities and objective necessities, contains only indicative
concatenations. The indicative sign falls outside the content of absolutely
ideal objectivity, that is, outside truth (SP, 31/29-30, translation modi-
fied).

We can now begin to see the broader contours of Derrida's strategy: if the
acts involved in signification in general contain only indicative concatena-
tions, then logical proof would be "contaminated" by indication. And
indication, whose function is not a matter of insight, falls outside the truth .
This would be a dramatic result, one worthy of the goals of deconstruction.
But it is completely dependent on the series of misreadings we have noted .
Nothing that Derrida writes indicates, much less proves, that this result can
be derived from a serious reading of Husserl's text.

llI. Essentially Occasional Expressions

Husserl defines "essentially occasional expression" as expressions whose

concrete meaning is a function of the occasion of their use, in contrast to
objective expressions, for which the circumstances of their utterance do not
determine the meaning expressed (cf. LI, First Investigation, §26). Derrida
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 53

defines objective expressions as "absolutely pure expressions, free from all

indicative contamination" (SP, 105/94). This is a clear indication of what
is at stake here. Husserl distinguishes expression from indication in the first
paragraphs ofthe First Investigation, and the appeal to soliloquy is to show
that expressions can function even when they exercise no indicative
function (cf. LIII.I, 24/1, 269). Yet Husserl apparently finds himse1fforced
to speak of indication in analyzing occasional expressions (which can
appear in soliloquy): he speaks of an "indicating function" and of
"indicating and indicated meaning" (LI 11.1, 83/1, 316). And when he later
admits that we are "infinitely removed" from the ideal that objective truths
in themselves should be expressed by means of objective meanings, this
seems to confirm Derrida's earlier promise that "indicative adherences,
sometimes of another kind, continually reappear further on, and getting rid
ofthem will be an infinite task" (SP, 28/27). Here Derrida finds a "massive
return of indication into expression" (SP, 105/94), and the scope which
Husserl himself measures for this return-expressions concerning oneself,
perceptions, beliefs, doubts, wishes, fears, commands-shows just how
important this is." Wherever we find expressions such as I, here, and now,
"the meaning (Bedeutung) ofthese expressions is carried off into indication
whenever it animates real intended speech for someone else" (SP, 105/94).
Given Derrida's emphasis on the rhetoric of threat, it is clear that he
assumes that such a result would have to be most unwelcome for Husserl.
Derrida chooses the essentially occasional expression "I" for closer
attention. There are two issues here. 1) As an expression, "I" should
express an ideal meaning which is independent of all "realized" (cf. LI
11.1,37-38/1,280-282) relation to an object. 2) The expressive function of
"I" should not essentially involve indication. Husserl is committed to these
principles, but Derrida finds that his concrete analysis of "I" contradicts
both ofthem. In the first place, Husserl states that in solitary speech (where
we were to find expressions freed from being interwoven with the
indicative function of intimating or manifesting the intentional life of the
speaker), "the meaning of 'I' is essentially realized [vol/zieht sich ... we-

8 The passage which Derrida quotes from 26 of the First Investigation begins "An
essentially indicating character ..." in the Findlay translation, which Allison takes over (LI
II.1, 85/1, 318, quoted at SP, 105/94). It should read, "The essentially occasional character
"
54 CLAUDE EVANS

sentlich; Fr. se realise essentiellement] in the immediate idea [unmittelbare

Vorstellung] of one's own personality... " (LIIl.l, 82/1,316, quoted at SP,
94nl1 06n). In the second place, the word "I" "has the character of a
universally operative indication" of the fact that "each speaker has his own
I-presentation [Ichvorstellung] and thus his own individual concept of I"
(Ibid., trans. altered, my emphasis). Fulfillment seems essential to the
speaker's meaningful use of "I," and the word seems to function indica-
tively.
Husserl thus seems to be caught between conflicting demands which he
places on his own account. When he takes account of the role of occasional
expressions, Husserl must write:

Whatits meaning [Bedeutung-that of the word"I"] is at the moment can

be gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive cir-
cumstances which surround it. Ifwe readthis word withoutknowing who
wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless (bedeutungs/os) but is at least
estranged from its normal meaning (Bedeutung) (LI IU, 82/1, 315, as
quoted at SP 107/96).

But if one recalls Husserl's insistence on distinguishing between the mere

meaning-intention and the realized relation to an object in §9 of the First
Investigation, it would seem that Husserl's position should be just the
opposite. The word I is ideal, the same over a multiplicity of contexts and
even in my own absence or even death. And the ideality of meaning is
never dependent on the givenness of the object referred to: under-
standing-even in the case of our own utterance-s-cannot require that we
know who is speaking. Husserl's account of meaning was built on the
refusal to identify meaningfulness with the realized relation to an object,
but he now claims that the word "I" has its "normal meaning" only when
its meaning is "realized." And whereas Husserl had insisted on the ideality
of meaning, he now claims that "I" has "an ever new meaning" depending
on who utters it (LI 1l.1, 82/1, 315, translation altered). Derrida thus feels
compelled to object that

Husser/'s premises should sanction our saying exactly the contrary. Just
as 1need not perceive in orderto understand a statement aboutperception,
so there is no needto intuitthe objectI in order to understandthe word I.
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 55

The possibility of this nonintuition constitutes the Bedeutung as such, the

normal Bedeutung as such (SP, 107/96).

The "normal meaning" of the expression would be constituted by the

possibility of nonintuition.
This interpretation requires several comments. In the first place, the
translation of "vollzieht sich" by "is realized" in the English and "se
realise" in the French translations, while not false, can easily mislead the
unwary reader. HusserI uses the word "realisiert" in §9 of the First
Investigation, e.g., in the phrase "in the realized relation of the expression
to its object" (LIn.!, 38/1, 281, quoted atSP, 92n/l03n). It always refers
to the fulfillment of the meaning intention. To use the same word in §26 to
translate "vollzieht sich" suggests that these are simply two ways of saying
the same thing . This is precisely the way Derrida reads the passage: "But
HusserI seems to think that this Bedeutung, as a relationship with the object
(I, here, now), is 'realized' for the one who is speaking" (SP, 105-106/94).
And indeed there would seem to be good reason to make this assumption.
After all, how is the "immediate presentation of one's own personality" to
be understood other than as immediate self-presence, essential fulfillment?
A closer look at the broader context shows that this cannot be the correct
reading. The two crucial sentences, which Derrida quotes in a footnote,
read,

In solitary speech the meaning of "1" is essentially realized in the

immediate idea of one's own personality, and thus the meaning of the
word in communicated speech also lies in it. Each speaker has his own
I-presentation (and with it his individual concept of 1) and this is why the
word's meaning differs from person to person (LI 11.1, 82/ I, 316).

Several things become apparent when these two sentences are read
carefully. In the first place, even if it is the case that for Husserl the
meaning of the word "I" is always fulfilled for the speaker, this does not
mean that we can translate the passage as "In solitary speech the meaning
of 'I' is essentially fulfilled in the immediate idea of one's own personality
. . ." If this were the proper meaning of HusserI's statement, i.e., if the
immediate idea were a fulfilling sense, the second part of the sentence, " .
. . which is also the meaning of the word in communicated speech" would
56 CLAUDE EVANS

make no sense. Husserl is clearly stating that the meaning of the word "I"
"lies in" the immediate idea of the speaker's personality, and this is true for
both the speaker and the hearer. Only in the first case is the meaning also,
for Husserl , necessarily fulfilled. The hearer may know who is speaking or
writing without having intuitive fulfillment of this individual presentation.
Thus, nothing that Husserl writes here contradicts his claim that there is an
essential distinction between meaning and the fulfilled relation to an
object."
It is particularly noteworthy that Derrida does not give any details about
Husserl's analysis of occasional expressions. And in this case the details
make all the difference. Husserl argues that in the "normal" use ofthe word
"I" we find two meanings or two levels of meaning at work.

The one, relating to the word's general function, is so connected with the
word that its indicating function can be exercised once something is
actually presented: this indicative function is, in its tum, exercised/or the
other, singular presentation, and, by subsumption , makes the latter's object
known as what is here and now meant. The former meaning can be called
the indicating mean ing, the latter the indicated mean ing (LI II. I, 83/1,
316).

The "normal meaning" of the word requires both of these elements. Now
both of these meanings are ideal. The first constitutes the word's "general
function" or the word's "universal meaningfunction [Bedeutungsfunktion],"
namely "to designate whoever is speaking" (LIII.I , 82/1,315-316, trans.
altered). This enables us to understand the expression even if we do not
know who uttered or wrote it, and on this level it is clear that meaning-
fulness is not dependent on a realized relation to an object. In concrete use,
or rather in successful communication, this general function guides the
hearer's or reader's understanding to the indicated meaning, namely to the
singular presentation (Vorstellung) of a specific individual. Vorstellung in
this sense is the "nominal presentation in the purely logical sense" (LI 11.1,

9 Derrida expresses amazement at Husserl's appeal to an "individual concept." This is

surely a Leibnizian influence at work.
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 57

505111, 656).10 This meaning is again ideal-a multiplicity of auditors can

understand the same indicated meaning. In addition, this understanding
need not be intuitive. Husserl does make statements which seem to raise
stricter demands: "What its meaning is at the moment, can be gleaned only
from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which
surround it" (LIII.1, 8211,315, my emphasis) and "Through such indication
the hearer achieves understanding of the meaning, he takes the person who
confronts him intuitively, not merely as the speaker, but also as the
immediate object of this speaker's speech" (LIII.1, 82-8311, 316, my
emphasis). But these statements are oriented to the face-to-face situation,
and when we turn to other communicative situations it becomes clear that
intuition is not the crucial thing. Thus, "if we read the word without
knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless, but is at least
estranged from its normal sense" (LIlLI , 8211,315, my emphasis). A
properly oriented reader, one who knows who the (absent) writer is, who
has the individual presentation or concept of that person, can understand
the indicated meaning quite adequately in the absence of the writer. The
possibility of nonintuition, indeed of not knowing at all who the writer was,
is built in to the situation, and there is a level of understanding appropriate
to it.
Once these details of Husserl's analysis are brought in, it becomes
obvious that Derrida's claim, namely that Husserl's own premises sanction
drawing precisely the opposite conclusion from the one Husserl actually
draws, is dead wrong . Further, it becomes an easy task to make Husserlian
sense of Derrida's rather hyperbolic conclusions. Thus, when Derrida
writes, "When the word I appears, the ideality of its Bedeutung . . . puts us
in what Husserl describes as an abnormal situation-just as if I were
written by someone unknown" (SP, 107/96), it is clear that he is taking into
account only the indicating meaning." Again , when he writes that "the
signifying value [la valeur signifiante] of the I does not depend on the life

10 A more exhaustive analysis of this text would have to bring in Husserl's distinctions
between no less than thirteen different meanings of the word "Vorstellung,"

11 Robert Scholes has noted that Derrida "claims that what [Bertrand] Russell called the
'trivial' sense of the word is the only sense that counts ." (Robert Scholes, "Deconstruction
and Commun ication," Critical Inquiry 14 [1988],290.)
58 CLAUDE EVANS

of the speaking subject" (SP, 107/96, translation altered), he is again taking

into account merely the general function of the word "I," and not the
specific indicated meaning of this token of "I" which is now at issue.
Similar things can be said about claims such as "my death is structurally
necessary to the pronouncing of the I" and "whether or not life as
self-presence accompanies the uttering of the I, is quite indifferent with
regard to the function of meaning" (SP, 107, 108/96): both neglect the fact
that a marginal awareness of my own conscious life-which is not the
immediate self-presence in an instantaneous present which Derrida reads
into Husserl-is a condition for the full use of the 1. And Husserl's claim
that the indicated meaning is part ofthe "normal meaning" is anything but
arbitrary: all he is doing is taking the case of everyday communication (and
not even necessarily face-to-face communication) as the point of departure.
There is one other point to be made here. In Speech and Phenomena
Derrida is very open about the fact that he is reading early texts in light of
later texts , but here he is taking an early text to be representative of
phenomenology's general metaphysical commitments without paying any
attention to Husserl's own criticisms of the position under discussion,
criticisms which can be found in the very edition of the Logical Investiga-
tions Derrida was using. In the Forward to the second edition of the
Logical Investigations, Husserl writes, "The manner in which [the First
Investigation] deals with occasional meanings (to which, however, in
strictness, all empirical predications belong) is a tour de force-the
enforced consequence of the imperfect conception of the essence of 'truth
in itself in the Prolegomena" (LI I, xiv/l, 48). Since the problem with the
conception of truth in itself was that it was "too one-sidedly oriented to
verites de raison" (LI I, xiii/I, 47), this would mean that the issue of
"objective reason" (LIII.I, 90/1, 321) would require reexamination.
And indeed, Husserl undertook such a reexamination, above all in
Formal and Transcendental Logic and in the Crisis. In Formal and
Transcendental Logic this leads to a brief reconsideration of occasional
expressions. Husserl relates the intersubjective truth or falsity of occasional
judgments to an intersubjective "typical specific likeness among situations"
 INDICATION AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS 59

which is a function of "the constituting horizon-intentionality.t'" In a

footnote Husserl notes that in the Logical Investigations he had not yet
worked out the theory of horizon-intentionality and thus could not deal
adequately with occasional judgments and their meaning (Ibid., 297 n/199
n). Thus, rather than recurring to an "I-presentation [Ichvorstellung]," i.e.,
to a singular presentation as the indicated meaning, Husser! now analyzes
occasional expressions in terms of the consciousness of horizons. In the
case of the occasional expression "I," this would refer us to what Aron
Gurwitsch called the marginal awareness that any conscious act has of
itself, an awareness which is rooted in the structures of time
consciousness." And this awareness is not, for Husser! or for Gurwitsch,
a function of an instantaneous present, as Derrida would have it."

IV. Conclusion

To return to our point of departure, we saw that Husser! tries to distinguish

between the expressive and indicative functions of signs. When the analysis
ofthe meaning function is forced to recognize the presence of an indicating
function at the very heart ofthe normal, communicatively oriented meaning
of those essentially occasional expressions which, as Husserl must
recognize, language cannot do without, does this not amount to the
ship-wreck of Husserl's enterprise of articulating the philosophical
foundations for pure logic? Does Derrida's rhetoric ofthreat not tum out to
have a good sense, in spite of all weaknesses in his specific arguments?
What Husser! takes pains to distinguish are the indicative and expressive
functions of linguistic signs . In the analysis of essentially occasional

12 Edmund Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, edited by Paul Janssen (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. [Husserliana Volume XVII)), 207. Formal and Transcen-
dental Logic, translated by Dorion Cairns, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 199.
Further references to this text will be abbreviated as "FTL," followed by the GermanlEnglish
pagination.

13 This line of analysis was extended by Aron Gurwitsch in his "Outlines of a Theory of
'Essentially Occasional Expressions'," in Marginal Consciousness, edited by Lester Embree
(Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Press, 1985), 66f.

14 J. Claude Evans, Strategies a/Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth a/the Voice,
Chapter 6.
60 CIA UDE EVANS

expressions, it is not the sign which exercises an indicative function, but

rather the sign's indicating meaning . There is no reason to think that this
"contaminates" the meaning function of the sign such that logical proof is
"contaminated" by the noninsightfulness of indication. With that, Derrida's
main point against Husser! fails.

Washington University
 CHAPTER FOUR

HUSSERL AND DERRIDA

ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY

BURT C. HOPKINS

When considering the difference between something and the essence of

something, Aristotle seems undecided as to whether this difference is
discerned by different capacities of the psyche, or by the same capacity in
different relations (On the Soul, 429b, 10-23). Proceeding from the recogni-
tion that the state of affairs at issue is such that there are many cases in
which there is indeed a difference between something, e.g., magnitude,
water, flesh, straight, and its essence, Aristotle finds in the difference or
differences at issue a reference to the psyche's capacity to discern the terms
of this difference.
For instance, in the case of magnitude, the difference between "this
magnitude" and "the essence of magnitude," points for Aristotle to the
psyche's capacity to discern each of these and (or perhaps "in") their
difference. The distinction, and as well the psyche's capacity to make the
distinction, are taken by Aristotle to be beyond issue. However, precisely
"how" the distinction is arrived at, is an issue, and, if Aristotle's singling
out ofthe two possibilities regarding "how" this occurs, without expressing
a preference for either one, is any indication, the issue may be one which
(perhaps in essence) does not lend itself to a determinate decision.
Now Husser! of course likewise holds that in many cases there is a
difference between something and the essence of something. In addition,
he likewise holds that this difference points to the psyche's capacity to
discern both the "terms" of this difference, i.e., (1) the something and (2)
the essence of something, as well its capacity to discern their "difference."
However, unlike Aristotle, Husserl seems to make a decision with respect

61
W. R. McKenTUl and J. C. Evans (eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 61-93.
© 1995 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
62 BURT C. HOPKINS

to precisely "how" the psyche manifests the capacity to discern both the
different "terms" and their difference that is at issue.
With respect to Aristotle's formulation of the options involved in the
psyche's capacity to differentiate the "terms" ofthe difference at issue, viz.,
something and the essence of something, Husserl seems to opt for the
psyche manifesting distinct-although ultimately not unrelated-faculties
for their discernment. For instance, in the so-called "early" Husserl there
is the Aristotelian-sounding distinction between sensuous hyle and non-
sensuous (irrea!) categories, I which in turn appears to refer for Husserl to
the distinct psychic capacities of sensuous and categorial intuition.
Likewise, early on for Husserl there is the Kantian-sounding distinction
within the irreal between categories and essences that are factically
founded in sensuous hyle and Ideas in the Kantian sense that are not so
founded.' which again appears to refer for Husserl to the distinct psychic
capacities of Wesensschau (seeing essences) and ideation. And, in the so-
called "later" Husserl, there is the Heideggerian-sounding distinction
between the objective world of scientific idealization and the historicity of
the world's horizon of horizons within which any scientific (and for that
matter, philosophical) truth makes its phenomenal appearance, which
points as well for Husserl to the distinct psychic capacities of mundane and
transcendental reflection.'

I Upon closer examination, HusserI's understand ing of hyte differs markedly from
Aristotle's. This is case inasmuch as for Aristotle hyl« is understood in terms of an
unperceivable hypokeimenon, whereas for Husserl hyl« is understood in terms of the
phenomenal manifestation of the very "stuff' of (sensuous) perception .
2 Again, as is the case with Aristotle, upon closer examination , HusserI's understanding

of "Ideas in the Kantian sense" is substantially different from Kant's. This is the case since
for Husserl the status of such Ideas is given in phenomenologically pure intuition, whose
"ideation" yields "the phenomenologically clarified concept of Kant's pure intuition"
(Edmund Husser!, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy, translated by Fred translation [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982],359). The
phenomenological clarification of this concept functions, contra Kant, to (1) uncover these
Ideas in intellectual (i.e., eidetic) intuition, and (2) disassociate from their significance all
reference to an unknowable "thing-in-itself."
3 As in the above instances of a seeming similarity between key distinctions in Husserl
and other thinkers, closer scrutiny reveals that for Husserl the distinction between scientific
idealization and historicity is not fundamentally an ontological distinction, as in the case of
Heidegger's distinction between the rootedness of theoretical cognition in Vorhandenheit
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 63

Regarding the issue of "how" these apparently distinct psychic

capacities are nevertheless sufficiently related such that the essentially
distinct terms of the differences at issue are capable of being discerned qua
their difference,' Husserl appears to think that the apparently distinct
psychic faculties at issue are related insofar as they themselves somehow
refer to a common origin in the functioning (Leistungsjiihig) capacity of the
psyche itself. This, admittedly difficult, thought is consistently pursued by
Husserl in terms of the progressive unfolding of functioning subjectivity by
reflectively accomplished phenomenological reductions.
Viewed across the various levels of the "terms" of the differences at
issue and of the psychic or subjective capacities involved in the discern-
ment of both the different "terms" and as well of their differences as such,
Husserl's phenomenological reductions can be seen to traverse a "zigzag"
course which traces the phenomenal "how" of the distinctions at issue.'
Thus for instance the initially uncovered different "terms" of hyle and
irreal categories refer "back" (qua the "zig") to the functionally different
capacities of sensuous intuition and categorical intuition; these functionally
different capacities in tum point toward (qua the "zag") the coeval
appearance of the horizonally interdependent founding and founded
relation of, respectively, hyle and categories; these again refer "back" (qua
another "zig") to their common origin "in" the accomplishing synthesis of
subjectivity that unites the functionally distinct capacities which exhibit the

and existence in Geschichtlichkeit. Rather, for Husserl the distinction at issue is fundamen-
tally epistemic , insofar as what is phenomenologically at issue concerns the descriptive
(evidential) clarification of the sense (Sinn) of each; and indeed, the clarification of the
reference to the historicity of the world's horizon of horizons that is manifest in the sense
of the objective world of scientific idealization .
4 It is important to keep in mind here that for Aristotle as well as Husserl both the "terms"

of the difference and the difference "itself' are not at issue. Again, what is at issue is
whether the psyche's manifested capacity for their discernment can itself be discerned vis-a-
vis precisely "how" it exhibits this capacity.
5 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology, translated by David Carr (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1970),58. I
have tried to work out the formal structure of this methodical "zigzag," as it is manifest in
the methodology of Husserl's project of descriptively accounting for the "how" of the
givenness of phenomena, in my "Phenomenological Self-Critique of its Descriptive
Method," Husserl Studies 8 (1991): 129-150.
64 BURT C. HOPKINS

interdependent and interrelated terms "previously" uncovered by the "zag,"

and so on.
Until finally, the reductively uncovered "terms" of the "zag" are the
exemplary ideality of geometry and the historicity of its horizon of
horizons; and the reductively uncovered capacities of the "zig" referred
"back" to by this "zag's" "terms" are the functionally distinct capacities of
ideation and the transmission of an intersubjective tradition. And these
capacities, in turn point to (qua still another "zag") the coeval appearance
of the horizonally interdependent and interrelated phenomena of ideality
and historicity, which refer (qua the ultimate "zig") at last--or at first, and
this of course is the rub--to their common source in the originating event
of transcendental subjectivity.

Jacques Derrida, in his Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An

Introduction.' takes issue with not only Husserl's decision regarding the
capacities of the subject to discern both the "terms" of the differences as
well as the respective differences "themselves" at issue; but also, so far as
I can tell, with the initial state of affairs wherein Husserl-following
Aristotle and the tradition-takes as his Ansatzpunkt the indisputableness
regarding there being a difference at all between something and the essence
of something. Following or amplifying certain hints provided by Husserl's
erstwhile assistant Eugen Fink, Derrida challenges not so much the specific
nature of the decisions that Husserl makes, but rather the, for him, more
basic (and no doubt more decisive) question of the decidability of the
issues with respect to which Husserl makes his decisions.
Specifically, Derrida finds (I) that the "irreducible proximity of
language to primordial thought" (lOG, 70) is something which "eludes by
nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality" (Ibid., my emphasis). And
related to this, he finds (2) that the legitimate scope of Husserl's phe-
nomenological reductions reaches its limit with the uncovering of the

6 Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin ofGeometry: An Introduction, translated by

John P. Leavey , Jr. (Stony Brook : Nicolas Hays, Ltd., 1978), cited hereafter as "lOG."
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 65

intertwining of arche and te/os in the historicity that is announced by the

sense (Sinn) of every fact.
Regarding (1), Derrida amplifies Fink's observation that" 'HusserI
does not pose the problem of a transcendental language' " (lOG, 69n) and
his wonder at whether "if, after the reduction, one can stilI 'have at his
disposal a Logos in the same sense as before' " (lbid.). Derrida does so by
calling attention to the consistently unthematized assumption operative in
Husserl's post-reductive descriptions, regarding the phenomenological
transparency of the natural sense of the factically embodied language that
he must employ in order to make and maintain the non-factical distinctions
putatively uncovered by these very descriptions. This assumption reaches
crisis proportions according to Derrida when, regarding (2), Husserl's
methodological "zigzag" (lOG, 50, 118) accounts for the capacity of
intrasubjectively constituted sense to become intersubjectively constituted
sense-i.e., the historically transmitted sense of tradition-on the basis of
an appeal to the already constituted status of ideality which factically
embodied language functions to disclose .
Indeed, it is the irreducible tension in Husserl's treatment of historicity
between, on the one hand: the sedimented arche of historical sense, which
is manifested according to Derrida in the guise of a subjectless, "autono-
mous transcendental field" (lOG, 88) of writing functioning as the Iived-
body (Leib) of linguistically mediated ideality; and, on the other hand, the
te/os of phenomenologically bringing to evidence the concealed (since
sedimented) sense of this origin, which circumscribes for Derrida this
method's necessary limit. This limit manifests itself in Derrida's view via
the silence ofHusserl's method regarding not the sense of historicity, which
for him is rightfully accounted for in terms of the irreducible tension at
issue here with respect to (its) sense-but regarding the question of the
"Fact" that there is a "Being-History" at all.
The teleological aspect of phenomenology, which is characterized by
Derrida in terms of "the threatened unity of sense and being, of
phenomenology and ontology" (lOG, 151), cannot according to him "be
determined in a philosophical language without provisionally breaking this
unity for the benefit of phenomenology" (Ibid.). The infinite task of
phenomenology's method, with the related "absolutes" of its "double
origin," is symptomatic of this. For, on the one hand, there is the absolute
of its ground in the Living Present of consciousness, which is "animated
66 BURT C. HOPKINS

and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense) of the total flux of Iived-
experience" (lOG , 136). And, on the other hand, there is the methodic
reflection that is conscious of "another, previous, possible, and absolute
origin in general" (lOG, 152), viz., the historical origin of the possibility
of idealizing abstraction . The latter likewise for Derrida assumes, or
perhaps better, creates, the guise of ideas in the Kantian sense, with which
the teleological "passage to the limit" of phenomenology's self-realization
as an infinite task is inextricably intertwined. Indeed, insofar as the
radicality of the "leap" beyond the sensible involved in the "institutive
operation" (lOG, 133) of idealizing abstraction, i.e., ideation of ideas in the
Kantian sense, eludes concrete description, as a result of the "finitudes"
(lOG, 132) of the prescientific cultural world and the protogeometer
philosopher that are its conditions, Derrida speaks of "the Origin that
indefinitely reserves itself' (lOG, 153).
As a result of these double, and indeed, when the coincidence of
historicity (=tradition=sense) and the interplay of "a primordial Logos
toward a Telos" (lOG, 149) are taken into account, infinite origins of phe-
nomenology, Derrida characterizes its method in terms of "Passage." He
does so with respect to

their [i.e., primordial Logos and Telos] reciprocal inspiration . . .

illuminating one by the other in a movement wherein consciousness
discovers its path in an indefinite reduction , always already begun, and
wherein every adventure is a change of direction [conversion] and every
return to the origin an audacious move toward the horizon (JOG, 149).

This passage is for Derrida the absolute of transcendental phenomenology.

As such, it is quintessentially characterized by him in terms of the pure
thought of the Reduction, wherein the "delay" in origin, with its passage,
and the phenomenological/philosophical "impotence" and "impossibility"
of "reducing" this delay, "are given in a primordial and pure consciousness
of Difference" (lOG, 153).
Derrida's attempt at what is no doubt clearly intended to be an
"immanent" critique ofHusserl's The Origin ofGeometry, finds, then, that
the "adventure" of the "Passage" of thought that is traced therein is
exposed to two insurmountable dangers.
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 67

First, there is the danger of a loss of sense in the passage from

"factically free" ideality to its sedimentation in factically limited writing.
Husserl's decision in favor of the phenomenological transparency of the
latter, vis-a-vis the former, rules out, according to Derrida, both the
phenomenological investigation of the Logos as it functions in its
methodical descriptions," and as well, the sensitivity to the " irreducible
proximity" of pure thought and language.
Second, there is the danger of an idealization of senses in the passage
of origin, that occurs with the attempt to reduce the Differences "of all the
significations [instances] dissociated by the various reductions: factuality
and essentiality, worldliness and non-worldliness, reality and ideality,
empeiria and transcendentality" (lOG, 149), to the de jure conditions of
possibility. It is this which must necessarily pass over in silence the
question of the "upsurge of stark fact" (lOG, 151n) that announces non-
HusserlianBeing-History."? And indeed, although for Derrida this question
can

neverstem from a [Husserlian] phenomenology as such .. . we [Derrida]

do not believe either that this question can ever, in philosophical
discourse, simply precede transcendental phenomenology as its
presupposition or latent ground. On the contrary, this question would
markwithinphilosophy in generalthe momentwhereinphenomenology
terminates asthe philosophical propaedeutic forphilosophical decision-a
moment conceived moreoverby Husserl'" (JOG, 150).

7 Derrida designates this sense of the functioning of language as "transcendental

discourse" (lOG, 68, 77n).
8 Or, what for Derrida amounts to the same thing, there is the danger-which he takes in

the end to be afait accompli-ofreducing "factuality as wild singularity (always outside of

the reach of every eidetic subsumption)" (lOG, 151n), what he also calls "pure factuality"
(lOG, Ibid), to its phenomenological sense.
9 At least one commentator makes explicit the connection-which Derrida only hints

at-between "Being-History" and "ontology in the Heideggerian sense." See Rudolf Bemet,
"On Derrida's ' Introduction' to Husserl's Origin of Geometry," in Derrida and Decon-
struction, edited by Hugh J. Silverman (New York : Routledge, 1989), 143.
10 Derrida's understanding of Husserl's conception of this"moment" is no doubt to be
found in what he characterizes as the "ethico-teleological" (lOG, 136n) motivation
underlying Husserl's thought. The "decision" at issue, then, would involve the transcenden-
68 BURT C. HOPKINS

II

Despite what one commentator has characterized as the "bewildering

labyrinth of the most diverse inter-textual references?" of Derrida's text,
I think two foci stand out as crucial to his reading of Husserl. The first
concerns his account of Husserl's failure to pose the question of "transcen-
dental discourse ." The second concerns Husserl's alleged decision, no
doubt related in Derrida's view to Husserl's failure to pose this question,
regarding the ideal constituting capacity-and hence transparency-of
(factical) language. Derrida refers to language in this latter sense as
"transcendental language," and remarks that it "is 'constituting' as
compared with ideal Objectivity, and .. . it is not confused in its pure
possibility with any de facto empirical language" (JOG, 77n).
Derrida is confident that the result of this failure and decision is a
tension manifested in an unwarranted tendency toward idealization in
Husserl's thought. This tension according to him yields as its result the state
of affairs that ''phenomenology cannot be grounded as such in itself, [and]
nor can it itself indicate its own proper limits" (JOG, 140). This state of
affairs is manifest in the dual function that Derrida understands Husserl's
appeal to "Ideas in the Kantian sense" to assume with respect to this
unavoidable tension .
For, on the one hand, the tension between "thefinitizing consciousness
of its principle [viz., that its "archetypal form of evidence is the immediate
presence of the thing itself 'in person' "J" (JOG, 137-38) and its self-
conscious goal of achieving the "final intention of philosophy" (JOG, 141),
is such that Husserl's phenomenology can only be "set up" (JOG, 141)12 on
the basis of an Idea in the Kantian sense. The content of the latter "[b]y

tal phenomenologist choosing to respond to the contemporary European crisis by initiating

a Riickfrage into its historical origin(s) in accord with the phenomenological method . And
insofar as this method is for Derrida incapable of interrogat ing the"Being-History" of this
origin, such a response remains problematic according to him.
I) RudolfBemet, op. cit., 139.
12 Derrida draws an analogy between the function that the Idea in the Kantian sense
performs for eidetic seeing in Husserl's phenomenology and the role of the diaphanous in
Aristotle. Both for him are at once"unseen" and the source of the visibility of that which
is"seen" (JOG, 138).
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 69

definition" (lOG, 139) can never be given in intuition, "nor be determined

in an evidence" (lOG, 138). Indeed, for Derrida "there is no phe-
nomenology ofthe Idea" (Ibid., my emphasis).
On the other hand, there is the tension between the irreducibility of
"sensible ideality" (lOG, 133) and the phenomenological inaccessibility of
the original (and originary) ''process of idealization" (lOG, 134) which
both initially" and ever and again 14 radically institutes the "intentional
anticipation to leap [beyond "sensible ideality"] to the infinite" (Ibid.). The
result of this ideational "leap" for Derrida is the "more historical" (lOG,
135) "creation of an eidetic" (Ibid., my emphasis).
Before turning to the issue of language and thought in phenomenology
that is raised by the two foci that I have suggested are crucial for Derrida's
reading ofHusserI, I want to call attention to two decisions"in general" that
Derrida makes regarding Husserl's phenomenology. While Derrida would
no doubt want to maintain confidently that what is decided here "corre-
sponds to Husserl's intention" (lOG, 59; cf. 27 n, 49, 61, 65, 147), I will be
suggesting, to the contrary, that such confidence is misplaced. Which is to
say, that Derrida's decisions do not correspond to Husserl's intentions.
The first decision of Derrida's that I want to discuss concerns the
meaning of Husserl's principle of principles. At issue is what this princi-
ple's appeal to intuition refers to, in the sense of the "Leibhafte Wirk-
lichkeit" (palpable actuality") of the originarily given (or yielded). For
Derrida "[i]mplicitly that [i.e., "the immediate presence of the thing itself
'in person' " ] means : of the phenomenally defined or definable thing,
therefore the finite thing" (lOG, 138). In accord with this understanding of
the referent of phenomenology's "principle of principles," Derrida" finds,

13 Qua the phenomenologically insignificant "fact" of the act of the original proto-
geometer philosopher.
14 Qua the phenomenologically significant historicity of the transmission of the Sinn of
the "original" protogeometer philosopher's act.
15 The English translation of Derrida's text renders this as "the thing itself 'in person ',"
Derrida, op. cit., 137-38 .
16 And here (lOG, 139-40) Derrida is following Ricoeur's analysis in the article, "Husserl
and the Sense of History," in Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis ofHis Phenomenology,
translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston : Northwestern University
Press, 1967), 143-74 .
70 BURTC. HOPKINS

then, that implicit in the phenomenological appeal to Ideas in the Kantian

sense, there is the (for Husserl) unthematic distinction between intention
and intuition; i.e., between the de jure regulative scope of the infinitude
indicated by the Idea and the finitude, or better, inadequacy, of all
intuition. 17
That the "palpable actuality" of phenomenology's "principle of
principles" has a referent beyond an ontological determination ofthe "finite
thing" is of course explicitly recognized by Derrida himself.18 For instance,
he writes that "intuition of an essence (Wesensschau) . . . can determine it
[i.e., the "essence"] in an intuition" (lOG , 135). However, inasmuch as
"idealizing ideation has already produced" (lOG, 135) the irreal essence
that is intuited in Wesensschau, it is perhaps not going too far to say that
for Derrida this "already produced" status of the "palpable actuality" at
issue is taken to fall-vis-a-vis what for him is the unintuitable status ofthe
Idea-under the rubric of the "finite thing ."
Granting Derrida then this extension of the "palpable actuality" of
what is intuited, to include essences that are not Ideas in the Kantian sense,
the issue regarding the intuitive referent of Husserl's "principle of
principles" resolves itself into the issue of whether or not it was Husserl's
intention to refer to Ideas in the Kantian sense with this principle. When
Husserl writes that: "[i]n 'pure intuition' (for this ideation is the phenome-
nologically clarified concept of Kant's pure intuition) we seize upon the
'idea' .. . and all the essential moments included in it";" or again, that "the
variation" being meant as an evident one, accordingly as presenting in pure

17 Bernet (op. cit., 149) and 1. Bamouw (Review of Jacques Derrida's Introduction to the
Origin of Geometry, Review of Metaphysics 33 (Sept. 1979), 172) have pointed out that
what is at issue here is the incipient investigation of what Derrida later calls Husserl's
"metaphysics of presence."
18 In this connection Dane Depp writes: " [I]t is unclear what, according to Derrida, would
be ultimately finite for Husserl, since Derrida holds that even Husserl's'perceptual objects'
are idealized ," (Dane Depp, "A Husserlian Response to Derrida's Early Criticisms of Phe-
nomenology," The Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology 18 [1987], 228.)
19 Edmund Husserl, Ideas .
20 Of the factically limited or determined essence which yields a facticall y free "Eidos"

And although it cannot be argued here, the "Eidos" in this sense performs precisely the same
function, and therefore designates the "same" irreal phenomenon, as the Idea in the Kantian
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 71

intuition the possibilities themselves as possibilities, [and] its correlate is

an intuitive and apodictic consciousness ofsomething universal.?" there
seems to be little doubt as to whether it was his intention that Ideas be
understood as originarily given in terms of phenomenology's "principle of
principles."
Nevertheless, Husserl also writes that "the adequate determination of
its [i.e., the Idea in the Kantian sense] content ... is unattainable.'?" This
statement is of course crucial for Derrida's confidence that his reading of
Husserl corresponds to his intention." However, in order to consider what
is at issue here in this apparent inconsistency or discrepancy on Husserl's
part, regarding the status of Ideas vis-a-vis intuition, the methodological,
and hence, "reflective" context within which Husserl always situates all
phenomenological problematics of intuitive evidence needs to be consid-
ered. And what especially stands in need of consideration is the problem-
atic which gives rise to Husserl's introduction of the notion of phe-
nomenologically clarified Ideas in the Kantian sense. These considerations
will also provide the occasion to call attention to the second decision of
Derrida's regarding Husserl's phenomenology "in general " that I want to
discuss.
Unlike the first decision of Derrida's that I have called attention to,
which is explicitly addressed by his text, this second one is conspicuous by
its absence oftextual address. I am referring here of course to the near total
lack of any consideration by Derrida of the problematic of "reflection" in
Husserl's phenomenology in general, or more particularly, with respect to
its sine qua non, the "reduction." Of course, this in-itself is not necessarily
significant. What is significant however, is the decision that Derrida makes
regarding the meaning of the "reduction," a decision which, minimally,
does not take into account Husserl's formulation of its reflective context or
dimension.

sense .
21 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns (The Hague : Martinus
Nijhoff, 1960), 71.
22 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, op. cit., 198.
23 See especially lOG, 106.
72 BURTC. HOPKINS

To wit, in a more than Kantian-sounding leitmotif, Derrida seems to

understand the reduction in terms of the uncovering of the de jure
conditions of possibility for the sense (Sinn) ofthe empirical, of facts. This
uncovering appears to involve for Derrida the "dissociating" (lOG, 149) or
"separation'?' of the tandems of fact and essence, worldliness and non-
worldliness, reality and ideality, the empirical and the transcendental. Thus
the reduction is definitively characterized for Derrida by the telos of its
attempt to "reduce"-and here I would read "separate"-all "traces" of the
first terms of these tandems from the phenomenological purity of the
second. Which is to say, by the attempt to "reduce" what is initially
recognized (or even uncovered) as the "difference" operative, nay,
constitutive, ofthese tandems, to the univocity of the Sinn of their de jure
conditions of possibility. And of course, Derrida's diagnosis of the
constitutive function that language assumes for Husserl with respect to the
reduction to this univocity, a function that remains operative, indeed drives
his project, despite his own analyses (which can be seen to suggest the
contrary), signals-incipient deconstruction-the impossibility of the
reduction . Or, in other words, the asymptotic phenomenological quest for
the univocity of Sinn, indicated by the Idea of the infinite which is
expressive of the "passage to the limit" of both the ethico-teleological self-
understanding of this quest and its historical origin, marks for Derrida the
transgression of the empirical/factical medium of language which is
necessarily intertwined with the expression of this passage.
However, before considering more closely Derrida's discussion of the
role of language in all of this , I want to focus on the implicit decision
regarding "reflection" which is consistently operative in his account of the
phenomenological reduction. To be blunt, Derrida's understanding of
"reflection," and hence, the phenomenological reduction, is subtly
"naturalistic"; or, if you will, "ontological." The first clues indicative of
this are to be found in the strange appeals throughout the early part of his
text to a "reduction" that emerges without any cognitive or epistemic intent
on the part of the "knower." Talk of the mathematical object as "always
already reduced to its phenomenal sense" (lOG, 27); of "ready-made
geometry ... which must be reduced in its factuality" (lOG, 38); of "the

24 Bernet, op. cit., 141.

 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 73

spontaneous eidetic reduction" (JOG, 41); and of "a spontaneous neutral-

ization of the factical existence of the speaking subject" (JOG, 67) is very
strange indeed from one who understands himself to be following Husserl's
intentions."
To be sure, upon reflection, the status ofthe "ideal" vis-a-vis the doxic
many of Plato, the aistheton of Aristotle, the sensuous manifold of Kant,
the hyle of Husserl, is remarkable for its absence of what the Moderns
would designate as "empiricality." So there is no doubt a kernel of truth in
Derrida's seeing the ideal to be more akin to the eidetic than to the empiric.
However, to hold that this kinship emerges "spontaneously," i.e., indepen-
dent ofthe epistemic and hence reflective interest on the part ofthe knower
to consider the terms of the difference(s) at issue with respect to one term's
(the "ideal") pointing towards (hence its "kinship" with) the "eidos," is,
minimally, clearly contrary to a correct reading of Husserl's intention." In
other words, the "ideal" and the "eidetic" are not the same for Husserl."

