Aron Gurwitsch - Gelb-Goldstein's Concept of - Concrete - and - Categorial - Attitude and The Phenomenology of Ideation

International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Gelb-Goldstein's Concept of "Concrete" and "Categorial" Attitude and the Phenomenology of

Ideation
Author(s): Aron Gurwitsch
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Dec., 1949), pp. 172-196
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF "CONCRETE" AND
"CATEGORIAL" ATTITUDE AND THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF IDEATION
WRITTEN IN HONOR OF KURT GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER AND
THE FRIEND, ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY,
NOVEMBER 6, 1948
Husserl's theoryof universalsas generalobjects and specificideal en-

titieshas very soon acquired widespreadnotorietynot, however,without
too often being grossly misinterpretedand misrepresented,partly on
account of the not veryfortunately chosentermof "intuitionof essences"
("Wesenserschauung").When Husserl establishedhis theoryof ideation
forthe firsttimein LogischeUntersuchungen, he hardlywentbeyondassert-
ing the specificnature and irreducibilityof those acts throughwhich
universalsin contradistinction to particularthingsare meant and appre-
hended and, correspondingly, also the specificnatureand irreducibility of
the objects apprehendedthroughthe acts in question. For this purpose,
Husserl had to engage himselfin a thoroughgoing analysis and discussion
of the theoriesof abstractionprevailingin the traditionof classical British
empiricism.
Most of the essentialideas whichHusserl developedin the course of his
criticaldiscussionand refutationof the empiricistic
theoriesof abstraction
have been fullyconfirmed by the resultsto whichGelb and Goldsteinhave
been led in theirstudiesof braininjuries.Consideringthat Gelb and Gold-
steincarriedout theirinvestigationswithina mereneurologicaland psycho-
pathological settingand in complete independenceof phenomenological
and, quite in general, philosophicalpoints of view and theories,their
corroboration ofthe pertinentviewsofHusserlappearsthe moresignificant
and conclusive.Afterhaving set forththe convergencebetweenHusserl's
and Gelb-Goldstein'stheories,we shall embarkupon formulating further
phenomenologicalproblemsof ideation which arise on the basis of the
mentionedconvergence,takingalso into account Husserl's later contribu-
tions towardsthe problemunder discussion.
I. CATEGORIAL EQUALITY AND QUALITATIVE HOMOGENEITY
Empiricistictheoriesdeny universalsas ideal entitiesand objects sui

generis.Ideation is reducedto, or, at least, explainedby apprehensionof
similarityor likeness betweenparticularthings. General termsare, ac-
cordingly,held to denote classes of similarparticularthings.When a gen-
172
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE 173
eral termis predicatedofa particularthing,the meaningofsuchpredication

can be but the assertionthat the given thingbelongsto a certainclass,
i.e., bears similarityor likenessto otherparticularthings.
In his refutationof the empiricistictheories,Husserl points out that
everyrelationofsimilarity orlikenessbetweenparticularthingspresupposes
a point of view from,and a respectin, which the particularthingsare
similaror alike'. If two thingsare alike as to theircolor or theirform,the
point of view with referenceto whichthe relationof likenessobtains is,
in the formercase, the elaos of color, in the latter case, that of form;
both el3q have to be consideredas identicalideal entities.Every object
bears similarityto a greatmany objects; to some in one respect,to others
in a different respect.To put it otherwise,everyobject belongsto a great
many classes comprisingobjects whichare similarto each other.Empha-
sizingtheclassesfoundedon similarityor likeness,but denyingtheidentical
ideal dl6oswith referenceto which the relationsof similarityor likeness
obtain, one is confronted,as Husserl shows, with the insuperablediffi-
cultyof accountingforthe constitutionand unificationof the veryclasses
and also forthat which separates the classes fromeach otherand keeps
themapart. A red sphereis similarto both a greensphereand a red cube;
the similaritiesinvolvedin eithercase are of a different kind. Hence simi-
laritiesproveto admit of differences in kind.As the objects themselves,so
similaritiesbetweenobjects may be comparedwith each otherand thus
turnout to be similaror alike or else to differfromeach other.Similarities
too may, therefore, be groupedand classifiedaccordingto species. Again
the problemarises as to the point of view with referenceto whichsimi-
laritiesare similarto, or differentfrom,each other.In otherwords,thevery
problemof the >en fromwhichwe started is but transferredfrom the
objects between which similaritiesobtain to the similaritiesthemselves.
On the groundsof the empiricisticdenialof the e'l6has identicalideal units
and entities,thereremainsbut the resortingto similaritiesbetweensimi-
larities,and thisshows that a regressusin infinitum is unavoidableon the
mentionedgrounds.
Equality or likenesswith referenceto an eltos as point of view or, as
we shall likewisesay, categorialequality or likenessis definedby Husserl
as that relationshipwhich obtains betweenobjects as fall under one and
the same species.2Since every Jr6osnecessarilyconstitutesand defines
1 Husserl,LogischeUntersuchungen (referredto hereafteras Log. Unt.), Vol. II,
II, chap. I; cf. the condensedbut faithfulrenderingby M. Farber, The Foundation
ofphenomenology (Cambridge,Mass., 1943),chap. IX A.
2 Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1, p. 113,"Gleichheitist das VerhAltnisder Gegen-
stande, welche einer und derselbenSpecies unterstehen";cf. also Erfahrungund
nurein KorrelatderIdentitateinesAllgemeinen...."
Urteil,p. 393 ". .. Gleichheit
174 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH
a class, namely the class of objects which fall under it,' the relation of
categorialequality may be said to obtain between objects by virtue of
the latter'sbelongingto one and the same class. For any objects to state
that they belong to the same class or that they stand in the relationof
categorialequality are but two expressionsof the same state of affairs.
Objects betweenwhich the relation of categorialequality is ascertained,
to obtain,are not taken in themselvesin all theirindividualitiesand par-
ticularities,but are ratherconsideredwith reference to a certainspeciesas
particularizations of the latter,or as representatives of the class to which
theybelongby virtue of theiractualizingthe eltos in question.
From equality in the categorialsense there is to be distinguishedthe
sensuousfactorof equality ("das sinnlicheGleichheitsmoment"), the latter
beingto theformer what "figuraleMomente" by means ofwhichpluralities
are perceptuallyrecognizedare to pluralitiesas apprehendedthroughgenu-
ine representation.4 For the apprehensionof a pluralityin the lattermode,
there are requiredas many acts as the pluralitycontainselements,each
elementbeingapprehendedthroughone of these acts; in additionto these
acts of individual apprehension,there is furthermore requiredan act of
synthesisthroughwhich the individuallyapprehendedelementsare col-
ligatedand united.5Such genuineapprehensionof a pluralityby means of
explicitcolligationcannot be assumedto occurwhen,e. g., lookingat the
sky we instantaneouslysee "many" stars or enteringa hall perceiveat a
glance "a lot" of people.' To account forthe apprehensionof pluralities
under circumstanceswhichprecludeexplicitcolligation,Husserl refersto
"quasi-qualitativeMomente"or "figuraleMomente"as perceptualfeatures
exhibitedby certaingroups.' In speakingof the perceptionof a "row of
trees," a "columnof soldiers,"a "swarmof birds,"etc., we renderby the
terms"row," "column,""swarm" a certainaspect,a certaincharacteristic
propertyor organizationalformwithwhichthe groupin questionpresents
itselfin very sense-experience.Geometricalconfigurations, all kinds of
3 Id., Erfahrung
und Urteitl,
p. 423.
4Id., Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1 p. 282 note.
6 Id., PhitlosophiederArithmetik, pp. 79 f.
6 Id., ibid.,pp. 219ff.
7Id. ibid.; pp. 228 ff.;cf. also Farber, loc. cit., pp. 46 ff.In the presentcontext
we cannot dwell at some lengthon Husserl's conceptof "figuraleMomente"; we
wish,however,to pointout that the phenomenareferred to by Husserlare thesame
whichChr. v. Ehrenfelsstudiedin his consequentialarticle "Ueber Gestaltqualit-
taten" in Vierteljahrsschrift fazr wissenschaftltiche Philosophie,Vol. XIV (1890).
ConcerningthecompleteagreementbetweenHusserland v. Ehrenfelsas to thetheo-
reticalinterpretation of the phenomenain question,cf. A. Gurwitsch,"Quelques
aspects et quelques d6veloppements de la Psychologiede la Forme" pp. 415 ff.in
Journalde Psychologie NormaleetPathologique, Vol. XXXIII (1936).
arrangementsof points and lines belonghere as well as the characteristic

