(Applied Logic Series 15) Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Erich Peter Klement (Auth.), Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Erich Peter Klement (Eds.) - Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning About Knowledge-Springer Ne

Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge
APPLIED LOGIC SERIES

VOLUME 15
Managing Editor
Dov M. Gabbay, Department of Computer Science, King s College, Londen, U.K.
Co-Editor
John Barwise, Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN,
U.S.A.
Editorial Assistant
Jane Spurr, Department of Computer Science, King s College, London, U.K.
seOPE OF THE SERIES

Logic is applied in an increasingly wide variety of disciplines, from the traditional
subjects of philosophy and rnathematics to the more recent disciplines of cognitive
science, computer science, artificial intelligence, and linguistics, leading to new
vigor in this ancient subject. Kluwer, through its Applied Logic Series, seeks to
provide ahorne for outstanding books and research monographs in applied logic,
and in doing so demonstrates the underlying unity and applicability of logic.
The titZes published in this series are listed at the end of this voZume.
Fuzzy Sets, Logics and
Reasoning about
Knowledge
edited by
DIDIER DUBOIS
I.R.I.T., C.N.R.S.,
University ofToulouse-lll,
France
HENRI PRADE
I.R.I.T., C.N.R.S.,
University of Toulouse-lll,
France
and
ERICH PETER KLEMENT

Johannes Kepler Universität,
Linz, Austria
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

A C.I.P.·Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-5324-4 ISBN 978-94-017-1652-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-1652-9
Logo design by L. Rivin
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved

© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1999
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1999
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
CONTENTS
Editorial Preface ix
Dov M. Gabbay
Introduction: Bridging the Gap between Multiple-valued 1
Logics, Fuzzy Logic, Uncertain Reasoning and Reasoning
about Knowledge
Didier Dubois, Henri Prade and Erich Peter
Klement
Part I: Advances in Mutiple-valued Logics

The Poincare Paradox and Non-classical Logics 7
Ulrich Höhle
Propositional Fuzzy Logics based on Frank t-norms: A 17
comparison
Erich Peter Klement and Mirko Navara
AResolution-based Axiomatisation of 'Bold' Propositional 39
Fuzzy Logic
Stephan Lehmke
How to Make Your Logic Fuzzy: Fibred Semantics and The 51
Weaving of Logics
Dov M. Gabbay
Introducing Grade to Some Metalogical Notions 85
Mihir K. Chakraborty and Sanjukta Basu
Closure Operators, Fuzzy Logic and Constraints 101
Giangiacomo Gerla
vi
Part 11: Aigebraic Aspects of Multiple-valued Logics

Ulam Game, the Logic of MaxSat, and Many-valued 121
Partitions
Daniele Mundici
A Many-valued Generalisation of the Ultrapower 139
Construction
Costas A. Drossos
Gabriel Filters and the Spectrum of an MV-Algebra 151
Panagis Karazeris
Conditional States in Finite-valued Logics 161
Antonio Di Nola, George Georgescu and Ada
Lettieri
Conditioning on MV-algebras and Additive 175
Measures-further results
Siegfried Weber
Part 111: Advances in Approximate Reasoning
Toward Adequacy Conditions for Inference Schemata in 201
Approximate Reasoning:
The Case of the Rule of Syllogism
Siegfried Gottwald
Formal Theories in Fuzzy Logic 213
Vilem Novcik
A Note on Fuzzy Inference as Deduction 237
Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek
The Role of Similarity in Fuzzy Reasoning 243
Frank Klawonn
T-indistinguishability Operators and Approximate 255
Reasoning via CR!
Dionis Boixader and Joan Jacas
About Similarity-based Logical Systems 269
Francesco Esteva, Pere Garcia and Lluis Godo
CONTENTS vii
On Similarity-based Fuzzy Clusterings 289

Helmut Thiele
Part IV: Reasoning about Information and
Knowledge
Informational Representability: Abstract Models versus 301
Concrete Models
Stephane Demri and Ewa Orlowska
From Possibilistic Information to Kleene's Strong 315
Multi-valued Logics
Gert De Cooman
A Roadmap of Qualitative Independence 325
D. Dubois, L. Fariiias dei Cerro, A. Herzig,
and H. Prade .
Truth Functionality and Measure-based Logics 351
Luca Boldrin and Claudio Sossai
Logic Programs with Context-dependent Preferences 381
Gerhard Brewka
An Overview of Inconsistency-tolerant Inferences in 395
Prioritized Knowledge Bases
Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois and Henri Prade
Index 419
EDITORIAL PREFACE
We welcome Volume 15, Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge
on fuzzy and many-valued 10gics. The volume editors and contributors are from
among the most active front-line researchers in the area and the contents shows
how wide and vigorous this area iso There are strong scientific connections with
earlier volumes in the series.
I am confident that the appearance of this book in our series will help kindIe
the interest of more and more researchers from formallogic in the foundations of
fuzzy logic.
D. M. Gabbay
DIDIER DUBOIS, HENRI PRADE AND ERICH PETER
KLEMENT
INTRODUCTION: BRIDGING THE GAP

BETWEEN MULTIPLE-VALUED LOGICS,
FUZZY LOGIC, UNCERTAIN REASONING AND
REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE
The term 'Fuzzy Logic', although very well-known, is ambiguous as it
refers to several only loosely related concerns ranging from rule-based sys-
tem control to various multiple-valued logics. The most popular acception
of the term 'fuzzy logic' is generally not related to logic proper, since it is
primarily employed by control engineers that use fuzzy rule-based systems
like a sort of neural network capable of approximating non-linear functions.
However in the recent past, it has been stressed that fuzzy logic in the nar-
row sense can be envisaged from the point of view of logic provided that
fuzzy sets are considered as stemming from the multiple-valued logic tra-
dition. The relationship between multiple-valued logic and fuzzy sets had
been noticed by Moisil [1972] in the late sixties. At the same period, in
Eastern Germany, Klaua independently built up a multiple-valued set the-
ory (see Gottwald [1984] for an extensive bibliography of Klaua's papers).
The current trend relating fuzzy sets and multiple-valued logic actually
dates back to a seminal paper by Goguen [1969]. In this paper Goguen
insists on an algebraic structure he calls a 'closg' (for commutative lattice
ordered semi-group) and shows that the lattice-theoretical concept of resid-
uation can be generalized to operations other than the minimum. Following
Goguen's program, Pavelka [1979] has definitely anchored fuzzy logic in the
multiple-valued tradition, emphasizing a link with Lukasiewicz logic already
pointed out by Giles [19761. Since then, a large amount of work has been
carried out whose aim is to equip fuzzy logic with a syntactic component,
and several algebraic structures have been laid bare as potential candidates
for supporting fuzzy logics.
The aim of this book is to report on recent results pertaining to gen-
uinely logical aspects of fuzzy sets in relation to algebraic considerations,
to knowledge representation and common-sense reasoning. It proposes a
state-of-the-art glance at the current status of multiple-valued and fuzzy
set-based logics.
An intriguing state of facts is the almost non-existing role of multiple-
valued logic in Artificial Intelligence (AI). As of today there is very little
activity that lies at the intersection of both fields, if we except some very
limited use of three-valued logics in logic programming, natural language
processing, and non-monotonic reasoning. Perhaps one reason for this lack
D. Dubois er al. (eds.). Fuu;y Sets. Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 1-6.
© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
2 DIDIER DUBOIS, HENRI PRADE AND ERICH PETER KLEMENT
of interest in multiple-valued logic from AI is that in AI, the central prob-

lem is to represent incomplete knowledge and draw plausible condusions.
This problem is naturally addressed via logics of uncertainty, and modal
logics. Multiple-valued logics are not typically concerned with the issue of
incomplete information nor belief revision. They are tailored to the logi-
cal representations of statements about non-Boolean entities, propositions
involving variables that can take more than two values. On the contrary,
logics of uncertainty are supposed to express statements about an agent's in-
complete ability to know the truth status of standard Boolean propositions.
Thrner's [1984] survey book mentions three-valued logics in connection with
partial knowledge, and multiple-valued logics in connection with fuzzy logic.
However since then, non-monotonie logics, modallogics and temporallogics
have blossomed in AI, rather than multiple-valued logic as such.
Another reason for the lack of a multiple-valued logic tradition in AI is the
suspicion that a multiple-valued logic is a form of number-crunching device
that offends the taste of AI researchers for symbolic reasoning. Noticeably,
Zadeh's proposals for approximate reasoning patterns have encountered in-
difference or even hostility from mainstream AI in the past, and it is only
recently that fuzzy logic has become an official keyword for Artificial Intel-
ligence conferences. It is conjectured that Artificial Intelligence will become
more interested in multiple-valued logics once the specificity of the latter,
that is, a logicallanguage to speak about non-Boolean variables, is acknowl-
edged. However it seems to be not so easy to bring many fuzzy set scholars
back to AI, especially now that the 'Soft Computing' school sometimes
presents itself in opposition to symbolic AI.
This volume is an attempt to show that rigorous research in the frame-
work of fuzzy logic is taking place on topics that may be of interest to
researchers in Artificial Intelligence. Some rigorous formal systems for ap-
proximate reasoning about non-Boolean sentences are currently under study.
Some new forms of common-sense reasoning not so popular in Artificial In-
telligence, such as similarity-based reasoning and interpolative reasoning
seem to be naturally cast in the setting of multiple-valued logics. It is dear
that multiple-valuedness play an important role in such forms of reasoning.
One original feature of this volume is precisely to bring together an overview
of multiple-valued logics and their mathematical underpinnings, and a col-
lection of contributions on reasoning about vagueness, similarity, interpola-
tion, uncertainty, priority, and partial inconsistency. Moreover the volume
sheds light on the links between fuzzy sets and multiple-valued logics, in-
duding the question of devising a proper syntax for fuzzy logic. Lastly, it
offers improved communication between Logics of AI and Fuzzy Sets, whose
respective programs have many common concerns, while researchers in each
area usually do not publish in the same journals.
The book is divided in 4 sections that go from a review of multiple-valued
systems to issues in approximate and practical reasoning.
INTRODUCTION 3
The first section offers a glance at the purely logical side of fuzzy sets.
Hoehle gives an overview of multiple-valued logics based on triangular norms
that follows the tradition of Goguen. The main connectives are a non-
classical implication and a conjunction to which it is related via residuation.
Klement and Navara consider on the one hand a class of fuzzy logics with
the same syntax as classicallogics, namely a conjunction and an involutive
negation and on the other hand Lukasiewicz, Gödel and product logics (see
also [Hajek, 1998]) where the implication is also obtained via residuation,
and provides a rather complete comparison of the properties, advantages
and disadvantages of these two approaches. Altogether, the papers by Höhle
and by Klement and Navara provide the reader with an extensive overview of
multiple-valued logic systems. Especially it points out that while monoidal
logics, including Lukasiewicz, Gödel and product logics (see also Hajek,
[1998]); rely heavily on the notion of residuation in a lattice augmented
with a distinct conjunctive operation, it is also possible to found a multiple-
valued logic on a De Morgan algebra. The latter tradition goes back to
R. T. C. Lee's [1972] max-min fuzzy logic and the attempt to extend the
resolution rule to the multiple-valued case. Indeed clausal forms are easy
to define in max-min De Morgan logics. However the expressive power
of De Morgan logics seems to be rather limited except when it coincides
with Lukasiewicz logic. Lehmke lays the basis of an automated theorem
prover in Lukasiewicz logic, based on resolution. The difficulty here is to
find a proper clausal form, due to the lack of mutual distributivity on the
conjunction and the disjunction. Lehmke introduces an original notion of
layered normal form and a reasoning method based on refutation, which is
sound and complete.
The next three papers envisage fuzzy logics from a more general point
of view. Gabbay explains how a general principle of combining logics make
it possible to introduce graded truth assignments into any logic. The idea
is that properties of compound logics can be derived from the properties
of the component logics. In particular the combination of multiple-valued
logics with modal logics is envisaged. Two papers are devoted to the na-
tion of logical consequence in a multiple-valued truth setting, beyond the
particulars of specific systems. Indeed instead of starting from the syn-
tax, it is interesting to focus on the semantics of multiple-valued deduction.
Chakraborty and Basu investigate the properties of a graded consequence
relation, by extending Gentzen conditions for classical logic deduction. A
semantic counterpart is introduced based on a collection of states of affairs,
where astate of affairs is viewed as a set of formulas. The relation between
the two notions of consequencehood is studied. Lastly, other metalogical
notions such as degree of inconsistency are also investigated. Gerla con-
siders the notion of closure operator as a systematic way of computing the
degree of consequencehood of a formula. A set of valued formulas is viewed
as a set of constraints on a valuation, and the deduction problem consists
in exploiting these constraints to compute optimal bounds on the valuation

of formulas. This approach covers fuzzy logic in the Pavelka style as weH as
probabilistic, or possibilistic logics.
The second section pursues the study of a particular but very impor-
tant algebraic structure laid bare by the multiple-valued logic community:
MV-algebras [Chang, 1958]. Mundici investigates the problem of finding
whether a set of Boolean clauses contains a satisfiable subset of size at least
k, in the context of MV-algebras. To do so, the set of Boolean clauses
is turned into a formula in Lukasiewicz logic, interpreted as the result of
fusing unreliable information from several sources. This question is closely
related to Ulam games with lies, where aseries of questions is asked to a
possible liar, and leads to the MV-algebraic counterpart of a partition. The
other papers in this section are more mathematically oriented. Karazeris
proposes a topological investigation of MV-algebras. Drossos investigates
the connections between Boolean algebras, MV-algebras and probability
spaces, and more generally the dichotomy between quantitative and quali-
tative algebraic structures. Di Nola et al. explain how to canonically extend
a probability measure from a Boolean algebra to an MV algebra that con-
tains it. Weber investigates the problem of conditionals and conditional
probability in the MV algebra concept. There are two approaches: either
a conditional event is viewed as an interval in the MV-algebra; or the con-
ditional event is considered as a mean value of unconditional events. The
latter approach which makes no sense in a Boolean context seems to be
promising in the multiple-valued context.
The third section presents recent advances in syntactic and semantic as-
pects of approximate reasoning in the sense of Zadeh [1975; 1979]. Gottwald
examines formal conditions for chaining fuzzy rules represented by Cartesian
products, residuated implications and fuzzy clauses. Novak investigates the
links between a weighted extension of Lukasiewicz logic, often called fuzzy
logic in the narrow sense, and the semantic patterns of fuzzy inference such
as the generalized modus ponens proposed by Zadeh. His attempt aims at
casting popular approximate reasoning patterns inside a formal syntactic
framework. This is done by translating natural language statements into
sets of evaluated instances of formulas that represent intensions. A similar
question is addressed by Godo and Hajek. However they use a many-sorted
rational quantification logic and translate patterns of approximate reasoning
into sound deduction rules.
The four other papers of this section highlight the role of similarity in
approximate reasoning based on fuzzy sets. Klawonn explains that a family
of fuzzy sets necessarily underlies a similarity structure on the space where
these fuzzy sets are defined. He solves in the fuzzy case the problem of
constructing the coarsest algebra containing a given family of sets. Jacas
and Boixader reinterpret the compositional rule of fuzzy inference as a pat-
tern of analogical reasoning, by exploiting the extensionality property of the
INTRODUCTION 5
generalized modus ponens. This property expresses that similar premises

produce similar conclusions. Esteva et al. present axiomatic properties of
similarity-based inference and cast this type of reasoning in a multimodal
setting. Lastly, Thiele reviews the notion of fuzzy partition in the sense of
various kinds of similarity relations.
The last section deals with some forms of reasoning about data and knowl-
edge, that bear connections to the previous chapters, although sometimes
derived independently. Demri and Orlowska are concerned with the deriva-
tion of logieal information systems from data via concept formation tools.
Indistinguishability creeps into the picture under the form of similarity be-
tween pieces of data. The authors study the property of informational
representability from a formal point of view. Two papers consider the links
between multiple-valued logics and the modelling ofuncertainty, focusing on
what to do with the truth-functionality assumption in the non compositional
settings of uncertainty. De Cooman closely examines the resemblance and
differences between possibilistic logic and Kleene's strong multiple-valued
logics. It shows that the latter is only a conservative truth-functional ap-
proximation to the former. The lack of compositionality of possibility mea-
sures for the conjunction of events leads Dubois et al. to exploit it and
express notions of qualitative independence between propositions, as in-
duced by a possibility distribution. They show that the decomposition of
the possibility measure with respect to conjunction is not enough to express
ordinal independence, which is a directed notion and must rely on the no-
tion of conditioning. Five basie notions of independence and relevance are
laid bare. It is indicated that the language of independence is equivalent to
the language of belief revision in logical theories. Boldrin and Sossai pro-
pose a forcing technique that casts possibiIistic logie into a truth-functional
setting. The idea is to consider possibility distributions as informational
states where possibilistic formulas are true of false. Then the truth value
of a formula is the set of informational states where the formula is true.
Truth-functional connectives can be devised on such a basis. The underly-
ing algebraic structure, a Girard quantale, contains a Boolean algebra. In
standard possibilistie logie only the conjunction connective is introduced.
Their approach enable more connectives to be captured for the combination
of possibilistic formulas.
The last two papers deal with the handling of priorities in logic. While
many authors in multiple-valued logics consider fuzzy sets offormulas, where
the value attached to a formula is considered as a constraint on the truth
value of the formula, the priority view is basieally driven by the attempt
to cope with inconsistency in classieal logic. Brewka proposes an approach
to reasoning with prioritized knowledge in the framework of non-monotonie
logic programming, with application to legal reasoning. His approach ex-
tends the well-founded semanties of logic programs. It proposes a lan-
guage for representing legal statements and also for expressing priorities
among them as separate sentences. Benferhat et al. study various kinds

of inconsistency-tolerant inference methods in prioritized knowledge bases,
in connection with possibility theory. Several kinds of approaches are sur-
veyed: those where priorities help selecting a suitable consistent subbase of
an inconsistent set of formulas, those where several subbases are selected,
and lastly those which keep the belief base as is, but look for reasons to
believe and to disbelieve a conclusion.
This volume is based on talks given at the 1996 Linz Seminar on Fuzzy
Set Theory, devoted to Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Artificial Intelligence. It
was hosted by the Fuzzy Logic Laboratorium Linz, at the Bildungszentrum
Sankt Magdalena, Linz, Austria, February 20-24, 1996. This volume could
not have been put together without the support of the European COST
Action 15 'Multiple-valued Logics for Computer Science Applications' which
partially supported the participation of some contributors.
The editors also wish to thank Jane Spurr for her kindness, patience and
competent help in formatting the volume.
IRIT, Toulouse, France.
REFERENCES
[Chang, 1958] C. C. Chang. Aigebraic analysis of multiple-valued logics. 7hms Am.
Math. Soc., 88, 467-490, 1958.
[Giles, 1976] R. Giles. Lukasiewicz logic and fuzzy theory. Int. J. Man-Machine Studies,
8,313-327, 1976.
[Goguen, 1969] J. A. Goguen. The logic of inexact concepts. Synthese, 19, 325-373,
1969.
[Gottwald, 1984] S. Gottwald. Fuzzy set theory: some aspects of the early development.
In Aspects 01 Vagueness , H. J. Skala, S. Termini and E. Trillas, eds. pp. 13-30. D.
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984.
[Hajek, 1998] P. Hajek. The Metamathematics 01 Fuzzy Logics. Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht, 1998.
[Lee, 1972] R. C. T. Lee. Fuzzy logic and the resolution principle. J. ACM, 19, 109-119,
1972.
[Moisil, 1972) G. Moisil. La logique des concepts nuances. In Essais sur les Logiques
non-Chrysippiennes, pp. 157-163. Ed. Acad. Rep. Soc. Roum. Bucharest, 1972.
[Pavelka, 1979] J. Pavelka. On fuzzy logics. Part 1: Multiple-valued rules of inference. Z.
/ur Math. Logik und Grundladen der Math. 25, 45-52. Part 2: Enriched residuated
lattices and semantics of propositional calculi. Z. /ur Math. Logik und Grundladen
der Math., 25, 119-134. Part 3: Semantical completeness of sorne rnultiple-valued
propositional calculi. Z. /ur Math. Logik und Grundladen der Math. , 25, 447-464,
1979.
[Turner, 1984] R. Turner. Logics lor Artijicial Intelligence. Ellis Horwood, Chichester,
1984.
[Zadeh, 1975] L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy logic and approxirnate reasoning. Synthese, 30, 407-
428, 1975.
[Zadeh, 1979] L. A. Zadeh. A theory of approxirnate reasoning. In Machine Intelligence,
9,149-194. J. E. Hayes, D. Michie and L. 1. Mikulich, eds., Elsevier, New York, 1979.
ULRICH HÖHLE
THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL

LOGICS
INTRODUCTION
At various occasions H. Poincare emphasized that the physical continuum is not

transitive. In his popular books on Fondement de la Geometrie, La Science et
I'Hypothese and La Valeur de la Science (cf. [Poincare, 1902; Poincare, 1904])
he symbolized this situation by the following formulae
(1) A = B , B = C , A -I C
where he interprets the equality sign as indistinguishability-Le. A is indistin-
guishable kom B , B is indistinguishable kom C , but A might be very weIl dis-
cernible kom C . Poineare viewed this formula as a philosophical principle whieh
was not accepted by all of bis contemporaries (see e.g. E. Borel 's criticism). In the
meantime there exist a large variety of important examples indicating the validity
of formulae (1)-e.g. K. Menger's work on Positivistie Geometry (cf. [Menger,
1979]) or the whole field of Cluster Analysis. As a simple example we recall the
non-transitive, symmetrie and reflexive relation ~f describing the magnitude of
real numbers
(2) a b la - bl <
where € is a positive real number depending on the given system. In particular
we say that the real numbers a and b have the same magnitude if and only if
a ~f b holds.
Following the terminology proposed by K. Menger the formula (1) is also called
the Poincare Paradox.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the question wbieh systems of logical
axioms are compatible with the Poincare Paradox where compatibility means the
non-provability of the following well-formed formula
-.«x = y) /\ «y = z) /\ -.(x = z)))

(cf. Section 1). It is interesting to see that the intuitionistic logic is not eompatible
with the Poincare Paradox, while the Lukasiewicz (infinite-valued) logic and a
jortiori Girard's integral, commutative, linear logic are in fact eompatible with the
Poincare Paradox. Finally, we dose this paper with some models of the formalized
theory of identity and existence 'satisfying' the Poincare Paradox.
In order to have a fixed basis on wbieh we can start the logical discussion we
introduce the concept of monoidallogic.
7
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuu:y Sets, Logics anti Reasoning about Knowledge, 7-16.
8 ULRICH HÖHLE
1 MONOIDAL PREDICATE CALCULUS
In this section we recall axioms and inference rules of the monoidal predicate
calculus (cf. [Höhle, 1996]). Let .c be a fonnalized language of first-order and
{..." A, V, ~, ®} be the set of logical symbols. Tbe logical axioms of the monoi-
dallogic consist of the following axiom schemes 1
(Tt> «0: ~ ß) ~ «ß ~ 'Y) ~ (0: ~ 'Y))) (Syllogism Law)
(T2 ) (0: ~ (0: V ß»

(Ta) (ß ~ (0: V ß»
(T4 ) «0: ~ 'Y) ~ «ß ~ 'Y) ~ «0: V ß) ~ 'Y)))
(T5 ) «0: A ß) ~ 0:)
(T~) «0: ® ß) ~ 0:)
(T6) «0: A ß) ~ ß)
(T~) «0: ® ß) ~ (ß ® 0:»
(T7 ) (b ~ 0:) ~ « 'Y ~ ß) ~ b ~ (0: A ß))))
(Ts) «0: ~ (ß ~ 'Y» ~ «0: ® ß) ~ 'Y» (/mportation Law)
(T9 ) «(0: ® ß) ~ 'Y) ~ (0: -t (ß ~ 'Y))) (Exportation Law)
(TlO ) «0: ® ""0:) ~ ß) (Duns Scotus)
(Tu) «0: ~ (0: ® ""0:» ~ ""0:)

Further, we assume the usual quantifier axioms-i.e. for each fonnula 0: and tenn
r for which the individual variable v is free in 0: the following expressions are
axiom schemes
(VI) «Vv)o: ~ o:(v/r» (Universallnstantiation)
(EG) (o:(v/r) ~ (3v)0:) (Existential Generalization)
where 0:( v / r» denotes the result of replacing every free occurrence of v by r. As

rules of inference we apply Modus Ponens and the following quantifier rules
(V) From (0: ~ ß) infer (0: ~ (Vv)ß) provided v is not free in 0: .
(3) From (0: -t ß) infer «3v) 0: -t ß) provided v is not free in ß .
IThe associativity axiom (((0/ ® ß) ® 7) -+ (0/ ® (ß ® 7))) follows from (T~), (T~). (TB)
and (T9).
THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL LOOICS 9
The notion theorem is defined in the usual way. In particular,if a is provable, then
this situation is denoted by I- a .
It can be shown that the monoidal predicate calculus is sound and complete (cf.
Theorem 3.1.11 in [Höhle, 19961). Important special cases of the monoidallogic
are given in
REMARK 1 (Special cases).
(a) Ifwe add the lawo/idempotency
(a -+ (a ® a» (Law o/ldempotency)
to the logical axioms of the monoidallogic, then the logical symbols ® and A are
logically equivalent. In this case the monoidal logic reduces to the weIl known
intuitionistic logic.
(b) If we adjoin the law 0/ double negation and the law 0/ divisibility
(Law o/Double Negation)
«a Aß) -+ (a ® (a -+ ß))) (Law o/Divisibility)
to the axioms of the monoidallogic, then the weIl-formed formulas
(a®ß) and ...,(a -+ ...,ß)
and
(aAß) and (a ® (a -+ ß»
are logically equivalent, and the monoidal monoidallogic reduces to the (infinite
valued) lukasiewicz logic. In this context the system (T1)-(Tu ), (T~~), (T~;) is
equivalent to to the so-called Wajsberg axioms of lukasiewicz logic
(I) (a -+ (ß -+ a» (Affirmation 0/ the Consequent)
(11) «a -+ ß) -+ «ß -+ ,) -+ (a -+ I))) (Syllogism)
(III) «(a -+ ß) -+ ß) -+ «ß -+ a) -+ a)))

(IV) «...,a -+ ...,ß) -+ (ß -+ a» (Contraposition)
and the following defining axioms
(V) «a ® ß) -+ ...,(a -+ ...,ß» (...,(a -+ ...,ß) -+ (a ® ß»
(VI) «a V ß) -+ «a -+ ß) -+ ß» , «(a -+) -+ ß) -+ (a V ß»

(VII) «a A ß) -+ (a ® (a -+ ß))) «a ® (a -+ ß» -+ (a Aß».
10 ULRICH HÖHLE
In particular, if we replace (V)-(Vll) by the corresponding definitions, then the

symbols V, /\, ® can be deleted from the set of logical symbols, and the logical
axioms reduce to the Wajsberg axioms (I)-(IV).-
(c)Ifwe add the law of divisibility (T~~) and the algebraie strong de Morgan law
(T13 ) «0' --+ ß) V (ß --+ 0'» (Algebraie Strong De Morgan Law)
to the axiom of the monoidallogic, then we obtain the BL-logie (short for basic
many-valued logic) introduced by P. Hajek in [1996J. It can be shown that (T1 )-
(Tu), (T~~) and (T13 ) are equivalent to (Td, (T~), (T~), (Ts)-(Tll ), (T~~) and the
following axiom schemes:
(T~;') «0' ® (0' --+ ß» --+ (0' /\ ß»

(T~3) «(0' --+ ß) --+ ')') --+ «(ß --+ 0') --+ ')') --+ ')'»
(T~~) «0' V ß) --+ «(0' --+ ß) --+ ß) /\ «ß --+ 0') --+ 0')))
(T~~) ««0' --+ ß) --+ ß) /\ «ß --+ 0') --+ 0'» --+ (0' V ß»·
If we replace (T~; )-(T~~) by the corresponding definitions, then we can omit the
logical signs /\, V. Hence ., --+, ® are the basic logical symbols ofBL-logic.
It is weil known that the intuitionistic predicate calculus is sound and complete.
This result does not remain valid for Lukasiewicz logic. Referring to Scarpellini 's
result (cf. [Scarpellini, 19621) we know that the Lukasiewicz predicate calculus is
sound but incomplete. In order to overcome this difficulty we add an additional,
infinitary inference role
From (.0' --+ .(0' --+ (0' ,... --+ (0' --+ '0') .. .,.») for all nE N
...
n times
we infer 0'
to Lukasiewicz predicate calculus. This approach leads to a modijied version of
Lukasiewicz predicate calculus denoted by LPC·. Then LPC· is sound and eom-
plete (cf. Theorem 3.1.14 in [Höhle, 1996]). In particular, a well-formed formula
0' is provable whithin LPC· if and only if for all [O,lJ-valued interpretations 0'
attains the value 1 where the Lukasiewicz connections Tm and --+L are inter-
preted in the usual way
max(x +y - 1,0) , x --+L Y = min(1 - x + Y, 1).
2 FORMALIZED THEORY OF IDENTITY AND EXISTENCE
In various scientific fields identity (e.g. mathematical equations) or loeal existenee

(of particles) plays a fundamental role. Therefore we enrich the monoidal predicate
calculus in such a way that the set lP of predicate symbols contains always two
THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS 11
prominent predicates, namely a unary predicate symbol e interpreted as extent 0/

existence and a binary predicate symbol = reftecting the concept of identity.
The formalized theory J~ of identity and existence comprehends the axioms
and inference roles of the monoidal predicate calculus and the following axiom
schemes for identity and existence predicate
(lEI) «Tl = T2) -t (eh)" e(T2))) (Strictness)

(1E2) (e(T) -t (T = T)) (Rejlexivity)
(1E3) «Tl = T2) -t (T2 = Tl)) (Symmetry)
Further we require the following compatibility conditions w.r.t. n-ary functional
symbols f and n-ary predicate symbols p:
(1E4) (e(f(TI, ... , Ti, ... , Tn ) -t e(Ti)) ,

«Ti = Ti) -t (f(TI, ... ,Ti, ... ,Tn ) = f(TI, ... ,Ti, ... ,Tn ))
(IES) (p(Tl> ... ,Ti, ... ,Tn ) -t e(Ti)) ,
«e(Ti) -t (Ti = Ti)) -t (p(TI, ... ,Ti, ... ,Tn ) -t p(TI, ... ,Ti, ... ,Tn )))
REMARK2.
(a) The strictness axiom (lEI) reftects syntactically the philosophical principle
that IDENTITY implies EXISTENCE. The axioms (1E2) and (1E3) are self-
explanatory-e.g. reftexivity means that at least in its domain a particle is
identical with itself. Further the logical equivalence of e(T) and (T = T)
follows immediately from (lEI) and (lE2).
(b) It is not difficult to show that the axiom (IES) implies the transitivity of
the identity predicate = -i.e. = fulfills always the following important
axiom:
(Transitivity)
If we add a list A of additional axioms to the axioms of the monoidallogic (cf.

Remark 1), then this type ofnon-classicallogic is denoted by LA .
DEFINmON 3 (Compatibility with the Poincare Paradox). A non-classicallogic
LA is said to be compatible with the Poincare Paradox if and only if the following
formula
-.«(x = y) " (y = z» " -.(x = z))
is not provable within the formalized theory of identity and existence based on
LA.
THEOREM 4. The intuitionistic logic is not compatible with the Poincare Para-
dox.
The proof requires the following
12 ULRICH HÖHLE
LEMMA 5. Let a, ß', 'Y are well-formedformulas. Then

«(a 1\ ß) -+ 'Y) -+ ...,«a 1\ ß) 1\ ""'Y))
is provable within the intuitionistie logie.
Proof. We infer from (Tl), (T5 ), (T7 )-(Tg) :
I- « ( (a 1\ ß) -+ 'Y) 1\ (a 1\ ß)) -+ 'Y).
Referring again to (Tl), (T5 ) and (T7 ) we obtain
««a 1\ ß) -+ 'Y) 1\ «a 1\ ß) 1\ ""'Y)) -+ b 1\ ""'Y))
hence the assertion follows from (TlO ) and (Tu).

•
Proof [of Theorem 4]. The logical equivalence of the following formulas
«x = y) -+ «(y = y) -+ (y = z)) -+ (x = z))),

«(x = y) 1\ (y = z)) -+ (x = z))
is an immediate consequence from the law ofidempotency (cf. Remark l(a» and
the axioms (lEI), (T5 ), (Ts ), (T9 ). Hence Lemma 5 implies
I- «(x = y) -+ «(y = y) -+ (y = z)) -+ (x = z))) -+

-+ ...,«(x = y) 1\ (y = z)) 1\ ...,(x = z))).
Applying now the transitivity axiom (IE6) and Modus ponens we obtain the prov-
ability of ...,«(x = y) 1\ (y = z)) 1\ ...,(x = z)); hence the intuitionistic logic is
not compatible with the Poincare Paradox. •
THEOREM 6. Let lLc be the BL-logie (cf Remark lee»~ satisfying the law of
contradiction
«a 1\ ...,a) -+ (a @ ...,a)) (Law ofContradietion)
Then the non-elassieallogie lLc is not eompatible with the Poineare Paradox.
The proof is based on
LEMMA 7 (P. Hajek, 1996). The following well-formed formulas are provable
within lLc :
(i) (...,(a @ ß) -+ ...,(a 1\ ß))

(ii) «a -+ ...,a) -+ ...,a)
(iii) (...,a V ...,...,a) .
THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS I3
«
Proof. The formula -,(al8l ß) l8l (aI\ß» -+ (ß 1\ -,ß» is provable in the general
conceptofthe monoidallogic. Applying (Td and (T14 ) we obtain
r (( -,( a l8l ß) l8l (a 1\ ß» -+ (ß l8l -,ß»;
hence the relation (i) follows from (TlO ) and (Tn ). Because of (i) the formula
(-,(a l8l a) -+ -,a) is provable; hence the relation (ii) follows from (TB)-(Tn ).
Finally, we deduce the relation (iii) from (T~~» and (T~~). •
Proof [of Theorem 6] The provability of (((x = y) l8l (y = z» -+ ((y =
y) l8l (x = z))) follows from (T5 ), (T~), (TB), (T9 ), (T~~), (lEI) and (IE6); hence
r (-,((y = y) l8l (x = z» -+ -,((x = y) l8l (y = z))).
In particular (T~) implies r (.(x = z) -+ .((x = y) l8l (y = z))). Now we
invoke Lemma 7(i) and obtain
r (.(x = z) = y) 1\ (y = z))).
-+ .((x
Because of r (•• (x = z) -+ .(((x = y) 1\ (y = z» 1\ .(x = z))) we conclude
from (T4 )
r ((.(x = z) V .-.(x = z» -+ -.(((x = y) 1\ (y = z» 1\ -.(x = z)));
henceLemma2.6(iii)implies: r .(((x = y)I\(Y = z»I\-'(x = z» -i.e. lLc
is not compatible with the Poincare Paradox. •
THEOREM 8. The Lukasiewicz logic is compatible with the Poincare Paradox.
Proof. We consider the following [O,I]-valued model of the formalized theory of
identity and existence:
• Tm and -+L are the usual [0, I ]-valued interpretations
of the logical symbols 18l, -+ (cf. Section I).
• X = IR is the set of all real numbers.
• [X'Y]E 1 - min(~ 'Ix - yl, 1)
where € denotes a positive fixed, real number.
We choose a tripie (x, y, z) ofreal numbers provided with the properties
~ < Ix - yl < i· € ~ < Iy - zl < i· €
~ < Ix - zl < ~ . €.
Then we obtain
1 3
~ < min([x,y],[y,z]) <~ "2 < 1 - [x,z] < 4'
Since the Lukasiewicz predicate calculus is sound, we conclude from the inequal-
ity 1 - min([x,y], [y,z], 1 - [x,z]) < i
that the formula ...,(((x =
y) 1\ (y = z» 1\ ...,(x = z» is not provable within Lukasiewicz logic. Hence the
assertion follows. •
14 ULRICH HÖHLE
3 [O,I]-VALUEDSETS
The aim of this seetion is 10 present models which are compatible with the Poincare
Paradox. With regard to Theorem 8 natural candidates will be interpretations of
the formalized theory of identity and existence based on the I..ukasiewicz logic. In
order to simplify the situation we apply the modifed I..ukasiewicz predicate cal-
culus I..PC* and assurne that the set of functional symbols is empty and the set
of predicate symbols consists exactly of two predicates, namely the existence and
the identity predicate symbol. Hence it is sufficient to consider [0, 1]-valued inter-
pretations of the formalized theory of identity and existence where the implication
symbol -+ is interpreted by the I..ukasiewicz operator -+1.. (cf. Proof of Theorem
8).
Taking into account the logical equivalence of formulas e(v) and (v = w) we
observe that a pair (X, E) is a [O,I]-valuedinterpretation ofthe formalized theory
of identity and existence based on I..PC· if and only if X is a non empty set and
E : X x X f---+ [0,1] is map satisfying the following axioms
(EI) E(x,y) < min(E(x,x),E(y,y». (Strictness)
(E2) E(x,y) = E(y,x). (Symmetry)
(E3) E(x,y) - E(y,y) + E(y,z) < E(x,z). (Transitivity )
A map E : X x X f---+ [0,1] provided with the properties (EI)-(E3) is also

called a [O,l]-valued equality (resp. M -valued equality), and the pair (X, E) is
said to be a [O,l]-valued set (resp. M -valued set2). In this context we understand
E(x,x) astheextentof x and E(x,y) asthedegreeofoverlapof x and y.
PROPOSmON 9 (Characterization of many-valued equalities).
(a) Let E be a [O,IJ-valued equalityon X. Then there exists a uniquepseudo-

metric (} on X and a map d : X f---+ [0, 1] satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) ~ ~ d(x) , (}(x,y) < 1.
(ii) Id(x) - d(y) I < (}(x, y) . (Non-Expansivity )
(iii) (}(x, y) < d(x) + d(y) - 1.
(iv) E(x,y) = d(x) + d(y) - p(x,y) - 1.
(b) Bymeansof(iv)everypseudometric (} andmap d : X f---+ [0,1] satisfying

(iHiii) induce a [O,IJ-valued equality E on X.
2Cf. Section 3 in [Höhle, 1995]

THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS 15
Proof. Let E be a [0,1 ]-valued equality on X. Then we define two maps !l and d
as folIows:
d(x) =
E(x, x) +1 ( ) -_ E(x,x)+E(y,y) E( )
!lX,y 2 - x,y.
2
It is not difficult to show that the axioms (E1)-(E3) imply the relations (i)-(iii) .
The relation (iv) holds by construction. Finally the uniqueness of (d,!l) follows
immediately from (iv); hence the assertion (a) is verified.
On the other hand let (d,!l) provided with the properties (i)-(iii). It is not
difficult to show that the map E defined by (iv) is a [O,l]-valued equalilty; hence
the assertion (b) folIows. •
A [O,l]-valued equality E on X is said to be compatible with the Poincare

Paradox iff the relation
((x,y) E X x X 1 _ E(x,x) ; E(y,y} + E(x,y) > o}
is not transitive.
We close this paper with two examples of [O,l]-valued equalities which are
compatible with the Poincare Paradox.
EXAMPLE 10.
(a) Let X be the realline IR. The map E, : lR x lR 1---+ [0,1] defined by
E,(x,y) = [x,y], = 1 - min(~'lx

€
- yl, l)whereO </ö.
is a [O,l]-valuedequality which is compatible with the Poincare Paradox. In
particular, RE, coincides with ~. (cf. Introduction).
(b) Let X be the real unit interval [0,1]. On [0,1] x [0,1] we consider a [O,lJ-
valued map E o defined by
Eo(x,y) = max(x,l-x) + max(y,l-y) + Ix - YI-1, x,y E [0,1]

Then E o is a [0,1 J-valued equality which is compatible with the Poincare Paradox.
Inparticular, (O,~)EREo' (~,l)EREo' (O,l)~REo
Fachbereich Mathematik, Bergische Universität, Germany.
REFERENCES
[Hiljek, 19961 P. Hajek, Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, Institute of Computer Science, Academy
of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Technical Report no. 682, 1996.
[Höhle, 19951 U. Höhle, Presheaves over G L-monoids. In Non-Classical Logics anti Their Applica-
tions to Fuzzy Subsets, U. Höhle and E. P. Klement, eds. pp. 127-157. Kluwer, Boston, Dordrecht,
1995.
16 ULRICH HÖHLE
[Höhle, 1996] U. Höhle. On the fundamentals of fuzzy set theoIY. Journal Math. Anal. Appl. 201,
786-826, 1996.
[Menger, 1979] K. Menger. GeomelI}' and positivism-a probabilistic microgeomelI}'. In Selected
Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979.
[Poineare, 1902] H. Poincare. La Science et I' Hypothese. Flammarion, Paris, 1902.
[Poineare, 1904] H. Poincare. La Valuer de Ia Science. F1ammarion, Paris 1904.
[Scarpellini, 1962] B. Scarpellini. Die Nichtaxiomatisierbarkeit des unendlichwertigen Prädi-
katenkalkiils von Lukasiewicz, J. Symbolic Logic, 27,159-170,1962.
ERICH PETER KLEMENT AND MIRKO NAVARA
PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGICS BASED ON

FRANK T-NORMS: A COMPARISON
1 FRANK T-NORMS
Triangular norms were introduced in the framework of probabilistic metric

spaces [Schweizer and Sklar, 1961; Schweizer and Sklar, 1963; Schweizer
and Sklar, 1983], based on ideas first presented in [Menger, 1942], and
they are applied in several fields, e.g. in fuzzy sets [Zadeh, 1965], fuzzy
logics [Butnariu et al., 1995; Hajek et al., 1996; Pavelka, 1979] and their
applications, but also in the theory of generalized measures [Butnariu and
Klement, 1993; Klement and Weber, 1991] and nonlinear differential and
difference equations [Pap, 1992].
A triangular norm (t-norm for short) is a commutative, associative, non-
decreasing operation T : [0,1]2 --+ [0,1] with neutral element 1. An immedi-
ate consequence of the commutativity, the monotonicity and the boundary
condition is that, for each t-norm T and for each x E [0, 1], the following
boundary conditions are also fulfilled:
T(x, 1) = T(I,x) = x, (1)

T(x, 0) = T(O, x) = 0, (2)
which means that all t-norms coincide on the boundary of the unit square
[0,1]2. Algebraically speaking, ([0,1], T) is a commutative, linearly ordered
semigroup with neutral element 1 and annihilator 0.
Three important t-norms are the minimum TM, the product Tp and
the Lukasiewicz t-norm TL given, respectively, by TM (x, y) = min(x, y),
Tp(x,y) = xy and Tdx,y) = max(O, x + y -1).
A triangular conorm (t-conorm for short) is a commutative, associa-
tive, non-decreasing operation S : [0,1]2 --+ [0,1] with S(x,O) = x for all
x E [0,1], i.e. ([0,1], S) is a commutative, linearly ordered semigroupwith
°
neutral element and annihilator 1.
There is a strong duality between t-norms and t-conorms. Let N : [0,1] --+
[0, 1] be a strong (fuzzy) negation, i.e. an order-reversing involution. For a
t-norm T, the function ST,N : [0,1]2 --+ [0,1] given by
ST,N(X, y) = N(T(N(x), N(y)))
is a t-conorm, called the N -dual 0/ T. Dually, for a t-conorm S, the function

TS,N : [0,1]2 --+ [0,1] given by
TS,N(X, y) = N(S(N(x), N(y)))

17
D. Dubois et al. (eds.). Fuzzy Sets. Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 17-38.
18 ERICH PETER KLEMENT AND MIRKO NAVARA
is at-norm, called the N -dual oi S. Moreover, we have TST,N,N =T and

Srs,N,N = S.
If, in particular, we use the standard (fuzzy) negation N s : [0,1] -+ [0,1]
defined by
(3) Ns(x) = 1 - x,
then the Ns-duals of T and S are simply called duals thereof.
The duals ofthe three important t-norms are the maximum SM, the prob-
abilistic sum Sp and the bounded sum SL given, respectively, by SM(X, y) =
max(x,y), Sp(x,y) = x + y - xy and Sdx,y) = min(l,x + V).
The family (T>');.E[O,oo] of Frank t-norms is given by
TM(X,y) if A = 0,
Tp(x,y) if A = 1,
(4) T>.(x,y) = Tdx,y) if A = 00,
log>. (1 + (XC - ; ~ ~ - 1) ) otherwise.
The family (S>');.E[O,oo] of Frank t-conorms is given by

SM(X,y) if A 0, =
Sp(x,y) if A = 1,
(5) S>.(x,y)= Sdx,y) if A = 00,
.(AI-X -1)(A 1 -Y -1))
1 - log>. ( 1 + A_ 1 otherwise.
denoted by and sr,

In [Klement et al., to appear], the Frank t-norms and t-conorms, are
Tf respectively. As we do not work here with other
families of t-norms and t-conorms, we omit the upper index F throughout
this paper.
An element x E ]0, 1] is called a zero divisor of at-norm T if there is some
y E ]0,1] with T(x, y) = 0. A continuous t-norm T is called Archimedean
if T(x, x) < x for all x E ]0,1[. A continuous Archimedean t-norm is called
nilpotent if it has at least one zero divisor x > 0, and strict otherwise. The
minimum TM = To is the only Frank t-norm which is not Archimedean,
and the Lukasiewicz t-norm TL = T 00 is the only nilpotent Frank t-normj
all the other Frank t-norms are strict.
The family of Frank t-norms (T>');.E[O,OO] is strictly decreasing, and the
family of Frank t-conorms (S>');.E[O,OO] is strictly increasing with respect to
the parameter A (see [Butnariu and Klement, 1993]). Both families are
continuous with respect to A, i.e. for all Ao E [0,00]
lim T>. = T>.o'
>'-+>'0
lim S>. = S>.o.
>'-+>'0
PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGICS 19
For each A E [0,00], the Frank t-norm T>. and the Frank t-conorm B>. are
dual to each other, and they solve the functional equation
(6) T(x,y)+B(x,y)=x+y.
It was shown in [Frank, 1979] that, together with their ordinal sums (see
[Schweizer and Sklar, 1983]), these are the only pairs of continuous t-norms
and t-conorms solving the functional equation (6). Extensive overviews
on Frank and other t-norms can be found in [Klement et al., to appearj
Schweizer and Sklar, 1983].
2 PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGICS BASED ON FRANK T-NORMS
A many-valued logic with a continuum of truth values modelled by the unit

interval [0,1] is quite often called a fuzzy logic. In such a logic, conjunction
and disjunction are usually interpreted by at-norm and its dual t-conorm,
respectively. A way to construct propositionallogics within this framework
was presented in [Butnariu et al., 1995], where the full details and proofs of
most of the theorems can be found. Further results are proved in [Hekrdla
et al., to appear].
2.1 Basic definitions

To start with, let T>. be the Frank t-norm with index A E [0, 00], Ns the
standard negation given by (3), and B>. the Frank t-conorm dual to T>..
A t-norm-based propositional fuzzy logic [Butnariu et al., 1995] (B-fuzzy
logic for short) is defined, for each A E [0,00], as an ordered pair S>. =
(,c" Q>.) of a language (syntax) ,c, and a structure (semanties) Q>. described
as follows:
A»,
(i) The language of S>. is a pair ,c, = (A, (..." where A is an at most
countable set of atomic symbols and ..., and A are connectives which,
as usual, are called negation and conjunction, respectively.
(ii) The structure of S>. is a pair Q>. = ([0,1], (Ns , T>.», where [0,1] is
the set of truth values, and N s and T>. are the interpretations of the
negation..., and the conjunction A, respectively.
For simplicity, we fix the set A of atomic symbols throughout this paper. All
B-fuzzy logics S>. have the same syntax, they differ only by the semantics,
so there is no need to index the language ,c, by the parameter A.
The logics corresponding to the basic t-norms will play a special role.
For A = 0, we obtain the min-max B-fuzzy logic, So = SM. For A = 00, we
obtain the Lukasiewicz B -fuzzy logic, Soo = SL. In these cases, we use the
indices M and L also for the corresponding structures, etc.
20 ERleB PETER KLEMENT AND MIRKO NAVARA
The dass 9"3 of well-formed formulas in an S-fuzzy logic (S-formulas for

short) is defined inductively as folIows:
(i) Each atomic symbol p E A is an S-formula.
(ii) H<p is an S-formula, then -'<p is an S-formula.
(iii) H<p and t/J are S-formulas, then <p 1\ t/J is an S-formula.
Since the dass 9"3 of well-formed formulas in S.\ is independent of A, we
omit this index.
For each function t : A -+ [0,1], there exists always a unique natural
extension of t to a truth assignment t3>. : 9"3 -+ [0,1] which, for all atomic
symbols p and for all S-formulas <p and t/J, is obtained by induction in the
following canonical way:
t3>. (P) = t(p)

t3>. (-,cp) = N s (t3>. (<p»,
t3>. (cp 1\ t/J) = T.\(t3>. (cp), t3>. (t/J».
2.2 Derived connectives and compactness

Starting with the basic logical connectives -, and 1\, we can define additional
logical connectives in an S-fuzzy logic S.\. The disjunction V in S.\ is defined
using the de Morgan formula
Forthe interpretation of the disjunction, we obtain
so the disjunction V is interpreted by the t-conorm S.\ dual to T.\.

The implication -t in S.\ is defined as
This is one of numerous formulas which are equivalent to the (unique) im-
plication in the dassical logic. In fuzzy logics, these formulas are not nec-
essarily equivalent, hence the choice of implication becomes important. For
the interpretation of the implication, we obtain
Thus the logical implication -+ is interpreted by the binary operation h :

[0,1]2 -+ [0,1] defined by
h(x,y) = S.\(Ns(x),y),
which is often called the S-implication induced by the t-norm T>.. This
notion is the main reason why we call the corresponding logic an S-fuzzy
logic. Notice that, for all A E [0,00[,
(7) h(x, y) = 1 = or y = 1).
if and only if (x °
Only for the Lukasiewicz S-implication h = [00 we have
(8) h(x, y) = 1 if and only if x ~ y.
An important feature of S-fuzzy logics S>. is that they have the compact-
ness property. In order to formulate this properly, the following notions are
helpful. For r ~ !7S and K ~ [0, 1], we say that r is K -satisfiable in S>. if
there exists a truth assignment tS A such that we have tS A (<p) E K whenever
<p Er. The set r is said to be finitely K -satisfiable in S>. if each finite subset
of r is K -satisfiable in S>..
We then get the following results (see [Butnariu et al., 1995, Theorem
3.3, Proposition 3.6]):
THEOREM 1. Let A E [0,00] and let S>. be an S-Juzzy logic. Then for each
r~ !7s, for each closed subset K of [0, 1] and for each r E [0,1] we have:
(i) The set r is K -satisfiable in S>. if and only if it is finitely K -satisfiable

in ~h.
(ii) [fr is {r}-satisfiable in S>., then there exists a maximal number r* E
[0,1] such that r is {r*}-satisfiable in S>..
2.3 Axiomatization and deduction

In analogy to the classical two-valued logic, an S-formula <p is said to be a
logical axiom if, for some 0, ß, 1 E !7s, <p has one of the following forms:
[Cl] 0 -+ (ß -+ 0),
[C2] [0 -+ (ß -+ 1)] -+ [(0 -+ ß) -+ (0 ~ 1)],
[C3] (-'0 ~ -.ß) ~ (ß -+ 0).
REMARK 2. Since the implication is considered a derived logical connec-
tive in S>., its use in the axioms should be avoided. To be precise, we should
rewrite the axioms [Cl]-[C3] using only the basic connectives -. and /1..
However, this would lead to expressions which may be not familiar to the
readers. The form ofaxioms makes no difference in the notions depending
on the axiomatic system, so we use the standard form ofaxioms known from
the classicallogic, which was also used in [Butnariu et al., 1995].
A set r ~ !7S is said to be closed under modus ponens if we have 'ljJ E r
whenever <p Er and <p ~ 'ljJ Er (where <p ~ 'if; = -.(<p /I. -.'ljJ». The closure
of a set r ~ ~s under modus ponens is then the smallest subset of ~s

containing r and being closed under modus ponens.
An S-formula cp is called an S-theorem if it belongs to the closure of the
set of alliogical axioms under modus ponens. This notion is the same in all
S-fuzzy logics S>., so it is not indexed by )..
A theory 'J in an S-fuzzy logic S>., ). E [0,00], is a set of S-formulas. An
S-formula is called S-provable in 'J (in symbols 'J I- s cp) if it belongs to the
closure of the union of 'J and the set of all axioms under modus ponens.
This notion is independent of the choice of the particular S-fuzzy logic S>..
For all S-fuzzy logics, we have the classical deduction theorem:
THEOREM 3. Let). E [0,00], 'J be a theory in the S-fuzzy logic S>., and
let cp, 'Ij; be S-formulas. Then we have
if and only if
2.4 Completeness theorems

In any of the S-fuzzy logics S>., a truth assignment ts~ evaluates some
S-theorems, even the axioms, by values less than 1. Therefore, in order
to achieve soundness and completeness of an S-fuzzy logic, the notion of
tautology has to be adopted accordingly. We say that an S-formula cp is
°
a tautology in S>. ifts~(cp) > for all tE [O,I]A. Notice that this notion
depends on the choice of )..
THEOREM 4. Let). E [0,00[. Then the S-fuzzy logic S>. is sound and
complete, i.e. the set of S-theorems and the set of tautologies in S>. coincide.
REMARK 5. An analogue of Theorem 4 for the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic
SL does not hold because it is not sound. This follows from the existence of
zero divisors of TL. For instance, the formula (PAp) V (--.pA --.p), where p is
an atomic symbol, is an S-theorem which is not a tautology in SL. Indeed,
if we choose t(p) = 0.5, we obtain tS L «P A p) V (--'P A --.p» = 0.
In the other S-fuzzy logics, even more can be said in terms of validation
sets. The validation set Vs~ (cp) of a given S-formula cp in S>. is defined as
Vs~ (cp) = {ts~ (cp) I t E [O,I]A}.

PROPOSITION 6. For each ). E [0,00], each S-fuzzy logic S>. and for each
S-formula cp, the validation set Vs~ (cp) is a closed subinterval of [0, 1] such
°
that either E Vs~ (cp) or 1 E Vs~ (cp).
An S-formula cp is called an S-contradiction if --.cp is an S-theorem, and cp is
called an S-contingency if it is neither an S-theorem nor an S-contradiction.
For S-fuzzy logics S>. which are different from the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy
logic SL we can give a more specific characterization of the validation sets:
THEOREM 7. Let A E [0, 00[, S~ be an S-juzzy logic, cP an S-formula, and

Vs:, (cp) its validation set. Then we have:
(i) cP is an S-theorem if and only iJ, for some a E ]0,1[, Vs:, (cp) = [a,I];
(ii) cP is an S-contmdiction if and only if, for some b E ]0,1[, Vs:, (cp) =
[0, b];
(iii) cp is an S-contingency if and only if Vs:, (cp) = [0,1].
For the min-max S-fuzzy logic SM, we have an even stronger result
(see [Butnariu et al., 1995, Corollary 5.3]):
THEOREM 8. Let cp be an S-formula in the min-max S-juzzy logic SM,
and VS M (cp) its validation set. Then we have:
(i) cp is an S-theorem if and only if VS M (cp) = [0.5, 1];
(ii) cp is an S-contmdiction if and only if VS M (cp) = [0,0.5];
(iii) cp is an S-contingency if and only if VS M (cp) = [0,1].
No analogue of Theorem 7 holds for the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL.