2S In this connection Depp notes that "[t]here is simply no place in the conceptual
framework of phenomenology for the notion of a 'passive reduction'," Depp, op. cit., 238.
26 Not to mention Plato's, Aristotle's and Kant's intention, although this cannot be pursued
here.
27 The "ideal, " in the sense of the numbers and functions of mathematics, the shapes of
Geometry and the categories of pure logic, is, to be sure, non-sensuous and therefore
"irreal" for Husser!' And further, cognizance of the irreal qua irreal status of each remains
inaccessible to both the empiricistic (e.g., Hume, Locke) and rationalistic (e.g., Kant)
theories of abstraction in Husserl's view. The requisite for the evidential manifestation of the
irreality of the ideal is the phenomenologically peculiar (since it has as its sine qua non the
epistemological interest of the philosopher cum nascent phenomenologist) ideative
abstraction, the so-called "categorical intuition," as initially worked out by Husserl in the
Logical Investigations. Contra Derrida, however, not only is such "ideative abstraction" not
"spontaneous," it is also sharply differentiated-insofar as consideration of the Sinn of the
transcendent status of the objectivities involved in such abstraction is not a factor-by
Husserl from the phenomenological reduction(s). Hence, Husserl's self-understanding of the
"pre-philosophical" status of the Logical Investigations, which do not consider the issue of
the transcendent Sinn of objectivity. Indeed, while for Husserl the reduction and
Wesensschau of the ideal is founded in phenomenologically ideative abstraction, it is not
until the transcendent reference of the ideal is reduced and the ideal "itself' is ideatively
varied, that its Eidos emerges and is therefore a Sache for eidetic-as distinct from
categorial-intuition. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, translated by
John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977),62; Edmund Husser!, Experience and
Judgment, translated by J. Churchill, K. Arneriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
74 BURT C. HOPKINS

And maximally, the ascription of "spontaneity" to the reduction misses

precisely what is essential in Husserl's various and varied accounts of the
reduction: The (1) recognition on the part of the nascent phenomenological
knower of a "reference" in empirical (or broadly speaking, doxic)
experience to something beyond such experience, which qua what is
referred to renders such experience meaningful and which, paradoxically,
the doxic self-understanding of experience cannot account for, and; (2) the
systematic tracing of this reference beyond the limited (vis-a-vis the
meaning referred to) ambit of doxic self-understanding, toward the end of
evidentially accounting for the meaning (Sinn) pointed to or indicated by
the initial reference.
Of course, Husserl's methodological prescription for the "systematic
tracing"-from out of the doxic-e-of the reference to trans-doxic meaning,
is that it be "descriptive" in accord with phenomenology's "principle of
principles." It is therefore clearly Husserl's intention that the various
"relations" at issue for phenomenology, between fact and essence,
worldliness and non-worldliness, reality and ideality, the empirical and
transcendental (to borrow from Derrida's formulation of the decisive
relational tandems), have their bases in the descriptive tracing of the
phenomenal "references" uncovered by the reduction(s), and not the other
way around.
This is to say, that the descriptive tracing of the "references" beyond
the doxic exhibits for Husserl the phenomenological sine qua non for
determining the "relations" between the terms of the tandems at issue. And
this is most emphatically opposed to Derrida's understanding of the
"relations" between the "dissociated" or "separated" terms of the tandems
being the sine qua non for reductively exhibiting the descriptive "refere-
nces" at issue . Thus for Derrida, as a result of the terms of the tandems at
issue proving in the end (viz ., after his immanent critique) not to be
decidedly dissociable or separable, Husserl's attempt to "reduce" them is
doomed to failure.
Of course for Derrida the "sign" (lOG, 140) of this failure is the
infinite, as it is manifested by the Idea's regulative possibility. The Idea as
regulative possibility "is evidence only insofar as it is finite, i.e., here,

1973),358.
 ON THE ORIGJN OF GEOMETRY 75

formal, since the content ofthe infinite Idea is absent and is denied to every
intuition" (JOG, 139). For Derrida then, Husserl's reductive attempt to
separate what in the end continually defies all separation, i.e., the relational
terms of the tandems at issue, or in short, their "Difference," yields the
"Idea of infinity, [in which] there is determined evidence only of the Idea,
but not of that of which it is the Idea" (Ibid.). The latter, characterized by
Derrida in Kantian terms "as the infinite determinability of X, is only
relation with an object. It is, in the broadest sense, Objectivity itself'
(Ibid.). And it is this, then, which Derrida maintains "is only the possibility
of evidence and the openness of "seeing" itself; it is only determinability
as the horizon for every intuition in general, the invisible milieu of seeing"
(IOG, 138). As such, Derrida assigns to the Idea in the Kantian sense a
genetical priority over the essences intuited qua Wesensschau. This is the
case since it is on the basis of the ideative creation of the Idea that the
constituted ideality "seen" by Wesensschau "regains its rights" (JOG, 135)
by only repeating the productive idealization (Ibid.).
However, by attending to Husserl's account of the status of "horizon"
as it emerges within the reflective context of the reduction, both in general
and specifically in terms of the phenomenological ideation of Ideas in the
Kantian sense, the genetical priority that Derrida attributes to the Idea can
be seen, contra Husserl's intention, to assume an unwarranted "ontological"
function. Indeed, by situating Husserl's account of "horizon" within its
phenomenologically reflective context, the sense in which Husserl
understands that "the adequate determination of its [i.e., the Idea in the
Kantian sense] content . . . is unattainable" can be sharply dissociated from
Derrida's reading of it.
Husserl's notion of "horizon" attempts to capture the phenomenologi-
cally peculiar "movement" of the reduction (and phenomenological
reflection) beyond the doxic self-understanding of experience to the trans-
doxic meaning that is, paradoxically, indicatively referred to by such
experience. To wit, the tracing by phenomenological reflection of the
reference manifest in the immediately given reflected experience to
meaningful (sinnvoll) relations that are initially beyond such experience,
involves for Husserl the descriptive unfolding (Enthiillung) of the
"horizon" of the immediately given reflected experience.
The condition of possibility for this horizonal unfolding of the
meaning initially referred to by experience has as its sine qua non the
76 BURT C. HOPKINS

phenomenologically epistemic intention "to know." It is precisely this

"intention" which permits the initial indication in reflected doxic experi-
ence to be descriptively traced as a reference toward the horizon of such
experience. This occurs as a function of the descriptive tracing, which as
it were "follows through" that which is initially only "indicated," such that
the latter comes to be uncovered as the horizon of the experience in which
the initial indication is manifested.
What is noteworthy here is that for Husserl the initial "indication"
which is immediately given in the reflected doxic experience is not
encountered as having its source or origin in the reflecting "act" of
reflection. Rather, it is encountered in terms of its yielding itself "as having
been already there," prior to its coming before the regard (Blick) of
reflection. This priority is not taken by Husserl to be on the order of
temporal anteriority; but rather, it announces the phenomenally peculiar
status of phenomenologically reflected Sinn as an indication beyond that
which appears. And of course, the methodical intent to accept as meaning-
ful only that which is evidentially manifested in the immediacy of the
reflected indication, without yielding to the natural inclination to under-
stand that which is indicated as already there to be already there (i.e.,
"transcendent'), manifests what Husserl characterizes as the "unnatural"
direction of phenomenological reflection. Which is to say, that the
methodic execution of the epistemic intent to descriptively trace the
reflected indication, qua its phenomenal appearance, without accepting its
Seinssinn as the appearance of something which itself does not appear,
accomplishes the "bracketing" and "epoche" involved in the ontological
"neutralization" that is the defining characteristic ofthe phenomenological
reduction.
Toward the end of descriptively tracing what is indicated by the
phenomenologically neutralized (and reflected) Seinssinn, such that its
referential horizon is uncovered, Husserl's method initially compares
similar reflected experiences, or imaginatively varies a single experience.
That which is reflected thus assumes an "exemplary" function, such that
with the methodical "running through" (durchgehend) of the reflected
exemplars, a horizonal invariance is uncovered.
This methodical "running through" moves in a "zigzag" pattern. This
may be formally characterized as follows: Initially there is the reflected
exemplar's indicative Sinn manifested "already having been there." The
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 77

epistemic intention of the phenomenologically methodical reflection to

know this Sinn follows its indication such that it emerges as a reference
(the "zig") that yields its source in the now phenomenally uncovered lived-
experience; this in turn points to the likewise now uncovered experiential
horizon of the initial indication (the "zag"). Insofar as this initially
uncovered experiential horizon is, to borrow from Derrida, "empirically
bound" to the comparative or imaginatively varied manifold of exemplars,
it yields according to Husserl the de facto (jaktisch) contingent "empirical
style" of the Sinn at issue.
With a shift of the methodically reflective regard, such that the hor-
izonally uncovered "empirical style" now serves as the indicative exemplar
to be comparatively or imaginatively "run through ," this style itself
functions for Husserl to manifest a reflected exemplar, which is again
indicative of an invariant horizon. Thus the epistemic intention of phe-
nomenological reflection to know the Sinn indicated by the empirical style
follows its indication such that it emerges as a reference (the "zig") that
yields its source in a now uncovered lived-experience; and this in turn now
points to and thereby uncovers the experiential horizon (the "zag")
indicated by the empirical style. What is exhibited thus as the horizonal
invariant of the empirical style is of course what Husserl designates as the
phenomenologically peculiar "essence" (Wesen). And its reflective
intuition, following the methodical "adventure" (to again borrow from
Derrida) ofthe zigzag traced by its descriptive seeing, is likewise of course
what is at issue in phenomenological Wesensschau. Again, inasmuch as the
essence so intuited is "bound" to the empirical style yielded by the
manifold of the initial comparative or imaginatively varied reflected
exemplars, its irreal status remains de facto for Husserl.
Shifting now from this formal consideration ofthe reductive uncover-
ing and exhibition of phenomenological horizons, to the material cases in
point in which Husserl introduces the phenomenologically clarified
ideation of Ideas in the Kantian sense, two states of affairs stand out in
direct opposition to Derrida's reading of the status and function these Ideas
in Husserl's phenomenology. First, the ideation of the Idea in the Kantian
sense is not genetically prior to the Wesensschau of essences. Second, the
"unattainable content" of that which the Idea is the Idea of is not the non-
intuitive "relation with an object," i.e., Objectivity.
78 BURTC. HOPKINS

Regarding the first state of affairs, Husserl is both clear and consistent
in his account ofthe "limitlessness in the progression" characteristic of the
Idea. To wit, that its ideation has its Ansatzpunkt in the "essential
necessity?" that the reflective Wesensschau of de facto essences can never
yield "by a single pure regard?" "the whole concatenation (Zu-
sammenhangf'" of the reflected Sinn oftheir lived-experience. Indeed, the
classical passage in the Ideas characterizes this "limitlessness in the
progression" in terms of "intuitions of the immanent [i.e, the immediate
reflected Sinn discussed above] going from the fixed lived-experiences to
new processes of lived-experiences pertaining to its horizon of lived-
experiences, from its fixing to those of its horizons; etc.'?' Considered then
within this reflectively methodological context, Derrida's talk ofthe ground
of lived-experience(s) being "animated and unified by the Idea (in the
Kantian sense) of the total flux of lived-experience" (lOG, 136) is
preposterous. This is the case since within the context of Husserl's
methodical reflections, the "ground" of lived-experiences refers to the
latter's "mode of givenness" (Le., its phenomenal "how"). As such, the Idea
as the "limitlessness in progression" of the de facto horizons of the mode
of givenness of lived-experience neither "animates" nor "unifies" its
ground in the constitutive sense that is suggested by Derrida." Rather, as
the descriptively referential unfolding of the horizonal Sinn already
indicated by the de facto "ground" of lived-experience, the Idea to the
contrary unfolds this Sinn in accord with its already constituted meaningful
"traces."
Likewise preposterous is Derrida's genetic reversal ofessence and Idea
such that the Idea is maintained to be the condition of possibility for the
seeing of the essence. Again, considered in accord with Husserl's

28 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, op. cit., 197.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 In this connection Depp writes : "Derrida also appears to have in mind the Kantian
criticism that Husserl uses regulative ideas constitutively. For Husserl, however, there are
no strictly transcendental objects, thus no objects which are essentially beyond the reach of
the practically constitutive effect of regulative ideas" (Depp, op. cit., 242).
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 79

methodological point of departure, it is precisely the reverse . Namely, it is

on the basis of the eidetic necessity of the impossibility (and the corre-
sponding insight into this impossibility) of adequately bringing to evidence
the de facto bound Sinn of the essence, that yields "limitlessness in
progression" of ideationally unfolding the always inadequately exhibited
horizons of this Sinn. Indeed, this ideation of the Idea "does not on that
account [i.e., the impossibility of adequate evidential determination of this
Sinn], perhaps, lose the insight [i.e., its "perception of the immanent"]
because the adequate determination of its content, here the stream oflived-
experiences, is unattainable.?"
With respect to the second state of affairs mentioned above, i.e., the
"unattainable content" of that of which the Idea is the Idea, this last cited
passage ofHusserl's, again, when considered in its methodological context,
also clearly shows that the "content" of the phenomenologically clarified
Idea in the Kantian sense can in no way be equated with the non-intuitive
"relation with an object, i.e., Objectivity." Rather, it is precisely the Idea's
phenomenologically clarified sense which enables HusserI to say that a
"series of distinguishable modes of givenness [i.e., qua the evidentially
inadequate de facto Sinn of the essence and qua the phenomenologically
clarified Idea in the Kantian sense] belongs to the stream of lived-
experiences and its components.?" Far from being an undetermined and
indeterminable relation with an object, the phenomenologically clarified
Idea in the Kantian sense is intuitively determined on the basis of the
reflectively referential unfolding of the horizonally indicated content of the
essentially inadequately given Sinn of the de facto given essence. In the
case of the stream of lived-experiences, this "content" is the whole of the
concatenation of its streaming, which in the "limitlessness of progression"
yields the infinite horizon of its concatenations. In the case of the

physical thing-X . . . [i]t is an eidetic insight that each perception and

multiplicity of perceptions is capable of being amplified; the process is
thus an endless one; accordingly , no intuitive seizing upon the physical
thing-essence [i.e., the de facto Sinn of the essence] can be so complete

33 Ibid., 198, my emphas is.

34 Ibid.
80 BURT C. HOPKINS

that a further perception cannot noematically contribute something new

to it ... . On the other hand, we still seize upon the "idea," Physical
Thing, with evidence and adequately. In the consciousness of the
limitlessness of the progression ofhannonious intuitions, we seize upon
<the "idea"> in the free process of running-through,"

What is decisive here is that in either case the "content" ofthe phenomeno-
logically clarified Idea in the Kantian sense is not only not determined by
a relation, but by a phenomenally uncovered reference; but also, that this
referential determination is intuitive despite the eidetically recognized
unattainability of the adequate determination of its "content."
The unintuitable status of the Idea for Husserl is therefore not
phenomenologically determined in terms of the "pole of a pure intention,
empty of every determined object" (lOG, 139). For sure, the "content" of
the Idea is not, and in accord with "essential necessity" cannot be,
determined as an "object." However, this is because the status of the Idea
is determined for Husserl in terms of its referential unfolding of horizon of
the de facto "obj ect" at issue; and not because it is "only relation with an
object." In other words, as opposed to the Kantian sense of the Idea which
Derrida appears to conflate with its "phenomenologically clarified sense,"?"

35 Ibid ., 358 .
36 Husserl's initial discussion of " 'i deas' in the Kantian sense" in §74 of Ideas I has for

its context a consideration of "the contrast between geometry and descriptive natural
sciences (my emphasis) ." Derrida makes much of this section (lOG, 33, 123, 133-35) and
especially ofHusserl's characterization there (lOG, 134n) of" 'ideal' concepts, expressing
something which cannot be'seen ' ... [and that] thus their ' origin' and therefore their content
are essentially other than those of descriptive concepts." However, the "descriptive
concepts" at issue here are not those that emerge on the basis of a phenomenological eidetic,
but rather, those that emerge on the basis of "sensuous intuition." Hence, the reason the
'''ideas' in the Kantian sense" discussed there cannot be "seen," and are therefore
characterized as having an " 'origin' "other than "descriptive concepts," has its basis in for
Husserl in their exact status vis-a-vis the "morphological essences" that are descriptively
rooted in "sensuous intuition." In other words, the status ofthe "Idea in the Kantian sense"
at issue in §74 is precisely its non-phenomenological, and therefore Kantian, regulative
function, and not the status of the "Idea" that emerges with its "phenomenological
clarificat ion."
This non-coincidence of the " 'idea' in the Kantian sense" discussed in §74 and the
subsequent discussions (§§83, 149) of the phenomenologically clarified sense of "Ideas" in
Ideas I, comes into even sharper relief with the following consideration: In §74 the '"idea'''
 ON THE ORIGINOF GEOMETRY 81

the Idea understood in terms of the latter refers not to objects per se but to
their horizon. And, again, when considered phenomenally (i.e, in terms of
its methodically reflected mode of givenness), the latter is not related to
objects, but rather is that towards and to which objects refer .
Now it is precisely this reversal by Derrida of the phenomenal status
of "reference" and "relation" in Husserl that signals Derrida's subtly
"ontological" understanding ofthe phenomenological reduction, and hence,
of phenomenological reflection . For insofar as the phenomenological
reflection that is operative in the reduction(s) reflects the terms of the
tandems (i.e., fact and essence, worldly and non-worldly etc.) at issue with
respect to the referential tracing of relations , and not the relational tracing
of references, the entire issue of the putative "separation" or "separability"
of these terms is completely besides the point. This is to say, that for
Husserl the relation between the second term of these tandems is hor-
izonally unfolded on the basis ofthe reflected reference manifested by their
first term. Only by importing a "relational," which is to say, "ontological,"
understanding of the Idea of the horizon of the terms of the reflected
tandems at issue, is it possible to characterize the phenomenological
absolute with respect to the "impossibility ofreducing [reflecting] the delay
in the passage" from the one term to the other. In other words, if in the
initially reflected Sachen selbst there is no separation, nor any separability
at issue (and this is clearly Husserl's intended meaning), there can be no
"delay." Ergo, in accord with the phenomenologically formulated
understanding of reflection, the reduction(s) are possible.

at issue is characterized in terms of "the exactness of ideal concepts," i.e., in terms of its
status as an " ideal essence." However, such "exactness" is precisely what Ideas in the
phenomenologically clarified sense do not manifest. And this on account of the state of
affairs that is involved in their phenomenological unfolding within the context of the
"descriptive essential theory ofpure lived-experiences" (§75), which, as a function of its
status as a "descriptive" eidetic of lived-experience, is necessarily involved with the
investigation of inexact essences. 1. Bamouw notes in this connection that "[i]n fact Derrida
exaggeratesthe continuity of concern for absolute norms between Logical Investigations and
the Origin" (op. cit., 169).
82 BURT C. HOPKINS

III

However, such a line of defence or apologia on behalf of Husserl risks

missing what is decisive in Derrida's reading of Husser!. Namely, that
contrary or beyond Husserl's intention, Language functions to render
intrinsically problematical the project ofthe pure (and therefore univocal)
descriptive tracing of the references at issue. The methodological point at
which for Derrida the "references" at issue in Husserl's analyses become
problematical, emerges when these analyses attempt to move beyond the
"static" (lOG, 46, 50-51, 97, 123, 125, 132) unfolding of "already
constituted" Sinn . Specifically, Husserl's recognition, in The Origin of
Geometry" that the phenomenologically epistemological problems of
"genetically" grounding the origin of Sinn come together with the problems
of phenomenological historicity, signals for Derrida the collapse of
the-perhaps "statically" legitimate-phenomenological criterion of and
teleological quest for univocity.
In the exemplary instance of the origin of Geometry that is at issue,
this collapse occurs with Husserl's attempt to trace the statically unfolded
reference of the already constituted Sinn of Geometry "back" to its
historically original institution in protogeometrical "acts." Specifically,
Husserl's static differentiation of, as it were, "solipsistic ideality" that is
intrasubjectively created and therefore psychologically limited, and
"Objective ideality" that is intersubjectively accessible and therefore
psychologically unlimited, according to Derrida points for him to the
problem of the origin of the transition of ideality from the first sense to the
second. And for Derrida, Husserl appeals to language, and in particular, to
linguistic ideality, as the original condition of possibility for this transition
in the meaning of ideality. This is to say, Derrida maintains that for Husserl
language is assigned (and for the most part tacitly) a constituting function
with respect to Objective ideality, i.e., ideality whose meaning or sense is,
in principle, accessible to all and not simply the factually insignificant
protogeometer.

37 In Edmund Husser!, The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-

nology, translated by D. Carr (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1970), cited

hereafter as "OG."
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 83

Language according to Derrida, in the sense of "transcendental

language" discussed earlier, fulfills this function assigned to it by Husserl
in two guises. The first guise is that of Speech. Speech initially permits the
intrasubjective act constitutive of ideality, in the sense of the at will
repeatable self-evidence of identity, to be intersubjectively constituted as
an identity available to other subjects. It does so according to Derrida by
way of "a spontaneous neutralization of the factual existence of the
speaking subject, of words, and of the thing designated" (IOG, 67) such
that the "word" functioning as an "ideal object confronts language as such"
(Ibid.). Speech then, as "only the practice of an immediate eidetic" (Ibid.),
functions genetically to constitute the "intersubjective" sense of ideal
Objectivity.
The intersubjectively constituted sense of Objective ideality via
Speech does not, however, account yet for the institution of its historical
origin. And nor does it account for what Derrida takes in the end (and of
course, "in the beginning") to be coincident with the historicity of this
origin, i.e., the full constitution of ideal Objectivity. For this Derrida holds,
quoting Husserl, that communication needs to" 'become virtual ' " (IOG,
87). By this Derrida understands the "ultimate objectification that writing
permits" (Ibid.) via language's graphic inscription in signs, the significa-
tions of which function to make possible the transmission of sense in
absence of factual subjects . Hence, by "absolutely virtualizing dialogue,
writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every
present subject can be absent" (IOG, 88). Indeed, for Derrida the transmis-
sion of sense coincident with writing functions to yield the phe-
nomenologically unfolded "inner" sense of the historicity of tradition.
Now Derrida finds two major, and interrelated, problems with the
function that language assumes vis-a-vis the constitution of Objective
ideality in Husserl's analyses. The first problem concerns Husserl's failure
to provide an analysis of the phenomenological origin of language (IOG,
79; cf. OG, 358). Inasmuch as for Derrida Husserl is "very conscious"
(IOG, 79) that "[a]t bottom, the problem of geometry's origin puts the
problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that of the
phenomenological origin of language" (Ibid.), the omission of an analysis
ofthe latter is of more than programmatical concern. For in lieu of such an
analysis, Husserl's account of the institutive origin of Objective ideality
84 BURT C. HOPKINS

must necessarily involve decisions about the relation of language and

ideality that are not accounted for, i.e., grounded, phenomenologically.
Specifically, and this leads into the second major problem that Derrida
finds, HusserI's decisions about the role of language in the constitution of
intersubjective and ultimately "Objective" ideality, are based on a
phenomenologically unwarranted assigning of privilege to the sign as it
functions as a "sign-signifier" or "sign expression" (lOG, 92n) to clearly
intend "the model of an objective and sensible existent" (lOG, 82), i.e.,
objectively clear sense. Which is to say, that despite his early analysis (in
the Logical Investigations) of signs which do not function to "signify" or
"express" objectively clear sense, i.e., "indicative signs" which function to
signify in a mediate manner that which is incapable of objective presenta-
tion , HusserI's analysis of the origin of Objective ideality takes the pa-
radigmatic sense of language to be precisely the sign's signifying objec-
tively clear, i.e., "unmediated," sense.
The phenomenologically unwarranted status of this privileging of the
"sign-signifier" and its resultant elevation of the criterion of univocity to
juridical preeminence, is most acute according to Derrida when the
function that Husserl assigns to language, with respect to the possibility of
the constitution of Objective ideality, is confronted by the "empirical fact"
(lOG, 92) of language's worldly embodiment. For on the one hand,
language in its "transcendental" capacity of constituting "factically free or
unbound" ideality, i.e., intersubjective and ultimately historically trans-
mitted Objectivity, must in its pure possibility not be confused with any "de
facto empirical language." While on the other hand, as a function of the
vocal or graphic embodiment of its expression, language is always already
"intertwined" with de facto empiricality, with worldliness. In short ,
linguistic expression necessarily has the status of "bound ideality." And
insofar as linguistic expression is at once penultimately (qua Speech) and
ultimately (qua writing) "the sine qua non condition of Objectivity's
internal completion" (lOG, 89), "[t]he possibility or necessity of being
incarnated in a graphic [or vocal] sign is no longer simply extrinsic and
factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity" (Ibid.), but rather, inextricab-
ly bound up with it.
All this is to say that, contra HusserI's decision to privilege the sign-
signifier and hence univocity, language is intrinsically indicative and hence
equivocal. In Derrida's words:
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 85

[e)quivocity is always irreducible .. . because words and language in

general are not and can never be absolute objects. They do not possess
any resistant and permanent identity that is absolutely their own. They
have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as med-
iations. The "same" word is always "other" according to the always
different intentional acts which thereby make a word significative [sig-
nifiant). There is a sort of pure equivocity here . . . (JOG, 104).

The result of this state of affairs for Derrida is Husserl's disclosure, despite
his intentions, of the coincidence of the sense of ideal Objectivity with the
sense of historicity. For insofar as writing functions for Husserl as the sine
qua non for the full constitution of ideal Objectivity, the de facto em-
piricality characteristic of the indicative significations of the latter is
always already threatened by loss, forgetfulness, in short, "historicity."
Hence Derrida's uncovering in Husserl's analyses of the "spiraling
movement which is the major find of our [Derrida's] text" (lOG, 33), a
movement whose" 'zigzag' way of proceeding ... is only the pure form
of every historical experience" (lOG, 50-51), which traverses a "sort of
necessary circle" (lOG, 51). And it is precisely this "find" ofDerrida's that
signals for him the reversal of the priority that is assigned by Husserl's
static methodology, ofthe essential over the factual, the non-worldly over
the worldly, the transcendental over the empirical, and the univocal over
the equivocal. Indeed, insofar as the telos of univocity that is at the root of
this statically determined priority continues to inspire Husserl's Historical
Ruckfrage, and as befitting the latter's phenomenological character it seems
that for Derrida this telos can do nothing but continue inspire Husserl's
methodology, a reduction of the reduction, in the sense of phenomenology
manifesting the capacity to "ground itself," remains essentially out of the
question .
This means, then, that insofar as the significative reference at issue in
the phenomenological quest for origins points to the subjective," and here

38 Derrida also makes the point, although he does not push it, that with the phe-
nomenological thematization of the cultural life-world, the reduction to the preculturallife-
world, i.e., the "pure Nature" (lOG, 81) whose objective and sensible existents serve as the
model for univocal expression, is recognized as involving "a theoretical operation which is
one ofthe highest forms of culture in general" (lOG , Ibid). This operation is of course "the
reduction of a determined culture" (lOG, Ibid). Derrida holds that the latter is ultimately
86 BURT C. HOPKINS

it does not matter if the subject ivity of the origin in question is the
temporalization of the Living Present or the institutive leap beyond
sensibility of the philosopher's protogeometrical ideative abstraction, the
reductive regression to origin, in the sense of its evidential intuition, is
impossible . And this for the simple reason that for Derrida evidential
intuition and univocal linguistic expression are phenomenologically
equivalent.
With respect then to the earlier suggestion that Derrida's understand-
ing ofthe reduction and hence phenomenological reflection is subtly "onto-
logical," in that it reverses the status of "reference" and "relation" in
Husserl, it may now be said that since for Derrida there can be no reference
without linguistic expression, and nor can there be any linguistic expression
without pure equivocity, there can be no univocal "reference" to serve as
a guiding clue for the tracing of relations . Hence, the "undecidability" of
all relations .