aspectofthechess-boardpattern,thespecificnatureof a rhythm, a melody,.
etc. "FiguraleMomente"denotecharacters, properties,
aspectsofgroups,and
are no moreand no less a matterof meresense-experience than thegroups
themselves and the"elements"ofwhichthegroupsconsist.Amongsuchgroup-
aspects theremust also be reckoned,and it deservesspecial attentionin
the presentcontext,the perceptualfeatureof qualitativehomogeneity. We
see at a glance "a heap ofapples" or "a heap ofnuts,"withoutresortingto,
and, in most cases, withouteven being able to resortto n(n 1) com-
2 cm
parisons,n beingthe numberof elementsinvolved.8The groupin question
displays the perceptualfeatureof qualitative homogeneityof a specific
kind, by virtue of whichthe "heap of apples" presentsa group-aspect
differentfromthat ofa "heap ofnuts." Qualitativehomogeneity is involved
in both cases, but is differentlyspecifiedin either.
There is thena mereperceptualapprehensionof equalityin the sense of
qualitative homogeneitywhichneitherrequiresnor impliesany reference
to an Elaos.Sensuous equalitybetweenthe membersof a perceivedgroup
is exhibitedby the groupas a specificperceptualcharacterof its own,as a
"figuralesMoment" of a special kind. By the same token, the group-
characterin question,as every "figuralesMoment," is confinedand re-
strictedto the very group as experiencedin actual perception.Suppose
the perceptionofa certainnumberofred objects,all ofidenticalchromatic
properties(as to hue, brightness, etc.). For the perceptionofsuch a group,
of
the perceptual apprehension qualitative homogeneityspecifiedin a
certain determinatemanner,is characteristic.Still the perceptionof the
group in question with its characteristic group-aspectis not onlyentirely
differentfrom,butdoes not evenconveyor foundtheidea of theclass of red
objects,no morethan that ofthe class ofred objects ofa certaincompletely
particularizedchromaticdetermination.Such a class, understoodas the
extensionof a concept or olios,which is a necessarycorrelateof the d&os
is essentiallyan infinitelyopen class, comprisingwhateverobjects have
thepropertiesin question,whetheror not theyhappento be givenin actual
experience.9Consideredas that perceptualphenomenonas which it pre-
sents itselfin experience,qualitative homogeneity,on account of its sen-
suous nature and the ensuingrestrictionto actual sense-experience, con-
tains no motivationleadingbeyondactual perception,in particulartoward
the idea of a class in the conceptualsense. On the otherhand, a genuinely
conceptualclass, e.g.,that ofredobjects,which,as shownbefore,cannotbe
p. 233.
8 Husserl,PhilosophiederArithmetik,
und Urteil,?82 and pp. 422 f.
9Id., Erfahrung
176 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
constitutedand unifiedexcept with referenceto an d~os does obviously

not presentitselfas an experientialor perceptualwhole.10Its unityis not
ofa sensuousnature,but is derivedfromtheunityofa categorialintention,
the class itselfbeingthe correlateof that intention.It followsthat in con-
tradistinction to sensuousequality or qualitative homogeneity,categorial
equality, definedas the relationshipbetween objects which belong to a
certainclass or, what amountsto the same, fall under the corresponding
eldos,proves a mere conceptual relationshipestablished by categorial
thought,and not a relationshipof sensuousor perceptualnature.
As the resultof Husserl's discussionsand distinctions,we may state the
unaccountabilityof ideation in terms of equality, insofaras categorial
equality presupposes,and is renderedpossible by the apprehensionof an
e1dos,whereas qualitative homogeneitydoes not found the presentation
of a class in the conceptualsense,at least not withoutthe interventionof
specificmental activitiesand operations.
II. GELB-GOLDSTEIN' S ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF AMNESIA OF COLOR-NAMES
Husserl's views have foundhithertounnoticedcorroborationby Gelb-

Goldstein's concepts of "categorial" and "concrete" attitude, concepts
whichthe mentionedauthorshave laid down on the basis of theirstudies
of numerouspsychopathologicalcases presentingmost various symptoms.
For the sake of concisenessand brevity,we shall essentiallylimitourselves
to theiranalysis of a case of amnesia of color-names;"1 the symptomsin-
volved being closelyrelatedto the phenomenadealt withby Husserl.
a. The symptoms
and theperceptualexperienceofthepatient
Gelb-Goldstein'spatient,Th., manifestedthefamiliardifficulty
in naming
a colorshownto him;even the suggestionof the correctnamewas of little,
ifany,avail. Presentedwithcolor-samplesand requestedto choosea sample
fittingto a color-name,Th. repeatedlyutteredthename,but it seemedthat
the wordhad no meaningforhim. He could no moreindicatethe name of
the color of an object whichwas mentionedto him than he was able to
point out a color correspondingto a color-name.If, however,instead of
being asked to name the color of an object, the patient was requestedto
choose a sample fittingto the object in question,he succeeded very well
due to his excellentvisualization,provided a fittingspecimenwas there.
He neverchose a wrongcolor.If the specimendid not matchperfectlythe
colorof the mentionedobject, Th. was not satisfiedand continuedlooking
forbetterfittingones.
10 Id.
Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1, pp. 282f.
11A Gelb and K. Goldstein,"Ueber Farbennamenamnesie
.. ." in Psychologische
Vol. VI (1924).
Forschung,
Particularlyinterestingand revealingwas the behaviorof the patient,

whenhe was givena color-specimen(e.g., a red one) and was requestedto
sortout all those speciminaas agreedwiththe formerin hue, thoughthey
mightdifferas to brightness, warmth,etc."2Th. proceededwithmuchun-
easiness and hesitation.Sometimeshe triedto assort speciminaof equal
or verysimilarhue, sometimesspeciminaof different hue which,however,
agreedas to brightness.It happenednot infrequently that,havingalready
chosena correctspecimen(a red one), he laid it aside or that he paid no
attentionat all to the red specimina.Some of his choices appeared quite
incomprehensible. There arose the impression,rejected,as we shall see,
by Gelb and Goldstein,that the patient was unable to abide by his prin-
ciple ofcoordinationand shiftedfromone principleto any other;assorting
sometimesaccordingto hue, sometimesaccordingto brightness.The pa-
tienthimselfwas farfromsatisfiedby his own procedure.Having made a
firstselectionof specimina,he again and again comparedeach one of the
selectedspeciminawiththe sample of referenceuntil he finallyaccepted a
few, but very few only, as fitting,not withoutexpressingdoubts as to
whetherhe mightnot findstill betterfittingones. The meticulositywith
which the patient proceededin choosinga color-specimencorresponding
to the colorof an object eitherpresentedor merelymentioned,reappeared
in his assorting.For Th. to be satisfiedwithhis choice,the color-specimina
had to agreein bothcolorand brightness, i.e., to be identical.In fact,when
his task was to match identicalnuances, the patient succeededperfectly.
Startingfromthe procedureoftheirpatientin assortingcolor-specimina,
Gelb and Goldsteinexplain all the symptomspresentedby Th. as well as
by otherpatientswho had been studied by various authors,as effectsof
a generalreductionfromthe level of "categorial" behavior and attitude
to that of "concrete"attitude.Confrontedwith a color-specimen, the pa-
tienthas of the lattera characteristicperceptualexperiencein which,ac-
cordingto the objectivequalitiesofthe specimen,the factorofhue, that of
brightness,or some otherfactormay prevail."3 It is by thatcharacteristic
experiencewithits individuality and particularity thatthepatientabidesand
cannothelpabiding.When,e.g., in the experienceof the specimenof refer-
ence the factorof hue is predominant,whereasin that of anothersample
which Th. compareswith the former,the factor of brightnessprevails,
the patient cannot persuade himselfto group the two specimina,on ac-
count of the difference in brightness,though both are of the same hue,
say red. Converselywhenthe factorofbrightnessprevailsin the experience
of eitherspecimenand whenthe latterare ofthe same, or nearlythe same,
brightness,the patient considersthem as fittingtogether,the eventual
12 Id., ibid., I, ?3.
13 Id., ibid.,pp. 148f.
differencein hue notwithstanding. It goeswithoutsayingthatTh. some-