Also, for A E ]O,oo[ there is no chance for a strengthening of Theorem 7
since, in contrast to Theorem 8(i), we have the following result [Hekrdla et
al., to appear]:
THEOREM 9. Let A E ]0, 00[, S~ be an S-juzzy logic and let D be the
set of all numbers a E [0,1] such that there exists an S-theorem CPa with
VS:,(CPa) = [a,I). Then Dis a dense subset 0/[0,1].
2.5 Infinitary S-juzzy logics

The defining properties of at-norm allow us to extend it to an operation with
an arbitrary finite arity, and also to an infinitary operation with countably
many arguments. In order to use this operation in the interpretation of a
fuzzy logic, we modify our definition of an S-fuzzy logic as folIows.
For each A E [0,00], the injinitary t-norm-based proposition al juzzy logic
[Butnariu et al., 1995] (injinitary S-juzzy logic for short) S~ is defined analo-
gously to S~ with the following exceptions: we introduce one new connective,
the infinitary conjunction A (with countable arity). For a sequente (CPn)nEN
of S~ -formulas,
/\ CPn
nEN
is an St-formula. The infinitary conjunction is interpreted by the Frank

t-norm T~ with countably many arguments. Infinitary S-fuzzy logics do
not possess some of the properties studied in the previous sections, e.g. the
compactness property (Theorem 1). Also the analogues of Proposition 6
and Theorem 7 do not hold for infinitary S-fuzzy logics. We even loose the
soundness. Nevertheless, infinitary S-fuzzylogics allow us to produce an
interesting comparison of the universality of various t-norms which will be
specified in Section 4.3.
REMARK 10. The original definition of an infinitary fuzzy logic, presented
only for A E ]0, oo[ in [Butnariu et al., 1995], differs by introducing one more
binary connective => (the crisp implication) with the interpretation
1( )_{I°
e x,y -
if x ~ y,
otherwise.
It is proved in [Hekrdla et al., to appear] that this makes no difference,

because a connective with the interpretation I e can be derived from the
negation and the infinitary conjunction.
3 PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGICS WITH RESIDUAL

IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we present another approach to fuzzy logics (described in

detail in [Hajek, 1998]). A reasonable way of constructing connectives in
fuzzy logics is to start with a left continuous t-norm T and to use the
residuum (R-implication, see [Dubois and Prade, 1985; Fodor, 1991; Fodor,
1993; Gottwald, 1989; Pedrycz, 1982; Pedrycz, 1983; Pedrycz, 1969]) defined
by
(9) RT(X, y) = sup {z E [0,1] I T(x, z) ~ y}.
as the interpretation of the implication. It is immediate that we have, as in
(8),
if and only if x ~ y.
Since we restrict our attention again to Frank t-norms T", A E [0,00],
we shall write briefly R" rather than RT>.. In contrast to Section 2, the
residuum R" cannot be substituted by an expression in the t-norm T" and
other basic fuzzy logical operations. This requires further changes in the
definition of a fuzzy logic.
3.1 Basic definitions

A residuum-based propositional juzzy logic (R-juzzy logic for short) is de-
fined, for each A E [0,00], as an ordered pair :R" = (.c, Q,,) of a language
(syntax) .c and a structure (semantics) Q" described as folIows:
(i) the language of :R~ is a pair J:., = (A, (/\, -t, 0», where A is an at
most countable set of atomic symbols and /\, -t and 0 are connectives
which represent the conjunction, the implication and the (nulary) false
statement, respectively;
(ii) the structure of:R~ is a pair Q~ = ([0, 1], (T~, R~, 0», where [0,1] is the
set of truth values, and T~, R~ and 0 (the latter is the zero constant
function) are the interpretations of the conjunction, the implication
and the false statement, respectively.
Again, we assume a fixed set A of atomic symbols. All R-fuzzy logics :R~
have the same syntax; we denote by 9"~ the class of well-formed formulas
in an R-fuzzy logic (:R-formulas for short) constructed using the binary
connectives /\ and -t and the nulary connective O.
The logics corresponding to the t-norms TM, TL and Tp are the Gödel
R-juzzy logic :Ro = :RM, the Lukasiewicz R-juzzy logic :Roo = :RL and the
product R-juzzy logic :R1 = :Rp. In fact, only these three logics are studied
in [Hajek, 1998].
Each function t : A -t [0, 1] allows to be extended naturally to a unique
truth assignment h>. : 9":R -t [0,1] such that for all atomic symbols p and
for all :R-formulas cp and 'IjJ:
h>. (P) = t(p),

t~>. (0) = 0,
h>. (cp /\ 'IjJ) = T~(h>. (cp), t~>. ('IjJ»,
h>. (cp -t 'IjJ) = R~(t~>. (cp), h>. ('IjJ».
3.2 Derived connectives

Using the basic logical connectives /\, -t and 0, we can define additional
logical connectives in an R-fuzzy logic :R~ ..
The negation -, in :R~ is defined as an implication with consequence 0,
Le.
-'cp = cp -t O.
Its interpretation is the fuzzy negation N~ given by
For A = 00, Le. in the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL , we obtain the standard
negation, Le.
In aH the other cases, i.e. for all A E [0,00[, we obtain the Gödel (fuzzy)
negation,
N)..(x) = NG(x) = {1° If~f xx>= 0.0,

The Gödel negation is neither continuous nor involutive, so it is not a strong
negation. It attains only the crisp truth values 0 and 1. This causes prob-
lems in the interpretation of a disjunction.
A disjunction V in an R-fuzzy logic~).. may be defined using the de Mor-
gan formula
Its interpretation is the operation D).. : [0,1]2 -t [0,1] defined by
For the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic, we obtain the Lukasiewicz t-conorm, i.e.
Deo = SL. In all the other cases, Le. for all A E [0,00[, we have
This operation attains only the crisp truth values 0 and 1, and it does
not satisfy the boundary conditions for a t-conorm. So it is not an ideal
candidate for a reasonable interpretation of the disjunction. We shall dis-
cuss alternative possibilities to define a disjunction in an R-fuzzy logic in
Section 4.2.
Satisfiability (as weH as finite satisfiability) in R-fuzzy logics is defined
analogously to S-fuzzy logics, Le. for r ~ :7:R and K ~ [0,1] we say that
r is K -satisfiable in ~).. if there exists a truth assignment h" such that
h" (cp) E K whenever cp E r. The set r is said to be finitely K -satisfiable
in ~).. if each finite subset of r is K-satisfiable in ~)... In R-fuzzy logics ~)..
with A E [0,00[, the interpretation of the implication is not continuous, so
we cannot prove the compactness property analogously to Theorem 1.
3.3 Deduction
In contrast to S-fuzzy logics, we use the standard definition of tautology
(calIed 1-tautology in [Hajek, 1998]) in R-fuzzy logics. We say that an ~
formula cp is a l-tautology in ~).. if h" (cp) = 1 for all t E [0, 1]A. As some
theorems in the classicallogic are not 1-tautologies in ~).., it is necessary
to change the logical axioms in order to obtain asound logic. The notion
of 1-tautology in ~).. depends on the choice of A, hence we need different
axiomatizations for different R-fuzzy logics. We shall discuss them in detail

in the following sections.
An :R-formula cp is called an :R>. -theorem if it belongs to the closure of the
set ofaxioms of:R>. under modus ponens. The notions of a theory 'J in an
R-fuzzy logic :R>. and of a formula cp which is :R>.-provable in 'J (in symbols
'J /-:RA cp) are defined analogously to S-fuzzy logics. The only significant
difference is that the notions of :R>.-theorem and :R>.-provability depend on
>., because we use different axiomatic systems in R-fuzzy logics.
In all R-fuzzy logics :R>., >. E [0,00], the following deduction theorem
holds:
THEOREM 11. Let>. E [0,00], 'J be a theory in the R-Juzzy logic :R>., and
let cp,,,p be :R-formulas. Then we have 'J U {cp} /-:R~ "p if and only if there
is an n E N such that 'J /-:R~ cpn ~ "p, where cpn, n E N, is the :R-formula
defined recursively as folIows:
cpi = cp,
cpn+l = cp A cpn.
3.4 Axiomatization 0/ the Lukasiewicz R-Juzzy logic

Choosing the Lukasiewicz t-norm TL as the conjunction operator in the
Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL, we obtain the interpretation RL of the im-
plication defined by
RL(x,y) = min(l- x + y, 1).
The fact that RL is just the implication introduced in [Lukasiewicz, 1930]

justifies it to call TL and SL the Lukasiewicz t-norm and t-conorm, respec-
tively, although these operations nowhere appear explicitly in the work of
Lukasiewicz.
In this case, the R-implication RL coincides with the S-implication h,
and also the corresponding fuzzy negation coincides with the standard one.
So the interpretation of Iogical connectives in the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic
:RL and the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL is identical (although not the same
connectives are considered as the basic ones).
REMARK 12. There is one more difference between the two Lukasiewicz
fuzzy logics SL and :RL. The nulary connective 0 was not considered an S-
formula. Nevertheless, it can be introduced as a derived logical connective
putting, e.g. 0 = -.cp A cp for a fixed S-formula cp. These formulas are
semantically equivalent in the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL.
In the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL, the compactness theorem may be
proved analogously to Theorem 1 (see [Hajek, 1998]).
THEOREM 13. Let r ~ :r:J{, let K be a closed subset 0/ [0, 1] and r E [0, 1].
The Lukasiewicz R-Juzzy logic :RL has the /ollowing properties:
(i) the set r is K -satisfiable in:RL i/ and only i/ it is finitely K -satisfiable
in :RL ;
(ii) i/ r is {r} -satisfiable in :RL, then there exists a maximal number r* E
[0,1] such that r is {r*}-satisfiable in :RL.
The Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy 10gic:RL is axiomatizablej its set ofaxioms (see

[Hajek, 1998]) is given as folIows:
[Al] (a -+ ß) -+ [(ß -+ 'Y) -+ (a -+ 'Y)],
[A2] (a Aß) -+ a,
[A3] (a A ß) -+ (ß A a),
[A4] [a A (a -+ ß)] -+ [ß A (ß -+ all,
[A5a] [a -+ (ß -+ 'Y)] -+ [Ca A ß) -+ 'Y],
[A5b] [Ca Aß) -+ 'Y] -+ [a -+ (ß -+ 'Y)],
[A6] [Ca -+ ß) -+ 'Y] -+ [«ß -+ a) -+ 'Y) -+ 'Y],
[A7] 0-+ a,
[L4] [Ca -+ ß) -+ ß] -+ [(ß -+ a) -+ a].
The classical deduction theorem (Theorem 3) does not hold in the Lu-
kasiewicz R-fuzzy logic. It is replaced by Theorem 11 which is weaker.
The Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL is sound and complete, Le. the set of
:RL-theorems and the set of I-tautologies in :RL coincide.
REMARK 14. The soundness of the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL seems
to contradict the non-soundness of the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL (see
Remark 5j in Theorem 23 we shall see that these two logics are even 'se-
mantically equivalent'). The reason is that the notions of a theorem are
different (as a consequence of different axiomatizations) in these two logics,
and that the tautologies in SL are not necessarily I-tautologies in :RL.
REMARK 15. There is an alternative formulation of the Lukasiewicz fuzzy
logic, based only on the implication -+ and the false statement 0 as basic
connectives. The conjunction A is then considered as a derived connective,
This conjunction is interpreted by the Lukasiewicz t-norm TL, so the inter-

pretation remains the same. In this approach, there is an axiomatization
with the following four axioms:
[LI] a -t (ß -t a),
[L2] (a -t ß) -t [(ß -t ,,) -t (a -t ,,)],
[L3] (-.a -t -.ß) -t (ß -t a),
[L4] [(a -t ß) -t ß] -t [(ß -t a) -t a].
Notice that [Ll] and [L3] are just the axioms [Cl] and [C3] of the classical
logic, respectively, and that [L2] (which is equal to [Al]) is weaker than
[C2]. The closure of all axioms of the forms [L1]-[L4] under modus ponens
gives exactly all :RL-theorems which do not contain the conjunction 1\.
The corresponding algebraic model of the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic :RL
is an MV-algebra [Chang, 1958].
3.5 Axiomatization 0/ the Gödel R-Juzzy logic

Choosing the minimum t-norm TM as the conjunction operator in the
Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG, we obtain the interpretation RM of the implication
defined by
R M (x,y ) = { 1 ifx:5Y,
y otherwise.
The R-implication RM (called the Gödel fuzzy implication) is not continuous
in the points (x, x) with x E [0,1[. It gives rise to the Gödel negation NG.
In the Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG, we have at least the following compactness
theorem (see [Hajek, 1998]):
THEOREM 16. A set r ~ 9":R is {l}-satisfiable in:RG if and only if it is
finitely {I} -satisfiable in :RG.
The Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG is axiomatizable (see [Dummett, 1959; Gödel,
1932; Hajek, 1998]); its axioms are [A1]-[A7] together with
[G] a -t (a 1\ a).
The axioms [A2] and [G] imply that the conjunction must be interpreted
by an idempotent operation. The minimum TM is the only idempotent
t-norm, and so it is the only t-norm for the interpretation of a logic with
these axioms.
The Gödel R-fuzzy logic:RG is the only R-fuzzy logic in which the classi-
cal deduction theorem (Theorem 3) holds. It is a special case of Theorem 11
(which is also valid for the Gödel R-fuzzy logic), because the conjunction is
interpreted by the minimum which is idempotent. The Gödel R-fuzzy logic
:RG is sound and complete.
The corresponding algebraic model of the Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG is a
Heyting algebra satisfying one additional condition (see [Gottwald, 1989;
Hajek, 1998] for details).
3.6 Axiomatization 0/ the product R-/uzzy logic

Choosing the product t-norm Tp as the conjunction operator in the product
R-fuzzy logic :Rp, we obtain the interpretation Rp of theimplication defined
by
I ifx:::=;y,
Rp(x,y) ={~ otherwise.
The R-implication Rp (called the Goguen juzzy implication) is not contin-

uous in the point (0,0). It gives rise to the Gödel negation NG, the same
as for the Gödel R-fuzzy logic.
It seems to be an open problem whether a compactness theorem analo-
gous to Theorem 16 holds for the product R-fuzzy logic.
The product R-fuzzy logic :Rp is axiomatizable [Hajek et al., 1996]; its
axioms are [A1]-[A7] together with
[PI] -'-', --t [[(a 1\,) --t (ß 1\ ,)] --t (a --t ß)],
[P2] -,(a 1\ a) --t -,a.
The axiom [PI] expresses the validity of the cancellation law. So only t-
norms satisfying the cancellation law are acceptable candidates for the inter-
pretation of a logic with the axioms [PI] and [P2] (observe that a continuous
t-norm satisfies the cancellation law if and only if it is strict).
The product R-fuzzy logic does not satisfy the classical deduction theo-
rem (Theorem 3), only Theorem 11. The product R-fuzzy 10gic:Rp is sound
and complete.
The corresponding algebraic model of the product R-fuzzy logic :Rp is
called a product algebra (see [Hajek, 1998; Hajek et al., 1996]).
3.7 Axiomatization 0/ other R-/uzzy logics

What was said about the product R-fuzzy logic :Rp = :R1 , remains essen-
tially valid also for all R-fuzzy logics :R,\ with A E ]0,00[. Due to the
representation theorem for strict t-norms (see, e.g. [Ling, 1965; Nguyen and
Walker, 1997]), there is an automorphism (Le. an order-preserving bijection)
h,\ : [0,1] --t [0,1] such that, for all x, y E [0,1],
(10) h,\(T,\(x,y)) = Tp (h,\ (x), h,\(y)).
The automorphism h,\ represents a change of the scale of the unit interval
which transforms T,\ into the product t-norm Tp. It transforms the cor-
responding R-implication R,\ into the Goguen fuzzy implication Rp. The
Gödel negation NG, however, is preserved under the automorphism h,\. The
whole structure is (up to the change of scale represented by h>.) exactly the
same as in the product R-fuzzy logic :Rp .
Again the problem remains open whether a compactness theorem analo-
gous to Theorem 16 holds for the R-fuzzy logics :R>. with ,\ E ]0,00[.
All R-fuzzy logics :R>. with ,\ E ]O,oo[ are axiomatizable by the same
axioms as the product R-fuzzy logic :Rp , i.e. by [Al]-[A7] together with [PI]
and [P2]. They do not satisfy the classical deduction theorem (Theorem 3),
only Theorem 11, but they are sound and complete.
3.8 Properties oJ general R-Juzzy logics

Let us summarize some properties which are common for all R-fuzzy logics.
The general form of the completeness theorem is as folIows:
THEOREM 17. For each ,\ E [0,00], the R-Juzzy logic :R>. is sound and
complete, i.e. the set of :R>.-theorems and the set of l-tautologies in :R>.
coincide.
Again, more can be said in terms of validation sets. The validation set
V:R:. (cp) of a given :R-formula cp in :R>. is defined as
Notice that this notion depends on the choice of A. An analogy of Propo-

sition 6 holds only for the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic. In any other R-fuzzy
logic, the implication is interpreted by a noncontinuous operation, and val-
idation sets are not necessarily intervals.
An :R-formula cp is called an :R>.-contradiction if ...,cp is an :R>.-theorem,
and cp is called an :R>.-contingency if it is neither an :R>.-theorem nor an
:R>.-contradiction. In contrast to S-fuzzy logics, these notions depend on ,\
(because of different axiomatizations). We have the following characteriza-
tion by the valuation sets:
THEOREM 18. Let'\ E [0,00], :R>. be an R-Juzzy logic, cp an :R-formula,
and V:R:. (cp) its validation set. Then we have:
(i) cp is an :R>. -theorem if and only if V:R:. (cp) = {I};

(ii) cp is an :R>.-contradiction if and only ifV:R:.(cp) = {O};
(iii) cp is an :R>. -contingency if and only if {O} -:j:. V:R:. (cp) -:j:. {I}.
If, for an :R-formula cp and a truth assignment h:. , we have h:. (cp) E ]0, 1 [,
then cp is an :R>. -contingency. Observe that this condition is not necessary in
R-fuzzy logics since there are :R>.-contingencies cp with h:. (cp) f/.]O, 1[ for any
truth assignment h:.. For example, if we take ,\ E [0, oo[ and an arbitrary
atomic symbol p, then for the :R-formula cp = ""p we obtain V:R:. (cp) = {O, I}.
4 COMPARlSON OF THE TWO APPROACHES
During the introduction and discussion of S- and R-fuzzy logics, we already

mentioned some of their similarities and differences. We shall summarize
this knowledge and add a comparison from other viewpoints.
Both approaches can be formalized in a way similar to the classicallogic.
They use different sets of logical connectives. The missing basic connectives
cannot always be substituted by derived connectives. Different interpre-
tations of the implication cause the main difference in semantics. Both
approaches work with logics which are truth functionalj the truth assign-
ment is calculated for a compound formula uniquely from the evaluation of
its subformulas. The two approaches use the same single deduction rule -
modus ponens, but they are based on different axiomatizations and, there-
fore, they have to work with a different notion of tautology in order to
achieve soundness and completeness.
4.1 Advantages and disadvantages 0/ S-/uzzy logics

In an S-fuzzy logic, the basic connectives are the conjunction 1\ and the
negation...,. We can derive an implication -t and a disjunction V, as weIl as
the other usual logical connectives, in analogy to the classical logic. How-
ever, the nulary operation 0, Le. the false statement as a constant, can be
obtained only in the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL (e.g. as ""<p 1\ <p for an
arbitrary formula <p). In all other S-fuzzy logics, Le. in S~ for A E [0,00[,
there is no formula which is evaluated to zero by any truth assignment.
This disadvantage can be easily eliminated by adding 0 as a basic nulary
connective. No serious problems arise, only the validation sets may become
singletons {O} or {I} and the formulation of Theorems 7 and 8 has to be
generalized to include this case.
In an infinitary S-fuzzy logic with A E ]0,00], i.e. which is based on an
Archimedean Frank t-norm, the nulary connective 0 can be introduced as
a derived connective, e.g. as
/\ p,
nEN
where p is an arbitrary atomic symbol.

In Section 3.7, we argued that all R-fuzzy logics ~~ with A E ]0, oo[ are
equivalent to the product R-fuzzy logic ~p = ~1 up to an automorphism
h~ : [0,1] -t [0,1]. This argument does not work in S-fuzzy logics. The
automorphism h~ satisfying (10) is the same. However, it need not preserve
the standard negation Na, because the equality h~(Ns(x» = Na(h~(x»
does not hold in general. In this case, there is still a t-conorm S satisfying
which is not the (Ns-)dual of TA but the N-dual of TA, where the strong
negation N is given by
As a consequence, the S-fuzzy logics SA with .x E ]O,oo[ have basically

different semantics.
Proposition 6 works because all connectives in an S-fuzzy logic have con-
tinuous interpretations. On the other hand, the choice of an S-implication
as the interpretation of the implication causes serious problems from the
logical point of view.
The most important disadvantage of S-fuzzy logics seems to be that their
syntax is essentially the syntax of the classical logic and it does not bring
anything new. Using the standard system ofaxioms of the classicallogic, we
obtain as S-theorems exactly the theorems of the classical logic. Only the
semantics is different. Except for the Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL, there
seems to be no chance to find an axiomatization allowing a completeness
theorem for l-tautologies in SA with .x E [0, oo[ (Le. for formulas <p such that
tS A (<p) = 1 for all truth assignments ts A ) to be proven. The problem is in
equation (7); the S-implication does not give 1 for arguments which are not
crisp. In fact, without adding the nulary connective 0, there are even no
I-tautologies in SA with .x E [0,00[.
4.2 Advantages and disadvantages 0/ R-/uzzy logics

In an R-fuzzy logic, the basic connectives are the conjunction /\, the impli-
cation -+ and the false statement O. We can derive the negation -'. Except
for the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic ~L, a connective dual to the conjunction
(by the de Morgan formula) does not give a reasonable disjunction. We
also have some kind of non-symmetry, because we have a conjunction (in-
terpreted by at-norm) without a corresponding disjunction (interpreted by
the dual t-conorm).
There is one observation restricting the latter disadvantage: The formula
<p /\ (<p -+ 'tf;) (in any R-fuzzy logic) has many properties of an (idempotent)
conjunction of<p and 'tf;, and it is interpreted by the minimum t-norm (due
to the properties of R-implications). In the Gödel R-fuzzy logic ~G (and
onIy in it), this formula is semantically equivalent to <p /\ 'tf;. Further, the
formula
[(<p -+ 'tf;) -+ 'tf;] /\ [[(cp -+ 'tf;) -+ 'tf;] -+ [('tf; -+ <p) -+ <p]]

has properties of an (idempotent) disjunction of<p and 'tf;, and it is inter-
preted by the maximum t-conorm. So we have a disjunction (interpreted by
a t-conorm) in any R-fuzzy logic, but it is dual to the (basic) conjunction
only in the Gödel R-fuzzy logic ~G. In the Lukasiewicz R-fuzzy logic ~L,
we have a disjunction dual to the basic conjunction. So the problems with a

disjunction arise only in R-fuzzy logics ~>. with >. E ]0,00[. All these logies
are (up to an automorphism of [0,1]) equivalent to the product R-fuzzy
logic ~p.
The use of an R-implication for the interpretation of the implication
causes some problems; except for the Lukasiewiez R-fuzzy logic, the cor-
responding R-implication is not continuous. In this case (i.e. in ~>. with
>. E [O,oo[) the negation is interpreted by the Gödel negation NG which
is not strong and attains crisp values only. This seems to decrease the
applicability of such a logic.
On the other hand, the use of an R-implication allows very nice and deep
logical results. New (weaker) sets ofaxioms of the Gödel, Lukasiewiez and
product R-fuzzy logics led to quite new axiomatizations. They enrich also
the classieallogic by giving equally developed alternatives.
REMARK 19. The main disadvantage of R-fuzzy logics ~>. with >. E ]0, oo[
- the absence of a disjunction dual to the conjunction - led recently to a
new concept, an R-fuzzy logie with an involutive negation (see [Esteva et al.,
to appear]). In this approach, the negation..., becomes an additional basic
connective interpreted by a strong negation N. This negation can be used
in the de Morgan formula defining a dual disjunction which is interpreted by
the N-dual t-conorm. Then ...,cp does not necessarily coincide with cp -t o.
Also this logie is axiomatizable, sound and complete. On the other hand,
the system ofaxioms is more complicated, and also one new deduction rule
has to be added.
The introduction of infinitary R-fuzzy logics seems to be an open field of
research since we did not find any study of this subject in the literature.
4.3 Comparison 0/ strength 0/ S- and R-/uzzy logics

We want to investigate whether some logics are semantieally 'stronger' than
others in the sense that they contain more classes of semantieally equivalent
formulas. The meaning of 'stronger' in this context is that each reasoning
in the 'weaker' logic can be translated into a semantically equivalent rea-
soning in the 'stronger' logic. Philosophically speaking, this means that the
'stronger' logic provides arieher environment for approximate reasoning
than the 'weaker' one in the same context.
To make things precise, let S>. and S/, be two S-fuzzy logics with the
same set of atomic symbols A. Then S>. is said to be stronger than S/,
(see [Butnariu et al., 1995]) if there exists a mapping f : !fs -t !fs such
that for each formula cp E !fs and for each function t : A -t [0,1] we have
ts,- (f(cp)) = ts" (cp). We say that S-fuzzy logics S>., S/, are equally strong
if S>. is stronger than S/, and S/, is stronger than S>.. We say that S>. is
strictly stronger than S/, if S>. is stronger than S/" but S/, is not stronger
than SA. These notions can be carried over to infinitary S-fuzzy logics and
to R-fuzzy 10gicl1 in a natural way. The only difference is that we need a
mapping f between different sets of formulas. We always assume that all
the logics have the same set of atomic symbols.
The notion of strength allows us to formulate the following results con-
cerning the comparison of fuzzy logics. For each A E [O,oo}, the infinitary
S-fuzzy logic S1 is obviously strictly stronger than the (finitary) S-fuzzy
logic SA. There are important relations between Lukasiewicz and min-max
S-fuzzy logics (see [Butnariu et al., 1995, Proposition 6.2}):
PROPOSITION 20.
(i) The Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL is strictly stronger than the min-max
S -fuzzy logic SM.
(ii) The infinitary Lukasiewicz S -fuzzy logic Si. is strictly' stronger than
the infinitary min-max S-fuzzy logic SM-
The S-fuzzy logic SA for A E ]0, oo[ is not stronger than the Lukasiewicz
S-fuzzy logic SL (nor vice versal.
Nevertheless, for infinitary S-fuzzy logics we have the following posi-
tive result based on rather advanced techniques of mathematical analysis
(see [Butnariu et al., 1995, Theorem 6.5}):
THEOREM 21. Each infinitary S-fuzzy logic S1 with A E ]0, oo[ is strictly
stronger than the infinitary Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic Si..
The comparison of infinitary S-fuzzy logics S1 for different A E ]0, oo[ was
formulated as an open problem in [Butnariu et al., 1995}. Using results from
[Mesiar, 1993; Navara, 1993}, the following result was proved in [Hekrdla et
al., to appear] (compare also [Butnariu et al., 1997}):
THEOREM 22. For all A,j.t E ]0,00[, the infinitary S-fuzzy logics S1, S~
are equally strong.
So far we compared (infinitary) S-fuzzy logics according to their strength.
Now we shall include also R-fuzzy logics in this system of relations.
Although the minimum t-norm can be expressed by the operations of
any R-fuzzy logic, for the corresponding (Gödel) R-implication such an
expression does not exist. Similar arguments can be applied to other R-
fuzzy logics, too. Therefore, the Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG, the Lukasiewicz
R-fuzzy logic :RL and the product R-fuzzy logic :Rp are incomparable in the
sense that none of them is stronger than any other.
Because of the particular properties of the Lukasiewicz fuzzy operations,
we obtain the following fact:
THEOREM 23. The Lukasiewicz S-fuzzy logic SL and the Lukasiewicz R-
fuzzy logic :RL are equally strong.
For each A E [0,00[, the R-implication RA is not continuous, hence the

S-fuzzy logic SA is not stronger than the R-fuzzy logic :RA. The discussion
of strong negations (see Subsection 4.2) shows that, for each A E ]0,00[, the
R-fuzzy logic :RA is not stronger than the S-fuzzy logic SA. Also for A = 0,
the Gödel R-fuzzy logic :RG = :Ro is not stronger than the min-max S-fuzzy
logic SM = So·
Nevertheless, the infinitary S-fuzzy logics S~ with A E ]0, oo[ are so strong
that they satisfy the following relation (see [Hekrdla et al., to appear]):
THEOREM 24. For all A E ]O,oo[ and J.L E [0,00], the injinitary S-fuzzy
logic S~ is strictly stronger than the R-fuzzy logic :RI'.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed two main approaches to propositional fuzzy logics based

on Frank t-norms, the S-fuzzy logics (where negation and conjunction are
basic connectives) and the R-fuzzy logics (where the basic connectives are
conjunction, implication and the false statement). We have seen that the
main difference is the interpretation of the implication (by an S-implication
in S-fuzzy logics and by the residuum in R-fuzzy logics).
In both approaches we have studied the important issues of compactness,
deduction, axiomatization, soundness and completeness.
Finally, we tried to compare S-fuzzy logics and R-fuzzy logics in a twofold
way: on the one hand, by pointing out the advantages and disadvantages
of the two concepts, on the other hand, by comparing their semantical
strength.
It should be noted that there are many other approaches to [O,l]-valued
logics starting from different points of view, some of which are described in
detail in [Höhle, 1994; Novak, 1990; Pavelka, 1979]. For a rather extensive
overview, see [Gottwald, 1993].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank Marie Demlova, Petr Hajek and Dan Butnariu
for numerous fruitful discussions on the topic of this paper.
The work of the first author was supported by the FWF - Fonds zur
Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (Project P10672-ÖTE), by the
Action Austria-Czech Republic (Project 16p12) and by the CaST Action 15
- Many- Valued Logics for Computer Science Applications.
The work of the second author was supported by the Czech Ministry of
Education (Project VS96049), by the Grant Agency of the Czech Repub-
lic (Grant 201/97/0437), by the Action Austria-Czech Republic (Project
Nr. 16p12) and by the CaST Action 15 - Many- Valued Logics for Com-
puter Science Applications.
Erich Peter Klement

Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria.
Mirko Navara
Czech Technical University, Praha, Czech Republic.
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STEPHAN LEHMKE
A RESOLUTION-BASED AXIOMATISATION OF
'BOLD' PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGIe
1 INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, the development of the fields of automated theorem

proving and logic programming in many-valued and fuzzy logics has made
significant advances, but still a gap is perceivable between application-
oriented and theoretically-oriented approaches.
This paper aims at contributing to the closing of the gap with respect to
resolution theory for fuzzy logic. In [Thiele and Lehmke, 1994] and [Lehmke,
1994b; Lehmke, 1994a], we have presented some preliminary results concern-
ing the application of the resolution rule in a fuzzy logic where conjunction
is interpreted by bold and and disjunction is interpreted by bold or. Now
we are able to present a Jull resolution calculus for 'bold' fuzzy logic.
In this paper, we present aresolution calculus for a generalisation of
J. Lukasiewicz's continuously many-valued propositionallogic 1,00; in partic-
ular, we sketch the development of a structure preserving clausal form for
this logic, define resolution-based rules of inference and give some hints on
how to prove the soundness and completeness of these rules with respect to
the semantic consequence operator.
We try to outline the whole development of the logical apparatus; however,
we shall not be able to present any proofs. In Lehmke [1995; 1998], the
development is presented in detail.
It should be noted that the logic employed here has much more expressive
power than the 'usual' minimax fuzzy logic (see [Lee and Chang, 1971;
Lee, 1972]). This higher expressive power, however, is accompanied by
several specific problems in the development of a resolution-based derivation
system.
In the following, the sets of all natural numbers and real numbers are
denoted by N(=def {O,l, ... }) and lR, respectively. We introduce the
notation (r, s) for the closed interval of all real numbers t E lR with r ~
t ~ s. The notation (r, s) is used for the open interval of all real numbers
t E lR with r < t < s. The half-open intervals (r, s) and (r, s) are defined
accordingly.
For two sets S, T, the set of all mappings from Sinto T is written TS.
Ordered pairs are denoted by using square brackets, Le. the ordered pair of
a and b is written [a, b].
39
D. Dubois et al. (em.), Fuu.y Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 39-50.
40 STEPHAN LEHMKE
2 DEFINITION OF 'BOLD' PROPOSITIONAL FUZZY LOGIC
The syntax of the underlying propositionallogic is defined inductively in the

usual infix style, based on a set PV = p, q, ... of propositional variables, a
unary operator. (negation) and two binary operators ® (conjunction) and
@ (disjunction). The set of all propositional formulae is denoted by Frm.
For instance, x = (p @ -,(.p ® (q ® q'))) is a propositional formula.
The set of all literals is defined by Lit (PV) =def PV U {.p Ip E PV}.
Usually, PV is fixed, so we write just Lit.
The semantics of the underlying logic is based on the unit intenal (0, I)
as the set of all truth values. A mapping a : PV --+ (0, I) is said to be an
assignment of truth values from (0, I) to the propositional variables from
PV.
Given an assignment a : PV --+ (0, I), we inductively define a valuation
function Val(x, a) for every x E Frm by
1. If x = p for p E PV, then Val(x,a) =def a(p).
2. For x, y E Frm,
Val( .x, a) =def 1 - Val(x, a» (Lukasiewicz's negation)

Val«x ® y), a) =def max(O, Val(x, a) + Val(y, a) - 1) (bold conjunction)
Val«x @y), a) =def min(l, Val(x, a) + Val(y, a» (bold disjunction)
(we apply the usual bracketing rules)

The logic thus defined is equivalent with J. Lukasiewicz's continuously many-
valued propositional logic Loo • It should be obvious how additional
connectives A (for min-conjunction), V (for max-disjunction) and --+ (for
Lukasiewicz's implication) can be defined by the given connectives.
The idea of attaching a weight to a propositional formula not only raises
the expressive power of the logic (for a discussion of weights see for instance
Lehmke [1996; 1995]), but also allows us to define a refutation system
(see the observation below), which is exceedingly difficult for Loo (compare
[Novak, 1996]).
Here, we employ weights which are (closed or half-open) intervals from
(0, I), closed above with 1. This definition is essential for the definition of
the refutation system. For a finer characterization, we define three sets of
weights:
WC =ded (r, I) IrE (0, In (closed weights)

mr> =def {(r, I) IrE (0, In (half-open weights)
!ZU =def WC U mr> . (all weights)
A RESOLUTION-BASED AXIOMATISATION OF Loo 41
Using R. Hähnle's [1993] regular weights notation, we write ~ for (r,l)

and ~ for (r,I).
Given x E Frm and a weight w E !ID, the weighted formula with formula x
and weight w is defined to be the ordered pair [x, w]. The set of all weighted
formulae will be denoted by WFrm.
Now, we define the fundamental concepts of model and semantic conse-
quence.
For some weighted formula [x,w] E WFrm, an assignment 0: : PV --+
(a,l) is said to be a model of [x, w] (shortly 0: F [x, w]) =def Val(x, 0:) E w.
This concept is extended to X ~ WFrm by 0: F X =def for every [x, w] E
X, 0: F [x,w].
Given X ~ WFrm and [x, w] E WFrm, we say that [x, w] is a semantic
consequence of X (shortly X ft- [x, w]) =def for every 0: E {a, l}pv, if 0: F X
then 0: F [x, w]. The logic constituted by WFrm and ft- shall be called bold
fuzzy logic.
(It should be obvious that our concepts of model and semantic consequence
coincide with those for 1.00 if an weights are fixed to {I}.)
Concerning refutation, we get the following very convenient result.
OBSERVATION 1. Let X ~ WFrm, let x E Frm and r E (a,I).
1. X ft- [x,~] iff X U {[.x,I~I- TI]} has no model.
2. X ft- [x,~] iff X U {[.x,I>! rl}} has no model.
3 NORMAL AND CLAUSAL FORMS
Although for two-valued logic, there are approaches to define resolution-

based derivation operators applicable to arbitrary formulae (Le. not only to
clausesj see for instance Murray [1982]), we base our derivation system on
the concept of clausal form (partly because the handling of weights woul<l
pose additional problems in clause-independent systems).
However, the concept of clausal form is far from trivial for bold fuzzy
logic.
On the one hand, de Morgan's laws hold for ®, <5/) wrt .• and Lukasiewicz's
negation is involutive, so we can transform every propositional formula
into negation normal form where negation signs occur only in front of
propositional variables (see for instance R. Hähnle [1993]). We assurne
an operator JV to be given which transforms a propositional formula into
negation normal form. This operator shall not be defined formally here (see
for instance [Hähnle, 1993]), but in Figure 1 we give an example for the
propositional formula ,((Pl ®'P2) <5/) ('Pl ®P3)) ®.(.P2 ®P3)). In this and
the following examples, we shall depict propositional formulae as trees, to
42 STEPHAN LEHMKE
make clear the nesting structure and the exact impact of the normal form
transformations.
JV(,«PI ® '112) <SI> ('PI ® Pa» ® '('112 ® Pa» =

'Pa»
«'PI) <SI> 112) ® (PI <SI> <SI> ('112 ® Pa)
•
I
---A----_
-A------~---
® ® ®
JV -A------
<SI> <SI> ®
""PI P2 PI ""P3
Figure 1. 'fransformation to Negation Normal Form
The operator JV is extended to weighted formulae and sets of weighted

formulae in a straightforward way.
On the other hand, ®, <SI> are not distributive with respect to each other,
so we can not transform an arbitrary formula into conjunctive normal form.
We address the lack of distributivity by employing a (structure-preserving)
layered normal form, consisting of several layers, where each layer is a
set of 'Hat' formulae; the structure of the original (nested) formulae is
preserved by interrelations between the layers. To this end, we introduce
new propositional variables as placeholders for subformulae. It should be
noted that this is possible because our considerations are with respect to a
rejutation system, and the property of having no model is preserved by this
construction.
To account for the weights, we need to introduce formula-weighted
formulae, i.e. ordered pairs of formulae where the one formula acts as a
weight for the other one. For x, y E Frm and a : PV -+ (0, I), we extend
the model relation F to [x,y] bya F [x,y] =defVal(x,a) ~ Val(y,a).
The notion of model is extended to layered normal forms (i.e. sequences
of sets of weighted formulae) in the obvious way.
Again, the operator 2 which transforms a weighted formula [x, w] into
a sequence X of sets of weighted formulae, such that X is weakly equivalent
with [x, w] in the sense that X has a model iff [x, w] has a model, is not
introduced formally, but illustrated by an example in Figure 2 (observe
that new propositional variables ql, ... , qs are generated in the process).
The exact definition and the theorem establishing the (weak) equivalence
can be found in Lehmke, [1995; 1998). Note that we make explicitly sure
~ ([ «-'Pl @P2)®(Pl @-,pg))

@(-'])2 ®pg) ,
w]) =
{[ql @ q2, w]} ,
= {[q3 ® q4, ql], [qS, q2]} ,
{[-'Pl @])2,q3], [Pl @ -'P3, Q4], [-'P2 ® Pa, qs]}
w
@
I
-A------
@ @ ®
Figure 2. Transformation to Layered Normal Form
(in the example by introducing the 'connecting' weighted formula [q2, qs])
that the sets öf propositional variables used for formulae and for weights,
respectively, are disjoint at every layer. This is needed for the derivation
system to be defined later. The operator ~ can be extended to sets of
weighted formulae if this disjointness condition is preserved.
For a more convenient application of the derivation mIes, we make one
more transformation step, introducing a clausal form for 'Hat' weighted
formulae. Here, we encounter two problems. First, the bold operators are
not idempotent, so we can not represent clauses by sets (because multiple
occurrences of literals would be absorbed). Secondly, we can not eliminate
the occurrence of conjunctive and disjunctive formulae in the layered normal
form.
The lack of idempotency is addressed by using multisets of literals in
clauses. We denote the multiset consisting of the literals Pl, -'])2, -'P2,Pa
by {pt, -'])2, -'])2,P3}}; a literal multiset is regarded to be a mapping from
Lit to the set N of all natural numbers. Later, we need to remove literals
from a multiset. For literal multisets M and N and a literal I, we define
44 STEPHAN LEHMKE
(M " N)(l) =def max(O, M(l) - N(l». Furthermore, we sometines need to
°
remove all occurrences of a literal from a multiset, so we define (M~l)(l') =
M(l') if 1 ::/-1' and (M ~ 1)(1') = if 1 = 1'.
To address the occurrence of conjunctive and disjunctive formulae, we
exploit a peculiar property of the bald connectives. As an example, take
x =def PI ('0 P2 ('0 P3 and Y =def PI ® P2 ® P3· For n E (O,l)PV define Ti =def
n(Pi), for i E {I, 2, 3}. By definition we get Val (x , n) = min(l, Tl + T2 + T3)
and Val(y, n) = max(O, Tl + T2 + T3 - 2). But obviously, Tl + T2 + T3 ;:;; °
and Tl + T2 + T3 - 2 ~ 1, so we get
Val(x, n) = min(l, max(O, Tl + T2 + T3»

Val(y, n) = min(l, max(O, Tl + T2 + T3 - 2».
Now, the disjunctive and conjunctive formula are distinguished only by

an additive parameter. We can thus define a hold clause to consist of a
litera! multiset M and a conjunctive correction 6 consisting of the additive
parameter, i.e. by defining 6x =def 0, 6y =def 2, we get
Val(x, n) = min(l, max(O, Tl + T2 + T3

'--v------'
- 6x
'-v-'
»
Litera! multiset Conjunctive correction
Val(y, n) = min(l, max(O, Tl + T2 + T3
'--v------'
- 6 y
'-v-'
»
Litera! multiset Conjunctive correction
Formally, given a literal multiset M, 6 E lR and a weight w, the corres

ponding hold clause is defined to be the pair [M,6] and the corresponding
weighted hold clause is defined to be the tripie [M, 6, w]. The set of all
(weighted) bold clauses is denoted by CIs (WCIs). Semantically, we define
for n E (O,l)PV
Val([M, 6], n) =def max (0, min (1, (~t M(l) . Val(l, n») - 6) ) .
The definition ofthe model relation for weighted bold clauses and (sequences
of) sets of weighted bold clauses is obvious.
The transformation operator '{j' which transforms a sequence of sets of
weighted formulae into a sequence of sets of weighted bold clauses is again
illustrated by an example in Figure 3 (To simplify the notation, we have
abbreviated the weights whi~h are themselves bold clauses by writing e. g.
ql for [t{ ql]-, 0]).
The example shows that after the transformation, the treelike structure
of the formula has been completely dissolved. It should be noted, however,
that semantically, the relations between the truth values of the subformulae
are preserved by the newly introduced propositional variables.
w
I
ql
~ q2
- - -ql - - - - - - -q"2 - - -
q3
AI q4
-qi - - -q;;; - - - -
qs
-qs ---
I I I
<2> <2> ® [{-'PllP2} ,0,q3][{-'P2,Pa} , 1,qs]
[{Pll-'P3} , 0, q4]
Figure 3. Transformation to Layered Clausal Form
We can now state the foHowing theorem.

THEOREM 2. Every finite X ~ WFrm is equivalent with 'tl(.2"(JV(X)))
with respect to refutation, i. e.
X has a model iff 'tl(.2"(JV(X))) has a model.
Proof. The proof can not be carried out in fuH here. In a fuH proof, a
slightly stronger result (every model of 'tl (.2" (JV (X) )) is also a model of X j
every model of X can be extended to a model of 'tl(.2"(JV(X)))) is proved.
The proof is carried out by straightforward induction on the structure of
weighted formulae from X. •
4 RESOLUTION IN 'FLAT' CLAUSAL FORMS
As an introduction, we present derivation rules for layered clausal forms

consisting of a single layer. In this section we assume all weights to be
taken from 2lJ, and we work with sets of weighted dauses.
First, some preliminary definitions:
• The 'information content' of a bold dause, in the sense that the truth
value is not restricted to (0,1):
MaxTruth([M,~) =def (L
PEPV
max(M(p) , M(-,P))) - 8
46 STEPHAN LEHMKE
• The highest possible truth value a bold clause can assurne:

MaxVal([M, c5]) =def max (0, min (1, MaxTruth([M, 8])))
• The set of all contradictory clauses:

Contr =def ([M, 8, w] IMaxVal([M,8]) fJ. w}
OBSERVATION 3. [M, 8, w1 E Contr iff [M, 8,w] has no model.
Now, we can formulate the derivation rules for Hat clausal forms:
• Two clauses may be assembled into one:
MI UM2,8I +82 +max(rl,r2),I>-min(rl,r2)1
>-2, if >-1 is ~
where 0 fJ.lh r ll and 0 fJ.1>-a r 21 and >- =def { • .-
>, If >-1 IS>
• Two contradictory literals may be removed from a dause:
[M, 8, w] such that p,...,p E M
[M" {p,...,p},8 -l,w]
Note that Robinson's [19651 'dassical' resolution rule is a combination of
assembling and removing. We need two separate rules to account for multiple
occurrences of literals.
Now, we define the resolution-based derivation operator h for C ~
WCls.
DEFINITION 4. C I- [M, 8, wJ
=def [M, 8, w] can be derived from C by jinitely many applications of
embedding, 1 assembling, and removing.
We state the main theorem of this section without proof:

THEOREM 5. For each finite set C ~ WCls,
C has no model iff there exists [M, 0, w] E Contr such that C I-
[M,o,w].
The example in Figure 4 shows a proof, by our derivation operator, for
the fact that the set
C =def {[""Pl,I~O.4~ , [lpl,P2}, 1,1~0.2~, [P2,1~0.5~ , [1""P2,Pl}, 1,1~0.1~}
has no model (trivially, [I} ,0,1~0.1~ E Contr).
1 Embedding means simply taking a dause from C.

[{Pl,Pl,P2, ""P2}, 2.2,1~0.lij
I (removing)
[{Pl,Pl}, 1.2,1~0.lij
[{Pl,Pl, ""pd, 1.6,1~0.lij
I (removing)
[{Pl} ,0.6,1~0.lij
(assembling)
[{Pb ""Pl}, 1.0,1~0.lij

I (removing)
[n ,0, I~O.lij
Figure 4. Derivation in a 'Hat' clausal form
5 RESOLUTION IN CLAUSAL FORMS OF MULTIPLE LAYERS
The full resolution calculus for bold juzzy logic is completed by defining
derivation rules for layered clausal forms of multiple layers.
First, we need rules for derivations inside a layer. Additionally to the
two rules presented in the previous section, we need rules for derivations
with clause-weighted clauses. Note that by our derivation rules, no 'open'
weights are introduced into a layer where clauses are weighted by clauses,
so we need only two rules for combinations of clauses and open intervals as
weights:
• Assembling II (assuming 0 f/. ~:
[M1,8d~B] , [M2 ,82 , [M3 ,83 ]]

[MI U M 2 , 81 + 82 + T, [M3 , 83 ]]
48 STEPHAN LEHMKE
• Assembling 111:
Finally, we need a raising rule for transferring information upwards bet

ween layers:
Layer k:
Layer k + 1: [ {{lb ... ' Im}} ,m - Ö' - MaxTruth([M,ö]) - 1,gx]]
By extending the derivation operator f- to layered clausal forms, using
the above additional rules, f- already constitutes asound and complete
refutation-based derivation system for bold fuzzy logic, but for one remaining
problem: In the assembling rule for flat clausal forms, we have added the
condition 0 i Ihrll and 0 i 1>-2 r 2b which is vital for the soundness of the
derivation operator. A similar condition can not be formulated for weights
which are clauses. Thus, to get asound and complete derivation system, a
more complicated apparatus is necessary.
As a first remedy, we consider only 'positive' assignments, defined as
folIows.
DEFINITION 6. Let a weighted clausal form ([ be given. An assignment
a E (O,l)PV is said to be positive for ([ iff for every p E PV which occurs
in a weight in ([, a(p) > O.
As only disjunctive clauses are generated as weights, this assures that an
appropriate condition is met, and the derivation rules can be proved to be
sound with respect to positive assignments.
But of course, we want a derivation operator which is sound and complete
with respect to arbitrary assignments. However, we can simulate positive
assignments syntactically by removing variables from clausal forms. Given
a set P ~ PV, a bold clause [M, ö] and C ~ WCIs, we define
[M,ö]'P =def [M ~ Lit(P),ö - L M(--,P)]

pEP
c,p =def {[c,P, w] I [c, w] E C and wEm} U

{ [c ,p w,P]
,
I [c,andw] MaxVal
C and w CIs }
E E
(w'P) > 0
The operator ,p is extended to layered clausal forms in a straightforward
manner.
We can prove that every model of a given layered clausal form ([ corres
ponds to a positive model of (['p, for suitable P ~ PV. Thus by considering
all possible combinations of variables which occur in weights and carrying

out derivations in the corresponding 'reduced' clausal forms, we gain a
sound and complete refutation-based derivation system for layered clausal
forms:
THEOREM 7. Let C! be a finite layered clausal form and WVar(C!) the set
of all propositional variables occumng in weights in C!.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) C! has "!'O model;

(ii) For every P ~ WVar(C!), there is [M, 8, w]p E Contr such that C!,P I
- [M,8,w]P.
6 CONCLUSIONS
For lack of space, we cut the further considerations short. It should have
become clear which specific problems have to be addressed in bold resolution
theory.
In Lehmke [1995; 1998], we have defined a derivation operator which is
equivalent with the semantic consequence operator ft- of bold fu,zzy logic,
by employing Observation 1, the operators JV,.z', '6', and the resolution-
based derivation operator for layered clausal forms. We have furthermore
proved that by a slight alteration of the derivation system, ft- can be decided
for finite sets of weighted formulae. We leave this result, together with
considerations of extensions (e.g. to first order fuzzy logic) and restrictions
(e.g. to Horn clauses) of the proposed resolution theory, for forthcoming
publications.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to thank Prof. Dr. Helmut Thiele for his critical remarks,
his encouragement and helpful discussions on the subject, and furthermore
for his original idea to develop aresolution theory for 'bold' fuzzy logic.
University of Dortmund, Germany.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[Hähnle, 1993] R. Hähnle. Automated Deduction in Multiple-valued Logics, volume 10
of International Series 0/ Monographs on Computer Science. Oxford Science
Publications, 1993.
[Lee, 1972] R. C. T. Lee. Fuzzy logic and the resolution principle. J. ACM, 19; 109-119,
1972.
50 STEPHAN LEHMKE
[Lee and Chang, 1971) R. C. T. Lee and C.-L. Chang. Some properties of fuzzy logic.
Information and Control, 19,417-431, 1971.
[Lehmke,1994a) S. Lehmke. On resolution-based derivation in 'bold' fuzzy logic with
weighted expressions. Research Report 545, University of Dortmund, Computer
Science Department, Germany, 1994. Available by request from the author.
[Lehmke, 1994b) S. Lehmke. On semantic consequence, refutation and resolution in
fuzzy logic with 'bold' connectives. In EUFIT '94, volume 2, pages 802-809, Aachen,
Germany, Sept. 20-23, 1994.
[Lehmke,1995) S. Lehmke. On resolution-based theorem proving in propositional fuzzy
logic with 'bold' connectives. Diplomarbeit, University of Dortmund, Department of
Computer Science I, Dortmund, Germany, Feb. 1995. Available by request from the
author.
[Lehmke, 1996) S. Lehmke. Weight structures for approximate reasoning with weighted
expressions. In Proceedings of ISMVL '96, pages 178-183, Santiago de Compostela,
Spain, May 29-31, 1996.
[Lehmke, 1998) S. Lehmke. A resolution-based axiomatisation of 'bold' fuzzy logic.
Research Report 595, University of Dortmund, Computer Science Department,
Germany, to appear 1998. Available by request from the author.
[Murray,1982) N. V. Murray. Completely non-clausal theorem proving. Artijicial
Intelligence, 18:67-85, 1982.
[Novak, 1996) V. Novak. Open theories in fuzzy logic in narrow sense. In IPMU '96,
pages 1003-1007, Granada, Spain, July 1-5, 1996.
[Robinson,1965) J. A. Robinson. A machine-oriented logic based on the resolution
principle. J. ACM, 12, 23-41, 1965.
[Thiele and Lehmke, 1994) H. Thiele and S. Lehmke. On bold resolution theory. In
FUZZ-IEEE '94, pages 1945-1950, Orlando, Florida, June 26-July 2,1994.
DOV M. GABBAY
HOW TO MAKE YOUR LOGIC FUZZY: FIBRED

SEMANTICS AND THE WEAVING OF LOGICS
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
The aim of this paper is to provide a methodology for turning a known crisp
(i.e. {O, I} valued) logic into a fuzzy system. We require of the methodology
that it be meaningful in general terms, using processes which are indepen-
dent of the notion of fuzziness, and that it yield a considerable number of
known fuzzy systems.
To appreciate the need for such a methodology, consider for example the
{A, V, D, O} fragment of modal propositional logic K, and let us examine
our options for turning it into a fuzzy system. This logic is complete for
the crisp Kripke semantics. Kripke models have the formm = (S, R, a, h),
where S i 0 is a set of possible worlds, R ~ S x S is a crisp binary
relation, (of the form R: S x S t--+ {O, I}), a ES is the actual world, and h
is a binary function assigning to each t E S and each atomic q a crisp value
h(t, q) E {O, I}.
h can be extended to all wffs in the usual way with the inductive evalu-
ation of h(t, DA) being
h(t, DA) = 1 iff for all y such that tRy we have h(y, A) = 1.
Or equivalently,
h(t, DA) = Inf {h(y,A) I tRy}.
Similarly
h(t,OA) = 1 iff for some y, tRy and h(y, A) = 1.
We say m FA iff h(a,A) = 1.
Let us try and turn this logic fuzzy!
Working intuitively, one may turn modal logic into a fuzzy modal logic
in several ways [Fitting, 1991; Thiele, 1993]):
1. changing the function h(t,q) into a fuzzy function h*(t,q) E [0,1]

(obtaining real number values);
2. changing the crisp relation R into a fuzzy one R* : S2 r--t [0,1];
3. making a E S fuzzy;
4. any combination of the above.

51
D. Dubois et al. (eds.J, Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 51-83.
52 DOV M. GABBAY
Let us proceed and consider a particular option. We take the real closed
interval [0,1] as our set of fuzzy values and choose 0 as truth T and 1 as
falsity.1..1 The Lukasiewicz tables for the connectives are the following:
• x -+ Y = max(O, Y - x)
• x/\y= max(x,y)
• x V y = min(x, y)
• -,x = I-x.
We can turn ordinary modallogic into a fuzzy modallogic by introducing
functions h* and R* and defining the following evaluation in the fuzzy model
m* = (S,R*,a,h*)
(*1) h*(t,OA) = Infy{max(R*(t,y),h*(y,A)n
(*2) h*(t, DA) = Supy{max(o,h*(y,A) - R*(t,y)n.
These definitions are proposed and discussed by H. Thiele [1993, Definition

6] and seem reasonable, since for the classical two valued case they give the
right result (remember we take 0 as truth!).
The definition is in the right form, since classically satisfaction is written
as
t F OA iff 3y(tRy /\ Y F A)
t F DA iff Vy(tRy -+ y F A)
and we are turning it fuzzy by reading the right hand sides as formulas in
Lukasiewicz's logic.
Although the above seems reasonable, it is still an arbitrary choice. We
might take a different option. We might adopt the view that since 3y(tRy /\
Y F A) classically says that both conjuncts should hold, we can read it in
the many-valued case as
Inf{YIR*(t,y)=O} {h* (y, An.

In other words, we 'average' (using Inf) over those worlds where we are
'sure' they are accessible. H. Thiele [1993] discusses other options, consid-
ered by other authors. It is safe to say that the choices are theoretically
arbitrary and the preference of one choice to another can be determined
only by application needs and not by any methodological considerations.
Can we offer some methodological considerations for making a logic fuzzy
or do we just go from logic to logic and make fuzzy whatever semantical
component we find?
IThis is more convenient for the mathematical considerations of fibring, because we
can view fuzzy logic as a possible world substructural logic, with [0,1] as the set of
possible worlds.
HOW TO MAKE YOUR LOGre FUZZY 53
Obviously the latter alternative is not desirable. What if we use a differ-

ent semantics for K and make fuzzy the functions involved in that seman-
tics? Do we get yet another batch of fuzzy modallogics?
Clearly we could use some general principles.
The methodology we use is that of combining two logics together through
the fibring of their semantics. There are general ways of doing fibring that
are independent of the logics themselves, provided they satisfy some simple
assumptions Gabbay [1992; 1993; 1996]. See also [Gabbay, 1998].
Let LI and L 2 be two logics, say for example that LI is modal logic K
and L 2 is intuitionistic logic. Our methodology allows for several methods
of combinations.
1. One layer LI [L 2 ] allowing for substituting intuitionistic formulas for

the atoms of K.
2. One layer L 2 [Ld allowing the substitution of modal K formulas for
the atoms of intuitionistic logic.
3. More fibred layers say LI [L 2 [LI]] and so on.
4. Full fibring L 1 ,2 = LI ® L 2 •
Methods for obtaining semantics for such fibred logics from the seman-
tics of the components were developed in [Gabbay, 1992] and [Gabbayand
Finger, 1992] and [Gabbay, 1993; Gabbay and Finger, 1996; Gabbay, 1996].
The results are independent of the semantics employed, are logic indepen-
dent, and yield a huge number of known combined logics, logics existing in
the literature in the past thirty years.
In our particular example, let L oo be Lukasiewicz infinite valued logic
(with values in [0,1]) and let us apply our fibring machinery to K and L oo .
We get the following:
1. the fibred semantics for K[L oo ] is a fuzzy semantics with h fuzzy, R
crisp;
2. the fibred semantics for Loo[K] is a semantics with R fuzzy and h
crisp;
3. the semantics for Loo[K[Looll is a semantics where both Rand h are
fuzzy;
4. additional reasonable considerations arising from the fibring method-
ology will allow and lead us towards variations in the fuzzy semantics
obtained.
So in short, when you ask me how to make your logic LI fuzzy, I would
answer-take a pure fuzzy logic L 2 (e.g. L oo or any other) and fibre it to
LI in different ways, and follow the natural fibring options.
54 DOV M. GABBAY
Our plan is as follows. The rest of this section will give apreparatory
example of a parameterised family of modal logics which will explain and
prepare the reader for the fibring construction.
The next section explains intuitively, via examples, how juzzling (mak-
ing fuzzy by fibring) is done and how it relates to the general theory of
combining logics. Later sections will develop the formal machinery.
Consider a parameterised family of bi-modal models of the form mt =
(S, Pt, R t , a, ht ) where t ranges over [0,11 with accessibility relations Pt and
R t where only Pt, R t and h t are dependent on t. These satisfy the following
• t ~ simplies for all atomic q and xE S, ht(x, q) = 1 implies hs(x, q) =

1.
• t ~ simplies Pt ~ Ps,
• t ~ simplies R t 2 RB.
The above are three persistence principles. The first one says if q is true
at a point it continues to be true and the second says that if x and Y are
P connected at t they continue to be P connected. The third one says if x
and Y are R not connected, then they continue to be not connected.
We can define
• p~(x,y) = Inft{xptY holds}
• R~(x,y) = SupdxRty holds}
• h~(x,q) = Inft{ht(x,q) holds}.

We can assume that both Inf and Sup are actually attained!
Thus we have
• XPtY holds iff p~(x,y) ~ t
• ht(x, q) holds iff h~(x, q) ~ t
• xRty holds iff t ~ R~(x, y).

We imagine we have a language with two modalities, 0 and O. 0 uses
R t and 0 uses Pt. Thus 0 and 0 are not interdefinable unless R and P are
properly related.
Let us denote by Ft satisfaction in the model mt, and let us consider the
question of x Ft Oq. Clearly
(ü1) x Ft Oq iff 3y(xptY 1\ Y Ft q) iff 3y(p~(x, y) ~ t 1\ h~(x, y) ~ t)
(Ü2) x Ft Oq iffV'y(t ~ R#(x,y) ~ h#(x,y) ~ t).

HOW TO MAKE YOUR LOGIC FUZZY 55
So far we have done nothing 'fuzzy' except that the family of parame-
terised models mt, tE [0,1] can be presented as a single fuzzy-looking model.
m U = (8,pU,R#,a,h#).
This model looks like the fuzzy modal model m* = (8, R*, a, h*) considered
earlier, but the evaluation is done differently. However, we can motivate the
earlier model m* by using the family mt, through the foHowing considera-
tions:
(1) Gase 0/0
Consider the parameter t = 0. We want to check where x Fo Oq. Choose
a y. It may be that xpoY does not hold. In fact, XPtY starts to hold only
for t ~ pU(x, y). Similarly, ht(y, q} starts to hold only after h#(y, q). We can
say that y Fo q is numerically h#(y, q) 'far' from holding. Similarly, xpoY is
numerically p#(x, y)-far from holding. Together then (xpoY A y Fo q) is far
from holding to an amount which depends on both. It is up to us to choose
how to 'combine' these two amounts. We can add them together, or we can
°
take maximum (recall is truth). Either option is weH known from fuzzy
logic. We choose in this case to take maximum. Thus we say that the value
of xpoy 1\ y Fo q is
max(p#(x, y), hU(y, q»
far from holding. We can therefore reasonably say that
x Fo Oq,
which means,
3y(xPoY A Y Fo q)
is
Infy {max(p# (x, y), hU(y, q»}
far from holding.
(2) Gase 0/0
For this case,consider x Ft Oq. We have
x Ft Oq iff for all y (xRty implies y Ft q).
Choose an arbitrary y. If t ~ R#(x,y) then xRty holds and the distance
from the truth of y I=t q is max(O, h#(x, q) - t). Otherwise, if t > RU(x, y),
there is a further contribution to the distance from the truth to the amount
of t - RU(x, y).
Taking a generous point of view this overall distance is minimised when
t = R#(x,yr Thus the value is max(O,h#(x,q) - R#(x,y» and is now not
dependent on t. We can take Sup over y. Therefore we can say that
x 1= Oq is Supy{max(O,h#(x,y) - RU(x,y»}
far from holding.
56 DOV M. GABBAY
In (1) and (2) above we made arbitrary, through reasonable choices. This
is, however, enough to motivate the fuzzy (*) evaluation, which is itself a
reasonable though still arbitrary choice. Our considerations above do show
that the landscape of possible fuzzy choices can be methodologically moti-
vated by what we can call the [0, 1] parameterised family of modal models.
The next section will show that such parameterised family of models arise
naturally in the fibring process. We thus motivate our choice of making
fuzzy by fibring considerations: the fibring of modality with some chosen
many-valued logics.
2 FIBRING WITH LUKASIEWICZ LOGIC
This section explains though examples the general process of fibring and in
particular discuss fibring of modallogic with many-valued logic. We begin
by motivating the process of fibring.
In many application areas there arises the formal need of combining two
languages together. The most weIl known in applied logic is the use of
temporal logic to describe and verify the temporal behaviour of systems.
Here L 2 is the language for describing a static system and LI is a temporal
language. By substituting sentences of L 2 as 'atoms' within LI we get to
express temporal properties of the system. This is called 'temporalising' of
L 2 , see [Gabbay and Finger, 1992j Gabbay and Finger, 1996]. Another weIl
known family of examples are multimodal logics, such as logics of knowl-
edge and belief, logics of action and dynamic logics. The need to combine
systems also arises in languages that are self-referential and can talk about
themselves. If A(x, y) is a formula with the free variables x, y, we may form
the self-referential formula B(x, y) = A(x, A(x, y». We need to provide se-
mantics for such expressions and fibred semantics ca,n provide for our needs.
See [Gabbay, 1996a] for an overview.
The next example shows how to combine two modallogics.
EXAMPLE 1 (Fibring two modalities). Let LI, L 2 be two modal propo-
sitional languages built on the same atoms, with modalities 0 1 and O2
respectively. Assume Li is complete for the dass of models /Ci. The mod-
els are of the form In = (8, R, a, h), where 8 is the set of possible worlds,
R ~ 8 2 is the accessibility relation, a E 8 is the actual world and h is the
assignment function, associating with each t E 8 and atomic q a crisp value
h(t,q) E {O, I}. We can assume the model satisfies the following:
8 = {x I aRnx, for some n}
where xJl!ly Hf x = y and, xRn+1 y Hf 3z(xRz /I. zRny).

Satisfaction t 1= A, tE 8, A a wff, is defined in the traditional manner:
• t 1= q iff h(t, q) = 1, for q atomicj
• t 1= A /\ B iff t 1= A and t 1= Bj
• t 1=", A iff t 11 Aj
• t 1= DA iff for all s such that tRs we have s 1= Ai
• t 1= OA iff for some s, tRs and s 1= Ai
• m 1= A iff a 1= Ai
• /C 1= A iff m 1= A for all m E /C.

The level (1, 2) fibred language L(1,2} = Lt[L 2] allows for wffs of the form
B = B 1 (xI/CI, ... , xn/Cn, Yl, ... , Ym) where B 1 (Xl!"" X n, Yl,"" Ym) is
a wff of L 1 • Cl,"" Cn are wffs of L 2 and B is obtained by the simultaneous
substitution in B 1 of Ci for Xi respectively.
Let a = (el, ... ,en ) be a sequence of alternating numbers from {1,2}.
We define the fibred language La by induction.
L(e) = Le,e = 1,2.

L(el> ... ,e n } = Let [L(e2, ... ,e n )]·
Let L oo = Ua La denote the fuH fibred language.

We now define fibred semantics for La. A level (1, 2) fibred model has
the form n = (S, R, a, h, F) where m = (S, R, a, h) is a Kripke model of /Cl
and F is a function on S giving for each tE S a model F(t) = (St, R t , at, h t )
in /C2.2
We can assume that S and all the St are pairwise disjoint.
Satisfaction is defined in the usual manner, with the crucial fibring dause
for D i (and similarly for Oi) being the foHowing:
1. wESt for some t, and i = 2 and for all s E St(wRts --+ s 1= A).
2. wES and i = 1 and for all s(wRs --+ s 1= A),
3. wES and i = 2 and at 1= DiA.
4. Undefined" when WESt and i = 1.

In other words, when, at a point WES, we want to evaluate D2A, we go
to F(t) and continue the evaluation of D2 A at the model mt(St.Rt, at, h t ).
HF(t) is a family ofmodels then we have t 1= D 2 A ifffor all mt E F(t),mt 1=
D2 A.
2There is no reason not to allow F(t) to be a family of models or to be empty.
58 DOV M. GABBAY
A level a = (e1' . .. ,en ) fibred model is defined by induction. It has the

form (S, R, a, h, F) where (S, R, a, h) is a model in K e1 and for each t E S,
F(t) is a model in K(e2, ... ,e n ), i.e. a model of level (e2, ... , e n ).
Let K oo = Uo: Ko:.
The models of Ko: can provide semantics for Lo:.
The following figure 1 shows what the models in L(1,2,1) look like.
F(s) = (Ss,Rs,as,h s )
a model for 0 1
F(t) = (St, R t , at, ht )
a model for O 2
a
(S,R,a,h)
a model for 0 1
Figure 1.
The next example shows how such models can be presented more nicely.
EXAMPLE 2 (Simplified fibred models). Consider a model in K(1,2). There

is another way of looking at this fibred model. Since Sand St, t E S are all
pairwise disjoint, let n* = (S*, W a , R*, a, h*, F*) be the model with:
S* = S U UtES St
R* = RUUtRt
W a = {al U {at I t ES}
h* = hU Ut h t
F* : S* t-+ S* be the function with
F*(x) = {ax x, xE S
otherwise.
Consider a language L* with the modalities 0,0 and a jump operator.JJ.
Satisfaction is defined by
x 1= DA iff 'Vy(xRy -+ y 1= A)
x I- OA iff 3y(xRy /\ y 1= A)
x I=.JJA Hf F*(x) 1= A.
Let A be a wff of the mixed language. Translate 0 1 as 0 and O 2 as .lJ0.

Let A * be the translation then
a 1= A iff a 1=* A*
where 1= is satisfaction in (S, R, a, h, F) and 1=* s satisfaction in (S*, W a , R*,

a, h*, F*).
The sets S and St can be retrieved by
S = {x E S* I aR*nx , for some n}

St = {x E S* I atR*nx , for some n}.
and the models F(t) and m can be retrieved by restricting R* and h* to S

and St.
In fact, let (S*, R*, a, h*, F*) be a Kripke model with F* a function from
S* to S*. We call this model a simplijied jibred model (SFM-models) iff the
following holds:
Let W a = {al U {y 13x E S*(y = F*(x)}.
For y E W a , let Sy = {t I yR*nt, for some n}.
Then
2. F*(:Ü i- x 1\ F*(y) i- y -+ F*(x) i- F*(y);

3. S* = UyEw" Sy;
4. An SFM-model is said to be of depth n + 1 if for all x, F*(F*n(x)) =
F*n(x), where F*O(x) = x.
The SFM-models of depth n are models for L(xt, ... ,x General SFM-
n )'
models provide semantics for L oo . See [Gabbay, 1992] for more details.
The next example will motivate the shift in view of looking at fibred
models as fuzzy models.
EXAMPLE 3 (Motivating fuzzy values). We now give a concrete example
of an SFM-model of level 1. Figure 2 shows a 0 1 Kripke model.
Figure 2.
Here S = {a} U {1, 2, 3, ... } with aRn holding, for n = 1,2, ....
60 DOV M. GABBAY
Assurne h(a, q) = 0 and h(n, q) =1 for n =1,2,.... Try to evaluate

01 0 2q.
a 1= 0102q iff for some n, n 1= 02q. Sinee O 2 is in the L 2 language, we
eannot eontinue to evaluate. We need an L 2 model to get a value at n.
The fibring function F(n) gives an L 2 model (Sn, Rn, an, h n ). Let Sm =
{am} U {(m,n) In = 1,2,3, ... }. Let R m be defined by
and let
and
hm((m, n), q) = 1 Hf m ~ n.
To eomplete the picture, let F(a) = F(l). Thus 02q is false at an in all
the models F(n), but we have
(m, n) 1= 02q iff m ~ n.
This partieular fibred model has a special feature whieh is important.