IV

In response to this I want to close my discussion with a methodological

question addressed to Derrida's reading, which I will take the liberty of
answering. And on the basis of this answer I will then make a phenomeno-
logical appeal to die Sachen selbst that I think calls into serious question
Derrida's equation of evidence and univocal linguistic expression.
My question will assume that Derrida's account or reading of the
function oflanguage in Husserl's philosophy, specifically, of its function-
ing with respect to what he calls "transcendental language," is true to the
spirit of Husserl's phenomenological Ruckfrage. Which is to say, that
Derrida's "analyses" mark a phenomenological advance with respect to the

"irreducible," and that thus precultural pure Nature "is always buried" (lOG, Ibid). As a
result, the possibility of univocal communication with referents to objective and sensible
existents for Derrida "is a kind of infra-ideal" (lOG, 82). Hence, it could be suggested that
in the instance of "objective" as well as subjective referents, Derrida finds the phe-
nomenological regression to origin to be impossible, and for the same reason, viz., the pure
equivocity of de facto empirical (here "cultural") medium in which all references are
necessarily expressed.
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 87

status of language and Sinn in Husserl's thought. On the basis of this

(admittedly "big") assumption," the question I want to pose is as follows:

39 With respect to the assumption that Derrida's reading is "true to the spirit" of Husserl's

Riickfrage, the following discrepancy between Husserl's text (10) that deals with this
problematic and Derrida's reading of it needs to be mentioned. Specifically, as I have
discussed in detail above , Derrida holds that "writing" assumes a constitutive function for
Husserl in terms of both historicity's inner sense as "transmission of tradition," and as a
condition of possibility (qua the facticality and hence equivocity of its graphic embodiment)
for the loss (sedimentation) of tradition, i.e., of its "original" Sinn. Further, Derrida holds
that for Husserl it is the "Idea" (in the Kantian sense) which, as a result of its "factically
unbound" status, is paradigmatic with respect to historicity in the sense of "transmission of
a tradition." However, a close and careful scrutiny of Husserl's text reveals (1) that the
"transmission of tradition" is not limited to, and thus not necessarily grounded in, ideality
in the paradigmatic sense of "Ideas." And (2), that the loss or sedimentation of tradition is
not limited to, and therefore again not necessarily grounded in, the equivocity of language's
scriptural embodiment, writing.
Regarding (I), Husserl writes "[i]t is clear that the method of producing original
idealities out of what is prescientifically given in the cultural world must have been written
down and fixed in firm sentences prior to the existence ofgeometry; furthermore . .. the
reactivation of their self-evident meaning must have been, in its own way, handed down and
ever capable of being handed down" (10,366, my emphasis). Insofar then as there were no
"Ideas" prior to the existence of geometry (and Derrida's reading maintains this) , it seems
quite clear that for Husserl historicity in the sense of "transmission of tradition" does not
have as its sine qua non ideality in the paradigmatic sense of these "Ideas."
Regarding (2) , Husserl's text again is quite clear that the loss of the "original truth-
meaning" (10,368) of geometry is rooted in: (a) "the first oral cooperation of the beginning
geometers . .. [in which] the need was understandably lacking for an exact fixing of
descriptions of the prescientific primal material and the ways in which, in relation to this
material, geometrical idealities arose together with the first 'axiomatic' propositions" (Ibid.,
my emphasis); (b) in the relative lack of development of geometry which allowed the
beginning geometers to "return again and again to the original meaning" (Ibid.); and finally,
(c) in the "realm of praxis" (Ibid.), where the habitual utility of "[t]his method could
naturally be handed down without the ability for original self-evidence" (Ibid.). Thus,
insofar as the "handing down" at issue here involves the "important function of written,
documenting linguistic expression" (10, 360), it would seem, contra Derrida's reading, that
the loss or sedimentation of geometry's original meaning has its locus in Husserl's text prior
to its scriptural embodiment, rather then, as Derrida would have it, as its necessary
consequence. And indeed, insofar as Husserl's investigation of geometry is "exemplary"
with respect to "historicity as such', it would appear that with regard to the latter as well the
loss or sedimentation of original meaning would not be necessarily tied to scriptural embodi-
ment.
Of course, by pointing out these discrepancies in Derrida's reading of Husserl's text,
I do not mean to suggest that Husserl is necessarily "right" and Derrida "wrong" with
respect to the underlying issues . Rather, my intent is more modest, viz., emphasizing that
88 BURT C. HOPKINS

How does Derrida "know" what he claims to know about language and the
constitution of Sinn? Of course, Derrida does not make, and nor claim to
make, "knowledge claims" in the traditional sense. So perhaps a more
cautious phrasing of my question is called for, along the following lines:
How does the text ofDerrida disclose or otherwise "find" that the texts of
Husserl, contrary to Husserl's intention, move in the direction of showing
the ''pure equivocity" of all linguistic expression and therefore of the Sinn
whose constitution is inextricably intertwined with linguistic expression,
and further; that this movement of Husserl's text is itself somehow related
to the "linguistic being" of "words and language in general?" In other
words, how does Derrida's text "find" that Husserl's privileging of "sign
signifiers" or "sign expressions" is philosophically (or perhaps "linguistica-
lly') unwarranted vis-a-vis the being of words and language in general?
It seems to me that Derrida's "find" points, minimally, to his being
able to make and sustain the difference between Husserl's (or his texts')
assumptions about language and language "itself." And maximally,
Derrida's "find" seems to contain some positive appeals to what language
itselfis like, even if these are only offered by way oftentative "correctives"
to Husserl's assumptions.
Now in my view the only way that Derrida can sustain this difference
and its appeal to deficiencies vis-a-vis language, would be if he were able
to decipher in Husserl's text references to not only what Husserl holds to
be the phenomenological status of language, but also, references to
language itself, as that which both Husserl, and Derrida reading Husserl,
are interested in. The "operative" stability that these references assume in
Derrida's text seems to me to be indicative of both a recognition and appeal
to Sinne that, minimally suggest and maximally yield, some kind of
"resistant and permanent identity." To be sure, this identity does not appear
as a result of words and language in general being "absolute objects."
Rather, it appears in terms of the capacity of Derrida's text to constantly
reiterate, if not invoke "at will," Husserl's thought about language with
respect to the likewise constantly reiterated if not willfully invoked status
of language itself. What is noteworthy here is that the reiterative constancy

the assumption that Derrida's reading of Husser! is true to the "spirit" of his phenomeno-
logical Riickfrage, is a big one.
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 89

ofthese operational references do not demand of the language of Husserl's

or Derrida's texts, and nor of the language itself that is referred to and
therefore the referent of these texts, any kind or manner of conformity to
the paradigm of "absolute objects"; or, what would amount (for Derrida)
to the same thing, that these references have as their sine qua non
linguistically expressive univocity. To the contrary, it is precisely the
absence of such univocity which permits the references at issue to emerge
as indicative, as opposed to significative (in the sense of sign-signifers or
sign-expressions) indices whose referents yield Sinne that are at once
resistant and, as a function of their reiterability, constant in their identity.
For if the intelligibility of Derrida's text were dependent upon such
univocity being present in the text, not only his text but that which his text
is about, i.e., Husserl's text, and indeed, that which Husserl's text and
Derrida's text are about, i.e., the intertwining of language and Sinn, would
function linguistically in terms of sign-signifers expressive of objectively
clear Sinn. And surely this is as little the case as its contrary, viz., that in
the absence of this univocity, Derrida's text is, or if this "absence" has to
be discovered, becomes, unintelligible.
Indeed, it is precisely the demand for, or preoccupation with,
"linguistic univocity" that in my view points to some minimal threshold of
epistemic concern or involvement on the part of Derrida's text with respect
to both Husserl's text and language itself. And this for the simple reason
that Derrida's preoccupation or involvement with "language," be it
Husserl's, or words and language in general, or the relation or lack of
relation ofHusserl's language and words and language in general, signals
something in excess of both a non-philosophical functional involvement
with language and as well, of a merely literary involvement and concern
with the "texture" and "linguisticality" of language.
In my opinion, the condition of possibility for Derrida's text's
epistemic involvement with both Husserl's text and with words and
language in general as they function in the constitution of Sinn, is
"reflection." And further, insofar as such reflection is not directed by an
interest in the factual status of these themes and nor by an interest in their
empirically psychological genesis, the reflection pointed to by the
"operative references" to Sinne in Derrida's text wants to be phenomeno-
logical. Regarding the latter, Derrida's frequent allusions to "Husserl's
90 BURTC. HOPKINS

intentions," as well as the "immanent" orientation of his critique," need

only be recalled. Indeed, the careful reading of Derrida's text with respect
to the "pure equivocity" that it holds to be constitutive of words and
language in general, and therefore, of the Sinne and references to such
Sinne that are held to be inextricably bound up with this expressive
equivocity, shows that Derrida's text's finding occurs here with respect to
an appeal to their (i.e., "words and language in general") having "their
linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as mediations"
(lOG, 104, my emphasis). Hence, Derrida's text can then go on to conclude:
"The ' same' word is always ' other' according to the always different
intentional acts which thereby make a word significative" (Ibid.). And, at
the risk of belaboring the point, not only does Derrida's appeal here to
"intention" and "intentional acts" presuppose his text's intention to
reflectively accomplish the phenomenological reduction of "words and
language in general" to their phenomenal conditions of possibility; but also,
by locating these latter in the former's intentional traversal as mediations
that originate in different intentional acts, Derrida's text appeals here as
well to operative references and their sinnvoll referents which somehow
manage to escape or exceed the "pure equivocity" that is at issue. In other
words, insofar as what is at issue here is the "linguisticality" of linguistic
expression, Derrida's text recognizes that the phenomenal conditions for the
"pure equivocity" at issue, that is, for linguistic expression , are not
"themselves" exclusively linguistic. For were they "irreducibly"
"linguistic," they would be tainted by precisely the equivocality of
expression that it is their function to uncover in terms of the phenomenal
conditions of possibility. Which is to say, for the "intention' and "inten-
tional acts" appealed to by Derrida's text to be meaningful as "conditions
of possibility," they must somehow be exhibited or otherwise yielded by
his analyses as "resistant" and "permanent in their identity." Or, to put it
in Derrida's idiom, his analysis of the de facto empirical embodiment of
language that Husserl's functional account of "transcendental language"
assumes, as it were, "despite itself," presupposes a "transcendental
discourse" which is capable of escaping the very conditions of de facto

40 With respect to the latter, Derrida's discussion of linguistic embodiment and ideality

"which Husserl does not directly describe, but which we think can be located on the basis
of strictly Husserlian concepts" (lOG, 89n), is particularly telling .
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 91

empirical embodiment that in the case ofHusserl his discourse is maintain-

ing cannot be escaped.
Such meaningful conditions of possibility then seem to suggest,
contrary to other findings of Derrida's text, that the exhibition and
manifestation of phenomena, i.e, evidential intuition, and univocal
.linguistic expression (at least with respect to how Derrida understands it:
i.e., in terms of the sign-signifers's relational ground in paradigmatic
"absolute objects"), are not phenomenologically equivalent. The question
then emerges: How is this possible? In order to suggest an answer here, I
shall turn to die Sachen selbst of the phenomenological reflection that is at
issue in Husserl's texts, and attempt to show that and how it is that
Derrida's "ontological" understanding of reflection precludes the recogni-
tion of precisely the non-equivalence of evidential intuition and univocal
linguistic expression that is "somehow" uncovered via phenomenological
reflection.
For Derrida, the reduction, vide "reflection," of "Facts" for Husserl
involves the attempt to "repeat" in reflection the Fact that is reflected upon.
Such "repetition" necessarily involves for Derrida the unavoidable loss of
the "factuality of the Fact." And further, when the pure equivocity of the
linguistic embodiment ofthe full Objectivity of Facts is taken into account,
the phenomenological impossibility of reflectively "reducing" facts to Sinn
emerges. Hence the unavoidable "delay" in the phenomenological method's
"passage" from the reflected upon, and especially the origin of reflected
upon, that Derrida finds to be the quintessential characteristic of the
reduction.
However, for Husserl reflection clearly does not attempt to "repeat"
in reflection the Fact that is reflected upon." Rather, as I have already
discussed above, the "reflected upon" for Husserl, as a function of its
yielding the "reflected" as "already having been there" prior to its coming
before the regard of reflection, is in no way methodically engaged by
"reflection" as something to be evidentially intuited qua its "repetition" by
reflection. To the contrary, Husserl again clearly differentiates this function
of reflected Sinn to (1) indicate beyond that which appears and the natural

41 With respect to this issue, Depp writes : "he [Husserl] does not see phenomenological
reflection as actually repeating , in reflection, what is intended as being reflected upon" (op.
cit., 239).
92 BURT C. HOPKINS

inclination to understand that which is so indicated as already there to be

already there (i.e. , transcendent); and (2) the reflective reduction of this
inclination, whose epistemic intention is limited to the descriptive tracing
of this reflected indication insofar as it appears as such. In other words, for
Husserl, subsequent to execution of this reductive intent, the "reflected
upon" is differentiated in terms of the "ontological" status of the pre-
reductive intentional reference and referent and the "phenomenological"
status of the "same" intentional reference and referent that is now treated
descriptively, i.e., evidentially.
Derrida's conflation? of these two Sinne of the "reflected upon"
signals then not only his subtly "ontological" understanding of the phe-
nomenological reduction and the reflection which carries it out, but also,
his inability to see how the project of descriptively tracing the "same"
reference and referent that is at issue with respect to the pre and post
reductive "reflected upon," entails (1) neither its reflective "repetition" nor
(2) the unfulfillable demand for its "object-relational" univocal expression.
The former (1) is the case since the "sameness" at issue is not relational but
referential. The identity at issue is clearly then not formal in the sense of
either pure logic or formal ontology. Rather, this "sameness" is phe-
nomenological, with respect to the eidetic unfolding of the capacity of
reflection to referentially indicate "the same" "reflected upon" content
without thereby necessarily formulating the "sameness" of the Sinn at issue
in formal terms . The latter (2) is the case since the putative pure equivocity
at issue in the constituted Sinn of the "reflected upon" is itself a function
ofDerrida's own attempts to reductively reflect, and therefore referentially
trace, the (in a certain sense) "trans-equivocal" conditions of possibility of
a reflected Sinn: viz., "transcendental language."
To be sure, by pointing to this tacit reliance by Derrida on the capacity
of his analyses and indeed his text to "approximate," at the very least, some
kind of "trans-equivocal" meaning, I do not mean to suggest that the
phenomenological or otherwise "conditions of possibility" for such
meaning and its approximation have been established. Indeed, it seems to
me that the phenomenological and/or philosophical status of the "refer-

42 Again, in this connection Depp writes: "Husser! . . . distinguishes between the actual
difference between , and the intentional sameness of, an effective object of perception and
the reflectively considered object of the ' same' perception" (op. cit., 236).
 ON THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY 93

ences" at issue will always remain problematical so long as the "conditions

of possibility" of the philosophical telos of univocal dialogical accord
animating both Husserl's and Derrida's texts remain unaccounted for. That
Derrida's analyses in lOG could not ultimately shed this telos seems to me
ample testament not only to the power of Husserl's phenomenological
manifestation of it, but also to the presumption of "transcendental
discourse" which appears to ensnare those bold enough to attempt to shed
this telos.

Seattle University
 CHAPTER FIVE

PURE PRESENCE:
A MODEST PROPOSAL

JOHN SCANLON

The more sophisticated parody is, the easier it is to miss its parodic
character, to fall into the trap of taking it as a serious, straightforward
exercise of the art it mimics . Yet, to be successful as parody, it must
provide sufficient clues for the discerning reader to grasp its satirical
character. Otherwise, it remains an undetected , therefore unappreciated,
hoax.
At one end of the spectrum are universally acknowledged pieces of
satire such as Swift's "A Modest Proposal " and Voltaire's Candide. Swift
maintains the air of calculative, modest reasonableness throughout his
essay. Yet, the obvious preposterousness of the proposal leaves no doubt
of its satiric character. Its very outrageousness discloses that Swift is
parodying, rather than contributing to, the genre in which high-minded
Englishmen or Anglo-Irishmen offer their modest proposals for solving the
"Irish problem ." Only the densest readers would mistake its mock-
seriousness and engage in a polemic with its author. Similarly, in Candide,
the blatant contrast between Pangloss' facile idealism and the hyperbolic
accumulation of extreme miseries in the lives of the characters drives home
the point that the character of Pangloss presents a farcical parody of an
optimistic metaphysician.
Somewhat more subtle an example might be Sartre's Nausea. It becomes
obvious at the start that one is reading a work of fiction, for which the diary
format is only a frame. Yet, the novel maintains a heightened air of serious-
ness in depicting the character's fictitious metaphysical experiences and
reflections. Is the novel to be taken as presenting, in fictional form,
seriously asserted convictions about being and existence? It might be read

95
W. R. McKenTUJ and J. C. Evans (eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 95-101.
© 1995 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
96 JOHN SCANLON

thus. On the other hand, it can be read as a subtle but thorough parody of
a metaphysical journal. One strong hint in that direction would be, for
example, the ironic reversal by which Rocquentin is led by his pseudo-
mystical experiences to discover, not the exalted sense of something above
and beyond intelligible being, but the absurd existence lurking below the
everyday world of order and meaning . Another would be the bathos with
which he complains of being born in the world of existents, and not in that
of circles and triangles where he might feel at home. On that interpretation,
to argue for or against any metaphysical position depicted in the novel
would be to miss its parodic character.
From the field of poetry, Robert Frost's "The Road Not Taken" is
frequently anthologized as a poetic exaltation of affirmative individualism.
One might even be subjected to a solemn reading of it on public occasions
that seem to call for exalted sentiments favoring hard decisions. But it is
analyzed persuasively as a mock-sentimental parody ofthat genre in Satire:
That Blasted Art. I That ambiguous situation indicates that this poem may
exemplify a very high degree of sophisticated subtlety in the art of parody.
It exemplifies, more generally, that caveat lector is an injunction not to be
discarded lightly.
I would like to suggest that the strange little piece entitled Speech and
Phenomena can be read, justifiably, as a sophisticated parody of a
pompously pedantic exegesis of the first chapter of the first investigation
of Husserl's Logical Investigations.
Taken at face value, and in its most general features, Speech and
Phenomena presents a close, carefully reasoned commentary and inter-
pretation ofthe essential distinctions with which Husserl opens his Logical
Investigations. Ambitious in its scope, it attempts to argue that the seeds of
Husserl's phenomenology as a general philosophical position can be
discerned in those early distinctions. The hermeneutical strategy followed
is to trace out the general theory of language proposed in those distinctions,
to set that theory within a general theory of signs that Husserl does not
develop, to see in that theory of language an indication of the metaphysics

I John R. Clark, and Anna Motto, (editors) Satire: That Blasted Art (New York:

Putnam's, 1973).
 PURE PRESENCE: A MODEST PROPOSAL 97

of presence, and to critique that philosophical position by way of an

explicit theory of signs that undercuts it.
More specifically, the piece centers in on Husserl's intuitionism as
demanding a return to a pure presence of the self to itself. It attempts to
show how an ironic fate (embodied in the traditional heritage of the
metaphysics of presence) inexorably reduces the phenomenologist to
nothing but the present moment of his own muted voice . All else must be
excluded as contaminating pure presence . From this pure remainder
nothing can be derived. Hence, intuitionistic metaphysics is reduced to
absurdity.
The scholarly apparatus of frequent footnotes , discussions of the
differences between German words and their proper but not quite adequate
French translations, and citations of long passages from Husserl's texts,
present a cumulative appearance of a serious work, combining thorough
scholarly exegesis with profound philosophical argument.
However, when one follows the argument more closely, it turns out to
be preposterous in several ways. First of all, Husserl's distinctions are
proposed in his Logical Investigations as essential to the circumscribed
project of reflecting upon the sense of logic. To interpret them as if they
developed a general theory of language is to distort them from the start.
Secondly, the argument starts with a recognition that intuitionism is but one
strain in Husserl's approach to philosophy. Yet, it proposes to follow that
one strand exclusively. That procedure clearly results in a form of
caricature which, as such, distorts what it caricatures. Most basically, to
interpret Husserl's demand for intuitive evidence as if it were a metaphysi-
cal starting point in the grand style of a fundamental axiom to which all
else must be reduced and from which all else must be derived is to
misrepresent the very spirit of Husserl's phenomenology. Further, to
identify intuitive presence with the pure presence of the self to itself
misrepresents the openly diversified sense of intuitive givenness articulated
in the principle of all principles. To take that distortive identification as the
telos of phenomenology and then to show that it can not be achieved is to
present an obviously idle straw man argument.
If the line of argument is preposterous, the method of argument is even
more obnoxiously so. The method followed is to confront Husserl's texts
with one another in purely conceptual fashion. Texts taken from different
contexts, such as the distinctions operative in logical considerations on the
98 JOHN SCANLON

one hand, and the terms required for analyses of internal time-conscious-
ness on the other, are assimilated, as if the difference of context did not
matter. Further, and worse, all the texts are analyzed only from the
perspective of explicit or implicit word-meanings, never from the
perspective of the phenomena to which they refer, and in terms of which
their specific determinations can be understood. No referential context is
admitted, let alone consulted . Consequently, Husserl's texts are distorted
by being read as if they were themselves exercises in verbal-conceptual
analysis, rather than reflections upon phenomena. Finally, the void
occasioned by eliminating the inherent context of reflection upon various
phenomena is filled by the extraneously imposed context of the complex
of concepts that comprise the superimposed metaphysics of presence.
In short, and without entering into details, to take Speech and Phenom-
ena at face value and to read it with the customary critical attitude with
which one generall y confronts critical exegeses is to be outraged at the
deliberate distortions of Husserl's texts and the fallacious arguments
offered in discussing them. To construct elaborate arguments in order to
show conclusively that this strange little piece distorts Husserl's texts
would be rather like constructing an elaborate argument to show that is
wrong to eat one-year-old Irish children, even if one pays the fair market
price for them. Derrida's proposal seems no less preposterous, hermeneuti-
cally, than Swift's, morally. And no less obviously so, to anyone familiar
with Husserl 's philosophical writings.
But that last category surely includes Derrida. Hence, the distortions
must be deliberate. When are deliberate distortions not necessarily a worthy
object of outrage? Perhaps, when they are not seriously assertive but
playful distortions; that is, when they are satirical in character.
Does Speech and Phenomena provide any clues as to its being playful
in character? One suggestive clue is the central role of broad puns in
moving the pseudo-argument along. Fairly early in its development, "pure"
is thus broadly punned, so that the reading moves from the methodological
sense of purity as insuring conceptual precision relative to some phenome-
non, to the sense of hygienically sterile purity whose contrast is "contami-
nated." In another instance, a very complex word-play ironically inserts an
element of voluntarism into Husserl's phenomenology. First, it is carefully
pointed out that the French expression voulo ir-dire does not match
precisely the German bedeuten or the English to mean. The French term is
 PURE PRESENCE: A MODEST PROPOSAL 99

used with the proviso that it is not to be taken literally. But subsequently,
vouloir-dire is made to mean "want to say," so that the German text of
Husserl (which obviously does not contain vouloir-dire) is forced to
contain a voluntaristic account of meaning. A third such instance of a broad
pun occurs when the possible absence of the speaker from the thing spoken
about meaningfully is equated with the death of the speaker or author.
Depending upon one's taste in puns, and also upon one's degree of
distance from the object of the puns, one many groan at these instances,
titter at them, or laugh uproariously. In any case, they indicate something
other than a serious attitude. They may be taken as invitations to view the
recognizable distortions and fallacies of the text, not as assertions calling
for belief or disbelief, but as parts of a playful mode of discourse calling
for the suspension of disbelief appropriate to the reading of literary texts.
The puns are accompanied by instances of other devices characteristic
of satire's stock in trade: ironic reversal, hyperbole, caricature, paradoxes,
and ironic reductio ad absurdum . Cumulatively, they may be taken as
indications that the distortions are only in fun, like the distorting mirrors at
an amusement park, whether one is actually amused or not.
Nevertheless, such indications of the playful character of the writing
have to be teased out a piece of work that is consistently very serious, even
solemn, in tone. They are not wholly obvious . They can readily be passed
over by the serious reader to whom it is not necessarily manifest that the
work is only playing at interpreting Husserl's text. Further, the distortions
are not merely random, like a haphazard series of distorting mirrors. They
are tightly unified. The distortions all point toward one central core of
distortion.
Is there an interpretive hypothesis which could account for both the
uncrumbing facade of seriousness and the structural unity of the piece,
within a general context of playful distortion? To account for the almost
insurmountable appearance of seriousness, we might entertain the
assumption that what we are reading is not Derrida's playfully distortive
reading ofHusserl's text but Derrida's parodic presentation of a fictitious,
anonymous, exegete's serious but bumbling reading ofthat text. To account
for the unity of distortions, we might assume , further, that the fictitious
exegete's reading is dictated throughout by a pedantic fixation upon the
conceit that the text being interpreted must, in every respect, be subordi-
nated to a mythic master text known as the metaphysics of presence.
100 JOHN SCANLON

To illustrate, why does this pseudo-exegesis insist that intuitive presence

must equate with the pure presence of a self to itself? No textual evidence
is adduced, and none needs to be adduced, because this dogmatic pedant
knows in advance what presence must be to any philosopher caught within
the heritage of the metaphysics of presence.
Why does this pseudo-exegesis insist that Husserl's theory of meaning
must be voluntaristic? A flimsy, clearly specious argument is offered.
Namely, since Husserl, in distinguishing between expressive and indicative
meanings, includes involuntary gestures that can be interpreted by others
among the indicative functions that are not essential to assertive, expressive
discourse, he must be equating expressive meaning, as the essence of
meaning, with what one wills to say. The argument is offered only in a
casual manner, though the point is insisted upon, since the clinching reason
is actually extrinsic to Husserl's text and intrinsic to the pedantically
imposed demands of the metaphysics of presence. That a priori scheme
requires that meaning be correlated with spirit and spirit with will .
Why does this pseudo-exegesis overlook essential distinctions evident
to anyone working closely with the diverse phenomena reflected upon in
various contexts, such as the distinction between solitary discourse
employing the common meanings of communicative discourse as one
phenomenon, and the abstractly conceived sphere of ownness as an
essentially different phenomenon? Apparently, because from the Olympian
vantage point proffered by the conceit of the metaphysics of presence, such
differences can neither be discerned nor allowed.
I believe that such illustrations can be multiplied and that they make
coherent sense under the suggested interpretive hypothesis. They form a
coherent whole as aspects of an effective parody of an exegesis that is
flawed consistently by a rigid fixation upon the one a priori scheme of the
mythic metaphysics of presence. To it all parts of the text must be
forcefully submitted. Under that interpretive hypothesis, the fictitious
pedant is quite convinced that he is interpreting the text from a vantage
point of great superiority, a vantage point that leads him to claim to
understand the text far more profoundly than anyone actually involved in
fine points of reflection upon such limited topics as the sense of logic could
ever do. He is not at all playful , but pompously solemn about the interpreta-
tions he is offering. But the reader who picks up the subtle indications of
 PURE PRESENCE: A MODEST PROPOSAL 101

this sophisticated parody can notice the distortions and fallacies that his
fixity upon the one idea leads him to fall into unwittingly.
What does one do with such a parody, ifthat is what it is? As far as I can
see, there seems nothing to do but to take it lightly, appreciating its
peculiarly sophisticated form of wit, while enjoying the typically perverse
satisfaction offered by the comeuppance of the pompously bumbling
pedant. Beyond that, as always, caveat lector.
In any event, whether one interprets this strange little piece as a satiric
distortion ofHusserl's text or as a parody of a serious but flawed exegesis
of that text, I find no reason to consider it as offering either exegetic or
philosophical assertions to be defended or to be disputed.

Duquesne University
 CHAPTER SIX

OF GRAMMATOLATRY: DECONSTRUCTION
AS RIGOROUS PHENOMENOLOGY?

ALAN WHITE

I. Deconstructionist Bullshit

We are here, according to our program, to discuss phenomenology and

deconstruction. Before I do that, I would like to address a preliminary
question: why discuss deconstruction at all? Deconstruction is, after all, a
part of the "post-modernist contribution" that, according to an article in a
recent academic journal, is itself nothing more that "a spectacular PR
maneuver" that has "succeeded in repackaging and marketing-especially
in English Departments all too well-known for intellectual under-
development-what had been previously bemoaned as ontological Angst
into playfulness and joy: transcendental homelessness for the me-
generation"? ' Discussion of such a development might well have a place
at meetings ofthe Modem Language Association, but we gather here under
the auspices of the American Philosophical Association , and even if we
cannot be certain that the APA contains no pockets of " intellectual
underdevelopment," it remains true that, as John Searle has reported ,
"deconstruction [has] found little appeal among professional philoso-
phers"-as opposed, of course, to literary critics.'

I Russell A. Berman and Paul Piccone, "Hidden Agendas : The Young Heidegger and the

Post-Modem Debate," Telos 77 (Fall \988 ), \\8. I thank Hart Murphy for bringing this
estimable text to my attention.
2 John R. Searle, "The Word Turned Upside Down," The New York Review ofBooks , 27
October \983 , 78.

103
W. R. McKenna and J. C. Evans (eds.}, Derrida and Phenomenology, 103-\19.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers .
104 ALAN WHITE

If deconstruction has "found little appeal" among us, why are we talking
about it? And if we find it more than a little appealing, why aren't we at
MLA? Well, perhaps some of us are among the "notable exceptions" whose
existence Searle acknowledges-perhaps we are professional philosophers
who find deconstruction worth talking about. Even if we are, Searle warns
that we

are often ambiguous allies. One of these [notable exceptions] charac-

terized Derrida as "the sort of philosopher who gives bullshit a bad
name." We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that this may be an
expression of praise in the deconstructionist vocabulary ("Upside Down,"
78).

Why speak of the sort of philosophers, and philosophies, that "give bullshit
a bad name?" Have we nothing better to do?
Perhaps not. Confronted with the choice between exceptional philoso-
phers like Derrida and unexceptional ones like Searle, and assuming that
Searle's ilk must be those who give bullshit a good name, I must admit,
even at the APA , that I find the former more appealing. Perhaps de-
construction is worth discussing after all.
Discussion does not, ofcourse, entail agreement. It does, however, entail
discussion. The two articles I have cited reveal two strategies employed by
some who seek to reject deconstruction without discussing it. One is "to
insult an author instead ofcriticizing him through demonstration;" the other
is "to turn gossip into an argument."? I join Derrida in maintaining that
such strategies should have no place in discussions, even at the AP A. For
my part, I talk of deconstruction tonight because I deem it worthy of
discussion, even, or perhaps especially, at the APA. As for bullshit, I intend
henceforth (tonight at least) to avoid it altogether; failing that, I hope to
contribute to giving it the name it deserves.

3 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 139.

Limited Inc contains " Signature Event Context" (1971), 1-23 (hereafter, cited as Sec);
"Limited Inc abc . .." (1977),29-110 (hereafter, "Limited") and "Afterword: Toward a
Ethic of Discussion," dated 1988, 111-60 (hereafter, cited as "Afterword").
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 105

II. Rigorous Philosophy, Rigorous Science

My title is intended to suggest a thesis likely to be opposed by most

phenomenologists, and by at least some deconstructionists. The
thesis-which, in accordance with my preference for discussion over
debate, or for learning over winning, I intend more to examine than to
defend or to attack-is that the move from Husserlian phenomenology to
Derridian deconstruction is made when the demand for philosophical rigor
leads to the abandonment of the dream of a philosophical science.
My association of phenomenology with rigor and science should come
as no surprise: two of the three are named in the title of Husserl's 1911
essay, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," and the third, phenomenology,
appears as the answer to the question implicit in that title ." No more
surprising is my suggested opposition between deconstruction and science:
Derrida is known as a champion of indeterminacy and free play, as the
archenemy of scientific " logocentrism."" What may make my thesis
puzzling is its association of deconstruction with rigor: precisely the
features of deconstruction that oppose it to science are often taken, by
friend and by foe, to oppose it to rigor at well .
Given the power of Derrida's reputation, I fear that my thesis may
appear too implausible to be worthy even of brief consideration. I therefore
introduce some passages that may make it sufficiently intriguing to warrant
our attention for the next twenty minutes or so. Derrida writes:

what has always seemed to me the most rigorous (theoretically, scientifi-

cally, philosophically, but also for a writing that would no longer be only
theoretical-scientific-philosophical), is not indeterminacy in itself, but the
strictest possible determination of the figures of play, of oscillation, of
undecidability, which is to say, of the differaniial conditions of determina-
ble history, etc ("Afterword," 145; my emphases).

4 In Phenomenology and the Crisis ofPhilosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965);

hereafter, PCP.
S Concerning Derridean grarnmatology as "science," see OfGrammatology (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976),27,74,93.
106 ALAN WHITE

Derrida's concern with the "strictest possible determination" of these

"differantial" conditions leads him to seek "to reach the rigorous thought
of [the] strange nondifference [between signifier and signified] and [ .. . ]
to determine it correctly" (OJ Grammatology, 23). This attempt leads
Derrida beyond philosophy and its logic but, he insists, "the same demand
of rigor [that motivates philosophy's logic] requires the structure of that
logic to be transformed or complicated" ("Afterword," 123; my emphasis).
The transformative complication, Derrida continues,

leads neither to "illogic " nor to "indistinction" nor to "indeterminacy."

This other "logic" does not authorize, in theoretical discourse as such, any
kind of approximative statement. It never renounces . . . clear and
rigorous distinction ("Afterword," 127).

So writes Derrida. But why should we take him at his word, particularly
when he himself might well question the possibility of "his" "having" a
"word" at which we can "take him" in the first place? Derrida is a
deconstructionist, and deconstructionists are reputed "not to believe in
truth, stability, or the unity of meaning." If Derrida, according to his
reputation, denies stable or unitary meaning, they why seek to determine
what he might mean? To be sure, Derrida insists that the definition of
deconstruction on which this reputation is based is ''false (that's right: false,
not true) and feeble ; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and
feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine" ("Afterword," 146). So
writes Derrida. But again, so what? He's a deconstructionist, why trust
him?
Clearly-a problematic term, perhaps, but I use it nonetheless-dearly,
this will get us nowhere. In my attempt to get us somewhere else, I
rephrase my thesis in a manner that, it seems to me, should be acceptable
to all. My revised formulation: Derrida's writings contain passages, some
of which I have quoted, that seem to affirm the value of rigor.
Even if my revised formulation is accepted, my examination of it may
be blocked by an additional impediment. Granted that there are passages
in which Derrida seems to advocate rigor, there are also passages where he
seems to preclude the possibility of rigor. I therefore consider two passages
of this sort-two of the sort that, I suspect, has led Searle to insist that
"Derrida has a distressing penchant for saying things that are obviously
 OF GRAMMATOLA TRY 107

false. :" The interpretations I suggest for the problematic passages should
both undermine any contention of their obvious falsity, and begin to
articulate the rigor I take to be involved in deconstruction. The passages are
particularly appropriate with respect to the question of how deconstruction
relates to phenomenology in that they concern matters of central impor-
tance to Husserl , namely, evidence and adequacy.
Concerning evidence, Derrida writes: "the most insistent question in Sec
. . . seeks to discover what an event-which, in the case of a speech act, is
supposed to take place--might be, and whether or not the structure of such
an event leaves room for certitude or for evidence" ("Limited," 37). Sec
answers this question in the negative: the "eventhood of the event" leaves
no room for certitude or for evidence (See esp. 18).
Derrida's statement seems to place us in the position of jurors. Con-
fronted with a defendant, jurors must make a determination: guilty or not
guilty. Similarly, confronted with an utterance, I may make a determina-
tion: I may determine what I take the utterance to mean. Most of us, I
suspect-I, for one--would grant without argument that the structure ofthe
trial leaves no room for certitude. In reaching the verdict "guilty," jurors
are not expected to attain absolute certainty; they are instructed to be
confident "beyond a reasonable doubt, " but they need not conquer
Cartesian hyperbolical doubt. Similarly, many of us would grant, the
structure of the event of utterance is such that I can never be absolutely
certain that I know, in any case, exactly what an utterance means.
So far, I hope, so good : certainty is beyond us, whether we are judging
defendants or interpreting utterances. So far so good, but Derrida seems to
go much further. Not only, he tells us, does the event leave no room for
certitude, it leaves no room even for evidence. If that is so, what are we to
do? Ifjurors are presented with no evidence, but nevertheless must judge,
then they might as well flip coins. If I have no evidence to aid me in
interpreting an utterance, then I have no reason for choosing anyone
possible meaning over any other .
This is the position deconstruction is taken by some to leave us in. Yet
it is not the position into which Derrida's assertion places us (as at least
those familiar with Husserl's work should suspect). In French as in German,

6 Searle, "Reiterating the Differences : A Reply to Derrida." Glyph 2 (1977), 203 .

 108 ALAN WHITE

the operative cognates of the word "evidence" (a noun) generally refer to

what we tend to call, in (American) English, "self-evidence." This is
consistent with our ordinary use of the adjective "evident"; "it is evident
that . . ." means "it is obvious that ..."; to be "evident" is, ordinarily, to be
"self-evident." The situation is quite different with the noun "evidence"; in
our ordinary language, "evidence" is usually opposed to "self-evidence."
We need no evidence to inform us about what is (self-)evident; we require
evidence only for what is not (self-)evident. In ordinary French, there is no
comparable ambiguity.'
According to Derrida, the structure of the event is such that the meaning
of a given utterance can never be simply (self-)evident; one consequence
of this is that we judge, always, only on the basis of evidence (in the
juridical sense: signs that point beyond themselves toward something else,
be the something else the guilt of a defendant or the meaning of an
utterance). Since we judge on the basis of evidence-information,
signs-we cannot attain absolute certitude; it does not follow that we
cannot attain a confidence that is beyond reasonable doubt. Nor, then, does
it follow that we may as well reach our verdicts by flipping coins. What
does follow is that no matter what other procedure we use, we may later
deem ourselves to have reached the wrong conclusion.
Concerning adequacy, Derrida writes: "the minimal making-sense of
something (in conformity to the code, grammaticality, etc.) is incommen-
surate with the adequate understanding of intended meaning" ("Limited,"
64). This passage can be read as suggesting that we never understand each
other at all. So read, the passage seems, in Searle's terms, "obviously
false." Those of us who are here neither by accident nor by mistake have
understood our printed schedules well enough to get us here; our under-
standing was adequate for that. Yet Derrida seems to state that our
understanding is never adequate for anything .

7 I do not-nor could I, consistently-present these reflections on "ordinary language"

as establishing, beyond all possible doubt, the meaning of the passage in question. I
acknowledge, in addition, that I judge not as a master of the French language, but rather on
the basis of definitions in the Petit Robert. Despite these qualifications, however, my point
retains its force: it is more defensible to read Derrida's "evidence" as meaning "self-
evidence" than as meaning "outward sign" or "indication."
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 109

We are faced, I think, with another important ambiguity. I have no

doubt-no reasonable doubt-that Derrida would agree that our
understanding is often adequate--sufficient-jor all sorts of things. What
I take him to deny, in the passage I have quoted, is that understanding is
ever fully adequate--perfectly correspondent-to anything, particularly to
an intention or to itself. As in the case of "evidence," my reading is in
accord with the most common French (and German) usage of the relevant
cognates. It is also consistent with Derrida's use of "adequation:"

To reject the belief in "intentions" or "inner pictures" behind the

utterances . . . does not amount to endorsing the belief in any simple
adequation of the utterance to itself, or . .. in an adequation between "the
intention and its expression" in an ideal utterance that would be the
"realization" of the intention ("Limited," 72).