timesgroupedspeciminaagreeing in hue.Whether or nottwocolor-spec-
iminaappearto himas fitting together dependsentirely and exclusively
uponwhether ornothe hastheexperience ofconcreteagreement, accordance,
andcoherence ("konkretes Kohdrenzerlebnis") onaccountoftheparticular,
characteristic individualaspectswhichthe speciminapresentto him.In
thecase ofidenticalspecimina, thepatientobviously experiences concrete
agreement to thehighest degree;hencehe is prompt
possible, andunhesita-
tingin assorting suchspecimina.On the otherhand,whenthe samples
selectedbythepatientarenotidentical, butmerely veryclosetoeachother,
he stillassortsthemon accountofhis experience ofconcreteaccordance.
'Thelatter,however, appears to him as not quiteperfect and somehow in-
creasable;therefore he does not feel completely satisfiedwith his choice.
If in thecase ofTh.,theexperience ofconcrete accordance dependedupon
factorslikehue or brightness, it could,and did in othercases,14also be
attached to esthetic effects,
suitability forpracticalpurposes, etc.
Confronted withthesame task as the the
patient,viz., task ofgrouping
color-specimina to
according hue, the normal person unhesitatingly assorts
two,say,redspecimina, thoughtheonemaybe verydark,theotherrather
bright.In so doing,thenormalpersonis notunawareofthedifference be-
tweenthespecimina. Carrying outtheassignment givento him,however,
the normalpersondoesnottakethespecimina in theirparticularity and
individuality, butratherseesin eithera specialcase ofredness.To express
it in Husserl'sterminology, the normalpersondoes not dependforhis
assorting upon sensuousequalityor likeness,but may,and does,group
specimina according to therelation ofequalityinthecategorial sense,which
obtainsbetweenthespecimina in questioninsofarand onlyinsofaras the
latterare considered as particularizations and actualizations of the ethos
ofredness. In hisgrouping, thenormalpersonis notconfined to abidingby
theimmediately givenexperiential features ofperception, including among
the lattertheexperience of concreteagreement and accordance.He may
imposea principle ofclassification
uponthedataofperception, hemaycon-
siderthesedata froma certainpointofview,in thecase underdiscussion
fromthepointofviewofhue.
It is just this attitude,the "categorial"attitude,that brain-injured
patientsareutterly unableto adopt,an inability which,according to Gelb
and Goldstein, defines theessentialdifference betweennormalpersonsand
patients.Confined to the contentof perception as actuallyexperienced,
thepatientsabideby thatcontentin all its singularity and particularity;
theyareunableto seeinittherepresentative ofa color-speciesorofa cate-
14 Cf. K. Goldstein,"L'analyse de l'aphasie et l'etude de l'essence du langage,'I
Psychologiedu Langage(Paris 1933),pp. 480f.
To thepatient'smind,thegivencolor-specimen
goryor class of'colors."5
standsoutas thatas which,and exactlyas it,presents itselfin perceptual
experience withoutany reference whatsoever to any thingbeyonditself.
Especially,the patientscannotregardtheirperceptualexperience in the
lightorundertheperspective ofa principle extraneous to thatperceptual
experience in thesensethatit is notembeddedin,but somehow imposed
uponthelatter.Hencethepatientsproveunableto refertheiractualex-
perienceto anyideal or.conceptualorder;theycannottake a standor a
viewwithregardto theirperceptualexperience, notto speakofvarying
viewsso that,according to the viewtaken,sometimes these,sometimes
otherfeaturesof the perceptualcontentappearas particularly relevant
or essential."
Everybrain-injury entails,according to Goldstein,"7a regressionto the
levelof merelyconcretebehaviorand attitude.Onlythatexistsforthe
patientwhichoffers itselfin perceptual experience.Withinthecontentof
actualexperience, thereis no differentiationbetweentheexperiential fea-
turesas to theirrelevancy and significance.All featuresoftheperceptual
contentare ofequal importance forthepatient;each ofthesefeatures is
ofparamount importance forthemerereasonthatitisencountered inactual
perception. The patientsare somehowoverwhelmed and overpowered by
actualexperience imposing itselfuponthemby a forceofconstraint from
whichtheycannotemancipate themselves. Thus the patientsare unable
to conceiveof eventualchangesor modifications in the experientialcon-
tent,i.e.,to conceiveofthelatteras possiblybeingdifferent fromwhatit
actuallyis. This goes so farthatbrain-injured patientscannotmakeor
even repeatstatements whichare at variancewithactual experience as,
e.g.,repeating thesentence"Todaytheweatheris bad and it is raining,"
whenin factthesunis shining.18 All thatthesepatientscan do is act (in
thebroadestsenseoftheword)underthe suggestions and imperatives as
arisefromthegivenconcretesituation.To theextentto whichproblems
can be solvedin thisdirectand immediate way,thepatientssucceed,for
theiractions,oriented withregardto and dictatedbytheexperienced con-
cretesituation, proveadequateto thelatter.When,however, thepatients
areconfronted withproblems thatcannotbe solvedbyactionsdirectly and
15 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit., pp. 152f.; Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 453 ff.and 473
ff.;cf. also E. Cassirer,Philosophieder symbolischen Formen,Vol. III, pp. 258 ff.,
(Berlin,1929).
16 Cassirer,loc. cit.,pp. 261ff.
17 Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 453f. and 470; Der Aufbaudes Organismus (Haag, 1934),
pp. 18 ff.
18 Cassirer,loc. cit., pp. 295 f. and 314; cf. also W. Hochheimer, "Analyse eines
Seelenblindenvon der Sprache aus," Psychologische Forschung,Vol. XVI (1932),
pp. 30 f.
immediatelyinduced by the very experientialsituation,they always fail.

One mightsay, the patientsare at the mercyof actualitiesso as not to be
able to conceiveofpossibilitiesor to look at the givensituationfroma dis-
tance."9The latter attitude requires and implies a certain detachment
fromthe experiencedconcretesituationwhich,withoutlosingits character
of actualityand reality,yet loosens its grasp upon the experiencingsub-
ject's mindso as to permithimto considerthe givensituationundervary-
ing angles,fromdifferent pointsof view, and to displaysome initiativein
its respect.Since it has becomeimpossibleforthe patientsto detach them-
selves fromthe given situationand to look at the latterfroma distance,
theyprove deprivedof any initiativewhatever.
interpretations
b. Theoretical
Consideredin the lightof Gelb and Goldstein'sgeneralcharacterization
of the "concrete"and "categorial" attitudes,the behaviorof theirpatient
Th. in assortingcolor-samplesbecomes understandable.Already holding
in his hand a sample agreeingwith the specimenof referenceas to hue,
the patient, as mentionedabove,20not infrequentlyput the "correct"
sample aside to choose anotherone of different hue, but of equal or nearly
equal brightnessas the specimenof reference.It must not be concluded
herefrom thatthepatientinconsistently shiftedfromone principleofclassi-
ficationto another.To assortcolor-specimina withreference to a principle
of classificationrequiresadoption of the "categorial" attitude,whether
the principleof classificationis adheredto consistently,i.e., fora certain
lengthoftimeor is adoptedfora briefmomentonly.Maintainingthattheir
patientis utterlyunable to adopt the "categorial"attitude,Gelb and Gold-
stein conclude that he has no principleof classificationat all.2' Hence
Th.'s behaviorhas to be explainedby an alternationand successionupon
each other of different experiencesof concreteagreement.Suppose the
specimen of to
reference be experiencedin concreteagreementas to hue
witha specimena, and thepatientto noticeat thismomentanothersample
b which,thoughof different hue, is highlysimilarto the specimenof re-
ferenceas to brightness,even moresimilarin the mentionedrespectthan
a is as to hue. Whilethefactorofhue had thusfarprevailedin theexperience
ofthe specimenof reference, that ofbrightnessnow becomespredominant.
An experienceof concretecoherencebased on brightnesssupersedesthe
previousexperienceofconcretecoherencebased on hue. Guided exclusively
19Goldstein,Der Aufbaudes Organismus, p. 19; Gelb, "Remarques gdndralessur
l'utilisationdes donndespathologiquespour la psychologieet la philosophicdu
langage,"Psychologie du Langage (Paris, 1933),pp. 415f.
20 Supra, p. 176ff.
21 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 149ff.;Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 409f.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
CONCEPTSOF ATTITUDE 181
by that experienceof concreteaccordancewhichprovesstrongerand more

imperative,the patientis thus led to preferb to a.
This interpretation is borne out by Gelb and Goldstein'sobservations
of theirpatient Hac.22 Requested to sort out those color-sampleswhich
seemed to him to fitwith a givenspecimenof reference, Hac., differently
fromTh., selected a rathergreat number.A closerexaminationof Hac.'s
choicesrevealedthat any two speciminaselectedin immediatesuccession
were highlysimilarto each otheras to certainoptical qualities (e.g., hue,
brightness, warmth,and otherpropertieshardto describeand to formulate),
so that theymay well have been experiencedto be in concreteaccordance.
Such, however,was not thecase whenall theselectedspeciminawerecom-
pared withthe givenspecimenof reference.In the courseof assortingsam-
ples, Hac., in contradistinction
to Th., did not abide bythegivenspecimen
of reference.His specimenof referencevaried frommomentto momentin
that at any momentthe samplewhichhe had last chosenbecame the speci-
men of referencefor the subsequentselection. Th. performedone single
processof selectionin that he persistentlyreferred his choicesto the given
specimenof referenceand thus,aftermany vacillations and hesitations,
he came to assemble onlyvery fewsamples,since onlythese fewwere ex-
periencedin concreteaccordancewith specimenof reference.When Hac.
selecteda greatmanyspeciminaand establisheda seriesin whichtwoneigh-
bors, but only neighbors,stand to each otherin the relationof concrete
accordance,it is because,insteadof one singleprocessof selection,he per-
formeda setofpartialchoiceswithvaryingspeciminaof reference, looking
out at each choice fora sample as agreedwiththat whichhe had selected
just before.Whateverthe difference in the procedureof the two patients,
both of them were determinedin theirchoosingentirelyand exclusively
by the experienceof concreteagreementand coherence.
To gain more insightinto the procedureof assortingcolor-sampleson
the basis of the experienceof concreteaccordance,let us describethe phe-
nomenalaspect ofthat experience.Gelb and Goldsteinpointout23that the
experienceof concretecoherencemust not be misconstruedas a secondary
experiencesupervenientto those of the speciminathemselvesand their
chromaticqualities.In otherwords,it is not that the speciminain question
are firstexperiencedindependentlyof each other,each one determinedby
definitechromaticpropertiesofits own and are then,subsequently,related
by concreteaccordance.Rather the speciminain questionare experienced
but withintherelationofconcrete coherence. This is to say, the specimina-
forthe sake of simplicitylet us assume thereare but two-present them-
selves as membersor "parts" of a contexture of which,on accountof its
22 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 171f.
23 Id., ibid.,p. 153,note2.
uniformity, thephenomenon of concreteagreementis thespecificand distinc-