All the models F(n), have isomorphie framesj they are isomorphie to (T =
{O, 1,~,~, ... },~, 0), through 7rm , where 7rm (am ) = 0, and 7rm (m, n) = ~,
and they differ only in the assignment hm(q). The image of the truth set
h m (02Q) = {y I y 1= 02Q} is projeeted on {O, 1, ... , ~ I n = 1,2,3, ... } and
this image gets larger and larger as m inereases. In the limit we have
Sinee we are interested in a 1= (0102Q), where the table for 01 is exis-

tential, we ean say that 0102Q almost holds; it approaches the 'fuzzy' (or
'modal-L 2 ') truth set {;k Im = 1,2, ... }.
This is quite a conceptual jump. The model (S, R, a, h) is a model of
LI (in which 0102Q is false at the point a). This model has no business
getting set values from the set T via the mappings 7rm of the models of L 2 •
However, since all the fibred models F(t}, t E S are based on isomorphie
frarnes, we can extend the evaluation from the fibred models back into the
LI language.
It is important to note that the way we extended the evaluation from the
fibred model to 01 of LI was arbitrary. We chose a way of doing it which
was reasonable, but nevertheless it was a ehoice. We could have said let us
take as value for a 1= 0102Q, not the union of 7r m h m (02Q) but the maximum
or some other reasonable definition.
Having adopted ·a good definition, we now consider the expanded model

(8, R, a, h, F, T, 11").
We can define an L 2 -fuzzy value I't{A), for t E 8 and any A as follows:
• I't{A) = 1I"t ht {A) = {1I"t{S) I S E 8 t and S 1= A} for A in L2 or A
atomicj
• I't{A A B) = I't{A) n I't{B)j

• I't{'" A) = T -l't{A)j
• I't{Ot A ) = U{BltRB} I'B{A)j
• I't{D t A) = n{BltRB} I'B{A).
What we have done can be best understood in algebraic terms. Let B
be the Boolean algebra of the set T = {O, 1,~, 1, ... }
with the interior
operation QD 2 , for Q ~ T being
QD 2 = {x E T I for all y ~ x, Y E Q}.
Assign to each atom q and t E 8 the 'fuzzy' algebraic subset I't{q) ~ T.

In our particular model we assign
I'n{q) = {I, ~, ... , H

I'a{q) = I'I{q).
We extend the assignment by
• I't{D 2 A) = (l't{A))D 2
• I't{D t A) = n{BltRB} I'B{A).
The next example brings the idea forward even more c1early.
EXAMPLE 4 (Many-valued modal logic). This is an example of fibring
semantical models (modallogic) with algebraic models (Lukasiewicz many-
valued logic). We consider the modallanguage LI with 0 and the many-
valued language L2, with {A, V, -t, -,} and with truth values at the real
interval [0,1]. We study Lt{L 2 ). The algebraic models of L 2 are linearly
ordered Abelian groups which are embeddable in [0,1]. So it is sufficient
to consider assignments I' of values and truth table for values in [0,1]. The
following are the algebraic functions:
• the domain is [O,I]j

• ~ is numerical ~ j
• T = {O} {O is truth)j
62 DOV M. GABBAY
• .1 is 1 (1 is falsity);
• IA(X,y) = max (x,y);
• Iv(x,y) = min(x,y);
• I..,(x) = 1 - X;
• I-+(x,y) = max(O,y - x).
We now turn to fibring.

Let m = (8, R, a, h) be a Kripke model for 0 and O. The fibring function
F associates with each t E 8 an algebraic model at = (At, <";,,/A, Iv, 1-+, I.."
{O},I-'t). Since At = [0,1], fibring algebras at to t is nothing more than
associating with each t an arbitrary many-valued assignment I-'t to the atoms
of the modal language.
Let us now evaluate D(q --+ p), q,p atomic, at the fibred model (m, F).
• a t= O(q --+ p) iff for some t E 8 we have aRt and t t= q --+ p.
• a t= D(q --+ p) iff for all t E 8 such that aRt, t t= q --+ p.
• Since the main connective of q --+ p is many-valued, we have t t= q --+ P

iff at t= q --+ p iff I-'t(q --+ p) = 0 iff max(O,l-'t(P) - I-'t(q» = 0 Hf
I-'t(P) <,,;, I-'t(q).
Notice that the value of at t= q --+ q is crisp; it is true if I-'t(P) <,,;, I-'t(q) and
is false otherwise. We could make a choice and make it fuzzy by giving it
the value I-'t(P) - I-'t(q) when false.
Similarly, to evaluate t t= Dq, q atomic, we can consider at t= q and use
I-'t. at t= q is true Hf I-'t(q) = O. Again we get a crisp answer unless we make
a choice to make it fuzzy.
This fuzzy choice is discussed in the next remark.
REMARK 5 (Fuzzy modality). We would like to highlight a point which
will be of importance later. Consider the fibring in the previous example.
We start with m = (8,R,a,h). Then with each tE 8, we fibre an algebra
at. Since all the algebras have the same domain, the fibring reduces to
I-'t, the assignment. Let us pause at this stage and consider the entity
(8, R, a, h, 1-') and let us try to evaluate t t= Dq. Since Dq contains no many-
valued connectives, we get t t= Dq holds iff Vs (tRs implies s t= q) iff Vs(tRs
implies h(t,q) = 1). Consider the wff Iq = def(q --+ q) --+ q. Really Iq
is q but it is formally a many-valued wff. So we have to evaluate it at the
algebra ai. 'We have at t= I(q) iff I-'t(q) = O. t t= DI(q) iff for all s(tRs
implies I-'t(q) = 0).
To summarise, consider t t= Dq; we have two ways of looking at it.
1. Regard 'q' as an atom of the modallanguage, in which case
t 1= Dq Hf for all s, tRs implies h(s, q) = 1.
2. Regard 'q' as an atom of the many-valued language, in which case
t 1= Dq iff for all s, tRs implies Jts(q) = O.
The two evaluations need not give the same result.

We now have the opportunity to make t 1= Dq fuzzy (i.e. 'fuzzle' the
satisfaction 1=, or in other words, 'fuzzle' the modallogic) by extending Jtt
to Dq and Oq:
m • Jtt(Dq) = SUP{sltRs}Jt8(q).
• Jtt(Oq) = Inf{sltRs}Jt8(q).
The reader should note that this definition is a chosen one and we could
have chosen some other 'averaging' function.
Using m we can now fuzzle any wir of the modallogic and extend Jtt to
all wirs, by taking the many-valued table for /\, V,..., and 4-. We have thus
by understable intuitive definition, through (Ü), turned (8, R, a, 1') into a
sort of modal many-valued logic by changing the crisp {0,1} assignment h
into a fuzzy 1'. Note that what we are getting is not fibring, it is something
new.
EXAMPLE 6 (Persistence). This example will fibre modallogic to the in-
termediate logic Dummett's LC. It will serve to prepare the ground for
fibring in the presence of persistence. Let => be intuitionistic implication.
LC is the extension of intuitionistic logic with the axiom schema
or if disjunction is not available, we can write an implicational axiom schema
(p => q) => (((q => p) => r) => r).
Let LI be the language with {=>, /\, V,.l} and let L 2 be modallogic with
D. Consider the intuitionistic LC model with U = [0,1] (unit real numbers
interval) of the form (U,::::;, 0, h). Since we are dealing with intuitionistic
model, we must have persistence, i.e. for all atomic q and any t, sE U.
(*) t ::::; s and h(t, q) = 1 imply h(s, q) = 1.
(**) We also require, for technical reasons, that for all q, h(l, q) = 1.
Satisfaction is defined as follows:
64 DOV M. GABBAY
• t 1= A 1\ B iff t 1= A and t 1= B;
• t 1= A v B iff t 1= A or t 1= B;
• t 1= A :::} B Hf Vs(t ::; s 1\ s 1= A imply s 1= B);
• tl=.lifft=1.
The reader familiar with t-conorms, (see [Gottwald, 1993]), can view the
above as follows:
For each atomic q let
J.L(q) = Inf {t I h(t,q) = I}.

We have (beause of persistence) that J.L can be extended to an wirs as follows:
• ",(A 1\ B) = max(JL(A), JL(B»

• JL(A V B) = min(JL(A), JL(B»
• JL(A --t B) = Inf {t I max (t,JL(A» ~ JL(B)}.
For each t E U, let F(t) = (St, Rt , at, ht ) be a modal model of O. Note
that 0 is not intuitionistically definable from 0 and so we have to explicitly
include 0 if we want, in which case a relation Pt needs to be added for it.
Here we assurne we have 0 only.
By general fibring principles, we must have persistence for modal formulas
as well, for example, for Ok A.
[*] F(t) 1= Ok A and t ::; s imply F(s) 1= Ok A
This means that
It is possible to show that we can assurne without loss of generality (i.e.

without changing the semantic consequence relation) that:
(t) t::; s 1\ xRsY --t xRt y.3
In fact if we let S = Ut St we can assurne that the fibred models are
We are going to assurne the following additional properties:
at = a for some fixed a

3This condition is ror D. For 0 we need t:::; s A XPtY --+ xp.y.
and
t ~ s and ht(x,q) = 1 imply hs(x,q) = 1 for all xE 8 and atomic q.
We beIieve one can show that such assumptions can be made without loss
of generality.
So the models differ only in their accessibility relation Rt which satisfies
(t) above, and the assignment ht .
Define functions h# (x, q) E U, q atomic, x E 8 and R# : 8 2 t-+ U by letting
h#(x,q) = Inf {t I ht(x,q) = I}.
R#(x,y) = Sup {t I xRty}.
(Let us assume the Inf and Sup are attained.)
Consider the system (U,5,,0,Jl,8,R#,a,h#). We can view this system in
two ways:
1. an LC model (U, 5,,0,1') with a fibring of modal models (8, Rt , a, ht ),
where xRty holds Hf R#(x, y) ~ t, and ht(x, q) = 1 iff t ~ h#(x, q);
2. a fuzzy model (8, R#, a, hU) where the accessibility relation R# and the
assignment h# are fuzzy and where the fuzzy truth set is (U, 5,,0,1')
and evaluation is done using the t-conorm max, as indicated above. 4
Let us explore further the fuzzy model (8, R#, a, h#). Consider, for xE 8,
the statement x Ft A, i.e. x F A in the model F(t). Because of persisitence,
we can define (we shall understand the Infimum of the empty set as 1):
JlU(x,A) = Inf{t I x Ft A}.
Consider JlU(x, DA)
1'# (x, DA) = Inf{tlxFtDA}
= Inf {t I Vy(xRty impIies y Ft A)}
but xRty holds iff t 5, R#(x,y) and y Ft A holds iff JlU(y,A) 5, t.

Hence
JlU(x, DA) = Inf {t I Vy(t 5, RU(x,y) implies JlU(y,A) 5, t)}.5
4If we choose a different t-cononn, say
~(A 1\ B) = min (1,~(A) + ~(B»
~(A -+ B) = max (O,~(B) - ~(A»
~(AV B) = max (O,~(A) + ~(B) - 1)
we get evaluation which makes the accessibility relation Lukasiewicz fuzzy.
5For the case of 0 and p, let pU(x,y) = Infdpt(x,y) holds)}. We get
~1(x,OA) =Inf{tlxFtOA}
= Inf{t I 3y(xptY and y Ft A}
= Inf{t 13y(pl(x,y)::; t and ~1(y,A) ::; t)}
66 DOV M. GABBAY
Note that J.L#(x, OA) actually gives the lowest point t above which x F OA
holds. So if the Inf is taken over the empty set the value J.L#(x, OA) = 1, and
x Ft OA is always false.
Our semantics may look fuzzy but it can still be viewed as possible
world semantics. We are not adopting the view that since x FO OA means
3y(xRoY 1\ y FO A), we do a traditional fuzzy evaluation and let
• vo(x,OA) = Infy{max(R#(x,Y),J.Ly(A)}
The model (8, RU, a, h#) should be compared with the parameterised
model (8, p#, R#, a, hU) of Section 1. We saw in Section 1 how we can choose
to turn a parameterised model into a fuzzy model.
The previous two examples show that modal and many valued logic can
be put together in two different ways. If we start with a modal model
(8, R, a, h) then we can fuzzle (make fuzzy) h by changing it into a many-
valued assignment J.L and extend to the entire modal language. If we start
with a many-valued model J.L then we can fuzzle J.L by changing it into a
function into elements of a modal algebra. This turned out to be equivalent
to looking at modal models where the possible world relation is fuzzy but
the assignment is crisp.I.e. models ofthe form (8, R#, a, J.L) where R#(x, y) E
[0,1], while J.L is a {O, I} assignment. J.L can be exteded to all wffs, in which
case it bcomes a [0,1] valued function.
The obvious combination of the two approaches is to make both R# and
J.L# fuzzy. This leads us to the following definition.
DEFINITION 7. An algebraic fuzzled many-valued modal model has the
form (8, R#, a, J.LU), where RU; 8 2 f-t [0,1] is a fuzzy possible world relation
and for each s E 8 and atomic q,J.LU(q) E [0,1].
J.L~ can be extended to arbitrary formulas as follows:
J.L~(A * B) = f .. (J.L~(A), J.L~(B))

where * E {I\, V, -t,...,} and f .. is the many-valued truth table for *.
J.L!(DA) = Inft{for all y,RU(x,y) 2 t implies J.L~(A) S t}.6
SUMMARY 8. We summarise the ideas of this section.
• Making fuzzy is identical with fibring in a special way.
• Any logic L 1 can be 'made fuzzy' by fibring it with L 2 as L 1 [L 2 ].
• If L 1 is the Lukasiewicz infinite valued logic and L 2 is modal logic
then L 1 [L 2 ] can be understood as modallogic with fuzzy accessibility
but crisp assignment to atoms while L2[Ld is modallogic with fuzzy
assignment to atoms (but crisp accessibility).
6JL~(OA) = Inf{t I far same y, max(pU(x,Y),JL~(A)):S t}.
Query: What about LI [L 2 [Ld] and L 2 [LdL 2 ]]? Do we get fuzzy accessi-
bility and fuzzy assignment?
The next section will deal with the case study of fuzzy modal logic in
detail.
3 FUZZY MODAL LOGIC
Let U be the unit interval [0,1]. We consider 0 as T and 1 as .L Let 8 be

a triangular co-norm on [0,1] and let <p be its cP-operator. This m€ans that
8 and <p are binary functions on U and the following holds:
(80) 8 is associative;
(81) 8 is commutative;
(82) 8 is non-decreasing in both arguments;
(83) 8 has 0 as the neutral element, i.e. X80 = x, for all x E U;
(<p 1) v ~ w implies u<pv ~ u<pw;
(<p 2) (U<pV)8U ~ v;
(<p3) v ~ U<p(V8U).
Under suitable conditions the following holds
U<pv = Inf{w I W8U ~ v}.
See [Gottwald, 1993] for details.

We can define a many-valued logic with connectives @ and """* based on
8.
DEFINITION 9 (Fuzzy logic). Consider a language with binary {@,"""*} and

consider U = [0,1] and co-triangular norm 8 and its associated cP-operator
<po
1. A model has the form m = (U, ::;,0, JL), where JL is an assignment to

the atoms satisfying
JL(t, q) = 1 At::; S --7 JL(s, q) = 1.

2. Satisfaction is defined as follows .
• t 1= q iff JL(t,q) = l,q atomic .
• t 1= A @ B iff for some x, y such that x 1= A and y 1= B we have
X8Y ::; t.
68 DOV M. GABBAY
• t F A - B iff for all y such that y F A, we have tsy F B.

3. We say m F A iff 0 F A.
4. We say Al, ... , An Fm B iff for all t, if t F Al ® ... ® An then t F B.
5. To stress that muses the conorm s, we may write IIls.
6. Let K, be a class ofmodels (based on possibly different conorms s). We
write Al, ... , An F,IC B to mean that for all m E K"A l , ... ,An Fm B.
LEMMA 10. Let m be a model. Let JLU(q) = Inf{t I JL(t,q) = I}, for q
atomic. Extend JLU to arbitrary wffs as folIows:
• JLU(A ® B) = JLU (A)sJLU (B)
• JLU(A - B) = JLU(A)IPJLU(B)
Then for any t and A we have
(*) t F A iff JLU(A) :5 t.
Proof. For atomic q this holds by definition.

Case of®
Assume t F A ® B. Then for some x,y,x F A,y F B and xsy :5 t. By
the induction hypothesis JLU(A) :5 x and JLU(B) :5 y, and since s is non-
decreasing, we get
JLU(A ® B) = JLU(A)sJLU(B) :5 xsy :5 t.

Conversely, assume JLU(A ® B) :5 t. Let x = JLU(A),y = JLU(B). Clearly
by the induction hypothesis x F A and y 1= B and xsy :5 t and so t F A ® B.
Case of-
Assume t 1= A - B. Hence for all y, y 1= A implies tsy F B. This means
that for all y:
JLU(A) :5 y -+ JLU(B) :5 tsy
in particular, for y = JLU (A) we get
JLU(B) :5 tSJLU(A).
We also have that
For the choice w = t, we get

Assume now that JLU(A)cpJLU(B) ~ t. We want to show that t F A - B,

Le. we want to show that for all y
JLU(A) ~ Y ~ JLU(B) ~ tsy.
We have by (cp2) that:
JLU(B) ~ (JLU(A)cpJLU(B»sJLU(A) ~ tSJLU(A).
But also
Henee
as required.
•
The previous lemma turns many-valued logie into a substruetural, pos-
sible world semantics, logie. It was essentially observed by D. Seott for
Lukasiewiez infinite valued logie. See [Bole and Borowik, 1992]. Note that
we did not use the eommutativity of S in the proof.
We are now ready to fibre.
DEFINITION 11 (General fibred models). Let L l be the language ofmodal
logie with 0 and let L 2 be the fuzzy language with ® and -. Let Kl, K 2
be respective classes of models for the languages. It is convenient for us in
the many-valued case to allow for many disjoint copies of the interval [0, 1].
Let
Um = {m} X [0,1],
and let
(m,x) ~ (m,y) iff x ~ y
(m,x)s(m,y) = (m,xsy)
(m, x)cp(m, y) = (m,xcpy).
For convenience we write Om instead of (m,O).
The above gives us an infinite number of disjoint copies of our fuzzy
models in K 2 •
We are going to build fuzzled Li structure of level n, for arbitrary n. We
are going to use distinet eopies of Uk during the proeess, so that all models
involved are disjoint.
1. (a) The fuzzled struetures of K~ are all structures of K l .

(b) The fuzzled structures of K~ are all structures of K 2 • Note that
each structure (U,~, 0, 1') E K 2 has many isomorphie copies in
K2 •
Given a structure in K! and a possible world t in it we say that t is
of level 1 in the structure.
70 DOV M. GABBAY
2. Assume that the fuzzled structures of level n have been defined. Let
us use the notation Kf and K~ for the families of these structures.
Assume that the notion of a possible world t appearing in such a
structure is also defined and that each such point has a clearly defined
unique level k, 1 :::; k :::; n. We now define Kf+1, i = 1,2.
The structures of K~+1 have the form
m = (S,R,a,h,F~).
For the case n = 1, F~ is interpreted as identity.

The structure
n = (S,R,a,h) E K I
is called the sur/ace model of m.
Ff is a function giving for each t E S a structure Ff(t) E K~.
The points in S are called the sur/ace points of m and are of level
n + 1. We assume that S and all points in Ff(t), for all t E S are all
pairwise disjoint.
The structures in K~+1 have the form
m= (Uk,:::;,(k,O),l-'k,F~),
where
n = (Uk :::;, (k, 0), I-'k)
is a copy model of K2 (called the sur/ace model of m) and for all
u E Uk , F~(u) is a model of Kf of the form
F~(u) = (S,Ru,a,hu,F~-I).
We assume that u :::; u' implies Ru :2 Ru" and that for all x E S and
atomic q, hu(x, q) = 1 implies hu' (x, q) = 1.
We can also assume that k is chosen in such a way that Uk and
F~(u), u E Uk are all pairwise disjoint.
The points of Uk are said to be of level n + 1 and are called the sur/ace
points of m.
Note that S, a and F~-l do not depend on u.

We now define the wffs of the language Li, n = 1,2, ....
• The wffs of L! are the wffs of Li .
• Thewffs ofLf+1 havetheform B = Bo(xdCI, ... ,xn/Cn,YI, ... ,Ym)
where BO(XI' ... ,xn,YI, ... ,Ym) is aformulaofL i , and Cl, ... , C n are
formulas of Lj, j =J i, m :::; n and B is the result of the simultaneous
substitution of Ck for Xk in Bo.
DEFINITION 12 (Satisfaction). We now define a satisfaction t Fn A in a

model m of Kf of a formula of Lf' ,n' ~ n.
1. For models of K i and wffs of Li, satisfaction F n , n ~ 1 is as in modal
or many-valued logic.
2. Assume satisfaction t Fn C has been defined in models of Kf for wirs
of Lf' and surface point t of level n,n' ~ n.
Consider a model m E Kf+1, and a formula B = BO(Xk/Ck,Yr), k = 1, ... ,
m, r = 1, ... , m', of Lf' +1. n' + 1 ~ n + 1. If the surface model n of m is
a modal model, then BO(Xk,Yr) is a modal formula and Ck,k = 1, ... ,m
are L~k formulas with nk ~ n'. In case the surface model of m is an L 2
model, then B o is an L 2 formula and Ck, k = 1, ... , m are L~k formulas for
nk ~n'.
Let t be a surface point of m. For any subformula C of B o, t Fn +1 C
can be evaluated. We need only to say how to evaluate t F n +1 Ck, since Ck
is not in the language of the surface model. In this case we stipulate that
t F n +1 Ck iff Fn(t) F n Ck .
EXAMPLE 13. Consider a model in K~. This has the surface structure of
the form, say,
m2 = (U2,~,(2,O),JL2).
m2 is a fuzzy model, with satifaction defined by
u F q iff JL2(q) ~ u.
The points of U2 are of level 2.
With each u E U2 , we fibre a level 1 modal model of the form
n ... = (S1,R ... ,a1,h... ).
We have seen in Example 2.6 that the model m2 can be presented in the
form
m~ = (S1,RLa1,h~)
where satisfaction for x E S1 is defined as follows
x F... q iff h ... (x, q) = 1, q atomic
x F... DA Hf 'rty(xR ... y -+ y F... A)
X F ... OA iff 3y(xR... y 1\ y F ... A).
Note that since U1 ~ U2 1\ h"' l (x, q) = 1 -+ h"' 2 (x, q) = 1, we can let

h~(x,q) = Inf {u I h... (x,q) = 1}.
We assume h~ (x, A) is defined for A and that
x F... A iff h~ (x, A) ~ u.
We extend h~ to all wffs by
72 DOV M. GABBAY
h~(x,OA) = Inf{ulxFuOA}
• = Inf {u I for all y,xR,.y -+ y Fu A}
= Inf {u I for all y,u:::; R~(x,y) -+ h~(y,A):::; u}.
• h~(x,OA) = Inf{u 13y(u:::; R~(x,y) A h~(y,A) :::; u)}
• h~ (X, A A B) = h~ (X, A)sh~ (X, B)
• h~ (X, A -* B) = h~ (X, A)cph~ (X, B)

Consider now a model n E Kr. This has a surface model (82 , R3, a3, h 3)
with a fibring function F~, giving for each t E 8 3 a K~ model mt. By the
discussion above, mt can be presented as a model
Thus we can now view our Kr models as a fibred model of the form
(83 ,R3,a3,h3 ,FU), where FU(t) = (8t,Rf,at,h~), for each t E 83.
Consider now a model in K~. This has the level 4 surface fuzzy model
(U4 , :::;,(4,0), J.t4, F~), where for each u E U4 , F~(u) is a Kr model.
The latter has the level 3 form (83 , Ru, a3, h u , FU), where F# is as we have
seen above.
Again by method of Example 6 and considerations as above the level 4
and level 3 surface models can be presented as
and the general model in K~ has the form
The above considerations show that the basic modal fuzzy model can be
taken to be ofthe form (8,RU,a,h U), with RU,hUboth fuzzy. These models
can be fibred together to form the family K;,
see Definition 15 below. Note
that K; is identical with K~n viewed as n level fibring of models of the form
(8, RU, a, h U). Thus Un K; is the family of all models in K~, n = 2,4,6, ....
A model in K~n+1 has a model of K I as its level 1 model. We note that
any model of K I can be regarded as a model of K~, where the fuzzy model
of level 1 is a crisp {O, 1} model.
Thus any model of K~n+l can be regarded also as a model of K~n+2.
Therefore we conclude that
n n
Furthermore, a model m in K 1 can be regarded as a model n in K~ where

the surface model of n is the {O, I} crisp logic. Thus all models in can Kr
be regarded as models in K~+! and so we condude also that
n n
DEFINITION 14. Let K~ be the dass of all models of the form (8, RU, a, hU)
where R" and h" are fuzzy functions into some fuzzy model (U, :S:, 0, s, cp).
Let Kr+! models have the form (8, RU, a, h", F") where (8, R", a, h") is a
K~ surface model and F" (t), for t E 8 is in Kr-
DEFINITION 15 (Simplified fuzzy modal models). Let (U,:S:, 0, s, cp) be a
fixed fuzzy structure with co-norm s and 4>-operator cp. Let K be a family
of modal Kripke structures of the form (8, R, a, h). Asimplified uniform
fuzzy modal model (MZ-model) has the form (W, R", a, h", F") where W is
a set of worlds. F" is a fibring function F" : W t-t W, R" : W x W t-t U is a
fuzzy relation and h" is a fuzzy assignment, giving for each t E W and each
atomic q the value hU(t, q) E U.
Consider a language with O,.lf, ...... and 18).
Evaluation in the structure is as follows
• J.Lt(q) = h"(t,q), for q atomic;
• J.Lt(A 18) B) = J.Lt(A)sJ.Lt(B);
• J.Lt(A ...... B) = J.Lt(A)cpJ.Lt(B);
• J.Lt(OA) = Inf{u I for all y,u:S: R"(t,y) implies J.Ly(A) :s: u};
• J.Lt(.lfA) = J.LF~(t)(A);
• Let A hold in the model iff J.La(A) = 0;
• Let Af'vB hold in the model Hf J.La(A) 2:: J.La(B).
The reader should note that the presence of .lf (Le. the fibring function
F) allows us a multitude of ways of making a formula fuzzy. Consider an
atom q, and a tE W. We can evaluate q at t in many ways.
t 1=1 q iff t 1= q
t 1=2 q iff t I=.lfq iff F(t) 1= q
74 DOV M. GABBAY
Let A be a modal formula. We define the set of wffs Fuzz (A) in the
modallanguage with JJ as folIows:
Fuzz (q) = {q,.Jfq,JJ 2q, ... }

Fuzz (A A. B) = {X A. Y I X E Fuzz (A), Y E Fuzz (B)}
Fuzz ('" A) = {'" X I X E Fuzz (A)}
Fuzz (DA) = {.JfnOX I X E Fuzz (A), n = 0,1,2, ...}.
For any wff A and any X E Fuzz (A), we can see X as a way of making
A fuzzy.
Let On = .JfnO. The set {On} is a family of modalities. For any wff A
containing 0, we have the option of reading each box as On for some n.
All of these options give rise to the various wffs in Fuzz(A). Let p,* be a
function giving for each natural number n a fuzzy value p,*(n) E [0,1]. We
can use p,* to 'choose' which On the connective 0 is to be.
We can let
The above consideration amounts to making the syntax itself (namely '0')
fuzzy.
4 MAKING A FUZZY LOGIC EVEN MORE FUZZY
This section deals with the question of how to make a fuzzy logic even more
fuzzy-by fibring it with yet another fuzzy logic.
We begin with an illustrative example.
EXAMPLE 16. Let LI be Lukasiewicz many-valued logic. The values are
from U = [0,1] with 0 = T, 1 = ..1 and the co-norm and q; operators are
• xoy= min(1,x+y)
• x-y= max(O,y-x)
• x A. Y = max(x,y)
A model is an assignment P,I giving each atomic q a value P,1(q). P,I can
be exteded to all wffs using the tables above. As we saw in Lemma 10, this
can be turned into a possible world model (U,~, 0, h, t) by defining a crisp
assignment h and satifaction as folIows:
• ht(q) = T iff P,1(q) ~ t, for q atomic.
• t t= A A. B iff t t= A and t t= B.
• t t= A - B iff for all y t= A we have toy t= B.
By Lemma 10 we have for all wffs A
t 1= A iff 1'1 CA) 5, t.

Let us now take another logic L2, based on [0, I], with conorm s and
c{>-operator r.p, and fibre this logic to L 1, to form L(1,2) = L 1(L 2).
We want to study what we get. The models of L(1,2) have the form
(U, 5" 0, ht,I'~) where (U, 5,,0, ht ) is as before and I'Hq) E [0, I], for atomic
q. Following general fibring principles, we require that the fibred models
respect 5" Le.
• t 5, s ~ I'~(q) ~ I'~(q).
I'~ is defined for any wff a of L 2. It is not defined on wffs of L 1. Our

objective is to extend I'~ to the language L 1 in some natural way.
We observe that in the model (U, 5" 0, ht ) the assignment ht is crisp.
We fibre I'~ to the model in order to make it fuzzy. We get the model
(U, 5,,0, I'n.
Thus I'~ replaces h t , i.e. the crisp t 1= q is replaced by I't(q). The question
is how do we evaluate I'~(A - B), for the - of L 1.
We know that t 1= A - B is evaluated as
Vy(y 1= A implies t 0 Y 1= B).
If we assurne by induction that x 1= A is now replaced by 1'; (A), then we

want to evaluate Vy[Jt~(A) implies l'~oy(B)].
At this juncture it is up to us to decide how to extend I'~. We can choose
the most general view and take a completely new co-norm * with its <p
operator r.p* and let
1';2(A _ B) = Sup;{1';2(A)r.p*I';;y(B)}
where Sup* is defined on sets of elements from U by:
SUP*{X1, ... ,Xn } =X1 * ... *X n

(recall that * is commutative and associative) and
Sup* X = Sup{Sup*Y I Y ~ X, Y is finite}.
Thus 'implies' is evaluated by 'r.p.' and 'Vy' by 'SUp;'.7
It is more sensible to take the conorm 0 of the logic L 1 itself and its <p
operator - and extend I'~ using them. We get
7To be precise, the logic LI may already have a way of evaluating the universal
quantifier 'Vy'. In such a case we should use that same definition. Our proposal here
corresponds to the Sup; evaluation for 'Vy'. Another possibility is just to take Sup"
regarding 'V' as a big conjunction '1\'.
76 DOV M. GABBAY
J.t;cA --* B) = Vy(J.ty(A) --* J.ttoy(B))

= Sup~ max(O, J.ttoy(B) - J.ty(A)).
Note that since

t:::; s -+ J.t;(q) ~ J.t;(q)
we also get by structural induction
for all wffs of LI.

Now let us assurne that all the J.tt are equal to some fixed J.t2.
Then we get
i.e. we get the fuzzy model (U,:::;, 0, J.t2). If we choose J.t2 = J.tl, we get the
original model.
Thus we can take our basic fibred fuzzy concept of model to be (U, :::;,-+,
J.tt), where J.tt is a family of assignments, with the inductive evaluation being
• J.tt(A --* B) = Sup~{J.ty(A) --* J.ttoy(B))
For the case of J.tt = J.t for all t, this gives us the old unfibred definition
of a model.
The reader should note that Sup~ operates on sets and not on sequences.
Thus
Sup~{J(yr), !(Y2)}
will be !(yr) if !(YI) = !(Y2) and not !(YI) * !(Y2). It might be simpler to
use in our ordinary Sup instead of Sup*?
The notion of a self-fibred model was obtained from trying to make a
fuzzy logic even fuzzier. We took an ordinary (U, :::;,0, J.tl). We looked at it
as a possible world model (U,:::;, 0, ht ), where ht is crisp and we have
We then replaced the crisp ht by a fuzzy J.t~. This gave us a new notion
of a self fibred model (U,:::;, 0, J.tt). J.tt itself is a standard model (indexed
by t). If we iterate the process, we would have to replace the models J.t~ by
the new concept of self-fibred models. This means replacing J.t~ by a family
J.t~,8' t, sE U.
Thus the iterated concept gives us the notion of level n self fibred fuzzy
model as (U, :::;,0, J.ttt, ... ,tJ, (tl, ... ,tn ) E un.
The value of J.ttl ,... ,t n (A --* B) can be computed in n different ways,
depending on which coordinate we use.
J.ttl> O{ J.ttl,.
i ... ,t" (A -.. B) -- SUPy i .. ,1/, ... ,t" (A) !POJ.ttl> ... ,t,oy,... ,t" (B)}
i.e. we use eoordinate i.

We are thus lead to the following definition.
DEFINITION 17 (Self fibred fuzzy logie). A fibred fuzzy logie has the form
(U, 5:,0, J.tt, s, !Ps) where (U, 5:, 0) is a set of values (e.g. [0, 1], s and !Ps are
a eonorm and its <p operator and J.tt, for t EU is a fuzzy assignment giving
each atom q a value J.tt(q) EU.
We require
t 5: S -+ J.tt(q) ~ P,s(q).
We extend J.tt to an wffs by
A self-fibred model of the level n has the form (U, 5:, 0, J.tt l ,... ,t,,), where
J.th ,... ,t" is monotonie down in t b ... , t n and where evaluation of A -.. B ean
be done in n different ways, with
We ean add mode eonnectives .lTr r = 1, ... ,n and let
We start with an implieationallogie in a language Li with the eonneetives

® and -.. and with possible world semantics ofthe form (8,0,5:, a, ht ) where
• t 1= A ® B iff for some x, y, x 1= A and y 1= B and x 0 y 5: t.

• t 1= A -.. B iff for all y, y 1= A implies t 0 Y 1= B.
We make no assumptions of the binary operation '0' exeept possibly
associativity and monotonicity in the first eoordinate:
• t 5: s -+ t 0 y 5: so y.
LEMMA 18.
t 1= A /\ t 5: s -+ s 1= A.
78 DOV M. GABBAY
Proof. By induction on A. The atomic case and the case of A 0 B are clear
(since ~ is transitive).
Assume 'lr/y(y 1= A -t t 0 Y 1= B). Assume t ~ s. We want to show
'lr/y(y 1= A -t so y 1= B). This follows from the monotonicity of x 0 y in the
variable x.
Let L 2 be another fuzzy logic, say a many-valued logic with values in
[0,1), with conorm sand <p operator <po
We consider L(I,2) = LdL 2). This is a fibred system and so its models
have the form (S,~, 0, a, ht , F), where for each t E S, F(t) is an L 2 model,
say h~(q) giving values to the atoms q in [0,1). We can write the model as
(S, ~,o, a, ht , h~).
According to the principles of fi bring, h~ must respect the ~ order, namely
°
(remember = T, 1 = ..1) the followihg holds.
• t~ S -t h~(q) ~ h~(q)
We would like to extend h~ to the language of LI. The truth definition
for LI is.t 1= A -» B iff for all y (y 1= A -t t 0 Y 1= B)
H A,B are atomic then y 1= A means h~(A) = O. So the condition
becomes
• t 1=1 A -» B iff for all y, (h~(A) = 0 -t h~o!l(B) = 0).
1=1 is not satisfactory. It does not take full account of the range of values
of h:. It is up to us to choose a better definition. We can try
• t I=w A -» B iff for all y, (h~(A) ~ h~o!l(B»

or following the previous example, we can let
H we let -t2 denote Lukasiewicz implication and let 1\ denote Lukasiewicz

conjunction then
•
5 COMPARISON WITH THE LITERAT URE
Let us now compare our method with existing fuzzy systems from the lit-
erature.
EXAMPLE 19 (System of Gabbay, 1968). It is easy to turn any logic
into a many-valued system. This example recalls how Gabbay, in a let-
ter to A. N. Prior, defined an intuitionistic many-valued logic. The Kripke
structures for any logic (which allows for Kripke semantics) have the form
(8, R 1 ,R2, ... ,Rn, h) where Ri are various relations and h is an assignment.
H we consider h as a function h(t, q) E {O, I} for t E 8 and q atomic, it is
°
easy to turn the semantics into many-valued semantics. We make h many-
valued, e.g. have h(t, q) E [0,1], the unit interval. is T, 1 is 1.. Done for
intuitionistic logic we get the following structures, (8,:5, h) , where (8,:5)
is a partially ordered set and h is a function such that
• h(t, q) E [0,1]
• t:5 s -+ h(t, q) ~ h(s, q).
h can be extended to all wfIs as follows:
• h(t,A V B) = min{h(t,A,h(t,B)}
• h(t, A A B) = max{h(t, A), h(t, B)}

• h(t,A => B) = {max(O, h(s, B) - h(s,A»)}
• h(t, ...,A) = SUPB~dl - h(s, A)}
• A f- B ifI for all structures and all t, h(t, A) ~ h(t, B).
No axiom system was ofIered

EXAMPLE 20 (The Systems of Fitting). 8Melvin Fitting [1991] observed
that although there were many proposals for many-valued modallogics in
the literature, they all
'retain the general notion of possible world semantics, while

allowing formulas to have values in many-valued space. What
seems not to have been considered is allowing the accessibility
relation between possible worlds itself to be many valued.'
Fitting presents such a system. He takes aspace of truth values which

is a finite lattice T, with ordering:5. The language fitting uses contains
propositional constants naming elements of T. The connectives are A, V
and -+. A valuation v(A) gives lattice values to atoms and the constants
(constants get what they name) and v is extended naturally to all wfIs.
v(A A B) = v(A) A v(B), v(A V B) = v(A) V v(B).
For the case of v(A -+ B), we have several options. We must make sure
that
• v(A -+ B) = 1 ifI v(A) :5 v(B)

8Note that Fitting takes the value 1 as T and 0 as .L Th compare with our systems,
exchange ":::;' and ':2:' and 'max' and "min'.
80 DOV M. GABBAY
but the exact definition of v(A --+ B) is still optional. Since r is finite, it
having the property of being a pseudo complemented lattice is equivalent
to its being distributive and so we can define
v(A --+ B) = max{x I v(A) /\ x:::; v(B)}

= v(A) -» v(B).
Fitting gives aGentzen system for the above and uses the above to define
two modal many-valued logics.
Add D to the language and let (s, R, v) be a Kripke structure with v a
nmction v(t, q) E r.
v can be extended to all wffs pointwise as before with
• v(t, DA) = /\ {v(s, A) I tRs}
• v(t,OA) = V{v(s,A) I tRs}

Fitting axiomatises this system.
Note that we have names in the language to all elements of r.
In his second version Fitting allows R to be many-valued, thus for each
t,s E S,R(t,s) is a value in r.
v is extended to D as follows:
v(t,DA) = /\{R(t,s) -» v(s,A)}.
Fitting gives a complete axiom system for this semantics.

In a continuation paper, [Fitting, 1992], Fitting investigates the case
where the many-valued lattice T is a Heyting algebra.
REMARK 21 (Discussion of Fitting and Gabbay). The previous examples
are clear cut cases of 'fuzzling'. The first option is to fibre some many-
valued logic to modal logic and make the assignment fuzzy. Fitting makes
his modal logic fuzzy by using the lattice T as values. The accessibility
relation remains 'crisp' two-valued.
On the other hand, if we take many-valued logic and fibre modallogic to it
(giving values in modal logic) , we get the system where R the accessibility
relation becomes fuzzy. This is what Fitting does and this is what we
illustrated in Section 2.
If we do both steps, we get a logic where both the accessibility relation
and the assignment to worlds are fuzzy.
The important point is that these procedures are examples of general
fibring and can be done uniformly for any pair of logics.
EXAMPLE 22 (The System of Finger-Gabbay). Finger-Gabbay (1992) are
motivated from the application area of time varying systems. Given a sys-
tem S described in a logic L l , its state may change in time. Thus we need a
way to express changes in state of the system and one of the ways of doing
so is to add to LI a temporal componenet.
This is done by allowing atomic formulas of LI also to be formulas of a
logic L 2 , where L 2 is a temporallogic. Thus the wffs ofthe new logic LI [L 2 ]
are obtained by substituting in wffs of LI formulas of L 2 for the atoms.
This process is the same as giving 'new values' to the atoms of LI. The
ideas of this paper were adopted by teh logic and natural language com-
munity. There are ways of adding 'features' to 'types' to generate what
are known as feature logics. These can be viewed as making (fuzzling) a
type logic (say the Lambek calculus) into a 'many-valued' logic where the
'values' are the features.
EXAMPLE 23 (The System of H. Thiele). H. Thiele proposes in his paper
[1993) to change the assignment h into a fuzzy one as weH as the accessibility
relation R. He considers aH 3 options, making h fuzzy and R crisp, R fuzzy
and h crisp and both Rand h fuzzy.
We already discussed in Section 1 how to get the Thiele definition from
a parameterised family of modal models. We saw in Section 2 that such a
family can be obtained from fibring with Lukasiewicz logic.
6 CASE STUDY: FUZZY AUTOMATA
Let us apply our fibring ideas and see what notion of a fuzzy automaton
we can get. The reader should bear in mind that the definition of a fuzzy
automaton should arise automaticaHy from the idea of fibring. We are not
free to define it at will by making fuzzy any component we choose in the
traditional definition of an automaton.
DEFINITION 24 (Traditional non-deterministic automaton).
1. A non-deterministic automaton has the form (8,~, M, So, Q) where

8 is a (finite) set of states, I: a finite set of atomic alphabet letters,
So E 8 is the initial state and Q ~ 8 is a set of the accepting states.
M is a function giving for each u E I: and S E 8 a (possibly empty)

set M (u, s) ~ 8, being the set of all states. accessible to S when
encountering the input u.
2. Astring of words (U1,"" un) is said to be accepted by the automaton,

if there exists a sequence of states (S1> ... ,sn) such that
• SI E M(U1,SO)
• Si E M(Ui, Si-I), 1 :s; i :s; n

• Sn E Q.
82 DOV M. GABBAY
We now try to find adefinition of a fuzzy automaton arising directly

from the idea of fibring. Let tR u 8, for 0' E ~ and t,8 E 8 be defined as
8 E M(a, t). Ru can be viewed as a modal accessibility relation for the
modality Ou. Let q be a propositional constant and consider the modal
logic with {Ou I 0' E ~} and a single atomic propostion q. Consider the
special model In = (8, Ru, 80, h) where h(8, q) = 1 Hf 8 E Q.
We have the following
(*) (al, ... , an) is accepted by the automaton Hf InF OUt· .. OU n q.
Having established the connection between the automaton and modal
logic, we now know how to make a fuzzy automaton. We make h fuzzy and
each Ru fuzzy. This corresponds to the two ways of fibring, as discussed
in previous sections. Making h fuzzy means making Q a fuzzy function:
Qn : 8 t-t [0,1]. Making Ru(x,y) fuzzy means making M into a fuzzy
function Mn(a, 8, t) : ~ x 8 x 8 t-t [0,1].
Thus we can define a fuzzy evaluation as in Definition 1.7:
• J.Lt(q) = Qn(t);
• J.Lx(OuA) = Inf{t I for some y,J.Ly(A) ::; t::; MU(a,x,y)}.
Thus a fuzzy automaton can accept astring (al, ... , an) with a fuzzy
value J.Lso(OUt·· .Ounq).
The above definition corresponds to what was proposed in the literature,
see [Santos, 1968].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is part 3 of aseries of papers entitled 'Fibring semantics and the
weaving of logics'.
King '8 College, London.
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ings of the 23rd International Symposium on Multiple Valued Logic, pp. 62-67. IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1993.
MIHIR K. CHAKRABORTY AND SANJUKTA BASU
INTRODUCING GRADE TO SOME METALOGICAL

NOTIONS
INTRODUCI10N
That classical two-valued logic is ill-equipped to deal with reasoning involving

vague concepts is quite evident now. One instance of the inadequacy lies in that
the so-called Sorites and other paradoxes [Cargile, 1969; Dummett, 1978] emerge
when classical roles of inference are applied to premises involving vague expres-
sions. But vagueness is all-pervasive in naturallanguage expressions and strangely,
through such an inexact medium we communicate, reason and take decisions in
everyday life.
In spite of recognising this fact, Frege and RusseU have taken the position
of keeping vagueness outside the realm of logic [Frege, 1952; RusselI, 1923;
Russell and Whitehead. 1927]. This way of bypassing the problem however has
not satisfied the latter researchers.
A pioneering effort to analyse and provide an appropriate symbolism for vague-
ness has been undertaken by Max Black [1954]. Much later Zadeh [1965; 1975]
shows how fuzzy set theory with its notion of graded membership can provide a
reasonable mathematical basis for the semantics of vague expressions. Fuzzy logic
based on fuzzy set theory is a well-known approach towards understanding and
formalising reasoning involving vague concepts. Some significant works on fuzzy
logic and approximate reasoning are to be found in [Bandler and Kohout, 1981;
Castro et al., ; Cleave, 1974; Dubois et al., 1994; Edmonds, 1980; Gaines, 1977;
Gerla, 1994; Gerla, 1996; Gerla and Tortora, 1990; Goguen, 1968; Gottwald, 1993;
Hajek et al., 1996; Hajek,; Novak, 1988; Novak, 1990; Pavelka, 1979; Ra-
siowa, 1992; Rasiowa, 1990; Rasiowa and Ng, 1992; Sikic, 1991; Thronen, 1992;
Thrunen, 1992].
In this paper we propose that if vagueness is present at the object level lan-
guage (i.e. in its interpretation), it cannot be generally denied at the level of meta-
concepts like consequence, consistency, completeness, etc. Here we are not pre-
senting the logico-philosophical justification of this standpoint (which will be the
content of another work) rather we build up the mathematical formalism required
to support this position.
Tarski has pointed out [Tarski, 1956] that the notion of consequence is pivotal
to a study of any deductive system. A number of researchers have focused their
attention on the formulation of a notion of consequence appropriate for deductive
systems concerned with approximate reasoning. In two-valued logic the notion
of consequence has been defined in two alternative but equivalent ways by Tarski
[1956] and Gentzen [1969]. Shoesmith and Smiley [1978] have extended this
85
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 85-99.
86 MIHIR K. CHAKRABORTY AND SANJUKTA BASU
notion further to multiple conclusion logic. Pavelka [1979] and Novak [1990]
have constructed fuzzy logic with the help of a kind of closure operator which is an
extension of Tarski 's notion of consequence operator. They have given semantics
to their system and addressed the issue of soundness and completeness.
Chakraborty [1988] on the other hand, has proposed a notion of graded con-
sequence relation which is an extension of the notion of consequence relation as
defined by Gentzen and Shoesmith and Smiley.
The connection between fuzzy closure operators and graded consequem;e rela-
tions has been observed by Gerla [1996].
The present paper is a summary of the works done so far on graded conse-
quence relation and some further developments. On the basis of the notion of
graded consequence grade can also be introduced to other metalogical concepts.
Additionally, we here propose a general framework to introduce theories with ax-
ioms and rules that generate a notion of consequence which is graded in the above
sense. Issues regarding soundness and completeness in this axiomatic framework
have been dealt with. Any system arising out of the framework is shown to be
sound relative to the semantics. It has been argued that in fuzzy logic, complete-
ness may be partial and a measure of its degree of completeness may be introduced
meaningfully.
1 GRADED CONSEQUENCE
Without entering into the details of the formallanguage, let us assume that :F is the
set of all well-formed formulae of a formallanguage C; X, Y, Z, .. . are subsets of
F, and a, ß, T, ••• are elements of F.
The truth set is at least a complete pseudo Boolean algebra L = {L, 1\, V,
=>,0, I} with 0 and 1 as the least and the greatest elements respectively. A pseudo
Boolean algebra is a relatively pseudo complemented lattice with the least element.
A lattice L is relatively pseudo complemented if'v'a, bEL, a => b exists, such that,
i a 1\ c :::; b iff c :::; a => b for any cE L [Rasiowa and Sikorski, 1963].
An L-valued semantics on the set F of well-formed formulae is assumed to be a

subset ofthe set LJ'", the set ofL-fuzzy subsets of F [Goguen, 1968]. Henceforth
we will refer to an element of LJ'" as fuzzy subset only.\ Some other properties of
pseudo Boolean algebra used in the sequel are listed below:
ii a => b = 1 iff a :::; b,
iii 1 => a = a,
IWe note that in [Chakraborty, 1997], the truth set has been assumed to be a complete residuated
lattice. However even when we use a more general operator '*' and an implication operator which is a.
residuation with respect to '*' for computing metalinguistic conjunction and implication respectively,
most of the results conceming the theory of graded consequence presented in this paper remain valid
as shown in [Chakraborty, 19971.
INTRODUCING GRADE TO SOME METALOGICAL NaTIONS 87
iv a:5 b implies a ::} c ~ b ::} c,
V a:5 b implies c ::} a :5 c ::} b,

vi a::} b ~ «a" c) ::} b) " (a ::} c),
vii a" (a ::} b) :5 b,

viii (a::} b) " (b ::} c) :5 (a ::} c),
This structure is enough for the discussion about metalogical concepts. The lat-
tice meet· 'I\' and the operator '::}' would serve for the value-assign-
ment of the meta linguistic assertions involving meta linguistic conjunction and
implication. Some expected behaviours of metalinguistic conjunction and impli-
cation even in fuzzy context, give rise to certain demands that are fulfilled by ''''
and '::}'. This prompts us in using these operators for computing meta linguistic
conjunction and implication. When required we use 'inf' and 'sup' for comput-
ing 'for all' and 'there exists' respectively, as these are involved in meta linguistic
assertions. For computation of the values of well-formed formulae of the object
language we may need some other operators in L, corresponding to object lan-
guage connectives, but as we are not entering within the specificities of the object
language in any way in the present discussion, no such specific operator is intro-
ducedin L.
The notion of graded consequence is a generalization in the context of multiple-
valued logic, of the notion of consequence relation as formalized by Gentzen in the
context of two-valued logic. According to Gentzen 's formulation [Gentzen, 1969;
Shoesmith and Smiley, 1978] consequence is a binary relation f- from P(F), the
power set of the set of all well-formed formulae, to F, the set of well-formed
formulae satisfying the conditions:
(GI) Ifa E X,X f- a.
(G 11) If X ~ Y and X f- a, then Y f- a.
(G III) If X f- ß for all ß E Z and X U Z f- a, then X f- a, where X, Y, Z ~

F,a,ß E F.
A fuzzy relation r- from P(F) to F relating X ~ F to a E F to a degree
denoted by gr(Xr-a) E L, is called graded conclusion relation [Chakraborty,
1988], or simply conclusion relation.
DEFINITION 1.. A graded consequence relation or simply a consequence relation
is a graded conclusion relation satisfying the following conditions:
I Overlap: If a EX, then gr(X r-a) = 1.

II Dilution: If X ~ Y, then gr(Xr-o:) ~ gr(yr-o:).
III Cut: gr(Xr-o:) ~ gr(X u Zr-o:) 1\ infßEZ gr(Xr-ß).
Conditions (I)-(III) are thus generalizations in the context of multiple-valued

logic, of Gentzen's conditions for consequence relation in two-valued logic. Con-
dition (I) is also called reftexivity. Condition (11) is the criterion of monotonicity,
indicating a threshold of the degree to which 0: is a consequence of a super set Y
of X. This may not be acceptable always. A non-monotonie version of the notion
of graded consequence may be developed in future when condition 11 will not be
assumed. Condition III, i.e. cut has a simpler version viz. cut for an element, i.e.
(III') gr(Xr-o:) ~ gr(X U {ß}r-o:) 1\ gr(Xr-ß).
In general III' does not imply III. But if r- is compact (definition given below),
then the two notions coincide [Chakraborty, 1988].
DEFINITION 2. A conc1usion relation r- is said to be compact if and only if,
gr(Xr-o:) ~ sup gr(X'r-o:).
X'~X
X; finite
For any conc1usion relation r-, let r-' be defined by gr(Xr-' 0:) = gr(Xr-o:) 1\
sup gr(X'r-o:).
X'~X
X' finite.
The following results can be proved [Chakraborty, 1988].

PROPosmON 3. Let {r-i hEl be a collection of consequence relations. Then
r- = ni r- i is a consequence relation.
PROPOSITION 4. For any conclusion relation h r-' is a compact subrelation.
Infact r-' is the maximal compact subrelation contained in r-.
PROPOSmON 5. Ifr- is a consequence relation then r-' is so.
PROPOSITION 6. Any conclusion relation r- can be extended to a minimal con-
sequence relation r- c. This is the closure of r- under overlap, dilution and cut.
Let (r- c )' be the maximal compact subrelation of r- c • Then (r- c )' is a conse-
quence relation by Proposition 5.
In the general situation Cr- c )' can be smaller than r-. But when r- is compact,
by Proposition 4, r- ~ Cr- c )' ~ r- c • As r- c is the smallest extension of r-
satisfying I, 11 and III and Cr- c )' is also one such extension of h we have Cr- c )' =
r- c. Thus we get the following proposition.
PROPOSmON 7. If r- is compact, its closure r- c is also compact.
INTRODUCING GRADE TO SOME METALOGICAL NOTIONS 89
In the two-valued logic the semantic counterpart of the notion of consequence

~ is called the semantic consequence F, the two being related by,
if X ~ athen X Fa (soundness),
if X F athen X ~ a (completeness).
X F a holds if and only if for all states of affairs, whenever all the elements of
X are true, a is also true.
This notion has been generalized by Shoesmith and Smiley [1978] by shifting
from consideration of 'the collection of all states of affairs' to 'a collection of
states of affairs '. Astate of affairs in turn can be identified with a subset of the set
of well-formed formulae, the elements of which are true under this state of affairs.
Formally:
X F a if and only if'v'Ti[X ~ Ti implies a E 'Ti],
{TihEl being a collection of states of affairs.
In the multiple-valued situation values of a well-formed formula in F range over
L. Thus, astate of affairs can be considered as a mapping from F to L, in other
words as fuzzy subset of F. X ~ Ti is now transformed to the fuzzy inclusion
relation, gr(X ~ Ti) = infaEF(X(a)=?Ti(a», => being the residuation operator
with respect to ',,'. In the above equation X denotes the characteristic function
of the subset X, X (a) and Ti (a) are the degrees of belongingness of a in X and
Ti respectively. The expression on the right hand side is the fuzzy version of the
sentence 'for all a E F, a E X implies er E Ti'. The notion of weIl formed
formula being a crisp notion, it is natural to consider a collection of elements just
in its capacity as a collection of well-formed formulae, as a crisp set. Thus X
is a crisp set of well-formed formulae and X (a) is either 1 or 0, according as a
belongs to X or not.
Thus the graded counterpart of F should be given by
(~) gr(X~a) = infiE1[gr(X ~ Ti) => Ti(a)]
= infiEI[infßEX Ti(ß) => Ti(a)].
The following theorem [Chakraborty, 1995] establishes a connection between the

two fuzzy relations.
THEOREM 8. (i) For any family {TihEl offuzzy subsets of F the relation ~
as defined above is a consequence relation. (ii) For any consequence relation r-,
there is afamily {TihEl offuzzy subsets of F such that gr(Xr-a) = gr(X~a),
where ~ is dejined as in (~) relative to thefamily {Ti}iEI.
Contrary to classical consequence operator and classical consequence relation,
no equivalence can be obtained between the fuzzy consequence operator defined
by Pavelka and consequence relation. It can be shown [Gerla, 1996] that a fuzzy
relation r- between X ~ Fand a E F defined by gr(Xr-a) = C(X)(a) where C
is a fuzzy consequence operator in the sense of Pavelka [1979], is not a graded
consequence relation as it may not satisfy the cut condition. Gerla, however,
establishes some sort of connection between graded consequence relation and

fuzzy c10sure operator einthe form of a characterisation theorem [Gerla, 1996].
2 OTHER METALOGICAL NOTIONS
Consistency - Inconsistency
Depending on the notion of graded consequence, grade can be introduced to other
metalogical concepts.
DEFINITION 9. A set X ~ Fis called a-inconsistent, a E L, a :j; 0, if and only
if gr(Xr-a) ;::: a, for all a E F.
When a = 1, X is called inconsistent. This notion of inconsistency is an ex-
tension of the c1assical notion of absolute inconsistency which is equivalent to the
notion of negation inconsistency in case of two-valued logic.
DEFINITION 10. The degree of inconsistency of X,
ID(X) = inf"'EF gr(Xr-a).
In other words, ID(X) = Sup{ a : X is a-inconsistent}, Le. ID(X) is the largest
element in the lattice such that gr(Xr-a) ;::: ID(X) for any a E F.
ID(X) is in fact the degree of contradictoriness introduced by Gerla [1990].
If ID(X)= I, gr(Xr-a) = 1 for all a E F, and X is inconsistent in the
ordinary sense.
DEFINITION 11. Xis a-consistent if and only if X is not a-inconsistent. 2
DEFINITION 12. The degree of consistency of X relative to a family {Tdi E I
of fuzzy subsets of F
CD(X) = SUPiEI[inf"'EFTi(a)).
It should be noted that the notions of 'a-inconsistent' and 'a-consistent' are

crisp notions while the notions of inconsistency and consistency are vague notions
admitting of degrees.
Some results following from above definitions can be proved.
PROPOSITION 13. Let X be a-consistent. Then Y ~ X is also a-consistent.
Proof is obtained by applying dilution.
By virtue ofTheorem 8(ii), for any graded consequence relation r-, there exists
a family {Ti hEl of fuzzy subsets of F, such that
gr(Xr-a) = inf( inf Ti(ß)
iEI ßEX
=> Ti (a)), X CF, a E F.
-
2 Since L is not in general linear, a set X is a-consistent if either of the two coditions obtains:
l. thereexistsß E F such thatgr (Xf-vß) < a,
2. there exists ß E F such that gr (Xf-vß) = b for some bEL and a, b, are incomparable in L.
Henceforth whenever the identity
is used in the course of a proof, it will have reference to the family {Ti} )iEI of
fuzzy subsets corresponding to this consequence relation f'v. Other notions, e.g.
the degree of consistency of X used in connection with f'v such that the above
identity holds, should also be understood with reference to the same family of
fuzzy subsets.
PROPOSITION 14. If for some a E F, gr(Xf'va) ~ CD(X), then
gr(Xf'va) = 1.
Proot Let gr(Xf'va) ~ a, for some a E F, and a ~ CD(X), for some a E L.

Then, gr(Xf'va) = infiE1(infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a» ~ a.
So, for each i E I, a ::; infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a).
a.t\ infßEx Ti(ß ::; infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a) .t\ infßEX Ti(ß) ::; Ti(a), for each
i EI, by isotone property of ' .t\' and by condition vii.
Again, CD(X) = SUPiEI[infßEx Ti(ß)] ::; a by assumption.
So, infßEx Ti(ß) ::; a, for each i E I.
Then infßEx Ti(ß) = a.t\ infßEx Ti(ß) ::; Ti(a), for each i E I.
Hence, infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a) = 1, for each i EI, by condition ii.
So infiEI[infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a)] = 1, i.e. gr(Xf'va) = 1. •
This theorem is siginificant in the sense that CD(X) offers a threshold for X
such that if any well-formed formula a is derivable from X to a degree greater
than this threshold, it is derivable with the fun strength.
PROPOSITION 15. Ifgr(Xf'va) = l,for some a E F, then CD(X) =CD(X U
{al)·
Proof. Let gr(Xf'va) = 1, for some a E F.

Then, infiE1[infßEx Ti(ß) :::} Ti(a)] = 1.
So, infßEx :::} Ti(a) = 1 for each i E I.
So, infßEx Ti(ß) ::; Ti(a) for each i E I, by condition (ii).
Then, infßEx Ti(ß) = infßEx Ti(ß) .t\ Ti(a), for each i E 1.
So, SUPiEI[infßEx Ti (ß)] = SUPiEI[infßEX Ti(ß) .t\ Ti(a)}, i.e. CD(X) =
CD(X U {al). •
COROLLARY 16. lffor some a E F, gr(Xf'va) = a, a E L, and CD(X) = a,

then a = 1 and CD(X) = CD(X U {a}).
PROPOSITION 17. IfID(X) = 1, then CD(X) ::; infßEFCD(ß).
Proof. Let ID(X) = 1. That is, infßEF gr(Xf'vß) = 1.
So, for each ßE F, gr(X f'vß) = 1,
92 MllßR K. CHAKRABORTY AND SANJUKTA BASU
Le. infiEI[infO/Ex Ti(a) => Ti(ß)] = 1, for each ß E :F. So, infO/EX Ti(a) =>
Ti(ß) = 1, for each I E I, each ß E :F. This implies infO/EX Ti(a) ::; ließ) for
each i E I, each ß E :F, by condition(ü).
Then, SUPiEI[infQEx Ti (a)] ::; SUPiEI Ti(ß), for each ß E :F.
So, SUPiEI[infO/Ex Ti(a)] ::; infßE.r[suPiEl Ti(ß)], i.e.
CD(X) ::; infßE.r CD(ß). •
Using Propositions 14 and 17 we can prove the following Corollary.

COROLLARY 18. IfCD(X) = a, a > infßE.r CD(ß), then X is a-consistent.
PROPOSmON 19. (i) IfCD(X) = 0, then X is inconsistent.
(U) If CD(X) = 1, then X is consistent, provided the following conditions are
satisjied.
A. Relative to afamily {Ti}i E I offuzzy subsets, there is,for each i E I, some
a E :F such thaI li(a) < 1.
B. SUPiEI[infßEx Ti (ß)] is attained.
Proof. (i) Let CD(X) = SUPiEI[infßEX Ti (ß)] = O.