This passage suggests that there can be no "adequation" or perfect

correspondence between intention and expression, or, in evidential terms,
that no expression can make an intention (self-)evident.8 Yet it may also be
the case that expressions provide evidence concerning intentions, and that
the evidence may at times be sufficient. Indeed, linguistic expressions can
be adequate--sufficient-jor various purposes only because their terms can
be used in indeterminately many contexts. Precisely because the terms can
be used in indeterminately many contexts, however, and because we can
never exhaustively determine any specific context, linguistic expression
can never be adequate--perfectly correspondent-to any unexpressed
intention. Again, this does not mean that jurors cannot have "adequate
evidence" of guilt, i.e., information concerning a crime sufficient to justify
the reaching of a verdict, and it does not mean that we never understand
each other at all. It does not preclude rigor.
Having established that Derrida seems to attribute rigor to decon-
struction, and that at least some of the Derridian passages that seem to
exclude rigor from deconstruction merely seem to do so, I now turn to a
consideration ofHusserlian phenomenological rigor, and how it relates to
the Derridean variety.

8 An expression could make an intention self-evident only if the expression were the
intention, only of the two were indistinguishable.
110 ALAN WHITE

III. Phenomenological Rigor

As phenomenology, according to the Husserl of 1911, philosophy can

attain the status of a rigorous science. Phenomenology's pre-eminent
historian, Herbert Spiegelberg, acknowledges that Husserl "never discusses
the sense of [his] omnipresent term [rigor] explicitly,"? but provides a
suggestive passage from Husserl's 1906 diary :

I have been through enough torments (Qualen) from lack of clarity and
from doubt that wavers back and forth. .. . Only one need absorbs me: I
must win clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life unless I can believe
that I shall achieve it (1: 81-82) .

This passage suggests that Husserlian scientific rigor entails both clarity
and indubitability-the essential Cartesian criteria. The suggestion is
supported by Husserl's explicit adoption of Descartes's project, emphasized
by the appropriate titling of his later Cartesian Meditations:" In his
Meditations, Husserl embraces the project of grounding his phenomen-
ological science in an "absolutely indubitable" or apodictic evidence, (CM,
§6) the givenness of the transcendentally pure ego with its own pure,
conscious life. (CM, §8Y' Husserl elaborates:

The bare identity of the "I am" is not the only thing given as indubitable
in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the
particular data of actual and possible self-experience-even though they
are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details-a universal
apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego (for example, the
immanent temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes)
(eM, §12).

9 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenom enological Movement : An Historical Introduction, two

volumes, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), I: 81.
10 Huss erliana I. English Translation by Dorion Cairns (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff,
1970). Hereafter cited as " eM."
II Husserl's notion of evidence is notoriously complicated . In what follows, I sketch an

interpretation that seems to me plausible, and to offer support for the thesis I am examin ing.
The general argument is that if phenomenological evidence is as I suggest, then phe-
nomenology gives way to deconstruction . Other elaborat ions of evidence might well make
phenomenology more capable of resisting this development.
 OF GRAMMATOLA TRY 111

Although the transcendental ego, with its structure and its life, is
apodictically evident, these are not, according to Husserl, adequately
evident. Whereas apodictic evidence is indubitable, adequate evidence is
complete:

At the present introductorystage of philosophical meditation we have the

boundless infinity of prescientific experiences, evidences: more or less
perfect. With reference to them imperfection, as a rule, signifies incom-
pleteness, a one-sidedness and at the same time a relative obscurity and
indistinctness that qualify the givenness of the affairs themselves or the
affair-complexes themselves: i.e., an infectedness of the "experience"
with unfulfilled components, with expectant and attendant meanings.
Perfecting then takes place as a synthetic course of further harmonious
experiences in which these attendant meanings become fulfilled in actual
experience. The corresponding idea of perfection would be that of
"adequate evidence" (CM, §6).12

Whereas "transcendental self-experience" is apodictically evident-it is

indubitable that I am aware of what I take myself to be aware of.-

at any particulartime this experience offers only a core that is experienced

"with strict adequacy," namely the ego's living present (which the
grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, expresses); while, beyond
that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends,
comprising what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also-meant
(CM, §9).

According to Husserl, my apodictic knowledge of "the immanent

temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes" (eM, § 12)
informs me that whether I am perceiving, recollecting, anticipating, or
imagining-i.e., no matter what my noetic act may be-I am within my

12 In so quoting Husserl , I omit the completion of the final sentence, i.e., "-and the
question whether adequate evidence does not necessaril y lie at infinity may be left open. "
Husserl marked the entire sentence by means ofa wavy line in the margin (see Husserliana
I, 238, note to page 55, lines 24-27); according to Dorion Cairns, this is Husserl's way of
marking the sentence as unsatisfactory (eM, 15 n. 2). Assuming that Cairns is correct, my
suspicions would be that Husserl rejects the part of the sentence following the dash , because
the question it raises is "left open" only for a few pages; it is answered in §9 (quoted below).
112 ALAN WHITE

living present, the now structured by an impressional core, a horizon of

protention, and a "comet's-tail" of retention. What is given within the living
present is given adequately and, with the aid of such evidence, I as
phenomenologist am supposed to be able to build upon my apodictic,
"absolute foundation" an "all-embracing science" (eM, §64); this would
be the "philosophy as rigorous science" announced by HusserI in 1911.
I can now rephrase my initial thesis in terms I have introduced in
elaborating HusserI's notion of "rigor:" according to Derrida, we can know
apodictically that we cannot know adequately (i.e., perfectly), but if we
cannot know adequately (perfectly), then we cannot develop philosophy
into an "all-embracing," apodictically grounded phenomenological science.
I now attempt to develop this thesis in Derridean terms.

IV. From Phenomenology to Deconstruction

If there is deconstructive "logic" that undermines the rigor of Husserlian

adequacy, one of its effects is the binding of expressive terms to contexts
that cannot be exhaustively determined. This logic is, in one of Derrida's
formulations, the logic of iterability, which "ties repetition to alterity" (Sec,
7) in accord with a "law of undecidable contamination" ("Limited," 59).
This logic extends, according to Derrida, through all experience (see Sec,
9). In HusserIian terms, the logic can extend through all experience only if
it applies to consciousness as intentional: every consciousness is conscious-
ness of something or other, every noetic act has its noematic correlate. But
noemata are necessarily of kinds: I don't just see, and I don't just see
"something or other." I see trees and motorcycles and buildings; I see
things of different types . But as soon as "type" enters into the account, so
too does absence, and hence inadequacy. I recognize something as a tree
only by relating it not only to my general notion oftrees, and to other trees
I have seen, but also to my notions of non-trees-from which I necessarily
distinguish it-and to other non-trees I have experienced." I can't see a tree

13 Here-not for the first time-I move too quickly. In a passage I quote above, Husserl
seems to assert that even in cases of "adequate evidence," there is "an indeterminately
general presumptive horizon," that is "strictly non-experienced" but "necessarily also-
meant" (eM, §9). Perhaps that horizon can be taken to include my non-trees. Even then,
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 113

as a tree without seeing that it is not a bush; I can't see a tree as a pine
without seeing that it is not an oak, or a birch, or some other kind of tree.
But this means that the givenness of the tree that I see is not purely
intuitive, i.e., its giveness, as a tree, is not isolated or self-contained, even
within Husserl's living present. Instead, it is "linguistic" in the specific
sense that its determinacy depends upon its negative relations to what it is
not.
The argument that all experienced items are linguistic rather than
intuitive-again, that any item, to be experienced as itself, must be related
implicitly or explicitly to other items that it is not-is the first step away
from the "Platonism" Derrida takes Husserl to espouse. On the "Pla-
tonistic" model, true knowledge is necessarily intuitive; if I manage to see
or apprehend the form of beauty, beauty itself, I see beauty alone,
uninfected by ugliness, or by justice or virtue. In the Husserlian terms
introduced above, whatever is given within the living present is given
without any "infectedness ofthe 'experience' with unfulfilled components,
with expectant and attendant meanings" (eM, §6). The first step away from
this Platonism rests on the argument that one cannot know beauty as
beauty-or take anything to be anything-without knowing that, and
something about how, beauty is different from the likes of justice and
virtue. This first step, from intuition to discursion, is by no means
exclusively Derridean-one who shares it is Hegel. Within the present
context, a more appropriate designation for this step is "structuralist": to
understand any item, one must understand the system or structure of which
it is a part.
Derrida's second step away from Platonism takes him beyond struc-
turalism as well; it is based on the argument that there is no system or
structure, i.e., that there can be no complete account of the "others" upon
which the specific determinacy of any given item depends. Many forms of
this argument have been presented by Derrida and others." One form,

problems remain: given that protention is horizonal, and that retention fades indeterminably
into the past, the living present cannot be strictly delimited. But if it cannot, I do not see how
its "core" can be given with "strict adequacy ."
14 A valuable account that will be appreciated especially by those annoyed by Derrida's

styles is provided by Paul Ricoeur in "Structure-Word-Event" (Philosophy Today 11-12

[1968]: 114-129.) John Boly, in "Nihilism Aside : Derrida's Debate Over Intentional
114 ALAN WHITE

generally shared by Derrida, Ricoeur, and John Austin, emphasizes the

distinction between structure and event: one can provide a complete
account of a language only as closed and completed structure, yet no
expressive event-no speech act-is entailed by the structure alone. As
speakers of English, we may know, in some sense, what sentences like "I
have forgotten my umbrella" and "The cat is on the mat" mean, but that
knowledge does not tell us what specific speakers, in specific situations,
mean by them. Nor, as I have suggested (and as Derrida argues in detail"),
can our semantic and syntactic knowledge be supplemented by information
concerning context or speaker in any way that would fully determine the
meaning of the utterance.
With the first Derridean step away from Husserl, one denies that there
is any experience that would not be "infected" or "contaminated" with
"unfulfilled components, with expectant and attendant meanings"; with the
second, one asserts that the contamination is "undecidable," i.e., that no
complex account could serve to fulfill (or even to identify) all the relevant
components, or bring all the expectant and attendant meanings to conscious
presence. If one takes both steps, one is led to conclude of the "phenom-
ena" Husserl takes to be given in adequate (self-)evidence that "these
' phenomena' are not phenomena: they never appear as such" ("Limited,"
76). I have not attempted to make either of Derrida's steps compelling, but
I hope that I have said enough to reveal that both are defensible as "logical"
in that both are supported by reasons and evidence. That should be enough
to establish that the move from phenomenology to deconstruction is worth
discussing, even at the APA.

v. Of Grammatolatry
I have said most of what I set out to say-whether I have thereby done
what I take myself to have set out to do is not for me to decide. There are,

Models" (Philosophy and Literature 9 (1985]: 152-165), has argued that Ricoeur's critique
of structuralism applies to Derrida in that Derrida also reduces parole to langue . The same
charge against Derrida has been made by Vincent Descombes in Modern French Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 1980).
15 See especially Sec and "Limited."
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 115

however, two final issues I would like to broach. The first takes me back
to my title, which introduces the term "grammatolatry." The issue is, in
traditional terms, that of self-referentiality. According to Derrida's " law of
undecidable contamination," every iteration alters, meanings disseminate
in undecidable ways through repeated use. But mustn't the law apply to
itself? Might it not be altered, through repetition, in such a way that it no
longer applies?
Differently stated: what is the status of Derrida's favorite terms-in-
cluding differance, iterability, trace, writing, etc .? Are these concepts that
can be rigorously defined? If not, how can they be rigorously used? Doesn't
Derrida respond to the death of the old God-Yahweh, or Jehovah, or
logocentrism, or metaphysics, or philosophy-by introducing a new god,
the notorious differance? Doesn't Derrida himself present differance as
source or creator? For example:

in order for undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of

decisions and responsibilities as well), there must be a certain play,
differance, nonidentity. Not of indetermination, but of differance or of
nonidentity with oneself in the very process of determination. Differance
is not indeterminacy. It renders determinacy both possible and necessary.
Someone might say: but if it renders determinacy possible, it is because
it itself is "indeterminacy." Precisely not, since first of all it "is " in itself
nothing outside ofdifferent determinations; secondly, and consequently,
it never comes to a full stop anywhere, absolutely [elle ne s'arrete nulle
part], and is neither negativity nor nothingness (as indeterminacy would
be). Insofar as it is always determined, undecidability is also not negative
in itself ("Afterword," 149).

Is differance a new god? Does grammatology become grammatolatry,

worship of writing (in Derrida's "displaced and extended" sense)?
Deconstructionists, I suspect, will want to respond in the negative. Samuel
Weber, in particular, has attempted to resist the rigidity that would allow
for the idolization of differance, and for the institutionalization of a stable
deconstructive method." According to Weber, Derrida's laws and his logic

16 Samuel Weber, "It," Glyph 4 (1978), esp. 8-14.

116 ALAN WHITE

are temporary rather than a priori: they are to be used strategically, not
established veridic ally.
If Weber is right, then Derrida is not rigorous in the way I have taken
him to be. Yet Weber fears, I take it, that if Derridean rigor is as I have
suggested, the deconstructionist is in the uncomfortable position ofdenying
the legitimacy of taking positions. This is another issue that requires far
more discussion than can be provided tonight, but I would like to suggest
an alternative solution, a "position" that may avoid Weber's difficulties.
Consider the following:

Only infinite being can reduce the difference in presence. In that sense,
the name of God, at least as it is pronounced within classical rationalism,
is the name of indifference itself.. . . Infinitist theologies are always logo-
centricisms, whether they are creationisms or not (Grammatology, 71).

It is precisely the property of the power of differance to modify life less

and less as it spreads out more and more. If it should grow infinite-and
its essence excludes this a priori-life itself would be made into an
impassive, intangible, and eternal presence : infinite differance, God or
death (Grammatology, 130-31).

I note, first, that Derrida here explicitly attributes to differance an

"essence" that is capable of excluding, a priori, certain effects. I note,
second, that the effects this essence excludes are such that differance
cannot serve as God. l ? These considerations suggest an appropriately
peculiar status for differance and its associates: they are fundamental, but
what makes them fundamental precludes their serving as foundations. As
fundamental-as endowed a priori with essences-these associates have
something like the stability traditionally attributed to concepts. Yet, as
Derrida insists, they are not concepts, because they attain their stability
neither through any wholly adequate, intuitive self-evidence, nor through

17 Decreasing influence with increasing spread is reminiscent of the second law of

thermodynamics; hence Manfred Frank's well-chosen title for an article on Derrida, "Die
Entropie der Sprache," "The Entropy of Language."
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 117

placement within an exhaustively determinable network of concepts."

Differance and its associates would then be conditions of the possibility of
differences, without being anything above and beyond those differences.
They would also be conditions of the impossibility of any system of
differences.

VI. Rigor Mortis

In this discussion of rigor, which begins with bullshit, I end with rigor
mortis, i.e., a rigor that has become rigidity, a rigor that is an obstacle to
thought and discussion . The danger of such rigor arises, I fear, both within
phenomenology and within deconstruction.
The Husserlian rigidity that concerns me is implicit in a passage from
Husserl's journal, introduced above: whereas the demand for scientific rigor
is supposed to be the consequence of a will to truth, Husserl's demand, as
he describes it, arises instead from a reactive form of the will to power, a
will to make all things thinkable in order that they be endurable." The
Husserlian move toward the "adequately evident" appears, from this
perspective, not as a rigorous move "back to the thing themselves," but
rather as an attempt to construct things that-unlike the things them-
selves-might put a stop to the wavering that so tormented Husserl.
Insofar as it is determined by this form of the will to survive, Husserl's
philosophical project-his love of wisdom-is like Schelling's: each takes
himself to know, in advance, what would satisfy that love. In Schelling's

18 Derrida's denial that differance, etc., are concepts in the traditional sense does not mean

that these "non-concepts" are ineffable . On the contrary , Derrida articulates them in detail ;
consider, for example, the analyses of differance as involving both (spatial) distancing and
(temporal) deferring, and of iteration as involving both repetition and alteration . Both "non-
concepts" are analyzed, but the features or characteristics revealed through the analyses are
discovered by the analyses to stand in relations of unstable tension: one cannot determine
precisely "how much" differance depends, in any or every case, on differing and how much
on deferring, or, in any or every case of iteration, "how much" is simply repeated, and how
much altered. To borrow an Aristotelian phrase : these analyses (which are not like
conceptual analyses in that they do not discover stable elements or parts) may reveal
precis ely why complete precision is beyond us.
19 See Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 11:12, "Of Self-Overcoming;" also, "Of Truth

and Lie in an Extramoral Sense."

118 ALAN WHITE

words, "The first presupposition of philosophy as the striving for wisdom

is . . . that there is wisdom in . . . being, in the world itself/'" Husserl takes
himself to know , before beginning his phenomenological investigations,
that he could find the "wisdom" he seeks only in beings that could be
known stably, indubitably, adequately. In seeking a pharmakon effective
against this form of philosophical rigor mortis , one might look to what
Fichte presents as the philosopher's "highest maxim," the requirement that
the philosopher "seek only the truth, however it may be," so that "even the
truth that there is no truth would be welcome, if that were indeed the
truth.'?'
Deconstructive rigor mortis, if there is such, does not arise from a
demand for stability. The rigor mortis that endangers deconstruction
concerns not the wisdom the philosopher loves, but rather philosophy itself.
For all ofDerrida's concern with dissemination and undecidability, Derrida
himself seems convinced that there is one thing that has remained precisely
what it is, self-identical and repeatable, throughout its 2500-year history;
that one thing is philosophy." With supreme confidence, Derrida circum-
scribes "the epoch of onto-theology" as that of "the philosophy of
presence," which is "philosophy itself' (Grammatology, 12), insisting that
"Platonism," with its "conceptual oppositions," is "the dominant structure
in the history of metaphysics" (Dissemination, 149). No doubt, if one
rigorously seeks "Platonistic conceptual oppositions" within a text, one will
find them; but if such are all that one seeks, one will find nothing else.
Derrida's overly rigid adoption of the Heideggerian reading of the
history of philosophy (not completely rigid in that Derrida expands "onto-
theological humanism" to include Heidegger himself ["Afterword," 134])
leads him, it seems to me, to a totalization of that history that blinds him"

20 F. W. J. Schelling, Stimmtliche Werke (Damstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

1974-76),13 : 203.
21 J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, in I. H. Fichte (editor),

Sammtliche Werke (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter, 1971), I: 176 n.

22 See, in addition to the passages quoted below, OfGrammatology 12, 19,93, 160;

Dissemination 86, 109, 112, 122, 123, 128, 149; Limited Inc 3, 4,8, 17. This list is far from
exhaustive ; it seems to me sufficient.
23 And, to a much greater degree, his followers. See, for example, Culler's use of
"philosophy" in On Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), or Christopher
Norris's "d iscussion" of Plato in "Derrida on Plato: Writing as Poison and Cure," in Norris,
 OF GRAMMATOLATRY 119

to its richness, and prevents him from seeing the degree to which the
problems most interesting to him have been recognized, and considered, by
his predecessors-as early as Plato.24
In suggesting that Derrida's problems have been treated by others, I
mean to deny that Derrida is as radically innovative as he has often been
taken to be (again, by friend and by foe). But even if what Derrida has to
say is not new, it may nevertheless be important, and it may be important
that he say it. Even if Plato knew that language must always be
interpreted," few of us are as thoughtful or insightful as Plato.
I close on a note of qualification. The Derrida I have presented is logical
and lucid, and not particularly subversive (in my view, at least; but perhaps
I've already been subverted by Nietzsche). Some might object that this is
because my Derrida is a caricature. On this point, as on others, I am open
to discussion. I am not convinced that my interpretation, particularly of the
status of differance and its associates, is ultimately tenable (although I do
find it more attractive than, for example, Weber's). I present this interpreta-
tion not as a "finishing touch" or a "last word," but rather as a cooperative
response to Derrida's invitation to "a discussion that is both open and yet
to come" ("Afterword," 111).

Williams College

Derrida (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

24 In "Reconstructing Husserl: A Critical Response to Derrida's Speech and Phenomena,"
(Husserl Studies 4 (1987), 45-62) , I have attempted to demonstrate that Husser! fails to fit
into Derrida's net. The same holds, I believe, for Plato-as I hope to show in a projected
treatment of "Plato's Pharmacy ."
25 See Rosemary Desjardins, "Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," in Charles Griswold
(editor), Platonic Readings. Platonic Writings (New York : Routledge, Chapman and Hall,
1988), 110-125 .
 CHAPTER SEVEN

THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION

OF TIME

NATALIE ALEXANDER

I came to this study from a love for phenomenology and specifically for
Husserl's descriptions of internal time-consciousness, which move me as
both beautiful and profound . The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness offers a paradigmatic example of phenomenological
description which, as phenomenology of phenomenology, is of crucial
significance. Reading Derrida's criticisms of internal time-consciousness
in his classic essay "Speech and Phenomena," I find them seriously flawed.
At the same time, I find other deconstructions effective . I
Deconstruction is not, on my view, a sheer nihilism. I set out to provide
criteria for various ways to read such texts based on what Derrida said
about his techniques and strategies. In this endeavour, I am a backhanded
supporter of deconstruction, aiming to show that there are criteria by
showing how one very important and influential one falls short on most
plausible readings .
This essay is a part of that larger work; here, I will look at two tradi-
tional approaches to reading texts-as philosophical argument and as
rhetorical (almost literary) narrative. Elements in "Speech and Phenomena"
invite each of these readings. After summarizing Derrida's argument, I
provide an analysis showing that, in so far as " Speech and Phenomena"

I Edmund Husser!, The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Consciousness [cited as lTC],

edited by Martin Heidegger, translated by James S. Churchill , introduction by Calvin O.
Schrag (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1964). Jacques Derrida, "Speech
and Phenomena" [cited as SP], in Speech and Phenomena translated and introduced by
David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univers ity Press, 1973).

121
W. R. McKenna and J, C. Evans(eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 121-150 .
© 1995 KluwerAcademic Publishers.
 122 NATALIE ALEXANDER

may be read as "philosophical" argument, that is, in so far as we judge it

by the standards set up in the metaphysics of presence, it fails.
Nevertheless, there is another context of criticism in which I may say
that Derrida's essay succeeds. "Speech and Phenomena" may be read as
interpreting Husser/'s texts as one interprets literature.
Since that approach is less common when reading philosophical works,
let me give a brief introduction. Consider the following analogy: A
theatrical troupe wants to do a production-an interpretation-of King
Lear. They may well decide to stage it in Civil War period costumes, or to
cast Lear against type, or to mount a production that omits Cordelia's role.
Embroider the example as you will; something could be made of such
interpretations. Such a Lear might overturn standard interpretations in
order to produce texts which give great pleasure. Derrida has described his
own works in these words.'
The strength and enduring interest of a text, whether Shakespeare's or
Husserl's, may be judged, in part, by its ability to take on such interpreta-
tions and thereby to reveal some new insights. The purpose in this kind of
reading is not to do historical scholarship concerning Jacobean production
conventions or concerning Husserl's "real" intentions. The goal is, rather,
to engender an innovative interpretation subtly different from those that
have gone before, and, through that difference, to reveal hidden meanings,
strengths, and charms.
I do not pretend, herein , to do justice to the full-grown and extensive
texts of deconstructive literary-critical approaches, nor even to Derrida's
own deconstructive readings of literary texts. Rather, I conceive of this
reading of deconstruction as an " incision," a technique of "first reading,"
a means for traditional philosophers to achieve a sympathetic interpretation
of Derrida which, in its mildness, does not fall prey to the excesses which
plague some Derridian scholarship.' Post-structuralists may read my
attributions under erasure. I cannot here attempt a detailed rhetorical

2 Jacques Derrida, "Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta"
[cited as Pos.], in Positions, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press ,
1981),41-43 .
3 Chri stopher Norris, Contest ofFaculties: Philosophy and Theory afte r Deconstruction
(London and New York: Methuen, 1985),218-219. Norris gives an excellent analysis of the
history of deconstruction in America, and its " literary" excesses.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 123

analysis of "Speech and Phenomena" but will instead provide a few

rhetorical insights on those specific passages that proved logically
unjustifiable, a rhetorical "vindication" of equivocal language, and a few
remarks on rhetorical questions and negative expressions.
No production of a play, no reading of a text, is so definitive as to rule
out some other. Nevertheless, some readings are more interesting, or more
revealing, or more disturbing. Derrida writes that there is no text in and by
itself, and so, no privileged reading . There are, however, protocals of
reading, hence, weaker and stronger misreadings . Therefore, when I claim
that his arguments are fallacious and his "Husserl," a misreading, Derrida
would no doubt simply agree, perhaps, adding that it is at least a strong
misreading.

I. Summary of the Deconstructive Argument

Derrida always addresses specific texts. He urges us to read and reread the
philosophical texts he addresses; we can never simply discard their
foundations once and for all. He does not proclaim the "death of
philosophy," but rather its limit, that is, its borderline. Nevertheless,
Derrida himself represents "Speech and Phenomena" as offering reasoned
argumentation proving the internal incoherence of Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy.'
In "Speech and Phenomena" Derrida traces a series of Husserlian
"exclusions," beginning with the exclusion of indication from expression
and leading through the exclusion of representation from present meaning
to the exclusion of past and future times from temporal presence; on each
level, the exclusion is rejected only conditionally, until the last.' In the last
exclusion, Derrida exposes this contradiction: self-presence must exclude
temporality, but absolute subjectivity is temporal flux.

4 SP, 27, 33, 48 and 60, for example.

sSP, passim.; note, for example, the modality with which Derrida opens Chapter Three;
"Let us suppose that indication is excluded; expression remains." SP , 32. This important
featureis often overlooked by interpreters of "Speech and Phenomena ."
124 NATALIE ALEXANDER

Tracing back through the provisional exclusions, Derrida argues that

temporality is indicative in its structure. Thus, in the deconstruction of
internal time-consciousness, the foundation of all the phenomenological
exclusions is collapsed, undercut at the root. Without the pivotal de-
construction of internal time-consciousness, the entire argument of"Speech
and Phenomena" would remain "provisional" and fall apart.
I here examine with painstaking care this key "demonstration," the
critique of internal time-consciousness in "Signs and the Blink of an Eye,"
the pivotal fifth chapter of "Speech and Phenomena."
Two crucial points inform the Derridian interpretation of Husser! in this
chapter:
First, temporal immediacy, simultaneity, is a necessary condition, even
a defining condition, of evident presence. For brevity, I have dubbed this
thesis "the Augenblick criterion," after the brief passage in Investigations
from which Derrida develops it. Husser! wrote that "In a monologue words
can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since
such indication would there be quite purposeless, for the acts in question
are themselves experienced by us at that very moment" that is, in the blink
of an eye ."
Second, at the root of all presence and the source of all evidence, is self-
consciousness as self-presence (the self-presence criterion). Only a theory
holding both of these two theses can be effectively deconstructed by the
argument offered in "Speech and Phenomena."?
The presupposition of "the instant as a point" inaugurates the de-
construction of internal time-consciousness in "Signs and the Blink of an
Eye."! Derrida argues that Husser! requires a temporal present that is
simple, a punctual instant, in order to ground a self-presence which needs
no mediation by "inductive" signs; the punctual now phase provides just

6 Edmund Husser!, Logical Investigations [cited as LI], translated by J. N. Findlay

(London and Henley : Rouledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 280.
7 Elsewhere , I have argued that while Husser! may have held each of these at various
phases in the development of internal time-consciousness, he never held both at once; the
deconstruction of the consciousness of internal time from the fifth chapter of "Speech and
Phenomena," does not, in the last analysis, apply to any interpretation of internal time-
consciousness Husserl ever held.
8 SP, 60-69.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 125

such an original present, a present not constituted in a synthesis of

differences. Derrida acknowledges that this "source-point" always occurs
at the core of a "spread;" but the spread, Derrida claims, is based on the
self-identity of the now-phase."
The punctuality of the now as self-identical is the source-point for the
self-evidence of presence; yet it can be so only through a contradictory
relation with retention: (a) On the one hand, the authority of the present as
absolute perceptual source can be maintained only in contrasting continuity
with retention as non-source, non-perception. (b) But, on the other hand,
the retentive phase must remain within the present's sphere of absolute
certainty in order to maintain a foundational continuity. HusserI needs both
these claims, according to Derrida, to get (from (a» simple self-identity
and (from (b) temporal continuity. Both are self-presence, and therefore,
also, the presence of objective meaning that is recognizably the same
through reiterations.
The line between primordial and non-primordial must be drawn, not
between the now phase and retention, but between retention and recollec-
tion (secondary memory), because (from (b) retention as still grasping
what is just-passing lays claim to the absolute certitude enjoyed by the now
phase. Hence, retention belongs to the primordial; whereas recollection,
which must re-turn to content that has faded, belongs to the non-primordial,
having a lesser degree of certitude.
Yet, because (a) self-identity belongs only to the source-point, Derrida
may treat retention, which lacks this quality, as a kind of re-turn, like
recollection. Retention points beyond the present of which it is a part to the
no longer present of which it is not, that is to the prior now phase which it
retains. Derrida is here beginning to build an alternative account of time-
consciousness.
Developing a transformed and transforming conception of "time-
consciousness," Derrida keeps (from (b) the notion of retention as part of
the "present," but develops its character (from (a» as re-presentation of the
now absent prior now phase. Within the so-called living present, Derrida
concludes, there is a necessary indicative function, an essential retentive

9 The careful reader will already note how the distinction between the phases of temporal

objects and those of temporal consciousness has been blurred.

126 NATALIE ALEXANDER

pointing to what is absent; within the present, an essential and primordial

nonpresence.
The very possibility of repetition, what Derrida calls the trace, emerges
as more primordial than the phenomenologically primordial present.
Retention, as return, is the source of the presence of the present. Yet, such
a "source" rules out the simple self-identity required by the foundational
project. The foundational force of the living now, he argues, cannot survive
this primordial absence. We seem rather to have " indicative" retentions of
retentions-re-presentations which are primordial, that is, are not grounded
in any originary presentations. Difference, Derrida's "principle" of
foundationlessness, is discovered at the very foundation of Husserl's
phenomenology. At this point, Derrida is free to work back through the
distinctions only provisionally collapsed in prior chapters.

II. Critique of the Deconstruction of Time

In this section, I evaluate the deconstruction of internal time-consciousness

as critical argument ; I argue also that Derrida's reading falls into misinter-
pretations: first, a failure to distinguish phases of consciousness from
phases of objects, and second, a deeper failure to distinguish the three tiers
of consciousness. I demonstrate that it is precisely at these moments of
breakdown in argumentation that the strongest rhetorical reading is
possible.

A. Inappropriate Criterion of Evidence

(1) Presence

A sketch of the kind of presence that Derrida seems to think Husserl

requires for an adequate grounding of expression inaugurates my response
to this deconstruction of time .
Derrida summarizes the Augenblick criterion: "Self-presence must be
produced in the undivided unity of [an instantaneous] temporal present so
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 127

as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs.?" For

something to count as "present," according to Derrida's interpretation of
Husserl, it must be absolutely self-contained. It must not point beyond
itself to any further logical, temporal, or spatial context. Nor can the
present be a dependent moment of a greater whole, for then again, it must
point to or indicate something beyond itself.
For Derrida's Husserl, it seems, presence must be simply there, an
immediate, unmediated, fully independent, self-grounded presence. Derrida
seems to require that this self-presence experience itself reflectively as
present in the instant, and that it be an immediate, independent, self-
grounding object. This notion of presence, which Derrida foists on Husserl,
seems almost to recapitulate a Spinozistic concept of substance; Derrida
uses the Augenblick criterion to evoke and exaggerate the role of substance
philosophy in Husserl's thought.
Turning to a rhetorical reading ofthis text, I find that Derrida appropri-
ates Husserl's descriptive term, "pure," to this exaggerated standard.
Furthermore, Derrida links this purity to an ideal of the "virginity" of the
(pure) impression. I I Perhaps, Derrida intends a certain irony in this
metaphor of virginity; for, Husserl himself dwells almost endlessly on the
image of meaning as pregnant. Not for him, the ideal of the isolate
independence of the pure virgin. Husserl seeks instead the meaning which
is gravid with other senses, which grounds and engenders them.
Like the existentialists' reworking of Greek tragedies, like Shakespeare's
appropriation of the myth of Lyr, Derrida's reading of Husserl-taken
rhetorically-offers little more than an occasion for him to put forward a
different story, a story about the nature of time, of meaning, of language,
that is subtly but pervasively different from any Husserl ever told.

10 SP, 60.
II SP, 6 and 66 for example; on Derrida's punning use of "pure" and "contaminated," see

John Scanlon, "Pure Presence: A Modest Proposal," (Chapter Five).

128 NATALIE ALEXANDER

(2) Now-Phase as Evidence Itself

In order to apply the exaggerated criterion of presence, Derrida must

conflate the now-phase with the extended living present of which it is a
dependent part.
In a carefully wrought progression, Derrida concedes that "lived
experiences .. . must be extended," but responds that "this spread is
nonetheless thought and described on the basis of the self-identity of the
now as ... 'source-point' ." The punctual now, the now-apprehension, is
the "eye or living core;" and from this point onward, Derrida refers "living
now," "lived experience," "living present," etc., only to this instantaneous
phase taken as the source of all certitude.12 The lack of distinction between
the now-phase and the living, extended present drives the entire de-
construction of time. Furthermore, it continues to operate in later argu-
ments; for example, in the following chapters, Derrida argues that the link
between phono- and logo-centrism lies in the presumptive instantaneous
simultaneity of "I hear myself speak.?"
At the "source-point," the now-phase is read as the "absolute begin-
ning," the principium;" when identified with the "primordial dator
Intuition," the now-phase "is evidence itself,"!" Now Derrida can identify,
not the saddle-back present, but the now-phase as the source of all
evidence, when he writes that "it is to this self-same identity of the actual
now that HusserI refers in the "im selben Augenblick" we begin with.?"
The identification is unjustifiable on two counts. First, HusserI explains
in Internal Time-Consciousness that Investigations remained always on the
constituted levels and that what he there termed "acts" and "lived
experience" must now be understood as "a flux in which an immanent
temporal unity is constituted.'?" Therefore, it is not to the now-phase but

12 SP, 62, 64, 66 n. 5.

13 SP, 61-62, 67, 77, 86; but, opposing this notion of simultaneity see lTC, app . V.
14 SP, 61-62.
15 SP, 61-62, esp. 62 n. 3.
16 LI, 280; lTC, 176, 101.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 129

to what he later understands to be the temporally extended whole that

Husserl refers to in the " im selben Augenblick" passage.
Second, Derrida's identification of the now-phase as "evidence itself' is
also compromised. For, as Husserl makes clear, evidence, givenness,
resides primarily in concreta, that is, in temporally extended wholes. Far
from providing an independent foundation, the now-phase itself may only
claim givenness in so far as it is experienced as an abstractum, that is, as
a dependent phase of the articulate structure of a temporal whole. I? Husserl
always takes great care not to identify all relations of relative dependence
and independence with those of founding and founded; that is, the
foundational relation is just one among many types of dependency
relations. Thus, in Husserl's description ofthe running-off phenomenon, the
now-phase is dependent, that is, a dependent part along with the just-
passing and just-coming phases. Together these phases make up afounding
level, the adumbrations ofthe second level, which level is a dependent part
ofthe whole perceptual structure, the intentional correlation of act with its
object.
Derrida's interpretation, trading on its impossible criterion of presence,
assimilates all dependency relations to grounding relations. By treating the
now-phase as an independent foundation, the Derridian text drives Husserl
back toward Brentano, and toward the problem that a succession of
experiences is not an experience of succession, the problem of "empirical"
temporal atomism . If the relation between now-phases were a linear
succession of independent instants, then the only relation possible would
be an "indicative" association of independent existences.
How may this very conflation of "now-phases" with "living present" be
read not as logically pernicious but as rhetorically rich?
The sundry ambiguities, conflations, and equivocations that carry
Derrida's misreading can well be read as examples of metonymy (from the
Greek metonumia, change of name), substituting one thing's name for that
of another associated with or suggested by it. In other words, one under-
stands the thing signified from the sign, that is, from the name of some-
thing indicatively associated with it. One might name the (a) part for the
whole; (b) species for genus; or (c) material for formed object. These first

17 LI III, passim .
130 NATALIE ALEXANDER

three metonymic figures are often termed synecdoche. Further types

include (d) what precedes for what follows; (e) place for inhabitants; and
(f) cause for effect. An important variation on metonymy, called metalepsis
uses a signifying name that is several steps removed from that of its
understood object. The multi-layered metalepsis is powerful because it
crams all the connections to the remote sign into the immediacy of a single
figure.
Three features of metonymy shown here are crucial to the Derridian text:
First, the relation takes place in terms of naming, at the level of the
signifier. Second, the association in most ofthe types listed above could be
read as contiguity. Jacobson captures these features when he defines
metonymy as "a substitution of signifiers that have a relation of contigu-
ity.?" This definition uncovers a third crucial feature of metonymy.
Because substitution is a symmetrical relation between signifiers, most of
these figures can work in either direction . The fact that metonymy can run
either way is crucial to Derrida; he often runs two or more names as
metonyms-as signs-for each other.
The Derridian text sets up a systematic ambiguity of "present" and
related terms. The ambiguity of now phase and living present may be read
as a part-whole synechdoche which runs in both directions, linking names
of parts, "punctuality . . . source-point ... now as point" through such non-
Husserlian phrases as "an eye or living core" to names of (relative) wholes,
"the absolute beginning . . . evidence itself . . . the living now.''" On this
reading, an effective deconstruction need not proceed by means of explicit
argumentation and proof; these verbal associations are the overturning
phase of deconstruction.