tivefeature.From the point of view of the specimina,the uniformity of the
contextureof whichtheyare "parts" appears as qualitativehomogeneity.
The two speciminapresentthemselvesas platformson the same plane,
withno riseor fallfromthe one to the other,withno tensionbetweenthem.
Obviously this characterizationholds for the speciminabut as members
of the contexturein question which offersthe typical aspect of a level-
phenomenon.24 Withinthis contexture,eitherspecimenoccupies a definite
place and plays a specificrolewhich,to be sure,is the same forboth spec-
iminain a contextureof the kind as hereconsidered.It is fromthe contex-
turewiththe propertieswhichthe latterhas of its own and withreference
to all the othermembersof the contexturethat each one of the members
derivesits functionalsignificanceand that qualificationwhich definesits
phenomenalstatus in a given concretecase. All the examples to which
Husserlrefersfor"figuraleMomente"and v. Ehrenfelsfor"Gestaltqualith-
ten" are contextureswith charactersand propertiesof theirown, though,
of course,not all of them are of the type of the "level-phenomenon,"as
this is easily seen in the case of a melody,a rythm,an ascendingscale,
etc. Accordingly,all the componentmembersof a contexturehave not
always the same functionalsignificance. However,what holdsforthe mem-
of
bers any contexture, whatevertype and kind, is that each member
of
is experiencedwith, and as definedby, a specificfunctionalsignificance
which,in turn,is determinedby the role whichthe memberplays within
the contexturein question. The structureof such contextureshas to be
accountedforin gestalttheoretical termsofthekindofthosewhichwe have
used. A furtherclarificationof these termsis not withinthe scope of the
presentdiscussion.
Assortingcolor-speciminaon the basis of concreteagreement,the sub-
ject looks forsamples as lend themselvesbest to forminga contextureof
the mentionedkind togetherwiththe specimenof reference.All he has to
do is to selectsuch speciminawhichare experiencedas belongingtogether
with the specimenof referencein the sense of concreteagreementto the
highestpossibledegree.For that purpose,the subject does not need to go
beyondthe veryexperienceof concreteagreement.In particular,it is not
necessaryfor him to analyze the latter experienceand to recognizethe
agreementas agreementby equality of, say, brightness.25 It may well
happen that the agreement is in fact based upon the factorof brightness
which thus actually determines the perceptualexperience.Still the factor
in contradistinction
24 As to level-phenomenon cf.K. Koffka,
to step-phenomenon
"Perception:An Introductionto the Gestalt-Theorie,"The PsychologicalBulletin,
Vol. XIX (1922), pp. 540 ff.Koffkahas introducedthese concepts in discussing
quite differentproblems.
25 Cf. Gelb, loc. cit., p. 411.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
of brightness, is, so to speak, but silentlyeffective.

The subject acts under
the imperativesof its silenteffectiveness, withoutdisengagingand appre-
hendingthe factorof the brightnessas to.the role whichit actually plays
forthe experienceof concretecoherence.When, on the otherhand, speci-
mina are assortedwith referenceto brightnessas point of view and prin-
ciple of classification,theremay again occur,at the outset,an experience
of concreteagreement.Here, however,the subject does not merelyex-
perience concretecoherence,but proceeds fromthat experiencetoward
disengagingthe factorwhichis constitutiveforthat very experience.Ap-
prehendingthe concreteagreementas foundedupon equalityofbrightness,
the subject disclosesthe factorof brightnessin its effectiveness and may
then choose the factorthus thematizedas principleof classification.The
difference is betweenconcretecoherencefoundedin fact on brightnessand
concretecoherenceexplicitlyrecognizedand apprehendedas thus founded,
betweenthe factorof brightnessactually effectiveand the thematization
of that factorin its determinantrole. Previously26 we mentioneda certain
detachmentfromexperiencedsituationsas prerequisiteto the adoptionof
the "categorial" attitude.Such detachmentpermitsthe normalpersonnot
merelyto experiencethe actual situationand to undergothe effectiveness
of operatingfactors,but also to explicatethe givensituation,to apprehend
and thematizeeffective factors,and, eventually,to orienthis actionswith
respectto factorsthus'renderedexplicit.Reduced as the patients are to
passivelyacceptingexperientialsituationsin theiractualityand to acting
only under theirdirectinducements,explicationand thematizationhave
become operationsimpossibleforthemto perform.
If Gelb and Goldstein'spatient Th., who had an excellentcapacity of
visualization,foundno difficulty at all in choosinga specimenwhosecolor
matchedthat of an object pointedout or mentionedto him,it is because
the "categorialattitudeis not requiredforthat purpose.Evokinga mental
image of the object in question,all the patient had to do and did in fact
was to selecta specimenwhose colorwas experiencedby himto be in con-
creteaccordancewiththat of the object.27Normal personsdo not act dif-
ferentlywhentheyare confronted withthe same task.
Requiredto sortout speciminaofthesamecoloras thatofa certainobject,
we select,likethepatient,veryfewshadesonly,viz.,thoseas exactlyfitand
concretelycoherewiththe colorofthe object. Asked,e.g., to pointout the
colorofblood,we do not accept a pinkspecimen,not any morethana green
one. Actual mental visualizationof the object in questionis not even in-
dispensable for the accomplishmentof the task under discussion.28 The
selectionmay and, more oftenthan not, does take place on the basis of
26 Supra, pp. 178f.
27 Cf. Gelb and Goldstein, loc. cit., I ?2.
28 Id., ibid.,pp. 135f.
mere recognitionof a specimenas fittingwith the color of the object, no

mentalimage of the latterbeing evoked. What is important,and is alone
important,is the occurrenceof the immediately"intuitiveexperienceof
fittingness"("das anschaulicheErlebnis des Passens"), whetheron the
basis of visualizationor mere recognition.It is obviouslywith respectto
onlyveryfewspeciminathatthementionedexperiencetakes place, whereas
otherspeciminaof the same hue, but of brightness,saturation,and other
chromaticpropertiesdifferent fromthose of the object in questionappear
inappropriateand incongruous.Under certain circumstances,in the face
of certaintasks,normalpersonsalso adopt the "concrete"attitude.When,
however,we are given the assignmentto assort samples of the same hue
as a certainspecimenof reference, we selectall speciminaas fallunderthe
class representedby the specimenof reference.Preventedfromadopting
the "categorial" attitude,Th. resortsto the same procedurewith respect
to eithertask. Hereinreappearsthe difference betweenthe behaviorof the
patientand that of normalpersons.29
Finallywe have to mentionthe interpretation whichGelb and Goldstein
give of the affectionsof speech proper.Since these affections are the most
conspicuoussymptomsin amnestic aphasia, older theoreticianshad ex-
plainedthe latterby a deficiencyofwords,at least by a considerablediffi-
cultyon thepart ofthepatientsto findcertainwords.Againstthisexplana-
tion, Goldsteinpoints out that the very same words which the patients
are unable to findundercertaincircumstances are spontaneouslyand easily
utteredunder different circumstances.30 Whetheror not a certainword is
foundby a patientdoes notdependupon theworditself,but uponthemean-
ing with whichthe word is to be used in a concretesituationof speech.3"
Color-nameslike "red," "blue," etc., do not designateindividualand par-
ticular chromaticphenomenain all theirsingularity;they ratherdenote
classes or categoriesof colors. It is with this categorialmeaningthat the
subject has to use the termsin questionwhenhe is asked to name a color
shownto him or to point out a colorto whicha givenname applies. Since
patients suffering fromamnesia of color-namesare not able to consider
a given color as representativeof a class of colors,wordswhose significa-
tions are of an as predominantly conceptualnatureas is the case of color-
names, have lost all meaningforthem.32The inabilityof the patients to
29 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,p. 150.
30 Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 471 ff.;cf. also pp. 449 f.
31 As to thisview,firstadvocatedby H. Jackson,cf. Cassirer,loc. cit.,pp. 245 ff.
32 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit., I ?5; Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 411 f.; Goldstein,loc. cit.,
pp. 475 ff.The preeminently eideticsignification of color-namesalso appearsin that
mentioning the correctcolor-name, evenits utteranceby thepatient himself,hardly
producesany effectin contradistinction to cases of amnesia of names of objects
(Gelb and Goldstein loc.cit.,pp. 184ff.;Goldstein,loc.cit.,pp. 487if.). This notonly
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S
use wordswhichhave an essentiallyeideticsignification and theircharacter-