Then, infßEX Ti(ß) = 0, for each i E I.
Then, infßEX Ti(ß) => Ti(a) = (0 => Ti(a» = 1, for each i E I, a E :F by
conditions (iv), (ii), i.e. infßEx Ti(ß) => Ti(a) = 1, for each i E I, a E :F.
So, infiEI(infßEx Ti(ß) => Ti(a» = gr(Xf---a) = 1, foreach a E:F.
That is, X is inconsistent.
(ii) Let CD(X) = 1 and let X be inconsistent. Then, gr(Xf---a) = inf iE1
[infßEx Ti(ß) => Ti(a)] = 1, for every a E :F.
Then, infßEx Ti(ß) => Ti(a) = 1, for each i E I, each a E :F.
Hence, infßEX Ti(ß) ::; Ti(a), for each i E I, each a E :F, by condition (ii).
=
CD(X) SUPiEI[infßEx Ti (ß)] = 1 byassumption.
So, by stipulation (B), there exists io E I, such that infßEX Tio (ß) = 1.
By stipulation (A), corresponding to this io EI. there exists ao E :F, such that
Tio(aO) < 1.
Thus for some io E land some ao E .1', infßEX T io (ß) > Tio (ao).
But this contradicts the above conclusion that for each i E I and each a E
:FinfßEX Ti(ß) ::; Ti(a).
Hence, if CD(X) = 1, X cannot be inconsistent. i.e. X must be consistent. •
Equivalence
DEFINmON 20. X == Y. i.e. X is equivalent to Y if and only if for all a E
:F, gr(Xf---a) = gr(Yf---a).
PROPOSmON21. ForanyX, Y ~ :F,XUY == X ifandonlyifgr(Xf---ß) = 1,
forevery ß E Y.
Proof. Let X u Y == X.
Then,gr(XUYr-o:) = (Xr-o:) foreveryo: E:F.
gr(X u Yr-ß) = 1 for every ß E Y due to overlap.
Hence,gr(Xr-ß) = 1 forevery ß E Y.
On the other hand, let gr( X r-ß) = 1 for every ß E Y.
gr(Xr-o:) :::; gr(X u Yr-o:) for every 0: E :F, due to dilution.
gr(Xr-o:) ~ gr(XUYr-o:) AinfßEY gr(Xr-ß) = gr(XUYr-o:) bycut, because
of the assumption. •
PROPosmON22. ForanyX,Y ~ :F,X == Y ifandonlyifgr(Xr-o:) = l,for
every 0: E Y and gr(Yr-ß) = Ilor every ß E X.
Proof. The direct part follows by overlap. For the converse, let gr(Xr-o:) = I, for
every 0: E Y and gr(Yr-ß) = 1 for every ß E X.
By Proposition 21, we have X == X u Y and Y == X U Y. So X == Y. •
PROPOSmON 23. lf X == Y and Z == W, then X U Z == Y U W,lor any
X,Y,Z, W ~:F.
COROLLARY 24. For any X, Y, Z, ~ :F, if X == Y then X U Z == Y U Z.
PROPOSITION 25. 11 X == Y, then X U Y == X and X U Y == Y.
Proof. Let X == Y.
gr(Xr-o:) :::; gr(X U Yr-o:) for every 0: E :F, due to dilution.
gr(Xr-o:) ~ gr(X U Yr-O:) A infßEY gr(Xr-ß) = gr(X U Yr-o:) by Proposition
22.
So, gr(Xr-o:) = gr(X U Yr-o:) for every 0: E :F.
By analogous argument it can be proved that if X == Y, then X U Y == Y. •
PROPOSmON 26. 11 X ~ Y ~ Z and X == Z, then Y == Z.
PROPOSmON 27. 11 X is a-consistent, and X == Y, then Y is a-
consisstent.
PROPosmON 28. X == :F if and only if X is inconsistent.
Tautologyhood - Theoremhood
DEFINmON 29. A well-formed formula 0: is said to be an a-tautology, a -j:. 0,
relative to a family {Ti hEl of fuzzy subsets of :F, if and only if gr(0~0:) >
a,a E L.
0: is called tautology if and only if gr(0~0:) = 1.
DEFINITION 30. Tautologyhood-degree of a well-formed 0:, Taut(o:) =
infiEI Ti (0:).
Suppose 0: is an a-tautology, i.e. gr(0~a) ~ a.
Then, infiEI [infßE0 Ti(ß) => Ti (0:)] ~ a, Le. infi E/[1 => Ti (0:)] > a, i.e.
infiEI Ti (0:) ~ a.
DEFINITION 31. A well-formed formula a is an a-theorem if and only if

gr(0r--a) ~ a.
ais called theorem if and omly if gr(0r-a) = 1.
DEFINITION 32. Theoremhood-degree of a well-formed formula a,
Th(a) = gr(0f-va).
PROPOSmON 33. If X is a set ofa-tautologies then CD (X) ~ a.
PROPOSmON 34. T == 0 where T is the set of all tautologies.
PROPosmON 35. IfX isa setofa-theorems, andgr (Xf-va) = b ~ aforsome
a E F, and some a, bEL, then ais ab-theorem; moreever Th(a) = b.
Proof. Let X be the set of a-theorems, and let gr(Xf-va) = b ~ a, for some
a E F.
By cut, gr(X U 0f-va) 1\ infßEx(0f-vß) ~ gr(0r-a), i.e. gr(Xf-va) 1\ infßEx
gr(0f-vß) ~ gr(0f-va).
infßEX gr(0f-vß) ~ a, by supposition.
So gr(0f-va) ~ gr(Xf-va) 1\ infßEx gr(0f-vß) = b.
In other words, a is ab-theorem.
On the other hand, by dilution, gr(0f-va) ~ gr(Xf-va) = b. So,
gr(0f-va) = b, i.e. Th(a) = b. •
PROPOSITION 36. If X is a set of a-theorems, then for some a, gr(Xf-va)
~ a if and only if gr( 0 f-va) ~ a.
Proof. Let X be a set of a-theorems.

Let gr(Xf-va) ~ a for some a E F.
By cut, gr(0f-va) ~ gr(X U 0f-va) 1\ infßEx gr(0f-vß), i.e. gr(0f-va)
~ gr(Xf-va) 1\ infßEx gr(0f-vß).
Since X is a set of a-theorems by supposition, infßEX gr(0f-vß) ~ a.
So, gr(0f-va) ~ gr(Xf-va) 1\ infßEx gr(0f-vß) ~ a.
On the other hand, let gr(0f-va) ~ a, for some a E F.
Then, by dilution, gr(Xf-va) ~ gr(0f-va) ~ a.
Thus, if Xis a set of a-theorems, then gr(Xf-va) ~ a if and only if gr(0f-va) ~
a for some a E F. •
PROPOSmON 37. If X is a set of a-theorems and gr(Xf-va) ~ a for some
a E F, then a = 1, i.e. X is a set oftheorems.
Proof. Let X be the set of a-theorems, and let gr(Xf-va) ~ a for some a E F,
somea E L.
By cut, gr(0f-va) ~ gr(X U 0f-va) 1\ infßEx gr(0f-vß), i.e. gr(0f-va) >
gr(Xf-va) 1\ infßEX gr(0f-vß). This implies, by supposition, gr(0f-va) ~ a.
So, a is an a-theorem. Then, a EX.
Hence, gr(Xf-va) = a = 1, due to overlap.
If the condition of this proposition holds for all a E L, then the deductive
system with graded consequence would collapse ioto classicallogic. •
3 AXIOMATIC SYSTEM
Let {TdiEI be a family ofvalue assignments to F, the set ofwell formed formulae
of any language. The graded semantic consequence relation ~ is then defined by
(~). In the following we present the procedure of defining a graded consequence
relation r-relative to axioms and mIes and shall study the relationship between the
relations r- and ~.
Axioms are some well-formed formulae of the system and mIes are relations
between X ~ F, and a E F.
To each mle R j is associated a value I R j I from the lattice L and this value is
given by
I R j 1= X,ü<
inf[gr(X ~ a)], whereXRjaholds.
The above definition is motivated by the notion of valid mIes of inference in

classicallogic, namely a mle of inference in classicallogic is valid if and only if
the conclusion has to be true if the premises are true.
The pair (AL {R j }) where AL is a subset of F, the set ofaxioms and {Rj } is a
collection of mIes, is called a syntax.
A derivation X Da of a well-formed formula a from a set X of well-formed
formulae is a pair ({al, ... , an}, I al I ... I an I> of sequences {ai} of well-
formed formulae and values I ai IE L, i = 1, ... , n, satisfying the following
conditions:
1. an = a and for each i, 1 ~ i ~ n, either ai E X or ai E AL or

{ai l , • • . ,ain } Rjai holds, i 1 , ... ,in< i, and R j is a mle of inference.
2. I ai 1= 1 ifai EX.
lai 1= Taut(ai) if ai E AL \X.
I ai 1=1 Rj I if {ail' ... ,ai }Rjai holds.
n
The value of the derivation X Da, denoted by
val(XDa) = min{1 ai I}, 1 ~ i ~ n.
A fuzzy relation r- from P(F) to F can be defined with respect to the given
syntax where the grade of this relation is given by
gr(Xr-a) = sUPxDü<{val(XDa) : XDa is a derivation of a from X};

= 0, if there is no derivation X Da.
PROPOSITION 38. The relation r- as defined above is a compact conclusion
relation.
THEOREM 39. The relation r- is a graded consequence relation.
Proof. The proofs of overlap and dilution are simple. An outline of the proof of
cut is given below. Because of the compactness and dilution properties, it suffices
to prove that I--- satisfies cut for an element i.e. to prove that gr(X U {ß}I---a) A
gr(XI---ß) ~ gr(Xl---a).3
Case (i): If gr(XI---ß) = 0, then obviously the condition holds.
Case (ü): gr(XI---ß) i- O.
Then val(X Dß) > 0 for some derivation X Dß.
We now consider derivations X U {ß} Da. Let {aj} and {ak} be the sets of
values of all derivation of a from X U {ß} that does not and does involve ß re-
spectively. Then,
gr(X U {ß}I---a) A gr(XI---ß)

= sUPXU{ß}Do val(X U {ß}Da) A gr(XI---ß)
= (supj{aj} V SUPdak}) A gr(XI---ß)
= (supj{aj} A gr(XI---ß)) V «suPk{ak} A gr(XI---ß)).
The first component is ~ gr(Xl---a)(= supj{aj}). Now, (SUpdak} A

gr(XI---ß)) = sUPo~, ... ,Oi'''''O" min(l a1 1,···,1 ai 1=1 ß 1,···,1 an I) A
sUPXDß val(XDß)
[al, ... ,ai, ... ,an being any derivation of a from X U {ß} where ß actually
occurs; and without loss of generality we can assume that ß occurs only once, say
ai = ß·]
= sUP O l> ... ,Oi, ... ,O" supXDß[min(1 a1 1,···,1 ai 1,···,1 an I)A
val(XDß)]
= sUPo 1 , ... ,Oi, ... ,O" supXDß[min(1 a1 I,···, val (X Dß), .. ·,1 an Dl
(as 1ai 1=1 ß 1= 1)
~ SUPXDo val(XDa) = gr(Xl---a).
•
DEFINITION 40. A graded consequence relation r-
is said to be sound relative
to another graded consequence relation ~ if and only if
gr(Xl---a) ~ gr(X ~ a).
THEOREM 41. The relation I--- is sound relative to the semantic graded conse-
quence relation ~ induced by {TihEl'
Proof. It will be shown that for every derivation XDa, val(XDa) <
gr(X ~ a). This is proved by induction on the length of derivation.
Let a1, ... ak (= a) be any such derivation.
3The following propositions tbat have been proved in [Chakraborty, 19881. are referred 10 here:
If r-satisfies dilution then cut for an element implies cut for finite set and conversely. If r- is a
compact conclusion relation satisfying dilution, then cut for finite set implies cut.
INTRODUCING GRADE TO SOME METALOGICAL NaTIONS 97
The other cases being straightforward we prove onIy the case where ak is ob-
tained by the application of some rule R, i.e. {akl"" ak,,} Rak holds where
kl , ... kp < k.
Now,
val(XDak) = val(XDak_I)/\ 1 R I)
~ /\j = 1, ... ,p val (X Dak;)/\ 1 R 1
~ /\j gr(X ~ ak;) /\ infi[Ti(akl /\ ... /\ Ti (ak,,) => Ti(ak)]
(by inductive hypothesis and the definition of 1 R I.)
~ infi[inf"'Ex Ti(X) => (Ti(ak 1 ) / \ ••• /\ Ti(ak p »/\
(Ti(ak.) /\ ... /\ Ti(ak,,)) => Ti(ak)]
~ infi[inf"'Ex Ti(x) => (Ti(ak)]
= gr(X ~ a).
The compieteness issue has not been investigated sufficiently. However, we can
present the following resuits in this respect.
1. Iffor some X and a, gr(Xf'va) = 1, then gr(Xf'va) = gr(X ~ a).
2. Let X and a be such that SUPXDct val(XDa) is attained; then a necessary
condition that gr(Xf'va) = gr(X ~ a) is the following:
There is a derivation of a from X such that, min(l Al 1,···,1 A k 1,1 R l I,
.··,1 RL D~ infi[Ti(X) => Ti(a)] for any x EX, where Al, ... ,Ak are
the axioms and RI, ... , RL are the rules used in the derivation.
3. A grade of compieteness may be defined by
inf[gr(Xf'va) {::} gr(X ~ a)].
X,ct
Assuming that the system is sound, the above expression reduces to

inf[gr(X ~ a) => gr(Xf'va)].
X,ct
The following proposition establishes a relationship between a-theorems and

•
the degree of consistency.
PROPOSITION 42. For any set X 0/ a-theorems 0/ the axiomatic system,
CD(X) ~ a.
Proof. Let X be a set of a-theorems. Then,
ßEX
inf gr(0f'vß) >
-
a.
The axiomatic system being sound, a ~ gr(0f'vß) ~ gr(0 ~ ß), for every
ß EX. That is, infi Ti (ß) ~ a, for every ß EX.
Then infßEX Ti(ß) ~ a, for every i E I.
So, sUPi[infßEx Ji(ß)] ~ a, i.e. CD(X) ~ a. •
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our future investigations shall inc1ude introduction of appropriate operators in the

lattice of truth set corresponding to object language operators, keeping in mind be-
haviours of these object language operators in fuzzy context; and also observation
of the interplay between operators at meta level and object leveL
The interrelation between meta level and object level operators has a significant
role to play in building up a system of fuzzy logic where consequence would be
graded, fitting in the general framework presented here.
These investigations, we hope, shall eventually lead to some general theory of
algebraic structures suitable for fuzzy logic_
University ofCalcutta, India.
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GIANGIACOMO GERLA
CLOSURE OPERATORS, FUZZY LOGIC AND

CONSTRAINTS
1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of closure operator is very useful in several areas of classical

mathematics and this suggests to extend it to the framework of fuzzy set
theory. In particular, the theory of closure operator gives a powerful tool
for (crisp) logics and this since the deduction operator of any monotone
logic is a closure operator. This led several authors (see for example Tarski,
Brown and Suszko) to propose a general approach to crisp logic by defining
an abstract logic as a pair (F,D) where Fis the set of formulas in a given
language and D a closure operator in F.
In order to extend such an approach to fuzzy logic, in this paper we define
an abstract deduction system as a pair (L, D) such that
• L is a complete lattice (whose elements are 'pieces of information')
• D is a closure operator in L (the deduction operator).
The intended interpretation is that x ~ y means that y carries on more

information than x and that D is a tool to improve the available information.
We expose two examples of abstract logic in the range of fuzzy logic. In the
first one, that is strictly related with Pavelka's papers, L is the lattice F(F)
of the fuzzy subsets of the set F of formulas. The information carried on
by a fuzzy subset v is that, for every formula a, the actual value of a is at
least v(a).
The second example is related to the notion of constraint for truth values
of the formulas (see Gerla [1996c)). The idea is that a constraint is a subset
X of the set U = [0, 1] of truth values and that a truth value >. satisfies X
provided that >. EX. Then, the pieces of information we have to elaborate
are maps V : F -+ e: from the set of formulas into a lattice e: of possible
constraints. The meaning of V is that, for any formula a, the actual truth
value of a satisfies V(a). Such an approach is related with the one considered
in the book of R. Hähnle where a tableaux method for multivalued logic is
proposed. In this paper we will expose only some definitions and results.
All the proofs are omitted.
101
D. Dubois er al. (eds.), Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 101-120.
102 GIANGIACOMO GERLA
2 CLOSURE OPERATORS, CLOSURE SYSTEMS AND ABSTRACT

LOGICS.
We start with the basic definition of closure operator in a lattice.

DEFINITION 1. Let L be a complete lattice. Then a closure operator in
L is any operator J : L --+ L satisfying
(i) x ~Y => J(x} ~ J(y) (monotony)
(ii) x ~ J(x) (inclusion)
(iii) J(J(x)) = J(x) (idempotence).
H condition (iii) is skipped, J is called an almost closure operator in L,

in brief a-c-operator (see, e.g. [Ward, 1942]).
Strictly related to the notion of closure operator, now we introduce the
concept of closure system.
DEFINITION 2. A set C of elements of L is called a closure system if the
meet' of any family of elements in C is an element in C.
The next proposition shows how the notions of closure system and closure
operator are related.
PROPOSITION 3. For every C ~ L the operator Je : L --+ L defined by
setting,
(1) Jc(x) = inf{y E CI y ~ x}

for any x E L, is a closure operator. For every a-c-operator J : L --+ L the
class
CJ = {x E L I J(x) = x}
of fixed points of J is a closure system. Moreover, if J is a closure operator
and C a closure system, then
We say that the element Jc(x) defined in (2.1) is the element of C gen-
erated by x. Now, we are able to give the main definitions.
DEFINITION 4. Let L be a complete lattice and V a closure operator in
L. Then the pair S = (L, V) is called an abstract deduction system, V is
called deduction operator and the elements in L pieces of information. An
abstract semantics in L is any subset M of Land an abstract logic is defined
as an abstract deduction system (L, V) with an abstract semantics M such
that V =JM (i.e. the completeness theorem holds).
CLOSURE OPERATORS, FUZZY LOGIC AND CONSTRAINTS 103
Also, a theory is a fixed point T of V, Le. a piece of information T closed

under deductions. In particular, if 1 denotes the maximum in L, since
V( 1) = 1, 1 is a theory we call the inconsistent theory. If x is a piece of
information such that V(x) = T, then we say that x is a system 0/ axioms
for T. A piece of information TEL is consistent provided that V(x) is a
consistent theory, Le. V(x) I- 1. Also, in accordance with Proposition 3, the
set T = Cv of theories is a closure system and therefore a complete lattice.
If 0 denotes the maximum in L, then we define the system 0/ tautologies as
the piece of information Tau = V(O). Finally, if xis a piece of information
and m E M, then we say that m is a model of x provided that x ::; m. The
meaning of these definitions will be clear in the next sections. The idea is
that we have to identify
• a piece of information x with a set of formulas (proper axioms)
• V(x) with the set offormulas we can derive from x
• a theory T with a deductively closed piece of information

• a model with a complete piece of information ..
3 ABSTRACT FUZZY LOGIC IN PAVELKA'S SENSE.
Let 8 be a set, then we denote by U the real interval [0,1], and we call
fuzzy subset any map s : 8 --t U. Also, we denote by P(8) the complete
lattice of all the subsets of 8 and by F(8) the complete lattice of all the
fuzzy subsets of 8, respectively. We call closure operator in 8 any closure
operator in P(8) and fuzzy closure operator in 8 any closure operator in
F(8). Such a notion gives an elegant and powerful approach to fuzzy topolo-
gies, fuzzy subalgebras, necessity measures and envelopes (see, e.g. [Con-
rad, 1980; Biacino and Gerla, 1984; Murali, 1991; Biacino and Gerla, 1992;
Biacino, 1993]). Also, it enables to define the abstract fuzzy deduction sys-
tems, i.e. the deduction systems in the lattice of the fuzzy subsets of the set
F of formulas of a given language. The definitions of fuzzy closure system,
crisp closure system, crisp deduction system are obvious.
By following Pavelka, we give the following very general notion of a fuzzy
semantics.
DEFINITION 5. A fuzzy semantics is any class M of fuzzy subsets of F.
Given a piece of information v E F(F), we say that m E M is a model of
v provided that m ;2 v. In this case we write m I- v. The fuzzy closure
operator J M associated with M is called a logical consequence operator.
Obviously, given a piece of information v,
Examples of fuzzy semantics are obtained by setting M equal to the

dass of the truth-functional valuations of the formulas in a multivalued
logic. Another example is furnished by probability logic; in this case M is
the dass of the finitely additive probabilities.
Sometimes we call an initial valuation (or a piece 0/ juzzy information
or a juzzy system 0/ axioms) any piece of information v, i.e. any fuzzy
subset v of formulas. We interpret v as an incomplete information about
an unknown world m, namely, since m is a model of v iff v ~ m, the
information carried on by v is that, given any formula a, the actual truth
value of a is at least v(a). Moreover, like for the initial valuation v, the
meaning of JM(v)(a) is still 'a is true at least at degree JM(v)(a)', but we
have also that JM(v)(a) is the best possible valuation we can draw from
the information v. Note that, while JM(v)(a) = 1 entails that 0: is true
in any model of v, JM(V)(O:) = 0 does not mean that 0: is false hut only
that the available information v says nothing in favour of 0:. On the other
hand, this happens in the dassical logic, too. Indeed, assume that T is
a set of sentences expressing our knowledge about an unknown world m
and that a is a formula that is not a logical consequence of T. Then we
cannot condude that 0: is false in m but only that we are not able to prove
0:. In other words JM(V)(O:) carries on only positive information about 0:.
Negative information about 0: can be given (only if F is equipped with a
negation) by the number JM (v) ( -0:).
Now we can give the main definition.
DEFINITION 6. An abstract juzzy deduction system is an abstract logic
whose lattice is F(F). An abstract juzzy logic is a tern (F(F),D,M) where
(F(F),D) is an abstract fuzzy deduction system and M is a fuzzy semantics
such that D = JM (Le. the completeness theorem holds).
4 AN EXTENSION PRINCIPLE FOR ABSTRACT CRISP LOGIC.
Recall that, for every s E F(S) and x E S
(3) = sup{A E U I x E C(s, >.)}

sex)
where C(s, >.) = {x E S I sex) ~ >.} is the dosed >.-cut of s.This equation
suggests a way to extend any dosure operator J : peS) -+ peS) into a
fuzzy dosure operator J* : F(S) -+ F(S) (see [Ramik, 1983; Gerla, 1994c;
Castro, 1994]). All the proofs in this section can be found in [Biacino and
Gerla, 1996; Gerla, 1994c).
DEFINITION 7. Let J : peS) -+ peS) be an operator. Then the canonical
extension of J is the operator J* : F(S) -+ F(S) defined by setting
(4) J*(s)(x) = sup{>. EU I x E J(C(s,>.))}

for every fuzzy subset sand every X E 8.

PROPOSITION 8. The canonical extension J* of a closure operator J is
a juzzy closure operator extending J.
In the following we say that a dosure operator J is compact provided
that
J(X) = U{J(X,) I X, is a finite subset of X}.
We can simplify (4.2) in the case of compact operators.

PROPOSITION 9. Let J be a compact closure operator. Then J* can be
defined by setting
(5) J*(s)(x) = { 1 if xE J(0)

sup{ s(xd 1\ ... 1\ s(x n ) I x E J( {Xl, ... , x n })} otherwise.
Also, we may extend any classical closure system in a juzzy closure system
as folIows.
DEFINITION 10. Let C be a dass of sets. Then we call canonical extension
of C the dass
C* = {s E F(8) I C(s,..\) E C J01' every..\ E U}
of fuzzy subsets of 8.
PROPOSITION 11. The canonical extension C* of a closure system C is a
juzzy closure system.
The foHowing proposition relates Definitions 7 and 10.
PROPOSITION 12. Let J be a classical closure operator and C a classical
closure system. Then
5 EXTENDING A CRISP DEDUCTION SYSTEM, HERB RAND

FUZZY MODELS.
Let S = (P(F), V) be a crisp deduction system and assume that V is com-

pact. Then by (4.2) we obtain a fuzzy deduction system S* = (F(F), V*)
we caH the canonical extension of S. Moreover, as an immediate conse-
quence of Proposition 9, we have the following theorem, where we write
1'1, ... ,1'm I- a to denote that a E V({JI, ... ,1'm}) and we call tautology any
formula a in V(0).
THEOREM 13. Let v be a juzzy subset ollormulas and a EF, then
il a is a
I
V*(v)(a) - { tautology
- sup{ vbt} 1\ ... 1\ vbm} I ')'11 .•• , ')'m f- a} othewise.
In other words, V*(v)(a) is obtained by a multivalued interpretation of

the claim '')'1, ..• , ')'m exists such that ')'1, •.. , ')'m f- a'. Indeed, in a multi-
valued setting the claim '')'1, ... ,')'n belong to v' is evaluated by the number
Vbl) 1\ ... 1\ vbm} and the quantifier 3 is interpreted by the supremum
operator.
In particular, we will consider the canonical extension $* of a first order
deduction system and the related deduction operator V· and we will apply
it to extend some basic notion of programming logic. Indeed, let C be a first
order language and denote by Be. the related Herbrand base. We call juzzy
Herbrand interpretation for C any fuzzy subset m : Be. -+ U of Be.. The
name is justified by the fact that m defines a multivalued interpretation of
C in which, as in the classical case, the domain is the Herbrand universe
U(C), the constants in C are assigned themselves and any n-ary function
symbol I in C is interpreted as the map associating tl, ... ,tn with the term
I(tl, ... , t n ). The only difference is that any n-ary predicate symbol p is
interpreted by the fuzzy n-ary relation TI of Be. defined by setting
Let PCe. denote the set of definite program clauses and define a fuzzy
program as any fuzzy subset p : PCe. -+ U of PCe.. Then it is natural to
associate any fuzzy program p with the fuzzy closure operator J p : :F( Be.) -+
:F(Bc.) defined by setting, for every v E :F(Bc.) and a E Be.
Jp(v)(a) = V*(PU v)(a).

If p is a crisp program, i.e. the characteristic function of a classical program
P, then
Jp(v)(a) = supP E U I C(v, A) U P f- a},
or, equivalently
(7) Jp(v)(a) = supP E U I C(v U p, A) f- a}.

We call a juzzy Herbrand model for p every fixed point of Jp- Then, a
juzzy Herbrand model for p is a fuzzy subset m of Be. such that V*(P U
m)(a) = m(a) for every a E Be.. Jp(v) is the minimal fuzzy Herbrand
model containing v and, in particular, we call the least juzzy Herbrand model
m p ofp the fuzzy subset Jp(0) = V*(P). Then mp is the fuzzy subset offacts
that are logical consequences of the fuzzy program p. Notice that the dass
of the fuzzy Herbrand models of a dassical program P is a proper extension
of the dass of the Herbrand models of P. Also, from the point of view of
expert systems theory, we may interpret the number Jp(v)(a) as a valuation
of the truth degree of a, given the 'general theory' p and given the available
'fuzzy information' v. In this case it is very natural to assume that both v
and p are finite and therefore that in the codomain of v U p there are only a
finite number Al > A2 ... > An of elements. As a consequence, in (5.1) we
have to refer only to the chain of programs G (v U p, Ad ~ ... ~ G (v U p, An)
and Jp(v)(a) can be computed by a parallel processing.
PROPOSITION 14. Let p be a juzzy program and m an Herbrand model.
Then m is a juzzy Herbrand model for p if and only if every cut G(m, A) is
an Herbrand model for G(p, A).
6 FUZZY DEDUCTION SYSTEM IN HILBERT STYLE
Let M be a fuzzy semantics. Then, given the available information v, J.M (v)
carries on the whole information we can obtain from v. Unfortunately, the
definition of J.,M (v) is not constructive and we have to search for some tool
to compute J.,M(v) byan effective management of v. This is the role of any
deduction apparatus, obviously. By following Pavelka [1979], we deflne a
juzzy deduction system in Hilbert style, in brief a juzzy H-system, as any
pair S = (a,R) where F is a set, ais a fuzzy subset of F, the fuzzy subset
of logical axioms, and R is a set of fuzzy rules of inference. In turn, a juzzy
rule of inference is a pair r = (r' , r"), where
• r ' is a partial n-ary operation on F whose domain we denote by

Dam(r)
• r" is an n-ary operation on U such that
(8) r"(xl' ... ,SUPYi, .. · ,xn ) = sup r"(xl , ... ,Yi, .. · ,xn ).
iEI iEI
So an inference rule r consists of a syntactical component r' that operates

on formulas (in fact, it is a rule of inference in the usual sense) and an
evaluation component r" that operates on truth values to calculate how the
truth value of the condusion r ' (al, ... ,an) depends on the truth values of
the premises al,. .. ,an. Namely, the meaning of an application of r is that
if you know that al, ... ,an are true at least at degrees Al, ... ,An,
then
you can conclude that r'(al, ... ,an) is true at least at the degree
r"(Al, ... ,An).
A prooj 7r of a formula a is a sequence al ,... ,am of formulas such that

am = a, together with a sequence of related 'justifications'. This means
that, for every formula ai, we have to specify whether
(i) ai is assumed as a logical axiom orj
(ii) ai is assumed as a proper axiom orj
(iii) ai is obtained by a rule (in this case we have to indicate also the rule
and the formulas from ab ... ,ai-l used to obtain ai).
The justifications are necessary to valuate the proofs. Let v : F -t U be

any fuzzy set of formulas that we call initial valu.ation or fu,zzy set oj proper
axioms. The meaning of v is that for every a we belief that a is true at
least at degree v(a). Moreover, for every i ~ m denote by 7r(i) the proof
al, ... ,ai. Then the valu.ation Val (7r, v) of 7r with respect to v is defined by
induction on m by setting
Val (7r, v) = a( a m ) if a m is assumed as a logical axiom
Val (7r, v) = v( a m ) if a m is assumed as a proper axiom
Val(7r,v) = r"(Val(7r(i l ),v), ... ,Val(7r(i n ),v» ifi l ~ m, ... ,in ~ m
exist such that a m = r ' (ail , ... , ai n ).
If a is the formula proved by 7r, the meaning we will assign to Val (7r , v)
is that, given an initial valuation v, the proof 7r assures that a is true at
least to degree Val(7r, v). Now, unlike the crisp deduction systems, in fuzzy
deduction systems different proofs of a same formula a may give different
contributions to the degree of validity of a. This suggests to define the
operator V as folIows.
DEFINITION 15. Let S = (a, R) be a fuzzy H-system. Then the operator
V: F(F) -t F(F) defined by setting
(9) V(v)(a) = sup{Val(7r,v) 17r is a proof of a}
for every v E F(F) and a ER is called the deduction operator associated

with S.
The meaning of the number V( v ) (a) is still that a is true at least at de-
gree V(v)(a), but we have also that V(v)(a) is the best possible valuation
we can find (by using S) given the initial valuation v. The following propo-
sition shows that any fuzzy H-system defines a fuzzy deduction system (see
[Pavelka, 1979]).
PROPOSITION 16. The operator V defined in (6.2) is a fu,zzy closu.re op-
erator. Consequ.ently, every fu,zzy H-system S = (a, R) is associated with a
fu,zzy dedu.ction system (F(F),V).
Now we can define the notion of a fuzzy logic in Hilbert style.
CLOSURE OPERATORS, FUZZY LOGIC AND CONS:rRAINTS 109
DEFINITION 17. A fuzzy logic in Hilbert style is a pair (S,M) where M

is a fuzzy semantics and S is a fuzzy H-system whose deduction operator
1J coincides with the logical consequence operator J M associated with M.
7 CANONICAL EXTENSION OF A HILBERT DEDUCTION SYSTEM
Now we will show how we can extend a crisp H-system into a fuzzy deduction
H-system. Namely, we call a crisp rule 01 inlerence any partial operation
in F, Le. a map r : D -t F such that D ~Fn, n E N. A crisp H-system is
a pair S=(A,R) such that A is a subset of F, the set 01 logical axioms, and
Raset of crisp inference rules. The notion of a proof 'Ir under the set X of
hypothesis is obvious and we call deduction operator the operator V defined
by
(10) V(X) = {a E F I a proof of a exists whose hypothesis are in X}.
It is immediate that V is an algebraic closure operator and therefore that ev-
ery crisp H-system S is associated with a crisp deduction system (P(F),V).
DEFINITION 18. Given an n-ary crisp rule of inference r, we say that
the fuzzy rule r* = (r' , r") is the canonical extension of r if r' = r and
r"(xI, ... , x n ) = Xl /\ ••• /\ Xn . Given a crisp H-system S=(A,R), we call
canonical juzzy extension of S the fuzzy H~system S*=(A*,R*) such that
A* is the characteristic function of A and R* = {r* IrE R}.
In [Gerla, 1996a] the following proposition was proven.
PROPOSITION 19. Let S be a crisp H-system whose associated deduction
system is (P(F),1J). Then, S* is a juzzy H-system whose associated juzzy
deduction system is (:F(F),V*).
8 LOGIC OF THE CONSTRAINTS: SEMANTICS
Now we will consider abstract deduction systems in which the pieces of

information are constraints on the possible truth values of the formulas.
This point of view is the natural development of the one exposed in the
previous sections. Indeed, as a matter of fact, given an initial valuation v
and a formula a, the number v(a) is not a truth valuej v(a) represents the
constraint [v(a), 1] on the possible truth values of a.
DEFINITION 20. We define a constraint as any subset X of U and we
say that A E U satisfies X provided that A EX. A constraint X is an
improvement of a constraint Y, in brief X ~ Y, provided that X ~ Y.
The class P(U) of all the constraints is too big and no language should
be able to represent its elements. So, perhaps it is more convenient to refer
to particular constraintsj as an example, we can confine ourselves only to
closed intervals. In any case, as we will show in the following, it is useful to

assume that the class of possible constraints is a closure system in U.
DEFINITION 21. A constraints system in U is any closure system <t in U.
We denote by Gon the associated closure operator, i.e. for every subset X
ofU
Gon{X) = U{Y E <t I Y 2 X}.

We define Gon{X) as the constraint generated by X. With respect to the
improvement relation a constraints system <t is a complete lattice such that,
for every family (Xi)iEI of elements of <t.

DEFINITION 22. Let <t be a constraints system. Then we define a <t-set of
formulas as any map V:F -+ <t. A <t-set of formulas is also called an initial
<t-valuation or a <t-system ofaxioms. We denote by Val(<t) the class ofthe
initial <t-valuations and, given VI and V2 in Val(<t), we say that V2 is an
improvement of V!, in brief VI ::::; V2 , provided that VI (0:) 2 V2 (0:) for every
0: EF.
Obviously, Val(<t) is a complete lattice with respect to the improvement
relation, namely the direct power of <t with index set F. The following
definition claims that the information carried on by an initial <t-valuation
V is that, for every formula 0:, the actual truth value of 0: satisfies V(o:).
DEFINITION 23. Let M be a fuzzy semantics and V an initial <t-valuation.
Then, an element m E M is called a model of V, in brief m F= V, provided
that m(o:) satisfies the constraint V(o:) for every formula 0:. We call V
satisfiable if it admit a model. Two initial <t-valuations admitting the same
models are called logically equivalent.
The minimum in Val(<t) is the valuation Vo constantly equal to U. Ob-
viously, every mE M is a model of Vo, so no information is carried on by
Vo. The maximum in Val(<t) is the valuation VI constantly equal to the
maximum constraint Gon(0) = n{X I X E <t} and therefore it depends
on the choice of <t. We assume that there are initial valuations that are
not satisfiable and this is equivalent to assume that VI is not satisfiable,
obviously. In accordance, we call VI the inconsistent theory.
DEFINITION 24. The logical consequence operator associated with a fuzzy
semantics M and a constraints system <t is the operator GM : Val (<t) -t
Val(<t) defined by,
GM(V)(o:) = Gon({m(o:) Im F= V})

for V E Val(\!:) and 0: EF. Also, we define the \!:-set of tautologies Tau by
Tau = CM(Vo ) = Con({m(o:) Im E M}).

Obviously, even if no information is available, given any formula 0:, we
know that its actual truth value satisfies Tau(o:). Then, Tau represents
the a-priori information that any multivalued semantics M carries on. The
following proposition is immediate.
PROPOSITION 25. For every initial valuation V, CM(V) is the best im-
provement 0/ V that is logically equivalent to V. M oreover, the logical con-
sequence opemtor C M : Val (\!:) ~ Val (\!:) is a closure opemtor in the lattice
Val(\!:).
Finally, we can give the main definition.
DEFINITION 26. We call a constraint fuzzy logic a tern (Val(\!:) , V, M)
where \!: is a costraints system, (Val(\!:) , V) an abstract deduction system
and M a fuzzy semantics such that V = C M (Le. the completeness theorem
holds).
We have to look at an initial valuation V as at a system ofaxioms (the
available immediate information), and at the derived valuation CM (V) as
at the set of its logical consequences (the information we can derive). If V
is not satisfiable, then CM (V) coincides with the inconsistent theory VI.
9 LOWER BOUND CONSTRAINTS AND INTERVAL

CONSTRAINTS
Now we will expose two constraints systems. At first, we will observe that
the notion of constraint fuzzy logic extends the one of fuzzy logic. Indeed,
assume that \!: is the set of lower-bound constraints, Le.
\!: = {[A,1] I A EU].
Then the map associating with any A E U the lower-bound constraint [A,1]
is an isomorphism between U and \!:. This enables us to identify the fuzzy
subsets of formulas with the \!:-sets of formulas. Namely, any valuation
v : F ~ U can be identified with the initial \!:-valuation Vv defined by
setting Vv(o:) = [v(a), 1] and m E M is a model of Vv if and only if m is a
model of v in Pavelka's sense. Finally, since
CM(Vv)(O:) = [inf{m(o:) 1m2 v}, 1] = [C(v)(o:), 1],

we can identify CM with JM. Note that in this case the inconsistent theory
is the map constantly equal to the constraint {1}.
EXAMPLE. A more interesting constraints system is obtained by setting

<! equal to the set of interval-constraints, i.e.
<! = {[a, b] I a E U and b EU}.
In this case the inconsistent theory is the map constantly equal to the empty
set. Also, we can consider the one-element initial valuations, that is the
valuations V such that every V(o:) isa singleton. As a matter offact the dass
of satisfiable one-element valuations coincides with M provided that we
identify any mE M with the valuation V defined by setting V(o:) = {m(o:)}.
We can identify any initial valuation V with a pair (VI, V2) of fuzzy subsets
of formulas in such a way that V(o:) = [VI(0:),V2(0:)]. In other words, the
information carried on by V is that 0: is at least true with degree VI (0:) and
at most true with degree V2(0:). Also, if we set
J(VI,V2) = n{m E M I VI ~ m ~ V2}
and
J(VI,V2) = U{m E M I VI ~ m ~ V2},
then it is immediate that the logical consequence operator is defined by
CM(V)(o:) = [J(Vl,V2)(0:), J(VI,V2)(0:)].
In asense, J(VI,V2)(0:) expresses a necessity and J(VI,V2)(0:) a possibility.
In particular, the <!-set oftautologies is defined by the pair n{m E M} and
U{m E M} offuzzy subsets, i.e.
Tau(o:) = [inf{m(o:) Im E M} , sup{m(o:) Im E M}].
EXAMPLE. Assume that M is the set of finitely additive probabilities.
Then
{I} if 0: is a tautology
Tau(o:) = { {O} if 0: is a contradiction
[0,1] otherwise.
This emphasize that, in the case of the interval constraints, Tau represents
both to the set of tautologies and to the set of contradictions, in asense.
Another example is obtained by assuming that M is the set of the truth-
functional valuations m such that
=
m(o: 1\ ß) min{m(o:) , m(ß)};
=
m(o: V ß) max{ m(o:), m(ß)};
m( -0:) = 1 - m(o:).
Then it is easy to prove that, for every formula 0:,
[~, 1] if 0: is a tautology
Tau(o:) ={ [0, ~] if 0: is a contradiction
[0,1] otherwise.
10 CONSTRAINT LOGIC: DEDUCTION APPARATUS
By extending Pavelka's formalisms, we will propose some definitions of de-

duction system in Hilbert style for constraint logics.
DEFINITION 27. A <!-inference rule is a pair r = (r ' , r") such that r' is a
partial n-ary operation in F, and r" is an n-ary operation in <! such that,
for every directed dass T of constraints,
(11) r"(Cl, ... ,lim T, ... , Cn) = lim{r"(Cl , ... ,X, ... , Cn) 1 X E T}.
Obviously, since we refer to the improvement relation, T is directed pro-

vided that
X E T, Y E T ::} there is Z E T such that Z ~ X and Z ~ Y,
Le. two constraints in T are always compatible. Moreover, since the induc-
tive limits in <! are the intersections, (10.1) is equivalent to
The meaning of a <!-inference rule r = (r' , r") is that if the truth val-
ues of the formulas al, ... , an satisfy the constraints Cl, ... , Cn, then you
can condude that the truth value of r ' (al, ... , an )satisfies the constraint
r"(Cl , ... , Cn).
DEFINITION 28. A <!-deduction system in Hilbert's style, in brief <!-H-
system, is a pair S = (R,2l) where R is a set of <!-inference rules and
2l:F ~ <! is a <!-set of formulas we call logical axioms system.
The notion of a proof 7r is defined as in fuzzy logic. Let V:F ~ <! be any
initial valuation. Then the valuation of a proof 7r with respect to V is the
constraint Val (7r, V) defined by setting
Val(7r, V) = 2l(am ) if a m is assumed as a logical axiom
Val(7r, V) = V(a m ) if a m is assumed as a proper axiom
Val(7r, V) = r"(Val(7r(i l ), V), .. . , Val(7r(i n ), V» if a m = r' (ai" ... , ai n ).
If a is the formula proven by 7r, then 7r assures that the actual truth value
of a satisfies Val(7r, V). We define the deduction operator V : Val(<!) ~
Val(<!) by setting for every formula a and valuation V
(13) V(V)(a) = n{Val(7r, V) 17r is a proof of a}.

Thus, we propose the following definition of <!-logic.
PROPOSITION 29. A <!-logic is a pair (S,M) where S is a <!-deduction
system and M a fu,zzy semantics such that the related deduction operator
and logical consequence operator coincide.
We condude this section by noticing that in any lo,gic admitting a suitable
notion of negation to refer to lower-bound constraints is equivalent to refer
to interval constraints, in asense. Indeed, assume that in U an involution

- : U -+ U is defined and that -:F -+ F is an operation such that for every
m E M and 0 EF, m(o) = -me
-0). Then we say that M is balanced.
Such a condition is a multivalued translation of the classical condition
m F0 {:} m P! -0.
There are several examples of balanced semantics. For instance we can

assume that M is the set of finitely additive probabilities defined in F.
Also, we can consider the set of truth functional valuations in a multivalued
logic where the equality m(o) = -me
-0) holds by definition. The dass of
necessities is an example of fuzzy semantics that is not balanced. Obviously,
we have that for every m E M, m(-(-o)) = m(o). This suggests to
confine ourselves to the <t-valuations V such that V( -( -0)) = V(o) for every
formula o. We call balanced these valuations. In the following proposition,
given a U -subset v of F, we denote by v.L the U -subset defined by the
equation v.L(o)=-v( -0). As an example, if v is the characteristic function
of a subset X, then v.L is the characteristic function of {o E F I - 0 ~ X}.
PROPOSITION 30. Assume that M is balanced, let m E M and let v :
F -+ U be aU-system 0/ axioms. Then,
m model 0/ v {:} m satisjies the interval constraint (v, v.L).
Let (I, u) be a balanced interval constraint. Then
m satisfies (1, u) {:} m is a model of 1 U u.L.
11 DEDUCTION AS RESEARCH FOR THE MINIMUM AND THE

MAXIMUM
Consider interval constraints in U and let VI. V2, J (VI. V2), J( VI , V2) be de-
fined as in Section 9. In this section we will show that, for any formula 0,
the computation of J(VI.V2)(0) and J(VI,V2)(0) one reduces to the com-
putation of the minimum and the maximum of a continuous function in a
compact set.
Truth-runctionallogics. Assume that M is the truth functional seman-

tics of a multivalued logic whose valuation structure is U and that <t is
the interval constraints system. Also, in order to simplify our treatment,
assume that the available information is finite, Le.
• in the language under consideration there are only a finite number of

propositional variables PI, ... ,Pk
• in the interval constraints (v}, V2) under consideration both {a E

F I vl(a)rf0} and {a E F I v2(a)rfI} are contained in a finite set
of formulas {'Yl, ... , 'Yh} .
As a consequence, the elements in M coincide with the points (Al, ... , Ak)
in the hypercube [O,I]k and (Al, ... , Ak) is a model of (Vl, V2) if and only if
v2bl) > f'Yl(Al, ... ,Ak)~Vlbl) (14)
V2bh) > f'Yh (Al, ... , Ak) ~ vlbh)

where for every formula a we denote by fOt the k-ary polynomial function
associated with a. Denote by M(Vl, V2) the set of points (Al> ... ' Ak) satis-
fying (11.1), i.e. the set of (truth-functional) models of the system (Vl, V2)
ofaxioms. Then
(15) J(vl,v2)(a) =inf{fOt(Al, ... ,Ak) I (Al, ... ,Ak) E M(vl>~)}
and
(16) J(Vl, v2)(a) = sup{fOt(Al, ... ,Ak) I (Al, ... , Ak) E M(vl> V2)}.
for any formula a. If all the logical connectives are interpreted in [0,1] by
continuous functions, then M(Vl, V2) is closed and therefore compact. Thus,
the computation of J(Vl,v2)(a) and J(Vl,v2)(a) one reduces to the com-
putation of the minimum and the maximum of the continuous function fOt
in the compact set M(Vl, V2).
Probability logic. Let F, U and It be as above and set M equal to the set
of finitely additive probabilities, i.e. the functions m : F -+ [0,1] such that
(i) m(a) = 1 provided that a is a tautology
(ii) a logically equivalent to ß =* m(a)= m(ß) (transparency)
(iii) a and ß incompatible =* m(a V ß) = m(a) + m(ß).
Then, since there are only k propositional variables Pl, ... ,Pk, every m E M
is characterized by its values in the n = 2k atoms el, ... , en where ei is a
conjunction of literals and, in turn, a literal is either a propositional variables
or the negation of a propositional variables. This means that we can identify
a model with a point in the set
{(Xl, ... , X n ) E [O,It I Xl + ... + X n = I}.
Now, observe that if a is any formula, then a is logically equivalent to a
suitable disjunction eil V ... V ei, of atoms. By the transparency, this implies
that
m(a) = m(eil) + ... + m(ei,)
and therefore
where ai = 1 if ei entails a and ai = 0 otherwise. Then, an initial valuation

(VI, V2) is satisfiable by m E M if and only if the inequalities
V2hü > at· m(ed + ... + a~. m(en ) :::: VI(rd
V2(rh) :::: ai . m(el) + ... + a;· m(en ) :::: VI ('Yh)
are satisfied where the ai = 1 if ei entails 'Yj and a{ = 0 otherwise. As

a eonsequenee, the models of (VI, V2) are the solutions (Xl, ... , Xn ) of the
following system
V2(r1) > at· Xl + ... + a~ . Xn :::: VI(rI)
with the eonstraints Xl + ... + Xn = 1 and Xl :::: 0, ... ,Xn :::: O. As above,
we denote by M(VI,V2) the eompaet set of these solutions, i.e. the set of
(probabilistie) models of the system (VI, V2) ofaxioms. Moreover, given any
formula a, let ai = 1 if Ci entails a and ai = 0 otherwise. Then,
and
12 DEGREE OF INCONSISTENCY AND NON-MONOTONE LOGIC
Every fuzzy deduetion operator V is a closure operator and therefore a

monotone operator. In spite of that, in this seetion we will show that fuzzy
logie is not a monotone logie, in general. This sinee, as pointed out in
[Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1994], there is astriet eonneetion between non-
monotonie reasoning and ineonsisteney. We eall lower threshold or degree
0/ inconsistency of a fuzzy set V of formulas the number I nc( v) defined by
(19) Inc(v) = inf{V(v)(a) la E F}.

The lower threshold can be interpreted as a degree of inconsistenee only
if a negation is defined in F. Indeed, in this case we have that V( v)( a) ::::
Inc(v) and V(v)(-a) :::: Inc(v). Nevertheless, since the more interesting
logics are equipped with a negation, we prefer the expression 'degree of
inconsistence'. We say that V is completely consistent if I nc( v) = 0 and

that v is completely inconsistent if Inc(v) = 1, i.e. D(v) is the inconsistent
theory. The degree of inconsistency is necessary to evaluate the actual
degree of validity of a formula. Indeed, assurne that D is the deduction
operator of a fuzzy H-system, let V be an initial valuation and let 7f be a
proof of a formula a. Then in the case Val(7f,v) :s; Inc(v) such a proof
is useless, obviously. As a matter of fact, even if we are able to prove a
at a degree D( v)( a) different from zero, in the case D( v) (a) = I nc( v) no
reason exists in favor of the validity of a. Instead, the degree of validity of
a formula a is represented by the difference D( v)( a) - I nc( v) rather than
by D(v)( a). On the other hand, since I nc(v) is an increasing function of
v, such a difference is not an increasing function of v, in general. As an
example, assurne that the available information is represented by a fuzzy
subset v and that D(v)(a) > Inc(v). Moreover, imagine that at a given
time, new information is available, so that v is extended to a larger fuzzy
subset v'. Now, if the added information is partially inconsistent with the
previous one, then there is the possibility that the degree of inconsistency
increases and that, for example, Inc(v') = D(v')(a). So, while the primitive
information v suggests a, the new information shows that no reason exists
to believe into the validity of a. In account of the above consideration,
perhaps should be better to substitute the operator D with a normalized
operator D n defined as follows.
DEFINITION 31. Let D be a fuzzy deduction operator. Then the normal-
ized fuzzy deduction operator D n is defined by setting Dn(v) equal to the
completely inconsistent theory if v is inconsistent and
(20) Dn(v) = Dn(v)(a) - Inc(v)

1- Inc(v)
otherwise.
The operator D n is not a c10sure operator since is not monotone, in
general. Obviously, if we consider a fuzzy logic whose proper theories are
completely consistent, then, since Dn=D, D n is monotone.
Now, we will consider the case of a canonical extension D*of a crisp
deduction operator D. In this case Theorem 13 entails that, for every fuzzy
subset of formulas v,
(21) Inc(v) = Sup{v(-yt} /\ ... /\ v(-ym) I 'Yl,··· ,'Ym are inconsistent }.
Also, the normalized operator can be obtained by nürmalized valuatiün.
Namely, für every v E F(F) such that Inc(v) f= 1, define the normalized
valuation V n by setting
o if v(a) :s; Inc(v)

v(a)-Inc(v)
l-Inc(v)
otherwise.
Then the following proposition holds.

PROPOSITION 32. Given an initial valuation v such that Inc(v)#l we
have
(22) V~(v) = V*(v n ).
M oreover, V~ (v) is a completely consistent !uzzy theory.

In order to illustrate with an example the observation in this section,
consider a c1assical first order language containing a constant band the
following predicates:
B(x) := 'x is a Swedish citizen';

I(x) := 'x has Italian parents';
P(x) := 'x is a Protestant'.
Set Inil = {B(b) 1\ I(b) -+ -P(b)} and Inh = {B(b) -+ P(b)} and define v
by
0.8 if 0: E Inil
(23) v(o:) = { 0.6 if 0: E Inh
o otherwise.
Then, the following formula enable us to obtain the fuzzy theory V(v)
I if 0: is a tautology
V(v)(o:) = { 0.8 if Inil f- 0: and 0: is not a tautology
0.6 if Inil U Inh f- 0: and Inil ~ 0:
o if Inil Ulnh~ 0:.
Since Inil U Inh is consistent, we have that Inc(v) = 0 and therefore

V(v) = Vn(v). Now, imagine that we learn that bis a Swedish citizen. Then
the new information is represented by the initial valuation VI = V U {B(b)}
extending V and
1 if B(b) f- 0:
(24) V(v,)(a) ~ {
0.8 if InA U {B(b)} f- 0: and B(b) ~ 0:
0.6if Inil U In!2 U {B(b)} f- 0: and Inil U {B(b)} ~ 0:
o if In!l U Inh U {B(b)} ~ 0:.
In particular, I am ahle to prove P(b) at degree 0.6. Moreover, since B(b) is

consistent with In! I Uln! 2, we have that I nc(VI) = 0 and therefore V( VI) =
Vn(vd. Again, imagine that we learn both that b is a Swedish citizen
and that b has Italian parents. The new information is represented by
the valuation V2 = V U {B(b),I(b)} and, since InilUlnh U {B(b),I(b)} is
inconsistent,
I if S(b),I(b) I- a
(25) V(v2)(a) ={ 0.8 if Inh U {S(b}, I(b)} I- a and S(b) 1\ I(b)}t a
0.6 otherwise.
if S(b),I(b} I- a
if Inh U {S(b},I(b)} I- a and S(b) 1\ I(b)}t a
otherwise.
Thus, while the information VI enables us to prove P(b) at degree 0.6 and
-P(b} at degree 0, the information V2 enables us to prov:e P(b) at degree 0
and -P(b} at degree 0.5. This emphasizes that fuzzy logic is non-monotone
anywhere an inconsistency phenomenon arises. Indeed, while in absence
of the information In/2 a consequence a of Inh is valued 0.8 by adding
new information In/2 to Inh, a is valued 0.5. So, any new information
contradicting Inh determines a lowering of the degree of belief in Inh. In
this sense, also inconsistent information carries on useful information.
Universita di Salerno, Italy.
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428,1975.
DANIELE MUNDICI
ULAM GAME, THE LOGIC OF MAXSAT, AND

MANY-VALUED PARTITIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
The maximum satisfiability problem MAXSAT asks whether a set of Boolean

clauses G1 , ••• ,Gm contains a satisfiable subset of cardinality ~ k. Trivially,
there exists a Thring machine M recognizing MAXSATin nondeterministic
polynomial time: in fact, the problem is NP-complete, [Garey and Johnson,
1979]. Furthermore, there is a Thring machine T working in determinis-
tic polynomial time, such that, for any input instance (Gl, ... , Gm, k) of
MAXSAT, r outputs a Boolean formula D = D(G1 , ••• , Gm, k) which is
satisfiable Hf (G1 , ••• ,Gm ,k) E MAXSAT. In its actual form, as given by
Cook's theorem, D is only vaguely reminiscent of the input clauses Gi: most
of the variables in D takecare of the description of an accepting computa-
tion of (G1 , ••• , Gm, k) by M. Incorporation of the numerical parameter k
into the Boolean formula D takes its toll.
Our aim is to provide a direct reduction
of MAXSAT to the satisfiability problem BAT 00 in the infinite-valued (sen-

tential) calculus of Lukasiewicz [Tarski and Lukasiewicz, 1956]. The vari-
ables of Cwill be the same as those of G1 , ••• , Gm, and the length of Cwill
be proportional to the square of the length of the input set of clauses.
In order to better understand our reformulation of MAXSAT; following
Ulam [1976, p.281] and Mundici [1992]-[1993], we shall imagine agame be-
tween two players, the Questioner and the Responder. Initially, the Respon-
e
der chooses an assignment E {a,l}n and the Questioner's task is to find
e
the unknown by asking m yes-no questions. For some integer a ~ k ~ m
it is assumed that up to l = m - k of the answers may be erroneousjfalse.
We regard the input clauses G1 , ••• , Gm as representing the answers. For
each clause Gi there is a formula Gjl) with the following meaning in the
infinite-valued calculus: 'either the unknown assignment satisfies Gi' or else
the number of errors available to the Responder must be decreased by one'.
It follows that (G1 , ••• , Gm, k) E MAXSAT Hf the Lukasiewicz conjunction
Cof the Gi'>is satisfiable in the infinite-valued calculus. As a byproduct
we öbtain another proof that SAT 00 is NP-hard [Mundici, 1987].
Non-Boolean partitions naturally arise in our reduction of MAXSATj in
a final section we shall discuss partitions in the context of MV-algebras, the
121
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 121-137.
122 DANIELE MUNDICI
algebras of the infinite-valued calculus. The crucial irredundancy not ion

for the components h 1 , • •. ,ht of any partition of an MV -algebra B can be
very naturally formulated as linear independence of the h; in the enveloping
Abelian lattice-ordered group C with strong unit 1, given by the r functor,
[Mundici, 1986].
As shown by our results, the infinite-valued calculus has sufficient ex-
pressive power to allöw a purely logical treatment of pieces of information
arising from a fallible source.
2 INFINITE-VALUED SATISFIABILITY
Given the alphabet
s= {X, 1,"",8, ffi, 1\, V), ( }

the set :F of formulas in the infinite-valued calculus of Lukasiewicz is pre-
cisely the same as for the classical two-valued calculus. The symbols "",8, ffi
are called the negation, conjunction, and disjunction connective, respec-
tively. We call 1\ and V the idempotent conjunction and disjunction con-
nectives. Strings of the form XI, XII, XIII, ... (for short, Xl. X 2 , X 3 , •• •),
are called variables. The remaining formulas are obtained via the following
inductive stipulation: if P and Q are formulas, then so are ...,P, (P 8 Q),
(P ffi Q), (P 1\ Q) and (P V Q).
Both in the two-valued and in the infinite-valued calculus, the meaning
of connectives is given by
(1) ...,x=l-x, x0y=max(0,x+y-1), xffiy=min(x+y,l),
(2) x 1\ y = min(x, y), x Vy = max(x, y).

According as the truth-values x and y are assumed to range over the two-
element set {O, I} or over the unit real interval [0,1], we obtain the Boolean
calculus or the infinite-valued calculus of Lukasiewicz. In the Boolean cal-
culus, ffi coincides with V, and 8 coincides with 1\. By an assignment (in
the infinite-valued calculus) we mean an element a = (al, ... ,an) in the
n-dimensional unit cube [0, l]n, for some n ~ 1. In case a E {O, l}n we say
that a is Boolean.
To every formula F = F(X 1 , ••• , X n ) E :F we associate a function, de-
noted F : [O,l]n --* [0,1] (by a slight abuse of notation), via the following
familiar inductive procedure: for any assignment a = (al, ... ,an) E [0, l]n,
(3) X;(a) = ai,
(4) ...,C(a) = 1 - C(a),

THE LOGIC OF MAXSAT, AND MANY-VALUED PARTITIONS 123
(5) (G<:) H)(a) = G(a) <:) H(a) = max(O, G(a) + H(a) - 1),
(6) (G EB H)(a) = G(a) EB H(a) = min(l, G(a) + H(a)),

(7) (G A H)(a) = G(a) A H(a) = min(G(a), H(a)),
(8) (G V H)(a) = G(a) V H(a) = max(G(a), H(a)).
A formula F is unsatisfiable in the infinite-valued calculus iff F(a) 0 =

for all assignments a E [O,l]n; otherwise we say that F is satisfiable, in
symbols,
FE SAT oo .
The corresponding notions for the two-valued calculus are obtained by re-
stricting to Boolean assignments.
In the Boolean calculus, by a literal we either mean a variable or a negated
variable; a dause C is a finite set ofliterals, C = {LI, .. . , Lu}; its associated
nmction coincides with (the associated function of) LI V ... V Lu. A set
Cl, ... , Cw of dauses is satisfiable Hf there is a Boolean assignment satisfying
at least one literal of every clause. The MAXSAT problem is the set of all
strings of the form (CIo ••• , Cm , k), where 0 ::; k ::; m is an integer, and
Cl, ... ,Cm is a set of clauses containing a subset with ~ k elements that is
satisfiable in the Boolean calculus. Throughout this paper we let
1= m-k.
Standing Assumption. Unless otherwise specified, it is assumed that
(9) 1 ~ 2.
This assumption will ensure that octants, as defined below in 6, are in
one-one correspondence with their centers. On the other hand, there is no
essential loss of generality in assuming 1 > 2, because we can always add
one or two copies of the empty (hy definition, u~satisfiable) dause, thus
transforming (Cl> ... , Cp , k) into the equivalent input (Cl, ... , Cm , k) with
m - k ~ 2: this requires trivial modifications in the above syntactical and
semantical definitions, thus unnecessarily burdening the notation.
Our direct reduction T of MAXSAT to SAT 00 is given by the following
DEFINITION 1. Let C = (Cl, ... , Cm , k) be an instance of MAXSAT, and
1 = m - k. For every literal L = Xl, ... ,Xn , .,XIo •.. ,.,Xn , we let
(10) L(l) = «l + l)L <:) .,L) EB (L <:) L) EB (L <:) L),

where (I + l)L = LEB··· EB L, (I + 1 times). Further, for every dause
Ci = {Ll, ... , Lu} we let
(11) cJ') = Li' ) V ... V L~).

124 DANIELE MUNDICI
FinaIly, the map T : C = (Cl, ... , Cm, k) He is defined by
THEOREM 2. Let C = (Cl, ... ,Cm,k) be an instance 01 MAXSAT, and

assume without loss 01 generality, m - k ~ 2. Let 11 C 11 denote the total
number oloccurrences 01 variables in C. We then have
(i) C E MAXSAT iff CE SAT 00.
(ii) The same variables occur in Cf and in the input clauses Cl, ... , C m .
The number oloccurrences 01 variables in Cf is S 11 C 11 2 + 6 11 C 11 •
(iii) T is a reduction 01 MAXSAT to SAToo , and can be computed by
a deterministic Turing machine in a number 01 steps proportional to the
square 01 input length.
3 PROOF OF THEOREM
Properties (ii) and (iii) immediately follow by Definition 1. To prove (i) we

prepare
PROPOSITION 3. The natural pointwise order between the junctions F :
[0, l)n --t [0,1) (F E T) is definable in terms 01 -',0, EB. Indeed, lor any two
such junctions Fand G we have
(1S) F S G il and only il F 0 -.G = 0.
Furthermore, the pointwise max and min operations are definable in terms
01 -., 0, EB as lollows:
(14) F 1\ G = min(F, G) = -.(-.F 0 G) 0 G
and
Proof. By direct inspection, using (4)-(6).

•
PROPOSITION 4. For every lormula in F E T, the associated junction
F: [0, l)n --t [0,1) is continuous and consists 01 finitely many linear pieces,
each piece being given by a linear polynomial ao + alYl + ... + anYn with
integer coefficients.
Proof. By induction on the number of connectives in F.