(3) Source-Point

The ambiguity-the conflation-of part and whole, of now-phase with

living present, is facilitated by a further ambiguity in Husserl's use of the

18 Roman Jakobson, "Two Types of Aphas ia and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,"
in Jacobson and Halle, Fundamentals ofLanguage (The Hague : Mouton, 1956).
19 SP, 61-62, 67.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 131

phrase "source-point." Or rather, I should say that Husser! uses the same
phrase in two clearly differentiated contexts which are not distinguished in
the Derridean text.
On the one hand, Husserl writes of the (horizontal) shading-off of a
temporal Object:

... mode of running-off an immanent temporal Object have a beginning,

that is to say, a source-point. This is the mode of running-off with which
the immanent Object begins to be."

Here, Husserl refers to the phase of time with which some particular
temporal Object begins. Derrida quotes this passage to support his claim
that for Husserl the now-phase is the ultimate source of evidence. Yet, he
could not possibly be referring to this sense of "source-point."
In this sense, of course, some now-phases are "source-points" and some
are not. For, a temporal Object also has intervening phases or "middle-
points," which are also nows, and, in its tum, "the last now as an end-
point.'?' Of course, the Object may still be retained in evidence as just-
passing after that end-point, even though the new now is not a phase of that
same Object. It is in this context alone-relative to an Object after its end-
point-that Husserl writes of a now as a "null-point" and of the "autonomy
of retention/'" Yet, Derrida will use these notions to set up the conflicted
image of source-point as empty , of the Augenblick as the closing of an eye.
On the other hand, Husserl also uses "source-point" in a different
context when he writes of the (diagonal) shading-off by which primal
impression (or primal phantasy, remembrance, etc.) as "moment of origin"
generates continua of retentions:

The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this generation-the

primal source, that from which all others are continuously generated. In

20 lTC, 48; quoted in SP, 62.

21 lTC, 50.

22 lTC, app. I, 130, app. III, 142.

132 NATALIE ALEXANDER

itself, however, it is not generated; [it comes into existence] through

spontaneous generation: it is primal creation.P

Here, phases not of objects but of consciousness are at issue; the primal
impression is not the now phase, but Derrida treats it as such. (I will return
to Derrida's conflation of these dimensions in the next section.)
The passage from Appendix I offers an early, succinct analysis of the
passive synthesis. The primal [Ur] moment of any act of experience has
two roles corresponding to the transverse and longitudinal dimensions of
intentionality. On one hand, it receives in relation to protention "the "new,"
that which comes into existence foreign to consciousness." On the other
hand, it can exist only as the origin of the continuum, the flux, of re-
tentional modifications."
The latter role seems fairly close to Derrida's focus. Oddly enough, when
Derrida discusses and quotes from this passage in a late chapter, he makes
no use at all of the former role . He dissimulates the role of primal
impression as openness to the "foreign" and the correlative role of
protention to such an extent that he can write that "the 'source-point' or
'primordial impression' . . . is a receiving that receives nothing.'?" He trades
again on this conflation when he refers to self-consciousness as a null-
point.
This example illustrates most starkly Derrida's way of making senses
slide toward a new configuration, whether we conceive of this move as
logically pernicious or rhetorically delicious. From the former sense,
Derrida imports the conceptions of a now-phase as a source-point-and as
a null-point-and of the autonomy (exaggerated to independence) of
retention, while dropping the dependence of all these notions on specific
experiences oftemporally extended objects. From the latter, he imports the
conception ofthe primal impression as a moment of origin, while dropping
its openness to the foreign and its interdependence with protention and
retention. Through this figure, Derrida begins to construct an alternative

23 lTC, app. I, 131; quoted in SP, 84.

24 lTC, app . I, 129-132 .
25 SP, 83.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 133

description oftemporality, still masquerading as commentary and critique

of HusserI.

(4) Conflation of Now-Phase with Impression

Derrida's discussion of the concept of source-point starkly reveals an even

more radical problem with Derrida's interpretation of internal time-
consciousness. For, he refers to this "source-point" indiscriminately as the
now and the primal impression. Clearly, Derrida has fallen into that very
error of interpretation which Brough discovered in so many other Husserl
interpreters."
Derrida has identified phases of intending consciousness with the
temporal phases of the intentional correlate. In other words, he has
conflated parts of acts with parts of objects. The primal impression, like
retention and protention , is a dependent moment, but not a temporal
"moment," of a slice [querschnitt] of a constituting consciousness. The
now-phase, like the just-passing and just-coming phases, is a dependent
temporal part of a constituted intentional correlate . Such conflation of
dimensions cannot help but yield a distorted and etiolated interpretation of
internal time-consciousness.
The passages which identify the now phase with the extended living
present of the Augenblick also illustrate this confusion of dimension. The
present-now is "evidence itself, conscious thought itself." Derrida's
argument shifts seamlessly from the "real now" to the "now apprehension"
and back to the "actual now.?" The confusing language of Husserl's
schematic interpretation oftime consciousness may be partly to blame; for
"apprehensions" in the ordinary sense are themselves independent,
constituted temporal "spreads," which therefore have their own "now
phases." A sensitivity to Husserl's use of language--distinguishing
secondary from core, pregnant meanings-and a careful reading of the

26 John B. Brough, "The Emergence of Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early

Writings on Time-Consciousness," in Husser!: Expositions and Appraisals, edited by

Frederick A. Ellison and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame and London : University of Notre
Dame Press, 1977), 83-100.
27 SP, 62.
134 NATALIE ALEXANDER

passage in which he clarifies the contrasting senses of "apprehension" at

stake here would dispel any continued confusion."
This confusion of dimensions continues to operate throughout "Speech
and Phenomena ." For example, Derrida discusses, in the next chapter, how
time as "auto-affection" undercuts pure presence:

This auto-affection must be pure since the primordial impression is here

affected by nothing other than itself, by the absolute "novelty" of another
primordial impression which is another now. (Emphasis added)"

This passage illustrates not only the equating of now-phase with the
impression that intends it but also the notion of each now as absolutely
independent atomic unit, therefore, not distinguishable in terms of relative
position within the whole. See how Derrida pushes Husser! toward a
Brentanean, even toward a Lockean, view of time.
This conflation of dimension occurs, not as a result of careful argument,
but by fiat. It occurs because Derrida has transferred, without examination,
assumptions and attitudes from Investigations which no longer characterize
the Husserlian text under scrutiny. The argument in "Speech and
Phenomena" fails to distinguish primal impression from now-phase
because it remains locked in the concept of impression or sensation from
Investigations; it does not distinguish act from content ofsensation.
Husserl explains, in The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Conscious-
ness, that the "acts" or rather the act phases of sensation cannot be
discerned within the "closed sphere" ofthe constituted levels, and that what
he has treated as momentary acts of consciousness must now be understood
as constituted temporal wholes." It follows , therefore, that any interpreta-
tion which continues this conflation cannot properly characterize Husserl's
absolute constituting level of consciousness. It follows further that any

28 lTC , 119.
29 SP, 85.

30 lTC, app. XII, 176-177; Independ ent corroboration emerges from Brough's argument
that commentaries which confuse these dimensions do so because of a deeper confusion, a
radical failure to distinguish Husserl's three tiers of constitution-Bough, 93-94 .
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 135

criticism which discovers the "impossibility" of the constituting level on

the basis of this conflation must be suspect.
Derrida collapses the act/content distinction without going through the
careful structural analysis he himself often calls for. The collapse is, in fact,
achieved precisely in the slipping and sliding of one term into another. Yet,
such metonymic slippage may be read as a strength, an important, useful ,
powerful function of language, given a rhetorical reading .
The indifference of now phase and primal impression-of which the
ambiguity on source-point is a symptom-is a complex metonymy in
which the parts of one whole are identified with those of another. This
slippage oversimplifies the relations which can be understood fully only in
terms of Husserl's concepts of mediate parts, relatively independent
wholes, and reciprocally founding parts. This articulated complexity need
not be recounted here, for the double-edged metonymy slashes through all
that. Not only does this analogic metonymy run powerfully in both
directions, but one of its members , the now phase, is already involved in
the powerful synecdoche with "living present" described above.
Anyone of these phrases carries with it the tremendous force of the
whole shifting network of phrases. The conceptual force of all of these
concepts is gathered into a "concept" of presence, of the now, a tool with
the rhetorical force to slash through and so to reconfigure the whole field
of Husserlian distinctions at stake here. Rhetoric , not logic, has forged the
tool that Derrida wields in the next logical move of his argument.

B. Ambiguity of "Perception" and the Flattening of Relations

In this section , I will show, first, that Derrida's text misrepresents two
senses of perception which Husserl is at pains to distinguish and relate,
and, second, that his argument uses his misrepresentation in order to
generate a faulty analysis of the relations of continuity and discontinuity
between perception, retention , and secondary memory.
136 NATALIE ALEXANDER

(1) Ambiguity of "Perception"

In order to establish the conflicting roles of retention, Derrida places

retention in the same plane with the now-phase as "perceived present":

One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can
appear as such only inasmuch as it is continually compounded with a
nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation
(retention and protention).

As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now,

perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality and non-
perception, in the zone of primordiality commonto primordial impression
and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the
A ugenblick. 31

Between these two remarks occurs one of the strongest and most convinc-
ing passages in the chapter.
Derrida generates a tension within the concept of perception by means
ofthe following progression of quotations from Phenomenology ofInternal
Time-Consciousness (here quoted in the order cited in "Speech and
Phenomena," abbreviated somewhat, and identified by letter for reference):

(a) .. . if we call perception the act in which all "origination " lies, ...
then primary remembrance is perception.

(b) [There is] no mention here of a continuous accommodation of

perception and its opposite.

(c) ... the antithesis ofperception is primary remembrance . . . whereby

perception and non-perception continually pass over into one another.

31 SP, 65, 66.

 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 137

(d) . .. Moreover, it is alsotrue that even this ideal now is not something
toto cae/o differentfromthe not-now but continually accommodates itself
thereto ... .32

The contradiction generated here appears incontrovertible. Husserl both

does and does not hold the "continuous accommodation ofperception with
[retention as] its opposite."
These quotations come from two different parts-{c) and (d) from part
16, (a) and (b) from part 17-both of which Boehm traces back to 1905
lecture notes." Husserl's use ofthe term "primary remembrance" also alerts
us that we are dealing with the earlier interpretation here. In addition, these
passages are quoted by Derrida in roughly reversed order (as reproduced
above) ; the actual order is (c), (d), (b), (a). Of course, a contradiction is a
contradiction, the order doesn't matter.
Yet, in this context, Husserl is developing increasingly adequate
conceptions of time-consciousness and of perception. Husser! pursues a
sort of Socratic elenchus, exploring-then rejecting-first Brentano's, then
Stem's approaches. Yet, as new meanings are discovered, earlier meanings
are not discarded out of hand, but recontextualized, understood in their
derivative relation to the more adequate meaning. As he develops his own
descriptions, he discovers an antinomy, then "absurd properties" and
infinite regress; from each he appropriates partial truths, building a relation
of the multiple derivative senses to the core sense, the "pregnant" sense."
I argue that Husserl is involved in just such a transition concerning the
meaning of "perception" in the passages cited above; the order, therefore,
matters very much. Part 16 begins: "Any reference to "perception" still
requires some discussion here.''" First, Husser! discusses the perception of
a whole melody, carefully delineating of dimensions and levels. Their
context makes it clear that these passages subordinate the derived to the

32 SP, 64-65 ; quoting lTC, 64 «a) and (b», 62-63 «c) and (d» .
33 Edmund Husser!, Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1883-1917),
Husserliana X [cited as ZB], edited by Rudolf Boehm (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966),
38 n. 3.
34 lTC, 88, 99-100.
35 lTC, 60.
138 NATALIE ALEXANDER

core sense. Husser! writes that the "gross" now includes and constitutes the
now-phase, and he defines perception simpliciter in terms of the temporal
spread." Given this context, the passage quoted by Derrida ((c) above)
clearly operates within the narrower, and now superseded, sense of
"perception."
Husser! returns to the relative sense of perception as impression in order
to emphasize that it is a mere dependent phase of consciousness; he treats
it, not as ground of all evidence, but as an abstraction, an ideal limit. In
fact, Derrida quotes this passage (a part of (d) not reproduced above), but,
for obvious reasons, does not comment on it. This narrower sense of
perception and its accommodation with retention can now be understood
as occurring within the context of perception simpliciter (or rather of
internal perception). Through this sensitivity to core and relative senses, we
may read the ensuing passage ((d) above) not as requiring an accommoda-
tion of perception (impression) to its opposite, but rather as modifying the
opposition between impression and retention and between the associated
(and, therefore, also derivative) sense of now and not-now. The accommo-
dations at stake here are not contradictory.
Beginning part 17, Husser! moves explicitly from the contrast between
the derived sense of perception (as primal impression) and retention to that
between ordinary perception and memory: "Here, therefore, it is a question
of an entirely different concept ofperception." Ordinary memory, on the
other hand, "is just the opposite ofthis [of perception] . There is no mention
here of a continuous accommodation of perception to its opposite.?"
Ordinary perception and ordinary memory, temporally extended acts
constituted on the second level, are discrete, not continuous. Here, it is
correct to speak of opposition, but not of accommodation. The relation,
within ordinary perception, between retention and primal impression
remains one of "continuous accommodation," but is no longer a relation of
opposites.
Yet, Derrida writes as if this last sentence (cited as (b) above) referred
to the relation between primal impression and retention instead of that
between perception and ordinary memory. The passage must be taken

36 lTC, 60-63.
37 lTC, 63, 64.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 139

totally out of context and referred to the wrong subject in order to generate
the tension within perception as both accommodating and not accommodat-
ing its opposite.
Furthermore, Derrida's first word is Husserl's last, that is, the character-
ization (in (a) above) of retention as originary, and so, as perception. This
reversal marks the role ofthis passage as summation of the most adequate
conception of perception achieved so far: the concept of perception as "the
act in which all 'origination' lies." This passage situates retention along
with primal impression and protention as a dependent, grounding moment
of the temporally extended perceptual act.
Nevertheless, the derived and dependent use of "perception" stands in
Derrida's reconstruction of the passages as if it were Husserl's last word on
perception. The point here is not to assert that Husserl's hierarchy is
correct, but rather to ask "Where is the deconstruction which overturns it?"
The necessity for such a deconstruction has been dissimulated, masked, by
the conflation of now-phase with both impression and living present.
Once again, it is clear that Derrida's text does not contain a reading of
Husserl plausible to any who follow Derrida's own abjuration to "read and
reread those texts in whose wake I write. "
At this point, Derrida has laid the groundwork for discussing Husserl's
contrast between retention and ordinary memory. Before continuing my
critique ofthe Derridean "argument," I turn to a rhetorical technique used
extensively throughout "Speech and Phenomena."
Rhetorical questions pepper the Introduction and almost every chapter
ofthe essay, questions that are not explicitly answered in the ensuing few
paragraphs." Recall that before "Signs and the Blink of an Eye," Derrida
makes only provisional conclusions--often marked by conditional syntax
and subjunctive mood. Many of the rhetorical questions operate within this
provisional syntax, but they modify it too by the force of the tacit answers.
They ask "Is not . .. ?" and carry the rhetorical force of the tacit reply,
"Yes, it is." The clustering of questions intensifies this effect. Much of the
forcefulness ofthis figure lies in the repetition of questions, the latter ones
building from the tacit responses to the former. A reader is even more

38 SP, 8, 41, 83, for example.

140 NATALIE ALEXANDER

likely to accept a position already used, however tacitly, to pose and answer
further questions.
The pivotal fifth chapter contains one question that appears in isolation
in the center of Derrida's reversal on "perception." "And yet, did not the
preceding section quite explicitly entertain this very possibilityr?" The
answer, of course, is "But, no; One passage refers to secondary memory
and the other to primal impression ." But, if we good readers supply the
expected " Yes," then this invitation to contradiction sets the ground for the
conflicting roles of retention .
By metonymy and rhetorical question, Derrida has "swung" the pivot.
The clusterings of questions that almost fill the last two pages of "Signs
and the Blink of an Eye" receive their explicit, and by now firmly
anticipated, answers in the final chapters . The conditions seem to be met,
the subjunctives become pro forma, then drop out altogether. In the sixth
chapter, the questions are indicative in mood; they no longer possibilize
their results : they ask, not "should," "could," "would ," but "shall" and
"can." By the seventh chapter, the clustering effect that once marked
rhetorical questions simply introduces the next theme-the questions
receive answers."
Furthermore, perception has been thoroughly estranged from its
progression of development in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness. In a syntactic metonymy that must, for Derrida's purposes,
remain unidirectional, Derrida's order of quotation gives us to understand
what precedes from what follows, or rather to understand what precedes as
what follows." Finally, not only retention (with its own metonymic linkage
to images and signs) but also primordial impression are named as
perceptions, by synechdoche of (mediate) part for whole, while primordial
impression is already involved in the anologic metonymy discussed above.

39 SP, 65.
40 SP, 71, 74, 83 (ch. 6); 92-93, 95 (ch. 7).
41 What is fascinating here is that for the slippage to work as Derrida needs it to, this

metonymy must "slide" only in one direction; but Derrida's own notion of the metonymic
structure of language cannot justify such unidirectional slippage.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 141

(2) Memory-Retention-Perception

Derrida maintains this ambiguated conception of perception through a

procedure so characteristic of deconstruction as to almost define it, that is
through a flattening of levels in the relations between secondary memory,
retention, and perception: "[Husserl] holds to establishing a radical
discontinuity between retention and reproduction ... and not between
perception and retention.':" Derrida treats these relations as a linear,
discontinuous progression from proximal to remote, the only relational
issue being where to draw the line of discontinuity between primordial
presentation and nonprimordial representation. How does Derrida achieve
this "flatland" model of these relations?
On one hand, Husserl does indeed hold a discontinuity between
perception and memory. Like imagining or expecting, they are discrete,
temporally extended acts which intend thematic and temporal objects. They
are (usually) independent of each other, but have only relative indepen-
dence in relation to the bipolar, intentional correlation to which each
belongs or in relation to any "higher" acts they may inhabit (e.g., perceiv-
ing the tone in relation to perceiving the melody). In this sense, perception
and memory belong to Husserl's second level of constitution.
On the other hand, Husserl does not hold any contrasting continuity
between retention and perception in this sense, except in so far as a part can
be described as "continuous" with its whole. There is a sort of mediate
continuity between, on the one hand, a phase of a founding, dependent part
of a whole and, on the other hand, the founded , relatively independent
whole the phase helps to constitute. This kind of mediate continuity exists,
however, between retention and memory also, as between retention and any
other constituted act. So this particular continuity cannot evoke the tension
Derrida describes.
Yet, Derrida writes that:

The difference between retention and reproduction, between primary and

secondary memory, is not the radical difference Husserl wanted between

42 SP, 64.
142 NATALIE ALEXANDER

perception and nonperception; it is rather a difference between two

modifications of nonperception."

This sentence practically quivers with the doubled and trebled meanings of
"perception" and "nonperception." One sees clearly that no unambiguous
reading of this sentence could plausibly refer to the more articulated (and
more "standard") reading of Husserl I have offered here .
The "nervus demonstrandi of [Husserl's] critique of Brentano" is not, as
Derrida claims here, a shifting of the discontinuity between primordial and
nonprimordial further down the line, into "the past.?" It consists, rather, in
Husserl's sensitivity to distinguishing act from content. Husserl's careful
delineation of the dimensions of momentary consciousness (retention,
primal moment, protention) from the temporal dimensions of temporally
extended wholes Gust-passing, now-phase, just-coming) has never been
deconstructed. Since Derrida's interpretation of Husserl does not recognize
this distinction, it pushes still further an increasingly "flattened" and
linear---even Brentanesque-reading of Husser\.
With reference to other Husserl interpretations, Brough has argued that
the conflation of dimensions was rooted in the deeper oversight-the
failure to appreciate Husserl's distinction between (the first level) absolute,
constitutive flux and (the second level) immanent, temporal objectivity."
I have shown, here , that Derrida's mis-interpretation follows the same
pattern: the dimensional conflation of now-phase and primordial impres-
sion which inaugurated the deconstruction of time is ultimately made
possible by this flattening of the constitutive levels.
The conflating, ambiguating-s-call it metonymic-process of flattening
has been aided by isodunamia, a rhetorical figure found almost exclusively
in this pivotal fifth chapter. Derrida has long been recognized as master of
the persuasive use of the "negative figures," rhetorical tropes and figures
of speech using negation or indirection, conveying meanings which are
nowhere literally "present" in the words. Derrida is well-known for his
rhetoric of absence, especially rhetorical question, as discussed earlier, and

43 SP, 65.

44 SP, 64.

4S Brough , 93-94 .
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 143

hyperbole. Yet, when I searched for examples of straightforward [;

sodunamia, for sentences that signify their ideas negatively, I found very
few. Instead, throughout this text, Derrida uses forceful, positive syntax,
and casts his claims in the (rhetorically) strong modality of necessity
opposed to impossibility. Nevertheless, in the early chapters, such passages
are always framed by passages in subjunctive mood, e.g., conditionals and
rhetorical questions.
In contrast, I discovered an isodunamic figure in the fifth chapter,
designed as caveat, that is, as discounting (de-signing) certain aspects of
Husserl's description: "Whether or not it is a metaphysical presupposition,
the concept of punctuality . . ..Despite this motif of the punctual now as
' primal form' ....Without reducing the abyss which may indeed separate
retention from re-presentation .... "46 This figure appears almost exclu-
sively in the fifth chapter.
The third passage quoted above also operates to flatten the complexity
of a relation-which is not an abyss-and to convey it as a simple
opposition. Compare it to: "Despite all the complexity of its structure,
temporality has a nondisplaceable center, an eye or living core, the
punctuality of the real now.?" Here too, the figure discounts the complex-
ity, places it in opposition to the "simple" core, and introduces the "eye"
imagery, which, as I argue in the next section, will serve to displace the
nondisplaceable center.
The isodunamic figure, used extensively in the pivotal chapter and
almost nowhere else, breaks down the previous distinction between the
conditional frame and the language of necessity by de-signing those
features and relations in The Phenomenology ofInternal Time-Conscious-
ness that work against the set conditions. The conditions seem to have been
met; the forceful necessities of Derrida's strong misreading of Husserl rule
the final chapters.

46 SP, 61, 63 (introducing his sections I. and 2. respectively), and 67; see also page 55 in

Chapter 4. The few occurrences after the fifth chapter are all "whether or not" constructions
and seem to carry little rhetorical weight.
47 SP, 62.
144 NATALIE ALEXANDER

c. Equivocal Argument
I come now to the crux of the Derridean deconstruction of time. The
ambiguity of now-phase with living present, the dimensional conflation of
this ambiguous "present" with primal impression, and the flattening by fiat
of the Husserlian levels of constitution all support this argument, the
keystone ofthe essay. Here, a subtle equivocation on "perception" leads to
that contradiction involving retention by which Derrida destructures the
hierarchy of "exclusions" through which he has read Husserl's foundational
system.
Retention, according to Derrida, not only does but must play contradic-
tory roles, in order for Husserl's system to maintain both the primordiality
(immediacy) and continuity of self-conscious identity over time:

(a) The living now is constituted as the absolute perceptual source only in
a state of continuity with retention taken as nonperception ....

(b) The source of certitude in general is the primordial character of the

living now; it is necessary therefore to keep retention in the sphere of
primordial certitude .. . .48

So, retention (as not-now) is nonperception; yet, as primordial, it is

perception.
This passage, which has seemed at first so clear-cut and plausible, now
reverberates with the problematic meanings Derrida assigns. What of the
living now? Is the "living now" the primal impression, the now-phase, or
the extended perceptual present?" Only the extended, living present makes

48 SP, 67.
49 In fact, Husserl never uses "living now" in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-

Consciousness. Derrida has appropriated it (e.g., SP, 67) to signify his ambiguous "present"
from Ideas (221-222; quoted in SP, 66-67 n. 5). There, Husserl actually describe s not the
extended present but the fluxing now-phase, defining "a continuously flowing absolute
primordial phase" which can be grasped only in reciprocal foundedness with continuously
flowing just-passing and just coming phases. Even ':lis relative use of "living now," naming
a dependent aspect of the flux, does not designate that "instant at a point " which Derrida
requires. Of course, Derrida's treatment also elides the contrasting dimensions explicit in the
passage he quotes between the continua of temporal phases and of intending phases .
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 145

(b) true ofHusserl's model. Only primal impression fits into (a) to establish
the continuity with retention. Indeed, on the limited, derivative sense of
"perception" as primal impression , retention is "nonperception." Primal
impression, however, is not Husserl's core sense of perception, not the
"absolute perceptual source." "The source of certitude in general" is always
the concrete perception which inhabits the extended, living present.
One of the few metaphors employed by Derrida operates within this
tension. Derrida characterizes the present (now phase, living present,
perception, primal impression) as a "living eye," evoking thereby the
Augenblick criterion of immediacy. This imagery evokes also the image of
the blink which closes the eye on the empty present as "zero-point" and
retains only an after-image on the closed eyelid-a metonymic displace-
ment of what precedes by what follows .

. . .when we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick;

nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink ofan instant.
There is a duration to the blink and it closes the eye."

In the image of the blinking eye, the rhetorically molded temporality ofthe
after-event, (Nachtriiglichkeit), in which conscious experience is the after-
image, in which presence is pursued but never given-here, prefigured, is
the alternative temporality toward which Derrida is leading us. In the
Augenblick, at first a symbol of Husserl's criterion of presence, the
metonymic structure of the "trace" is prefigured.
I've shown how Derrida's interpretation treats phenomena on radically
different constitutive levels of consciousness as if they were on the same
level, as if they could be interpreted in terms of a flatland model using only
the relational distinction of continuity and discontinuity-holding a
continuity between "primordial" elements, in discontinuity from the
nonprimordial.
Derrida's interpretation takes no account ofthe distinctions and relations
defining the three levels. I have already shown how Derrida assimilates all
relations of dependency with those of foundation. Since the relation of the
three levels depends, above all, on the difference, even the contrast,

50 SP, 65.
146 NATALIE ALEXANDER

between the dependent and the founded, Derrida's interpretation cannot

address this structure. The only relational contrast left available draws a
"discontinuity" between (independent and founding) primordial presenta-
tion and (dependent and founded) nonprimordial re-presentation. Derrida
attributes the former status to the now-phase (taken as the ambiguated
"present") and the latter, to a conflation of memory, imagination, symbol-
ism, and of course, signification. Is it any wonder that retention, which is
both dependent and founding, seems problematic on this flatland model?
Conflation and equivocation may be treated, not as errors of interpreta-
tion but as metonymy and metalepsis. Metonymy marks the multiplicity of
meaning, the polysemy which makes language so beautifully rich in
metaphor and connotation. In equivocation, for example, the sense of a
signifier shifts within a single context, so that something shown of the first
sense is claimed of the second. But, if the second sense was already
implicit, as connotation, as metaphor, merely as another sense of the
"same" word, then it could be teased out of the text, made to influence the
reading.
Indeed, Derrida claims that these shifts are not only possible, but
unavoidable and even desirable. On this view of language, all texts are
marked by slippage, gradual transformation of meanings relative to the
context of differences which constitute them . This flattening of the
theoretical landscape is effected through metonymy, whose core rhetorical
structure as described earlier is one of symmetrical substitution which
overrides differences in kind or "level."
The oppositions, the tensions, the resonances that these figures invest
into ''presence'' and ''perception'' become almost poetic in their forceful-
ness. Indeed, the entire "equivocal argument," keystone of the chapter and
pivot of the essay, is a multidirectional, multidimensional metalepsis
(extended metonymy) of staggering proportions-and the force of this
metalepsis is to collapse the rich web of distinctions, discharging all their
energy into the flattened relation of indicative trace : "Such a trace is ...
more "primordial" than what is phenomenologically primordial.?"
Derrida's references to his demonstrations, arguments, and proofs must
be taken, on this view of deconstruction, as rhetorical, evocative of the

SI SP, 67.
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 147

powerful persuasive force rather than logical necessity. The trappings of

logical argument are themselves but a rhetorical play; on this reading,
" Speech and Phenomena" only masquerades as philosophical argument.
One cannot take the standpoint that Derrida successfully argues for and
then , only after the pivotal fifth chapter, adopts this rhetorically volatile
approach to language. On the contrary, although at first subtly clothed in
the language of philosophical analysis, commentary and argumentation, the
essay progresses from the start through metonymic slippage, that is, more
through rhetorical than logical force." He writes, using this interpretation
of language from the start, in order to give a strong misreading of HusserI,
a misreading de-signed to bring these overturned, anti-Husserlian notions
to the fore. To a great extent, the essay, "Speech and Phenomena," provides
a strong, rhetorically effective misreading of HusserI.
Through this rhetorical reading, we have advanced beyond simply
criticizing Derrida's "logic," to a fuller feeling for his enterprise. Derrida
writes to indicate that univocity, definitive interpretation, logocentrism are
impossible dreams, that even the driest philosophical texts are polysemous,
open to variable readings , susceptible only to weaker and stronger
misreadings. What at first appeared as one among other rhetorical
techniques now appears to be the underlying structure of both language and
time. Slippage is the movement ofthe trace; the temporal trace, the closing
ofthe eye, is nothing other than metonymic slippage.
On Derrida's own account of language, all texts are marked by this
metonymic trace-that is, by substitutive elements, standing in for others
which have been repressed , displaced, dissimulated. What has Derrida
dissimulated? What is missing from his account of time-consciousness?"
Derrida crystallizes the implicit temporal structure of the after-event
that, he claims, both underlies and undercuts phenomenological presence:

The possibility of re-petition in its most general form, that is, the
constitution of a trace in the most universal sense . . . must constitute [the

52 SP, 17-18, and 102, for example; see also Newton Garver, Preface to Speech and
Phenomena xxvi-xxvii.
53 I believe that Derrida dissimulates not only protention but also the language Husser l
develops to discuss flux, the noetic, and marginal perception.
148 NATALIE ALEXANDER

pure actuality of the now] through the very movement of differance it

introduces .54

The Derridean terminology supervenes, eclipsing the Husserlian. "Re-

petition" is "to-ask-again." Derrida emphasizes the prefix, linking
repetition morphologically as well as analogically to retention, return,
representation, and remembrance. The "petition" itself, the expectant
asking, must be linked to protention and the future. Surely, protention
should playa large role in any deconstructive reading of HusserIian internal
time-consciousness.
Protention is,primafacia, an even better point of deconstructive incision
than is retention: (a) Husserl has often been charged with neglecting---even
repressing protention; (b) when conflated with the just-coming temporal
moment, it is susceptible to the same treatment Derrida gave retention; (c)
many of Derrida's objections to presence hinge on the future; (d) the
Derridean notion of differance connotes not only differing but deferring,
seemingly requiring that Derrida take up this deconstruction in terms of
protention.
Does Derrida neglect protention? Does Derrida need to characterize
time-consciousnessness in terms of a binary opposition between retention
and the ambiguous now? When Derrida quotes HusserI, "primary
expectation" appears only once; and "protention," once in a footnote." In
neither case does he discuss it.
Derrida himself mentions protention only twice in "Speech and
Phenomena." He mentions it to introduce that passage in which he so
strangely reverses HusserI's developing senses of perception, but turns , at
once, to his critique in which only the (conflated) relation between
retention and the now is at stake.56 He mentions it in passing once again, as
he sharpens the conflicting roles he has created for retention; the trans-
formational conceptions of after-event, trace, and differance develop in
terms of retention alone.

54 SP, 67.

55 SP, 65 (quoting lTC, 62) 66 n. 5 (quoting lTC, 142).

56 SP, 64; he does however mention protention again in " Differance."
 THE HOLLOW DECONSTRUCTION OF TIME 149

The deconstruction of time with its empty, hollowed out present,

actually requires the dissimulation of protention and the future. Retention,
primal impression, and protention are reciprocally founding moments. One
never has an independent perception of primal impression simpliciter; the
"self-consciousness" of the constitutive flux can be characterized neither
as enduring object nor as instantaneous point but only as the standing
stream of absolute consciousness as flux."
The deconstruction requires the confusing of foundation relations with
dependency relations, specifically the founding with the independent, so
that a rich subtlety of distinctions can be simplified to the metonymic
either/or. Derrida can cast the now as founding/independent and retention
as founded/dependent, only by ignoring the protention of new primal
impressions and content-laden "spreads."
Derrida refuses to call attention to the Husserlian symmetry of just-
passing and just-coming because the now-phase must always be co-
constituted in interdependence with both phases. But in order to inaugurate
the temporality ofthe trace, now and retention (conflated with just-passing)
must be conceived in opposition . The deconstruction gives to the now, as
"source-point" but also as null point, the annunciative function of pro-
tention; retention takes on the fulfilling function of the living present, but,
since it is always past, fulfillment is always deferred .
Derrida recenters the "blink of an eye" to the after-image retained on the
eyelid closed by the now phase as null point; he can do so only by ignoring
the way in which protention gradually opens-as retention slowly
shuts-the "eye" of the living present. The Derridean deconstruction of
time dissimulates protention.
I am at the last not deeply moved by Derrida's deconstruction of internal
time-consciousness. Whether I read it as philosophical argumentation or
rhetorical narrative, it strikes me as a hollow deconstruction. To my taste,
interpreting internal time-consciousness without protention is like

57 lTC, 100-111 , app. I, 129-132, and especially app. VIII, 157-160; see also, Brough, 95-
98.
150 NATALIE ALEXANDER

producing King Lear without Cordelia: feasible , if you can get the backers,
but ultimately unsatisfying-a weak misreading.

Beloit College
 CHAPTER EIGHT

THE RELATION AS THE FUNDAMENTAL

ISSUE IN DERRIDA

LEONARD LAWLOR

Of all the aspects of Derrida's thought, his interpretation of Husserl has

occasioned the most debate. 1 Although all of Derrida's critics start out
wanting to understand him-none, for instance, claim to do anything as
extraordinary as "deconstruction"- none adhere to one of the most basic
hermeneutical rules: reconstruct the context. Because critics neglect the
context, some charge Derrida with interpreting Husserlian phenomenology
merely as ontologism and intuitionism, in a word, as Platonism.' They do

1 The latest addition to these debates is of course J. Claude Evans' Strategies of

Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice (Minneapolis, MN; University of
Minessota Press, 1991). Rudolf Bernet has also participated in this debate; see his "Husserl's
Theory of Signs Revisited" in Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition :
Essays in Phenomenology, edited by Robert Sokolowski (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1988), 1-24; also his "On Derrida's 'lntroduction' to Husserl's
Origin ofGeometry," in Derrida and Deconstruction (Continental Philosophy, II), edited
by Hugh J. Silverman (New York: Routledge, 1989), 139-153; also his "Is the Present ever
Present? Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence," in Research in Phenomenology,
12 (Husser! and Contemporary Thought), 85-112. See also Jean-Luc Marion's Reduction
and Donation (Paris: PUF, 1990). Additional essays are cited in the next two notes. The best
review of this literature is John Protevi's unpublished" 'A Certain Outside': The
Establishment of Exteriority in General in Derrida's Speech and Phenomena."