istic behaviorin assortingcolor-specimina thus appear, accordingto Gelb
and Goldstein,as twomanifestations ofthesame fundamentalmodification,
viz.,regressionfromthe "categorial"to the "concrete"level. Neithermani-
festation,however,mustbe consideredas the cause of,or in any sense pri-
marywith respectto, the other.Both must be regardedas coordinateto
each otherand must equally directlybe referred to the fundamentalmodi-
ficationof attitude.
WhenTh. speaks ofcolors,he oftenuses expressionsas "grassy" (grassar-
tig"), "like a cherry" ("kirschartig"),-"like a violet" ("veilchenartig"),
etc.33Of anotherpatientGoldsteinreportsthat she consistently used color-
names like "red," "green," etc., with referenceto only a few determinate
shades, mostlyhighlysaturated ones. As to othershades, the mentioned
termsdid not apply; in theirstead, the patienthad expressionslike "dark
yellow" ("jaune fonq6"),"brightblue" ("bleu clair"), "leaf-green"("vert
feuille"), or "fashioncolor" ("couleur mode"), "spring color" ("couleur
printanibre"),etc.34If inferencesfromthe verbal formulationsof the pa-
tients to their chromaticexperiencesare warranted,one mightpresume
that colorsdo not appear to the patientsas "pure qualities" but as attri-
butes and propertiesof objects,in attachmentto and adherencein objects.
Tendenciesto designatecolorsafterobjectshave also been observedamong
primitivepeoples.35We furthermore referto the thesis of Pradines who
asserts the priority,fromthe genetic,especially the phylogeneticpoint
ofview, of colorsas well as sounds as essentiallyrelatedto agentsand ob-
jects over colors and sounds divested of objective significanceand thus
giventhe status of "pure qualities."36Accordingto Pradines, "pure qual-
ities" are no primarydata, not even data at all, but ratherproductsof
mentaloperationsby means ofwhichthe realm of sensibilityis surpassed.
It thus seemsthat theirreductionto the "concrete"level of behaviorand
leads to the question,discussedby Gelb and Goldstein,as to whetherall termsWhich
are of generalapplicabilityhave by this verytokena genuineeideticsignification;
it also gives rise to the problemas to whetherthere are e1657 with referenceto all
objects, of whateverkind and description,and to all properties,attributes,char-
acters, etc., of any objects. In the presentcontext,we must confineourselvesto
notingthat a problemdebated in Platonismas well as in platonizingphilosophies
(e.g., that ofMalebranche)also arises out of a merepsychopathological discussion.
33Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 133f.; Goldstein,loc. cit.,p. 476.
34Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 480 f. and 483 f. As to both denominating and assorting
colors,the patientexhibitedthe symptomsof amnesticaphasia.
36 Cf. D. Katz, Der Aufbauder Farbwelt(Leipzig, 1930),pp. 4 f.; Cassirer,loc.
cit.,pp. 265ff.;and also the remarksby Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,p. 134.
36M. Pradines,Philosophiede la Sensation,Vol. I (Paris, 1928),Livre I, chap.
IV; cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, Ph~nomenologie de taPerception(Paris, 1945),p. 352,
who distinguishesbetween"couleur-fonction" and "couleur-qualitd."
attitudepurportsforthe patientsthe inabilitynot onlyto considera given

color as memberof a class, i.e., to perceivethe color with referenceto a
species,but also to severthe relatednessof the colorto some object whose
propertyand attributeit is. Such severanceis necessaryforthe conception
of a purelyqualitative order,i.e., an orderin whichcolorsfigureas mere
chromaticphenomena,as "pure qualities," detachedfromobjectsto which
they adhere. We thus venturethe hypothesisthat if patients,reducedto
the "concrete"attitude,speak of colorsin termsimplyingessentialrefer-
ence to objects,it is because theirconfinement to acceptingactual experi-
ence in all its concretenesspreventsthemfromperforming mental opera-
tions upon the data of experience,in the case under discussion,divorcing
colors fromthe objects whose attributesthey are and thus experiencing
the colors as pure chromaticphenomena,with the exception,perhaps,of
the limitingcase of identityof shades or similarityto such high degreeas
bordersupon identity.The propoundedconceptionof colors as originally
and primarilyattributesof objects also makes understandablethe fact
previously37 pointedout that evennormalpersonsdo not adopt the "cate-
gorial" attitudewhen they are requiredto assort speciminawhose color
matchesthat of some object mentionedto them. Under the conditionsof
the assignment,the color reassumesits primaryfunction;it is perceived
withreference to some object; it is experienced,so to speak, as an envelope
ofthe latterwhichin a certainspecificmannerannouncesitselfin the very
chromaticexperience.A closerexaminationofthe phenomenalimpliedness
and involvementof objects in colorsor, forthat matter,in sounds,cannot
be attemptedhere.It has its place withinthebroaderframeofthe phenom-
enologyof perception.
III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF IDEATION
ofHusserl's and Gelb-Goldstein's

a. Convergence views
Husserl's distinctionbetweenequality in the categorialsense and sen-
suous equalityappears,in the lightof Gelb-Goldstein'stheory,as a special
case ofthe distinctionbetweenacts whichare performed in the "categorial"
attitude and those which belong to the "concrete".attitude. We cannot
here discussthe questionas to whetherand, ifso, in whichsense,the same
holds forHusserl's distinctionbetweenmultiplicitiesapprehendedthrough
acts of genuineexplicitcolligationand multiplicitieswhichin very sense-
experienceare perceivedas such by means of "figuraleMomente." Sensu-
ous equality, as previouslymentioned,38 is counted by Husserl among
"figuraleMomente." When we speak of the distinctionbetweensensuous
and categorialequality as of a special case of that between "concrete"
37 pp. 183 f.
38 P. 175.
and "categorial"acts,it is becausethelattertwoconceptscomprise much

morethanthephenomena which,forthesakeofthediscussion, had to be
emphasized in thepresentcontext.
Guidedin hisassorting ofcolor-specimina by theexperience ofconcrete
agreement, coherence, andaccordance, i.e.,inHusserl'sterminology, bythe
experience of sensuousequalityto the highestpossibledegree,Gelb and
Goldstein's patientsproveutterlyunableto conceiveof the relationship
ofequalityinthecategorial sense.Thisobservation ofGelband Goldstein's
bearsout ourpreviousconclusionas to the impossibility to accountfor
ideationby apprehension ofequality.39 BothHusserl'sand Gelb-Goldstein's
theories converge towards recognizing ideationas an actsui generis witha spe-
cificnatureofits own.Patientsofthekindhereconsidered have become
unableto perform acts ofideation,an inability whichalso appearsin that
color-names, whenusedinan eideticsense,haveno longeranymeaning for
them.It is thespecific actofideationthatrenders possibletheapprehension
ofa particularthingor of a plurality of particular thingswithreference
to, or undertheperspective ofan EdLOS.4O Amongthelatteracts,thereare
to be includedthosethrough whicha particular thingis conceivedof as
belonging to a classwhich,in turn,is constituted withrespecttoan EI6oS.
Husserl'sdistinctions and theoretical ideasfurther clarifyand complement
Gelband Goldstein's concepts.
Expounding Th.'sprocedure inassorting color-specimina andemphasizing
thedifference between thepatient'sprocedure andthatofa normalperson,
Gelb writes:"Rapprocher ... les teintes6galement claires,parcequ'elles
s'accordent en fait,-etque momentan6ment c'est ce rapprochement et
non tel autrequi s'impose-esttouteautrechoseque de connaitreces
teintesen tantqu'analogues par la clarte,puis de choisircettepropri6t6
commeprincipede classement."'4' This argument ofGelb'sis reminiscent
ofHusserl'sdiscussion ofthelogicalpresentation "all A." For thelatter
presentation to be conceived it is notsufficientto surveyinfactall A, even
ifthenumber oftheindividuals inquestionis finite. "WievieleEinzelheiten
wir. . . durchlaufen, und wie eifrigwirsie kolligieren m6gen,bestenfalls
wren, wenndie Ersch6pfung des Begriffsumfanges wirklich gelange,all
A vorgestellt, unddochwren nichtaile A vorgestellt, dielogische Vorstel-
lungwarenichtvollzogen."42 In bothGelb'sand Husserl'sarguments, ref-
erenceis madeto an operation ofconsciousness whichwe proposeto term
thematization, meaningherebydisengagement and disclosureof factors
whichpreviously to theoperation in questionarepresentto consciousness
39Pp. 175 f.
40 Cf. Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, II, ?1; cf. also Farber,loc. cit.,pp. 246f.
41 Gelb, loc. cit.,p. 411.
42Husserl,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 1, p. 173; of.also Farber,loc. cit. p. 268.
188 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
in a ratherimplicitform.In Gelb's example,the nature of thematization