•
THE LOGre OF MAXSAT, AND MANY-VALUED PARTITIONS 125
DEFINITION 5. [Mundici, 1992]

For each b E {O, I}, we let
b(l} _ {
-
1/(1 + 1)
1/(1+1)
if b= °
if b = 1.
More generally, the map ß = (ßI, ... , ßn) E {O, I} n t-t ß(l} E [0, l]n is
defined by
(16) ß(l} = (ß~'}, ... , ßg».
DEFINITION 6. For every Boolean assignment ß E {O, l}n, the octant Oß

is defined by
For every I ~ 2 we say that ß<l> is the I-center of Oß.
Our assumption (9) is to ensure that the map ß t-t ß(l} is a bijection of
{O,I}n onto {dl' 1~1 }n. Thus, octants are in one-one correspondence
with their I-centers.
PROPOSITION 7. For each Boolean assignment ß E {O,l}n, integer I ~ 2
and j = 1, ... , m, we have: ß satisfies Ci iff Cl'} (ß<l}) = 1; further, ß
does not satisfy Ci iff Ci'> (ß<l» = 1~1 •
Proof. By (3)-(8) together with (10) and Definition 5, for every literal
L E Ci we have: ß satisfies L iff L(I}(ß(I}) = 1. Similarly, by direct
inspection, ß does not satisfy L iff L(I}(ß(I}) = I/Cl + 1). Assume
now Ci = {LI,' .. ,Lu}; then, by definition, the associated function of CJl}
coincides with the pointwise maximum of the functions associated to the
formulas Li' }, ... ,L~} of Definition 1, and the condusion again easily follows
by direct inspection. •
PROPOSITION 8. For any integer I > 2 and every octant 0, the restriction
01 C to 0 attciins its maximum value-in the I-center 010. In other words,
lor each ß E {O,I}n and , E 0ß' C(ß<I» ~ C(,).
Proof. Let Feither coincide with some input dause Ci, or with some
literal occurring in Ci' With reference to Definition 1 we shall prove that
the restriction to 0 of F(l} = F(l}(XI , ... , X n ), attains its maximum value
in the I-center of O. There are three cases to consider:
Case 1 : F = X = Xi for some i = 1, . .. ,n.
Then by (10) the result follows by direct inspection of the graph of the
function X (I) :
126 DANIELE MUNDICI
1
(I + I)X 0-,X 2(X0X) I
1+1
o 1 3
4"
Gase 2 : F= ..,G = ",Xi. The proof is similar, in the light of (10).

Gase 3: F = C j = L l V ... V Lu.
Then,- since F(l) = Li'}
V ... V L~}, the desired conclusion follows from
the previous cases, together with the monotonicity of the V operation.
After the analysis of Cases 1-3, since by (12), C= ci'}
0···0 C;:'}, the
desired conclusion follows from Proposition 7, using the the monotonicity
of the 0 operation (Equation (1)). •
COROLLARY9. Let C = (Cl, ... ,Cm,k) beanarbitraryinstanceoj
MAXSAT, where 2 ~ m - k = ,. Then the following conditions are equiva-
lent:
(i) C is satisfiable in the infinite-valued calculus, CE SATooi
(ii) For sorne Boolean assignrnent ß E {O,1}n, C(ß(l}) ~ l/(l + 1);
(iii) CE MAXSAT.
Proof. (i) ++ (ii) Octants form a family of 2n pairwise disjoint subsets
of [0, l]n, and the closure of their union coincides with [O,l]n. By continu-
ity, (Proposition 4) if C E SAT 00 we can safely write C(c5) > 0 where the
assignment c5 belongs to some octant Oß. By Proposition 8, C(ß(I}) > O.
Then by Definitions 1 and 5, together with Proposition 4 we can write
C(ß(I}) ~ l/(l + 1). The converse implication is trivial.
(ii) ++ (iii) Trivially, ß E {O,l}n satisfies at least k of the clauses
Cl, ... , C m Hf ß falsifies at most l many of them. By definition of Lukasiewicz
conjunction, together with Proposition 7, this latter condition is equivalent
to the inequality C(I}(ß(l}) ~ l/(l + 1). •
The proof of this corollary concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
•
REMARK. Since MAXSAT is NP-complete [Garey and Johnson, 1979],
from Theorem 2 we get another proofthat SAT00 is NP-hard. See [Mundici,
1987] for a proof that SAT 00 is in fact NP-complete. Remarkablyenough,
THE LOGle OF MAXSAT, AND MANY-VALUED PARTITIONS 127
for the SAT 00 problem one ean apply teehniques arising from desingular-
ization algorithms for torie varieties [Mundici, 1996a]. It follows that the
same teehniques ean also be applied to MAXSAT.
4 ULAM GAME AND THE MEANING OF C

In this seetion we do notyrove any new theorems, but we aim to explain
the meaning of formula C as given by Theorem 2(i). To this purpose we
shall interpret MAXSAT in Ulam game with errors.
Preliminaries
Ulam game of Twenty Questions with lliesJerrors [Ulam, 1976, p.281] has
two players, the Questioner and the Responder. Initially, the two players
fix a search space S = {O, 1, ... , 2n - I}. The Responder ehooses a number
x E S, and our task (the Questioner's task) is to find the unknown x by
asking m questions, to which the Responder ean only answer yes or no.
Questions are identified with subsets of S. For any question Q, the opposite
question -,Q is defined by
-,Q=S\Q.
A (yes-no) answer is a bit b E {O, I} = {no, yes}. It is agreed that a

maximum number I 0/ the answers can be erroneous//alse. Any question Q
and answer b jointly determine the set Qb ~ S, where Qb = Q iff b = 1,
and Qb = -,Q Hf b = O. Let Q be an m-tuple of questions Ql, ... , Qm, with
their respeetive answers b1 , ... , bm = b. For eaeh j = 1, ... , miet
Sinee up to 1 errors are allowed, a number y E S eannot be disearded un-

less it falsifies at least 1+ 1 of the answerSj stated otherwise, one must diseard
y iff y is an element of at least 1 + 1 sets in the m-tuple (-,K1 , ••• , -,Km ).
Suppose that y is an element of precisely k sets in the list. Let
#y = min(k,l + 1).
We ean safely normalize the integer #y, dividing it by 1 + 1. Equivalently,
and more eonveniently, we shall heneeforth use the truth-value
#y
(19) 1- 1+1' #YE{O,l, ... ,l+l}.
128 DANIELE MUNDICI
The logic of Ulam game with no lies

When no lies are allowed, Ulam game becomes the familiar game of Twenty
Questions. A faithful formalization of the game is given by the two-valued
propositional calculus, as folIows:
First of all, the search space S is replaced by the set S' = {O,l}n. Any
Boolean assignment (j E S' is in canonical one-one correspondence with an
integer SES, letting (j1, . • . ,(jn display the bits of s in the natural order:
thus, e.g. the last bit (jn is equal to 0 iff S is even. The assignment ~ E S'
corresponding to the unknown number x E S shall be naturally referred to
as the unknown assignment.
Given the above m-tuple of questions Q with their respective answers b,
we let the Boolean function
EQ,b : S' ~ {O, I}

be defined by stipulating that for every assignment ( E S', and correspond-
ing number z ES,
if z E K 1 n ... n Km
otherwise.
Let us agree to say that EQ,b is the effect of Q and b. Intuitively, EQ,b
gives truth-value 1 to every assignment ( satisfying all answers, and gives
truth-value 0 to the remaining assignments.
PROPOSITION 10. EQ,b = EQ"b, /1. .•• /I. EQm,b m , where /I. denotes the
pointwise minimum operation.
Thus, the effect of any m-tuple of quest ions and answers coincides with
the Boolean conjunction of the effects of each question and answer taken
individually.
The logic of Ulam game with 2,3, ... , errors

Unless otherwise specified, throughout this subsection we assurne that the
Questioner does not know the actual value l ::::: 2 0/ the maximum number
0/ lies available to the Responder. Let us (readers and author) impersonate
the Questioner.
Suppose we ask 'is x odd?' and we receive the answer 'yes'. Then, for
every l = 2,3, ... , both hypotheses 1l 1 ,/,n and 1l o,/,n must be considered,
where
1l 1 ,/,n means: 'the nth bit of x is 1, and up to l lies are allowed';
1lo,/,n means: 'the nth bit of x is 0, and up to llies are allowed'.
To give a better representation of the totality of these hypotheses, recalling
Definition 5, we map 1l 1 ,/,n into the point /~1 in the nth coordinate axis;
further, we map 1l0,I,n into I~l' In this way, the nth axis accommodates
two sets of points, {2/3, 3/4, 4/5, ...} and {1/3, 1/4, 1/5, ...}. Similarly,
any hypothesis 1l1,I,i and 1lo,l,i ab out the ith digit of x can be mapped
into the ith coordinate axis.
To cope with all possible hypotheses 1lb,l,i simultaneously, we replace the
search space S by the set
(20) S· =U
1~2
{A,A}n.
+ +
Every assignment 8 E {I~l' I~l }nis said to be an l-candidate (for the
unknown x, as well as for the unknown €). By (5), for every l-candidate
8 there is precisely one Boolean assignment ß E S' = {O,I}n such that
ß{I) = 8. Conversely, for any fixed I = 2, 3, ... , every ß E S' corresponds to
precisely one l-candidate 8. Thus indeed, 8 represents one candidate for the
unknown x or €.
Still assuming that we are given the answer 'x is odd', let us consider the
effect of this individual answer on each l-candidate 6 with corresponding
number dES. Thus, before receiving this answer, d does not falsify any
answer whatsoever, and its truth-value, in accordance with (19), is initially
set equal to 1. By analogy/contrast with the case ofno lies, we are naturally
led to prescribe that
(i) 8-rather than being discarded-should only be 'fined', in case 8 fal-
sifies the answer , but
(ii) the truth-value of 8 should be kept equal to its initial value 1, if 8
satisfies the answer .
In more detail, arguing by cases we have:
Case 1. 8n = 1/(1 + 1) (i.e. dis even).
Then, to formalize the idea that 8 should be fined one error, upon recall-
ing equation (19), since #d = 1, we decrease the truth-value of 8 from the
initial value 1 to 1/(1 + 1).
Case 2. 8n = 1/(1 + 1) (i.e. dis odd).
Then, to formalize the idea that 8 should not be fined, again with refer-
ence to (19), since #d = 0, we keep the truth-value of 8 equal to its initial
value 1.
Prescriptions and their algebra

With reference to (20), by a prescription we mean a function P : S* -t [0,1]
such that for every l-candidate 8,
P(6) E {O, 1/(1 + 1), ... ,1/(1 + 1), I}.

130 DANIELE MUNDICI
Given the above m-tuple of questions Q = Q1,"" Qm, with their respective
answers b = b1 , .•• , bm , we define the prescription PQ,b : S* -+ [0,1] by
stipulating that, for each 1 2:: 2, 1-candidate a, and corresponding element
8 E S,
#8
(21) PQ,b(a) = 1 - 1 + 1 '
where, as in (19), #s is the number j ofsets among K 1 , •.• ,Km to which

8 does not belong-with the usual proviso about collapsing to 1 + 1 any
j 2:: 1 + 1. We say that prescription PQ,b : S* -+ [0, 1] is determined by
questions Q and answers b.
Intuitively, PQ,b(a) is the relative distance, measured in units of 1 + 1,
between 1 + 1 and the number #8 of subsets among K 1 , ... ,Km to which
8 does not belong. Thus, PQ,b actually prescribes that any candidate a
should be fined a number of errors equal to the number of answers falsified
by its corresponding number s.
EXAMPLE. The prescription determined by one ans wer.
Let us consider the prescription PQj ,bj determined by the single question
Qj and answer bj E {O, I}. By (21), PQj,bj prescribes that every 1-candidate
o whose corresponding number d belongs to Q/j should not be fined, while
aB remaining candidates should be fined one error. In symbols,
iff d E Q/j
otherwise.
The following proposition, whose proof is immediate, is the counterpart

of Proposition 10 for the case of 1 2:: 2 errors:
PROPOSITION 11. Let Q and b be as above.
(i) PQ,b coincides with the conjunction 0/ the individual prescriptions

determined by each question and answer, in symbols,
(ii) Let dES, and 0 E S' be its corresponding Boolean assignment. For
each 1 = 2,3, ... , m, let 8(/) E S* be its corresponding 1-candidate.
°
Then d is a member 0/ at least k = m -1 0/ the sets K 1, ... , Km
iff PQ ,b(8(l») > iff PQ ,b(8(1») 2:: 1/(1 + 1).
The algebra 0/ prescriptions.

°
The zero prescription is the constant function over S*. This prescribes
that every 1-candidate should be fined 1 + 1 errorSj in other words, all can-
didates should be discarded.
At the opposite extreme, the initial prescription (= the constant function
By writing V 0 W = °
lover S*) prescribes that no candidate should be fined.
we signify that two prescriptions V and W
are incompatible, i.e. the cumulative application of V and W results in the
elimination of all candidates.
Given prescriptions Wand V, we say that W is milderthan V Hf V(o:) :::;
W(o:) for all 0: E S·.
For every prescription W : S* -+ [0,1], its Lukasiewicz negation ..,W is
the mildest prescription incompatible with W. Thivially,
(23) --,W = 1 - W.
Finally, the Lukasiewicz disjunction of prescriptions W and V is defined
by
(24) WEB V = --,(--,W 0 ..,V).
The meaning of C
For every formula F E F, the restriction to S· of the function F : [0, l]n -+
[0,1] defined in (3)-(6), is a prescription, denoted F'. As a matter of fact,
by Proposition 4, for each 1 candidate 8, the truth-value F'(8) must be an
element of the set {O, l/(l + 1), ... , l/(l + 1),1}. We say that prescription
F' is represented by F.
Prescriptions from variables.
Given l ~ 2, together with a Boolean assignment (, with its corresponding
number z E Sand corresponding l-candidate 8 = (I), we have by (3):
l/(l+l) iff (;=1 iff 8;=l/(l+1)
Xi(8) = { l/(l + 1) iff (i = 0 iff 8; = l/(l + 1).
In other words, in case the ith bit of z is odd, 8 is fined one errorj in case the
ith bit of z is even, 8 is fined the maximum number l 0/ errors: one more
error is sufficient to discard 8. Summing up, the variable Xi represents the
following prescription:
any candidate for a number whose ith bit is odd shall be fined one error; all remaining
candidates shall be fined the maximum number of errors.
Similarly, by (23), the formula ",Xi represents the following prescription:

any candidate for a number whose ith bit is even shall be fined one error; all remaining
candidates shall be fined the maximum number of errors.
The conjunction 0/ two prescriptions.

Given formulas Fand G, by (5) F0G represents the following prescrip-
tion:
132 DANIELE MUNDICI
any candidate shall be fined according to the first prescription, and then, cumulatively,
also according to the second.
This operation may be applied when the prescriptions represented by F

and G are determined via Proposition 11 by two consec'Utive Ulam games
GI and G2 with the same Responder and the same unknown and it ise,
known that GI and G 2 are half-times of a unique game, (possibly played
by two different Questioners), and the Responder is not allowed to reset to
I the number of lies available to him, at the beginning of G 2 • Note that
Xi 0",Xi represents the zero prescription. Further, Xi 0 Xi represents the
following prescription:
any candidate for a number whose ith bit is odd shall be fined two errorsj all remaining
candidates shall be discarded.
Naturally, the two formulas Xi and Xi0X i represent different prescriptions.

Further opemtions on prescriptions.
Using (23) and (24) one can similarly handle Lukasiewicz negation and
disjunction. For instance, by direct inspection one sees that the formula
",Xi EB (Xi 0 Xi) EB (Xi 0 Xi) represents the following prescription:
every candidate for a number whose ith bit is odd shall not be finedj all remaining
candidates shall be fined one error.
Suppose we are given formulas F and G. Then, with reference to (15),

formula F V G = ..,(..,F EB G) EB G represents to the following prescription:
give every candidate the smaller fine between the one prescribed by F and the one
prescribed by G.
Note that minimum number of errors corresponds to maximum truth-value.

Trivially, the prescriptions represented by F V F and by F coincide.
Given formulas F and G and their prescriptions F' and G', with reference
to (14), formula F I\G = ..,( ..,F0G) 0G represents the following prescription:
give every candidate the bigger fine between the one prescribed by F and the one pre-
scribed by G.
Suppose F' and G' are determined by two pamllel Ulam games, played by
two independentpropor Questioners with the same Responder, and the same
unknown number x. If in both games the Responder is allowed the same
maximum number I of lies, then the prescription represented by F 1\ G is
the best we can get from F' and G'.
Other classes 0/ prescriptions.
Let us fix I to some definite value ~ 2. Then the formula xii> defined in
(10) represents the following, more complicated, prescription:
any candidate for a number whose ith bit is odd shall not be finedj on the other hand,
given any I'-candidate 6 whose ith bit is even, (I' ?: 2 and otherwise arbitrary) if I'
happens to coincide with I, then 6 shall be fined one errorj if.l' f:. I then 6 shall be fined
proportionally larger numbers of errors.
For the meaning of 'proportionally' see the pictures in the proof of Propo-
sition 8.
Always keeping l fixed, let us identify each set Kj ~ {O, l}n of (18) with
the set of assignments satisfying the input dause Cj of our instance C of
MAXSAT. Then, recalling (11), together with Propositions 7 and 11, we
see that formula CY>
represents the following prescription:
any I'-candidate for a Boolean assignment actually satisfying Cj shall not be fined (I' ?: 2
arbitrary)j any I'-candidate 6 for a Boolean assignment falsifying Cj shall be fined one
error, in case I' = Ij otherwise, 6 shall be fined proportionally larger numbers of errors.
Recalling (12) and (19), C represents the following prescription P:

discard all I-candidates for Boolean assignments falsifying more than I input clausesj for
each e ~ I, any I-candidate whose corresponding Boolean assignment falsifies exact1y e
clauses, shall be fined e errorsj the remaining candidates shall be fined proportionally
larger numbers of errors.
Since by definition, P is the restriction of C to S*, it is dear that the input

C= (Cl,'" ,Cm,m-l) belongs to MAXSATiffthere exists an l-candidate 8
that is not fined more than l errors by P, iff there exists a candidate 8 E S*
such that P(8) > O. By construction, Cis satisfiable in the infinite-valued
calculus iff P is not the zero prescription iff C E MAXSAT. This is in
agreement with Theorem 2(i).
5 PARTITIONS OF MV-ALGEBRAS
Typically, every question in Ulam game may be regarded as a partition of

the search space Sinto two components A and B = S \ A: the Responder
must choose between A and B, and one bit of information will tell us his
choice. More generally, we might be interested in a situation where we ask
the Responder to choose a component in a partition having, say, 2k com-
ponents; since the latter are in one-one correspondence with k-bit numbers,
we immediately see that the larger is k, the smaller is the degree of inter-
activeness (or, feedback) between such questions and answers: indeed, k
yes-no answers must be given before the next question is asked. The maxi-
mum degree of interactiveness occurs in genuine Ulam games, where k = 1;
at the other extreme, traditional error-correcting codes amount to search-
ing strategies for generalized Ulam games where all questions are asked in
advance.
134 DANIELE MUNDICI
More general kinds of 'non-Boolean partitions' also arise from the an-
swers. For instance, let us consider some properties of the two prescriptions
PI and P2 represented by Xi and ...,Xi . First of all, the disjunction PI 81 P2
is the initial prescription. Equivalently, H 0 P2 is the zero prescription
'discard all candidates'. A deeper property of the pair of functions PI and
P2 is their 'independence': no nontriviallinear combination of PI and P2
with integer (equivalently, with rational) coefficients coincides with the zero
prescription over S*. The pair (PI, P2 ) is the prototypical partition in the
infinite-valued calculus of Lukasiewicz.
To discuss partitions at the proper level of generality, by analogy with the
algebraic approach to probability spaces given by (a)-Boolean algebras, we
shall work in the purely algebraic context of MV-algebras. Intuitively, MV-
algebras are algebras of prescriptions in Ulam games where search spaces
may be infinite and truth-values may range in nonstandard unit intervals
[0,1]. This intuition will be made more precise by Di Nola's theorem below.
DEFINITION 12. An MV-algebra is a structure B = (B,O, 1,"",0,(1) sat-
isfying the following equations:
(a) s 0 (t 0 u) = (s 0 t) 0 u
(b) s 0 t = t 0 s
(c) s00=0
(d) s01=s
(e) ...,0 = 1
(f) ...,1 = °
(g) rEBs=...,(...,r0...,s)
(h) ...,(...,r0s)0s=...,(...,s0r)0r.
We shall henceforth assurne familiarity with the basic properties of MV-

algebras, [Chang, 1958; Chang, 1959; Mundici, 1986; Mundici, 1988]. We
refer to [Cignoli et al., 1995] for a comprehensive monograph on the subject.
In the light of Proposition 3 one can routinely equip every MV-algebra A
°
with additional operations V and /\. Then, as proved by Chang, A becomes
a distributive lattice with smallest element and largest element 1. As also
proved by Chang, a Boolean algebra is the same as an MV -algebra satisfying
the additional equation x 0 x = x. When (and only when) this equation is
satisfied, x EB y = x V y and x 8 y = x /\ y. MV-algebras stand to the infinite-
valued calculus as Boolean algebras stand to the two-valued calculus. With
reference to our initial definitions in Section 2, up to isomorphism, the MV-
algebra of functions {F : [0, l]n -+ [0, 1]1 F E F} with pointwise operations
of negation, conjunction and disjunction, is the free MV-algebra over the n

generators X!, ... , X n .
EXAMPLES.
(i) The MV-algebra [0,1] of real numbers in the unit interval, where
"",0, EB are as in (1). Chang's completeness theorem [Chang, 1958],
[Chang, 1959] states that an equation holds in the MV-algebra [0,1]
iff it holds in all MV-algebras.
(ii) For each n = 1,2,3, ... , the MV-algebra of all prescriptions in a Ulam
game over the search space S = {O,l}n, with negation, conjunction,
and disjunction as defined in the previous section.
(iii) Let G be an Abelian lattice-ordered group (for short, l-group) with
distinguished strong unit u = 1 (in the sense that for all
°
9 EG
there is an integer < n such that g :::; nu.) Then the unit interval
°: :;
[O,u] = {h E G I 0 :::; h :::; u} equipped with negation ...,g = u - g,
conjunction g0 h = 0 V (g + h - 1) and disjunction 9 EB h = 1/\ (g + h)
becomes an MV-algebra B, in symbols, B = r(G,u). Further, if for
every l-homomorphism 4> : (G,u) -t (G',u') such that 4>(u) = u'
we let r(4)) be the restriction of 4> to [O,u], we then obtain from r
a categorical equivalence (i.e. a fuH, faithful, dense functor) from l-
groups with strong unit to MV-algebras [Mundici, 1986]. For every
MV-algebra B, we shall tacitly identify B with the unit interval of
(G,u), in symbols,
(25) [O,u] = B = (B, 0,1,,,,,,0, EB) = r(G,u).
DEFINITION 13. Let B and (G, u) be as above. Then a partition of B is

a finite multiset II in B, i.e. a subset {h l , ••• , h k } of B, together with a
function assigning to each h i an integer mi 2: 1 (i = 1, ... , k), satisfying
the following conditions:
(*) mih l + ... + mkhk = 1 = u, where + denotes addition in Gj
(**) the set {h 1 , •.• , hk} (equivalently, the set {mI h 1 , ••• , mk h k }) is linearly
independent in the Z-module G: in other words, whenever 0 = nIh l + ... +
nkhk E G with integer coefficients ni, then all ni are zero.
Given a partition II = ({ h 1 , ... , h k }, ml,"" mk}, each h j is called a
component of II. The integers mj are the multiplicities of IIj by (**) they
are uniquely determined.
DEFINITION 14. Let B and (G,u) be as above. For any two partitions
of B, II = ({hl, ... ,hk}, ml, ... ,mk) and II' = ({gl, ... ,gl}, nl, ... ,n,),
we say that II is a refinement of II' iff the subsemigroup of G generated by
{ht, ... , h k } contains the set {gI, .. " gd.
136 DANIELE MUNDICI
REMARKS.
1. In the particular case when B is a Boolean algebra, one recovers the

usual definition of partition (with dosed-and-open components) over
the topological space of maximal ideals of B with the Stone topol-
ogy. In this case, all multiplicities are equal to 1, and Condition (**)
amounts to the customary requirement that no component is void.
2. Let B be the MV-algebra [0,1]. Then (G,u) is the additive group of

real numbers with the natural order, and with 1 as the strong unit.
The multiset W = ({1/18, 2/3}, 6,1) satisfies Condition (*), but does
not satisfy Condition (**), whence it is not a partition of B.
3. As a consequence of Chang's eompleteness theorem, in ease B is

semisimple, (the interseetion of maximal ideals of Bis the zero ideal),
a partition TI of B is a family of rationally independent [O,I]-valued
nmetions fi over the space of maximal ideals of B, in such a way that
the eonstant function 1 is obtainable as a linear eombination of the
li with integer eoefficients ~ 1. In the most general ease, when B
need not be semisimple, by Di Nola's theorem [Di Nola, 1993], B is
isomorphie to an MV-algebra of nonstandard [O,I]-valued funetions
defined over some set. Thus, the functions li ean take their values in
a nonstandard unit interval [0, 1]*, allowing infinitesimal truth-values.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is grateful to Peter Sehmitt for his eriticism of an earlier version
of this paper. FUrther , the author gratefully aeknowledges the eriticism and
suggestions of Didier Dubois, as weIl as those of an anonymous referee, that
greatly helped to improve the readability of this paper.
The author was partially supported by CNR-GNSAGA Projeet on Sym-
boHe Computation.
Universita degli Studi di Milano, Italy.
REFERENCES
[Chang, 1958) C. C. Chang. Algebraic analysis of many-valued logics, 'Irans. Amer.
Math. Soc., 88, 467-490, 1958.
[Chang, 1959) C. C. Chang. A new proof of the completeness of the Lukasiewicz axioms.
'Irans. Amer. Math. Soc., 93, 74-80, 1959.
[Cignoli et al., 1995) R. Cignoli, I. M. L. D'Ottaviano and D. Mundici. Algebras 0/
Lukasiewicz Logics, (in Portuguese). Collection CLE, Vol. 12, Center of Logic, Episte-
mology and History of Science, State University of Campinas, UNICAMP, SP, Brazil,
Second Edition, 1995. Expanded edition in English, in preparation.
[Di Nola, 1993] A. Di Nola. MV-Algebras in the Treatment of Uncertainty. In Proceed-

ings of the International IFSA Congress, Bruxelles 1991. P. Löwen and E. Roubens,
eds. pp. 123-131. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993.
[Garey and Johnson, 1979] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson. Computers and Intractabil-
ity, A Guide to the Theory of NP-completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company, San
Franciseo, 1979.
[Mundici, 1986] D. Mundici. Interpretation of AF C*-algebras in Lukasiewiez sentential
calculus, Journal of Functional Analysis, 65, 15--63, 1986.
[Mundici, 1987] D. Mundici. Satisfiability in many-valued sentential logie is NP-
complete, Theoretical Computer Science, 52, 145-153, 1987.
[Mundici, 1988] D. Mundici. Farey stellar subdivisions, ultrasimplicial groups, and Ko
of AF C*-al~ebras, Advances in Math., 68, 23-39, 1988.
[Mundici, 1992J D. Mundici. The logic of Ulam's game with lies. In Knowledge, Belief
and Stmtegic Internetion, C. Bicchieri and M. L. Dalla Chiara, eds. pp. 275-284. Cam-
bridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory, Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
[Mundici, 1993] D. Mundiei. Logic of infinite quantum systems. International J. of The-
oretical Physics, 32, 1941-1955, 1993. .
[Mundici, 1996a] D. Mundici. Lukasiewiez normal forms and torie desingularizations, In
From Foundations to Applications. Proceedings Logic Colloquium '93, W. Hodges et
al., eds. pp. 401-423. Oxford University Press, 1996.
[Mundici, 1996b] D. Mundici. Uncertainty measures in MV-algebras, and states of AF
C*-algebras. Special issue of Notas de la Sociedad de Matematica de Chile, in memo-
riam Rolando Chuaqui, 15,42-54, 1996. .
[Tarski and Lukasiewiez, 1956] A. Tarski and J. Lukasiewiez. Investigations into the Sen-
tential Calculus. In Logic, Semanties, Metamathematics, pp. 38-59. Oxford University
Press, 1956. Reprinted by Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1983.
[Ulam, 1976] S. M. Ulam. Adventures of a Mathematician, Seribner's, New York, 1976.
COSTAS A. DROSSOS
A MANY-VALUED GENERALIZATION OF THE

ULTRAPOWER CONSTRUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
D. Scott in [1969] remarked: 'The idea of constructing Boolean-valued mod-

els could have been (but was not) discovered as a generalization of the ul-
traproduct method used now so often to obtain nonstandard models for
ordinary analysis. Roughly, we can say that ultraproducts use the standard
Boolean algebras (the power-set Boolean algebras) to obtain models eIe-
mentarily equivalent to the standard model, whereas the Boolean method
allows the nonstandard complete algebras (such us the Lebesgue algebm of
measurable sets modulo sets of measure zero or the Baire algebm of Borel
sets modulo sets of the first category.) Thus the Boolean method leads to
nonstandard nonstandard models that are not only not isomorphie to the
standard model but are not even equivalent. Nevertheless, they do satisfy
all the usual axioms and deserve to be called models of analysis.'
The ultraproduct construction can be divided into two stages: 'a product
stage' foHowed by an 'ultra stage'. Thus a generalization of the ultrapower
construction can have two kind of generalization: apower genemlization
and a ultm genemlization. In [Drossos, 1990; Drossos and Markakis, 1992;
Drossos and Markakis, 1993; Drossos et al., 1992; Drossos and Markakis,
1995; Drossos and Theodoropoulos, 1996] etc., we applied a weH known
power generalization, the Boolean power construction into the foundations
of fuzzy sets, and nonstandard mathematics. Thus instead of a fuH Boolean-
valued model as is used in [Scott, 1969], the concept of Boolean power is
used, which is a direct generalization of the power stage of the ultrapower
construction. This can be seen, by notiee the foHowing relationship:
AT ~ A[P(T)].
2 BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this section we are going to setup a logieal framework, that is useful for
work in many-valued logie. This is what is usually called satisjaction based
logic, see [Ryan and Sadler, 1992].
DEFINITION 1. A predicate language L is a tuple,
(V, LC, Q; F, P)
where,
139
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuuy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 139-150.
140 COSTAS A. DROSSOS
• V is a set of countably many variables.

• LC is a set of logical connectives, each one with a specified arity.
• Q is a set of quantifiers.
• F is a set of function symbols, each one associated with a non-negative
integer n = 0,1,2, ... which is called its arity. 1
• P is a set of predicate symbols each one associated with a non-negative
=
integer, n 0, 1,2, ... which is called its arity.2
The terms, atomic formulas and formulas of the language are constructed
as usual, using the function symbols, the predicate symbols, the logical
connectives in LC and the quantifiers in Q. All the above sets are assumed
to be disjoint.
DEFINITION 2. A valuation system 0, is a tuple 0 == (0, D, OC, G) such
that,
• 0 is a set called the valuation set, which contains at least the elements
0,1.
• Dis a nonempty proper subset of 0, called the set 0/ designated truth
values, which contains at least the element 1.
• OC, is a set of functions,
where n c is the arity of the logical connective lc E LC. Each function

WcE OC corresponds to a lc ELC.
• G is a set of functions,
gq : P(O) --+ 0
one corresponding to each quantifier q E Q. These functions map

possibly infinite subsets of 0 onto an element of 0, and so they are
called infinite operations on O.
DEFINITION 3. An assignment for 0 is a pair (a, M) consisting of a func-

tion a together with a nonempty set M such that:
10-ary function symbols are names for constants, since for any set M, the function
I: M0 ~ M with MO = {0} essentially picks up an element of M.
20_ary predicate symbols are identified with the symbols 0 and 1 since e.g. for any
set M, MO == MO = {0} and so any O-ary relation is one of the subsets of {O}, i.e. O,or
= =
{O} 1. In addition for n 1, any l-ary relation is obviously a subset of M.
MANY-VALUED ULTRAPOWER CONSTRUCTION 141
(i) If x E V then a(x) E M.

(ii) If tE TERM(C), then a(t) E M.
(iii) If pEP has arity n then a(p) is a function,
a(p) : Mn --t n
We also use the notation a "'z a' , which means that given two assign-
ments for n, a, a' they agree on everything except possible the element
of n assigned to x.
DEFINITION 4. Given a valuation system n == (n, D, nc, G) for the pred-

icate language C == (V, LC, Qj F, R), and an assignment a for n, a valuation
is a function,
Va : FORM(C) --t n
defined as folIows:
(i) If pEP has arity n and tt, ... ,tn E TERM(C), then,
(ii) If lc E LC has arity n, then
(iii) va(qx,<p) = 9q({va'(<p)la "'z a'l).

The above formulation is general enough to accommodate many logical sys-
tems, e.g. classicallogic, Boolean-valued logic, many-valued logic, etc.
3 THE 'POWER' GENERALIZATION: BOOLEAN POWERS.
For a Boolean-valued logic (Boolean powers) concerning, for simplicity, the

structure (A, R) with just one binary relation R, we usually take as its
language the following specification:
• LC:= {A,-.}
• Q:= {3}.
• F:= 0.
• P:= {~,R}.
As for the valuation system, we take:
• n:= IB where (IB, 1\., V, c, 0, 1> is a complete Boolean algebra.
• D:= {1/B} or Dis either a filter or ultrafilter in IB.
• nc:= {w",w~}, where w" := 1\., w~:= C are the usual Boolean
operations.
• G:= {g3} where g3, is defined as:
g3 : P(IB) -+ IB
X ~ g3(X):= Vx
"'EX
For the assignment (a, M), we choose,
M := A(JB) == A[IB1 := {J E /BA I fex) I\. f(y) = O/B, X =F y

& V"'EA f(x) = 1/B}
and a is a function such that,
• ('Vx E V)[a(x) E M1.

• (Vt E TERM(.C) )[a(t) E M1.
• For ~,R E P, we have:
a(~) : A(/B) x A(/B) -+ /B

(f,g) ~ a(~)(f,g) == [! ~ g] :=
V [fex) I\. g(x)]

:l:EA
and,
a(R) == R(/B)
(f,g) ~ a(R)(f,g) == [R(f,g)] :=
V [tex) I\. g(y)]
Olf,JlEA:
R(""y)
The above formulas satisfy the following relations:
(i) [! ~ !] = 1/B, f E M.
(ii) [J~g]=[g~f], l,gEM.

(iii) [J ~ g] 1\ [g ~ h] ~ [! ~ h], I,g,h E M
(iv) [ft ~ gl[l\[h ~ g2] l\a(R)(ft,h) ~ a(R)(gl,g2) li,gi E M, i =
1,2.
The above assignment can be extended to a valuation (a truth assignment)
Va (.) == [ . ] for all formulas as follows:
(i) For R E P and t1, t2 E TERM(C) then,
and,
(ii) Suppose now that, for formulas <p, 'IjJ constructed at the n th step, have
been assigned truth values then,
Va(<p 1\ 'IjJ) [<p 1\ 'IjJ] := [<p] 1\ ['IjJ] == Va(CP)WAVa('IjJ)

Va (-'<p) _ [-'<p]:= [<p Je == w~ (va(cp)) .
Va «V'x)<p) _ [(V'x)cp(x)]:= 1\ [/(x/a)]
aEA
The above definitions give a Boolean-valued formulation of the 'power stage'.

The basic theorems related to Boolean powers are:
THEOREM 5 (Los Theorem). For any /ormula cp in FORM(L) we have:
[cp(/t, ... , In)] = v

zl.···,znEA:
Al=cp(xl, ... ,x n )
THEOREM 6 (Mixing). 1/ (ti)iEI is a pairwise disjoint collection 01 ele-

ments 01 IB and (!i)iEI is any collection 0/ elements 0/ A(LB), there exists
an I E A[IB] with [J ~ Id 2: ti. 1/ in addition Vti = lLB this I is unique
and will be written,
THEOREM 7 (Maximum Principle). For any /ormula cp(x) there is an 10 E

A[IB] with,
[(3x)cp(x)]:= V [cp(g)] = [cp(fo)]
gEA[LB)
THEOREM 8. Let /B and /B' be two eomplete Boolean algebras, and let,
h: /B ~ /B'
be a homomorphism of Boolean algebras, then for every 2-valued C-strueture
M, h induees a homomorphism,
h : M(IB) ~ M(IB')
1f h is an embedding (resp. isomorphism) then so is h.
Some results of a theoretical value are (see for more [Drossos, 1990; Drossos
and Markakis, 1992; Drossos and Markakis, 1993; Drossos and Markakis,
1995; Drossos and Theodoropoulos, 1996])
THEOREM 9. Let S = {x E A : rp(x)} be a subset of A. Then S(IB) is
isomorphie to the set {J E A (IB) : [rpU)] = lIB}
In the following theorems let E(IR) == E and V(IR) == V be the stochastic
space of point-free elementary and general random variables correspond-
ingly, see [Kappos, 1969], and IR(IB) the Boolean power of the reals, then,
THEOREM 10. [Drossos and Markakis, 1995J The struetures E and IR(IB) ==
IR[/B] are isomorphie and both elementarily extend the structure of the real
numbers IR.
THEOREM 11. [Drossos and Markakis, 1993J [Boolean representation of
juzzy sets].
(i) Discrete fuzzy sets. Let E[o,l] be the subset of V[O,l], of all elementary
random variables, having values in [0,1], then we have,
E[o,l] ~ [0,1](/B) == [O,I](IB)
i.e. E[O,l] is isomorphie to [0, 1](IB) , where [0,1](/B) is the Boolean

power 0/[0,1].
(ii) General fuzzy sets. Let 1 = (0,1) and DIB(!) the set of all /B -
valued Dedekind cuts, with appropriate boundary values for 0 & 1,
then depending on the type of cut,
V[O,l] ~ DIB([O,I])
i.e. V[O, 1] is isomorphie with DIB(!), and therefore eaeh /B-valued

Dedekind cut uniquely determines a dass of almost everywhere equal
random variables on (0, A, P) with values in [0,1].
THEOREM 12 (Drossos et al., 1992). Let f : X ~ [0,1] be an arbitrary

juzzy set. Then there is a probability algebra (/B, p) and a /B -valued junction
1f : X ~ /B such that,
f=p 0 1f
4 GENERALIZING THE 'ULTRA STAGE'
Qualitative and Quantitative Valuation Systems.

Recalling that according to Lawvere the basic dialectic scheme in math-
ematics, is 'Geometry vs. Logic', we see that in Geometry and Analysis
we had a lot of 'quantitative structures' (groups, rings, fields, etc.), that
is, structures where the elements were not necessarily indempotent. In the
case of Logic however, the usual valuation systems were almost exclusively
qualitative i.e. indempotent (Boolean, Heyting algebras, lattices etc.). In
Recent years there is a strong interest in quantitative valuation systems (lin-
ear logic, fuzzy logic, many-valued logic etc.) and the associated structures
(quantales, residuated lattices, MV-algebras etc.).
Usually these valuation systems have mixed signatures, made up from a
qualitative and a quantitative part.
The basic problem is to study the connection and the relationships be-
tween truth-values expressed in one part and truth-values expressed in other
part. Especially we are interested in studying connections between the two
types of signatures. A result which is very relevant to quantitative struc-
tures is the following [Johnstone, 1982, p.2]:
THEOREM 13. Let (M, V, O) be a commutative monoid in which every el-
ement is indempotent. Then there exist a unique partial order on M such
°
that a V b is the join 0/ a and b, and is the least element.
By the contrapositive of the above theorem, it is immediate that, in the
case of quantitative (not necessarily indempotent) structures, there is no
order compatible with the operation and the unit elements. However there
is always the possibility of defining an additional residuated structure on M,
compatible with the previous partial order, making (M, V,O) a residuated
monoid.
In this paper we shall restrict ourselves in problems associated with ul-
trapower construction. The general study will be left for a future paper.
Quantitative generalizations 0/ the ultrafilter concept.

Let us now consider [0,1] as a quantitative structure e.g. an MV-algebra,
([0,1], EB, 0,' ,0,1), where the operations are the usual Lukasiewicz oper-
ations see e.g. [Höhle, 1996}. The idempotent elements of this structure
are {O, I}. In this subsection when we say [0,1] we shall always mean the
MV-algebra structure.
Suppose now that F : JB --* [0, 1] is a homomorphism between a quali-
tative and a quantitative structure. The following theorem proves that this
concept reduces to a trivial 0, 1 homomorphism.
146 COSTAS A. nROSSOS
THEOREM 14. Let F : IB ~ [0,1] be an [0, l]-ultrafilter in IB. Then

F[IB] = {O, I} is the trivial Boolean subalgebra 0/ the MV-algebra [0,1].
Proof. Let x E F[IB], then there exists t E IB, such that x = F(t). But
t 1\ t = t and hence F(t 1\ t) = F(t), Le. F(t) 8 F(t) = F(t) or x 8 x = x,
so that x E C([O, 1]) = {O, I}. •
Even if we consider instead of an MV-algebra a De Morgan algebra (a

qualitative structure) then again, every homomorphism reduces to a trivial
one, as can be easily verified. Thus there is no non-trivial homomorphism if
we want to connect a Boolean algebra with the closed interval [0, l].There is
therefore a need to investigate what is the appropriate connecting morphism
beyond the non-truth functional probability measure. In the following we
shall examine the concept of covariant Galois connection (adjointness), as
the appropriate connecting morphism between mixed valuation systems.
Let first (IB, 1\, V, c, cl, 0, I) be a closure algebra, where the closure op-
erator is a Kuratowski one. Closure algebra-valued models are weIl known
models of epistemic set theory, [Scedrov, 1986]
By the results in [Drossos and Navara, 1996],
(1) xUy .- { cl xVy

(x) V cl (y)
ifx=Oory=O
otherwise
and,
{ x I\y ifx=lory=l
(2) xny .- int (x) 1\ int (y) otherwise
define a pair of generalized t-norm and t-conorm on IB. Thus we have
constructed a mixed structure (IB, {I\, V}, c, {n,u},O, I} which we may call
'epistemic Boolean algebra'.
It is also easy to prove the following,
THEOREM 15. Let (IB, 1\, V, c, cl, 0, I) be a closure algebra and p a prob-
ability on IB. Then cl 0 p and int 0 p are fuzzy probabilities on IB.
Suppose now that, C[O,1) (IB) be the elementary stochastic space over IB,
of point-free elementary random variables with values in [0,1]. It is known
that C[0.1](IB) ~ [O,l][IB] (Theorem 10) and both elementarily extend the
structure of [0, 1].
Let X E C[0.1](IB) and let,
X = LXi1t;, Xi E [0,1]
i;::1
where {tih>1 is a partition of unity, be the reduced representation of X

by indicato~s. The corresponding element of Boolean power is given by
Ix = L Xiti(= V[Xi 1\ ti)]'
i;::1 i;::1
Define,
Sx [0,1] -t IB
x Ho sx(x) == [X < x]:= V ti
X(t ö )<'"
which is known as lower spectral chain 0/ X in IB. This spectral chain has
the following properties [Kappos, 1969]:
(i) Sx is order preserving.
(ii) 0 -lim"'-to sx(x) = 0, 0 -lim"'-tl sx(x) = 1.

(iii) Xn t x=}o -limn-too SX(X n ) = sx(x) [order continuity from the
left)
If IB is a probability algebra then it satisfies the countable chain conditions
(c.c.c.) and so arbitrary suprema are reduced to countable ones. By the
left continuity it is dear that Sx preserves arbitrary suprema and so by the
Adjoint Functor Theorem [Johnstone, 1982], Sx has a right adjoint which
is defined by:
m : IB -t [0,1]
b Ho m(b):= V{x E [0,1] : sx(x) $ b}
One can prove directly that s x has a right adjoint by verifying the following
identity: For J ~ I we have:
sx(V Xj) = V{sx(y)ly < VXj}

jEJ jEJ
= V{sx(y)I(3j E J)[y < Xj]}
= VV{sx(Y)IY
j
< Xj}
= VsX(Xj)
jEJ
m preserves arbitrary meets and finite joins. In this respect one can consider
m either as possibility or necessity measure. The important fact here is that:
A Galois connection between a Boolean algebra and an MV-algebra leads to
a juzzy measure different than probability.
We should also note that having a covariant Galois connection we may
define on IB a closure and an interior operator. Using tl1ese operators and
the definitions in (1), (2), we may define an epistemic algebra on IB and
similarlyon [0,1], and try to define an appropriate epistemic ultrafilter
(epistemic homomorphism) with respect to these epistemic algebras. These
matters however there will be treated elsewhere.
Using probability
We would like to see probability as a generalization of the two-valued finitely
additive measures (homomorphisms). In the general case it seems that this
is not possible. Therefore taking probabilities of the truth values of propo-
sitions lead us to struggle with non-truth functional probabilities. An in-
teresting probability interpretation of a Boolean-valued model is given by
P. VoitaS, see [Voitas, 1995]. Taking the probability of the truth value of
a statement is a natural think to do, but probability in general it is not a
generalized ultrafilter. In the Boolean case, Boolean-valued ultrafilters are
identical with Boolean homomorphisms. Probability cannot be considered
as [0, 1]-valued ultrafilter. However in arecent paper U. Höhle [1996] proved
that: If [0,1] is considered as an MV-algebra then we have: 'finitely addi-
tive probability measures defined on the ordinary set P(X) and [0, 1]-valued
ultrafilters are the same things'.
This means that when we take into account the structure on [0,1], proba-
bility seems to behave better. Using this theory we may have an MV-algebra
valued generalization of the ultrapower construction.
Let us now state some useful propositions:
PROPOSITION 16. Let (n, A, P) be a probability space. For every A, B E
A we have:
(i) P(A n B) ::; P(A U B)
(ii) P(A) + P(B) - 1 ~ P(A n B)
From the above Proposition we get:
P(A) + P(B) - 1 ~ P(A n B) ~ P(A U B) ~ P(A) + P(B)
Similarly if (IB, p) is a probability algebra with set representation (n, A, P)
and ([0,1], ffi, 0,...,,0,1) is the Lukasiewicz MV-algebra then:
PROPOSITION 17. For every t,tl,t2 E mB,
(i) p(tt} 0 P(t2) ~ P(tl 1\ t2) ::; P(tl V t2) ::; p(tt} ffi P(t2)'
(ii) pW) =1 - p(t).
(iii) P(tl => t2) ::; p(h) "'-+ p(t2)'
where p(tt} "'-+ P(t2) := (1 - x + y) 1\ 1 = (1 - x) E9 y
Using the above and other identities as needed, we may develop a calculus
and a interrelationship of probability logic with many-valued logic.
Another very important issue in probability logic is its truth-functionality.
It is evident that for every pair (Tl! T 2 ) of partitions of unity of IB one
can find a copula [Schweitzer, 1991], CTl,T2! with,
P(ti 1\ Sj) = CTbT2(P(ti),p(Sj», ti E Tl! Sj E T2.
Using the correspondence of product decompositions and partitions, see

[Koppelberg, 1989], we may introduce a projective limit of copulas, based
on the directed set of the set of all partitions of a Boolean algebra. The
question is: Is it possible to have a sheaf of copulas on the projective limit
in such a way that we gain truth functionality on the projective limit of
product decompositions of a Boolean algebra? This however is an open
question.
A related approach of the same problem is through qualitative indepen-
dence and the associated probability measure see [Renyi, 1970, p.I6-18].
More explicitly let S := (n, A, P), be a probability space and let Al, ... , An
ther that °
be a finite sequence of stochastic independent events in S. Suppose fur-
< Pk < 1 where Pk := P(A k ), k = 1,2 ... n. Then each
of the 2n events (basic Boolean polynomials) bn;o, ... bn;2n-1 have positive
probability, so that none of these can be empty, and so they are qualita-
tively independent. Thus qualitative independence of a finite sequence of
events Al, ... , An concerning the experiment (n, A) is a necessary condi-
tion of the existence of a probability measure on (n, A) such that the events
°
Al, ... ,An are stochastic independent in Sand have prescribed probabili-
ties P(Ak) = Pk, k = 1,2, ... n with < Pk < 1. The following theorem
shows that this necessary condition is at the same time sufficient.
THEOREM 18 (Renyi, 1970, p. 109). Let Al, ... , An be a sequence 0/
qualitatively independent subsets 0/ a set n. Let Adenote the least Boolean
algebra 0/ subsets 0/ n containing the sets Al, ... ,An. Let Pl,P2,··· ,Pn be
°
an arbitrary sequence 0/ numbers such that < Pk < 1, k = 1,2, ... , n.
Then there exists a uniquely determined probability P on (n, A) such that
the events Al, ... , An are stochastic independent in the probability space
(n,A,p), and P(Ak) = Pk, k = 1,2, ... ,no
Using as probability the one in the Theorem, one can see that this prob-
ability becomes a homomorphism between the Boolean algebra at hand and
the product algebra, Le. ([0,1],0, EB, 0, 1,) where, for all x, y E [0,1],
x0 y := x . y, and x EB y := x +y - x . y.
so that, p(t l Vh) = p(h) = p(t 2) - p(tt}p(h) = p(h) 0P(t2) and P(t l l\t2) =
P(tl) . P(t2) and finally probability is a 1B - A homomorphism, where A ia
a product algebra, or probability is an A-valued ultrafilter. In this case one
can develop truth-functional probability logic, but with probability taking
values in a product algebra.
5 FINAL REMARKS
Although the natural connection between a qualitative and a quantitative

valuation structure seems to be related to probability measure and in gen-
eral to measurement theory, it seems that the structures of residuated lat-

tices, quantales, etc. give more satisfying solutions from a logical point
of view. It could be very desirable, from a foundational point of view, if
these structures can be taken as a result of some kind of 'measurement'
on some corresponding qualitative valuation systems. However introducing
residuated lattice-valued probability seems very promising.
The dichotomy qualitative-quantitative exists also in category theory,
where the quantitative counterpart is called 'closed categories'.
It seems that the whole matter deserves further and deep investigation.
University 0/ Patras, Greece.
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PANAGIS KARAZERIS
GABRIEL FILTERS AND THE SPECTRUM OF

AN MV-ALGEBRA
1 INTRODUCTION-SURVEY OF RESULTS ON GABRIEL

TOPOLOGIES ON QUANTALES
In this work we treat monoidal lattices (or multiplicative semilattices, in

some people's terminology, but we stick to the terminology in [Sun, 1994])
and monoidal closed (=residuated) lattices and MV-algebras (as special
cases) from the viewpoint of the theory of quantales. We use the machinery
of Gabriel topologies on coherent quantales in order to describe (the locale
of opens of) the prime spectrum of an MV-algebra. For that we rely heavily
on results obtained in [Karazeris, 1998]. Let us introduce the types of
structures we study, in a hierarchy of increasing structural complexity:
• A monoidal lattice (or multiplicative semilattice) is a V-semilattice

(M, V, 0) equipped with a further binary associative and commutative
operation ® having a unit 1, which is also a top element for M and
satisfying, for all a, b, cE M
a®(bVc)=(a®b)V(a®c) (*)
As a consequence of (*) we have that the operation a® -is monotone,

for all a E M and, combined with the fact that 1 is also the top
element, that
a®b~b, forall a,bEM. (**)
Also monotonicity of ® implies a ® 0 ~ 1 ® 0 = 0, for all a E M .
• A monoidal closed (or residuated) lattice is a monoidallattice equipped

with a further operation -+, so that
a ® b ~ c if and only if a:5 b -+ c.
Notice that (*) follows from the latter postulate. Indeed, when M is
a complete lattice, the latter is equivalent to the distributivlty of ®
over all suprema. Such a structure is called a commutative quantale
(more precisely a right sided one, in the terminology of [Rosenthal,
1991], if we want to maintain property (**».
151
152 PANAGIS KARAZERIS
• An MV-algebra is a (finitary) monoidal closed lattice M in the above

sense satisfying, for an a, b E M, the identity
a V b = (a -+ b) -+ b (cf. [Hoehle, 1992]).
An MV algebra comes equipped with two more operations defined in

terms of the already described ones as ...,a = a -+ 0 (0 is the bottom
element) and a E9 b = ...,(a ® ...,b).
Returning to the connection between quant ales (the complete case) and
monoidallattices (the finitary case) notice that the set of order ideals on
a monoidallattice (qua semilattice), ordered by inclusion, is in a natural
way aquantale. It is algebraic as a lattice having the extra property that
the top element is finite and that the finite elements are closed under ®.
Such quantales are called coherent. Ideal completions are typical coherent
quantales: Recall from [Rosenthal, 1991, Prop. 4.1.4] that Q is a coherent
quantale if and only if it is of the form I dl (M), where M is a join semilattice
with a top element T and a binary associative operation, denoted abusively
by ®, such that a ® - and - ® apreserve finite suprema and a ® T = a, for
all a E M.
Gabriel topologies on quant ales generalize directly the classical notion in
ring theory, studied extensively in the 1960's in connection with localisations
of rings and more generally of module categories [Stenström, 1975}. The
notion of Gabriel topology on aquantale makes sense only when the quantale
is algebraic as a lattice, i.e the finite elements (called also compact in the
literature, a word though that here we reserve for other purposes) generate
the lattice. The finite elements of the quantale play the role of the elements
of the ring in the classical definition of a Gabriel topology on a category of
modules.
DEFINITION 1. Let Q be an algebraic, right sided quantale. A filter S ~ Q
is called a Gabriel topology on Q if it satisfies
(Tl) If b E S and c is a finite element of Q then c -+ bE S.

(T2) Ifb E Sand, for an c ~ b, where c is finite, it is the case that
c -+ a ES, then a ES.
REMARK. We can deduce that nonempty collections satisfying the above

conditions are filters by arguments, wen known in the ring theoretic context,
as they appear in [Stenström, 1975]. The fact that they apply to our case
is secured by the requirement that the quantale is right sided.
DEFINITION 2. A topology S on an algebraic, right-sided quantale Q is
called compact if, whenever {ai I i E I} is a directed family of elements of
Q with ViEI{ai li E I} E S, then there is ai E S for some i E I.
GABRIEL FILTERS AND THE SPECTRUM OF AN MV-ALGEBRA 153
We exploit here the following results from [Karazeris, 1998] :

THEOREM 3 (Rosenthal, 1991, Proposition 4.5.8). The set 01 Gabriel
topologies, top(Q) , on a eoherent, right sided quantale Q, omered by in-
clusion, is a locale (eomplete Heyting algebra).
(For a prool more explieit than the one suggested in [Rosenthai, 1991J,
see also [Karazeris, 1998, Theorem 2.1J.)
THEOREM 4 (Karazeris, 1998, Theorems 1.3 and 3.7). The set topw(Q)
01 eompaet topologies on a eoherent, right-sided quantale Q = Idl(M) is a
eoherent loeale (a quotient loeale 01 that 01 all Gabriel topologies, i.e closed
in it under A and V).
Coherent locales are characterised as ideal completions of distributive
lattices ([Johnstone, 1982], Prop. 11. 3.2). In particular the coherent locale
tOPw(Q) arises as the ideal completion of a distributive lattice. Note that as
Gabriel topologies are closed under intersection, there is always a smallest
topology containing a given element of Q. The distributive lattice of finite
elements of the locale tOPw(Q) comes about as the set of smallest topologies
containing given elements of M (such topologies happen to be, as shown in
[Karazeris, 1998], compact). We denote the distributive lattice so obtained
by S[M] and the dual of it by R[M] (the reticulation of M).
THEOREM 5 (Kazaris, 1998, Corollary 3.9). The eoherent loeale 01 eom-
paet topologies on a eommutative, eoherent, right sided quantale is isomor-
phie to the ideal completion 01 the lattiee S[M] = {Sill E Q, I finite},
where SI denotes the smallest topology eontaining I. The operations 01
meet and join are defined by
and
As a matter of fact the lattice S[M] is universal with these properties:

THEOREM 6 (Karazaris, 1998, Proposition 4.1). Let M be a monoidal
lattice as above, and S[M] the distributive lattice 01 finite elements 01 the
loeale 01 eompaet topologies on Idl(M). Then the (order reversing) map
"1: M -+ S[M] given bY"1(a) = Sa, is universal among maps /rom M to
distributive lattiees satisfying
1. "1(1) = ..lL, "1(a V b) = 71(a) A 71(b) ,
2. 71(0) = TL, 71(a 0 b) = 71(a) V 71(b).
In other words, the (order preserving) map 71: M -+ R[M] is the unit 01 the
(Iorgetful-free) adjunction
R[-] --l U : dlat' • mlat

between monoidal lattices (and maps preserving 0 and V) and distributive
lattices.
The proof of this last statement hinges on the following lemma, of which
we will make explicit use in what follows:
LEMMA 7 (Kazaris, 1998, Lemma 2.5). 11 1 is a finite element 01 the
commutative, coherent, right sided quantale Q and b any element 01 Q then,
with the above notations, b E S J iff there is an n E N with r
~ b, where
r = 1 ® ... ® f (n times).
2 GABRIEL TOPOLOGIES AND PRIME SPECTRA OF

MV-ALGEBRAS
We turn to investigate closer the set of Gabriel topologies on Q = Idl(M)

in the case M is an MV-algebra. First we notice the following general fact:
PROPOSITION 8. Let Q be the ideal eompletion 01 a monoidallattiee L.
Then :F(L), the set 01 filters on L closed under ® (we eall sueh filters
multiplieative), is order isomorphie to topw(Q), the set 01 eompaet Gabriel
topologies on Q.
Proof. We construct maps J.L:tOPw(Q) --t :F(L) and v::F(L) --t tOPw(Q)
assigning to a compact Gabriel topology S the filter J.L(S) = S n L and to
the filter F the Gabriel topology v(F) = {xE Qla E F and x ~ a}. We
really have to argue only that the two maps take values in the sets indicated,
as the fact that they are inverse to each other is immediate. Notice that we
avoid to distinguish between elements of L and finite elements of Q. First
we show that if S is a Gabriel topology then J.L(S) is a (multiplicative) filter:
By an argument which is again weIl known in the ring theoretic context
[Stenström, 1975], a Gabriel topology is a multiplicative filter: because, if
x,y E S, then for all finite c ~ x, e®y ~ x®y, equivalently y :::; c --t (x®y),
hence x ® y E S, while as we have remarked after Definition 1, Gabriel
topologies are upper closed sets. Thus J.L(S) = S n L is a multiplicative
filter. Conversely, if Fis a filter then v(F) is a compact Gabriel topology:
It satisfies (Tl) since, if cE L and x ~ a E v(F), then e --t x ~ e --t a and
the latter is in v(F). Further, let x ~ a E v(F) and assume that, for all
c ~ x, it is the case that c --t y E v(F), so that in particular b :::; a --t y
for some bE v(F) depending on c. Consequently we have b ® c ~ y. But
b ® c E v(F) from which follows that y E v(F), so that (T2) is satisfied. As
for compactness, if Xi E v(F), where the supremum is directed, by the very
definition of v(F), there is c E L so that c :::; Xi. But c is finite in Q, so
that, for some i E I, we have that c ~ Xi. •
Coming to the case of MV-algebras we can further identify the lattice

of Gabriel topologies with that of (additive, as opposed to order-theoretic)
ideals on the algebra. By an ideal we mean a downwards closed subset of
the algebra that is closed under ffi. More precisely we have:
PROPOSITION 9. Let M be an MV-algebra and the quantale Q be its ideal

eompletion. The set toPw(Q) 01 eompaet Gabriel topologies on Q is order
isomorphie to the set I(M) 01 ideals on M. Under this isomorphism (v-)
prime filters on Q (equivalently on M) are identified with (1\-) prime ideals
onM.
Prüüf. The eorrespondenee of (multiplieative) filters with ideals of an MV

algebra is weIl known. The seeond claim follows by the equally weIl known
faet that De Morgan 's rules hold for the lattiee operations in an MV algebra .
•
In [Karazeris, 1998, Proposition 2.10] we have shown that the points of
the loeale topw(Q), where Q is a eommutative eoherent quantale, eorrespond
exaetly to those Gabriel topologies that are prime as filters, that is, inaeees-
sible by finite joins. So, when Q is the ideal eompletion of an MV-algebra
M, the points of toPw(Q) eorrespond one-to-one to the prime ideals of M.
Also the loeale of eompact Gabriel topologies on a commutative eoherent
quantale is itself eoherent, thus, after Prop. II 3.4 in [Johnstone, 1982], it
is a spatial loeale. This means that the loeale toPw(Q) ean be reeovered
as the lattice of open subsets for a topology on the set of prime ideals of
the MV-algebra, i.e. the (underlying set of points of) the speetrum of the
MV-algebra. The topology on the set of points of toPw(Q), which gives us
baek the loeale toPw(Q), is the huIl-kernel topology, i.e. it comprises the sets
of the form
D(F) = {P E F(M) I P prime, F not eontained in P},
for all F E F(M). Alternatively, eonsidering now the points as prime

additive ideals rather than prime filters, we ean identify the opens of this
spaee as:
U(I) = {P E I(M) I P prime, I not eontained in P},
for all I E I(M). Sueh a set is though a typical open set for the speetral
topology on the set of prime ideals on M, as the latter topology is built from
the subbasie opens the sets of the form
U(a) = {P E I(M) IP prime, a not in P}.
So we summarize all the above diseussion in the following:

THEOREM 10. The loeale 01 eompact Gabriel topologies on the ideal eom-
pletion 01 an MV algebra, equivalently 010-filters, is isomorphie to that 01
opens lor the spectral topology on the algebra.
3 COMPUTATION OF PSEUDOCOMPLEMENTS AND SPECTRA

OF HYPERARCHIMEDEAN ALGEBRAS
We come to compute pseudocomplements of elements in the Heyting alge-

bra tOPw(Q). We start by computing the pseudocomplements of the finite
elements of the locale of compact topologies. The pseudocomplement of an
arbitrary compact topology is of course the intersection of the pseudocom-
plements of the finite elements below it.
LEMMA 11. Let Q be a commutative coherent quantale and a anyelement
oJ Q. Then the set ca =: {x E Qla V X =: T} is a topology.
Proof. It is easy to see that ca is a pretopology i.e. that it satisfies condi-

tion(Tl) in Definition 1. To verify (T2), let a V x=: T (1) and assume that
for all finite c ~ x it is the case that a V (c -? y) =: T. For all such c then
the following hold:
C =: C ® T = C ® (a V (c -? y)) = (c ® a) V (c ® (c -? y)) ~ (c ® a) V y.
From (1) we get that T =: a V ViCj = V·(a V Cj), where Ci the finite
elements below x. Since the top element of Qis finite, there is j for which
T = a V Ci ~ a V (Cj ® a) V y ~ a V y, so that y E Q. •
When a is finite, the topologies ca are indeed pseudocomplements of the

building blocks of the locale tOPw(Q).
PROPOSITION 12. With the notations used so Jar, ca
is the pseudocom-
plement oJ Sa in tOPw(Q), where Q is a commutative coherent quantale and
a a finite element therein.
Proof. First we show that the intersection of Sa with ca is the bottom

element of the set of topologies, Le. that Sa n ca = {T}. H b E Sa n ca,
then a V b = T, and, on the other hand, there is a k with a k ~ b. Then
using the distributive law of the quantale, so that T = b. Now, if Sa n R =

{T} and x is in R but not in ca, then x V a :1: T. In that case,
T :f; T -? (x V a) 2:: (T -? x) V (T -? a).
But, T -? a E Sa while T -? x E R, so that the join of the two elements

above is different than the top element but it belongs to the intersection
Sa n R, a contradiction. We conclude that R ~ ca. •
REMARKS.
1. The pseudocomplement of a general element F of tOPw(Q) is
-,F = -,( V Sa) =

aEF
n
aEF
ca.
2. In the case M is an MV-algebra we may ask whether S~a is a good

candidate for the pseudocomplement, or even the complement of Sa.
We notice that Sa V S~a = Sa®~a = So and the latter is the top element
of tOPw(Q). Also ca ~ S~a. Because if X is such that (a -+ x) -+ X =
a V X = T, hence a -+ X 5 x, it follows that -,a = a -+ 0 5 a -+ X 5 X
so eventually X E S~a, as required. But, on the other hand, in order
that Sa n S~a = Sav~a = {T}, there has to be a V -,a = T, which
implies that M is a Boolean algebra itself. In order that the spectrum
of the MV-algebra M be a Stone space we have to examine when it is
the case that Sa V ca = So, equivalently that 0 E Sa V ca.
The supremum of two Gabriel topologies is the completion under the
property (T2), in the definition of a Gabriel topology, of their union. The
latter is a transfinite process, familiar from the ring theoretic case, given as
follows:
So=P,
SaH = {a E Q 13b E Sa S.t, Ve 5 b,e finite, e -+r a E Sa},

S>.. = Uo«>' Sa, where A is a limit ordinal.
So it does not appear possible to give a characterization of those MV-
algebras for which 0 E Sa V ca, for all elements a. If we require though
that already 0 E Sa U ca, for all a E M, that would mean that either for
some natural number n, an = 0 or a = T. We arrive in other words at the
condition that is usually referred to as the MV-algebra being locally finite.
Actually more can be done.
PROPOSITION 13. The speetrum 0/ a hyperarehimedean MV-algebra (qua
aloeale) is a Stone loeale (i.e. it is the ideal completion 0/ a Boolean algebra).
Furthermore the Boolean algebra in question, that is the retieulation R[ M]
01 M, is isomorphie to the center B(M) 01 the MV-algebra.
Proof. Analysing what would mean that 0 appears in the first stage of
the completion procedure we conclude that a sufficient condition for the
spectrum of an MV-algebra to be a Stone space is
Va 3e (a V e = T and 3n(an 5 -,e».