2 See for example Burt Hopkins, "Derrida's Reading of Husserl in Speech and
Phenomena: Ontologism and the Metaphysics of Presence," in Husserl Studies, 2 (1985):
193-214 . Hopkins says, "The first [feature of ontolog ism] may be characterized as the
insensitivity to the reflective nuance which differentiates the ontic modality of Being and
the thematic reflective awareness of the subjective experience of Being." "The second
feature of ontologism," he goes on to say, "may be characterized as the understanding of the
phenomenologically disclosed Sinn to be predicable of, correlative to, or otherwise

151
W. R. McKenna andJ. C. Evans (eds.) , Derrida and Phenomenology, 151-184.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publi shers.
152 LEONARD LAWLOR

this despite the fact that Derrida has repeatedly stated his allegiance to
transcendental philosophy.' Others charge him with failing "to recognize
the subtleties ofHusserl's account of the interplay of presence and absence,
of immanence and transcendence, of filled and empty intention.'?' even
though Derrida appropriates precisely these subtleties to criticize the so-
called "metaphysics of presence" he nevertheless finds in Husser\. The one-
sidedness of such charges is startling. Perhaps however the critics'
negligence can be excused; to assemble all the parts of the Derridean
context is an immense task. Roughly the context can be divided into two
parts, and even these two do not exhaust it.
First and most obviously, in order to construe Derrida's interpretation
of Husserl responsibly, one must examine Derrida's entire corpus on
Husser\. If one is going to write a commentary on the 1967 Speech and
Phenomenal it is essential to examine his 1962 Introduction to his French
translation of Husserl's The Origin ofGeometry? Not only does Derrida

homogeneous with, the naive (uncr itical) data oflower level reflections" (201-202). Both
of these characteristics are captured by the word "Platonism" (or objectivism): the belief that
an absolute object, an idea, may be merely given without subjective constitution.

3 Cf. Affranchissement du transfert et de la lettre, edited by Rene Major (Paris : Edition

Confrontation, 1981), in which Derrida again repeats that the transcendental question is a
necessity (76).

4 Alan White "Reconstructing Husserl : A Critical Response to Derrida's Speech and

Phenomena ," in Husserl Studies 4 (1987), 46. Indeed White intensely reconstructs Husserl's
Logical Investigations context but of course fails to do the same for Derrida; he only
discusses and cites Speech and Phenomena, as if Derrida had never written anything else on
Husser!. In particular, if White had read Derrida's Introduction to Huss erl 's The Origin 0/
Geometry he would have realized that Derrida discovered "a teleological concern" (cf.
White, 57) in Husserl's philosophy of history. This could have been seen even in '''Genesis
and Structure' and Phenomenology," but White never apparently read this essay either.

S Jacques Derrida, La voix et Ie phenomene (Paris : PUF, 1967); translated by David B.

Allison as Speech and Phenomena (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
Hereafter abbreviated as "SP," with reference to the English translation first, then to the
original French .

6 L 'origine de la geometrie, traduction et introduction par Jacqu es Derrida (Paris : PUF,

1974 [1962]); translated by John Leavey as Edmund Husserl's The Origin ofGeom etry: An
Introduction (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Hereafter abbreviated as
"INF," with page reference to the English translation first, then to the original French.
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 153

cite this piece at the most crucial juncture in Speech and Phenomena-at
the exact moment when he relates phenomenon to voice, presence to
language (SP, 81 n. 7/91 n. I)-but also explicitly prioritizes it in his 1980
thesis defense speech.' The recent publication (1990) of his 1953-54
Memoire, his Le probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl,
adds yet another text that must be examined." Finally, there are several
essays and even pertinent book reviews."
Second, one must examine Derrida's Husserlian corpus within the
context of his other works; after all, Derrida's studies ofHusserl are only
a part of his work. The fact for example that Derrida wrote an extensive
essay on Levinas in 1964 must be taken into account. One must be aware
moreover of how Derrida lets Husserl intersect with the other great
phenomenologists, Hegel and Heidegger. It is relevant to his reading of
Husserl that Derrida was a student of Hyppolite and that during the 1960's

7 Jacques Derr ida, "The Time of the Thesis," in Philosophy in France Today, edited by
Alan Montefiore (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1983),39. See also Jacques
Derrida's recent "Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms,
Parasitisms, and other Small Seismisms," in The States of "Theory," edited by David Carroll
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990),91-92. Also Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit,
translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1989 [1987]) , 60 n. 1.

8 Jacques Derrida, Le probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husser! (Paris : PUF ,

1990). Hereafter abbreviated a "PG."

9 Jacques Derrida, review of "Phanomenologische Psychologie. Vor!esungen Som-

mersemester 1925" par Edmund Husserl, in Les etudes philosophiques 18 (1963) : 203-206;
Jacques Derrida, review of Edmund Husser!, The Idea of Phenomenology, traduction
anglaise par William P. Alston et George Nakhnikian, review of Edmund Husser!, The Paris
Lectures, traduction anglaise et introduction par Peter Kosenbaum, both in Les etudes
philosophiques, 20 (1965) : 538-539; Jacques Derrida, review of Robert Sokolowski, The
Formation ofHusserl's Concept ofConstitution, in Les etudes philosophiques, 18 (1965):
557-558; Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: an Essay on the Thought of
Emmanuel Levinas," '''Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology," both in Writing and
Difference , translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978 [1967])
79-168; "Differance," "Ousia and Gramme," "The Ends of Man," "Form and Meaning in
Husser!'s Phenomenology," "Signature Event Context," all in Margins of Philosophy,
translated by Alan Bass (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1980 [1972]) , respectively,
1-27, 29-67, 109-135, 155-173, 307-330; Jacques Derrida, "Phenomenologie et la cloture
de la metaphysics," in Epoches (Fevr 1966), 181-200 .
 154 LEONARD LAWLOR

Derrida read Heidegger extensively, and in particular, the later Heidegger."

Lastly, one must examine the Husserlian scholarship influencing Derrida .
The questions Derrida asks Husserl are inherited .
Although Derrida himself has noted his debt to Tran-duc-Thao's
Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, II there is another Husserlian
who exerted pressure on Derrida's thought: Eugen Fink, the so-called
"author" of the first version of "The Origin of Geometry.l'" In his
Introduction to The Origin ofGeometry Derrida mentions and cites Fink
often; this also happens in the earlier Masters thesis." The essay cited most
often is the 1933 "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
and Contemporary Criticism ." Here, as is well-known, Fink demonstrates
the inadequacy of the then prevalent interpretations of Husserl's phe-

10 Compare the footnotes to "Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing and Difference, in

which Derrida cites such late texts as Identity and Differenc e, to the Introduction, in which
Derrida mentions Heidegger (and only Being and Time) in passing, INF, 101 n. 109/103 n.
I.

II Jacques Derrida, "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations," in Philosophy in France Today,

38. Tran-duc-Thao, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism , translated by Daniel 1.
Herman and Donald V. Morano (Boston: Reidel, 1986 [1951]).

12 Th is was publi shed in la Revue internationale de Philosophie in 1936. See Derrida's

Avertissement to his Introduction; this is where he calls Fink the "author" of The Origin of
Geometry .

l3 1n the Introduction Fink is cited on the following pages: 25 n. l/Avertissement, 27 n.

4/6 n. 1,42 n. 31/25 n. 1,55 n. 50/42 n. 1,69 n. 66/60 n. 1,77 n. 76/71 n. 1, 141 n. 168/155
n. 1. He is explicitl y mentioned in the Introduction on 89/86, 90/89. In Le probleme de la
genese Fink is cited on: 2 n. 2, 3 n. 4, 19 n. 31, 19 n. 32, 88 n. 31. Derrida also mentions
Fink in his critical review of Robert Sokolowski's Husserl's Theory ofConstitution in Les
etudes philosophiques. The Fink essays cited are: "Les concepts operatoires dans la
phenornenologie de Husserl," in Husser!: Cahiers de Royaumont, III (Paris: Minuit, 1959),
214-241, English translation "Operative Concepts in HusserI's Phenomenology," in Apriori
and World, edited by W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan and L. E. Winters (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981); "Die Phanornenologische Philosophie E. Husserl in der Gegenwartigen
Kritik," in Kantstudien, Band XXXVIII, 3/4 (Berlin, 1933), 319-383 , English translation
"The Phenomenological Philosoph y of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," in
The Phenomenology of Husserl, edited by R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1970), 73-147; "Das Problem der Phanornenologie E. Husserl," in Revue internationale de
Philosoph ie, 2 (1939) : 226-270 , English translation "The Problem of the Phenomenology
of Edmund Husserl," in Apriori and World. Fink's essays on Husserl written in the 30's are
collected in Studien zur Phdnomenologie 1930-1939 (Hague : Nijhoff, 1966).
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 155

nomenology: intuitionism and ontologism." Perhaps less well-known

however is that Fink also explains why Husserlian phenomenology always
lends itself to such interpretations.
Phenomenology possesses, according to Fink, an " ineradicable
'transcendental Schein' i?" Because of the "striking ambiguity" within the
term "epoche," the transcendental ego in Husserl appears to be another
being different from the empirical ego. This however is only an illusion."
The transcendental ego differs from the empirical ego, but is not something
different; its existence overlaps-somehow-with that ofthe psychological
ego. Relating the transcendental and the empirical without ontic duplica-
tion, this relation must be, according to Fink, entirely different from any
found in the world; no standard logic can account for it. Its nature
therefore, according to Fink, is phenomenology's most basic paradox; he
asks: "How are we to determine the identity of the transcendental and the
human egos? Are they simply the same ego viewed from two different
perspectives, or are they two separate egos?"" In his 1959 "Les concepts
operatoires dans la phenomenologie de Husserl ," Fink even describes the
relation opened by the epoche as "ischizophrenie' methodique?"
Other paradoxes are bound up with the paradox of the relation . Since
the two egos, according to Fink, are ontically identical, then the difference
between them is entirely one of sense, a linguistic difference. How then,
Fink asks, is this difference to be communicated from someone residing in
the phenomenological attitude to those still in the natural attitude; how is
one to free phenomenological terminology from empirical (or ontic)

14 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas' 1930 Husserl's Theory of Intuition (translated by Andre

Orianne (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973]) which also demonstrates the
inadequacy of these readings . In fact, Levinas' book is devoted to showing that Husserl's
thought is the thought of the ontological difference; see page 4, for example. The fact that
both Fink and Levinas oppose these reductionistic readings of Husserl and that Derrida
studied both these texts makes Hopkins' criticisms of Derrida all the more remarkable.

15 Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy," 75, 142, 145.

16 Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy," 117-119.

17 Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy," 144.

18 Fink, "Les concepts operatoires," III, 222.

156 LEONARD LAWLOR

contaminationv" Again in his "Les concepts operatoires," Fink laments that

Husserl never took up the question of a transcendental language." All
irresponsible interpretations therefore according to Fink result from these
paradoxes over how to conceive, how to talk about, the relation between
the transcendental and the empirical, between the spiritual and the material.
Thanks to Fink, Derrida's entire interpretation ofHusserI focuses on the
paradox of the "parallelism" between the empirical and the transcendental.
Indeed, what I am going to show in this paper is that Derrida's entire
thought is an attempt to conceive this relation." To do this I am going to
proceed in four steps . First, I am going to provide a detailed reading of
Derrida's Introduction to HusserI's Origin of Geometry?' As already
mentioned above, this book is essential for understanding Derrida's
interpretation of HusserI; as we shall see, it is devoted to HusserI's
conception of the relation in The Origin of Geometry. Then in order to
show that the relation dominates Derrida's entire interpretation of HusserI
I am going to go back to Derrida's Memoire and forth to his Speech and
Phenomena. Third in order to extend this analysis up to Derrida's more
recent works, I am going to examine "White Mythology" (1971) in
Margins of Philosophy (1972)23 and "Psyche: Invention of the Other"

19 Fink, "Les concepts operatoires," III, 229.

20 Fink, "Les concepts operatoires ," III, 229. It is of course interesting to read this Fink
essay in connection with Rudolf Bernet's "Husserl's Theory of Signs Revisited," in Edmund
Husserl: Essays in the Phenomenological Tradition, in particular, 14-20. I shall return to
Bernet's essay below in note 52.

21 When we read Derrida's more recent "political" writings, we should not forget that
politics is fundamentally concerned with the relation between egos.

22 As far as I know, Rudolf Bernet's "On Derrida's 'Introduction' to Husserl's The Origin
ofGeometry," in Derrida and Deconstruction, 139-153 is the only other extensive reading
of the Introduction. While this is a fine essay, it does not analyze the Introduction
systematically, only impressionistically.

23 Jacques Derrida, "La mythologie blanche : La metaphore dans Ie texte philosophique,"

in Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 247-324 ; English translation as "White
Mythology : Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins ofPhilosophy, translated by
Alan Bass (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1982), 207-272 . Hereafter abbreviated
as "WM," with references to the English translation first, then to the original French .
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 157

(1983-84) in Psyche: Inventions de ['autre (1987).24 The first three steps

will attempt to elucidate Derrida's thought in general and his interpretation
ofHusser! specificially; indirectly therefore they will attempt to defend him
from his critics. The fourth step I shall take, however, will directly defend
him; although brief, it will consider the ethics of deconstruction.
What I hope to show finally is that Derrida's entire thought attempts to
remain faithful to what Fink recognized as "ineradicable" (untilgbaren) .
Derrida attempts to respect the difference between the transcendental ego
and empirical ego and yet conceive the relation non-ontically." This means
he conceives the relation as a zigzag, as a fold, as catachresis, and as a
psyche. All of these terms define what Derrida for a long time has called
differance. Because of this previously unrecognized affinity to Fink, we
shall even be tempted to say that Husser! himself authorized the Derridean
notion of differance, In his introduction to Fink's "The Phenomenological
Philosophy ofEdmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism" Husserl says:
"I am happy to be able to state that [Fink's essay] contains no sentence
which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as
my own conviction.?" We shall see however that for essential reasons
Husserl's authority could not extend that far; indeed we shall see that all of
the Derridean terms like differance, Derrida's deconstructive readings
themselves, are only responses to this lack of authority.

24 Jacques Derrida, "Psyche, Invention de l'autre" (1983-84), in Psyche. Inventions de

l'autre (Paris : Galilee, 1987), 11-62; English translation as " Psyche: Invent ion of the
Other," in Reading de Man Reading, edited by Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzick
(Minneapolis, MN: Univers ity of Minnesota Press, 1989),25-65. Hereafter abbreviated a
"PI," with references to the English translation first, then to the French .

25 Rodolphe Gasche's "Du trait non-adequat: Ie notion de rapport chez Heidegger" (in Les
fins de I'homme-Colloque de Cerisy, edited by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe [paris: Galilee, 1981], 131-161) was instrumental in achieving my interpretation
of Derrida.

26 Edmund Husser!, Introduction to Fink's "The Phenomenological Philospohy of Edmund

Husser! and Contemporary Criticism, " 74.
 158 LEONARDLAWLOR

In the Introduction Derrida focuses on a "tension" within Husserl's

thought." Derrida stresses that the singularity of The Origin ofGeometry
among Husserl's writings lies in the fact that Husserl's "two denunciations
of historicism and objectivism [have never] been so organically united"
(INF, 26/4). In a unique way, The Origin ofGeometry unifies critiques of
genetic ism and of structuralism. The extraordinary organic unity of these
two critiques leads to Derrida's insight that Husserl has two organically
united projects in The Origin of Geometry. On the one hand , Husser!
engages in a new type of historical reflection aiming at reactivating the
original acts that produced geometry; Husserl attempts to "question back "
(ruckfrageni to the subjective genesis of geometrical knowledge. On the
other hand, he attempts to describe historicity or traditionality, the
condition for the possibility of reactivation; Husser! tries to describe the
structure of history or tradition. As Derrida's Introduction brings to light
then, Husserl's enacts in The Origin of Geometry a zigzag movement
("mouvement en vrille," Derrida says, literally, a tendrillic movement),"
a zigzag between the genetic and the structural project, between the
specificity of the geometrical science as a cultural product and culture in
general, between a posteriori and a priori, between finally origin and end
(INF,33/14).
Following Husserl's zigzag in The Origin, Derrida's Introduction starts
with the notion of origin for which Husserl says he is seeking. According
to Husser! (in contrast to someone like Kant for example), geometry
happened for a "first time" (INF, 47/31). Even though, as Derrida stresses,
this act includes a strata of receptive intuition, it is still a production

27 Section 1 is based on a chapter from my forthcoming book, Imagination and Chance:

The Difference between the Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida. 1 would like to thank the
SUNY Press for allowing me to borrow it for this paper .

28 Derrida apparently inhereited this phrase, "rnouvement en vrille," from Paul Ricoeur,
who used it in his introduction to his French translation of Ideas I (Ideas I. Idees directices
pour une phenomenologie, [paris : Gallimard, 1950]), xxi.
 THE RELATION AS THE ISSUE 159

(Leistung) (INF, 40/22) .29 Even though , for Husserl, geometrical ideal
objectivities such as triangularity must arise out of non- or pre-geometrical
objectivities, they did not exist as such before this "experience." This
"experience" is not equal to a becoming conscious of something already
implicitly possessed. As non-revelatory, geometry's original experience
cannot not be a "total fact." It must bear the characteristics of singularity
or oneness ("unicite," as Derrida says), irreversibility, and irreplaceability
(INF, 30/8, 47/31; cf. INF, 47 n. 39/31 n. 1); a creation happens only once.
The "first time" for Husser! therefore is an inaugural and institutive act.
This notion of origin would seem to dictate that Husserl provide
empirical or factual descriptions. He does not do this however because,
according to Derrida, the non-repeatable fact must have in principle (en
droit) conducted into history what can be willfully and indefinitely
repeated, an "essence-of-the-first time" (Erstmaligkeit) (INF, 46-8/30-2).
Husserl describes this type of essence, according to Derrida, in Ideas I as
ultimate material essences or eidetic singularities." Such essences exclude
empirical individuality, the tode ti of brute existence, while including the
individuality in general of a particular thing; they refer to "the sense of the
fact," the repeatability of the non-repeatable (INF, 48/33).31 The essence-
of-the-first time therefore consists in the exemplarity of the factual
example. By creating in a singular historical event this very specific type
of universal essence, "this experience," Derrida says, "remains, de jure as
well as de facto (en droit comme enfait), first" (INF, 46/29) .
From this description of the specific type of origin he seeks Husserl's
zigzags , Derrida shows, to his structural project. Derrida calls this zigzag
a "detour" and a "surprising turnabout" (INF, 62/51, 76/69). Husser!
attempts to describe the conditions for the possibility of questioning back
in general; he describes the structure of tradition. In other words, he

29 I am following Derrida's translation of "Leistung" as "production;" the standard English

translation however is "accomplishment." Cf. Derrida's footnote explaining his translation,
[NF, 40 n. 27/22 n. 3.

30 See sections 11, 14, 15.

31 The primary example of such an essence is the essence of an artwork. An artwork, by

definition, is unique , singular; and yet, copies can be made, which refer back to the
singularity of the original.
 160 LEONARD LA WLOR

attempts now to answer the question of "[how] .. . subjective egological

evidence of sense become objective and intersubjective," becomes for
everyone at all time (INF, 63/52)? Husserl's answer to this question is of
course: language or "literature in the broadest sense" (INF, 66/56-7).32
Husserl's answer may appear surprising because, according to the
terminology of Experience and Judgment, (INF, 72/63)33 geometrical
objects are entirely free idealities, while language is bound . Although
linguistic units possess a degree of ideality-their phonetic and graphic
forms and their intentional content are repeatable (INF, 67/58)-they
cannot be understood without referring to facto-historical linguistic systems
and to real sensible things in this world (INF, 70/62). A geometrical object
however such as circularity (as Plato knew) is intelligible, entirely noetic
and thus not bound to the real and contingent world . Geometrical proposi-
tions then , like the Pythagorean theorem , can be translated an infinite
number of times; they are supra- or a-temporal and supra- or a-spatial.
Geometrical ideality seems to lie beyond all language and sense content as
such (INF, 75/68).
Husserl's reliance on language as the essential condition for absolute
objectivity should not however surprise anyone according to Derrida (INF,
79/73). From the Logical Investigations on, Husserl always insists that
ideal objectivity must be communicated to others in order to be constituted
as such. Without language, geometrical idealities would remain imprisoned
in the inventor's head, in his psychological subjectivity (INF, 77/70). And
while oral communication frees ideal objectivity for the protogeometer's
institutive community, ideal objectivity does not become "for everyone"
until someone writes it down (INF, 87/84). This is the "decisive step,"
Derrida says, through which alone ideal objectivity achieves its complete
constitution, its "indefinite perdurability" (INF, 87/83-4).

32 Derrida also notes that Husserl describes tradition as a postal service ; this is implied
by the word "Ruckfrage" which Derrida translates as "question en retour" (INF, 50/36) .
Geometry's essence, delivered to us by this postal service, makes a reference back (renvoi) ,
Derrida says, to its first sending (it prem ier envoi) (lNF, 50/36). Derrida's use of the word
"envoi" here in 1962 of course refers ahead to the "Envois" section of the 1980 Post Card .

33 Edmund Husser!, Experience and Judgment, translated by James S. Churchill and Karl
Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1938]),267.
 THE RELATION AS THE ISSUE 161

The Introduction's entire seventh section is devoted to describing the

"ambiguous value" of writing's virtual communication. "The graphic
possibility," as he says, is ambiguous because it possesses "... an original
spatiotemporality that escapes the alternative of the sensible and the
intelligible, or the empirical and the metempirical" (INF, 90/88). When
someone inscribes a geometrical truth, its absolutely free ideality penetrates
into less and less free ideality. It finally resides in a real event composed
of "vague morphological types" like letters and sensible matter such as ink
and paper; it resides, as Derrida stresses, in a book (INF, 90-1/88-90, 89
n.92/86 n.3). The inscriptive event consists of an incessant synthesis that
not only binds the ideality of sense to a factual sign, but also however frees
the sign from its non-repeatable character. Other books can be made ; its
morphe can be reproduced (INF, 90 n. 93/88 n. I). Writing not only
" localizes and temporalizes" ideal objectivity, but also "un localizes and
untemporalizes" it (INF, 89/86). As a necessary condition for knowledge
and truth , writing therefore primordially joins essence (or droit) and fact
(jait) (INF, 92/90; cf. 46/31). And this primordial marriage of essence and
fact implies that writing is according to Derrida simultaneously the
condition for the possibility and impossibility of knowledge and truth. It is
simultaneously the possibility for discontinuity and continuity, loss and
gain , forgetfulness and recollection. As Derrida says, writing is danger-
ous-dangerous in two ways (INF, 92/91).34
The first corresponds to writing's factual or sensible side. Because "first
sense must be able to be recorded in the world and be deposited in sensible
spatiotemporality" (INF, 92/91), it seems that sense is subject to "a
universal conflagration, a world-wide burning of libraries, or a catastrophe
of monuments or ' documents' ," all of which are part of what Derrida calls
"the terrifying foreseeable risk (risque)" (INF, 92-7/91-7). Ifwe look at
Ideas I, we see however that for Husserl such a possibility has nothing to
do with ideal meaning; to associate the possibility of factual destruction
with meaning (which must by definition transcends every fact) is nothing
less than a confusion of ontological regions. According to the analyses of
Ideas I, writing should be nothing more than a Kiirper, a constituted,
factual , sensible body. Derrida points out however that in The Origin of

34 Cf. Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon, 10, 54, 77-82 .

162 LEONARD LA WLOR

Geometry Husserl calls writing a Leib, a lived or constituting body. Thus

Husser! himself in The Origin associates essence and fact (expression and
indication). It's hard to understand, as Derrida therefore suggests, how truth
could escape the possibility of factual destruction and forgetfulness (INF,
97/97-8). Death would seem to be transcendental , irreducibly connected to
the indefinite perdurability of sense, to the very completion of its constitu-
tion , to life (cf. INF, 88/85).
The second danger lies in writing's ideality. For Husser!, according to
Derrida, the real danger of inscription lies in passivity. The reader's first
awareness of the meaning of printed words is associative; he or she
arbitrarily follows threads of equivocations. Such associations for Husser!
are irresponsible. The reader must be active (not passive) in his or her
reading. But the reader's associations are possible according to Husser! only
because the writer has left surfaces upon which sedimentations have been
able to be deposited (INF, 100/101). In other words, equivocations can be
followed only when they have been sewn into the text (INF, 100/101). For
Husser! , as Derrida points out, "Responsibility for reactivation is co-
responsibility" of the author and reader (INF, 100/101). Forgetfulness is
therefore for Husser! merely a modification of consciousness, "a lapse
more than a defeat" (INF, 98/98) .By imposing an imperative of univocity
on readers and writers (l 00/101), Husser! believes the interweaving of Leib
and Korper should be able to be undone.
According to Derrida, Husser!'s devotion to the reduction of equivocity
can be seen as both a refusal of history and a deep fidelity to history. On
the one hand, univocity seems to take meaning or truth out of history's
reach. Univocity involves no virtual or potential meanings; it has mastered
the dynamic of sense. Univocal language therefore remains the same; it is
an ahistorical structure or essence. Yet, on the other hand, as Derrida points
out, univocity guarantees the exactitude of translation; thus it is the
condition for the possibility of communication, historical transmission, and
reactivation. As Derrida says, "Univocity only indicates the limpidity ofthe
historical ether" (INF, 102/104). Husser!'s imperative of univocity can be
seen then as only a reduction of empirical and factual language towards
historicity.
Derrida recognizes however that the structure of history must include
univocity (sameness) and equivocations (changes); without one or the other
we would not have history. Derrida therefore endorses Husserl's imperative
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 163

ofunivocity and yet he opposes to it an imperative of equivocity. He says,

" Such a reduction [to univocity] should (doi!) be recommenced indefi-
nitely, for language neither can nor should (doi!) be maintained under the
protection of univocity" (INF, 102/104, my emphasis). Derrida of course
is endorsing neither "radical equivocity" nor "absolute univocity." Radical
equivocity would "preclude history by plunging it into the nocturnal and
ill-transmissible riches of 'bound' idealities;" similarly, "absolute univocity
would itself have no other consequence than to sterilize or paralyze history
in the poverty of an indefinite iteration" (INF, 102/104). In order therefore
to have history, there must be a reciprocal dependence between equivocity
and univocity."
Derrida however does not merely bring a new imperative of equivocity
into symmetry with Husserl's imperative of univocity; there is dissym-
metry: equivocity is absolutely irreducible. According to Derrida, there are
only two limit cases in which absolute univocity can be imagined (INF,
103/1 05-06) . The first case concerns propriety or the proper . We could
imagine that the designated thing was singular or unique, precultural or
natural. A singular name then could correspond to it and be univocal. As
Derrida stresses however, the word itself must be ideal or universal. The
notion of univocity itself implies that the meaning must remain the same
across a transmission; the characteristic ofunivocity is translatability. The
project ofunivocity itselfthen necessitates the word's utterance; if the word
is not ,communicated, I would never know that it was univocal. Sharing
places the singular word, as Derrida says, "in a culture, in a network of
linguistic relations and oppositions, which would load the word with

35 Because ofthe reciprocal dependence between the imperative ofunivocity and that of
equivocity, Derrida indicates a mutual dependence between the projects of Joyce and
Husserl (INF, 102-03/104-06). In Ulysses, Joyce according to Derrida attempts to recollect
all empirical and cultural meanings, all equivocities, in one book ; he focuses on the passive
associative resonances and ignores the translatable cores. Husserl in contrast attempts to
impoverish factual or empirical language down to its translatable cores in order to remember
the pure structure of history . Joyce's project depends upon that of Husser! because there
could be no recollection of empiricity without a structure supporting transmission ; Husser!'s
depends upon that of Joyce because he would not be remembering the structure of history
if no genesis had taken place. This entire discussion of course anticipates the 1987 Ulysse
Gramophone.
164 LEONARD LAWLOR

intentions or with virtual reminiscences" (INF, 103/106). Thus in this first

limit case absolute univocity defeats itself.
In the second Derrida starts from universality, not singularity. Here the
chance for univocity does not lie in a precultural object but in a trans-
cultural one, an absolutely ideal objectivity such as a geometrical object.
Derrida argues however that an ideal object in principle is "always
inscribed within a mobile system of relations and takes its source in an
infinitely open project of acquisition" (INF, 104/106). In other words, an
object is indefinitely iterable. Indefinite iterability implies that an ideal
object is irreducibly relational; a true proposition can always fall into
"some singular placings in perspective, some multiple interconnections of
sense, and therefore some mediate and potential aims" (INF, 104/1 06). An
ideal object can be singularly recontextualized, mediated by lateral
relations, animated by unforeseen intentions. Iterability defines all
language, not just absolutely ideal objectivities. Thus as Derrida says,

If, in fact, equivocity is always irreducible, that is because words and

language in general are not and can never be absolute objects. They do
not possess any resistant and permanent identitythat is absolutelytheir
own. They have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses
them as mediations. The"same"word is always"other" accordingto the
always different intentional actswhichthereby make a word significative.
There is a sort of pure equivocity here, which grows in the very rhythm
of science (INF, 104/106-07).

To understand this pure equivocity that grows from the very rhythm of
science, in other words to understand Derrida's criticism of both limit
cases, indeed Derrida's criticism of this structuralist strain in Husserl, we
need only think ofthe word "I." This word possesses a different or singular
referent (and thus a different meaning) every time someone else generates
it. Yet this word's meaning must have some sort of identical mean-
ing-without it transcendental philosophy for example would be
impossible-some sort of universal structure that makes it available for
more singularizations and equivocations. In contrast to Husserl himself, the
horizon of language for Derrida is not univocity but equivocity, not
communication but "non-communication" (cf. INF, 82/77).
 THE RELATION AS THE ISSUE 165

Dependent upon writing, the success of Husserlian reactivation,

according to Derrida, seems then to be uncertain (INF, 105/107). Finite, as
Husserl recognizes, the phenomenological investigator is outstripped by
writing which is infinite, infinitely equivocal , different, other. Husserl's
response to the problem of finitude is to speak, however, of the possibility
of removing the "limits from our capacity, in a certain sense its in-
finitization" (INF, 106/109). According to Derrida, this secondary
reactivating operation is the same as geometry's originating subjective act
for Husserl (INF, 106/109-10). To tum to geometry's specific (not general)
Erstmaligkeit is Husserl's penultimate zigzag in The Origin ofGeometry
(INF , 117/123-24).
For Husserl, the origin ofgeometry lies in the invariant structures ofthe
lifeworld." We know apriori, according to Husserl, that within the
lifeworld things are laid out in "anexact" space and time. While things
consist in a number of determinations (aesthetic, ethical, etc.), things are
also corporeal and have spatial shapes. We also know that under the
pressure of pragmatic needs these shapes can be perfected; imaginative
variation produces morphological shapes such as roundness. And finally we
know that the art of measurement must have been developed. This art
according to Husserl points the way to univocity and exact objectivity.
The origin of geometry itself then is based on these lifeworld structures
and yet leaps away from them. This passage away is prepared according to
Derrida by the philosophical act (INF, 127/136). The philosopher,
according to Husserl, inaugurates the theoretical attitude which overcomes
finitude (INF, 127/136). Some ideal "Euclid" (under the influence of
Platonism) opens up the horizon of knowledge as an infinite task. The
theoretical attitude, Derrida says, "makes idealization's decisive 'passage
to the limit' possible, as well as the constitution of the mathematical field
in general" (INF, 127/136). In other words, the theoretical or philosophical
attitude outlines mathematics with a boundary or a limit within which
infinite developments are possible.
According to Derrida, Husserl's initial description of idealization as the
passage from the finite to an infinite limit complicates the Husserlian
notion of origin . Derrida recognizes that Husserl must consider the

36 Derrida summarizes these preconditions on 127/136 .

166 LEONARD LAWLOR

lifeworld invariants not as immediate conditions for the origin of geometry,

but as pre-conditions. If they were conditions, Husserl would fall into an
infinite regress of origins (lNF, 125/134-35). Derrida however also
recognizes that the inaugural infinitization based in the theoretical attitude
which opens up mathematics is only the first stage of infinitization. The
"Greek" infinitization is not entirely open; it is limited to mathematical
content within which or about which there is the possibility of infinite
developments. In the Modem age however there is another infinitization,
one which extends mathematical infinity to all fields of research; this
infinitization is not limited to content. This is The Crisis' mathematization
of nature . According to Derrida, this second infinitization is a "resurrec-
tion" or "rebirth" of geometry because it is based on-Derrida uses the
phrase "a partir de" frequently in this discussion-because it is based on
the first. It actualizes something latent in the geometry's origin, something
only announced or indicated there. Moreover, as Derrida stresses, HusserI's
vision of philosophy being transformed into phenomenology itselfdevelops
on the basis of the inaugural infinitization. Phenomenology however
thematizes subjectivity's anexact essences. Why have, as Derrida asks then,
the origin of geometry begin with the idealization of exactitude; why not
place the origin in the imaginative variation producing morphological
shapes (lNF, 131/142)?
Each revolution based on geometrical or mathematical infinity then
implies that we must rethink the origin's composition. And because the
development itself is infinite we must conclude that the origin recedes with
every upsurge or revolution. The infinite openness of the geometrical
tradition itself implies an infinite regress of origins. Derrida therefore
wonders "if it is legitimate to speak of an origin of geometry" (INF,
131/141). Geometry, as Derrida says , "is on the way to its origin, not
proceeding from it" (INF, 131/141) . This problem of the reciprocal
implication of end and origin brings Husserl, and Derrida following him,
to his ultimate zigzag. The geometrical traditional line, for Husserl, is only
a fragment of and relative to the absolute, "universal teleology of Reason"
(INF, 131/142). The idealization that Husserl describes therefore as the
 THE RELATION AS THE ISSUE 167

specific origin of geometry-the passage to the limif7-is really the origin

of all knowledge, tradition, and culture.
According to Derrida, a passage to the limit is defined for Husserl by
the "immer wieder" and the "und so welter." by iteration (INF, 134-35/146-
48, 135 n. 161/148 n. 1). Geometrical idealizing iteration, for example,
bases itself upon morphological shapes such as roundness. If a passage to
the limit is to produce however an absolutely free ideality such as
circularity, it must "leap," according to Derrida, "from every descriptive
mooring" (INF, 133/145). Ultimately idealization can take no aid from
sensibility or imagination; it cannot be equivalent to Wesenschau which
determines an object in intuition. Yet, taking no aid from sensibility, the
geometrical passage to the limit cannot be arbitrary (INF, 135/147) .
Geometrical iteration must be regulated by the unity of an object; the
infinite approximation to complete ideal objectivity must be prescribed
already to idealization. The perfectly intelligible geometrical object then
according to Derrida is simultaneously created and re-cognized (INF, 134-
35/147). Husserl of course would call this object, guiding and produced by
idealization, an Idea in the Kantian sense."
According to Derrida, an Idea in the Kantian sense in Husserl bears two
characteristics, totality (or completeness) and infinity (or openness); the
word "horizon" combines these two. In Ideas Is phenomenology of reason,
to which Derrida turns, Husserl says that because a transcendent thing
possesses infinite profiles and iterations, complete or total determination
of it is impossible for finite consciousness; nevertheless completeness is
prescribed to it as an Idea (cf. INF, 139/152). We should try to approximate
the transcendent thing's complete or total determinations, even though
approximation will be infinite. According to Husserl , we know about the
Idea's prescription by means of a specific sort of evidence or presence.