is quite obvious. It denotesthe afore-mentioned43 transitionof the factor
ofequalityby brightnessfromthe state of silenteffectiveness in determin-
ing the phenomenalaspect of perceptionto the state of explicitapprehen-
sion. It is just this transitionwhich cannot be performedin the case of
amnesia of color-names.As to the example referredto by Husserl, it is
conceivablethat in proceedingfromone A to anotherand thus actually
exhaustingthe extensionof the concept,the experiencingsubject is not
aware at all ofhis coveringall A. Undertheseconditions,thereis no thema-
tization,not any morethan a motivationto formthe logical presentation
all A. We therefore considerthe case in whichat the end ofhis surveythe
subject is aware of all A havingbeen covered.Still the logical presentation
all A cannotbe conceived,the totalityof the A cannot be explicitylyap-
prehendedand stated,unless the mentionedawarenessis renderedexplicit
and thematized,ratherthan accompanying,in an implied and involved
form,the act of consciousnessexperiencedin the finalphase of the survey.
To both the apprehensionof logical formsand the processof ideation,the
operationof thematizationprovesessential.44 Concernedwithideation,we
have to assignto the operationofthematizationits systematicplace within
the whole of the processof ideation.
b. The problemof theperceptualbasis ofideation

To obtain an idea of the phenomenalaspect which the heap of color-
speciminapresentsto theirpatient,Gelb and Goldsteinhad a fewnormal
personsmove the specimenof referenceforthand back over the heap.45
These observerswereinstructedto look at theheap as passivelyas possible
and especially to refrainfromplacing themselvesat a point of view or
Speciminaidenticalwith,or extremely
adoptinga principleofclassification.
similarto the specimenof referenceappear in concreteaccordance and
coherencewith the latter.When there are no identical or highlysimilar
specimina,the heap sometimespresentsan aspect of instability,fluctua-
tion, unrest and agitation. Incipient contexturesbetween color-samples
are formedand dissolved almost at once. Differentgroupingsof color-
speciminaconflictwitheach other.Experiencesof concreteagreementand
accordanceofvarious descriptionscompetewith,and supersedeupon each
43 Cf. supra,pp. 182ff.
44 As to the apprehensionof logical forms,cf. Husserl, Formaleund Transzen-
dentaleLogik, pp. 69 f. Husserl's operationof "nominalization"(Log. Unt.,Vol.
II, V, ??35 f. and Ideen zu einer reinenPhanomenologie und phdnomenologischen
Philosophie(referred to hereafteras Ideen) ??119ff.,134,148) seems to us a special
case ofthatofthematization.
45 Gelb and Goldstein,ibid., pp. 151ff.
other.It is moreor less underthisphenomenalaspect that Gelb and Gold-

steinpresumetheheap ofcolor-specimina to appear to theirpatient.When,
however,underthe influenceof a givenassignment,e.g., that to assort all
red specimina,the normalpersonabandonshis heretofore passive attitude,
the instabilityand agitationof the heap of color-specimina, the vacillation
of conflictingcontextures,the alternation between and fluctuationof
inchoate groupings,dissolved almost as soon as formed,etc., all at once
give way to a reorganizedperceptualfield.All red speciminaacquire pre-
dominanceand emergefromthe rest which in turn formsa more or less
irrelevantbackground.Since the organizationand groupingof colors is
not immaterialto the phenomenalappearanceofthe latter,Gelb and Gold-
stein conclude that their patient's experienceof colors differsfromthe
chromaticexperiencewhich the normal person has, when he adopts the
"categorial"attitude.46 In Gelb and Goldstein'stheory,the behaviorofthe
patient is not interpretedas a mereintellectualdeficiency, viz., the loss of
the ability to subsume perceivedcolors under categories,while the very
perceptualexperienceof colorsremainsunaltered,i.e., is with the patient
the same as withnormalpersons.Merleau-Ponty47 sees hereinthe "existen-
tialist" ratherthan "intellectualist"characterof theirtheory:". .. l'acti-
vite categoriale,,avant d'6treune pens6e ou une connaissance,est une cer-
taine manibre se rapporterau monde, et correlativement
de un style ou
une configuration 1'experience."Accordingly, le troublede la pensee
de ". . .
que l'on decouvreau fondde l'amnesie. . . concernemoinsle jugementque
le milieud'exp6rienceoAle jugementprendnaissance,moinsla spontan6ite
que les prisesde cettespontaneitesurle mondesensibleet notrepouvoir de
figurer en lui une intentionquelconque."
Emphasizingthe difference between the chromaticexperienceof their
patient and that of a normal person adopting the "categorial" attitude,
Gelb and Goldsteinstill seem to admit, at least in theirarticle on "Far-
bennamenamnesie,"that thereis hardlyany difference betweenthe chro-
maticexperience of the patient and that ofa normalperson,providedtheTat-
teradopts the "concrete" attitude.This is borneout by Gelb and Goldstein's
explanation of the failure to detectanomaliesin the chromaticperception
of their patient by means of certainophthalmologicalmethods.48 What is
examinedby the methodsin questionis but the experienceofhomogeneity
and inhomogeneity betweencolors.For that experience,the adoptionofthe
"categorial" attitude is not required.To the extentto whichthe normal
person perceivescolors in a mere intuitive,i.e., "concrete," attitude,his
chromaticexperienceis not assumedby Gelb and Goldsteinto differsub-
46 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,p. 162.
47 Merleau-Ponty,
loc. cit., pp. 222 ff.
48 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 161f.
stantiallyfromthat oftheirpatient.Yet in an articlewrittensubsequently

to that on "Farbennamenamnesie,"Gelb cautionsagainstassimilatingthe
perceptionof the patient to that which the normal person has when he
adopts the "concrete" attitude.49From the fact that the normalperson
may,and withrespectto certaintasks,does adopt the "concrete"attitude,
the conclusionmust not be drawn that the patient experiencesand acts
likethenormalpersondoes in the "concrete"attitude.Whereasthepatient
is reduced and confinedto the "concrete" attitude,the latteris with the
normalpersonbut one phase of a more comprehensiveprocess,it is inte-
grated into a total process of experiencewhich also comprisesphases of
"categorial" attitude,of detachmentand contemplationfroma distance.
In the lifeof the normalperson,the "categorial"and "concrete"attitudes
-the latter moreimmediateand direct,more "manual"-fecundate each
otherand it is fromthis integrationinto the total process of experience
that eitherderivesits fullmeaningand significance.
Gelb's remarks,it seems to us, mustnot be construedto mean that the
integration in questionis but a factascertainableby an onlookingobserver,
and not by the experiencingsubject himself.On the contrary,we submit
that a perceptionexperiencedin the "concrete" attitudeappears in itself
as integrableinto a widercontext,is descriptively characterizedas a phase
of a more comprehensive process.For a perceptionthus to presentitself,
it must include a specificphenomenal tinge or featureby means of which
a moreencompassingcontextis referredto, through which the possibility
of the "categorial" attitudeis somehowpreannounced and anticipatedin
the very perceptionexperienced in the "concrete" attitude.
To formulatemore preciselywhat we mean by the inclusionin an act
pertainingto the "concrete" attitude of a possible "categorial" attitude,
let us proceedby way of contrast.Confinedto abidingby perceptualdata
as theyactuallypresentthemselves,thepatientcannotexperiencesuch data
except in that organizationalformin whichthey imposethemselvesupon
him.If,as in the case ofa heap ofcolor-sampleswhichcontainsno identical
or highlysimilarshades, the perceptualfieldexhibitsno unambiguously
determinedorganization,the fieldappears unstable and fluctuatingwith
conflicting groupingssupersedingeach other.The normalperson,on the
contrary,may adopt the "categorial" attitude,and imposeupon the per-
ceptual fieldan organizationalformwhich that fielddoes not possess in
its own right.He may even imposeupon the fieldvaryingformsof organ-
ization accordingto different pointsof view. As we have seen,50the per-
ceptual fieldaccepts organizationalformsdeterminedby the point ofview
at which the subjectchoosesto place himself.
49Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 413 ff.
50 Pp. 188 f.
CONCEPTSOF ATTITUDE
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S 191
In the perceptionofthe normalperson,thereis then a certainreadiness

