Dura Lex Sed Lex

(the law is harsh, but it is the law)

 The first duty of the judge is to apply the law ––whether it be wise or not, whether unjust
 provided that the law is clear, and there is no doubt
 It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor, to follow its mandate,
not to temper with it. What the law grants, the court cannot deny

If a Judge of a lower court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by the Supreme Court is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the
case in accordance with his personal view, he must first think that it is his duty to apply the
law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the land, and that any deviation from a principle laid
down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and
expenses to the litigants

(People vs. Santos, et al, 104 Phil. 560)

Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their
feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere –– clemency
from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court
cannot but apply the law

(People vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, Jan. 18, 1996)

Exemplar Cases
People v. Abano, G.R. No. L-57184-85, November 14, 1986
Lahom v. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
 LAHOM VS. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989
Petitioner: Isabelita S. Lahom
Respondent: Jose Melvin Sibulo (previously referred to as "Dr. Melvin S. Lahom")
Ponente: J. Vitug

Facts:
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took into their care, Isabelita's nephew,
Jose Melvin Sibulo, at the tender age of two. They filed a petition for adoption in 1971
and was granted on May 05, 1972. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." In December
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. The petition stated, among others,
the following:
a.) Respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his
death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented
by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to
charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
b.) Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo
originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
c.) Respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once
a year.
d.) That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, respondent all the more remained callous
and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.
e.) Respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
f.) In view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner and also knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of
Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent
to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason
there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.
 Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code."

In the RTC, the respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition contending
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner
asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested
under the regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family
Code. In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the petition was ordered dismissed citing Section
19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 which deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption
earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action.

Issues:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

Held:
1. No, it was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
2. Yes, matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to
nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. R.A. No. 8552 has
unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. DURA LEX SED
LEX would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with.
PEOPLE v ABANO
145 SCRA 555, G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986
Right against Self-Incrimination; Doctrine of Dura Lex Sed Lex

FACTS:
Eugenia Abano and Agripino Abano were married but had been separated for three years.
Eugenia stayed in the conjugal home in Balamban, Cebu with their two children while Agripino
lived with her paramour, Bienvenida Cumad, at the conjugal hut that was separated only by a
bridge from the Abanos' conjugal home. Eugenia allowed the cohabitation in the conjugal hut
because Agripino was "brave" and used to box and maltreat her whenever she objected the
cohabitation. Behind Eugenia's house was another hut occupied by Rodolfo, a son of Eugenia and
Agripino, and daughter-in-law, Concordia.

On February 7, 1980, Concordia saw Eugenia had dinner with medicine men, Eliseo Cabana and
Teofilo Cabana. Just before midnight, Concordia was awakened by Eliseo pulling her hair, and
with him was Teofilo. She was forced to accompany both men to Agripino's hut and in order to
draw Agripino out, she was instructed to say that her husband Rodolfo needed to be brought to
a doctor because of a stomachache. Agripino went out first, followed by Bienvenida, both were
hacked to death by Eliseo and Teofilo.

Eliseo and Teofilo revealed that it was Eugenia who hired them.

During the interrogation, without the presence of counsel throughout the process, Eugenia
testified that she only admitted everything the investigator said so that her daughter-in-law will
not be implicated and on the promise that she will not be included in the case instead making
her a witness for the prosecution.

Informations for parricide with murder were filed against Eugenia as principal by direct
inducement and double murder against Eugenia, Eliseo, and Teofilo. Lower court found that the
web of circumstantial evidence produced guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The instant case was
an automatic review of the decision.

ISSUE:

Are the rights of the accused had been properly protected when they made self-incriminating
statements?

RULING:

NO, but the circumstantial evidence still produced guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
inadmissibility in evidence of Eugenia's extrajudicial confession, notwithstanding, the Court finds
the "web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial court found sufficient for conviction, to have
remained unimpaired. Under Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. These requirements have been satisfied in the case
at bar.

The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How she must have suffered
during the three years that her husband lived with his paramour. The wound in her heart,
occasioned by the separation, never had a chance to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the
brazen and cruel behavior of her husband maintaining a love nest so near the abandoned wife.
Four hundred meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community
where the next-door neighbor may be housed at an even greater distance. It is indeed in cases
like this, that the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law becomes a painful task and the
maxim "dura lex, sed lex" makes its full impact felt. In view of the exceptional circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, the Court recommends executive clemency for Eugenia Abano.