37 Within this word "passage," we should hear a number of resonances: the passage of
time, the past, tran sition , passing something along, passage or strait, even the French
negative adverb, "pas," which itself of course also means step . In reference to the phrase
"passage to the limit," it is also instructive to look at Derrida's discus sion of Husserl' s final
reduction in The Origin, INF, 119-120/127 .

38 Derrida makes this transition to the discussion of the Husserlian Idea in the Kantian
sense by recalling Husserl's brief analyses in Ideas I of inner-time consciousness (INF, 135-
136/147-149).
168 LEONARD LA WLOR

According to Derrida, this cannot be adequate evidence because of the

Idea's infinite iterations, because of its openness, its "again and again." We
have evidence only of the Idea, not what it is the Idea of. In the Idea of
infinite determination infinity itself, that is, its content, does not appear. All
possible appearances of the thing are not evident; only that there will be
more is present. The infinite Idea therefore possesses, as Derrida says, a
"strange presence," merely formal or finite presence (INF, 139/153).39
Derrida interprets this strange presence as the mediation of a sign .
Indeed, Derrida says that the Idea in the Kantian sense is an empty or
unfulfilled meaning intention (INF, 139-40/153-54). Our only access to
what Husserl calls "pure thinking" (cf. INF, 134/145) is through language,
through the logos (lNF, 140/155). The Idea's content is absent or non-
present but the form refers to it across future distance. As Derrida says,

[Husserl] locates the space (Derrida's emphasis) where consciousness

notifies itself (se signifie) ofthe Idea's prescription and thus is recognized
as transcendental consciousness through the sign (my emphasis) of the
infinite: this space is the interval (Derrida's emphasis) between the Idea
of infinity in its formal and finite (yet concrete) evidence and infinity
itself out of which there is the Idea (INF, 140/154).

Thus, and this criticizes an intuitionistic strain in Husserl, there is no

immediate (or adequate) evidence of an object's total structure, of a total
cultural object or of a science, because of the spacing between the finite
form and the infinite content." The finite form functions like a sign of what
is to come."

39 Cf. Derrida, '''Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology," in Writing and Difference,
162.

40 We must note that it is not an accident that Derrida cites Levinas' The Theory of
Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (translated by Andre Orianne [Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press , 1973]) at this po int in the Introduction , 136 n. 162/149 n.
1.

41 Because of this absolute, irreducible, linguistic mediation, Derrida in a footnote can

speak of phenomenology being '''overcome' or completed in an interpretative philosophy"
(INF, 86 n. 89/82 n. 1). And it is not by accident that during this very discussion of the
infinite Idea's finitude Derrida cites Heidegger (INF, 138 n. 164/151 n. 1). In fact, at the
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 169

The Idea then "announces itself' as a sign;" simultaneously, it is

produced by iteration and presupposed by iteration as its guide or
imperative. Because of its infinite iterations, and thus because of its infinite
differentiations or equivocations, the Idea that results can be nothing more
than minimally the same form, a letter, a mere "X." In tum, the Idea
dictates-this is an imperative paralIel to Husserl's univocity impera-
tive-that this minimally the same form should become completely
determined, filIed in with the content of all possible subjectivities. The Idea
then is, as Derrida says, objectivity in the broadest sense. Similarly, the
intention, of which the Idea forms a pole, is empty of every determined
object; it is nothing but pure directedness. As Derrida says, its being is
intentionality (INF, 139/153) or Reason (INF, 140/154).
Reason and Idea then for Husserl must be the beginning and end of
history. As Derrida stresses however, although Husserl calls Reason and
Idea eternal, eternality for him is a mode of temporality. Reason and Idea
are arche and telos of time and history (INF, 141-42/155-56, 148-49/165).
According to Derrida, eternity's temporality implies that this genitive must
be simultaneously subjective and objective. If the genitive were only
subjective, then the Idea would be a mere static value standing outside
factual history ("Being or History," as Derrida says)," descending down

very end of the Introduction Derrida establishes a mutual dependence between ontology (in
the non-Husserlian sense) and phenomenology, between in other words Heidegger's
philosophy of finitude and HusserI's philosophy of infinite tasks (cf. INF, 150-152/167-
170). This relation, however, for Derrida is not symmetrical; he lets phenomenology outstrip
ontology. This of course indicates how transcendental and not ontological his reading
Husser! can be.

42 Derrida uses the verb "to announce itself' (s'annoncer) frequently throughout the
Introduction (cf. for example /NF, 86/82, 130-31/140-41). Cf. also Derrida, "'Genesis and
Structure'," 165. See also the French translation of Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics (Kant et Ie probleme de la metaphysique [Paris: Gallimard, 1953]), in which
de Waehlens and Biemel translate Heidegger's "Sich-melden" as "s'annoncer" on 244.

43 In this passage (and in others over the Introduction's last four pages) Derrida uses
"History" and "Being" somewhat synonymously . He capitalizes these words in order to
indicate the inseparable unity of fact and essence within it. Historicity of course strictly
designates the essence of history. Although capitalization of key terms is almost a fad in late
Fifties, early Sixties French thought, Derrida uses this practice in the Introduction, as far as
I can tell, rigorously. Whenever a term refers to what is absolute, Derrida capitalizes it. Cf.
Jacques Derrida, "The Deaths of Roland Barthes," translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and
170 LEONARD LAWLOR

into it only for empirical embellishment. This subjective interpretation

would result in objectivism. In contrast, interpreting the genitive objec-
tively would result in psychologism or historicism. Then Reason and the
Idea would be relative to empirical genesis. Because however the genitive
is simultaneously subjective and objective, Derrida can conclude that "The
Absolute is passage" (lNF, 149/165). Passage or mediation-the
relation-is primary in every sense ofthe word.
The Absolute of passage means first that all sense arises out of a series
or iterations of singular, factual, or empirical events. Conversely however,
since an iterable structure cannot come about through an arbitrary series,
the series itself must have presupposed some structure as its guide.
Structure conditions genesis; genesis conditions structure." Second, the
Absolute of passage implies the reciprocal implication of end and origin .
A sense or structure can approximate its complete constitution only
because of its infinite iterability; in turn however, because the telos of
totality is only approximate, the arche withdraws or recedes. Because there
are infinite tele or destinations for this letter, there are infinite archai or
senders. Historicity therefore can be conceived neither as a straight line nor
as a circle but only as a zigzag. Third, for Derrida, following Husserl, the
absolute of passage means linguistic iteration. Being graphic, passage is
both sensible or material, factual, and intelligible or intangible, essential.
As irreducibly interwoven, essence is necessarily subjected to catastrophes
and fact is necessarily subject to the abuse of "mediate intentions."
Language, therefore, for Derrida, is simultaneously the condition for the

Michael Nass, in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty, edited by Hugh J.

Silverman (New York : Routledge, 1988), 262.

44 Cf. Derrida, '''Genesis and Structure'and Phenomenology," in Writing and Difference .

Derrida first delivered "'Genesis and Structure'" at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1959. The essay was
then published in 1965 in Entretiens sur /es notions de genese et de structur, edited by
Maurice de Gandillac (Paris: Mouton, 1965), 242-268. An editor's footnote states that (242):
"M. Derrida, who has revised and completed his text, has added a certain number of
explicative notes and references." Then the essay was republished in Writing and Difference.
A comparison of the 1965 and '67 versions reveals that Derrida revised this essay again for
the publication of Writing and Difference. Thus because '''Genesis and Structure' and
Phenomenology" predates and postdates Derrida's 1962 Introduction to Husser/'s The
Origin of Geometry, it can instruct our reading of the Introduction . This essay outlines a
tension between genesis and structure within Husserl's entire thought.
 THE RELATION AS THE ISSUE 171

possibility and impossibility of objectification and return inquiry. The

passage of writing is the Absolute, "the Absolute," however, "of a Danger"
(INF, 149/166).
This phrase, "the Absolute of passage, " is not however restricted
merely to histor icity for Derrida; it refers beyond intersubjective passage
to Husserlian temporalization or the living present. Because the living
present is the absolute of all experience (INF, 150/166), the three implica-
tions of historical passage must be rooted therein. This absolute means then
for Derrida first that empirical genesis conditions transcendental structure
and simultaneously that transcendental structure conditions empirical
genesis. The living present is the structure or form of all experience, of all
temporal genesis , from which objects or structures come. As a structure
however, the living present itself must be subject to this generation. It must
come about in a series of temporal moments in order to attain a level of
ideality and objectivity. (cf. INF, 136-37/148-50) Thus the living present
is simultaneously consti tuting and constituted. Derrida, on the one hand,
calls it "auto-temporalization" (INF, 152/170); on the other, he says that it
is "the dialectic between the dialectical ... and the nondialectical ..."
(INF, 143/158). Second, like that of any structure, the completeness of the
living present's structure can only be approximated because it too can be
infinitely iterated. In turn however, because the te/os can only be approxi-
mated , the arche recedes; in other words, the original subjective experience
of the living present withdraws as time marches on. The living present, like
historicity, contains a reciprocal implication of end and origin.
Most importantly however, and third, the living present's passage is
also dangerous. Because the form of the living present, like any structure
or meaning, is recollectively identified according to Husserl, it is for
Derrida nothing more than a sign; a sort of "fold" between the living
present and recollection makes the memorial replica possible. As recalled
and identified, this trace can be iterated indefinitely. The form of the living
present is an Idea in the Kantian sense; Husserl in Ideas I indeed speaks of
its unity as an Idea. Being recalled in recollection and anticipated in
protention, this finite sign of infinite content implies intersubjective
circulation within me; it is being communicated among others within
myself. That each now always fades away into retention and can only be
recalled recollectively in a sign implies "the transcendental sense of death;"
that the now is always conditioned by an open protention portends mediate
172 LEONARD LA WLOR

intentions and equivocations. The interval between the Idea's form and its
content can never be closed. The living present therefore is always deferred
to another and delayed by another. As Derrida says, "the Absolute is
present only in being different without respite" (INF, 153/171) . And
because Husserlian temporalization always includes both alterity and
sameness, singularity and generality, it is according to Derrida "the
necessarily one root" of "all the instances dissociated by the various
reductions: factuality and essentiality, worldliness and nonworldliness,
reality and ideality, empeiria and transcendentality" (INF, 148-49/164-65;
cf. INF, 57-8/45-6,85-6/81-3). Husserlian temporalization, this precursor
of differance, therefore is the relation.

II

What we have just seen in the Introduction is already anticipated in Le

probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl. In 1953-54, Derrida
is already concerned with the transition (passage) made in the genitive
between genesis and structure, between fact and essence, between reason
and Idea. Already, Derrida interprets Husserl in terms of a sort of mirroring
between Husserl's intellectual development and his phenomenological
concepts. What the Memoire shows therefore-just like the Introduc-
tion-is that the dialectic within Husserl's concept of genesis (or more
precisely, within his notion of constitution) is reflected within Husserl's
own back and forth movement of thought. Following Derrida then (in
particular in the "Avant Propos?"), we can reconstruct first the "restless-
ness" of Husserl's thought and then the "restlessness" within his notion of
genesis.
As is well-known, from The Philosophy ofArithmetic to the Logical
Investigations Husserl turns from psychological genesis to a sort of pure
structuralism. Still distancing himself from empirical or historical genesis,
Ideas I transforms the Logical Investigation's "descriptive psychology" into
transcendental phenomenology; yet Husserl's faithful descriptions of lived-

4S According to the Memoire's very first footnote, the "Avant-Propos" was never intended
to be the introduction to this book, but, as Derrida suggests, it throws light on it (1 n. I).
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 173

experience eventually lead to his reconquest of genesis in Experience and

Judgment. Finally, because transcendental genesis constitutes all identities
or structures, it seems to make "a sort of philosophical recuperation of
history" possible. The Crisis and The Origin of Geometry however
recuperate not history itself but its structure.
Similarly, according to Derrida, Husserl's notion of genesis implies, on
the one hand, "birth, absolute emergence of an instant or of an 'instance'
irreducible to the preceding instance, creation, radicality, autonomy in
relation to something other than itself' (PG, 7). Genesis is possible only if
there is an absolute origin, discontinuity. Genesis however on the other
hand seems to exist "only within an ontological and temporal totality which
contains it; all genetic production is produced by something other than
itself, carried by a past, called , oriented by a future" (PG, 7). Genesis is
possible as well only ifthere is a structure, continuity. Within Husserl's
very notion of genesis therefore according to Derrida a "contradiction"
exists between discontinuity and continuity, between genesis (as rupture)
and structure.
According to Derrida, the "dialectic" constitutive of both the con-
tradiction of Husserl's thought and that within his notion of genesis
resembles Hegel's concept of dialectic (PG, 6, 8). Since this dialectic of
genesis is, as in Hegel , "simultaneously the possibility of a continuity of
continuity and discontinuity, of an identity of identity and alterity, etc.," it
must be, in a sense, according to Derrida, "worldly;" it must be structural
and thus constituted (PG, 8). As such, it too must refer to an origin or
constituting act, a, so to speak, "transcendental" genesis. In order not to fall
into an infinite regress of origins, this origin would have to be "non-
dialectical;" yet, as Derrida points out, the origin must "already" be
dialectical if this constitution is not to be a creation ex nihilo or a simple
associative construction. As Derrida says, if the "origin" is second to a
"primitivity," "The distinction between the transcendental and the worldly
collapses and with it the possibility of every radical foundation for
philosophy" (PG, 8). According to Derrida's Memoire "phenomenology of
phenomenology," it is impossible therefore to find the beginning of this
dialectic. We cannot determine when or where constitution begins; we
cannot determine when or where Husserl 's thought begins. Neither
transcendental nor worldly can be said to be original in a chronological,
logical, or ontological sense ; neither psychologism nor structuralism,
 174 LEONARD LAWLOR

neither historicism nor objectivism can be said to be Husserl's first thought.

Just as in the Introduction, here in the Memoire, Derrida says that the
relation must be conceived as a zigzag (PG, 264).
The Memoire and the Introduction therefore locate tensions within the
Husserlian concept of genesis, within the development ofHusserl's thought.
And although the Introduction criticizes Husserl at different points of The
Origin, these criticisms take place within a view of phenomenology as the
most radical critique (cf. INF, 150-153/167-171). Without question
however Speech and Phenomena's tone is different. Between the Introduc-
tion and Speech and Phenomena, Derrida, it seems, realizes that Husserl
betrays the paradox ofthe relation." Despite the fact that Husserl through-
out his entire career describes the relation in all of its complexity, despite
the fact that the dialectical zigzag character of Husserl's thought itself
reflects the relation, Husserl is not faithful to the things themselves."
Derrida's Introduction shows that Husserl dictates in The Origin of
Geometry that univocity be achieved by actively willing , not passively
accepting, the meaning of terms, that indefinite historical genesis be
reigned in by a "universal teleology of reason," a Kantian Idea." On the

46 Derrida's essay "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology," in Writing and

Difference testifies to Derrida's realization .

47 Speech and Phenomena's critics find support in Husserl's unparalleled ability to

describe. Undoubtedly Husserl describes exactly what Derrida calls differance, but these
descriptions are still animated by a will to presence .

48 C£ Rudolf Bernet's "Husserl's Theory of Signs Revisited," in Edmund Husserl: Essays

in the Phenomenological Tradition. Examining Husserl's "Texts of 1914" from the
Nachlass, this essay shows that Husserl's later theory of the sign differs dramatically from
that of the Logical Investigations. In particular, opposing himselfto Derrida 's Speech and
Phenomena, which of course criticizes Husserl's attempt in the Logical Investigations to
separate expression (the spiritual signified) from indication (the sensuous sign ifier), Bernet
finds in Husserl's "Texts of 1914" a "parallelism" (13) and a "tension" (10) between the
sensuous signifier and the spiritual signified . Bernet moreover shows that Husser1 now
recognizes the role of codes and gives a constitutive role to passivity (19). He even says that:
"Passive signifying is as good as active signifying, and in lingual communication it even
enjoys some priority . . . (20)." This is definitely an advance over the Logical Investigation
theory of the sign, but the issue, for Derrida, would be how passivity and activ ity are being
related in "the Texts of 1914." Does Husserl here still preserve a priority, perhaps only
teleological, for activity? It seems that Husserl must ; why else would Husserl pay so much
attention to the notion of the will?
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 175

basis of the Introduction, Derrida comes to realize therefore that Husserl

wants to resolve the relation into structure, into intuition; he wants to
eradicate the paradox.
We then understand why Derrida proclaims so infamously in 1967 the
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, with Husserl as its last and
greatest stage (SP, 5-7/3-6).49 Influenced by Heidegger, Derrida's de-
construction aims at the definition of being as permanently available, that
is, being as structure or form permanently before my eyes, over and against
but right next to me. In a word, it aims at Platonism. The fact that Derrida
discovers Husserl's Platonizing will in Husserl's so-called final work leads
him to return to Husserl's so-called first work, the First Logical Investiga-
tion. Derrida returns to the first "essential distinction" to see whether "the
germinal structure," indeed the conscious logic, of Husserl's thought
already implies a coming to rest in structure. Husserl's notion of ideality
could not not be the focus here.
Derrida recognizes in all three Husser! studies that ideality does not for
Husser! mean permanence independent of change, structure independent of
genesis, object independent of subject. We must, as Derrida does in Speech
and Phenomena's Introduction, remind ourselves ofwhat Husser! calls "the
authentic mode of ideality": indefinite repeatability (SP, 6/4). Indefinite
repeatability implies that every ideality makes a reference back to
subjective acts of repetition. As indefinite, however, an ideality must be
correlated to the indefinite life of a subject. It must be correlated to the
subject's structure, the living present. Derrida's question then is: How can
this structure of transcendental life be indefinite when empirical life dies?
The answer to this question depends entirely upon the nature ofthe relation
(SP, 10110).
In Speech and Phenomena's Introduction, Derrida reminds us that in
Phenomenological Psychology Husserl conceives the relation between the
purely psychic life and the purely transcendental life as a "parallelism" (SP,
11/10).50 This concept implies, according to Derrida, that although there is

49The word "deconstruction" does not appear in Speech and Phenomena until 74/83.

50 See also "'Genesis and Structure' in Phenomenology," in Writing and Difference, 164;
also Derrida's review of Phanomenologische Psychologie, in Les etudes philosophiques, 18
(1963) .
176 LEONARD LAWLOR

a "perfect overlapping" (recouvrement parfait) between the domain of pure

psychological experience and the whole domain of what Husserl calls
transcendental experience, a radical difference between them remains. By
producing no ontic double, by distinguishing nothing, this difference
establishes "an invisible distance" within the self. Derrida even says,
echoing Fink (or Heidegger), that this difference has "nothing in common
with any other difference" (SP, 11/10). Thus Derrida's "deconstruction" of
Husserl's metaphysics of presence respects the difference between object
and subject, between the worldly and the transcendental that Husserl
himself disclosed; Derrida even respects the radical specificity of this
difference. It is precisely because of its radical specificity that Derrida can
say that the empirical and the transcendental cannot be completely
separated .
Derrida shows therefore over the course of Speech and Phenomena that
transcendental life is always limited by empirical death, that presence is
always conditioned by absence, that expression is always contaminated
with indication. And over the course of Speech and Phenomena we come
to realize that the word "epoche"-it comes from the Greek verb
"epochein," meaning to arrest, to stop--ultimately implies for Husserl the
complete separation of the transcendental from the empirical. To under-
stand Speech and Phenomena's terribly dense closing pages (in particular,
SP, 102/114-115), one needs then only remember Husserl's Ideas I (section
49) explanation of the reduction as the annihilation of the factual world.
We come to realize at the close of Speech and Phenomena that the
reduction's conscious logic implies in the end this holocaust. That we
moreover realize at the closure vaster implications is one of Speech and
Phenomena's great achievements: phenomenology, being "the metaphysical
project itself in its completion and in the merely restored purity of its
origin," implies the Zweck of metaphysics as the end of empirical life.
Derrida's greater achievement lies however in his attempt to maintain
the tension between the empirical and the transcendental, the way he
extends Husserlian concepts, how he reconceives the relation in Speech and
Phenomena. As is well-known, in "The Sign and the Blink of the Eye"
Derrida focuses on the descriptions in the Phenomenology ofInternal Time
Consciousness where Husserl calls retention a non-perception . Retention
as non-perception, according to Derrida, cannot be a mere modification of
primal impression, even though this is how Husserl interprets it (SP,
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 177

65/73). If it were a mere modification of primal impression's presentness,

we would not be able to account for retention's negativity or pastness." If
primal impression's presentness were extended to retention without rupture,
recollection being itself a modification of retention would imply that
"things that happened ten thousand years ago would be present now.?" A
"difference," a "blink," an "empty space, an "abyss" therefore must be
inserted between primal impression and retention; a limit must be marked
between the retention and primal impression. Yet, in order for the present
to have duration, in order for the present to be "thick," according to
Derrida, retention must be the "fold" (Pli) of a re-turn, of a re-peatability
(SP, 68/76) . According to Derrida, the "folding" that is the living present
grounds all re-plicas, all re-presentations, all re-collections; it is "the
constitution of a trace in its most universal sense" (SP, 67/75) . How else,
Derrida asks, "can it be explained that [for Husserl] the possibility of
reflection and representation belongs in essence to every lived experience
. .." (SP, 67-68/76)? Even a reflection upon the form of presence itself,
upon the living present, a "phenomenology of phenomenology," must be
grounded in "folding."
Derrida's invented concept of folding receives another twist then in
"The Voice that Keeps Silence. " Here Derrida describes interior mono-
logue, what Husserl uses to characterize expression in the First Investiga-
tion, as auto-affection. Interior monologue's auto-affection, according to
Derrida, is a type of auto-affection unlike any other (SP, 76/85); it
possesses a radical specificity . While other types such as touching oneself

51 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, III, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and
David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). After opposing Derrida's
interpretation of Husserlian retention (30-31), Ricoeur nevertheless confirms it when he
turns to Husserl's distinction between imagination and recollection (37). In order to
distinguish recollection from imagination, Husser!, according to Ricoeur, must stress
recollection's thetic character of reproduction. And the thetic character "aligns," as Ricoeur
says, recollection with retention. Both retention and recollection can be called past because
of this mode of reproduction, which imagination lacks. Retention's and recollection's
"alignment," however, implies that the difference between primary and secondary memory
"is not the radical difference Husserl wanted between perception and nonperception" but,
as Derrida says, "a difference between two modifications of nonperception" (SP, 65/73).

52 This of course quotes from Aristotle's Physics, book IV. See Jacques Derrida, "Ousia
and Gramme," in Margins ofPhilosophy, 29-67.
178 LEONARD LAWLOR

are spatial (and thus worldy) , interior monologue is temporal (and thus
transcendental, essential). Talking to oneself implies no difference, no
distance; I immediately hear what I say. Yet, as Derrida stresses, and as he
has just shown in "The Sign and the Blink of the Eye," Husserl's own
descriptions of the living present imply that there must be difference here,
a blank, a sort of "spacing" (SP, 83/93). If there were not some sort of gap
or ecart within me, I would have no need to talk to myself; there would be
no need to make sense "pass" (passer) into the ideality of conceptual and
universal form (SP, 74/83). Sense in its conceptual and universal form
would simply be given to me. This specific sort of auto-affection therefore
is a self-folding, a re-flecting. Or, as Derrida says here, auto-affection is the
production of "the same," "the same as self-relation within self-difference,
the same as the non-identical" (SP, 82/92). The same is not a relation
between two determinate beings, but a relation between two egos, empirical
and transcendental, within me. Interior dialogue, this very specific sort of
auto-affection, is the relation.
Even Derrida's extension however of a word like "folding" does not
strictly capture the specificity of the relation called interior dialogue;
"folding" is too literal. As Derrida says, " ... we have already been adrift
in ontic metaphor ... ." The reason for the drifting however is not that this
is the wrong word ; we are stuck in metaphors because "temporalization
[itself] is the root of a metaphor that can only be primordial" (SP, 85/95).
The very "movement" that duplicates the ego non-ontically, that divides me
into a non-repeatable genesis or event and a repeatable structure or ideality,
is the very one that traditionally we call metaphorization. This relation is
the transference, the passage, from the sensible to the intelligible.

III

Because of Derrida's achievements in his early works, one could stop

reading him here. To restrict oneself however to the pre-1967 and 1967
texts overlooks the fact that later Derrida will not conceive the relation
dialectically. The word "dialectic" unifies all three Husserl studies. Even
Speech and Phenomena, operating at "the closure of metaphysics,"
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 179

contains this word (SP, 69/77).53 Dialectic always implies an original unity
and a teleological or horizonal unity; it always implies continuous content
and predictability; it always implies an end to the relationship: the perfect
spiritualization of empirical life. As we have been able to see, while
retaining the word, all three Husserl studies contest dialectic's implications.
The post-1967 texts however explicitly conceive the relation non-di-
alectically. As Derrida himself says, the word "dialectic" "would end up
disappearing entirely" from my discourse (PG, viii)." For example, in
"White Mythology" (1971) this word-or more precisely the word
"Aujhebung," which Derrida translates as "relever" (WM, 226/269)-this
word appears only in a critical or deconstructive mode."
This long, dense essay opposes any attempt to dominate metaphorical
discourse . On the one hand, Derrida shows that a rhetorical project like the
one Nietzsche envisioned, which would disclose the hidden metaphoricity
of metaphysical terms, can never be achieved. On the other hand, a
philosophical project like that of Hegel, which would attempt to dominate
the metaphoricity of everyday discourse in the concept, can never be
achieved. "White Mythology" therefore shows that either rhetorical or
philosophical metaphorologies are structurally impossible (WM, 219/261).
Indeed in "White Mythology's" second section ("Plus de metaphore" [WM,
219-229/261-273]) Derrida presents a sort of argument which the following
reconstructs.
If one is going to dominate metaphorical discourse, one would need a
definition of metaphor; this necessity is the case whether one's target is
philosophical or everyday discourse. One would need a trait that circum-
scribes the field, a characteristic that frames the set; in other word, one
would need to draw a line, impose a blank space or a "white," between

53 Moreover, the word "passage" occurs in all three texts. This word too is sedimented
with dialectic; when Hyppolite translated Hegel's The Phenomenology ofSpirit in 1939-41 ,
he used passage to render Ubergang .

54 Because Derrida distances himself from dialectic after Speech and Phenomena, Jean-
Luc Marion's comment in his Reduction et donation (paris : PUF , 1989), that " [Speech and
Phenomena] . . . is exemplary and determinative for 1. Derrida's entire later itinerary" (13
n. 5, my translation), is perhaps not entirely correct.

55 For an analysis of this piece see my "A Little Daylight: A Reading of Derrida's ' White
Mythology' ," in Man and World, 24 (1991) : 285-300.
180 LEONARD LA WLOR

one's own discourse and the mythos. Such a trait, however, would have to
be extracted from the field it attempts to dominate . The term "metaphor"
itself is not only a philosophical term, but is also itself metaphorical. The
term of course not only refers to Aristotle's metaphysical discourse, but
also literally means spatial transference. Thus any definition of metaphor
would itself be a metaphor, even a philosophical metaphor, yet one not
included in the field. One would then need to construct another definition,
but the problem would merely reproduce itself. The second definition could
not not be a philosophical metaphor. Every new definition would therefore
participate in without belonging to the field of philosophical metaphor. As
Derrida says in "White Mythology," "The field is never saturated" (WM,
220/261) . Metaphorization would necessarily continue ad infinitum.
We might be tempted to call such metaphorization dialectical. To
conceive it dialectically however presupposes the continuity of content (cf.
WM, 215/256). The process then would be nothing more than the making
explicit of an implicit meaning, the conceptualization of images on the
basis of resemblance. Metaphorization would be interiorization, the
Hegelian process of reflection . In fact, as Derrida points out, this is how
Hegel describes the production of philosophical concepts in his Lectures
on Aesthetics (WM, 225-26/268-69). One would then say that the process'
infinity projects a horizon of completeness; meaning (Sinn or sens)
provides a direction for development.
What separates "White Mythology's" metaphorization from dialectic
however is the blank space itself. For Derrida, what remains after Hegel is
the "nothing" that makes reflection possible in the first place. Without
drawing a line, without inserting a trait, without framing the field, one
would not be able to adopt a meta-position. "White Mythology" (and "The
Double Session?") are attempts to think this discontinuous relation left
unthematized by Hegel. The term Derrida uses to refer to the relation
therefore does not actualize a meaning , explicate something implicit,
conceive an image; rather "metaphor" literally refers to nothing, to the
space between, or more precisely, to spacing. Because the term "metaphor"

56 See Jacques Derrida, "The Double Session," in Dissemination, translated by Barbara

Johnson (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1981). See also Rodolphe Gasche's
"Nontotalization without Spuriousness: Hegel and Derrida on the Infinite," in Journal ofthe
British Society for Phenomenology, 17.3 (October 1986), 289-307 .
 THE RELATIONAS THE ISSUE 181

refers literally to nothing, it implies no horizon of completion; lacking sens

or Sinn, there can be no end. On the basis of this concept ofthe relation, the
image one is left with is the well-known mise en abime. Derrida suggests
that infinite metaphorization, thought non-dialectically, would be more
precisely called catachresis, the forced, almost arbitrary, extension of a
term (WM, 225-27/304-07).
What in 1971 Derrida calls catachresis in 1983-84 he calls invention.
We now know the well-trodden path Derrida follows in every discussion
ofthe relation; two polar opposites can be conceived neither separately nor
identically. So, on the one hand, in "Psyche: Invention of the Other,"
Derrida says, "Never does an invention appear, never does an invention
take place, without an inaugural event" (PI, 28/16). To be such, an
invention must happen for a first time; it must be unique, novel, singular,
or different. It must carve a path, break rules, perform (PI, 42/35). Yet, on
the other hand, an invention cannot not be public , and once it is it can be
copied, duplicated, stolen . As Derrida says, "Invention begins by being
susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription" (PI, 28/16, Derrida's
emphasis). This is why inventions must be patented, must acquire a title,
must meet certain specifications (PI, 28/16) . In other words, an invention
must obey the law. Its very existence therefore presupposes both arbitrari-
ness and necessity, both difference and identity.
Affinities with the Memoire, with the Introduction, and with Speech
and Phenomena can be found here. It is easy to see that we cannot decide
whether the difference of the event or the identity of law, whether genesis
or structure, come first. As Derrida says in "Psyche," "the paradox gets
sharper: every invention should make fun of the statutory, but without a
prevailing statutory context there would be no invention " (PI, 45/38). All
we can say in regard to invention is that the absolute is passage. Thus we
can say moreover that the distinction between worldly and transcendental
collapses. Similarly, what Derrida calls in "Psyche" "invention," we could
just as well call "folding." Invention begins with self-duplication. And
indeed in "Psyche" Derrida calls invention a structure of "self-reflexivity"
(PI, 29/17).
This mention of reflexivity leads to another affinity with Speech and
Phenomena. Derrida also defines invention as "psyche." "Psyche," accord-
ing to Derrida, refers not only to the myth of Psyche-Psyche loses her
husband, Eros, by looking at him after she had been forbidden to do
182 LEONARDLAWLOR

so-not only to the myth of Psyche but also to a large revolving double
mirror-this is what term means in French (PI, 38/31). Making the two
references overlap, Derrida says that "The woman, let us say Psyche, her
beauty or her truth, can be reflected [in the mirror], can admire or adorn
herself from head to foot" (PI, 38-39/31). Psyche can "admire or adorn
herself' only because the psyche is not transparent (PI, 39/31). Psyche can
relate to herself, reflect upon herself only because of the silvering on the
mirror's back. Simultaneously however, because the mirror works, because
of the tain, Psyche cannot see through it to what she wants, herself. What
she wants, her "Eros," so to speak, disappears just as she sees it. Psyche
therefore is a white mythology; because of the blanc between herself and
her reflection,psyche invents another within the same (PI, 33/23).
In "Psyche" Derrida even calls this other an "entirely other" (PI,
55/53). The other within the psyche is the indefinitely iterable form of the
self; it is the transcendental. As indefinitely iterable, but also as anar-
chic-it has no simple origin, hence no origin at all, due to the silver-
ing-this form cannot be an available object right next to me, before my
eyes . Instead of standing in reserve, it can swerve directionlessly beyond
my particular, empirical life. It is therefore subject to what no one can
control or master; it is subject to what Derrida calls here "the aleatory" (PI,
55/53). And being exposed to chance,psyche can let happen "the coming
of a still unanticipatable alterity, . . . an absolute surprise" (PI, 55/53).

IV

On the basis of our context reconstruction we can see now that throughout
his entire career Derrida respects what Fink in 1933 called phenome-
nology's most basic paradox, phenomenology's "ineradicable" transcenden-
tal illusion. Such respect, even infinite respect, defines Derridean de-
construction. Any such attempt to conceive the relation as one between an
empirical thing and a transcendental thing, even any attempt to determine
the interplay between the transcendental and empirical teleologically, lacks
respect. Such attempts always want to keep things close by, to treat ideas
like tools and matter like capital, to diminish that which is greater than me,
to appropriate that which is other. Thus in what Derrida calls the negative
phase, deconstruction always opposes any attempt to conceive the relation
 THE RELATIONAS THEISSUE 183

one-sidedly. If one tries to prioritize the empirical, then Derrida shows that
the condition of repeatability is necessary for any experience. If one tries
to prioritize the transcendental, then Derrida shows that ontic instantiation
is irreducible. In order to respect the radical specificity of the relation,
deconstruction therefore reverses the priorities-and reinscribes them.
All ofthe well-known Derridean words-e-differance, supplementarity,
trace, pharmakon, hymen, etc.-are based on the reversed terms. Because
in deconstruction's positive phase these terms however come to refer to the
relation, their former connotations, their former rigor, their former
familiarity vanishes. Because, as we know, the relation transcends all
standard logic, the logic of such terms can only be perverse, even the worst.
These invented terms are redetermined yet, referring to nothing, they travel
without a destination. They fall out in the most surprising ways. In the
positive phase therefore, deconstruction hopes-if we can speak of such a
thing as hope when chance is involved-it hopes that the turns these terms
take will affect us. Perhaps now, after reading one of Derrida's texts, we
can start to want to stop spiritualizing matter and to stop materializing
spirit. Perhaps now we can start to want to let the entirely other be in our
soul.
All of this-this so to speak ethical, even religious, dimension-ean
now be seen in Derrida thanks to our context reconstruction. Derrida's
thought however transforms the very notion of context." In our study we
came to see that Derrida's conception of the relation as zigzag, as folding,
as catachresis, as psyche implies that there is no unified principle from
which all things flow; the relation consists in a basic sort of anarchy. This
insight into the nature of things implies that authority cannot rule its
domain completely. Conditioned by the relation that he knew so well,
Husserl himself then could not have known entirely what he wanted to say
in his texts. His so-called intention could not have mastered them nor the
contexts within which they could be placed . He could not have predicted
differance, This "death of the author" does not mean that arbitrariness
rules. Rather, what rules now is the form of the text itself, with all its

57 Cf. for example, Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in Margins ofPhilosophy, 326;
also JacquesDerrida, Limited Inc., translated by SamuelWeber(Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1989).
184 LEONARD LAWLOR

associated contingent factuality and all its irreducible essential iterability;"

defined this way the form makes the context immense, inexhaustible. If one
is therefore going to be a responsible reader, one should reconstruct the
context infinitely. One should want to let it be equivocal. One should want
to let affinities between texts be invented. This is what deconstructive
readings do; this is what makes them forms of responsible anarchy. And if
this "ought" amounts to a new imperative of context reconstruction-an
imperative different from and yet related to the traditional hermeneutic
one-then there is no excuse for neglecting the context. In fact, it seems
that we must say that it is unethical to do so.