to receiveformsof organizationimposedfromwithout,a. certainambiguity
and plasticitywhich are in marked contrastto the rigiditycharacteristic
of the perceptionof the patient. To the normalperson'smind,the things
perceiveddo not appear as mereactual data and facts,as they do to the
patient,but rather,withoutin the least being divestedof theircharacter
of real thingsgiven in actual experience,as eventualexamples,as potential
varietiesof an invariant.Even whenthe normalpersondoes not adopt the
"categorial" attitude,his perceptionis not mere perceptionin a "pure"
state,but,we tentativelysubmit,is pervaded and permeatedby some con-
sciousness or awareness of possibilities,of possible referenceto a non-
perceptualorder.Such consciousnessof possibilitiesdoes not necessarily
exist in an entirelyexplicitand distinctstate; more oftenthan not it as-
sumesthe formof greaterorlesserinarticulation, latency,and implicitness.
The referenceis, especiallyin the lattercase, to the realm of possibilities
as suchratherthanto any specifiedpossibility.To a greaterorlesserdegree
of implicitness,the perceptualexperienceof the normalpersonis oriented
withrespectto non-perceptualordersand possibilitiesso that, even when
a thingis perceivedin itselfand forits own sake, withoutactual reference
to a conceptualorder,it still is experiencedas referableto such an order;
even when it is not perceivedas an example,it still appears as thus per-
ceivable.All perceptual-experience is encompassedby the horizonof an at
least potential consciousnessof possible non-perceptualperspectives.In
everyperceptionexperiencedin the "concrete" attitude,thereis implied
a more or less vague, indistinct,and inarticulateconsciousnessof and
referenceto a possibletransitionto the "categorial" attitude.It is by the
plasticityin the sense as just sketchedthat experienceswhichthe normal
personhas, whenhe happensto adopt the "concrete"attitude,seem to us
to differsubstantiallyfromthose of the patientwho by virtueof the pro-
foundmodificationwhichhe has undergoneis confinedto the "concrete"
attitude.
c. The operationof "freevariation"
Already in LogischeUntersuchungen Husserl mentionsthe operationof
"freevariation." To be sure,in LogischeUntersuchungen, the operationin
question is not introducedin orderto account forthe apprehensionand
phenomenologicalconstitutionof e'Ch, but ratheras a method forestab-
lishinga priorilaws betweened6l,as, e.g., between the e6os of color and
that of extension.5'In the very performanceof "free variation," certain
limitationsbecomeapparentwhichthe operationunderdiscussionis bound
to respect.Eidetic laws a prioriare formulations
ofsuch limitations.Start-
61Husserl,,Log. Unt.,Vol. II, III, chap. I; cf.Farber,loc.cit.,chap. xA.
ing,e.g., froma coloredsurface,we may imaginethe surfaceto vary arbi-

trarilyas to size and shape, and still the color remainsunaltered.When,
however,we go as faras imaginingthe size of the surfaceto decreaseuntil
the extensionvanishesaltogether,we see that the colorvanishesas well.52
Color and extensiondo not coexistmerelyaccidentally.It appears fromthe
mentalexperimentby way of "freevariation"that no instanceofcolorcan
exist except in connectionwith an instanceof extension.By virtueof an
eideticlaw a priorithereis an essentialand necessaryrelationshipbetween
color and extension.Because this relationshipis foundedon the very e'Z3r,
of extensionand color,it extendsto everyinstanceof eitherJ13os.
Even whenit startsfromsome actual experience,the operationof "free
variation" leads-of necessity,as we shall presentlysee-to formswhich
are not and have not been given in actual experience,whichforempirical
reasonswill, perhaps,neverbe actually experienced.Since eideticscience
in not interestedin mattersof fact,but in possibilities,the eventualexist-
ence or inexistenceof formsarrivedat in the process of "freevariation"
is of no relevancywhatsoever.53 Geometry,whichis an eidetic science it-
self,sets the example. Arbitrarilymodifying passingfromform
his figures,
to formby way ofcontinuoustransformations, the mathematicianis not in
the least concernedwiththe questionas to whetheror not the productsof
his geometricalimaginationcorrespondto somethingin empiricalreality.
To assure the geometricalvalidityof these formsit-Isboth necessaryand
sufficient that they may be contrivedin the process of "free variation"
orientedin a certaindirection.In othereidetic fields,the situationis not
different.Setting out to disclose the eltlos"material thing,"we may be
led to considergoldenmountainsand wingedhorses.As faras theirfunc-
tionas exemplifications of the d~os in questionis concerned,the mentioned
productsof the fancyare no more and no less valid possibilitiesthan are
stones and trees given in actual experience.54 Since 'Lanare exemplified
in factsof actual experienceas well as in creationsof the imagination,the
operationof "free variation" is not bound to start fromreal existents.
Products of the imaginationmay serve as starting-points as well.55At
any event, whatever its starting-point, the operation of "free variation"
62 This argumenthas been advanced by C. Stumpf,Ueberden psychologischen
UrsprungderRaumvorstellung (Leipzig,1873),pp. 112fF.Taking overthe argument,

Husserl (Log. Unt.,Vol. II, III, ??4 ff.),presentsit in an ontologicalratherthan
psychologicalsetting.
53Cf. Husserl,Ideen, ??4,7, 70; MeditationsCartesiennes, sect. 34.
54Id., Ideen,?149.
55Id., ibid., p. 12, (Wir) "konnen... ., ein Wesenselbst und originarzu erfassen,
von entsprechendenerfahrendenAnschauungenausgehen, ebensowohlaber auch
von nicht-erfahrenden, nicht-daseinserfassenden,vielmehr'bloss einbildenden'An-
chauungen."'-
GELI3-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE 193
must lead to, and pass through,merelyimaginaryforms.Otherwisethe

processwouldbe confinedto actualitieswhichformbut a subclass ofpossi-
bilities,whereasit is the verypurposeof the processof "freevariation"to
yield a survey of what is possible in a certaindomain, regardlessof its
actualizationin empiricalreality.Imaginationthus provesthe "organ" of
eideticknowledge.56 The processof "freevariation"by meansof whichnot
only eideticlaws and relationsbetweenel'a are established,but e'7f them-
selves are apprehendedand constituted,is carriedout in imagination.
If the processof "freevariation" leads to the constitutionof EL67, it is
because certainfeaturesand structuresproveto remainunalteredthrough-
out theprocessin question.Startingfroma musicalsound,whetheractually
experiencedormerelyimagined,we engendera seriesofauditoryphenomena
whichoriginatefromeach otherby way of variationand transformation.
All membersofthe seriesprovecongruentin a certainrespectby whichthe
membersof the mentionedseries differfromthe membersof that series
whichwould have been engendered,ifwe had startedfroma colorand ap-
plied to it the process of variation and transformation. Throughoutall
varietieswhich are encounteredin the very process of "free variation,"
there appears an invariantgeneralform,an invariantstructure exhibited
by everymemberoftheseries.Different as themembersin questionare from
each otherand mustbe on accountoftheirorigination, theyall exhibitcon-
gruityas to an invariantidenticalcontent.57 Congruitywithothermembers
of the seriesas to the invariantis the conditionforany memberto belong
to the seriesin question,the latterbeing conceivedas generatedby "free
variation"and transformation of a certainexemplar,e.g., a musicalsound.
Ideation reachesfinal completion withthedisengagement, disclosure,explicit
apprehension,briefly,thematization of the invariantin question.This in-
variant is the ltios,in the Platonic sense, to be conceived without any
metaphysicalconnotation.
Constitutedas an invariantwhich manifestsitselfin the very process
of "free variation," the ci1os presents itself in genuine apprehension as
e ePrt TroAXXv,i.e., in oppositionand therefore, in necessaryrelatednessto
a multiplicityof varietieswhich,howeverdiffering fromeach other,are
all actualizationsofthe same invariantform.58 The dtLosis apprehendedas
an identicalideal entityin contradistinction, and withreferenceto an in-
66 Cf. Fr. Kaufmann,"On Imagination,"pp. 372 f. in Philosophy and Phenomeno-

logicalResearch,Vol. VII (1947).
6 Husserl,Erfahrung und Urteil,?87 a and e.
58 Id., ibid.,?87c; Log. Unt.,Vol. II, 2, p. 162". . . gegenilber
derMannigfaltigkeit
von einzelnenMomenteneiner und derselbenArt, diese Art selbst,und zwar als
eineund dieselbevorAugenstehenkann ... wirwerdenuns ... auf Grundmehrerer
individuellerAnschauungender IdentitAtdes Allgemeinenbewusst.....
finitemultiplicityof possible varieties. Since the significanceof the eJaos