The latter condition is clearly equivalent to the notion ofhyperarchimedeaness

used by Torrens in [1987], which reads as follows:
Va ::In (,an Va = T)
We have thus proved the first claim.

The second claim is true because the map B(M) ---t R[M], sending a to
Ba, which is a Boolean monomorphism when a is idempotent, is also onto
in the case M is hyperarchimedean. For in this case, for all a E M, there is
a natural number n so that an is idempotent and Ba = Ban, after Lemma 7.
•
Finally, we look at the representation of a hyperarchimedian MV algebra
as a Boolean product of subalgebras of [0, 1] [Torrens, 1987, Theorem 10] in
this perspective.
Let us recall from [Rosenthal, 1991, Theorem 4.5.4], that Gabriel filters
on aquantale Q are order isomorphie to 'respectful quantic nuclei', l.e.
endomorphisms j of the quantale satisfying
j(a) Q9 j(b) :::; j(a Q9 b)

j(a 1\ b) = j(a) 1\ j(b)
j(c -+ a) = c -+ j(a), for finite c
The fixed points of a nucleus form a quotient quantale of the initial. Ae-
tually the restrietion of j aets as a surjeetion j: Q -+ Q j in the eategory of
quantales. When the filter is compaet, in whieh ease the nucleus eommutes
with direeted joins, j takes finite elements to finite elements. Also finite ele-
ments in the quotient are closed under implieation so they are MV-algebras
themselves. They ean also be deseribed as the quotient algebras by the
ideals that uniquely correspond"to the nuclei via Gabriel filters. So given an
MV algebra M the assignment of a nucleus to its quotient algebra defines
a funetor
M:R[M]OP = B[M]-+ MValg,

from the lattice of finite elements of toPw(I(M» to the category of MV
algebras. This extends naturally to a strueture presheaf on the loeale in
question, which turns out to be separated. This is so beeause the loeale
at hand is coherent, so we only have to define the presheaf and eheck the
relevant property on the finite elements ofit [Johnstone, 1982, Lemma 1.7].
Taking into aeeount all simplifieations made possible in this ease, let x, y E
M be two elements that are identified when restrieted to a eovering of the
top element of R[M). That is xli = Yli and Xlk = ylk, where j and k
cover the top element of R[M), equivalently j 1\ k = .1, where .1 E S[M)
is the identity nucleus. This means that j(x) = j(y) and k(x) = k(y)
and since infima of such nuclei are computed pointwise we conclude that
x = .1(x) = .1(y) = y. So the presheaf so defined is indeed separated. Note
further that the global sections of this presheaf is Mitself. Hence it embeds
into the global sections of the associated sheaf IM of that presheaf.
Now we claim that the stalks of the associated sheaf are linearly ordered.
But as we are appealing to constructive methods here we may temporarily
circumvent the stalks. We show equivalently [Johnstone, 1982, V. 1.10),
that M is linearly ordered internally in the topos of sheaves sh(I(R[MJ)).
In other words we have to verify the axiom
in the internal logic of the topos. After [Johnstone, 1982, V. 1.10), this
is done as follows: Start with any x,y E Q and consider the nuclei c", =
x V _ and u y = y -t _. They are respectful quantic nuclei. Then the set
{c'" 1\ uy, cy 1\ u"'} is a covering of .1. The restrictions of x, y and x 1\ y to the
members ofthe covering become (c",l\uy)(xl\y) = xl\(y -t x) = (c",l\uy)(x)
and (cy 1\ u",)(x 1\ y) = Y 1\ (x -t y) = (cy 1\ u",)(y). This means that the
linear order axiom (*) is satisfied when passing to a covering, thus M is
internally a linearly ordered MV-algebra.
Reinterpreting in classical terms the above discussion, we have repre-
sented the given MV-algebra as a subalgebra (since the presheaf is sepa-
rated) of the global sections of a sheaf over aspace with linearly ordered
stalks. When the algebra is hyperarchimedean the space is Boolean. The
points of the space in that case are maximal ideals. The stalks are given as
quotients by such ideals, thus they are embeddable into the algebra [0,1].
This concludes our discussion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank Professor C. A. Drossos for introducing me to the sub-

ject of MV-algebras and Professor D. Mundici for pointing out a serious
misconception of mine, reflected in the misleading title of my Linz talk.
AMS classification codes: 03G25, Secondary 18B35
The author acknowledges partial support by the EU COST Action 15
University 0/ Patras, Greece.

REFERENCES
[Belluce, 1986J L. P. Belluce. Semisimple algebras of infinite valued logic and bold fuzzy
set theory. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, XXXVIII, 1356-1379, 1986.
[Di Nola, 1993J A. Di Nola. MV-algebras in the treatment of uncertainty. In Fuzzy Logic,
R. Lowen and M. Roubens, eds. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
[Hoehle, 1992] U. Hoehle. Commutative residuated l-monoids. In Proceedings 0/ the Linz
1992 Con/erence on MV-Logics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
[Johnstone, 1982) P. T. Johnstone. Stone Spaces. Cambridge Studies in Advanced Math-
ematics 3, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[Karazeris, 1998) P. Karazeris. Gabriel topologies on coherent quant ales. Journal 0/ Pure
and Applied Algebra, 127, 177-192, 1998.
[Rosenthai, 1991) K. RosenthaI. Quantales and their Applications, Longmann Scientific
and Technical, 1991.
[Stenström, 1975) B. Stenström. Rings of Quotients, Springer, 1975.
[Sun, 1994J S. H. Sun. Spectra of monoidal lattices. Algebra Unillersalis, 31, 274-292,
1994.
[Torrens, 1987) A. Torrens. W-algebras which are Boolean products ofmembers of SR[l)
and CW-algebras. Studia Logica, XLVI, 265-274, 1987.
ANTONIO DI NOLA, GEORGE GEORGESCU AND ADA
LETTIERI
CONDITIONAL STATES IN FINITE-VALUED

LOGICS
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the basic principles of probability theory is that the set of the events
of a trial is a Boolean algebra. It is the case when we consider that the
trial follows the laws of classicallogic. On the other hand, there exist many
trials which are based on a many-valued logic. In this case one can accept
the hypothesis that the set of the events has a structure of MV-algebra [Di
Nola et al., to appear].
This remark makes it necessary to consider a notion of finitely additive
probability defined on an MV-algebra. Such an appropriate concept was
defined by Mundici in [1995] by the notion of state. This paper deals with
the conditional state in n-valued logic. We define a concept of conditional
state on an MV-algebra, extending the axiomatic definition of conditional
probabilities given by Renyi in the Boolean case (see [Sikorski, 1964]).
Several different approaches to conditioning on MV-algebras are based
on the definition of conditional event. For example, in [Weber, to appear],
conditional events are defined as intervals in an MV-algebra. In [Höhle and
Weber, ] and [Weber, to appear] a conditional event on an MV-algebra A
is defined in A as an appropriate 'mean value' obtained using a mean-value
function C (the conditioning operator).
The main result of this paper provides a sufficient condition for a Boolean
conditional probability defined on the Boolean centre B(A) of an n- valued
algebra A to be uniquely extended to a conditional state on A. This result
has many consequences. We shall show that some conditional states on an
n-valued algebra can be represented by strictly positive states with values
in ordered extension fields of the real numbers. This extends a theorem
of Krauss about the representation of conditional probabilities on Boolean
algebras [Krauss, 1968].
161
D. Dubois et al. (etts.), Fu~ Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 161-174.
162 ANTONIO DI NOLA, GEORGE GEORGESCU AND ADA LETTIERI
2 PRELIMINARIES
An MV-algebra is an algebraic structure A = (A, 0,1, -, EB, 0) satisfying

the following identities:
x EB (y EB z) = (x EB y) EB Z
xEBy=yEBx
xEBO=x
xEB1=1
0=1
1=0
x 0 y = (x EB y)-
(x EB y)- EB y = (y EB x)- EB x.
Boolean algebras coincide with MV-algebras satisfying the additional equa-

tion x EB x = x.
Let A be an MV-algebra. The set B(A) = {x E A I x EB x = x} is
a Boolean algebra. Actually, as proved by Chang, B(A) is the greatest
Boolean sub algebra of A. MV-algebras were introduced by C. Chang in
[1958] as algebraic models of the many valued Lukasiewicz logic. We shall
refer to [Chang, 1958; Mundici, 1986] and [Mundici, 1995] for any unex-
plained not ion on MV-algebras. Chang's completeness theorem states that
the class MV of all MV-algebras coincides with the variety generated by the
MV-algebra defined over the real unit interval [0, 1] as follows:
xEBy= min(l,x+y) x=l-x, x0y= max(0,x+1-1).
For every integer n = 1,2, ... , let the finite sub algebra Sn of [0, 1] be defined
by
I n-1}
Sn = { O'~'···'-n-,l .
We shall denote by V(Sn) the subvariety of MV generated by Sn. Every

MV-algebra A E V(Sn) will be called an n-valued MV-algebra. In [Grigolia,
1977] the author gave a finite equational axiomatization for the subvariety
generated by Sn.
Following [Mundici, 1995] we call 8tate of an MV-algebra A every function
8 : A -t [0, 1] ~ R satisfying the following conditions:
1. 8(0) =0
2. 8(1) = 1
CONDITIONAL STATES IN FINITE-VALUED LOGICS 163
3. for every a, bE A with a ® b = °we have s(a) + s(b) = s(a EI1 b).
LEMMA 1. [Mundici, 1995] If s is astate on an MV-algebra A, then the
following holds:
a. s(a EI1 b) = s(a) + s(b) - s(a ® b) for all a, bE A;
ß. a::; b ~ s(a) ::; s(b).
We say that astate s is faithful iff, for every nonzero a E A, we have

s(a) =f:. 0.
In [Di Nola et al., to appear] the authors introduced the following func-
tions defined on an MV-algebra A:
For every xE AFo,i(X) = x ® (ix) for every integer i > 0,
Fo,l,i(x) = (FO,1(X) EI1 ••• EI1 FO,i-1(X») ® FO,i(X)

for every integer i > 1, and by induction:
FO,1,i, ... ,r,i(X) = (FO,1,i, ... ,r-i,r(X) EI1 ••• EI1 FO,1,i, ... ,r-i,i-1(X») ® FO,l...r-i,i(X)
for every integer i > rEN.
Moreover they defined, for any fixed integer n, the following polynomials:
1f[j(X)= nx
1ff(x} = 2:7:/ FOi(x)
1fn(x)
r
= ,,~-1
~t=r
F.O,l, ... ,r-l,t'(x)
1fnn-l (x) = F.O,l, ... ,n-l,n-l (x)
In [Di Nola et al., to appear] the following propositions are proved:

PROPOSITION 2. Let A E V(Sn)' Then, with the above notations, 1f~(a) E
B(A) for every a E A and r E {O, 1, ... , n - I}.
PROPOSITION 3. Let A E V(Sn) and p a jinitely additive probability on
the Boolean algebra B(A). Then the function s : A --+ [0,1] such that
s(x) = p(1f[j(x» + p( 1f f(x» + ... + P(1f;:_l (x»
n
for every x E A, is the unique state on A which extends p.
Let s be astate defined on an n-valued MV-algebra A and b E A be such
that s(b) > O. Let the function s(. I b) : A --+ [0,1] be defined by
(1) s(a I b) = s(a ® 1f[j(b» + s(a ® 1f~~?;) + ... + s(a ® 1f;:_1 (b»
for every a E A.
In many papers conditional probabilities on Boolean algebras appear as
a fundamental concept (see [Csaszar, 1955; Krauss, 1968; Renyi, 1955]).
If Bis a Boolean algebra, then areal valued function p(. 1 .) defined on
B x (B - {O}) is a conditional probability Hf the following conditions hold:
1. p(. 1 y) is a probability on B for every y :F 0;

2. p(y 1 y) = 1 for every y :F 0;
3. For any x, y, z E B, if xAz :F 0, then p(xAy 1z) = p(x 1z).p(y 1xAz).
3 EXTENSION THEOREM
In this section we shall introduce the fundamental notion of conditional state

on a MV-algebra A. Then we shall prove that, if A E V(Sn), any Boolean
conditional probability on B(A) can be uniquely extended to a conditional
state on A.
DEFINITION 4. Let A be an MV-algebra. A conditional state on A is a
real valued function s(. 1 .) defined on A x (A - {O}) such that the following
conditions hold:
I For any y :F 0, s(. 1 y) is astate on A;
H s(y 1 y) = 1 for every y E B(A) - {O};
III For any y E A,x,z E B(A) = {O} and x ® z :F O,s(x ® y 1 z) =
s(x 1 zs(y 1 x®z);
IV For any x, y E A - {O}, s(x 1y)s(y 11) = s(y 1x)s(x 11).
It is clear that the restrietion of s(. 1 .) to B(A) x (B(A) - {O}) is a Boolean
conditional probability.
If s is a strictly positive state on A, then one can prove that the function
s(. 1 .) defined by the relation 1 of Section 2 verifies the axioms I, H, IH, IV.
LEMMA 5. Let A(V(Sn) and x, a E A. Then 1I"j(1I"f(x)®a) = 1I"f(x)®1I"j(a)
/ori,j E {0,1, ... ,n -1}.
Proof. Obvious by Remark 4 of [Di Nola et al., to appear].
•
PROPOSITION 6. Let A E V(Sn) and s(. 1 .) be a conditional state on A.
1/ x, a E A, a :F 0, and s(a 11) :F 0 then
( 1 )- s(x ® 1I"{t(a) 11) + ... + s(x ® 11";::_1 (a) 11)

s x a - ns(a 11) .
Proof. Assume rr~_l (x> 0). By IV
(2) s(-rri(x) 1a)s(a 1 1) = s(a 1rri(x))s(rri(x) 1 1) für i E {O, 1, ... ,

n -I}.
Then we have by I and 2
s(x 1a) = s(rrö(x) 1a) + ... + s(rr~_l (x) 1a)

n
s(a Irrö(x»s(rrö(x) 11) + ... + s(a 1rr~_l (x»s(rr~_l (x) 11)

ns(a 11)
BylII
by Lemma 5
( I) s(rrö(a) rz> xiI) + ... + s(rr~_l (a) rz> xiI)

sxa=---'--.:::...:...--'-----'---'------;---;--:-:-'---=-=--....=....:..--'-----'---'-
ns(a 11)
Nüw suppüse rr;?'_l (x) > 0 and rr;?'(x) = 0 für süme r E {I, 2, ... , n - I}.
BylV
s(rrh(x) 1a)s(a 11) = s(a 1rrh (x))s(rrh (x) 11) für every h < r.
By I, we have:
( 1 )- s(a 1rrö(x)) s(rrö(x) 11) + ... + s(a Irr;?'-l (x»s(rr;?'_l (x) 11).
sx a - ns(a 11) ,
by III
( ) _s(arz>rrö(x)11)+ ... +s(arz>rr;?'_1(x)1).
s x1a - ns (a I )
1 ,
by I and Lemma 5
Since 1fh (x) = 0 für r ~ h ~ n - 1, then rr;:(a) rz> 1fh (x) = 0 für k E
{O, 1, ... , n - I} and r ~ h ~ n - 1. B Lemma 5 we have:
( ) - s(rrö(a) rz> xiI) + ... + S(1f~_l (a) rz> xiI)

s x1 a - ns (aI )
1 .
The theorem is completely proved.

This result shows that every conditional state s(. 1 a), such that s(a 1
1) =fi 0, on an n-valued MV-algebra can be represented in the quotient form
(a) of Section 2. •
Let A be an MV-algebra and s(. 1 .) a conditional state on A. We say

that s(. 1 .) satisfies the condition 1I"(a) iff s(1I"f(a) 11I"j(a) > 0) whenever
i > j and 1I"j(a) > O,a E A.
PROPOSITION 7. Let A E V(Sn) and s(. 1 .) a conditional state on A.
Then for every x E A and every a E A - {O} such that s(. 1 .) satisfies the
condition 1I"(a) we have
1. if 11";:-_1 (a) > 0, then
ns(x 1a)
3. if 1I"[t(a) > 0 and 1I"f(a) = 0, then:

ns(x 1 a) = s(1I"[;'(x) 11I"[;'(a» + ... + S(1I";:-_1(X) 11I"[;'(a».
Proof. Assume 11";:-_1 (a) > O. By Proposition 6
( 1 ) - s(x ® 1I":;(a) 11) + ... + s(x ® 11";:-_1 (a) 11

ns x a - s(a 11)
By III
s(x ® 1I";.'(a) 11) = (s(x 11I";.'(a»s(1I";.'(a) 11) for rE {O, 1, ... ,n -I},
ns (x I)
8(zl1r~(a»8(1r~(a)11)+ ... +8(zl1r~ l(a»8(1r~ l(a)11)
a = s(aI1) j
then by I
ns(x 1a)
+
that is equivalent to
ns(x 1 a)
Now set
s(7rj(a) 11)
s(7r;:,(a) 11) = 'f/jr
then it follows:
1. if j = r, then 'f/jr = 1
2. if j > r, then 7rj(a) ::; 7r:.'(a); by III s(7rj(a) 1 1) = s(7r:.'(a) 1
l)s(7rj(a) 17r:.'(a), therefore 'f/jr = s(7rj(a) 17r:.'(a»
3. if j < r,7rj(a) 2:: 7r:.'(a); by III s(7r:.'(a) 1 1) = s(7rj(a) 11)s(7r:.'(a) 1
7rj(a», therefore
1
'f/jr = s(7r;:,(a) 17rj(a»·
By 1, 2 and 3 and by hypothesis we prove thesis in the case i)
Now let us prove ii).
( 1 ) - s(x ® 7r(;'(a) 11) + ... + s(x ® 7r~(a) 11)

ns x a - s(a 11) .
By II
s(x ® 7r~(a) 11) = s(x 17r~(a»s(7r~(a) 11) for r E {O, 1, ... ,h}, then
ns(x 1 a) = s(zI1l"(j(a»s(1I"(j(a)ll) + s(zI1l"i(a»s(1I"j(a)ll) + +

E7=o s(1I"j(a)ll) E7=o s(1I"j(a)ll) .••
+ S(zI1l"h(a»s(1I"h(a)ll)
E7=o s(1I"j(a)ll) .
Reasoning similarly as above, we get the thesis in the case ii).
Now let us prove iii).
By hypothesis and Proposition 6
( 1 ) - s(x ® 1r[i(a) 11)

ns x a - s(1r[i(a) 11)
and by III
ns(x 1 a) = s(x 11r[i(a»
and finally, by I,
ns(x 1a) = s(1r[i(x) 11r[i(a» + ... + S(1r~_l (x) 11r[i(a».
The theorem is completely proved.

•
Let A be an n-valued algebra and p(. 1 .) a conditional probability on the
Boolean algebra B(A) such that, for every a E A - B(A),p(. 1 .) satisfies
condition 1r(a). Let us define on A x (A - {O}) the function s(. 1 .) by the
following stipulation :
for (x,y) E A x (A - {O}):
j) if 1r:!_1 (y) > 0:
ns(x 1 y) =
+
+
jj) iffor some h E {1, 2, ... , n - 2} it is 1r~(Y) > 0 and 1r~+1 (y) = 0, then:
ns(x I y)
+
+
jjj) if 1r[i(y) > 0 and 1ri(Y) = O. Then,

ns(x 1y) = p(1r;;(x) 11r;;(Y» + ... + p(1r:_ 1 (x) 11r;;(Y»·
THEOREM 8. Let A E V(Sn), and pe.

I .) be a conditional probability
on the Boolean algebra B(A) such that, for etJery a E A - B(A),p(. I .)
satisfies condition 1l"(a). Then the abotJe defined junction s(. I .) is the
unique conditional state on A which extends p(. I .).
Proof. We remark that s(. I .) is an extension of pe.
I .). the uniqueness of
the extension follows by Proposition 7. We shall prove that s(. I .) verifies
the axioms I, H, IH and IV.
Axiom I.
Let a E A - {O}. By an easy calculation we can prove that s(O I a) = 0 and
s(ll a) = 1.
Assume x, y E A such that x ® y = O.
If a E B(A),p(. I a) is a probability defined on B(A). By Proposition 3 the
function s' : A ~ [0, 1] such that:
'()
s x = p(1l"[f(x) I a) + (1l"f(x) I na) + ... + P(1l";:_1 (x) I a) ~
~oreveryxE
A
,
is the unique state on A which extend I a). pe·

Therefore
s(x E9 y) = s'(x) + s'(y)
that is
n-l n-l n-1
(3) LP(1l"j(x EB y) I a) = LP(1l"j(x) I a) + LP(1l"j(y) I a).
;=0 j=O ;=0
Assume 11";:_1 (a) > o. Then
nS(XEBYla)
by (c)
ns(xE9Y I a) =
+
+
= ns(x I a) + ns(y I a).

Thus we have shown that sC. I a) is astate on A.

Analogously in the remaining cases.
Axiom II. Obvious.
Axiom III. Let x E A and a, b E B(A) such that a 0 b =I- O. Assume
1f~_1 (a 0 b) > O. Then 1f~_1 (a) > O. Hence we have to show that:
sex 0 bl a) = s(b I a)s(x I a 0 b).
Since a is a Boolean element, 1fj (a) = a for every j E {O, 2, ... , n - I}, then
n-l
ns(x0b I a) = LP(1fj(X0b) I a).
j=O
Since bE B(A), by Lemma 5, 1fj(x 0 b) = b 0 1fj(x). Hence,

n-l
(4) s(x0b I a) = LP(b0 1fj(x) I a)
j=O
(5) s(b I a) = p(b I a)
and
n-l
(6) ns(x I a0b) = LP(1fj(x) I a0b).
j=O
By 4, 5 and 6 we get:
s(b I a)s(x I a 0 b) = p(b I a) L;':-~ p(1fj(x) I a 0 b =

L;':-~ p(a I b)(1fj(x) I a 0 b) =
L;';;-~ p(b 0 1fj(x) I a) = ns(x 0 bl a).
The remaining cases similarly follow.
Axiom IV. Observe that by III, for j > r and 1f~(a) > 0,
n n _ p(1fj(a) 11)
p(1fj (a) l1fr (a)) - (n;.'(a) 11) .
Moreover, by I, we have:
n-l
L(nj(x) 11f;?(Y)) = ns(x In;?(y)) for r E {O,I, ... ,n -I}.
j=O
Let x, y E A - {O}, n~_l (x) > 0 and n~_l (y) > o.

Then
then
sex l 7rö(Y»p(x l 7rö(Y» + sex l7rf(y»p(x 17rf(y» + ... +

sex 17r~_1 (y»p(z 1X~_l (y»
sex 1 y) = - - - - - - -n-l
-----------
LP(7rj(y) 11)
j=O
On the other hand ns(y 11) = I:j':~ p(7rj(y) 11).

Therefore
ns(x 1 y)s(y 11)s(x l7rö(y»p(7rö(Y) 11)+ ... +s(x 17r~_dy»p(7r~_l(Y) 11).

Recall that
n-l
ns(x 17r~(Y» =L p(7rj(x)7r~(Y»,

j=O
hence by III
n-l
ns(x 17r~(y»p(7r~(Y) 11) = LP(7rj(x) ® 7r~(Y) 11).
j=O
We conclude that
n 2 s(x 1y)s(y 11) =

I:j':~ p(7rj(x) ® 7rö(Y) 11)+
+ I:j':~ p(7rj(x) ® 7rf(y) 11) + ... +
+ I:j':~ p(7rj(x) ® 7r~_1 (y) 11 =
= I:~':~(I:j':~(7rj(x) ® 7r~(Y) 11).
A similar computation shows that n 2 s(y 1 x)s(x 1 1) has the same value.
Hence IV is true. Analogously in the other cases. •
4 AN APPLICATION OF EXTENSION THEOREM
Let *R be a nonstandard model of the field of real numbers,

1
[ = {x E *R I lxi < - for all n E N}
n
and
D = {x E*R IIXI < n for some n EN}.
Then R ~ D ~ *R. D is an integral domain and [ is a maximal ideal in D
such that D / [ is isomorphie to R (see [Krauss, 1968, Lemma 3.1]). Every
xE D univocally determines areal number st(x) such that I x - St(x) IE [.
For any x, y E D, we have
St(x + y) = St(x) + St(y)

and
St(xy) = St(x)St(y).
Let A be an MV-algebra; in an obvious way we can introduce a concept
of state, or conditional state, defined on A with values in *R. All the results
about states or conditional states defined on an n-valued MV- algebra hold
in this setting. Partieularly, the extension theorem proved in Section 3
holds. Now we shall give a representation theorem for the conditional states
on an n-valued algebra A, extending some results of [Krauss, 1968].
Let m : A --t *R be a faithful state defined on an n-valued MV-algebra
with values in the ordered extension field *R of real numbers.
For x, y E A, y :I 0 define
ns(x I y) = St (Lj':-~ m~~~ 1rj(y» )
PROPOSITION 9. Let A E V(Sn) and m : A --t *R be a laithful state from

A to the ordered field *R 01 real numbers. With above notions, s(. I .) is a
conditional state on A.
Proof. We shall verify the axioms I, 11, 111, IV.

Axiom I. Assume x,y E A such that x ® y = 0 and a E A - {O}.
By [Chang, 1958] Lemma 2:
ns(x ® Y I a) =
= t Ej';ol(m(xl8i7rj (a»)EIl(m(YI8i7rj (a)))
s m{~
= tEj.:"i(m(xl8i7rj(a))) + t E j.:"ol(m(YI8i7rj(a»
s m{a) S m(a)
= ns(x I a) + ns(y I a).

Axiom 11 is trivial.
In order to verify Axiom III, assumex E A and a, b E B(A) - {O} such
that a ® b "I- O. So 1r~(a) =
a, 1r~(b) =
b and 1r~(a ® b) =
a ® b for
r E {O, 1, ... , n - 1}.
Thus
s(b ® x I a) = St m(b®z®a).
mez) , s(b I a)
= Stm.i(~)b);s(x I a®b)
= St m(z®a®b).
mez) ,
Hence
s(b ® x I a) = s(b I a)s(x I a ® b).
Axiom IV follows similarly.
•
THEOREM 10. Let se. I .) be a conditional state on an n-valued MV-
algebra. Then there exists an ordered extension field *R of real numbers and
a faithful state m* on A with values in *R such that, for all x, y E A, y "I- 0,
",n-l(m*(x ® 1rn ( »
- StL.Jj=o
ns (x I y ) - ( )
i y
.
m*y
Proof. Let pe.I .) be the restriction of sC. I .) to B(A) x (B(A) - {O}).

Then by [Krauss, 1968, Theorem 3.4], there exist an ordered extension file
*R of real numbers and a faithful probability m on B(A) with values in *R
such that for any x, y E B(A), y "I- 0
( I) m(x ® y)
Px Y = m(y) .
By Proposition 3 we can extend m to astate m * defined on A by
m*(x) = m( 1r8(x» + m(1rf(x» + ... + m(1r:!_1 (x»

n
m* is faithful. Indeed, if m*(x) = 0, then m(1r~(x» = 0 for any r E

{O,l, ... n -l}, so 1r~(x) = 0 for any rE {O,1, ... ,n -l}, because m is
faithful. That implies x = O.
In order to prove the thesis, consider x, y E A, y "I- O. Assume 1r:!_1 (y) "I-
O. Since 1rf(x), 1rj(y) E B(A) for i, jE {O, 1, ... , n - 1}:
Thus by Theorem 8
ns(x I y) =
The remaining cases similarly follow.

•
A. Di Nola and A. Lettieri
Universitd di Napoli, Italy.
G. Georgescu
Institute 01 Mathematics, Bucharest, Romania.
REFERENCES
[Chang, 1958] C. C. Chang. Algebraic analysis of many valued logics. 7rans. AMS, 88,
467-490, 1958.
[Csaszar, 1955] A. Csaszar. Sur la structure des espaces de probabilite conditionelle.
Acta Math. Acad. Sei. Hung., 6, 337-361, 1955.
[Di Nola et al., to appear] A. Di Nola, G. Georgescu and A. Lettieri. Extending Prob-
abilities to states of MV-Algebras, Collegium Logicum. Annals of the Kurt-Gödel-
Society, to appear.
[Goodman et al., 1991] I. R. Goodman, H. T. Nguyen and E. A. Walker. Conditional
Inference and Logic for Intelligent Systems, North- Holland, 1991.
[Grigolia, 1977] R. Grigolia. Algebraic analysis of Lukasiewicz-Tarski's n-valued sys-
tems. In Selected paper in Lukasiewiez Sentential Calculi, Ossalineum, Wroclaw, 1977.
[Höhle and Weber, J U. Höhle and S. Weber. Uncertainty measures, realizations and
entropies, preprint.
[Horn and Tarski, 1948] A. Horn and A. Tarski. Measures in Boolean algebras. 7rans.
AMS, 64, 467-497, 1948.
[Krauss, 1968] P. H. Krauss. Representation of conditional probability measures on
Boolean algebras. Acta Math. Acad. Sei. Hung., 19, 228-241, 1968.
[Mundici, 1986] D. Mundici. Interpretation of AFC*-algebras in Lukasiewicz sentential
caJculus. J. of Functional Analysis, 65, 15-63, 1986.
[Mundici, 1995] D. Mundici. Averaging the truth-value in Lukasiewicz logic. Studia Log-
ica, 55, 113-127, 1995.
[Renyi, 1955] A. Renyi. On a new axiomatic theory of probability. Acta Math. Acad.
Sei. Hung., 6, 285-335, 1955. _
[Sikorski, 1964] R. Sikorski. Boolean Algebrns, Springer-Berlin, 1964.
[Weber, to appear] S. Weber. Conditioning on MV-Algebras and Additive Measures,
Part 11, to appear.
SIEGFRIED WEBER
CONDITIONING ON MV-ALGEBRAS AND

ADDITIVE MEASURES, FURTHER RESULTS
INTRODUCTION
In probability theory the conditional probability of an event a given an event

bis introduced as the normalized (ordinary) probability of a, restricted to
the (fixed) subuniverse b, Le. as the quotient mJ(~t) for m(b) > 0, and can
be interpreted as the '(probability 0/ a) given b' rather than as 'probability
0/ (a given b)" because such conditional events 'a given b' were not defined.
Two, essentially different, solutions of this problem are presented, where
we do not start from the above mentioned Boolean situation, but from the
more general situation of events in an MV-algebra L (Section 1), induding
also fuzzy events.
In the first solution, conditional events are defined as intervals (Section
2), say (a 11 b) = [a 1\ b, b ~ a], which form in a very natural way a lattice
i. This 'interval approach' was presented by the author in the former
paper [Weber, 1997], where also some references to previous works by other
authors are mentioned. In the present paper, i. will be equipped with the
structure of a Girard-algebra (see Sections 1 and 2), which has been found
and is motivated, in a more general setting, in a joint paper with Höhle
[Höhle and Weber, 1998].
Additivity of an uncertainty measure m on a given MV-algebra L of events
has adear, unique meaning. But the problem arises now how to extend
additivity from m to an uncertainty measure m on the Girard-algebra i. of
conditional events, because a counterexample shows that neither strong nor
weak additive extensions on i. may exist (Section 3). A unique solution to
this problem is obtained for the quite natural dass of 'mean value extensions'
m(a 11 b) = M(m(a 1\ b),m(b ~ a))
by restricting the strong additivity of m to a suitable subset Cw C i. x i.
This leads to
m(a 11 b) = m(a 1\ b) + ~ . m(b'),
which corresponds to the mean value function M(x,y) = ~ (Section 4).

For the Boolean situation, strong additivity on Cw is equivalent to additiv-
ity.
In the second solution, conditional events are defined in the same MV-
algebra L of the (unconditional) events as appropriate mean values (Section
5), say
(a 1 b) = C(a 1\ b, b ~ a).
175
176 SIEGFRIED WEBER
This 'mean value approach' requires, naturally, the existence of such mean
value functions C with the crucial additional property (C(a, b»' = C(b', a')
of 'compatibility with the complement' and, particularly, the existence of a
self-complemented event in lL , which would be (0 I 0) = C(O, 1). Therefore,
this approach is not possible in Boolean MV-algebras. On the other hand,
positive results are obtained for other MV-algebras, induding not only, but
also the dass of strict MV-algebras. In this situation, there always exist
conditional events of the form
(a I b) = (a A b)Ü(r(b»',
denoting by r(b) the unique square root of b, such that for any additive
measure m follows that
m(a I b) = m(a A b) + 21 . m(b')

(Sections 1 and 5). The Fuzzy situation is obtained as a special case. The
basic ideas of the present paper were presented by the author in several
talks, mainly in [Weber, 1996].
1 MV-ALGEBRAS
In the following definition we will summarize the basic notions as used in

the present paper.
DEFINITION 1.
1. A set lL is called a commutative residuated lattice ordered semigroup
with zero (Birkhoff [1960]) if it is equipped with the two structures of
a lattice (1L,::;, A, v) with universal upper (resp. lower) bound 1 (resp.
0) and a commutative semigroup (1L, n) with 1 (resp. 0) as unit (resp.
zero), such that the distributivity
an (b v c) = (a n b) V (a n c)
between n and V holds, and such that there exist all residuals
b -t a = V{c: bn c::; a}.
For each bElL can be defined a residual complement by
b' = b -t O.
2. If the residual complementation ' has the involution property
b" = b,
CONDITIONING ON MV-ALGEBRAS 177
then we will calllL a Girard-algebra, and a dual semigroup operation

can be defined by
aU b = (a' n b')/.
3. If in a Girard-algebra lL the divisibility property
b/\ a = bn (b --+- a)
holds, then lL will be called an MV-algebra.
4. An MV-algebra lL will be called a Boolean algebra, if the semigroup

operation n is equal to the lattice meet /\.
5. An MV-algebra lL will be called a strict MV-algebra, if each bElL has

a square root r(b) EIL, defined by the following two properties
r(b) n r(b) = bj an a ~ b ~ a ~ r(b), (existence of square
roots)
and if r(O) is self-complemented, Le.
(r(O»' = r(O). (strietness property)
fu this paper we will take as underlying structure for the (unconditional)

events always an MV-algebra lL, where the operations can be interpreted as
follows: n as "and' ('intersection'), I as 'not' ('complementation' or 'nega-
tion'), U as 'or ('union'), --+- as 'implies', /\ as 'restricted to'. Notice that
we do not consider the lattice operations as connectives but the semigroup
operations. Disjoint events are defined by a n b = 0, the corresponding
'disjoint union' will then also be written as aUb. The two special structures
of a Boolean MV-algebra and astriet MV-algebra are important because of
the following two examples.
EXAMPLE 2 (Boolean situation). Let (0, A) be any measurable space and
set lL = A with n = /\ = n (classical intersection) and V = U (classical
union). Then lL is an MV-algebra with the Boolean complement b' and U =
U as the MV-algebra sum +. Naturally, lL is a Boolean algebra and has the
trivial square roots r(b) = b, but is not astriet MV-algebra. Furthermore,
the MV-algebra structure is essentially different from the ring structure of
A, where the ring theoretieal sum is the classieal 'symmetrie difference' but
not the 'union'.
EXAMPLE 3 (Fuzzy situation). Let lL = [0,1] with the 'natural' lattiee-
structure given by /\ (minimum), V (maximum). Then lL is an MV-algebra
with respect to the Lukasiewicz connective
an b = (a +b- 1) V 0,
178 SIEGFRIED WEBER
where b -t a = (1 - b + a) 1\ 1, b' = 1 - b, aU b = (a + b) 1\ 1. The same

n
structure will be obtained for the set :F of fuzzy subsets f : -t [0, 1] of
a given universe n, by pointwise operations. The logic behind this setting
seems to be an adequate one for fuzzy sets, see the survey paper by Stout
[1984]. Furthermore, lL equipped with the Lukasiewicz structure is a strict
MV-algebra, where r(b) = Itb.
On the other hand, lL equipped with the Fodor [1995] connective
al\b if a+b>l}
anb= { ,
o if a + b ~ 1
is not an MV-algebra, but only a Girard-algebra, where
b-ta= {
a V (1-
1
b) if b> a
if b ~ a
},
aVb if a+b<1 }.
b' = 1 - b, a U b = {
1 if a+b~1
In Section 2 we will see that the set of all conditional events can be
equipped with the structure of a Girard-algebra. Therefore, we will sum-
marize now the properties for such a structure we will need in the present
paper. We use the shorter name 'Girard-algebra' instead of the longer name
'integral, commutative, Girard-monoid', introduced by Höhle [1995]. The
term 'algebra' seems an adequate term because a Girard-algebra is a special
De Morgan algebra.
PROPOSITION 4. Let lL be a commutative residuated lattice ordered semi-
group with zero. Then: b -t adefines a binary operation, which is antitonic
in band isotonic in a, and b -t a = b -t (a 1\ b); particularly, ' is an order
reversing unary operation, such that the following properties hold
1. 0' = 1, I' = O,ana' = O.
2. (a Vb)' = a' 1\ b'.
In a Girard-algebra lL, the further properties hold
3. aÜa' = 1, (a 1\ b)' = a' Vb', aU (b 1\ c) = (a U b) 1\ (a U c).

4. b -t a = b' U a = b'Ü(a 1\ b).
The proofs of the only non trivial properties (2) and (4) can be found
in the author's paper [Weber, 1997] or, in a more general context, in the
above mentioned paper by Höhle [1995]. The same refers to the following
proposition which summarizes additional properties in an MV-algebra we
will need in the present paper.
PROPOSITION 5. Let lL be an MV-algebra. Then:
1. bVa=(b-ta)-ta. (MV-property)
2. b = (b A a)Ü(b n a'). (disjoint decomposition)
3. aA(bVc)=(aAb)V(aAc).
4. an (b A c) = (a n b) A (a n c).
The MV-property is even equivalent to the involution property jointly
with the divisibility property. Therefore, an MV-algebra as introduced in
Definition 1 is the same as in [Weber, 1997] and, furthermore, is the same
as in the paper by Chang [1958], where this structure was introduced at
the first time, but in a rather different way. Our operations n, U and ' play
the role of Chang's MV-operations· , + and -, respectively. Finally, we
will emphasize the importance of the disjoint decomposition property to be
used frequently in the present paper. Passing now to strict MV-algebras,
the next proposition will summarize the basic properties for square roots, a
notion introduced by Höhle [1995], where also the proofs can be found. But
in order to familiarize with this new structure and to prepare for Section
5 we will deal with the simple proofs. Furthermore, we see that the basic
properties from the Proposition 6 only require the existence of square roots,
but not the other assumptions of a strict MV-algebra.
PROPOSITION 6. Let lL be a commutative residuated lattice ordered semi-
group with zero, in which all square roots r(b) exist. Then:
1. b ~ r(b), particularly, r(l) = 1.
2. a ~ b =} r(a) ~ r(b).
3. r(a) n r(b) ~ r(a n b).
4. r(b -t a) = r(b) -t r(a).
Proof.
1. follows from the the first part of the definition: b = r(b) n r(b) ~
r(b) nl = r(b) ~ 1.
2. follows from both parts: a ~ band a = r(a)nr(a) imply r(a)nr(a) ~ b,

therefore r(a) ~ r(b).
180 SIEGFRIED WEBER
3. follows by analogy: (r(a)nr(b»n(r(a)nr(b» = anb S anb, therefore

r(a) n r(b) S r(a n b).
In order to prove (4), first we obtain
bn (r(b) -t r(a» n (r(b) -t r(a)) =

r(b) n (r(b) -t r(a» n r(b) n (r(b) -t r(a)) S r(a) n r(a) = a,
which implies
(r(b) -t r(a» n (r(b) -t r(a)) Sb -t a,
therefore
r(b) -t r(a) S r(b -t a).
On the other hand, (3) and (2) imply
r(b) n r(b -t a) S r(b n (b -t a)) S r(a),

therefore
r(b -t a) S r(b) -t r(a).
•
2 CONDITIONAL EVENTS AS INTERVALS IN MV-ALGEBRAS
In this section we will deal with the concept of 'conditional events as inter-
vals' in an MV-algebra L, as introduced by the author [Weber, 1997] at the
first time for this structure. For Boolean algebras, this approach has been
discussed previously by many authors in different contexts, see Koopman's
paper [1940] as the earliest reference and the book by Goodman, Nguyen
and Walker [1991] and the survey paper by Dubois and Prade [1991] for
further discussions and references. The crucial point for extending the con-
cept, is to find an adequate operation U which could replace the Boolean
join v.
Now, in the first part of this section, we will summarize the definition
and the basic results referring to the lattice structure. For more details
see [Weber, 1997], where the not ion (a 1 b) was used instead of (a 11 b). A
change in the notation is necessary, because in Section 5 we will discuss a
rather different concept for conditional events and we have to make a clear
distinction between both.
DEFINITION 7. For all a, bEL the conditional event (a 11 b) of a given bis
defined as the interval
(a 11 b) [a t\ b, b -t a]
{x E L : a t\ b S x S b'U(a t\ b)}.
The set of all such conditional events will be denoted by i.

PROPOSITION 8. The conditional events are in a one-to-one correspon-
den ce to intervals in L via
[a,e] = Ca 11 e -+ a). (representation 0/ intervals)
This easily proved equivalence between intervals and conditional events
in the sense of the Definition 7 will also often be used, without explicit
mention.
PROPOSITION 9.
a. The conditional events extend the (unconditional) events in the sense

that
1. Ca 111) = a,
and are not changed by restriction to the condition event in the sense
that
2. Ca 1\ b 11 b) = Ca 11 b).
b. The given partial order on the set L 0/ (unconditional) events is ex-
tended to a partial order on the set i 0/ conditional events via
(a 11 b) :::; (e 11 d) iff a 1\ b :::; e 1\ d and b -+ a :::; d -+ e.
Frorn this /ollows that (a 11 b) is isotonic in a and antitonic in b in the

sense that
3. al :::; a2 :::; b :::::} (al 11 b) :::; (a2 11 b),

4. a:::; bl :::; ~ :::::} (a 11 ~) :::; (a 11 bl ).
Furthermore, i is a lattice with respect to
(a 11 b) 1\ (e 11 d) = [Ca 1\ b) 1\ Ce 1\ d), Cb -+ a) 1\ Cd -+ e)J,

Ca 11 b) V (e 11 d) = [Ca 1\ b) V Ce 1\ d), (b -+ a) V Cd -+ e)],
and has the universal bounds Ö= (0 111) = {O}, i = (1111) = {I}.

c. Conditional events are uniquely determined rnodulo restriction to the
condition in the sense that
Ca 11 b) = Ce 11 d) iff a 1\ b = e 1\ d and b = d.
In the next proposition, the MV-algebra structure on L will be extended

to a Girard-algebra structure on i. This extention was found by Höhle
182 SIEGFRIED WEBER
and the author [1998], see also [Höhle and Weber, 1997], where for a more
general setting it is shown that this structure is uniquely determined by five
basic properties, which correspond to (1)-(4) from the Proposition 9 jointly
with (5) from the following.
PROPOSITION 10. The lattice i, equipped with the additional operation
n, given by
(a 11 b) n (e 11 d) := [( a t\ b) n (e t\ d), (( a t\ b) n (d -+ e» V ((b -+ a) n (e t\ d»],
is a Girard-algebra. The residuals are given by
(a 11 b) -+ (e 11 d) = [(b V d) -+ D, (b n d) -+ D],
where D := (b -+ a) -+ (e t\ d), and D ::; b t\ d if (e 11 d) ::; (a 11 b).
The residual complementation ' is given by
5. (a 11 b)' = [(b -+ a)', (a t\ b)'] = (a' nb 11 b),
where, particularly,
(0 11 0)' = (0 11 0) = lL.
The dual operation U is given by
(a 11 b)U(e 11 d) = [((b -+ a)U(et\d»t\((at\b)u(d -+ e»,(b -+ a)U(d -+ e)].
Proof. By definition (a 11 b) -+ (e 11 d) is the greatest element (e 11 f)

satisfying the inequalities
et\f::; (at\b) -+ (et\d) =: Al,

e t\ f ::; (b -+ a) -+ (d -+ e) =: A 2 ,
f -+ e ::; (a t\ b) -+ (d -+ e) =: B,
and therefore is equal to [Al t\ A 2 , B]. The announced form of the residuals
is obtained by rewriting these events:
Al = (a t\ b)' U (e t\ d)
= b' U (bn (a t\ b)') U (et\ d)
= b -+ ((b -+ a) -+ (e t\ d» =: b -+ Dj
A2 (b -+ a)' ud' U (e t\ d)
= d' U ((b -+ a) -+ (et\ d» =: d -+ D;
Al t\ A 2 (b -+ D) t\ (d -+ D) = (b V d) -+ Dj
B (a t\ b)' U d' U (e t\ d)
= ((b -+ a)' U b') ud' U (et\ d) =: (bnd) -+ D.
H furthermore (e 11 d) :::; (a 11 b), then

= b, D :::; (d -+ e) -+ (e 1\ d) = d.
D :::; (b -+ a) -+ (a 1\ b)
The form for the residuals is obtained from the setting (e 11 d) = (0 111):
(a 11 b)' = [D,b -+ D]
with D = (b -+ a)' = b n a', b -+ D = (a 1\ b)'. Finally, the definition of the

dual operation leads to
(a 11 b) U (e 11 d) .- «a 11 b)' n (e 11 d)')'
= [(b -+ a)' n (d -+ e)',
«b -+ a)' n (e 1\ d)') V «a 1\ b)' n (d -+ e)')l'
= [«b -+ a) U (e 1\ d» 1\ «a 1\ b) U (d -+ e»,
(b -+ a) U (d -+ e)].
•
COROLLARY 11 (Boolean situation). For the Boolean MV-algebra lL = A,
the lattice i is an MV-algebra.
Proof. As an exercise there can be proved that in general
(a 11 b) n «a 11 b) -+ (e 11 d» = [D 1 , D 2],
where
D1 (e 1\ d) 1\ «a 1\ b) n «b -+ a) -+ (d -+ e))),
D2 = (d -+ e) 1\ (b -+ a) 1\ «a 1\ b) V (b -+ (e 1\ d))).
For lL = A we obtain
(e 1\ d) 1\ (a 1\ b),
= (d -+ e) 1\ (b -+ a),
= (a 11 b) 1\ (e 11 d),
which shows that i is divisible and, therefore, an MV-algebra. •

For the Boolean situation, this result was already proved in [Goodman
et al., 1991], but in a quite different way.
COROLLARY 12 (FUzzy situation). For the MV-algebra lL = [0,1], the
lattice i is not an MV-algebra.
184 SIEGFRIED WEBER
The following lemma will be needed in Section 4. But, furthermore,

it permits to see the relations between the new operations n and U from
the Proposition 10 and the former operations from [Weber, 1997], which
here will be denoted by nl and UI, in order to distinguish between both
structures on L.
LEMMA 13. The following two disjoint decompositions are valid.
1. (b -t a) n (d -t e) = EÜB1 ,
where E := «a /\ b) n (d -t e)) V «b -t a) n (e /\ d)), BI := «b -t a) n (d -t
e)) /\ (b' /\ d').
2. F = «a /\ b) U (e /\ d))ÜB2 ,
where F := «b -t a) U (e /\ d)) /\ «a /\ b) U (d -t e)), B 2 := «a /\ b)' n (e"
d)') /\ (b' /\ d').
The abreviations for BI and B 2 will be used in the same meaning in
Section 4.
REMARK 14. In [Weber, 1997] we used the De Morgan structure on the
lattice L, given by
(a 11 nl (e 11 d) .- [Ca /\ b) n (e /\ d), (b -t a) n (d -t e)],

b)
(a 11 b) UI (e" d) .- «a" b)' nl (e" d)')'
[(a" b) U (e /\ d), (b -t a) U (d -t e)].
The relationship between these operations and those we are working with
in the present paper can be expressed as folIows. .
(a " b) nl (e " d) ~ (a " b) n (e "d), where '=' holds iff BI = O.

(a 11 b) UI (e 11 d) ~ (a " b) U (e 11 d), where '=' holds iff B 2 = O.
3 ADDITIVITY OF UNCERTAINTY MEASURES
We use the term uncertainty measure on a lattice L for any isotonic mapping
m : L -t [0,1] which preserves also the universal bounds. Now, in view of
the structure needed in Section 4, let L be a Girard-algebra. Then there
are two 'natural' notions of 'additivity' of an uncertainty measure m.
DEFINITION 15. Let L be a Girard-algebra. Then we consider the follow-
ing properties.
1. m(aÜb) = m(a) + m(b) for all an b =0. ('weak additivity')
2. m(a U b) + m(a n b) = m(a) + m(b). ('strong additivity')

It is clear that strong additivity implies weak additivity. Furthermore, if lL is
an MV-algebra, then an easy proof, see [Weber, 1997], gives the equivalence
of both properties, which we will call 'additivity'.
EXAMPLE 16. Let lL = [0,1] be the lattice from Example 3 and m an
uncertainty measure on 1L. Then the unique additve measure on lL as the
MV-algebra, based on the Lukasiewicz connective, is given by m(a) = a.
But the unique (strong and weak) additive measure on lL as the Girard-
algebra, based on the Fodor connective, is given by
m(a) = {; :: ::: }.
1 if a>l2
EXAMPLE 17. The 3-valued lattice lL = {O,!, I} becomes an MV-algebra

defining ! n ! = O. The left diagram shows the corresponding lattice 1L.
It will be equipped with the Girard-algebra structure from the Proposition
10. But i.. is not an MV-algebra, as it can easily be checked; Now, let m be
the unique additive measure on 1L, which is given by m(!) = We ask for !.
a (strong or weak) additive measure in on i.., which extends m. The latter
condition fixes the three values
m(a 111) = m(a) = a.
The two self-complemented conditional events (~ 11 1) and (0 11 0) have

necessarily the measure ~, therefore we get the forth value
in(O 11 0) =~.
The remaining two conditional events are complements of each other, there-
fore
m(~ 11 ~) = 1- m(O 11 ~).
This situation is illustrated in the second diagram, where JL := in(O 11 E !)
[0, !l. But such a value JL does not exist, because applying the weak ad-
ditivity to the following two disjoint pairs «a
11 b), (c 11 d), we obtain a
contradiction:
1 1 1 1 1 1
«Oll "2)' (Oll "2» leads to JL = 3' «Oll "2)' ("2 111» leads to JL = 4'
Therefore, there does not exist a weak (even less: a strong) additive exten-
sion in of m. A solution to this problem will be given in Section 4.
186 SIEGFRIED WEBER
(1111) = {1}
I
(~ 11 ~) = g, 1}
(a 11 b): (~1I1) =
/
H}
~
(Oll 0) = {O,!, 1}
~ ~
(0 11 ~) = {O, n
(0 111)
I= {O}
I1-Jl
m(a 11 b) : 1
/\ 1
2 2
\/ Jl
I
0
4 CHARACTERIZATION OF RESTRICTED STRONG ADDITIVE

MEASURES OF CONDITIONAL EVENTS
In this section the set of (unconditional) events will be again an MV-algebra

IL, and the set of conditional events will be equipped with the structure from
the Proposition 10 of a Girard-algebra i.
The first step is to extend a given uncertainty measure m on IL to an
uncertainty measure m on the set lL of conditional events. Due to the
construction of conditional events the most 'natural' and quite general way
seems to be that from the following
PROPOSITION 18. Let M be a 'mean value function' on [0,1] in the sense

that M is a mapping from the set 0/ all (x,y) with 0:::; x:::; y :::; 1 to [0,1],
which satisfies the /ollowing conditions
M(x,x) = x,
M is isotonic in both arguments.
Then any uncertainty measure m on lL can be extended to an uncertainty

measure m on L, called the 'mean value extension' 0/ m, via
m(a " b) = M(m(a A b),m(b ~ a».
Proof. Follows immediately, where M(x, x) = x yields the extension prop-

erty m(a " 1) = m(a) . •
EXAMPLE 19. For any A E [0,1] and n E N, a mean value function

M = Mn is given by
n-l
Mn(x,y) = A· (y - x)n + X· L(Y - x)k,O:::; x:::; Y :::; 1.

k=O
The following two extreme cases are included.
M1(x,y) = x + A· (y -
= (1- A)· x + A· Yi
x)
Moo(x,y):= limn-+ooMn(x,y) = :z:+~-y if (x,y) #; (0,1),
Moo(O, 1) = A.
If the underlying uncertainty measure m on lL is additive, then the special

mean value functions Mt and M oo lead to the corresponding mean value
extensions mt and m oo on L, given by
mt(a 11 b) = m(a Ab) + A· m(b')j
_
moo(a 11 b) = {m~(~;) if m(b) > 0 }
.
A if m(b) =0
Both appear in [Weber, 1997] in the theorems which characterize 'levelwise
additivity' and some types of 'global additivity'.
The second step consists now in looking how to extend the additivity of
a given uncertainty measure m on lL to a mean value extension m on L
188 SIEGFRIED WEBER
As we already know from the Example 17, in general neither strong nor
weak additive extensions exist. One solution to this drawback is to restriet
(strong) additivity to some subset C c lL x 1L, where the greatest possible
subset will be the subset Cw introduced in the following.
LEMMA 20. Let B l := «b -+ a) n (d -+ c» A. (b' A. d') and B 2 := «a A. b)' n
(c A. d)') A. (b' A. d') be the abbreviations introduced in the Lemma 13. Then:
a. The subset Co c lL x lL of all disjoint pairs «a 11 b), (c 11 d» can be
characterized by
-+ a) n (d -+ c).
B l = (b
Furthermore, this implies that B l ~ B 2 = b' A. d' .
b. For the subset Cl eIL x L of all pairs «a 11 b), (c 11 d» satisfying
Bl = (b -+ a) n (d -+ c) = b' A. d',
it follows that B l = B 2 = b' A. d' and
Cl C Co.
c. For the subset Cw C lL x lL for all pairs «a 11 b), (c 11 d» satisfying

B l = B 2 , holds
Cl C Cw •
For any Boolean MV-algebra L the following additional relations are
satisfied:
Cl = Co C Cw = t x t,
but Cw and Co are incomparable in general, take the MV-algebra L =
[0,1].
Proof. In order to prove the only non trivial part (a) we use the decompo-
sition (1) from the Lemma 13 and get
(a 11 b) n (c 11 d) = (0 111) <=> E = 0 <=> (b -+ a) n (d -+ c) = B l .
The further assertion follows from the inequality
b' A. d' = «a A. b)' n (b -+ a» A. «d -+ c) n (c A. d)') ~ (a A. b)' n (c A. d)'.
By definition, B l ~ b' A. d' is always satisfied, therefore the inclusion from
part (b) folIows.
The announced relationships for the Boolean situation follow from the
easily calculated equalities
•
LEMMA 21. Let m be an additive measure on L. Then the (unrestrieted)

strang additivity of a mean value extension m on L is eharaeterized by the
fu,netional equation
M(m((a A. b) U (e A. d» + m(B2 ), m((b -t a) U (d -t e»)

+M(m((a A. b) n (e A. d», m((b -t a) n (d -t e» - m(B I »
= M(m(a A. b), m(b -t a» + M(m(e A. d), m(d -t e)), (MI)
where BI and B 2 are as in the Lemma 20.
Proof. In order to obtain the indicated functional equation (MI) we rewrite

the summands from the left side of the equation, which characterizes the
strong additivity of m, using the two decompositions from the Lemma 13:
m((a 11 b) U (e 11 d» = m([F, (b -t a) U (d -t e)))

M(m((a A. b) U (e A. d» + m(B 2 ),
m((b -t a) U (d -t e)))j
m((a 11 b) n (e 11 d» = m([(a A. b) n (e A. d), E])
M(m((a A. b) n (e A. d)),
m((b -t a) n (d -t e)) - m(BI )).
•
THEOREM 22. Let m be an additive measure on L. Then the unique mean
value extension m on lL, whieh is strongly additive on the subset Lw oflL x lL,
has the form
m(a 11 b) = m(a A. b) + ~ . mW).
The eorresponding mean value fu,nction is given by M = MI for A = ~ /rom
the Example 19, i.e.
x+y
M(x, y) = -2-.
Proof. We start with the functional equation (MI) from the Lemma 21.
The setting a = b = e = d = 0 implies BI = B 2 = 1, and therefore (MI)
leads to M(O, 1) = ~ = m(O 11 0). The setting d = 1 implies BI = B 2 = 0,
and therefore (MI) leads to the functional equation
M(m((a A. b) U e), m((b -t a) U e» + M(m((a A. b) n e), m((b -t a) n e»

= M(m(a A. b), m(b -t a» + m(e). (M2)
190 SIEGFRlED WEBER
= 1, c = (a 1\ b)' leads to the functional equation

The setting d
M(x,x+z) = x+M(O,z) (M3)
for all x = m(a 1\ b), z = m(b') with x + z ::; 1. The setting d = 1, a = 0 and
the decompositions
b' u c = cü(b' 1\ c'), b' = (b' 1\ c')Ü(b' n c)

lead to the functional equation
(M4)
for all Xl = m(c), Zl = m(b'l\d), Z2 = m(b'nc) with Z2 ::; Xl and Xl +Zl ::; 1.
Replacing in (M4) the summand M(Xb Xl +zt} by means of (M3), we obtain
the functional equation
(M5)
for all Zl = m(b' 1\ d), Z2 = m(b' n c) with Zl + Z2 ::; 1. The solutions of

(M5) have the form
M(O,z) = A· z.
The already known. value M(O,I) = ! implies A = !. Then (M3) gives
the announced form for the mean value function M, but only for values
corresponding to pairs «a 11 b), (c 11 d)) with BI = B2 = b' 1\ d'. The
theorem is proved, because the functional equation (MI) for this function
M is equivalent to
•
The form of the resulting mean value extension is the same as in the
Theorem 6.3 from [Weber, 1997], although both underlying structures are
different. But the reason is, essentially, in the Remark 14 and the proof of
the Theorem 22.
COROLLARY 23 (Boolean situation). An additive meas'Ure m on a Boolean
MV-algebra n.. can be extended 'Uniq'Uely to the additive mean val'Ue extension
m on the MV-algebra lL, given by
m(a 11 b) = m(a 1\ b) + ~ . m(b').