Memphis State University

S8 Jacques Derrida, "Devant la loi," translated by Avital Ronell, in Kafka and Performa-
tive Criticism (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 1988) , 145.
 CHAPTER NINE

THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE

THOMAS M. SEEBOHM

Husserl criticizes traditional metaphysics. Nevertheless, for Derrida, "meta-

physics' finest hour is represented by Husserl ... . The 'return to the things
themselves' is precisely this ultimate effacement of metaphysics in the act
of its predominance. The 'principle of principles,' that which guarantees
the truth of the things themselves is an essential metaphysical one: the
presence of presence to itself.") Derrida himself says: "The ultimate form
of ideality, the ideality of ideality, ... is the living present, the self-
presence of transcendental life. Presence has always been and will always ,
forever, be the form in which, we can say apodictically, the infinite
diversity of contents is produced."?
But Derrida adds here as well "phenomenology seems to us tormented,
if not contested from within, by its own descriptions of the movement of
temporalization and of the constitution of intersubjectivity. At the heart of
what ties together these two decisive moments of description we recognize
an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value, and with it a
nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an
ineradicable nonprimordiality."?

I Irene E. Harve y, Derr ida and the Economy of Differance, (Bloomington: Indiana

Uni versity Press , 1986), 116.

2 Jacques Derrida, Sp eech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of
Signs, translated by David B. Allison, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press , 1973),6.
3 Ibid., 6-7.

185
W. R. McKenna and J , C. Evans (eds.), Derrida and Phenomenology, 185-200.
© 1995KluwerAcademic Publishers.
186 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

In chapter 5 of Speech and Phenomena Derrida points out that, even in

the phenomenology of inner time consciousness, Husserl still understands
the present as the "source point" hence as a point which is an absolute
beginning, the source ofthe "spreading out." It is this source point that, for
phenomenology, provides evidence of itself, in primordial intuition, and
hence the security and ground for phenomenological discourse. Thus
Husserl must-s-contrary to Freud-assert, according to Derrida: "It is
certainly an absurdity to speak of a content of which we are ' unconscious' ,
one of which we are conscious only later.?" Thus we have, for Derrida, a
tension in Husserlian phenomenology. On the one hand, we have certain
descriptions which, implicitly, deny the priority of presence and, on the
other hand, the priority of presence is maintained against this tendency, and
must be maintained, because it is implied in the "principles of principles'"
of Husserl's phenomenological method. According to the principle of
principles, phenomenology is capable of reaching an ultimate ground in
absolute evidence and primordial or original intuition, ursprunglicher
Anschauung.
Besides pointing out some conclusions drawn by Derrida from this
interpretation of HusserI, it can be mentioned that this tension in Husserl's
phenomenology is related to some other tensions that occur in the develop-
ment of his thinking. I have pointed out elsewhere that Husserl has the
tendency to use an "ontological" language, though he should, according to
his methodical principles, restrict himself to the epistemic question of the
"how of the givenness" of all types of givens, the world and the subject
included." He speaks for instance about the "absolute being of the subject"
and the "relative being of the world." Such talk is further supported by his

4 Ibid., 61ff and 63. The quotation from Husserl is taken from Husserl's On the

Phenomenology ofthe Consciousness ofInternal Time, App IX, cf. fn. 18.

5 Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosoph ie Bd. 1.,

Husserliana Bd. III, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), (Ideas l), § 24, p. 53.

6 For a detailed account of Heidegger's critique and possible consequences see my : "Die
Stellung der phlinomenologischen Idee der Letztbegriindung zur Seinsfrage," in Einheit als
Grundfrage der Philosophie, edited by K. Gloy and E. Rudolf, (Darmstadt: Wissenschftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1985),303-321 and "Wissenschaftsbegrundung und Letztbegrtindung im
Denkweg Martin Heideggers," in Selbstbegriindung der Philosophie, edited by Wolfgang
Marx, (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 157-177 .
 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 187

interpretations of phenomenology in terms of traditional metaphysics, e.g.,

Leibniz' monadology. Thus his critique of traditional metaphysics and
especially customary forms of idealism becomes ambiguous.
But Husserl's own enterprise also collapses. Heidegger's challenge,
namely, that Husserl's phenomenology fails in its attempt to reach the
ultimate ground, Letztbegrundung, letzten Grund, because he does not ask
the question of being, is fully justified, because Husserl's language clearly
indicates at many places that he talks about being qua being and not about
"being as given." That Heidegger later on rejects philosophizing on the
basis of the principle of sufficient reason and thus all attempts to reach
final transcendental grounding in general does not touch the viability of his
earlier argument against Husserl, Thus, in order to save the Husserlian
project, one has to avoid ontological interpretations of phenomenological
analysis--even against Husserl's own ontological terminology and against
his metaphysically biased self-interpretations and to restrict phe-
nomenology to the level of epistemic questions.
Given the considerations of Derrida and assuming-without giving a
detailed justification for this assumption in this essay-that they offer a
critique of Husserl which is more adequate and radical than the one given
by Heidegger, one can emphasize some features which both criticisms have
in common. We have to distinguish between Husserl's descriptions and
their consequences, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a critique of
a metaphysics that, in the last instance, grounds Husserl's phenomenology.
The difference between Heidegger and Derrida is that the latter has a very
specific way of determining the essence of metaphysics. It is the priority
of presence, the unmediated self-givenness of the present to the present,
that determines the essence of metaphysics for him . Since Derrida
discusses this criticism ofHusserl in connection with the phenomenology
of inner time consciousness, i.e., within the framework of the "critique of
the critique" that is supposed in the end to reach final grounding, his
criticism is at the heart of the matter.'

7 Cf. my "Transcendental Phenomenology," in Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook,

edited by 1. N. Mohanty and W. R. McKenna (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989),345-385, especially
367ff. The discussion of Derrida's interpretation and critique of Husserl given presupposes,
of course, my interpretation of transcendental phenomenology. It is impossible to develop
188 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

It is the merit ofDerrida's interpretation and critique of Husserl to allow

us, however, to ask some questions from the viewpoint of phenomenology.
The first question is whether Derrida's account of "irreducible nonpresence
as having a constituting value" in Husserl's descriptions is complete. To
add some viewpoints to what he has said in this respect might be interest-
ing, but is, at least prima facie, not of significance for the main point,
namely, that primordial intuition and the evidence that guides the phe-
nomenological method is grounded in the priority of presence."
Before asking these questions some remarks about certain aspects of
Derrida's interpretation and critique of Husserl are necessary.
1. He says that, according to Husserl's analysis of inner time conscious-
ness, we have to recognize contents of which we are unconscious and
which become "conscious" only later. To say that there is something
unconscious indicates only that it was not conscious at one time, but was
or will be conscious at some other time. Such an account of the uncon-
scious is, however, not able to explicate Freud's concept of the uncon-
scions."
2. Derrida says: "Doubtless Husserl would refuse to assimilate the
necessity of retention and the necessity of signs, for it is only the latter
which , like the image, belong to the genus of representation and symbol-
ism. Moreover, Husserl cannot give up this rigorous distinction without
bringing into question the axiomatic principium of phenomenology
itself"?" In other words, the radical distinction which does not allow us to
reduce retention and sign-and images-to a broadened conception of sign

this in this paper. I apologize for the numerous self-references. It was, however, impossible
to repeat in this framework what might be of interest for readers concerning the explication
of the assertions here without giving detailed justifications. I have written on Derrida also
in "Deconstruction in the Framework of Traditional Hermeneutics," Journal ofthe British
Society for Phenomenology 17 (1986) : 275-288.

8 I know that the meaning of "the priority of presence" in Derrida is very complex. A

care ful interpretation requires a lengthy discu ssion that cannot be given here. I use the
expression in the essay only to indicate the aspects which are of immediate significance in
Derrida's crit ique of Husser\.

9 Cf. Speech and Phenomena, 63.

10 Speech and Phenomena, 66.

 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 189

is immediately connected with the "priority of the present" in Husserl's

phenomenological method.
3. Derrida recognizes the important tum in Husserl when he recognizes
the function of kinesthesia for a new transcendental aesthetic. This recogni-
tion implies a recognition of the function of space and spatiality, which is,
nevertheless, overpowered by the metaphysical notion of the present, the
time of all evidence. I 1
The last point will be a crucial one for Husserl interpretation, i.e., not for
systematic phenomenology, but for the question of the degree to which
Husserl sometimes, against the consequences of his own descriptions,
adheres to certain metaphysical preconceptions. There can be no doubt that
Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's personal attitudes and ontological
biases can be provided with sufficient textual evidence. It can be shown,
however, that some of Husserl's descriptions lead far beyond the results for
which Derrida is willing to give him credit.
Some remarks about the textual material which Derrida used for his
interpretation of HusserI might be useful in preparation for the systematic
argument. Consideration of the textual basis for the criticism mentioned
under (1) above will discover only some textual facts that are in themselves
enigmatic. The real key to an understanding of the significance of these
enigmas will be the systematic consideration of the criticism mentioned
under (2). This consideration will culminate in the transition to the
discussion of the criticism mentioned under (3). The considerations of (1)-
(3) will still not touch the further question, whether or not, given the
principles of Husserl's method, all that is said by Husserl in the later work
either contradicts--or, in the final instance, collapses into-the priority of
the present of the "principle of all principles." This question will be the
topic of our concluding remarks.
The citations in Speech and Phenomena show that the material used by
Derrida for the explication of Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time
Consciousness is restricted to Ideas I and material which-though
published later-was written before Ideas 1. Especially the research of the
1920s, in which Husserl develops his new conception of a transcendental
aesthetic, and, in this connection, the concepts of association and kinesthe-

11 Cf. Harvey, 237-38 and the quote from OfGrammatology there .

190 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

sis, is not considered by Derrida. It is of interest in this respect that in the

passages quoted by Harvey it is stated that Derrida needs a new "transcen-
dental aesthetics" for his talk about inscription and writing. There is,
however, no hint about Husserl's own attempts in this direction. The work
that represents most of the later Husserl's work on a new transcendental
aesthetic, namely the Analysen zur passiven SynthesisP is not included in
the bibliography of her book. Given Harvey's intrinsic knowledge of
Derrida one has to conclude that Derrida himself never mentioned this
book or the other sources, such as the C-Manuscripts, which have certain
relations to his theses about Husserl. I do not want to criticize Derrida or
Harvey for some philological negligence. They are interested in systematic
questions and so am I. Thus what I am interested in is only a response
which refers to the systematic points. It will not be of great concern for me
whether Derrida has or has not studied these sources after his criticism of
Husserl in his earlier writings where he does not refer to them. Perhaps he
is just reading them now. My main concern is the kind of response that can
be given on the basis of these writings ofHusserl, which are now available ,
to Derrida's criticisms.
Given Husserl's work in the writings just mentioned and reading in their
light other writings of the later period, that were published earlier,
especially the Cartesian Meditations, one fact is obvious. Husserl was
developing a phenomenologically justifiable conception ofthe unconscious
and it is obvious from what he says that this implies a clear cut retraction
of what we can find in the appendix of the Phenomenology ofInner Time
Consciousness quoted by Derrida. This does not answer the question,
whether a phenomenologically justifiable explication of Freud's conception
of the unconscious is possible or not. Ricoeur" recognizes that there is a
phenomenological account of the unconscious in Husserl , but denies that
it is sufficient for an explication of Freud's conception of the unconscious.
Ricoeur argues on the basis of the Cartesian Meditations. Hermann Drue,
philosopher, practicing psychotherapist and professor of psychology at

12 Husserliana IX, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) (APS).

13 P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, translated by D. Savage (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1970), 380-381.

 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 191

Cologne, draws the opposite conclusion." I myself have sided with him
against Ricoeur on the basis of the textual evidence of the Analysen zur
passiven SynthesisP This is not a question which I wish to discuss here,
because, beyond the more general problem of absence, it presupposes the
question of explicating the ideal possibility-by no means necessity-of
repression in passive genesis. What has been said with respect to textual
facts is, however, sufficient to show that there is material which allows us
to explicate further how phenomenological descriptions might torment the
alleged presuppositions of the principle of all principles of the phe-
nomenological method.
What I want first of all to challenge is the above-mentioned thesis (2) of
Derrida. I say to the contrary: Husserl is not willing to assimilate the
necessity of retention to the necessity of signs, because the nature of
absence, which is grounded in retention, is more radical and onesidedly
founds the absence indicated in signs. The possibility that Derrida and
Husserl are very close to each other in this matter and that their difference
is only a difference in the construction of terminology, is not excluded with
this sed contra. We have, however, first to summarize Husserl's findings.
It is a summary of results, not a phenomenological analysis, and therefore
I can represent it in the fashion of "first," "second," and "third."
We have to distinguish between absence in the proper sense and an
absence in a sense in which it is improper. The most improper, inauthentic
absence is the absence that resides in signitive evidence qua predicative
evidence. What can be given in original evidence can be given also in
predicative evidence. This does not mean that everything that is given in
predicative evidence can be given in original evidence. It only means that
signitive evidence has in general original evidence as its necessary
correlate.
The second absence occurs in the acts ofthe imagination, remembering,
expecting, free phantasy, and the presentification of the presently absent.

14 Hermann Drue, Edmund Husserls System der phiinom enologischen Psychologie,

(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968) , 307-315.

15 Cf. my "The Ne w Hermeneutics," in Continental Philosophy in America, edited by

Hugh J. Silverman et al. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press , 1983), 64-89, especially
85-89.
192 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

What is given in acts of the imagination is something absent, not given in

originary evidence in the proper sense. The predicative acts signify, i.e., are
capable of representing the absent, because they are onesidedly founded in
acts of the imagination. The question of the relation between signification
and imagination need not be discussed on this occasion in detail. Only two
points can be mentioned. First there is evidence enough to assume that we
have the power of a pure pictorial imagination that is not accompanied by
signs. Secondly-and this is of greater significance for our consider-
ations-we can hint to Kant's thesis, according to which an empirical
concept refers to objects only because it provides the power of imagination
with a scheme. Given, e.g., the scheme of a dog, the power of imagination
is capable of producing signs of second order, namely pictures of all kinds
of dogs which can be created as their images and, conversely, we can
recognize many different dogs as dogs with the scheme of imagination. The
creation of material pictures according to schemes, is, of course, the
creation of another sign, an inscription. There is-and to this extent Derrida
is doubtless right-before the logos and a writing which "pictures" only the
logos a more "profound" writing and conception of writing . What writes
here is, however, the power of imagination, and the absence found here is
the absence in which the absence presented in predicative signification is
onesidedly founded .
The absence given in imagination is not yet absence in the most proper
sense. In order to unearth this third and deepest layer of absence some
further consideration of the acts of imagination is necessary. Only
expectation relates to its content-and this in attitudes of modalizing, a
question which cannot be investigated here further'<e-as possibly given in
original evidence. Since expectation is nothing else than turned around,
umgekehrtes, remembering, it is onesidedly founded in contents which
cannot be brought to originary evidence in the present. Past content can be
remembered. It is characteristic for remembering that it refers to something
that was originary given but can never be as such given in originary
evidence again. It is the past in which the first evidence announces itself.
It is the absence which governs the "constitution" of inner time con-
sciousness which has to be considered in an investigation that is interested

16 APS, Sections I and II.

 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 193

in the roots of radical absence.

Before performing this step some points of the foregoing exposition can
be emphasized that are of interest for a comparison of the theory of signs
in Husserl and Derrida. Prima facie this exposition seems to be diametri-
cally opposed to Derrida's account of sign, trace, etc. Though this is not my
main topic I want to suggest that this is not necessarily so. What is at stake
is rather a different logic for constructing a terminology. The terms "sign"
and "signification" are used by Husser! with respect to a specific difference
and not with respect to the genus or the underlying essence. A predicative
sign signifies with a certain sign matter which has in its content nothing in
common with the signified content, at least when predicative, judgmental
signification is at stake. The absence indicated in the sign is onesidedly
founded in some act of the imagination, i.e., the act that actually connects
the sign with the signified content. The essential feature of indicating
absence is inherited, so to speak, from the absence which belongs to
imagination and this in turn is inherited from the temporal and spatial
structure of consciousness, i.e., the absence in the most proper sense
residing here. Derrida, however, constructs his terms in another, opposed
fashion. He recognizes that absence is the most essential feature ofthe sign.
Starting there and not from what is different in the sign as compared with
other absences, it is only natural that all the other absences be conceived as
involving signs of some sort. This terminological technique is, I think, not
merely characteristic ofDerrida. It is quite common procedure in semiotics.
Many misunderstandings and puzzlements can be avoided if this is made
clear from the very beginning. What sounds prima facie like a very
profound difference might boil down to a comparatively trivial difference
in the method of describing states of affairs.
The passive constitution of the past in the field of retentions, i.e., its
structure, is the structure of the continuum of retentions. What is absent in
the proper sense in the field of retentions is absent first in a formal sense
and secondly with regard to the content. From a formal point of view, it can
be said that every past now, which is supposed to be formally presented in
some retentional phase , repeats in itself the formal structure of inner
temporality, i.e., it refers to some other retentions as its protention and to
a continuum of other retentions as its own specific past horizon. Given this,
it is obvious from a formal point of view that it is impossible to explicate
this multidimensional continuum of retentions by representing its past
194 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

phases by natural numbers.'? This will be essential for another dimension

of absence in consciousness.
Seen from the material point of view, what are absent are the contents
of the retentional horizon in the past. It is essential-and this follows
already from the formal structure of temporality-that remembering can
only thematize a very small fraction of this content. In addition-and this
is new in the later Husserl-the contents are for themselves connected by
association. It is this connectedness that guides remembering, expectation
and free phantasy and not vice versa. It should be noted that this con-
nectedness is not bound to the formal frame of explicit subjective time
consciousness, i.e., a time consciousness that is thematically aware of
duration and succession, because both are only given through activities of
consciousness in imagination, remembering and expectation. IS In this sense
the contents and their associative connectedness are atemporal and
precisely in this sense they are unconscious because they do not belong in
the connectedness, to the lowest level of explicit subjective time conscious-
ness. Nevertheless, in the specific way in which they are connected, they
guide all conscious life, because they guide the course of the acts of
imagination. 19
Husserl's conception of association is peculiar. On the one hand we
have-and this is the way we used the term in the foregoing paragraphs-
-association in the traditional sense, i.e., as some power which connects
a presently given content with some content in the past. This type of
association is, according to Husserl's theory of passive synthesis, one-
sidedly founded in another type of passive constitution, i.e., a constitution
which takes place without and before any activity of consciousness in the
living present. Here we come to the heart of the matter. Content organizes
itself in the living present not only in the "flowing off' of internal time as
pure flux but also in fields of "localization" in coexistence . The forms of
the "association" are roughly speaking the forms which are investigated by

17 Cf. my "Reflection and Totality in the Philosophy of E. Husserl ." Journal of the
British Society fo r Phenomenology 4 (1973) : 20-30, cr. esp. 26ff.

18 Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserliana X, (The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), §§ 18, 19.

19 APS §§ 36-39 .
 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 195

Gestalt theory, i.e., the relations of pairing, of foreground and background,

of contrast and blending, Verschmelzung, chaining, Verkettung, and others
which are investigated in great detail by HusserI. The basic pairing
phenomenon in the field of localization is the pairing of body and outside
that determines the difference of the "here" and the "there."
These rough indications are sufficient for the observation that there is,
within the living present and not only in the direction of the past horizon
of retentions that transcends the living present, an absence. First, it is the
absence of a vast multitude of passively constituted connections between
contents and these contents themselves in the living present, which are not
conscious. I am not aware of them, i.e., I can "notice" only a minimal
fraction ofthem and in the final instance not I, but they, determine whether
I will be aware of them or not. This is the case because these connections
guide the genesis of the connections that belong to second-order associa-
tion . It is this content that through contrast phenomena-i.e., not through
contents but through relations between contents-first "awakens"
consciousness for activities in which some content becomes conscious.
The second absence is the absence of the "there" in opposition to the
"here." It is of utmost radicality and this radicality reveals itself in the
givenness of the other, who has an appresented absolute "here" in a
location that is for me "there." It can only be appresented and never given
in "original intuition" because there is, in the formal structure of localiza-
tion, only one "here" as originally given "here" possible for each of us, i.e.,
his or her own.
We have thus the absence of the past that presents itself in the order of
growing radicality on the level of predication, of imagination , and of the
past as continuum of retentions. We have secondly the absence of the all
encompassing work of passive synthesis in general and thirdly we have the
absence of the there as a possible here. All these absences are implied in
the very structure ofthe living present. Before asking for the mode of "giv-
enness" in which we may know absence, we need finally to indicate the
most radical absence in the field of consciousness.
This absence indicates itself in the phenomenological question of the
givenness ofthe actual Now, the nunc stans, from which all contents flow
off in the structure of temporality. Following the still unpublished C-
Manuscripts and their descriptions, the result is that we know about the
formal "place" of the actual now only in an analysis that is actually, to the
196 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

extent in which content is involved that allows us to separate the temporal

data, an analysis of some past now, an already "flowed off' now because
thematizing reflection can have as its object only that which has flowed off
or is imagined , i.e., precisely not its own "standing in the now.'?" Seen
from a merely formal point of view, it is an abuse of a metaphor, if one
explicates the term "source point," Quellpunkt, Urquellpunkt , as a "point"
or "starting point." A beginning is something seen from the outside and
intrinsically also spatial. It can furthermore not be said that the actual Now
is describable as a "zero" point, in which some stream begins . It can be
approached, as said, only from some flowed off phase. But if we want to
characterize the way in which it appears--or better does not appear-in
such an approach, then it can be said to stand in the relation in which the
transfinite stands to every effectively constructed finite number, i.e., every
number which is actually given. But that means that the nunc stans, the
absolute subjectivity, the actual now does not belong to the contents that
can be given in original intuition in the living present. It can be known only
indirectly, to use the formal metaphor, in the same indirect fashion in
which the mathematician knows numbers that cannot be, in the sense of
Brower's intuitionism, constructed effectively."
We have thus found many other and much more radical absences, which
are constitutive for the living present in the later Husserl, than have been
mentioned by Derrida. Given those absences the question arises: How
could Husserl still stick to the methodical first principle of phenomenology,
the conception oforiginal intuition, originare Anschauung, and the primacy
of the present implied there? Let me first observe that Husserl was very
reluctant to follow consequences of descriptive analyses that did not fit his
metaphysical implications. He accepted the fact, which follows from his
analyses, that the givenness ofthe other and of intersubjectivity in general

20 C 71, C 10, C 16 V, C 17 IV. These MSS are not yet published.

21 Cf. my "The Other in the Field of Consciousness," in Essays in Memory ofAron

Gurwitsch, edited by Lester E. Embree, (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research
in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1984),283-303, esp. 288-299.
 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 197

is a transcendence, i.e., absence, in immanence." But he still characterizes

space and spatiality in general simply as transcendence, i.e., as something
foreign to the immanence of consciousness and belonging to the actively
constituted other objects. The consequence is that temporality and only
temporality is the medium of immanence and consciousness. The only
transcendence in immanence is the realm of the past, the continuum of
retentions. His critics have always pointed out, with good reasons, that it
is under these circumstances by no means obvious how the other can be
interpreted as another transcendence in immanence. If the spatial can, in no
sense whatever, be accepted as representing also a transcendence in
immanence and if the givenness of the other is grounded in the difference
of the "here" and the "there," then it follows that the givenness of the other
is onesidedly founded in the transcendence of outer given objects. But then
the transcendence of the other is the constitution of my "solipsistic"
constituting acts and by no means a constituting factor of my own
conscious life. Husserl's refusal to solve this dilemma by simply retracting
certain assertions, which did not harmonize with the results of his own phe-
nomenological analyses, especially those concerning localization, can only
be explained by the assumption of some biases due to sympathy with
certain metaphysical positions. The price he paid was that his theory of
subjectivity lacks phenomenological plausibility and can only be supported
either by transcendental arguments or in a spiritual metaphysics of monads.
Keeping this paradigm in mind, some remarks can be made about the
changes in Husserl's interpretation of his "principle of principles." From
the texts it is obvious that his thoughts about evidence and absolute
evidence changed significantly in the last two decades of his life. Some
serious inconsistencies--e.g., at one place in Erste Philosophie he says that

22 The concept "transcendence in immanence" occurs first in Ideas I, § 57 and § 80.

Husserl uses this concept here to characterize the relation of the pure ego to the stream of
consciousness. In Cartesianishsche Meditationen, Husserliana I, (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1950), 100 and 175 and in Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die
Transzendentale Phanomenologie, Husserliana VI, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1954),
189, the same concept and similar formulations are used to refer to the relation between the
past and the living present, on the one hand, and, on the other, to characterize the difference
of the how of the givenness of the other and the how of the givenness of outer objects. The
latter are transcendent without qualification and presuppose the givenness of the other which
is a qualified transcendence-a transcendence in immanence.
198 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

an apodictic evidence must be adequate, a claim which is then rejected in

Cartesian Meditations-indicate that a real struggle of motives was going
on."
Derrida could have noticed that there are serious differences in the
descriptions of the evidences underlying the transcendental-
phenomenological methods and procedures. A careful reading can discover
that "original evidence" and "original intuition" are no longer used in the
later works to characterize the "absolute evidence" with which phe-
nomenology has to begin. Even the word "original" itself does not occur
very often in Cartesian Meditations. What is discussed at length are
adequate evidence and apodictic evidence." To the extent in which
adequate evidence requires that all aspects and adumbrations of a
phenomenon be given in some sense, it is obvious that an original evidence
can not be adequate evidence or vice versa. Neither the givenness of an
object nor the givenness of the subject can imply that they are given in
original evidence, i.e., given in all of their aspects at once in the living
present. Thus an evidence that is adequate in some degree implies
necessarily that many aspects of the given in question are given only
through acts of imagination and/or signitive evidence and not in original
evidence. Thus also the subjective life is given to itself originally only in
a nucleus. We have seen that the living present as a whole transcends this
"nucleus" in several dimensions. Since adequate evidence is in its very
nature the ideal of a possible last evidence it cannot serve as a first
evidence.
The last word of Cartesian Meditations about the quest for an absolute
evidence is that such an evidence can only be an apodictic evidence. It is
meanwhile well known that the concept of apodicticity underwent
significant changes in the development from Ideas I to Cartesian Medita-
tions. Without going into detail it can be said that in Ideas I the old
conception according to which apodicticity qua necessity and unthinkablity
of being other than presented is the characteristic of, perhaps, not all, but

23 Erste Phi/osophie II, Husserliana VIII, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), (EPII)
35. cf. E. Straker, "Zur Frage der Entwicklung von Husserls Evidenzprinzip" in Husserls
Evidenzprinzip (Frankfurt a. m.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 1-34.

24 CM§§ 4-7 .
 THE APODICTICITY OF ABSENCE 199

at least eidetic intuitions which have their respective objects in a higher

degree of adequacy . It can be understood from this point of view why
Husserl still maintains in Erste Philosophie that an apodictic evidence has
to be adequate . In Cartesian Meditations, however, things have changed.
First, it is not an evidence which is not restricted to eidetic intuitions, but
used primarily with respect to the givenness of existence . It is said that the
existence of the subject is given to the subject in immediate apodictic
evidences while the existence of the world is given only in a presumptive
apodictic evidence-this is the strongest assertion about the givenness of
existence of the world we can find in Husserl in this respect."
Please note that I use the term "apodictic" only as a predicate for
givenness and not for being and hence use it in a strictly epistemic and not
an ontological way. The "not being able to be represented or thought
otherwise" is now specified . An evidence is apodictic if any reflection on
the mode of such a givenness reveals in its own underlying structure what
is in question. It is obvious that apodictic evidences can in general only be
found with respect to the evidences in which the subject is given to itself,
first of all with respect to its existence, but then also with respect to certain
general structures of subjectivity such as temporality, because all reflec-
tions on this structure are "necessarily" themselves temporal. They happen
in subjective time.
The above account is sufficient for present purposes. It is not sufficient
for a complete account of the significance the development of Husserl's
theory of evidence has for a proper understanding of the "principle of all
principles." It is, however, sufficient to point out that apodicticity has
nothing in common with and even excludes adequacy. The pure givenness
of the existence of an otherwise completely unexplicated realm can be
apodictic and nevertheless be completely inadequate. The knowledge of
some features of the structure oftemporality can be inadequate, it may even
contain serious misunderstandings generated on the level of predication,
but it is nevertheless apodictic in the sense mentioned . What kind of
consequences must be drawn from the results of these analyses is a serious
question for a phenomenology in the wake of Husserl. The "critique of
apodicticity," the analysis of its limits and the question whether, under

25 EP II, Beilage X, 386 .

200 THOMAS M SEEBOHM

these new circumstances, we can obtain the new "science" and the ultimate
grounding-perhaps in a limited sense-that Husserl expected from his
enterprise in the beginning requires much more investigations in the
"phenomenology of evidence.'?" Answers to such questions are not of
crucial significance for the main thesis of this essay.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this essay is that absence in
phenomenology is of interest only if that absence qua absence-and this
includes first of all also the direction in which it reveals itself as ab-
sence-is apodictically given. To be given apodictically has nothing to do
with adequacy. Though also given in original experience as lived through
experience of absence, it is precisely a denial of the priority of presence
and it indicates how absence is constitutive for the present. I wonder how
anybody could make meaningful claims about absence and its function in
all kinds of dimensions if these are not offered as referring to some
apodictic evidence-which may be very hazy. What Derrida tells us about
difference, trace, archewriting, and absence is not presented in the manner
of an arbitrary story about some accidental happenings . Nobody would be
interested in it if it was not about something that belongs to our condition
with necessity. To say this in this fashion, however, can be misleading. It
could be understood as an ontological statement about the human condi-
tion. The correct epistemic assertion says that the givenness of radical
absence in several dimensions, which have to be investigated in phe-
nomenology, is constitutive for the givenness of the present in principle.

Universitat Mainz

26 Cf. my "Apodiktizitat, Recht und Grenze," in Husser! Symposion Mainz J988, edited

by Gerhard Funke (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Abhandlungen
des Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse , Steiner, 1989),65-99.
 CHAPTER TEN

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
DERRIDA AND PHENOMENOLOGY

MANODANIEL

The following bibliography is focussed primarily on discussions of

Derrida's treatment ofHusserlian phenomenology . Also included are some
more general texts that have a bearing on this discussion . The bibliography
on Derrida prepared by John Leavey and David B. Allison, published in
Research in Phenomenology 8 (1978), was consulted. For a comprehensive
bibiography of Derrida's works see Albert Leventure, "A Bibliography of
the French and English Works of Jacques Derrida 1962-90," Texual
Practice 5.1 (Spring 1991).

Allison, David Blair. "Derrida's Critique of Husserl: The Philosophy of

Presence." Ph.D. diss., Penn State, 1974.
Allison, David B. "Derrida and Wittgenstein: Playing the Game." Research
in Phenomenology 8 (1978) : 93-109.
Alexander, Natalie B. "Presence and Deferral: Derrida's Critique of
Husserlian Internal Time-Consciousness." Ph.D. diss., Northwestern
University, 1990.
Barnouw, J. Review of Jacques Derrida's Origin ofGeometry. Review of
Metaphysics 33 (Sept. 1979): 168-172.
Benoist, Jean-Marie. '''Presence' de Husserl ." Les Etudes Philosophiques
4 (1969): 525-31.
Berman, Robert A. and Paul Piccone. "Hidden Agendas: The Yonger
Heidegger and the Post-Modern Debate." Telos 77 (Fall 1988).
Bernasconi, Robert. "Deconstruction and Scholarship." Man and World 21
(1988): 223-30 .

201
W. R. McKenna and J. C. Evans (eds .), Derrida and Phenomenology, 201-211.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
202 MANODANIEL

Bernet, Rudolf. "Is the Present ever Present? Pnenomenology and the
Metaphysics ofPresence," Research in Phenomenology 12 (1982): 85-
112. Reprinted in Husserl and Contemporary Thought. Edited by John
Sallis, 85-117. Atlantic Highlands, NJ : Humanities Press, 1983.
Bernet, Rudolf. "Differenz und Anwesenheit. Derridas und Husserls
Phanomenologie der Sprache, der Zeit, der Geschichte, der wissen-
schaftlichen Rationalitat." Studien zuer neuren franzosischen
Philosophie. Phanomenologische Forschungen 18 (1986): 51-112.
Bernet, Rudolf. "Derrida en Husserl. Het supplement als oorsprong." In
Jacques Derrida. Een inleiding in zijn denken. Edited by S. IJsseling,
90-112. Ambo: Baarn, 1986.
Bernet, Rudolf. "Presence and Absence of Meaning: Husserl and Derrida
on the Crisis of (the) Present Time." In Phenomenology of Tem-
porality: Time and Language. Pittsburgh: The Simon Silverman
Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, 1987.
Bernet, Rudolf. "Husserl's Theory of Signs Revisited." In Edmund Husserl
and the Phenomenological Tradition. Essays in Phenomenology
(Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 18). Edited by
Robert Sokolowski, 1-24. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1988.
Bernet, Rudolf. "On Derrida's 'Introduction' to Husserl's Origin of
Geometry." In Derrida and Deconstruction (Continental Philosophy
2). Edited by H. J. Silverman, 139-153,234-235. New York/London:
Routledge, 1989.
Boehm, Rudolf. "A Tale of Estrangement. Husserl and Contemporary
Philosophy." Research in Phenomenology 12 (1982): 13-20.
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Florida Atlantic University

 INDEX
absolute, 171, 182
absence, 3-4, 126, 191-97,200-201
apodicticity, 198-200
Aristotle, 17,61-62,63,64,69
association, 194-95
auto-affection, 18-19, 134, 178
Bacon, Francis, 23
being, 28-29; and presence, 30
Bergson , Henri, 40
Brentano, Franz, 129, 134
Brough, John B., 133
consciousness, transcendental , 9-10,
18
deconstruction, 121-24, 175, 176,
183
dialectic, 171, 173-74, 179
differance, 3-4, 7, 116-17, 157
equ ivocity, 162-65
evidence , 107ff., 124-26, 128-31,
168, 198-200; apodictic and ade-
quate, 198-200
Fichte, Johann G., 118
Fink, Eugen, 64-65, 154-57
fold (folding), 157, 172, 178-79,
182, 184
Freud, Sigmund, 2, 186, 190
Garver, Newton, 23-24
genesis, 170, 172-74
Hegel, Georg W.F., 2, 113, 159
Heidegger, Martin, 30, 62, 119, 154,
187
213
historicity, 171
history, 151ff.
idea (in the Kantian sense), 78-81,
167-70, 172, 175
ideality (ideal objects), 12-13, 175-
76, as created, 26, 38-41, 160-62,
164; and identity, 25; and repet i-
tion, 175-76
idealization, 68, 165-67
imagination, 192-94
impression (and primordial im-
pression) , 132ff., 178-79
indication, 46-50, 126, 129
infinitization, 165-66
Joyce, James, 163 n.35
Kant, Immanuel, 62
language , Derrida's view of, 146,
148; transcendental , 65, 68-69,
83-86,93 ,156,160-65
Levinas, Emmanuel, 154, 155 n.14
living present, 171-2, 195-97
Locke, John, 134
Lotze, Hermann, 29, 32, 36
meaning, 99-100, 107, 114
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 20, 36, 37
metaphor , 180-81
metonymy , 130
motivation, 46-50
noema, 28-29
occasional expressions, 52-58
214 INDEX

origin, 158-59, 166, 173-4; of Geo- rigor, 105ff., 116-17

metry, 151ff. See genesis
Schelling, Friedrich, 118
Poe, Edgar Allen, 21 sign, 169, 172, 193; expressive, 4-
Plato, 119 13; indicative, 4-13
presence, 3-4, 6-7, 10-11, 13,30,97, spacing, 178
134ff.; and identity, 27, 30 Spinoza, Benedict De, 127
principle of all principles, 185, 186, supplement. 6
200
protention, 148-150 teleology, of phenomenology, 65-66
psyche, 182-83, 184 time, consciousness of, 14-16,
128ff., 194-96. See retention
Quine, Willard v.a., 25 trace, 6, 11, 126

reduction, phenomenological, 9-10, univocity, 162-65, 174

20, 72-78, 86
reflection, 72-78, 90-93 voice, 7,17-19
relation (the), 156, 170, 172, 174,
176,179,183 writing, 7, 12, 17,65,83-86, 161-62
repetition (iteration), 12-13,27, 167,
169, 170-1, 175-76 zigzag, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165,
retention, 15-16, 125-26, 137ff., 173,174,184
144ff., 178-79, 194-96
Ricoeur, Paul, 114