lies in that it is an invariantwithregardto all possiblevarietiesofa certain
domain,e.g., that of musical sound,the referencecan obviouslynot be to
those varietiesonlyas have actuallybeen consideredin a givenprocessof
"freevariation"which,like any processactuallyperformed, is by necessity
finite.Though the processis in fact brokenup aftera certainnumberof
steps,it is, however,carriedout withthe consciousnessthat it can be con-
tinuedad libitum.59 It is thisconsciousnessof a possible continuationthat
renderspossiblethe referenceof the eldos not only to the varietieswhich
have actually been taken into account,but also to more varieties to be
contrivedad libitum.The veryphenomenologicalconstitutionof the d1o ,
whichherewe can but roughlysketch,accountsforthe above-mentioned60
essential correlationbetween the elhosand its extensionas an infinitely
open class. It also appears that the extensionin questiondoes not comprise
real objects and their real properties,but rather pure possibilities,i.e.,
possible varietiesA6 If it is justifiedto speak of an empiricalextensionof
an ethos,and if eidetic relationshipshold, and hold even necessarilyand
a priori,formattersof fact,it is because everyreal occurrencemay, and
must,be consideredas a possiblevarietywhichhappens to be actualized.
By the same token,the distinction,upon whichwe previously62 insisted,
betweena class in the conceptualsense and a perceptualgroupingwhich
exhibitsthe "figuralesMoment" of, e.g. qualitative homogeneity,finds
hereits ultimatevalidation.
As alreadymentioned,the process of "freevariation" is carriedout in
imagination.All the formswhichoriginatefromeach otherby way oftrans-
formationand variation,play theirrolesas, and onlyas, possiblevarieties,
i.e., as possiblycontrivablein imagination.This holds withoutexception
foreverymemberof the seriesgeneratedin the processunder discussion.
It also holds forthe memberfromwhichthe processstarts,even whenthe
memberin question happens to be a real occurrence.For the process of
ideationto apply to an object givenin actual experience,the latterobject
mustbe subjectedto what Husserl occasionallycalls "eideticreduction."63
By eidetic reduction,the real existentis divested of its actuality,of its
existentialcharacter,its spatio-temporaldeterminationsfrom which it
59Id., Erfahrung und Urteil,?87b, "Es kommt... daraufan, dass die Variation
als Prozess der Variantenbildungselbst eine Beliebigkeitsgestalt habe, dass der
Prozess im BewusstseinbeliebigerFortbildungvon Variantenvollzogensei."
60 Cf. supra,p. 175.
61 Husserl,Erfahrung und Urteil,??90f.

62 Supra, pp. 175if.
63 Husserl, Ideen, p. 4. "Eidetic reduction,"it must be stressed emphatically,
oughtnot to be confoundedwithphenomenological or transcendental

reduction.
GELB-GOLDSTEIN'S CONCEPTS P ATTITUDE' 195
derivesits individualization,and also of all those charactersas accrue to

it on accountofits integrationintothereal world.A4 Every real existentcan
be regardedas an actualized possibility.Under the eideticreduction,the
fact of its actualizationis consideredas immaterialand, hence, is disre-
garded.What is encounteredas a matterof fact,is "irrealizec"; i.e., con-
sideredas to its imaginableness,and not as to its actuality;it is transformed
into a "pure possibility"among otherpossibilities.65 From the status of a
real existent,it is transferredto that of an example or exemplarlending
itselfto "freevariations" and thus becomingapt to functionas starting
point foran infinitelyopen series of possible,i.e. imaginable,varieties.66
Eidetic reductionis obviouslya necessaryconditionfora real existentto
play a role in ideation. Only possibilitiescan findinsertioninto a process
whose very purpose is to yield a surveyof what is possible in a certain
domain.
Recalling Goldstein'scharacterizationof the modification undergoneby
brain-injuredpersons,67 we can, in the lightof the resultswhichwe have
now attained,understandthe incapacityof the mentionedpatientsto per-
formany operationwhichinvolvesideation.Overwhelmedby the actuality
of factual experience,the patients in question are unable to conceive of
possibilities;theycannotimagineany actual experienceto be possiblydif-
ferentfromwhat is actuallyis.68In the case of the patients,the verypre-
conditionofideation,whichwe foundto be conceptionoffactsas actualized
possibilitiesand freevariabilityofthe latterin and by imagination,is not
realized. Expressingit in Kantian terms,Merleau-Ponty69speaks of an
affectionof productiveimaginationratherthan understanding("entende-
ment"). By its very structure,the perceptualexperienceof the patients
resistsbeing subjected to imaginationaloperations,processes,and trans-
formations.Thus we are broughtback beforethe rigidityin the perception
ofthe patientsin contrastwithwhat we tentativelydescribedas plasticity
in the perceptualexperienceof normalpersons.70When we referto psy-
chopathologicalfindings,it is because, by way of contrast,these findings
permitus to discloseconditionswhich,just on account of theirrealization
in the case ofnormalpersons,are likelyto be takenforgrantedand, hence,
64 Cf. Husserl,Ideen, ?2; Erfahrungund Urteil,?89.
65 Id., MeditationsCartesiennes,
pp. 59 f.
661d.,Erfahrung und Urteil,pp. 410 f.
67 Cf. supra,pp. 178ff.
68
We wish to stressthat the modificationin questionis not peculiarto amnesia
of color-namesalone. Impairmentof imaginationin the mentionedsense has been
observedby Gelb and Goldsteinon numerouspatientsexhibiting themostdiversified
symptoms.
(9 Merleau-Ponty,loc. cit.,p. 224.
70 Cf. supra,pp. 190f,
196 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
to be overlooked.The structureof perceptualexperience,proves,we sub-

mit,a necessaryconditionofideationand, therefore, an importantproblem
forthe phenomenology ofideation.It is to thisproblemthat we wishto call
attention.
ARON GURWITSCH.
BRANDEISUNIVERSITY.
EXTRACTO
Al establecersu teoria de la ideaciony mantenerla naturaleza especifica
y la irreductibilidad de los universalescomo objetos ideales, Husserl hubo
de distinguirentrela igualdad categorial,o sea la igualdad con referencia
a un puntode vista odbos, y la igualdad sensibleo inmediatamentepercep-
tiva y experiencial.La distincionde Husserl la confirmanplenamentelos
analisisde Gelb-Goldsteinsobrelos efectospsicol6gicosde las lesionescere-
brales,como se indica en el ejemplode un paciente que sufreamnesia de
los nombresde colores.
Gelb y Goldsteininterpretan los sintomasdel paciente como manifesta-
ciones de una reducciongeneral del nivel de la actitud "concreta." En
contrast con las personasnormales,las cuales pueden imponera sus cam-
pos perceptivosunas formasde organizationque aquellos no presentanpor
si solos, el pacientese limitaa una realidad perceptivesin mas, y tienela
incapacidad de concebirnada puramenteposible. Esto nos conduce a la
hipotesisde que la personanormal,inclusocuando adopta la actitud "con-
creta," experiment sus datos perceptivos,por lo menos implicitamente,
comoreferencias al reinode las posibilidadesy a los ordenesno perceptivos,
o sea como ejemplospotencialesy variantespotencialesde una invariable.
Sugerimosque la mencionadaestructurade la percepci6nnormalpermte
la operaciondel procesoimaginativede la "variacionlibre,"procesoal cual
Husserl consider una condicionfenomenologica necesariade la ideacion.

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International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Gelb-Goldstein's Concept of "Concrete" and "Categorial" Attitude and the Phenomenology of

Husserl's theoryof universalsas generalobjects and specificideal en-

Empiricistictheoriesdeny universalsas ideal entitiesand objects sui

eral termis predicatedofa particularthing,the meaningofsuchpredication

arrangementsof points and lines belonghere as well as the characteristic

constitutedand unifiedexcept with referenceto an d~os does obviously

Husserl's views have foundhithertounnoticedcorroborationby Gelb-

Particularlyinterestingand revealingwas the behaviorof the patient,

differencein hue notwithstanding. It goeswithoutsayingthatTh. some-

immediatelyinduced by the very experientialsituation,they always fail.

21 Gelb and Goldstein,loc. cit.,pp. 149ff.;Gelb, loc. cit.,pp. 409f.

by that experienceof concreteaccordancewhichprovesstrongerand more

uniformity, thephenomenon of concreteagreementis thespecificand distinc-

of brightness, is, so to speak, but silentlyeffective.

mere recognitionof a specimenas fittingwith the color of the object, no

use wordswhichhave an essentiallyeideticsignification and theircharacter-

attitudepurportsforthe patientsthe inabilitynot onlyto considera given

ofHusserl's and Gelb-Goldstein's

and "categorial"acts,it is becausethelattertwoconceptscomprise much

in a ratherimplicitform.In Gelb's example,the nature of thematization

b. The problemof theperceptualbasis ofideation

other.It is moreor less underthisphenomenalaspect that Gelb and Gold-

stantiallyfromthat oftheirpatient.Yet in an articlewrittensubsequently

In the perceptionofthe normalperson,thereis then a certainreadiness

ing,e.g., froma coloredsurface,we may imaginethe surfaceto vary arbi-

UrsprungderRaumvorstellung (Leipzig,1873),pp. 112fF.Taking overthe argument,

must lead to, and pass through,merelyimaginaryforms.Otherwisethe

66 Cf. Fr. Kaufmann,"On Imagination,"pp. 372 f. in Philosophy and Phenomeno-

finitemultiplicityof possible varieties. Since the significanceof the eJaos

61 Husserl,Erfahrung und Urteil,??90f.

63 Husserl, Ideen, p. 4. "Eidetic reduction,"it must be stressed emphatically,

oughtnot to be confoundedwithphenomenological or transcendental

derivesits individualization,and also of all those charactersas accrue to

to be overlooked.The structureof perceptualexperience,proves,we sub-

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