But in general, the last step of the proof of the Theorem 22 shows, that
the result of the theorem is not true replacing the 'strong additivity on Lw'
by (unrestricted) 'strong additivity' or by 'weak additivity', if there exist
pairs such that m(BI ) ;/; m(B2 ). This will be illustrated by the following.
EXAMPLE 24. Let us come back to the situation from the Example 17.
The second and third diagram show the values for· a mean value extension
mof m, i.e. for any mean value function M and for the special function of
the Theorem 22 .
(1111) = {I}
I
"
(~ 11 ~)
(a 11 b) : (~ 111) / (0 11 0)
............ /
(0 11 ~)
I
(0 11 1)
1
I
Mn,I) = I-I-'
m(a 11 b): 1 /" "--.... M(O 1) =1
2~ /'" 2
M(O,~)=I-'
I
o
1
I
3
4"
/ \
m(a 11 b) : ~ ~
\ /
1
4"
I
o
The only two pairs «a 11 b), (e 11 d) which are not in C w are the following.
«~ 11 ~), (~ 11 ~» ~ Co, ~ Cl,

because B 2 = 0 < ~ = b' A d' = B 1 < (b -t a) n (d -t c) = 1;
«0 11 ~), (0 11 ~» E'Co, ~ Cl,
because B 1 = (b -t a) n (d -t e) = 0 < ~ = b' A d' = B 2 •
192 SIEGFRIED WEBER
Applying the strong additivity to these two pairs, we would obtain
in contradiction to the choice
M(x, y) = ~ . (x + y) leading to p, = ~.
5 CONDITIONAL EVENTS AS MEAN VALUES IN CERTAIN

MV-ALGEBRAS
Now we come back to the question discussed for a long time if it is possible
to define conditional events as special (unconditional) events. It seems that
all authors get their motivation from Boolean algebras and tried to find
solutions compatible with the classical form of a 'conditional probability' .
It is weIl known that the answer is essentially negative, see the discussion in
[Goodman et al., 1991], with particular reference to Lewis' 'Triviality result'
[Lewis, 1976]. The aim of this section is to show that there exist a lot of
structures, where a positive 'measure free' answer can be given.
For this purpose, we restrict ourself again to an MV-algebra L for the
set of (unconditional) events. But in contrast to the construction from the
Definition 7, now we try to describe the conditional event 'a given b' of
a, bEL by some (also unconditional) event, say (a I b) E L, between the
events 'a restricted to b' and 'b implies a'.
DEFINITION 25. For all a, bEL the conditional event (a I b) of a given b
is defined as the event
(a I b) = C(a 1\ b, b -+ a) E L,
where C is a 'mean value function' on L in the sense that Cis a mapping

from (at least) the set of all (a, b) E L x L with a ::; b to L, which satisfies
the following conditions
C(a,a) = a,
C is isotonic in both arguments,
such that, furthermore, C is 'compatible with the complement' in L in the

sense that
(C(a, b))' = C(b', a').
PROPOSITION 26. The conditional events (a I b) satisfy the following

basic properties.
1. (a 11) = a.
2. (al\b 1 b) = (a 1 b).
3. al :::; a2 :::; b => (al 1 b) :::; (a2 1 b).
4. a:::; b1 :::; b2 => (a 1 b2) :::; (a 1 b1 ).
5. (a 1b)' = (a' n b 1b), where particularly (0 10)' = (010).
Proof. Follows from the properties of G, where G(a,a) = a yields the

extension property (a 11) = a. In the proof of (5) we use b' V a' = b' U (b n
a') = b -t (a' n b). •
The critical part of the Definition 25 is the condition of compatibility,

which requires that lL has a selfcomplemented element that could be taken
as (010) = G(O, 1). A consequence of this is
REMARK 27 (Boolean situation). In a Boolean MV-algebra lL, there do
not exist conditional events in the sense of the Definition 25.
But for a wide dass of other MV-algebras lL, there exist such functions
G, in general not uniquely. In strict MV-algebras, a 'natural' function G
can be constructed in terms of the square roots. In order to see this, we
need the following technical
LEMMA 28. Let lL be astriet MV-algebra, where the square root 0/ bElL
is denoted by r(b). Then:
1. (r(b'))' = r(b) n r(O).
2. r(b) n r(b') = r(O).

3. (r(a) n r(b))' = r(b') n r(a').
4. r(a) = aU(r(a))'.
Proof. From property (4) of the Proposition 6 follows r(b') = r(b) -t r(D)
and therefore the announced property (1), using the strictness property
(r(O))' = r(O). In order to prove (2), first we infer from (1) and the strictness
property that
r(O) U (r(b'))' = r(O) V r(b) = r(b).
From this we obtain
r(b') n r(b) = r(b') 1\ r(O) = r(O).

194 SIEGFRIED WEBER
In order to prove (3), first we use (1) and the strictness property and obtain
(r(b') n r(a'»' = (r(b'»' U (r(a'»'

= (r(b) n r(O» U (r(a) n r(O»
< r(O) U (r(a) n r(O»
= r(O) V r(a) = r(a).
From this and using also (2), we obtain
(r(b') n r(a'»' = r(a) 1\ (r(b') n r(a'»'

= r(a) n «r(a»' U (r(b'»' U (r{a'»')
= r(a) n (r{O) U (r{b'»')
= r{a) n (r{O) n r{b'»' = r(a) n r{b).
In order to prove (4), we rewrite the second term of the disjoint decompo-
sition
r{a) = aÜ{r(a) n a'),
using the same properties as above, and obtain
r(a) n a' = r{a) n r{a') n rea') = r(O) n rea') = (r{a»'.
•
THEOREM 29. Let L be astriet MV-algebra, where the square root ofb E L
is denoted by r{b). Then
C{a, b) = r{a) n r(b)
gives a mean value funetion C whieh is eompatible with the eomplement and
satisfies the additional properties G(a, b) n G{a, b) = an b, G{a, b) = G(b, a).
The eorresponding eonditional events have the form
(a I b) = r(b) -+ (a 1\ b)
= {a1\ b)Ü{r{b»'.
Partieularly follows
(b I b) = G{b, 1) = r(b), (O I 0) = G{O, 1) = r{O).
Purthermore,
(a I b) E]a 1\ b, b -+ a[ for all b < 1.
Proof. The function C, defined even for all (a, b) E lLx lL, is indeed a mean
value function: C satisfies the condition C(a, a) = a because r(a) is the
square root of a, C is isotonic in both arguments because r(a) is isotonic in
a. The two additional properties are trivially satisfied. The compatibility
of C with the complement follows from the property (3) of the Lemma 28.
The indicated form for the conditional events follows from property (4) of
the Lemma 28 and other basic properties:
(a I b) r(a 1\ b) n r(b -+ (a 1\ b»
r(a 1\ b) n (r(b) -+ r(a 1\ b»
r(a 1\ b) n «r(b»' U (a 1\ b) U (r(a 1\ b»')
r(a 1\ b) 1\ «r(b»' U (a 1\ b»
= «r(a 1\ b»' U (a 1\ b» 1\ «r(b»' U (a 1\ b»
(r(b»' U (a 1\ b).
Finally, if b < 1 then either assumption (a I b) = a 1\ b or (a I b) = b -+ a
leads to a contradiction, using the form of (a I b) as disjoint decomposition
and the fact that r(b) = 1 iff b = 1. •
COROLLARY 30. Let m be an additive measure on astriet MV-algebra lL.
Then the eonditional events
(a I b) = (a 1\ b)Ü(r(b»'
from the Theorem 29 have as measure
m(a I b) = m(a 1\ b) + 21 . m(b'),

which is of the same form as the mean value extension m(a " b) from the
Theorem 22.
Proof. From property (4) of the Lemma 28 follows that
1
m(r(b» = 2 . (1 + m(b»
and, therefore, the assertion.
EXAMPLE 31 (Fuzzy situation). In the MV-algebra lL = [0,1] from the
•
Example 3, there exist several mean value functions C which are compatible
with the complement and, therefore, lead to different notions of conditional
events: Using the structure of astriet MV-algebra, where r(b) = l!b, this
function is given by
a+b 1-b
C(a, b) = -2-' which leads to (a I b) = (a 1\ b) + -2-'
196 SIEGFRIED WEBER
But another choice is
a
a+l-b if (a,b)"# (0,1) },
1
2 if (a, b) = (0,1)
which leads to
(a I b) = {
aJ\b
b
if b"# °} •
! if b=O
EXAMPLE 32. In the 3-valued MV-algebra lL = {O,!' I} from the Exam-

pIe 17, there exist exactly two different mean value functions C which are
compatible with the complement. The first diagram shows the values for
the conditional events, where
1 1 . 1 1
C(2,1) = 1- C(O, 2) and the two chOlces for C(O, 2) E {O, 2}
are possible. The next two diagrams correspond to these two choices. The
first one can be written as
(a I b) = a /\ b if b "# 0,
b
corresponding to
C(a, b) = a+ ~ - b if (a, b) "# (0,1).
(a I b) :
1
I
1
/\
1 1
2 2
\ /
o
I
o
1
I
1
2
/ \
1 1
2 2
\ /
1
2
I
o
Obviously, lL is not a strict MV-algebra because ~ has no square root and
C(a, b) = ~ is not an admissible choice. H, furthermore, m is the unique
additive measure, given by m(a) = a, then the mean value extension m(a 11
b) from the Theorem 22 differs essentially from m(a I b) = (a I b) with any
of the two admissible choices of C.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
REMARK 33. The conditional events (a 11 b) from the Definition 7 are

defined as special intervals, but the Proposition 8 shows that any interval
in an MV-algebra can be written in this form. Furthermore, all definitions
and results concerning such conditional events really use only the end points
of the intervals. Therefore, conditional events (a 11 b) can be identified also
with pairs (aAb, b -+ a). Abusing the notation in this sense, the conditional
events from the Definition 25 can be written as (a I b) = C(a 11 b). In their
joint papers Höhle and the author [1997; 1998] take consequently this view
of defining conditional events as pairs (0., ß) E lL x lL with 0. :::; ß.
REMARK 34. Now we will briefly sketch the problem of iterating condi-
tional events. Whereas there is no principal problem with the (second)
'mean value approach' from the Definition 25, applying the (first) 'interval
198 SIEGFRIED WEBER
approach' from the Definition 7 leads to the following two problems. On the
one hand, if we try to define «a 11 b) 11 (c 11 d» as interval in the Girard-
algebra i, we would need a modification of the Definition 7 which works
weIl also for Girard-algebras instead of MV-algebras. This problem will be
solved in the joint papers [Höhle and Weber, 1997; Höhle and Weber, 1998]
by replacing al\b by bn (b -+ a), which are the same in MV-algebras due to
the divisibility property. But then, on the other hand, iterating conditional
events in the above mentioned way would lead to a higher dimensional space
in each iteration step, which seems not so useful for practical reasons. This
problem can be solved by combining the two approaches in the following
way. By means of a suitable mean function C on i which is compatible
with the complement in i, the interval in i can be mapped to an element
in i, say «a 11 b) 1 (c 11 d» = C«a 11 b) 11 (c 11 d», abusing the nota-
tion as in the Remark 33. This is mentioned in [Höhle and Weber, 1997;
Weber, 1996] and will be contained in [Höhle and Weber, 1998] in the more
general setting as mentioned above. In this sense, one extension step will
be sufficient.
REMARK 35. Let us remember the problem of extending additivity of an
uncertainty measure m on an MV-algebra lL to a mean value extension m
on the Girard-algebra i, illustrated by the (Counter-)Example 17. The
Theorem 22 of the present paper gives a (unique) sol~tion by restricting
strong additivity to the (suitable) subset Lw of lL x 1L. But this is only
one possible way. For a further discussion see [Höhle and Weber, 1997;
Höhle and Weber, 1998].
REMARK 36. Finally, let us mention the quite different (third) 'product
space approach', but valid only for the special case of a Boolean algebra lL
as the set of unconditional events, where conditional events are defined as
elements in some 'natural' infinite Boolean product space. It seems that the
earliest reference goes back to Van Fraasen [1976]. For a detailed discussion
see the survey paper by Goodman and Nguyen [1995].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Ulrich Höhle for many fruitful discussions and for drawing my
attention to strict MV-algebras, and to two unknown referees for drawing
my attention to the references [Fodor, 1995] and [van Fraasen, 1976].
This article is 'Part 11' of aseries of papers with the same title.
Fachbereich Mathematik, Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz, Germany.

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SIEGFRIED GOTTWALD
TOWARD ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR

INFERENCE SCHEMATA IN APPROXIMATE
REASONING: THE CASE OF THE RULE OF
SYLLOGISM
1 INTRODUCTION
In the field of approximate reasoning aseries of quite plausible inference

schemata for approximate inferences have been proposed, e.g. generalisa-
tions of standard syllogisms of classicallogic in [Zadeh, 1984; Zadeh, 1985],
cf. also [Lopez de Mantaras, 1990], and there has been argued for their
acceptability-but essentially only on a heuristic foundation. Therefore the
problem of adequacy conditions for such schemata is an open one.
The present paper aims to discuss this problem for a particular case only,
for the inference schema which is known as the rule of syllogism, Le. for the
chaining rule for fuzzy implications which-inside the field of approximate
reasoning-means the problem of chainability of fuzzy IF-THEN rules.
This paper intends to give a discussion of the main background ideas and
of the essential results. The proofs shall be given elsewhere, cf. [Gottwald,
to appear].
2 THE CHAINABILITY OF FUZZY IF-THEN RULES
What is usually called a juzzy IF-THEN rule and sometimes also a juzzy
implication is some particular approximate conditional statement given as
an if-then rule of the form
(1) if xis A then y is B.
Here A and B are fuzzy sets which themselves are interpreted as (fuzzy or
linguistic) values of some variables x resp. y. The fuzzy set A shall also
be called the antecedent juzzy datum and the fuzzy set B accordingly the
consequent juzzy datum of this fuzzy IF-THEN rule (1).
Having given two such fuzzy IF-THEN rules of the particular form
if x is Athen y is B and if y is B then z is C, one may pose the problem,
and has e.g. done so in [Driankov and Hellendoorn, 1995), whether from
these two fuzzy IF-THEN rules a third one if x is Athen z is C folIows.
This and related problems have been discussed e.g. in [Driankov and Hel-
lendoorn, 1995; Godo and Valverde, 1991; Godo and Valverde, 1992; Ruan
201
202 SIEGFRIED GOTTWALD
and Kerre, 1993a]. The corresponding problem related to the fuzzy method-
of-cases was treated e.g. in [Ruan et al., 1990], [Ruan and Kerre, 1993].
We follow the common usage to read the fuzzy IF-THEN rules in the same
way as is done with the control rules of a fuzzy controller: as fuzzy relations.
That means that the fuzzy IF-THEN rule (1) has to be transformed into - or
coded by - a fuzzy relation R. And this fuzzy relation R obviously has to be
determined by the fuzzy antecedent and consequent data A, B explicitely
mentioned in this fuzzy IF-THEN rule.
DEFINITION 1. A coding procedure e for fuzzy IF-THEN rules of the type
(2) if x is Athen y is B
is an operator e which maps pairs of fuzzy sets A E IF(X), B E lF(Y) to
fuzzy relations e(A, B) E lF(X x Y).
For chainability, however, one has not only to look at such a particular
coding procedure. Fuzzy IF-THEN rules which shall be taken into consider-
ation for chaining also have to be suitably related.
DEFINITION 2. Two fuzzy IF-THEN rules
if Xl is Al then
if X2 is A 2 then
are called connected Hf either one has YI = X2 and BI = A 2 or one has

Y2=xlandB2 =AI ·
As we are interested to discuss the chainability in our setting of fuzzy
IF-THEN rules, we also need to consider the result of chaining two connected
IF-THEN rules. To do this effectively, let us extend our terminology a bit.
DEFINITION 3. Having given two connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules
if xisA then y is B,
if yisB then z is C
by their chained juzzy IF-THEN rule we shall mean the fuzzy IF-THEN rule
(3) if X is Athen z is C.
In the case that one intends to discuss two such connected fuzzy IF-THEN
rules and to compare them with their chained fuzzy IF-THEN rule the coding
of fuzzy IF-THEN rules by fuzzy relations means that three fuzzy relations
R, S and T are given and that the fuzzy relations R, S and T have to be
compared in some suitable sense.
What now seems to be a reasonable understanding of comparison here?
It is obvious from the use in fuzzy control, that fuzzy IF-THEN rules-as
weIl as the former control rules-in the context of information processing
TOWARD ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR INFERENCE SCHEMATA 203
have to act as tools to transform some given piece of information into an-
other piece of information. Or to put it more formally: fuzzy IF-THEN rules
have to be understood in such a way that they are tools to transform a
given fuzzy set into another one.
From this point of view, connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules then transform a
first piece of information into a second one, and this second piece of informa-
tion furt her into a third one. But now there is a quite natural understanding
of what it intuitively shall mean that two juzzy IF-THEN rules are chain-
able: The result of transforming a given piece of information according to
two connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules should be the same as transforming this
piece of information according to the chained fuzzy IF-THEN rule. And this
should be the case for all given pieces of information.
To make the intuition behind the idea of information transfer via fuzzy IF-
THEN rules precise, we furthermore have to fix the method how to determine
the piece of information which some particular fuzzy IF-THEN rules yields if
applied to some particular piece of information, i.e. we have to determine a
method which produces a fuzzy set out of a given fuzzy relation and a given
fuzzy set.
This method, again, has to be understood as some operator mapping the
cartesian product 1F(X x y) x 1F(X) into the dass 1F(Y) of fuzzy subsets
of y. Here, however, we shall restrict our considerations to the particular
case that this operator is determined by the generalisation
(4) J.LB(Y) = supt(J.LA(X),J.LR(X,y)),
",EX
of the 'compositional rule of inference' with the t-norm t instead of the

commonly used minimum operator 1\. For the fuzzy set B determined in
this way we write as usual also A 0t R. The reason for this restriction, if
compared with the earlier approach toward thecoding procedure of fuzzy
IF-THEN rules by fuzzy relations, actually lies in the simple fact that in the
present applications of fuzzy IF-THEN rules and fuzzy control rules e.g. in
automated control and expert systems it is common usage to refer to the
compositional rule of inference for combining fuzzy sets with fuzzy relations,
but there exists a much wider field of approaches toward coding fuzzy IF-
THEN rules or control rules by fuzzy relations.
DEFINITION 4. Two particular connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules
if xis A then y is B,
if y is B then z is C
are t-chainable (w.r.t. some coding procedure 0) into the fuzzy IF-THEN
rule
if x is Athen z is C.
iff for all fuzzy sets A' E 1F(X) it holds true that
(5) (A' 0t 9(A,B») 0t E>(B,C) = A' 0t E>(A,C).

And the coding procedure E> has the t-chainability property iff any two
connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules are t-chainable w.r.t. this coding procedure
E>.
Both these notions of the t-chainability of two fuzzy IF-THEN rules and
of the t-chainability property of a coding procedure obviously cover the
intuitions we discussed earlier in this paper. Furthermore there is a nice
characterisation of the t-chainability property of a coding procedure E> which
does not refer to the actual inputs but only uses the 'fuzzy data' explicitly
given in the fuzzy IF-THEN rules.
THEOREM 5. Let t be a left continuous t-norm. A coding procedure E> has
the t-chainability property äff for all juzzy sets A E 1F(X), B E 1F(Y), and
C E 1F(Z) one has
(6) E>(A, B) 0t E>(B, C) = E>(A, C)

w.r.t. the t-based juzzy relational product 0t.
A closer inspection of the proof shows that the arguments also apply
in the particular case that the fuzzy sets A, B, C are fixed from the very
beginning. That means one also has the
COROLLARY 6. Any two particular connected juzzy IF-THEN rules
if x is A then y is B,
if yisB then z is C
are t-chainable iff one has
E>(A, B) 0t E>(B, C) = E>(A, C).

For an interesting further consequence of this theorem we introduce the
following notions.
DEFINITION 7. In the particular case that the coding procedure E> can be
described as
(7) E>(A,B) = {(x,y)lIxcAOycB}
with reference to a binary operation 0 between the membership degrees,
i.e. with reference to a binary connective 0 of the background many-valued
logic 1 , this connective is called E>-coding connective and the coding proce-
dure E> itself in this case is said to be based on the coding connective ().
1 By abuse of language we here use for the connective and their truth degree function
the same symbol. This is a nice simplification of the notation and shall not cause any
misunderstandings.
DEFINITION 8. A binary truth degree function () or its corresponding

connective is t-transitive w.r.t. some t-norm t Hf one has for all U,V,w E
[0,1]:
t(9(u,v),9(v,w» :s 9(u,w).
This t-transitivity can easily be reformulated as a condition that some

suitably chosen formula of the language of many-valued logic with connec-
tives for all the truth degree functions under consideration is a tautology,
i.e. logically true. To give such a formula we refer to a conjunction con-
nective &t with truth degree function t, to an implication connective -tt
representing the R-implication related to the t-norm t, i.e. having the truth
degree function 'Pt, and the crucial connective 9 with truth degree function
() . Then one has immediately
COROLLARY 9. For any left continuous t-norm tone has that a binaJ"y
connective 9 is t-transitive iff
and hence iff
There is, of course, a elose connection between this t-transitivity and the
usual t-transitivity of fuzzy relations as discussed e.g. in [Gottwald, 1993]:
if () is at-transitive binary connective, then each fuzzy relation 8(A, B) =
{(x,y) Ilxc:A9ycB} is t-transitive in the usual sense.
With these notions, Theorem 5 now yields the following necessary con-
dition for t-chainability.
THEOREM 10. Let the coding procedure 8 be based on the 8-coding con-
nective () and suppose that 8 has the t-chainability property. Then the
coding connective () has to be t-transitive.
Applying now the remark which immediately preceded this theorem, we
have the further corollary.
COROLLARY 11. Ifthe coding procedure 8 has the t-chaining property and
is based on .Borne connective, then any juzzy relation 8(A, B) is t-transitive.
3 CHAINABILITY FOR THE CARTESIAN PRODUCT CODING
The earliest way of coding fuzzy IF-THEN rules or fuzzy (control) rules,
and still one which in applications is often used, goes back to [Mamdani
and Assilian, 1975], cf. also [Bandemer and Gottwald, 1995]. The coding
procedure is defined via
(8) 9 0 (A, B) =defAXtt B

with reference to at-norm t 1 and thus equivalently characterised as
In the following we suppose that this t-norm t 1 is left continuous, as

it shall be the case with the t-norm t which is used in the (generalised)
compositional rule of inference (4).
PROPOSITION 12. Let a pair of connected juzzy IF-THEN rules
if y isB then z is C
be given and consider the cartesian product coding (8) based on the t-norm
t 1 . Then a necessary condition for the t-chainability of this pair of juzzy
IF-THEN rules is that one has
(9) hgt (A) 1\ hgt (C) :5 hgt (B).
Furthermore, one proves the following interesting fact.

THEOREM 13. If the t-chainability property holds true for the coding pro-
cedure (8) by the t 1 -based cartesian product, then the t-norms t 1 and t have
to be identical: t 1 = t.
The result of Proposition 12 shows, that in the case of hgt (B) < 1
one always will be able to find particular connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules-
connected 'via' the fuzzy datum B-which are not t-chainable. On the other
hand it is almost common usage in fuzzy control applications to suppose
that the fuzzy input and output values which are explicitely mentioned
in the control rules are normal fuzzy sets. Therefore a restriction of our
considerations to normal fuzzy sets is reasonable.
DEFINITION 14. A coding procedure 9 has the normal t-chainability
property Hf any two connected fuzzy IF-THEN rules with only normal fuzzy
sets as antecedent and consequent fuzzy data are t-chainable w.r.t. this
co ding procedure 9.
With this modified notion of chainability property we get the following
general result.
THEOREM 15. The coding procedure (8) by the t-based juzzy cartesian
product has the normal t-chainability property.
The proof of this theorem yields even a bit more which, nevertheless, is
not as interesting as the theorem itself. The proof of the following corollary
is obvious.
COROLLARY 16. A necessary and sufficient condition for the t-chainability

oftwo particular juzzy IF-THEN mIes w.r.t. the cartesian product coding pro-
cedure eo(A,B) = A Xt Bis, that the connecting juzzy datum is anormal
juzzy set.
4 CHAINABILITY FOR THE CODING WITH IMPLICATION

OPERATORS
Quite often the understanding of the co ding procedure e for fuzzy IF-THEN
rules if x is Athen y is B is based on some connective (), i.e. one assumes
(10) e(A,B) = {(x,y)II()([xc: A], [yc: B)},
in such a way that the operation () is a kind of generalized implication opera-
tion, i.e. the truth degree function associated with an implication connective
of a suitable many-valued logic.
The situation with implication operations is, however, much more diflicult
as with conjunction operations. This is caused by the fact that the t-
norms constitute a kind of 'natural' candidates for generalised conjunction
operators-and that one does not have an equally well suited dass of truth
degree functions for impIication operators.
One way out of this situation is to determine impIication connectives out
of other connectives in some way which e.g. corresponds to some semanti-
cally equivalent characterisation of the impIication in classicallogic by other
connectives, e.g. by disjunction and negation, or by conjunction and nega-
tion, which means to introduce implication operations based on other truth
degree functions.
There are two main approaches along this line, which yield implications
often referred to as R-impIications and S-impIicationsj cf. e.g. [Fodor and
Roubens, 1994]. Each R-implication operation is related to some given
(left continuous) t-norm t via a Galois connection usually named (in one
direction) 'residuation' and giving as implication operation C{Jt the operation
(11) C{Jt(x,y) =def sup{zlt(x,z) ~ y}
and hence corresponding to the definition of a pseudocomplement in im-
pIicative algebrasj cf. [Rasiowa, 1974]. Each S-implication operation, on the
other hand, is defined with reference to a disjunction operation s and a
negation operation n as
(12) 'l/Jn,s(X,y) =def s(n(x),y)
and hence corresponds to a well known characterisation of material impli-
cation of classical logic via classical disjunction and negation.
More preferable, however, is it to have some set of characleristic proper-
ties of implication operations i which collects basic properties all suitable
implication operations should have. Such a list was given e.g. by Smets
and Magrez [1987] and consists there, besides continuity, of the following
properties:
1. law oE contraposition: i(x, y) = i(n(y), n(x» ,
2. exchange principle: i(x, i(y, z» = i(y, i(x, z» ,

3. monotonicity properties: i is nonincreasing in the first and nonde-
creasing in the second argument ,
4. degree ranking property: i(x,y) = 1 {:::} x ~ y ,
5. neutrality: i(l,y) = y .
In this section we now suppose that the coding procedure is based on an
implication operation i, Le. on an implication connective 0i.
Of course, this implication connective has to be t-transitive if e is in-
tended to have the t-chainability property.
THEOREM 17. Suppose that the junction i : [0,1]2-+ [0,1] has the degree
ranking property and is t-transitive. Assume jurthermore that the juzzy set
B E lF(Y) has a membership junction /JB with 'Jull' range rg (/JB) = [0,1].
Then each pair
if yisB then z is C
0/ connected juzzy IF-THEN rules is t-chainable.

The particular assumption of this theorem, that the membership func-
tion of the 'connecting datum' B should have 'fulI' support [0,1] can for
continuous membership functions and e.g. Y = IR be changed to having
hgt (B) = 1 together with hgt (B) = 1. The second one of these conditions
can be given a nice reformulation using the following new notion.
DEFINITION 18. A fuzzy set B E lF(Y) is said to have restricted support
iff supp (B) '" Y holds true.
Then, obviously, hgt (B) = 1 is just equivalent with the fact that B has
restricted support.
Looking at R-implications, one now gets quite straightforward the fol-
lowing particular result.
THEOREM 19. Let t be a left continuous t-norm. Then the cpt-coding
procedure which uses the R-implication operator related to the t-norm t has
the t-chaining property /or all those pairs 0/ connected juzzy IF-THEN rules
which have a connecting datum B which is anormal juzzy set with restricted
support and a membership junction with 'Jull' range rg (JLB) = [0,1].
The other type of implication operators, S-implications, in general have

the form
(13) i.,n(u,v) = s(n(u), v)
for some t-conorm s and some (strong) negation operator n. Therefore the
necessary condition for the t-chainability of the coding procedure E).,n is,
according to Theorem 10, the t-transitivity of the implication function i.,n.
In the present case that means that one has to have
(14) t(s(n(u),v),s(n(v),w)) ~ s(n(u),w) for all U,v,W E [0,1].
In this generality, this condition actually seems to be almost intractable.
But even the more restricted case, that the t-conorm s is based-via a de
Morgan relation---on the t-norm t and hence is determined as
i.,n(u,V) = n(t(u,n(v))),
using only the idempotency n(n(u» - u (for all u E [0,1]) of the negation
operation, even this case means that the t-transitivity of i.,n is characterised
by the more specific condition for all u, v, w E [0,1]:
(15) t(n(t(u,n(v))),n(t(v,n(w)))) ~ n(t(u,n(w))).
And this condition again is equivalent with the following a little bit simpler
one which results from the factthat the negation function n is also supposed
to be order inverting, Le. non-increasing:
t(u,w) ~ n(t(n(t(u,n(v))),n(t(v,w))))
for all u, v, w E [0, 1] which itself means
t(u,w) ~ q(q(u,n(v))),q(v,w))))
for all u,v,w E [0,1] and the composed function
q(u, v) =def n(t(u, v».
But even these last conditions are quite complicated and the problem, to
determine suitable conditions on t and n which yield that these conditions
are satisfied, actually presents an open problem in the general theory of
t-norms.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The particular case of the rule of syllogism which was discussed in this paper
did not really pose deeper problems for the approach toward a soundness
proof. Only mild restrictions had to be imposed on the coding procedures

to guarantee soundness.
Soundness, however, in the particular sense of this paper. And it seems
that, despite the intuitive accessibility of this notion of soundness, one needs
a further suitable generalisation of this notion of soundness to extend the
approach of the present paper to a larger dass of inference rules.
The rough idea to reach such a goal actually is that for each inference rule
in the field of approximative reasoning their soundness should mean that the
'information transfer' which is provided by the condusion of (an instance
of) such an inference rule should be at least as good as the 'information
transfer' which is provided by the premises of (the same instance of) this
inference rule. But what here the phrase 'at least as good' should means,
just this is the main problem for a suitable generalisation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author gratefully acknowledges support through the COST action no.
15 of the European Union, and by fruitful discussions with H. Thiele which
made him better aware of the problem of this paper.
Institut für Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Universität Leipzig, Germany.
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754-763, 1985.
VILEM NovAK
FORMAL THEORIES IN FUZZY LOGIC
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we deal with syntactical aspects of two kinds of fuzzy logic,
namely of fuzzy logic in narrow (FLn) and of broader sense (FLb). Fuzzy
logic in narrow sense is now quite weH established though the work is far
from being finished. The goal· of this logic is to develop means for modeling
of the vagueness phenomenon. One of its partial goals, besides vagueness, is
to formulate analogues of most theorems of the classical logic. This makes
us possible to clarify the relation of fuzzy logic to the classical one and also,
to gain a more profound understanding to both logics.
One of the interesting problems are open fuzzy theories in FLn. We
consider this topic important as it has direct impact to questions of prov-
ability and algorithmization and thus, also to applications. Unfortunately,
as shown in [Hajek, 1995], proving in fuzzy logic is highly computationally
ineffective. However, this is a general result. When solving a specific prob-
lem, we have to seek some sophisticated methods suitable for it. One such
possibility is demonstrated in this paper in Theorems 23 and 24 where we
prove that for the case of the linguistic expressions used in the applications,
the formulas for derivation of the conclusion (including the Mamdani's one)
are the best possible ones (in the sense of the magnitude of the obtained
truth values).
Further interesting consequences may be expected in FLb, which is an
extension of FLn. The goal is to develop a logic of the commonsense human
reasoning whose main characteristic feature is the use of natural language.
FLb includes the concept of computing with words, which has been recently
introduced by L. A. Zadeh.
In this paper, we define the concept of formal theory in both fuzzy log-
ics, demonstrate some of their basic properties and mutual connection of
FLb and FLn. We will focus especiaHy to syntactical aspects and specific
questions of provability. However, we assume that the reader is, at least
partly, acquainted with some of the cited works [Hajek, 1996; Novak, 1990;
Novak, 1995a; Novak, 1996; Pavelka, 1979] where precise definitions of some
concepts and proofs of some theorems, which are only recalled in this paper,
can be found.
2 FORMAL THEORIES IN FUZZY LOGIC IN NARROW SENSE
2.1 Truth values

The set of truth values is considered to be the complete residuated lattice
213
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), FuZ1;Y Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 213-235.
214 VILEM NovAK
(1) C = (L, V, 1\, 0,~, 0,1),

where L = [0,1] and 0, ~ is the adjoint couple of product and residuation.
As analyzed in detail in [Hajek, 1998], we may distinguish three main
streams of FLn, namely that of Lukasiewicz style (FLn(L», Gödel style
(FLn(G» and product style (FLn(P». All three logics assurne L = [0,1]
and differ in the definition of the couple of operations 0 and~. In this
paper, we will work in FLn(L) (fuzzy logic in narrow sense of Lukasiewicz
style) with evaluated syntax in which 0 is the Lukasiewicz product and ~
the Lukasiewicz implication. The reasons for this are widely discussed in
the literature and we will mention some of them also in this paper. In the
sequel, by FLn we will always understand FLn(L) with evaluated syntax.
Note that 0 in (1) with L = [0,1] is a particular case of t-norm (cf. e.g.
[Gottwald, 1993; Klement et al., 196]) and ~ is the corresponding residu-
ation. A general feature of FLn can be characterized by the possibility to
introduce more kinds of connectives than are present in classicallogic. The
choice is practically unlimited but t-norms seem to have the most important
role. However, we have to cope with the fact that we obtain various logical
systems (determined especially by the implication operation) which may not
always behave weIl with respect to our idea. When confining to continuous
t-norms, we come to the three above mentioned fuzzy logics in narrow sense.
However, the only continuous residuation operation is the Lukasiewicz im-
plication. Therefore, FLn based on the Lukasiewicz operations possesses
the most distinguished properties, among them the possibility to introduce
evaluated syntax.
A specific feature of FLn with evaluated syntax is equal relevance of all
truth values, i.e. no designated truth values are defined. Instead, the maxi-
mality principle is postulated stating that if we obtain the same result with
various truth values (syntactical evaluations) then we take the maximum
(supremum) of all of them.
The general requirement in any logic is that the connectives should pre-
serve equivalence which in FLn is naturally interpreted by
(2) a +-+ b = (a ~ b) 1\ (b ~ a),
a, bEL. Furthermore, we put an = a 0 ... 0 a.

~
n
DEFINITION 1. The operation c : Ln --t L is logically fitting on L if
there are natural numbers k 1 > 0, ... ,kn > such that °
(3) (al +-+ b1 )k 1 0 ... 0 (an +-+ bn)k n ::; c( al, ... ,an) +-+ c(b 1 , .•• , bn )
holds for every al, ... ,an, b1 , ••• ,bn E L.

Using this concept, it is possible to develop fuzzy logic as an open system
in which four operations are basic (given by the structure of the residuated
FORMAL THEORIES IN FUZZY LOGIC 215
lattice (1» and to extend it, if necessary, by some additional operations.

Hence, the structure of truth values may be assumed to form an enriched
residuated lattice
(4) C = (L, V, 1\, ®,~, {Ci Ii E Jop}, 0,1),

where {ci I j E Jop} is a set of logically fitting operations (Jop is some
index set). Let us stress that introducing these operations in FLn does not
harm the whole logical system (cf. [Pavelka, 1979]). Note also that in FLn,
logically fitting operations are exactly those being Lipschitz continuous (see
[Mesiar and Novak; 1977]). Additional connectives are especially important
in FLb where we need them to accomplish interpretation of various natural
language connectives, modifiers and, possibly, other linguistic phenomena.
2.2 Syntactic consequence operation

We will deal with formal predicate language J consisting of variables, con-
stants, predicates, connectives and quantifiers, as defined, for example in
[Novak, 1990; Novak, 1996]. A specific feature of FLn is introducing logical
constants a E J being symbols for all truth values a E L. However, as
demonstrated in [Hajek, 1995; Hajek, 1998; Novak, 1995], we actually need
only countable number of them and hence, considering all of them is only a
useful technical means.
By FJ we denote the set of all the well-formed formulas (defined in a
common way) and by M J sets of all terms in the language J. The ba-
sic connectives are /\ (conjunction), V (disjunction), & (Lukasiewicz con-
junction) and => (implication) interpreted by the operations 1\, V, ® and
~,respectively. Additionally, we introduce sum by a E9 b = -(.,a ® ob),
a, bEL. It can be extended to multiple na. The operation of sum is a
natural interpretation of the Lukasiewicz disjunction \1.
Syntax of fuzzy logic is evaluated by syntactical evaluations taken from L.
This makes us possible to manipulate with truth values also on the syntac-
tical level. Furthermore, since the main task of fuzzy logic in narrow sense
has been declared to provide tool for grasping the vagueness phenomenon,
evaluated syntax seems to be a suitable means for this purpose.
The main concept is that of the evaluated formula, which is a coupl.e a / A
where A E FJ is a formula and a E L is its syntactical evaluation. Let us
remark that the evaluated formula can also be seen as a fuzzy singleton.
Hence, every set of evaluated formulas is at the same time a juzzy set of
formulas with the membership degrees equal to their evaluations. This
ambiguity will often be used in the sequel.
Evaluated formulas are manipulated using the n-ary inference rules r
which are couples
(5) r = (r syn , r e1Jl )

216 VILEMNovAK
where r syn is syntactical part of the rule r which is a partial n-ary operation
on FJ and re vI is its evaluation part which is an n-ary operation on L pre-
serving arbitrary non-empty joins in each argument (semicontinuity). We
will work with sound inference rules, i.e. those preserving truth evaluations
(for precise definition see [Novak, 1990; Pavelka, 1979]).
A question raises where the syntactical truth values come from; how they
should be interpreted? As pointed out by P. Hajek (cf. [Hajek, 1996}), it
is natural to understand evaluated formulas as the formulas a::}A (a is a
logical constant for the truth value a E L) which, when being true in the
degree 1, means that the truth of A is greater than or equal to a. This
understanding has several consequences.
First, we may interpret the evaluated formulas as shorts for the latter
ones. Second, the evaluated rules of modus ponens
a/ A, b/ A::}B
(6) rMP: a®b/B
and generalization
a/A
ra: a/(Vx)A
may be embedded in non-evaluated syntax simply as special cases of the clas-

sical ones. For example, rMP can be obtained in FLn (with non-evaluated
syntax and truth values a, a E L, in the language) using the proof, in which
the transitivity and importation tautologies, and (classical) modus ponens
are used:
a::}A, b::}(A::}B),
(b::}(A::}B))::} (A::}(b::}B)), A::}(b::}B),
(a::}A)::} ((A::}(b::}B) )::}(a::}(b::} B)), (a::} (b::}B),
(a::} (b::}B))::} (a ® b::}B), a ® b::}B.
(a ® bis a logical constant denoting the truth value a ® b).
Somewhat technical and not quite natural b-lifting rules
a/A
rRb: b -+ a/b::}A
may be omitted as they can easily be replaced by simple proofs which use
modus ponens and the transitivity tautology (a::}A)::}«b::}a)::}(b::}A)).
Let us stress, however, that it is not reasonable to avoid evaluated for-
mulas completely. Consistent replacement of evaluated formulas by a::} A
would lead to a very cumbersome notation. Furthermore, the primary goal
which is graded model of vagueness(fuzzy approach) would disappear.
FORMAL THEORIE:S IN FUZZY LOGIC 217
The second reason consists in the inference rules. The evaluation oper-
ation r evl in (5) is required to be only lower semicontinuous. This opens
the way for extension of fuzzy logic by various non-standard inference rules.
However, omitting the concept of evaluated formulas would result in the re-
striction only to the operations defined apriori in the structure (1)
(or (4». Consequently, the operation r evl would have to be inherently
realized as the interpretation of some logical connective.
As an example, let us consider the rule introduced already in [Pavelka,
1979]:
ajAVb
rD: btajA
where t is the operation defined by

b a-
t -
{Oa otherwise ifb2:a
a, bE [0,1]. The operation t is discontinuous and thus, not logically fitting

in the sense of (3). Hence, it cannot be used as a logical connective in
FLn. On the other hand, it is semicontinuous and so, the rule rD may be
used in FLn. Consequently, we may introduce various, in general n-ary,
inference rules with discontinuous semantical operation. We expect here
the potential, for example, for modeling of the abduction in FLn.
The third reason for keeping the evaluated formulas in FLn sterns from
the concept of provability, which is crucial in any logic. In many-valued
logic, we proceed as follows.
Let GeL be a set of designated truth values and C : FJ ~ L be a
nmction such that C(r(A 1 , .•• ,An» E G whenever C(A i ) E G, i = 1, ... ,n
for every inference rule r E R. Such a function will be called closed with
respect to all rules r E R. The following definition can be introduced in
classicallogic.
DEFINITION 2. A formula A belongs to the set c syn X of syntactic con-
sequences of the set of formulas X Hf C(A) E G holds for every function
closed with respect to the inference rules and such, that C(B) E G holds
for every formula B EX.
In classical as well as in many-valued logic, we usually require the strong
definition of the syntactic consequence
DEFINITION 3. A formula A belongs to the set c syn X of syntactic con-
sequences of the set of formulas X Hf there is a proof W of A from X.
In classical logic, Definition 3 is equivalent with Definition 2. The main
outcome of the latter is the possibility to generalize syntactic consequences
to the case of evaluated syntax.
218 VILEMNovAK
Recall that a fuzzy set X S FJ is closed with respect to the inference

rule r if X(r 8yn (A 1 , ••• ,An) ~ r elll (X(A1 ), ••. ,X(An )).
DEFINITION 4. Let R be a set of sound evaluated inference rules. Then
the fuzzy set of syntactic consequences of the fuzzy set X S FJ is given by
(7) (csynX)A = A{C(A) I C S FJ, C is closed w.r.t. r E Rand

AL,X ~ Cl.
(~ is classical inclusion offuzzy sets).
An evaluated proof w is a sequence of evaluated formulas al/Al' ... '
an / An such that every evaluated formula ai/Ai is either and axiom or it
is derived from previous evaluated formulas using some evaluated inference
rule. The evaluation an of the last formula in w is called the value oj the
prooj w and denoted by Val(w).
The proof of the foIlowing theorem is based on Definition 4 (see [Pavelka,
1979]).
THEOREM 5.
(8) (csyn X)A = a = V{Val(w) Iw is an evaluated prooj oj A from X}.
Theorem 5 generalizes Definition 3, Le. the requirement of the existence of a
proof is replaced by to supremum of the values of all the possible evaluated
proofs.
The main difference between FLn and standard many-valued logic lays
in the syntactic consequence operation. The former assumes Definition 3.
In [Hajek, 1998] it was shown that FLn can be interpreted in Lukasiewicz
many-valued logic if we introduce Iogical constants for the truth values
in its language and translate the evaluated formulas as mentioned above.
However, to obtain all the resuits in the foIlowing section, we still need to
generalize the concept of provability in the sense of Theorem 5. On the
other hand, both classical as weIl as Lukasiewicz many-valued Iogics can be
obtained within FLn as its special cases because in classical syntax, formulas
and inference rules may always be taken as evaluated by the value 1.
2.3 Same theorems 0/ FLn

In this section, some most important theorems are listed without proofs,
which can be found in the cited literature [Hajek, 1995; Novak, 1990; Novak,
1995c; PaveIka, 1979]. Our goal is to give the reader an idea about FLn and
its strength. A concise treatment of FLn can be found in the book [Novak,
Perfilieva and Mockof, 1999).
First, we will recall some definitions from FLn. A juzzy theory T is
determined by the tripie
(9) T = (AL,As,R)
where AL, As are sets of evaluated logical and special axioms, respectively
(or, equivalently, fuzzy sets AL, As C FJ) and R is a set of inference rules
containing at least the rules TMP and '" Ta (in general, there may be fuzzy
theories with different sets of inference rules). At the same time we may see
fuzzy theory T as a fuzzy set of formulas
T = (C 8y n(As U AL) C FJ.
'"
If (CByn(As U AL»A = athen we write T I- a A (a formula A is provable in
the degree a in the fuzzy theory T).
When defining a fuzzy theory, we will usually write only the fuzzy set of
its special axioms, Le.
where I is some index set.

A structure for the language J is
(10) V = (D,PD, ... , fD, ... , u, ... )
where D is a set, PD ~ D n , ... are n-ary fuzzy relations assigned to each n-
ary predicate symbol P E J, f D are ordinary n-ary functions on D assigned
to each n-ary functional symbol f E J and u, ... E D are elements assigned
to constants of J. The language J may also be many-sorted. Then the
definition of the structure is modified accordingly.
The interpretation V(t) of the term t E MJ in the structure V is an
element V(t) E D defined in a classical way. Similarly, the interpretation of
a formula A E FJ in V is a truth value V(A) E L.
Given a fuzzy theory T, its model V F T is a structure for which V(A) 2:
AdA) V As(A) holds. By T Fa A we mean that a formula A E FJ is true
in the degree a in the fuzzy theory T, Le.
a = /\{V(A) I V F T}
(for the precise definitions see [Novak, I990J).
Fundamental theorems characterizing the provability are the validity and
closure ones. The first one says that the provability degree of a formula
cannot exceed its truth. By the second one, we may confine ourselves to
closed formulas, analogously as in the classicallogic.
If T is a theory and E ~ FJ a fuzzy set of formulas then T' = TUE
s
is an extension of the theory T, Le. its fuzzy set A of special axioms is
s
A =AsUE.
THEOREM 6 (Deduction). LetA be a closedformula andT' = TU{ I/A}.
Then to every B there is n such that
T I- a An:>B iJJ T' I- a B.
220 VILEM NovAK
A fuzzy theory is contradictory if there is a formula A E FJ(T) and

proofs WA and W~A such that ValT(WA) ® ValT(W~A) > 0 (other equivalent
characterizations of inconsistency can also be introduced).
THEOREM 7. A theory T is contradictory äffT I- A holds for every formula
A E FJ(T).
It follows from this theorem that the concepts of the contradictory theory
in FLn and classical logic coincide. This is caused by the fact that the law
of the excluded middle does hold in FLn with respect to the connective of
Lukasiewicz conjunction &.
Other characterization of the contradictory theories is provided by the
following theorem.
a/
THEOREM 8. A juzzy theory TU{ A} is contradictory iffto every bEL
and every formula B there is m such that T h Am=>B.
The completeness theorem in classicallogic states that various character-
ization of truth of formulas provided by the provability and interpretation
coincide. In FLn, we obtain analogous result relative to the degrees of
provability and truth.
THEOREM 9 (Completeness).
(a) A theory T is consistent iff it has a model.
Hence, the syntactic evaluation a in the evaluated formula a / A can be seen

as its truth evaluation on the level of syntax. Note that analogous result
holds also in classicallogic where we 'put on the paper' only true formulas,
i.e. those evaluated by 1.
The equality predicate fulfilling the following (common) axioms in the
degree 1 can be introduced: There are natural numbers ml > 0, ... ,mn> 0
such that
(EI) Fx= x
(E2) F (Xl = yd m1 => ... =>(Xn = Yn)m" =>(f(Xl, ... ,Xn ) = f(Yb . .. ,Yn»
(E3) F (Xl = Yl)ffl 1=> ... =>(Xn = Yn)m" =>(P(Xl, . .. ,Xn){::}P(Yl' . .. , Yn»
for every n-ary functional symbol f and predicate symbol p. Classical equal-
ity is a special crisp case also fulfilling the above axioms with exponents
equal to 1.
THEOREM 10 (Equality). Let T I- a ; ti = Si, i = 1, ... ,n. Then there are
natural numbers ml > 0, ... ,mn > 0 such that
where A' is a /ormula which is a result 0/ replacing 0/ the terms ti by the

term Si in A, respectively.
THEOREM 11 (Equivalence). Let A be a /ormula and Bt, ... ,Bn some 0/
its sub/ormulas. Let T I- a ; Bi{::}B~, i = 1, ... , n. Then there are natural
numbers ml > 0, ... ,mn > 0 such that
where A' is a /ormula which is a result 0/ replacing 0/ the /ormulas BI, ... , B n
in A by BL ... ,B~.
Let r C FJ be a fuzzy set offormulas. By Supp(r) we denote its support,
'" = {A I r(A) > O}. The 'V denotes Lukasiewicz disjunction
i.e. Supp(r)
given by A 'V B := -,( -,A & -,B).
In the sequel, we will use the following symbol:
a >.. b := { a> b ~f b < 1

a=1 Ifb=1.
THEOREM 12 (Reduction for the consistency). A theory T' = TU r
is contradictory iJJ there are natural numbers ml > 0, ... , m n > 0 and
Al, ... ,An E Supp(r) such that
T I- c -,A;"l'V ... 'V-,A~"
where ai = r(Ai ), i = 1, ... ,n and c >* ...,(a;"l ® ... ® a~").
COROLLARY 13. A theory T' = T U { ...,a/ -,A} is contradictory iff T h
mA tor some natural number m > 0 and b >* ma.
Given a formula A(x) and a term t E MJ. An instance Az[t] of A(x) is
a formula obtained from A(x) when replacing the variable x by the term
t E MJ. A formula A is a juzzy quasitautology in the degree a, A F~, if
Fa BI & ... & Bk=?A
where Bi are closed instances of the equality axioms. Now we may formulate
a generalization of the famous Hilbert-Ackermann theorem of classicallogic.
THEOREM 14 (Consistency). Open theory T is contradictory iJJ'there are
natural numbers PI > 0, ... , Pn > 0 and special axioms Al, .. . , An ot the
theory T such that
F~ -,Äf1'V ... 'V-,Ä~"
is a juzzy quasitautology in the degree b where Ä i are instances 0/ the special

axioms and b >* ...,(afl ® ... ® a~") tor ai = As(Ai ) and i = 1, ..• , n.
The following is a generalization of the classical Herbrand theorem to
FLn, which has been proved in in [Novak, 1998]. Recall that the matrix of a
222 VILEMNovAK
formula A := (V'xd'" (V'x n )B(x1!'" ,xn ) in the prenex form is the formula
B(Xl, ... , x n ). The Herbrand existential formula AH is constructed from A
by substitution of new functional symbols in the same way as in classical
logic.
THEOREM 15. Let T be a fu,zzy theory, A E FJ a closed formula in prenex
form and a = As(A). Then
T h mA iff F=~ PlAg>V'" VPn A };>

is a fu,zzy quasitautology for some m and Pl, ... ,Pn where b >* ma, d >*
(Pl + ... + Pn)a and AW are instances of the matrix of the formula AH.
3 FORMAL THEORIES IN FUZZY LOGIe IN BROADER SENSE
3.1 Meaning 01 naturallanguage syntagms in FLb

Unlike FLn, which is a graded generalization of the classical logic, FLb
is motivated by modeling of the human deduction in which crucial role is
played by naturallanguage. We develop it as a certain extension of FLn .. In
our considerations, we confine to selected linguistic syntagms l taken from
certain set S.
The formal part of FLb is based on a many-sorted language J of FLn
having a finite number of sorts L, L = 1, ... ,po By MJt we denote a set of
closed terms of the sort L. As in the previous section, FJ is a set of ail the
weH formed formulas of J.
Natural language syntagm is, in general, a name of some property of
objects. This is assigned a formula A(x) E FJ where x is a variable of the
sort L. However, since the meaning of syntagms is vague, we suppose that
each syntagm A E S is assigned a set
of evaluated formulas being closed instances of A(x). We will call A in

(11) a multiformula. Obviously, a multiformula A can at the same time be
viewed as a fuzzy set of closed instances A.,[t] of the formula A(x).
This model is motivated by the use of natural language, and also by
the potential of fuzzy logic in narrow sense, which enables us to work with
fuzzy sets of formulas included in the syntax. This makes us possible to
introduce and formalize (at least partly) the distinction between the con-
cepts of intension and extension which are very important in the study of
naturallanguage semantics. In this paper, we identify the intension with
1 Linguistic expressions formed a.ccording to the grammatical rules and having a spe-
cific meaning.
the multiformula A.2 Recall that in intensionallogic, intensions are (loosely

speaking) functions assigning truth values to objects in each possible world
and time moment. fu our formalism, possible worlds as weIl as time are
not explicitly included, but they are hidden behind the assignment of truth
values to the instances Ao: [tl in the multiformula A. The multiformulas A
are considered here to be given apriori.
Due to the previous discussion, we formulate the basic scheme in FLb:
syntagm A I-t intension A I-t extension V(A)
where V is an interpretation (model) of the formallanguage J in concern.
The extension of the syntagm is the fuzzy set
V(A) = { V(Ao:[t]) /V(t) tE M,}. I

It is clear that one intension A may lead to (infinitely) many extensions
V(A). Obviously, V(t) is a concrete object and V(Ao:[t}) is a truth degree
in which the object V(t) has the property A(x) in the structure V. fu
the case of A(Xl, ... , x n ) where Xl> .•• , Xn are variables of various sorts, we
obtain a fuzzy relation
EXAMPLE. Let A:= Young and M = {to, ... , tlOO} be a set of terms
representing years. We may define a multiformula Young by
Young = {1/Yaung(to), ... , I/Yaung(t2o)"", 0.6/Yaung(t3o),
... , 0.2 /Y aung(t4S), ... , 0 /Y aung(t6o)},
This is the logical representation of the intension of the syntagm 'Young'.
The extensions can be, for example, the following: Let D be a set of ages
of people. Then the extension of the syntagm 'Young' is
(12) V(Young} = { 1/1, ... , 1/20, ... ,0.6/30, ... ,0.2/45, ... , 0/60}
where V(t o ) = 1, ... , V(t 20 ) = 20, ... , V(t30) = 30, ... , V(t4S) = 45, ... ,
V(t60) = 60 are interpretations of the terms from M J when representing
age of people. When representing age of dogs, we may obtain the following
extension of 'Young':
(13) V(Young) = { 1/0.1, ... , 1/4, ... ,0.7/6, ... , 0.3/8, ... , 0/14}
2Let us remark that a simplified interpretation of fuzzy logic in broader sense which
concerns only the logical aspect without linguistics has been proposed in [Godo and
Hajek, 1996]. However, we are convinced that linguistics should not be excluded from
fuzzy logic and fuzzy techniques. For example, the main stress in the concept of soft
computing is given to 'computing with words'.
224 VILEMNovAK
where V(to) = 0.1, ... , V(t20) = 4, ... , V(t30) = 6, ... , V(t4S) = 8, ... ,
V(t60) = 14. Note that the truth degrees in (13) are grater than the corre-
sponding ones in (12) to illustrate that only the inequality V(A) ;?: a should
be fulfilled where a is the syntactic evaluation of the formula A in the eval-
uated formula a/ A. Note also that the fuzzy sets of the form (12) and (13)
are introduced in various examples in the literature on fuzzy set theory 2 as
the characterization of the meaning of Young. From our point of view, the
authors always considered some concrete, but usually not explicitly given
extension.
Intensions ofthe syntagms should be constructed from the other (simpler)
ones. We face here the problem of truth functionality which is subject to a
long and still unfinished discussion between logicians and Iinguists. Truth
functionality cannot, in general, be accepted in the model of semantics of
natural language. However, for some parts of it, the truth functionality
holds, or at least may be bypassed by accepting various kinds of connec-
tives in the local cases (recall our discussion about additional operations in
Section 2).
3.2 Derivation and theories in FLb

Since fuzzy logic in broader sense is an extension of FLn, the concepts of
the inference rule, proof and theory can be defined in it accordingly with
the concept of multiformula.
DEFINITION 16. The inference rule in FLb is the scheme
(14) R. Al [Al], ... ,An[An ]
. B[B]
where Ai> B are syntagms with the intensions Ai, B, respectively.
Inference rules are usually based on some corresponding rule of FLn.
Then the rule (14) takes a more specific form and the conclusion is modified
on the basis of Theorem 5. For example, the rule of modus ponens in FLb
has the form
R . A[A] , IF ATHEN B[A=>B]
MP· B[B]
where A = { at/ Ax[t] I t EMd, A=>B = { Cts/(Ax[t]=>BII[sj) It E

Mb sE M 2 }, MI, M 2 are sets of terms of the sorts 1 and 2, and
B = { VtEM (at ® bs)/BII[s]ls E M2 }.

1
The proof in FLb is a sequence of linguistic statements (syntagms from

S) together with their intensions
2See, e.g. [Zadeh, 1975] and a lot of other papers and books.
each of which is a linguistically formulated axiom (logical or special), or it

is derived using some inference rule.
The linguistic statements in (15) may not always be present. Considering
the corresponding syntagm at each step of (15) would mean that the rea-
soning proceeds using the words of the natural language all the time. But
this is unrealistic since people do not normally use words during thinking.
Hence, we will often write the proof using the multiformulas (intensions)
only, i.e.
(16) IJI, ... ,lJ n .
A formal theory of FLb is given by the set of linguistically expressed
special axioms together with their intensions
(17) T = {Ao[AoJ, ... ,Am[Am ]},

where Ai E S, i = 1, ... , m. The reasoning uses proofs of the form (15).
As these deal with multiformulas, Le. sets of evaluated formulas, the proof
(16) can be viewed as a multiple proof in the fuzzy theory T adjoint to T,
which determined by the multiformulas Ai, i = 1, ... ,m from (17)
(18) T = A o U ... U Am.
The general procedure is therefore the following. We form a fuzzy theory
Tin (17) using naturallanguage. Then we realise multiple reasoning within
the adjoint fuzzy theory T in (18). The result is a multiformula IJ which is
finally translated into the corresponding syntagm ß ES.
We will be interested in specific kinds of theories of FLb based on the con-
cept of the linguistic description. This is a description of the given situation
in naturallanguage. Such a situation may be, for example, some functional
dependence, decision situation, control process etc. Informally, the linguis-
tic description is a set of IF- THEN rules stated in natural language. We
will give a precise definition below.
Let SA, SB be two disjoint sets of simple syntagms in the form
(1 g) [(linguistic modifier)]( adjective) (noun) .
Each syntagm A E SA, ß E SB has the intension being a multiformula

(20) A { atl Ax[t] I t EMd,
(21) IJ {asIBx[s] I s E M 2 }
where MI, M 2 are sets of c10sed terms of the sorts 1 and 2.
DEFINITION 17. The linguistic description in FLb is a finite set of lin-
guistic conditional statements of the form
226 VILEMNovAK
(22) CV = {IF A j THEN Bj [Aj=>Bj] I j = 1, ... m}

where Aj E SA, Bj E SB, are syntagms ofthe form (19) with the intensions
(20) and (21), respectivelyand
Aj=>Bj = {(ajt ~ bjs)/(Aj", [t]=>Bjy[s]) I t E Mlos E M 2 }
are intensions of the conditional statements from (22).

The statements in the set (22) can be joined by the connective AND inter-
preted using logical conjunction. The intension of the linguistic description
(22) is then the multiformula
Ni=l (Aj=>Bj) =
= { 1\~1 (ajt ~ bjs) / 1\~1 (Aj", [t]=>Bjy[s]) It E MI, sE M2}
where x, y are variables of the sorts 1 and 2, respectively.
3.3 Special theories 0/ FLn

In the previous section, we have exposed the basic definition of FLb. It has
been noted that a theory of FLb is always converted into a fuzzy theory
of FLn. In this section, we prove severallemmasconcerning special fuzzy
theories corresponding to those of FLb which are determined by the two
basic approximate reasoning schemes applied in fuzzy control and elsewhere.
Recall that a formula A' is a variant of A if it is the result of replacing
of all subformulas of A of the form (Vy)B by the formulas (Vx)By[x] where
x is substitutible into A.
LEMMA 18. Let T be a fu,zzy theory and A' be a variant 0/ A. Then
T f- a A iff T f- a A'.
This lemma justifies the following concepts.

DEFINITION 19. Two formulas A and B are independent if no variant or
instance of one is a subformula of the other one.
Let Fo be a set of evaluated formulas such that, if a/ A, b/ B E Fo
then A, B are independent and to each A there is at most one a such that
a/ A E Fo. We will call Fo a set ofindependent evaluated formulas.
We say that Fo is directed, if:
(a) If a/(Vx)A E Fo and b/A",[t] E Fo, then a ~ b, where t E M,.
(b) If Ais a logical axiom then a/A E Fo implies a = AL(A).

Note that if A(x),B(y) are independent then also all their respective in-
stances are independent.
The proof of the following lemma was inspired by the paper of E. Turunen
[1995].
LEMMA 20. Let F o be directed set of independent evaluated formulas Let
T = { a j AI a j A E Fo }. Then there is a model 1> 1= T such that
(23) 1>(A) =a
holds for all aj A E Fo.
Proof. We construct a Henkin extension TH of the theory T and a Linden-

baum algebra C(TH) using the equivalence
A ~ B, Hf T f- A<=:>B.
By Theorem 13 in [Novak, 1990], C(TH) is a residuated lattice. Let I.I
denote the elements from C(TH).
Now, we construct an algebra Q generated by the set
Qo = {lAll (3A)(3a)( aj A E Fo)} U {101}.
The Q is determined by the following conditions:
(a) Qo ~ Q.
(b) If lAI, IBI E Q then lAI -t IBI := IA=*BI E Q.
Using the rule of modus ponens, logical axioms and formulas provable in the
degree 1 (theorems) we can show that Q is a residuated lattice (analogously
as in the proof of Theorem 13 in [Novak, 1990]).
Let us now define the function f : Q ~ L as follows:
(a) f(IAI) = a if aj A E Fo.
(b) f(I01) = O.
(c) f(IAI-t IBI) = f(lAI) -t J(lBI).
Since F o is directed set of independent formulas, the function J exists and
it is a homomorphism. Using the results of [Glushankof, 1992], the lattice
of truth values L in consideration is injective and thus, J can be extended
to homomorphism
9 : C(TH) ~ L.
Finally, we define the truth evaluation H : FJ ~ L by H(A) = g(IAI).
Obviously, H(A) = a for every aj A E Fo. We will also show that
H((Vx)B) = AtEM, H(B,,[t]).
228 VILEMNovAK
As TB is Henkin and H is a homomorphism, it follows from the logical

and Henkin axioms that
H«Vx)B) = H{B:t[r])
where r is a special constant for (Vx)B, both of the same sort t .. At the
same time,
H«Vx)B) :::; H{B:t[t])
holds for every term t ofthe sort t. H H{C):::; H{B:t[t]) holds for all terms
t then,
H{C) :::; H{B:t[r)) = H«Vx)B)
as a special case, i.e. H«Vx)B) is infimum of all the truth evaluations
H{B:t[t)), t E M,J. Analogously we proceed for suprema, using the nega-
tion.
Hence, using H, we can construct a canonical structure V, which is a
model of the theory TB and has the property (23). But then V F T follows
from the fact that TB is a conservative extension of T. •
This lemma plays an important role in proving of the lemmas below.

LEMMA 21. Let Aj(x), Bj{Y), j = 1, ... be formulas, x,y variables of the
sorts 1 and 2 such that tor every j =f:. k, Aj and Ak, as well as Bj and Bk
are independent, respectively. Let k, 1 :::; k :::; m be given and
T = { akt/Akz[t], cta/ A,i:l{Aj:t[tj::>Bjll[sDlt E MI,s E M 2 }
be a juzzy theory. Then
T h •. Bkll[sj, bka = V (akt ® Cta),

tEMl
Proof. Put
Fo = {ajt/Aj:t[tj, bjs = VtEM1 (ajt ® Cta)/Bjll[sj
I t E MI,s E M 2 ,j = 1, ... m}.
It follows from the assumptions that Fo is a set of independent evaluated
formulas which, obviously, is also directed. By Lemma 20, there exists a
structure V such that
V{Aj:t [t)) = ajt

V{Bjll[sj) = bja.
We will show that V F T.
Obviously,
ajt ® Cts $ V (ajt ® Cts)

tEMl
for all t E MI and S E M 2 and j. By the adjunction, we obtain
Cts $ ajt -+ VtEMl (ajt ® Cta) = V(Ajz[t]) -+ V(Bjy[s])

= V(Ajz[t]~Bjy[s])
for all i = 1, ... m, and thus

m m
j=1 j=1
i.e. V F= T.
Consider the proofs
Wts:= akt/Akz[t]SA, Cts/ A;1(Ajz[t] ~

Bjy[S])SA, akt ®CtS/Bky[S]rMPO'
t E Mb S E M 2 where rMPC is a modified rule of modus ponens for the
conjunction of implications (cf. [Novak, 1996; Novak, 1995a]). Then
bks ~ V ValT(Wts) = V (akt ® Cts).

But at the same time, bks $ V(BkY[S]) = V tEM1 (akt ® Cts). To obtain the
desired equality, use the completeness theorem. •
This lemma states that for special kinds of formulas, we may obtain the
maximal provability degree only on the basis of multiformulas used in the
definition of the fuzzy theory in concern.
The following lemma is proved using the same methods. It concerns
the standard Mamdani's Max-Min rule. We introduce special axioms (see
[Novak, 1994]) in which we consider a new predicate R(x,y) representing
some function to be approximated. Then, for the formulas in concern, the
resulting computation formula gives the best possible result in the same
sense as above.
LEMMA 22. Given a fuzzy theory
T' = {{ (ajt A bjs) /(Ajz[t]I\Bjy[s]) I t E MI, sE M 2 } I j = 1, ... ,m}

where x, y are variables of different sorts, M 1, M 2 are the corresponding sets
of closed terms and the formulas Ajl\Bj and Akl\Bk are independent for
every j i= k. Furthermore, let R(x, y) be a formula and put
230 VILEM NovAK
(24) T = T' U { 1/(Vx)(Vy)«Aj(x)I\Bj(y»~R(x, y» Ii = 1, ... , m}.
1f
T I- a ; A~[t] tE MI
where A' (x) is either A j (x) for some j = 1, ... ,m or it is independent on

all AI (x)I\Bj(Y) then
T h~ B~[s]
where
m
b~ = V (a~ 1\ V(ajt 1\ bjs»
tEMl i=1
and B'(y) := (3x)(A'(x) 1\ R(x, y».
Proof. Using the instances of the substitution axiom, we obtain the

provable evaluated formula 1j«Aix[t]I\Bjy[s])~Rx.y[t, s]), from which it
follows that
where dts ;::: V7=l (ajt 1\ bjs). Then there is a set of proofs in T
Wjt := a~j A~[t], (ajt 1\ bjs) j Rxy[t, s], ... ,

(a~ 1\ ajt 1\ bjs) / (A~ [t]I\Rxy[t, s]),
... (a~ I\ait I\bjs )j(3x)(A'(x)I\R(x)y[s]),
t E Mb j = 1, ... ,m where we have used the rule r M p, substitution axiom

and its consequences. From it follows that
V. tEMl
J=l •...• m
ValT(Wjt) = V7=1 (a~ 1\ (ait 1\ bis»
V tEM1
= VtEM1 (a~ 1\ Vj=1 (ajt 1\ bis»

which gives
where
m
(25) cs ;::: V (a~ 1\ V(ajt 1\ bjs».
tEM1 j=1
As the formulas Aj I\Bj and A', j = 1, ... , m are independent, there exists
a model V' F= T' such that
V'(Aj:I:[t]I\Bjy[s]) = ajt" bjs,
V'(A~[t]) = a~,
j = 1, ... m, t E Mb S E M 2 • Let us construct a model V as follows. We

put D = D' and, furthermore,
V(Ajz [t]I\Bjy [s])
m
V(Rzy[t, s]) V(ajt "bjs)
j=1
t E Mb S EM2 , j = 1, ... m and V(C) = V'(C) for every formula C
containing no instance of R(x,y}. Then
V (V'x) (V'y) «Aj (x}I\Bj(y»=>R(x, y}}) =
= 1\ (V(((Aj:I: [t]I\Bjy [s])=>Rz,y[t, s]}) =
V(ajt "bjs »= 1
m
= 1\ «ajt "bjs ) ~
tEMl>sEM2 j=1
and thus, V F= T. Finally,
V(By[s]} = V«3x)(A'(x} " R(x}y[s]}) =
m
V V(A~[t]" Rzy[t, s]) = V (a~" V(ajt "bjs »,

"tEM1 tEMl j=1
Le.
m
Cs ~ V (a~" V(ajt "bjs »

tEMl j=1
which together with (25) gives the required equality.
•
3.4 Properties 01 theories 01 FLb based on simple linguistic
descriptions
In this section we formulate two theorems which state that the logical infer-
ence and Mamdani's fuzzy interpolation used in the situations described by
simple linguistic descriptions, Le. those in which only simple linguistic terms
(19) are used, give the best possible result in the sense of the provability
degree. In other words, the formulas used in the generalized modus ponens
proposed already by the classics of fuzzy logic, namely L. A. Zadeh and
232 VILEM NovAK
E. H. Mamdani, give the maximal possible truth value, provided that we

confine only to linguistic syntagms of the special kind. However, note that
these are exact1y the syntagms used in the known practical applications.
In this section, we assume that SA,SB are two disjoint sets of syntagms
(19). Using the translation rules from [Novak, 1996J, the intension of each
syntagm is a set of closed evaluated instances of a formula of the form
c(P(x») where c is a logically sound unary connective.
THEOREM 23. Let the theory of FLb
1= {Ak[AkJ, AND(IF A j THEN Bj

1=1
) [I\~1=1 (Aj=}Bj ]}
be given using the above syntagms for some k, 1 ~ k ~ m.
Let
and
Then we may derive the conclusion Bk with the intension
(26) Bk = { bs = VtEMl (akt ® Cts) / Bkll[sJI sE M 2 }

such that all bs for s E M 2 in the multiformula Bk are maximal.
Proof. The linguistic description determines the fuzzy theory
T = {Ak, 1\:1 (Aj:::>Bj ) } =

~ {a,,/ A•• [I], Co'/;6 (A;.([I]=>B;,[.j) IE M". E M, } .
The theorem then follows from Lemma 21.
•
This theorem explicitly states that the Iogical deduction which interprets
IF-THEN rules as logical implications and uses simple linguistic syntagms
leads to the conclusion, which is the best possible one (in the sense of
maximalization of the provabiIity degree). Note that in the present version,
we do not consider modification of the premise. However, this is possible
when using special inference rules in fuzzy Iogic in narrow sense (cf. [Novak,
1996]).
The following theorem is analogous to the previous one.
THEOREM 24. Let the theory 0/ FLb

T= {A'[A'],~(Aj AND Bj) [V:)A j "Bj )]}
be given using the same syntagms as in Theorem 23. Furthermore, let

R( x, y) be a /ormula fulfilling the axioms
(27) (Vx) (Vy) «Aj (x)I\Bj (y»=?R(x, y», j =l, ... ,m,
in the degree 1. Then we may derive a conclusion B' with the intension
B' = { b~ = VtEM1 (a~ " V;'l (ajt "bjs » / B~[s]1 sE M 2 }

where B'(y) := (3x)(A'(x) " R(x,y» and all b~ tor sE M 2 in the multi/or-
mula B' are maximal.
Proof. The linguistic description determines the fuzzy theory

T' = {Ajl\Bj I j = 1, ... ,m} =
{{ (ajt " bjs) / (Aj", [t]I\Bjy[s]) I t E Mt, s E M 2 } I
j=l, ... ,m}.
The theorem then foHows from Lemma 22.
•
This theorem, analogously as Theorem 23, explicitly states that using the
syntagms known from the applications of fuzzy control, which characterize
some relation R in the sense of the axioms (27), the Mamdani's Max-Min
rule can be used to derive a conclusion which is the best possible one (in
the sense of maximalization of the provability degree).
We have thus basically two effective (from the point of view of truth
values) inference procedures: the first oneis based on sound inference rules
of fuzzy logic in narrow sense and deals with linguistically stated logical
implications. The second one is based on the additional assumptions and
deals with conjunctions of linguistic statements.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed some formal aspects of fuzzy logics in narrow as

weH as in broader sense. FLn can be viewed as a special many-valued logic,
which aims at modelling of the vagueness phenomenon. Most important is
its ability to derive conclusions concerning any truth value, i.e. all the truth
values are equally relevant. As a consequence, we obtain evaluated syntax in
which evaluated formulas al
A are considered. We have discussed out comes
of this approach and demonstrated that FLn may be considered as a direct
generalization of the classical one. Since the requirement that a provable
234 VILEM NovAK
formula in the many-valued logic must have a proof is quite strong and
restrictive for FLn, it has been weakened (cf. Definition 4 and Theorem 5).
Then the syntactico-semantical completeness of FLn with the evaluated
syntax (see Theorem 9) is preserved. Unfortunately, this is possible only in
the case that the corresponding implication is continuous and thus, we are
forced to use the Lukasiewicz implication only.
The last section is devoted to fuzzy logic in broader sense. This should be
the logic of commonsense human deduction, which uses natural language.
As natural language inherently encompasses vagueness, FLn becomes its
frame and FLb can thus be seen as an extension of FLn. Syntagms of natural
language are translated into multiformulas (sets of evaluated instances of
formulas of FLn), which are interpreted as intensions of the former. We have
proved two theorems demonstrating that when confining ourselves to certain
kinds of syntagms, the formulas widely used for generalized modus ponens
both in implicational as weIl as Mamdani's forms give the best possible
truth values. 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper has been supported by the grant AI086501 of the GA AV CR

and partiaIly also by the grant 201/96/0985 of the GACR.
University o/Ostrava and Academy 0/ Sciences 0/ the Czech Republic, Czech

Republic.
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LLUis GODO AND PETR HAmK
A NOTE ON FUZZY INFERENCE AS

DEDUCTION
1 1NTRODUCTION
As we sketched in [Godo and Hajek, 1996], most offuzzy inference in Zadeh's

style is weIl formalized in the many-sorted many-valued Pavelka-style fuzzy
predicate logic - and this can be done in several ways. The most important
fact is that patterns of fuzzy inference can be presented as sound deduc-
tion roles, with all necessary assumptions expressed by some formulas of
predicate logic (with the usual quantifiers V, 3) in the premisse part of the
rule. Here we complement the presentation of [Godo and Hajek, 1996] by
a somewhat unexpected formalization of Zadeh's Generalized Modus Po-
nens (GMP, cf. e.g. Zadeh [1988; 1990; 1994]). We shall be sketchy; a full
detailed presentation is to be found in [Godo and Hajek, to appear]. For
the reader's convenience we repeat the definition of the many-sorted RQL
(rational quantification logic, cf. [Hajek, 1995; Hajek, 1997]).
The following are the characteristic features of the many-sorted many-
valued logic RQL.
Language. 1t consists of
1. sorts of variables; a type is a tuple of sorts

2. object variables and object constants, each having its sort
3. predicates, each having a type;
v
4. connectives .., and -+, quantifiers V and 3, rational truth con-
stants r for each rational r E [0,1].
Atomic formulas. They are of the form P(x, ... ,y) where P is a predi-
cate, x, ... , y are variables or object constants and the sorts of x, ... , y
correspond to the type of P. Formmas are built from atomic formulas
using connectives, quantifiers and truth constants in the obvious way.
Interpretations. In an interpretation M = (U, I-L) each sort 0' is inter-

preted by anon-empty domain Urr and apredicate P oftype (al, ... ,O'n)
is interpreted by a fuzzy relation
an object constant C of sort 0' gets a ffi c E Urr •
237
D. Dubois et al. (eds.). Fuzzy Sets. Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 237-241.
238 LLUis 0000 AND PETR HAmK
Evaluations. An evaluation of variables is a mapping e associating to each

variable x ofsort u an element e(x) E Uq • The value IIP(x, ..c.. )IIM,e is
pp(e(x), ... , m c , •. •); this extends to the value IICPIlM,e for each formula
cp in the usual manner with Lukasiewicz's semantics of connectives, i.e.
with the truth functions 1
-,x = I-x
x~y = min(I,I-x+y);
quantifiers are interpreted using in! and sup.
1-tautologies. cp is a 1-tautology if IICPIlM,e= 1 for each interpretation M

and evaluation e.
Axioms. Axioms of ms-RQL are axioms of RQL modified to many-sorted

case, Le. Rose-Rosser, bookkeeping for truth constants, further
(1) (Vx)cp(x) ~ cp(x')
(x, x' of the same sort, x' substitutable for x)
(2) (Vx)(v ~ cp) +t (v ~ (Vx)cp)
(x not free in v)
Deduction rules are modus ponens and generalization.
Remark. Note that the formula
(Vx)(cp ~ v) +t «3x)cp ~ v), x not free in v
is provable in ms-RQL and so is the converse implication of (2). The
completeness proof for RQL in [Hajek, 1997] easily generalizes for ms-
RQL.
2 FORMALIZING GENERALIZED MODUS PONENS
The GMP is usually formulated as folIows:
from 'X is A*' and 'IF X is ATHEN Y is B', infer 'Y is B*'
where X and Y are variables ranging in domains U and V respectively, and

B* is a fuzzy set of V such that sUPuEUmin(PA*(U),PA(U) ~ pB(V» ::;
PB" (v), for all v E V.
Several formalizations were offered in [Godo and Hajek, 1996}. We shall
use the formalization in which X, A, A* are unary predicates of the same
sort, Y, B, B* unary predicates also of the same sort, possibly different from
that of X,A,A*. We use x,y as object variables of the respective sorts.
1 We shall use the same symbols to denote both connectives and truth functions
A NOTE ON FUZZY INFERENCE AS DEDUCTION 239
'X is A' is formalized as (VX)(X(X) -+ A(X»2 or, brießy, X ~ A; similarly

for X ~ A * ,Y ~ B etc. The condition 'where' above is expressed as the
following ms-RQL formula Cand:
(Vy)«3x)(A*(x) 1\ (A(x) -+ B(y))) -+ B*(y»,

where 1\ denotes min-conjunction, that is, <p 1\ 1/1 is -,«1/1 -+ <p) -+ -,1/1).
There are various ways of interpreting the 'IF-THEN rule'. Here we con-
centrate in the question whether we can read it as an ms-RQL implication,
i.e. as (X ~ A) -+ (Y ~ B). Thus consider the rule
(X ~ A) -+ (Y ~ B),X ~ A*,Cand
Y~B*
with the above condition Cand. The situation is as follows:

LEMMA. In classical (two-valued) logic the rule becomes sound (truth-
preserving) if we add the non-emptiness assumption (3x)X(x) to the pre-
misses. But in many-valued logic the rule is not sound (even with the
extended premisses; three values suffice).
3 VARYlNG GENERALIZED MODUS PONENS-A POSITIVE

RESULT
We shall show how to save the above rule by changing the condition C and
to be
(1) (Vy)(3x)[«A*(x) -+ A(x» -+ B(y)] -+ B*(y»
or, equivalently (in ms-RQL),
(2) (Vy)([(Vx)(A*(x) -+ A(x» -+ B(y)] -+ B*(y»,
or, brießy,
2The formalization ofthe fuzzy assertion 'X is A' as (\fx)(X(x) -+ A(x)) is easily jus-
tified in terms of the possibilistic interpretation of fuzzy statements. Indeed, it is widely
accepted (see for instance [Dubois and Prade, 1991)) that the possibilistic constraint
induced by the previous fuzzy statement is the following inequality:
where 7rx stands for the possibility distribution which fuzzily constraints the vaJues of
the variable X. Hut this inequality is very easy to capture by the ms-RQL formula
(\fx)(X(x) -+ A(x))
if we consider both A and X as many-vaJued predicates which are interpretable by
the fuzzy relation IJ.A : U ---+ [0,1] and the possibility distribution 7rx : U ---+ [0,1]
respectively. Finally, just observe that 11 (\fx)(X(x) -+ A(x)) IIM= 1 if and only if
IIX(x)IIM,e$IIA(x)IIM,e, for any evaluation e\f of x.
240 LLuis GODO AND PETR HAJEK
(3) ('v'y)([(A" ~ A) -+ B(y)] -+ B"(y».
THEOREM. The formula
(4) «X ~ A -+ Y ~ B) & (X ~ A") & Cond) -+ Y ~ B"
is provable in ms-RQL (and hence a I-tautology), where & denotes Luk-

asiewicz's conjunction, that is cp&t/J is --.(cp -+ t/J).
As an immediate consequence we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY. The following is a derived deduction rule (and hence a
sound deduction rule) in ms-RQL:
(X ~ A) -+ (Y ~ B),X ~ A",Cond
(5)
Y~B"
where Cond is the formula [(A" ~ A) -+ B] ~ B", i.e. the formula
('v'y)[«'v'x)(A"(x) -+ A(x» -+ B(y» -+ B*(y)].
At this point some remarks are of worth considering.

1. Observe that taking A" for A, Cond becomes equivalent to B ~ B",
thus we get the trivial rule (modus ponens)
X~A-+Y~B,X~A
Y~B
as a particular case.
2. More generally, assume M to be a model; Hf IIA" ~ AII M = 1 then

in M,Cond is equivalent to B ~ B", if IIA* ~ AII M = r < 1 then
11 Cond 11 M = 1 iff for each v from the common domain V of Y, B, B* ,
it holds that I'B.(V) ~ min(I,JLB(v) + 1 - r). This shows that the
present rule (5) is a very natural generalization of modus ponens.
3. The corresponding traditional formulation of the above ms-RQL in-

ference rule would be the following one: from 'X is A*' and 'IF X is
ATHEN Y is B', if the condition
holds for all v E V. It is of worth noticing that this model of general-

ized modus ponens already appears in [Magrez and Smets, 1989] and
more recently in [Boixader and Jacas, 1996], both presenting com-
pletely different justifications for it.
A NOTE ON FUZZY INFERENCE AS DEDUCTION 241
Finally, if we consider a system of fuzzy rules {IF X is Ai THEN Y is

Bdi=l...n, the above form of Generalized Modus Ponens (5) also lead us in
a direct way to the following derived rule:
{X 5; Ai -4 Y C Bih=l...n,X C A*,Cond
Y 5; B*
where now Cond is the formula Ai=l...n[(A* 5; Ai) -4 Bil 5; B*, i.e. the
formula
(Vy) ( A ((Vx)(A*(x) -4 Ai(x» -4 Bi(y» -4 B*(y».
i=l. .. n
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors recognize partial support by the COST Action 15.
Lluis Godo
GSIG, Bellaterra, Spain.
Petr Hajek
Academy 0/ Sciences, Prague, Gzech Republic.
REFERENCES
[Boixader and Jacas, 1996] D. Boixader and J. Jacas. CRI as Approximate Reasoning
Tool: An analysis via T-indistinguishability operators. Prvc. 0/ FUZZ-IEEE'96, New
Orleans, USA, pp. 2094-2097, 1996.
[Dubois and Prade, 1991] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Fuzzy sets in approximate reasoning,
Part 1: Inference with possibility distributions. Fv.zzy Sets and Systems, 40, 143-202,
1991.
[Godo and Hajek, 1996] L. Godo and P. Hajek. On deduction in Zadeh's fuzzy logic.
Prvc. IPMU'96 Granada, Spain, pp. 991-996, 1996.
[Godo and Hajek, to appear] L. Godo and P. Hajek. Fuzzy inference as deduction. To
appear in Journal 0/ Applied Non-Classical Logics.
[Hajek, 1995] P. Hajek. Fuzzy logic and arithmetical hierarchy. Fv.zzy Sets and Systems,
13, 359-363, 1995.
[Hajek, 1995b] P. Hajek. Fuzzy logic from the logical point of view. In SOFSEM'95:
Theory and Practice 0/ In/ormatics; Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1012
(Milovy, Czech Republic, 1995), M. BartüSek, J. Staudek, and J. Wiedermann, Eds.,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 31-49, 1995.
[Hajek, 1997] P. Hajek. Fuzzy logic and arithmetical hierarchy 11. Studia Logica (1997).
To appear.
[Magrez and Smets, 1989] P. Magrez and P. Smets. Fuzzy modus ponens: a new model
suitable for applications in knowledge-based systems. International Journal 0/ Intel-
ligent Systems, 4, 35-57, 1989.
[Zadeh, 1988] L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy Logic, vol. 1. IEEE Computer, 1988.
[Zadeh, 1990] L. A. Zadeh. The birth and evolution of fuzzy logic. Int. Journal 0/
General Systems, 11, 95-105, 1990.
[Zadeh, 1994] L. A. Zadeh. Preface. In Fv.zzy Logic Technology and Applications (1994),
R. J. Marks 11, Ed., IEEE Technical Activities Board, 1994.
FRANK KLAWONN
THE ROLE OF SIMILARITY IN FUZZY

REASONING
1 INTRODUCTION
The fundamental concept in fuzzy systems is the notion of membership de-

gree, generalizing from the idea of an element having crisp membership to
a set, to gradual membership. Therefore, most fuzzy systems are based on
a fuzzification of the predicate E (is element oE). Another concept closely
related to gradual membership is similarity or indistinguishability which
may be modelIed as a fuzzification of equality. A formalization of this na-
tion in the general framework of GL-monoids is given in Section 2. The
unit interval endowed with the usual ordering and a continuous t-norm is
a special example of a GL-monoid. We prefer the more general notion of
GL-monoids since in this context the fundamental concept-namely resid-
uation which establishes a connection between many-valued eonjunctions
and implications-becomes more obvious than in the unit interval with its
rieh structure. Section 3 reviews some results on the indistinguishability
inherent in standard approximate reasoning schemes that can be formalized
in terms of fuzzy relations. Finally, in Seetion 4 these results are discussed
in the view of fuzzy logic in the narrow sense.
2 GL-MONOIDS AND FUZZY EQUALITY
As already mentioned in the introduction, we use GL-monoids as the formal

framework for our investigations instead of the unit interval. From [Höhle,
1992], we recall the definition of a GL-monoid.
DEFINITION 1. (L,:$, *) is a GL-monoid if
1. (L,:$) is a complete lattiee,
2. (L, *,1,0) is a eommutative monoid with unit 1 and zero element 0,

i.e. the operation * : L x L ---+ L is associative and commutative and
the equations 1 * 0: = 0: and 0: * 0 = 0 hold for 0: E L,
3. * is isotone, i.e.
4. (L,:$, *) is integral, i.e. 1 = VL

243
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuu:y Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge, 243-253.
244 FRANK KLAWONN
5. (L,~, *) is the dual of a divisibility monoid, i.e.
a ~ ß implies the existence of 'Y E L such that a = ß * 'Y,
6. (L,~, *) is residuated, meaning that there exists a binary operation

-+ on L satisfying
7. the infinite distributive law holds, Le.
a* V ßi = VCa*ßi).
iE1 iE1
Unless otherwise stated we assume (L,~, *) to be a GL-Monoid. L will

be considered as the set of 'truth' values of a many-valued logic. V can be
considered as the valuation function of a disjunction, A and * as two alter-
natives for a conjunction. The binary operation -+ is uniquely determined
by the adjunction property (1):
-+ can be viewed as the valuation function for the implication (associated

with the conjunction *). From this implication we can derive in a canonical
way a valuation for the negation by defining ...,a = a -+ O. Note that in
a GL-monoid the zero element of * is also the universal lower bound, Le.
o = AL. We define the biimplication +t: L x L --t L by
a +t ß = (a -+ ß) A (ß -+ a).
For a more detailed discussion of GL-monoids and their properties see

[Höhle, 1992; Klawonn and Castro, 1995] and [Höhle, 1994], which is devoted
to the relation between logical calculi and structures like GL-monoids.
Interesting for applications is the case when L is the unit interval with
the usuallinear ordering. * can be any continuous t-norm (a commutative,
associative, non-decreasing binary operation on [0,1] having 1 as unit). * is
understood as an alternative to the lattice operation A (in the case of the
unit interval simply min) for the valuation function of a conjunction.
EXAMPLE 2. Let L = [0, 1] be the unit interval with the usual ordering.
Then
a +t ß = max{a,ß} -+ min{a,ß}
holds [Thillas and Valverde, 1985]. It is easy to check that based on the
choice of * the following formula can be derived for -+, +t, and ..., (cf. [Jacas
and Recasens, 1992; Kruse et al., 1994]).
THE ROLE OF SIMILARITY IN FUZZY REASONING 245
a*ß max{a + ß -1,0} min{a,ß} a·ß

ifa ~ß 1 ifa ~ß
a-+ß min{l-a+ß,I}
l~ otherwise .~ otherwise
ifa =ß
a++ß l-Ia-ßI { min{a,ß}
1 ifa =ß
otherwise
1
min{cr.ßl
max{cr.ß} otherwise
..,a l-a { 01 ifa-O
otherwise
1 ifa -0
0 otherwise
Interpreting L as the set of truth values, an L-fuzzy (sub)set (or simply

a fuzzy set) of the set X is a mapping p, : X - 4 L. The value p,(x) E L
is understood as the degree or truth value of x being an element of the
(sub)set p,.
DEFINITION 3. An equality relation (w.r.t. the operation *) on the set X
is a mapping E : X x X - 4 L satisfying the axioms:
(EI) E(x, x) = 1, (reflexivity)
(E2) E(x,y) = E(y,x), (symmetry)
(E3) E(x,y) * E(y,z) ~ E(x,z). (transitivity)
In the unit interval, depending on the choice ofthe operation *, sometimes

Eis also called a similarity relation [Zadeh, 1971; Ruspini, 1991], indistin-
guishability operator [Trillas and Valverde, 1984], fuzzy equality (relation)
[Höhle and Stout, 1991; Klawonn and Kruse, 1993], fuzzy equivalence rela-
tion [Thiele and Schmechel, 1995] or proximity relation [Dubois and Prade,
1994]. Although these different names are used for the same concept, the
underlying philosophy is the same, namely to have a notion that certain
objects may be identified to a certain degree.
Considering the relation element oE (E) for ordinary sets, equal elements
may be exchanged, i.e. we have
(3) x E M and x = y * y E M.
Replacing the crisp equality in this statement by an equality relation and
the notion of a set by fuzzy set, we obtain the foHowing definition.
DEFINITION 4. A fuzzy set p, E LX is called extensional w.r.t. the equality
relation E on X iff
p,(x) * E(x,y) ~ p,(y)
holds for all x, y EX.
The fuzzy set
j.& = 1\ {v I p, ~ v and v is extensional w.r.t. E}

is called the extensional huH of p, w.r.t. E.
246 FRANK KLAWONN
Obviously, an: extensional fuzzy set coincides with its extensional hull and
the extensional hull has the following properties.
(i) jJ,(x) = V{p.(y) * E(x,y) I y EX},

(ii) jJ, is extensional w.r.t. E,
(iii) P, = jJ,.
It should be noted that a fuzzy set p. E LX is extensional W.r.t. the
equality relation E if and only if
(4) p.(x) B p.(y) ~ E(x,y)
holds for all x,y E X.
Note that for any fuzzy set p. we can define an equality relation E,..(x, y) =
p.(x) B p.(y), having the property that it is the coarsest equality relation
for which p. is extensional. Theorem 5 in the following section will provide
a more general result.
3 EQUALITY RELATIONS IN APPROXIMATE REASONING
After we have introduced the notions of equality relations and extensional

hulls in the previous section, we present some results that demonstrate
the relevance of equality relations in approximate reasoning, in the sense
that they characterize the indistinguishability inherent in a fuzzy system.
For proofs and more details we refer to [Klawonn and Castro, 1995]. The
equality relation that is defined in the following theorem will be of great
importance for the rest of this paper.
THEOREM 5. Let:F ~ LX be a set 0/ juzzy sets. Then
(5) E:F(x,y) = /\ (J.t(x) B p.(y»)
,..E:F
is the coarsest (greatest) equality relation on X such that all juzzy sets in
:F are extensional w.r.t. E:F.
The equality relation (5) already appeared in Valverde's representation
theorem [Valverde, 1985] which he proved for L = [0,1]. This theorem
states that E:F is an equality relation if and only if there is a set :F of fuzzy
sets such that E can be written in the form (5).
In [Klawonn and Castro, 1995] it was proved that the set AE of all fuzzy
sets that are extensional w.r.t. the equality relation E has the following
closure properties. For any B ~ A E , P. E AE, and er E L we have:
(a) (V B) E AE,
(b) (A B) E AE ,
(c) (a * /-L) E AE,
(d) (/-L -+ a) E AE,
(e) (a -+ /-L) E AE·
Vice versa, for a set A of fuzzy sets fulfilling these axioms there exists a
unique equality relation - namely the one given in Theorem 5 -such that
A coincides with the set of all extensional fuzzy sets w.r.t. this equality
relation. It is interesting to remark that, because an equality relation is
uniquely determined by its set of extensional fuzzy sets, Valverde's repre-
sentation theorem is also valid in the more general context of GL-monoids.
The above mentioned properties characterize equality relations in an al-
gebraic sense. Another interesting approach is described in [Schmechel,
1995; Thiele, 1995; Thiele, 1996; Thiele, 1996a; Thiele, 1996b; Thiele and
Schmechel, 1995] where connections between equality relations (or related
concepts) and fuzzy partitions or fuzzy coverings are established.
In approximate reasoning if-then rules of the form
(6) If ~ is A, then 'fJ is B,
are very common where ~ and 'fJ are variables with domains X and Y,
respectively. A and Bare linguistic terms like positive big or approximately
zero (see, e.g. [Klir and Yuan, 1995]). These linguistic terms are usually
modelIed by suitable fuzzy sets, say /-LA E LX and /-LB E LY. In addition to
such general rules one has specific information like
(7) ~ is A'
where A' is represented by the fuzzy set /-LA' E LX (or simply by /-L E LX).
The application of a single rule of the form (6) to the information (7)
is usually formalized on the basis of a computing scheme of the following
form. The rule is encoded as a fuzzy relation of the form
where 0 E {A, *, -+}. For a given input information in the form of the
fuzzy set /-LA' E LX, the 'output' fuzzy set Vconclusion is computed as the
composition of the fuzzy relation {!0 and the fuzzy set /-LA', i.e.
(9) (/-LA' on (!)(y) = V {/-LA' (x) n {!(x,y)}

"'EX
for all y E Y, where nE {A, *} (cf. e.g. [Di Nola et al., 1989; Gottwald, 1993;
Klir andYuan, 1995]). This scheme is called sup-A-inference. In fuzzy
control, for instance, usually n = min = 0 is chosen.
,248 FRANK KLAWONN
The following two theorems show that for such typical inference schemes
the indistinguishability inherent in the fuzzy sets cannot be overcome.
THEOREM 6. Let /L, /LA E LX, /LB E L Y . Jilurthermore, let E be an equal-
ity relation on X such that /LA is extensional w.r.t. E. Let (}0 be defined as
in Equation (8). Then for the combinations <:) =~ and n = *, <:) = * and
n = *, <:) = 1\ and n = *, the equation (cf. Equation (9))
(/L On (}d = (ß On (}0)
is valid.
When we interpret Theorem 6 in the sense that the fuzzy sets /LA and
/LB represent the linguistic terms A and B of an if-then rule of the form
(6), then it states that for the mentioned combinations of operations for a
given input /L the output fuzzy set /L On (}0 inferred by the mle does not
change when we replace /L by its extensional hull. Although not explicitely
mentioned, the case n = 1\ is also included in the theorem, namely when
we choose * = 1\ for our GL-monoid.
For the output fuzzy sets we have an analogous result, nameIy, that the
output fuzzy set is always extensional.
THEOREM 7. Let /L, /LA E LX, /LB E LY. Jilurthermore, let F be an equal-
ity relation on Y such that /LB is extension al w.r.t. F. Let (}0 be defined
as in Equation (8). Then for the combinations <:) =~ and n = *, <:) = *
and n = *, <:) = 1\ and n = *, the juzzy set (/L On (}0) (cf. Equation (9)) is
extensional w.r.t. F,
The results of Theorems 6 and 7 can be easily extended to a set of if-then
mIes of the form
H { is Ai. then 1/ is B il (i EI),
where the linguistic terms Ai and Bi are modelled by the fuzzy set /LA. E LX
and /LB. E LY. The output fuzzy set for a given 'input fuzzy set' /L E LX is
usually computed either by
(10) 1\ (/L On (}i)

iEI
or
(11) V(/L On (}i).
iEI
This does neither effect Theorem 6 nor Theorem 7 according to the closure
properties (a) and (b). The theorems are also valid for fuzzy mIes with
more than one premise using the Cartesian product of equality relations
(combining them by the minimum). For details see [Klawonn and Castro,
1995].
4 EQUALITY RELATIONS AND FUZZY LOGIC
In this section we extend the results derived in the previous section to fuzzy
logic in the narrow sense. It would lead us astray to give a complete defini-
tion of first order fuzzy logic. A thorough introduction to this topic can be
found in [Novak, 1989; Novak, 1990]. What we mainly need to know for the
context in which we consider fuzzy logic here is that fuzzy logic admits by
truth values evaluated logical formulae. We concentrate on the predicates
which correspond to fuzzy sets, i.e. an n-ary predicate is associated with a
fuzzy set on xn, when X is the underlying domain for variables. The ques-
tion that we will examine is how weH can objects in X be distinguished,
when we consider a set of elementary predicates and take all predicates into
account that can be formulated using the elementary predicates and the
logical connectives and quantifiers. Formally, the question can be formu-
lated in the foHowing way. We are given a set A (the fuzzy sets associated
with the elementary predicates) of fuzzy sets. What is the coarsest equality
relation such that all fuzzy sets that can be defined with the fuzzy sets in
A and the logical connectives are extensional?
Let us first restriet to unary predicates. Thus A ~ LX. The set of fuzzy
sets we can build from A with the logical connectives is the smallest set A *
satisfying
(i) A ~ A*
(ii) Ao ~ A* =? (I\Ao) E A* and (V Ao) E A*
(iii) I' E A*, a E L =? (a --+ 1') E A* and (I' --t a) E A*

(iv) 1', v E A* =? (I' --+ v) E A* and (I' * v) E A*
Note that the extensionality of I' and v does in general not imply the
extensionality of I' --+ v or I' * v. Thus the coarsest equality relation making
aH fuzzy sets in A * extensional will be finer than the coarsest one making
an fuzzy sets in A extensional.
THEOREM 8. Let A ~ LX be a set 0/ juzzy sets and let A* ~ LX be the
smallest set 0/ juzzy sets satisfying the above mentioned properties (i)-(iv).
Then
(12) EA'(X,y) = A (EA(X,y)l
kEIN
holds tor all x,y E X. The exponent k is meant w.r.t. the operation *.
Ptoof. Let E(x, y) denote the right hand side of equation (12). We prove
that E is an equality relation making all fuzzy sets in A * extensional which
is not smaller than EA" This implies that Eis equal to EA" since EA* is
the coarsest equality relation making all fuzzy sets in A* extensional.
250 FRANK KLAWONN
An important property which we need in the proofis that in a GL-monoid

we have that the idempotency of an element 0 E L, i.e. 0 * 0 = 0, implies
o*ß = o/\ß for all ß E L. (For a proof ofthis fact see [Höhle, 1992].) From
the definition of E it is c1ear that for all x, y E L, E(x, y) is an idempotent
element of L.
E is obviously reflexive and symmetrie. Making use of the idempotency
of the values that E takes, we can prove that Eis not only transitive w.r.t.
* but even w.r.t. /\.
< /\ (EA(X, y»k * (EA(y, z»m

k,mEIN
< /\ (EA(X,y»k*(EA(y,z»k
kEIN
< /\ (EA(X,z»k.
kEIN
Thus E is also transitive.

Define
B = {tt E LX I tt is extensional w.r.t. E}.
Bis c10sed under the c10sure properties (a)-(d) mentioned in the previous
section. But Bis also c10sed w.r.t. the operations -+ and *. To see this, let
tt, v E B. Making again use of the idempotency of E(x, V), we derive
tt(x) * v(x) * E(x, y) tt(x) * v(x) * E(x, y) * E(x, y)

< tt(y) * v(y),
Le. Eis closed w.r.t. *.
To prove the extensionality of tt -+ v, Le.
(tt(x) -+ v(x» * E(x, y) ::; tt(y) -+ v(y),
it is sufficient to prove
tt(y) * (tt(x) -+ v(x» * E(x, y) < v(y)

according to the residuation property.
p(y) * (p(X) ~ v(X» * E(x, y) = E(x, y) * p(y) * (p(X) ~ V(X» * E(x, y)

< p(X) * (p(X) ~ v(X» * E(x, y)
= (p(X) A V(X» * E(x,y)
< V(X) * E(x, y)
< V(y),
where we have made use of the property er * (er ~ ß) = er A ß (see [Höhle,
1992]).
Since E(x,y) ~ EA(X,y) holds, any fuzzy set that is extensional w.r.t.
EA is also extensional w.r.t. E, which implies A ~ 8. Since 8 satisfies the
cIosure properties required for A*, we have A* ~ S, and therefore
In order to prove EA* ~ E, we need the laws

• (er A ß)k ~ erk A ßk, which is easily proved by induction, and
• (er ~ ß)k ~ er k ~ ßk. This formula is derived by residuation from
These two laws imply (er f+ ß)k ~ erk f+ ßk. Thus, taking (4) into
account, we have for all p E A
since pk E A* and therefore pk has to be extensional w.r.t. EA*. This

proves also EA* $ E. •
We only considered unary predicates that are associated with fuzzy sets
on X. If we consider also n-ary predicates, we only need to consider the
additional unary predicates that we obtain by instantiating all variables
but one of the n-ary predicates. In this way, we can again compute the
corresponding equality relation EA* on the basis of the enriched set A.
Obviously, the fuzzy sets P(Xl, ... ,xn ) associated with the n-ary predicates
are then extensional w.r.t. the equality relation
(13) E(Xl, ... ,Xn)'(Yl, ... ,Yn») = EA*(Xl,Yl)* ... *EA*(Xn,Yn).
But since the values EA* (Xi, Yi) are idempotent, we may replace * in (13)
by 1\.
Another interesting remark is that for * = 1\, we have EA* = EA, Le., it
is sufficient to consider only the elementary predicates in this case.
252 FRANK KLAWONN
Usually, fuzzy logic in the narrow sense with L = [0,1] as the underlying
lattice is based on the Lukasiewicz implication a -+ ß = min{1- a + ß, 1},
meaning that * is the Lukasiewicz conjunction a * ß = max{a + ß -1,0}.
The reason for this is that for soundness and completeness the implication
has to be continuous and the Lukasiewicz implication is - up to isomor-
phism - the only continuous residuated implication [Pavelka, 1979]. Since
the Lukasiewicz conjunction is nilpotent, this means that the equality rela-
tion EA* coincides with the crisp equality - at least iffor all x, y EX, x f y,
there masts a fuzzy set /L E A (elementary predicate) such that /L(x) f /L(Y)
holds. This means that this logic still maintains the potential for distin-
guishing objects weIl. Also when the product is chosen as the underlying
t-norm the corresponding logic has the potential for distinguishing objects
°
weIl. More generally, this applies to all t-norms whose only idempotent
elements are and 1.
Ostfriesland University 0/ Applied Sciences, Germany.
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[Gottwald, 1993) S. Gottwald. Fuzzy Sets and Ji'uzzy Logic. Vieweg, Wiesbaden, 1993.
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DIONIS BOIXADER AND JOAN JACAS
T-INDISTINGUISHABILITY OPERATORS AND

APPROXIMATE REASONING VIA eRI
1 PRELIMINARIES
This section is devoted to review some concepts concerning T-indistinguish-

ability operators which are used in different contexts like control processes
[Klawonn and Kruse, 1993], CADG environments [Jacas et al., 1995] and
cluster analysis [Kandel, 1992). An overview on this topic can be found in
[Dubois and Prade, 1994].
In the sequel, T will represent a continuous t-norm [Alsina et al., 1983]
and T its quasi-inverse [Valverde, 1985) defined by
T(x,y) = Sup{x E [0,1] I T(a,x) ::; y}, x,y E [0,1]
From a logical point of view, if T is interpreted as a conjunction in a

multiple-valued logic, T is the residuated implication associated to T. (More
details on this topic can be found in [Trillas and Valverde, 1985]).
Some elementary properties concerning quasi-inverses are:
PROPOSITION 1. For any continuous t-norm, we have:
1. T(xIY) = 1 ~ x::; y, for any x,y E [0,1].
2. T(xIY) is non-decreasing with respect to the second variable and non-
increasing in the first one.
3. T(xIY) is left-continuous with respect to its first variable and right-
continuous with respect to the second one.
Next, we introduce the concept of T-indistinguishability operator.

DEFINITION 2. Given at-norm T, a T-indistinguishability operator E in
a set X is a fuzzy relation in X satisfying:
1. E(x, x) = 1, 't/x E X (Reflexivity)
2. E(x, y) = E(y, x) 't/x, y E X (Symmetry)
3. T(E(x,y),E(y,z» ::; E(x,z), 't/x,y,z in X (T-transitivity).
T -indistinguishability operators-also termed fuzzy equivalence relations-

extend to the fuzzy framework the classical equivalence relation. To this
end, the degree of equivalence between two elements x and y is related to
255
256 DIONIS BOIXADER AND JOAN JACAS
their closeness with respect to some generalized metric [Jacas and Valverde,
1990). In this sense, similar points can be thought as a near points.
Some well-known T-indistinguishability operators, depending on the cho-
sen t-norm T, are:
T Min, Zadeh's similarity relations
T L, (Lukasiewicz t-norm), Likeness relations
T Prod, Menger's probabilistic relations.
The following lemmata give us two basic examples of T -indistinguishability
operators:
LEMMA 3., The fuzzy relation ET : [0,11 x [0,1] --+ [0,1) defined by
ET(X,y) = T(Max{x,y}1 Min{x,y}) = Min{T(xly),T(Ylx)} is a T-indistin-
guishability operator in [0,1 j.
LEMMA 4. Given a fuzzy set h : X --+ [0,1), the juzzy relation Eh : X x
X --+ [0,1) defined by
Eh(X,y) = ET(h(x),h(y)), x,y E X
is an T-indistinguishability operator in X.
The importance of these two previous examples lies in the fact that, as it
is stated in Representation theorem, every T-indistinguishability operator
can be obtained from a suitable family of Eh.
PROPOSITION 5 (Representation theorem [Jacas, 1988; Valverde, 1985)).
A juzzy relation E in a set X is a T-indistinguishability operator i/, and
only i/, there exists a /amily {hdiEI 0/ juzzy sets 0/ X satisfying
E = In/Eh •.
iEI
A fuzzy set h is termed a generator of a T-indistinguishability operator

E if it belongs to a family of fuzzy sets that generates E in the sense of the
preceding theorem.
Relevant studies on the consequences of Representation Theorem con-
cerning the structure ofT-indistinguishabilities can be found in [Jacas, 1990;
Jacas and Valverde, 1990; Jacas and Recasens, 1995).
Given aT-indistinguishability operator E over a set X, l/JE is an operator
over the set of fuzzy sets [O,l)X defined by
l/JE(h)(x) = Sup{T(E(x, y), h(y))}, hE [O,l)x

yEX
By using this operator, a nice equivalence between the fixed points of l/JE
and the generators of E can be established [Jacas and Recasens, 1995); that
is: h is a generator of E if and only if l/JE(h) = h. In [Jacas and Recasens,
1995), it is also proved that l/JE is a fuzzy closure operator and the set HE
T-INDISTINGUISHABILITY OPERATORS 257
of the generators is the set of the closed sets. In this case, given hE [0, I]X,
h' = tPE(h) is the smallest generator that contains h.
On the other hand, the Representation Theorem provides us with a new
intuitive interpretation of a T-indistinguishability operator. If we look to a
fuzzy set h as a function that evaluates the degree of fulfilment of a certain
criterion by the elements of a set X e.g. hex is tall)E [0,1], two elements are
E - T -indistinguishable at certain level 0 if it does not exist any generator
hof E such that ET(h(x), h(y» < o. That is, any considered criterion does
not allow us to differentiate x and y at any stronger level than o. This is the
fuzzy version-graded in [0,1] by ET--of the classical fact that, withiri the
framework of a theory, two elements are equivalent if, any valid proposition
in the theory, has the same truth value on both of them.
2 THE NATURAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY
In this section we deal with operators on sets of fuzzy sets. That is, we
consider structures (H, E, T) where H ~ [O,I]X for some set X and E is a
T-indistinguishability operator in H.
The following proposition gives us a way to construct a family of such
operators.
PROPOSITION 6. Giuen X o ~ X and H ~ [0, I]X, the juzzy relation
E: H x H -+ [0,1] defined by
(1) E(hI, h 2 ) = In! ET(h 1 (x), h 2 (x», h1 , h2 E H
zEXo
is a T-indistinguishability operator in H.
Proof. It is a consequence of the Representation Theorem, if we interpret
each x E Xo as a fuzzy set x* on H by means of the mapping x -+ x* E
[0, I]H where x.*(h) = hex), hE H.
Therefore (1) can be rewritten as
By means of the preceding proposition, for any X o ~ X we can build a

•
T -indistinguishability operator on H.
Let us note that these operators have been obtained in a completely sym-
metrical way from the one used in the representation theorem, exchanging
the roles played by the elements of X and the fuzzy sets on H. This sym-
metry formalised by the mapping
'ljJfIo : Xo -+ [0, I]H

X -+ x*
previously defined, provides us with a duality principle in the setting of

the T -indistinguishability structures that has been extensively studied in
[Boixader and Jacas, 1995].
DEFINITION 7. Let H ~ [0, I]X, the fuzzy relation. Ei :H x H -+ [0,1]
given by
is termed the natural T-indistinguishability in H.

Two vague propositions h 1 , h2 (fuzzy sets) are indistinguishable by EI:
at a. certain level 0, if it does not exist any element x E X such that
ET(h 1 (x),h 2 (x» < o.
This is the fuzzy version-scaled in [0,1] by means of ET-ofthe classical
equivalence between propositions, in the sense that, two propositions are
equivalent if, on any element of the universe of discourse, they both take
the same truth values.
NOTATION. In the sequel, if there is no possible ambiguity, Ei will be
represented by E.
3 THE NATURAL T-INDISTINGUISHABILITY AND THE CRI
In this section we analyze the behaviour of the different forms of the CRI
and we show that they all satisfy the same unifying criterion: they are
extensional [Klawonn and Kruse, 1993] with respect to the natural T-
indistinguishability E.
Given A E [O,lf and B E [0, IjY, if we have the rule 'If Athen B', the
Compositional Rule of Inference (CRI) [Zadeh, 1973] provides a functional
model of inference when we have an hypothesis A' different from A. This
process is represented by the following schema:
If Athen B
If A'
then B',
where
(2) B'(ti) = SupT (A'(u),RAB(U,V» , vEV

uEU
In this sense, we use the notation B' =CRIAB(A') or simply B' =CRI(A').
In the formula (2) T represents at-norm and RAB is a fuzzy relation
(R : U x V -+ [0,1]) that changes depending on the authors and on the
applications.
We can point out, among others, the following ones [Turksen and Zhang,
1990]:
RAB(U, v) = Max {Min {A(u), B(v)}, 1 - A(u)} (Zadeh)
RAB(U,V) = Max {1- A(u),B(v)} (Kleene-Dienes)
RAB(U,V) = Min {A(u),B(v)} (Mamdani)
All these relations try to quantify the degree of entailment between A
and B and therefore, they play the role of the implication in the setting
of the fuzzy logic. This is the basic reason that led to the proposal of the
relation RAB(U, v) = T(A(u)IB(v)) for modelling the implication [Trillas
and Valverde, 1985].
This .last point of view allows us to interpret the eR! as a generalized
Modus Ponens, by modeling the conjunction by the t-norm T and the im-
plication by the preceding relation (R-implication). In this sense, we can
see reflected in (2) the classical scheme of Modus Ponens.
Nevertheless, most of the mentioned relations, widely used in many suc-
cessful applications that involve Approximate Reasoning, can be hardly
interpreted as implications. The paradigm is, without any doubt, the Mam-
dani relation [Mamdani, 1977].
For this reason, it is necessary to search for some principle "(different from
Modus Ponens) that could be satisfied by all of them and that could explain,
in terms of Approximate Reasoning, its good behaviour in the applications.
We will see that this principle is the extensionality with respect to the
natural T -indistinguishability.
Basically, all the previous versions of eR! have two common features. The
first one is that they preserve the pointwise order in the inference process
that is, the less specific is the hypothesis (it contains less information) the
less specific the thesis iso
In order to formalize this idea, we need the following definitions.
DEFINITION 8. If X is a set, the pointwise order in [O,l]X is the order
relation :S;x defined by:
/-L :S;x v {:} /-L(x) :s; v(x), '<Ix E X, /-L, v E [0, l]x.
DEFINITION 9. A mapping ([ : [O,l]U -+ [O,l]V is an inference operator

if it preserves the pointwise order. That is:
The second common feature of the eR! procedures is that the thesis B' =
eR/(A') depends, in some way, on the hypothesis A' and they do not have a
chaotic behaviour. In other words, 'the more similar are the hypothesis the
more similar the thesis are'. Our main problem is to formalize and quantify
these similarities. We ean find in the literat ure different approaehes to this
problem. In [Baldwin, 1979; Godo et al., 1991] the 'inverse-truth funetional
modification' is proposed as a measure of these similarities, meanwhile in
[Bouehon-Meunier and Valverde, 1993], the so called 'resemblanee relations'
(a type of non-symmetrie relation) are introdueed to quantity the similarity
between fuzzy sets.
The point of view presented in this paper is that the natural T-indistin-
guishability operator E, being a generalization of the classical equivalenee
relation within the fuzzy eontext, is the appropriate tool to formalize and
quantify the intuitive notion of similarity between fuzzy sets. In this way,
all CRI operators fulfill the general prineiple of 'the more similar are the hy-
pothesis the more similar are the thesis', independently ofthe fuzzy relation
R and the t-norm T being used. In a more formal way, we have:
DEFINITION 10. If EI and E 2 are two T-indistinguishability operators
over [O,ljU and [O,I]V respeetively, It : [O,I]U --+ [O,ljV is an extension al
operator [Klawonn and Kruse, 1993] with respeet to EI and E 2 [Jaeas and
Valverde, 1990], if E 2 (It(Ad, It(A 2 )) ~ EI(AI,A z ), VAI,A z E [O,ljU.
If in the preeeding definition we take EI = E~ and E 2 = E~, then we
will simply say that It is extensional.
THEOREM 11. For any continuous t-norm and any fuzzy relation R: U x
V --+ [0,1], the mapping
CRI: [0, 1jU -+ [0, 1jV
/L I----t CRI(/L)
is an extensional inference operator.
Proof. First of all, let us observe that given at-norm T,
T(T(x, z)IT(y, z» ~ T(xIY) for any x, y, z E [0,1].
It is easy to show that the CRI is an inferenee operator. To prove its
extensionality, given A',A" E [0, ljU, let us eonsider B' = CRÜB(A') and
B" = CRIAB(A"). We have to show that Eu(A', A") ::; Ev(B', B").
For any v E V, we have:
T(B'(v)IB"(v» = T(SUPUEU T(A'(u), RAB(U, v)) I
SUPUEU T(A"(u), RAB(U, v))) =
= InfuEu T(T(A'(u), RAB(U, v»1
SUPrEu T(A"(r),RAB(r,v))) ~
> InfuEU T(T(A'(u), RAB(U, v)) I
T(A"(u),RAB(U, v») ~
> InfuEuT(A'(u)IA"(u» ~
> InfuEu ET(A'(u), A"(u» = Eu(A', A")
Analogously, for any V E V we also have:
T(B"(v)IB'(v» ;::: E,,(A',A"),
and therefore
Finally,
Ev(B',B" = Invf ET(B'(v),B"v»;::: E,,(A',A").
vE
•
At a first sight, it is surprising the absolute freedom we have for selecting
of the relation R. Nevertheless, in applications this selection depends on
the problem to be solved.
On the other hand, the CRI is based on the rule 'If Athen B', therefore
it is natural to wonder if this procedure interpolates the rule, in the sense
of the following definition.
DEFINITION 12. A mapping (! : [0,1]U -+ [O,l]V interpolates the rule 'If
Athen B', where A E [0, l]U and B E [0, l]V, if (!(A) = B.
It is obvious that, given a CRI operator, not any fuzzy relation R inter-
polates a given rule 'If Athen B'.
Under certain hypothesis, it can be proved [Trillas and Valverde, 1985]
that the relation R( u, v) = T (A( u )lB(v» interpolates the rule 'If Athen
B'. On the contrary, the Mamdani relation R(u, v) =Mn{A(u), B(v)}, even
thought it gives good approximate results [Mamdani, 1977], it does not
interpolate the rule.
Till now, we have assumed that the t-norm T used to model the CRI
is the same that the one used to build the natural T -indistinguishability.
Taking account that, if Tl ~ T2 then Tl ;::: 1'2, the next proposition follows
immediately
PROPOSITION 13. Given two continuous t-norms Tl, T2 satisfying
T 1 (x,y) ~ T 2 (x,y) for any x,y in [O,lJ the operator
CRI1'1 : [O,l]U -+ [O,lJY

A' -+ CRI1'1 (A') = B'
where B'(v) = SupT2 (A'(u),RAB(U,V» is extension al with respect to E~l
"EU
-T2
and E v .
The most widely used t-norm in the field of applied fuzzy logic is without
any doubt, T =Min, mainly in applications concerning Fuzzy Control.
As Min ;::: T for any t-norm T, Proposition 13 ensures that CRI~jn has
a very special behaviour with respect to the extensionality.
COROLLARY 14. The opemtor
CRI1f1n: [0,1jU --+ [0, 1jV

AI --+ CRI1f1n(A I) = BI
where BI(v) = Sup{Min(AI(u),RAB(U,V»)} is extensional with respect to

uEU
E'{; and E'{; for any continuous t-norm T.
4 EXTENSION AL OPERATORS AND APPROXIMATE REASONING
The main result in the preceding section is that all CR! are extension al
inference operators. This extensionality is the reason that makes them
suitable tools for Approximate Reasoning because it ensures that 'the more
similar are the hypothesis, the more similar the thesis are'. Even though
the extensionality is a good and desirable property from the intuitive point
of view, when looking for a justification of the CRI from the classicallogic
point of view, the given explanation is always based on the fact that these
operators extend the classical scheme of the Modus Ponens. In fact, the
usual way to represent the inference process via eRI is given by the scheme
If Athen B
(4) If AI
If AI then BI
Nevertheless, there exist another classical model, different from Modus

Ponens, whose fuzzy version is given by the extensional operators.
In a classical setting, given two propositions A and B if the rule 'If
Athen B' is true, then all the rules 'If AI then B Il are also true with
A ~ AI, and B ~ BI (~ represents the classical equivalence
between propositions).
In this case, this reasoning can be represented by
If Athen B
A~AI
(5) B~BI
If AI then BI
The result of this reasoning is not a thesis BI but a new valid rule. In
this sense (5) allows us to extend the rule 'If Athen B' to a whole set of
rules 'If A' then B", based on the equivalence between propositions. These
new rules extend the knowledge to situations different from the one that
has generated the original rule 'If Athen B'. This is a typical characteristic
of the Approximate Reasoning.
In order to generalize this principle to the fuzzy framework, we have to

substitute the classical equivalence between propositions by a fuzzy equiva-
lences relation, that is by a T-indistinguishability. A natural way to do this
translation is to use lower bounds of indistinguishability in the sense that
if Cl is a lower bound of indistinguishability between the hypothesis, this
bound should also be the same for the thesis. That is, for any Cl E [0,1], if
E(A, A') ~ Cl then E(B, B') ~ Cl.
This condition is equivalent to E(B,B' ) ~ E(A,A' ) and this is just the
extensionality condition.
From this point of view, the schema (5) is converted into
If Athen B
(6) E(A,A' ) ~ E(B,B' )
If A' then B'
Then, if in order to extend a rule 'If Athen B' to new rules we use an
operator l! (obtaining 'If A' then l!(A' »', then the extensional operators
are just the ones that fit into the schema (6) (we only need to put B' =
l!(A' )) and therefore, the rules generated by the extensional operators are
the fuzzy version -graded in [0,1] by a T-indistinguishability- of the crisp
rules compatible with the scheme (5).
At the same time, let us observe that the extensionality on its own it
does not guarantee the good behaviour of an operator l!, Le. a extensional
operator l! is not always an inference operator and therefore it could be
useless as a reasöning tool. Therefore, extensionality is a necessary but not
sufficient property for the good behaviour of the reasoning operators.
Furthermore, if A' is such that E(A, A') = 0 and we want to generate a
rule 'If A' then B" by using only the scheme (6) then any B' is valid and
the rule is useless. In fact this is the case, in the classical setting, when
A ~ A' and (5) can not be applied.
This critical situation also appears in some degree when E(A, A') = Cl,
O~Cl<1.
Next section is devoted to overcome this problem: the generation of rules
based exclusively on the extensionality.
The proposed solution is to take B' as the least specific fuzzy set among
all the ones that satisfy E(B,B' ) ~ E(A,A' ).
5 THE NATURAL INFERENCE OPERATOR (t
Given [0, l]U and [O,l]V endowed with their natural T-indistinguishability
operators E~ and E~, we will show that the problem of determining an
extensional inference operator e: : [0, l]U ~ [O,ljY that interpolates a rule
'If A the B', has a unique optimal solution that we shall call the Natural
Inference Operator associated to the rule.
DEFINITION 15. Given the rule 'if Athen B' with A E [O,ljU and B E
t,
[0, 1 the operator
~AB : [O,I)U ---+ [O,lt

A' ---+ ~AB(A') = B'
where B'(v) = T( uEU

inf T(A'(u)IA(u»IB(v)), is termed the Natural lnlerenee
Operator assoeiated to the rule.
THEOREM 16.
(a) ~AB is an inlerenee operator.
(b) ~ AB interpolates the rule 'lI Athen B '.
(e) B ~v ~AB(A') VA' E [O,I)U and il A' ~u A then ~AB(A') = B.
(d) ~AB is extensional.
(e) ~AB is the greatest (the least speeijie) fuzzy set satisfying (a), (b), (e)
and (d).
To prove Theorem 16 we need the next lemmata:

LEMMA 17 (Simplifieation). For any x,y,z E [0,1)
T(T(Ylz)IT(xlz» ~ T(xIY)
LEMMA 18. Given a eontinuous t-norm, lor any x, y, z E [0,1) we have
T(T(xly)lz) = sup{aIT(alz) ~ T(xIY)}
Proof.[of Theorem 16)

(a) It is an immediate eonsequenee of the monotonicity of T
Ce) For any x, Y E [0,1) we have T(xIY) ~ y.

Therefore, for any v E V,
~AB(A')(V) = T( uEU
Inf T(A'(u)IA(u»IB(v» ~ B(v)
On the other hand, if x ~ Y then T(xIY) = 1. Then, if A' ~u A, we

have
~AB(A')(V) = T( inf T(A'(u)IA(u»IB(v» = T(IIB(v)) = B(v)

uEU
(h) It follows immediately from (e)

(d) Given A', A" E [0, l]U, let us eonsider B' = ~AB (A') and B" =
CAB(A").
For any v E V we have: (Lemma 17)
T(B'( v) IB" (v» = T(T(InfuEu T(A'(u)IA(u»IB(v))l

T(InfuEU T(A"(u)IA(u»IB(v»)
> T(InfuEu T(A"(u)IA(u»1
InfuEuT(A'(u)IA(u))) =
InfuEu T(InfrEu T(A"(r)IA(r»1
T(A'(u)IA(u») 2:
> InfuEu T(T(A" (u)IA( u) )IT(A' (u)IA( u»)
> InfuEuT(A'(u)IA(u» 2:
> InfuEu Min{T(A'(u)IA"(u», T(A"(u)IA' (u»}
= InfuEuET(A'(u),A"(u» =
= E~(A',A")
In a similar way, we ean prove that T(B"(v)IB'(v» 2: Eu(A',A").

Therefore,
ET(B'(v),B"(v» =
Min{T(B'(v)IBI(v»,T(B"(v)IB'(v»} 2: Eu(A',A")
and
Ev(B',B" = Inf ET(B'(v),B"(v» 2: Eu(A',A").
vEV
(e) Let 1:> : [0, l]U --+ [O,ljV be a mapping satisfying (a), (b), (e) and (d).
Given A' E [0, l]U, we have to prove that ~(A') 2: 1:>(A'). Let us eonsider
A" = Sup(A,A') Le. A"(u) = Sup{A(u),A'(u)} for any u E U. Obviously,
S;u
A' ~u A" and therefore, Eu(A" A) = Inf T(A"(u)IA(u». Sinee 1:> fuHils
uEU
eonditions (b), (e) and (d), we deduee that
InfvEv (T(1:>(A II )(v)IB(v») = Ev(1:>(A")B) = Ev(1:>(A")1:>(A» 2:

2: Eu(A"A) = InfuEu (T(AII(u)IA(u»)
Therefore, for any v E V there exists a u v E U such that
and consequently, using Lemma 18, we have
:D(A") (v) < Sup{a E [0, 111T(aIB(v» ~ T(A"(uv)IA(u v))} =

= T(T(A"(uv)IA(uv»IB(v»:::;
SUPuEuT(T(A"(u)IA(u»IB(v» :::;
:::; T (InfuEuT(A"(u)IA(u))lB(v)) = ~(A"(v)
and :D(A") :::;v ~(A"). But, being A" = Sup{A,A'}, it is immediate that
~U
~(A") = ~(A'), and since :D satisfies (a) and A' :::; A", it follows that
:D(A') :::;v :D(A") Finally, we have
:D(A') :::;v :D(A") :::;v :D(A") = :D(A).
As a consequence of Theorems 11 and 16(e), we have that

•
GRÜB(P,) :::; ~AB(p,) Vp, E [O,ljU
In general, the equality GRIAB(p,) = ~AB(p,) does not hold, as it is shown
in the following example.
EXAMPLE 19. Let it be U = {UO,Ut,U2,U3}, V = {VO,Vl,V2}, A =
{O, 0'25,1, O}, A' = {O, 0'5,1, O} and B = {O'5, O'3,1}. Then we have the
following results:
B~
B~
= qRIAB(A') = {O'5, 0'5,
= <tAB (A') = {I, 0'6, I}
I}} T = product
B~ = GRI(A') = {O'5, 0'5, I} }

T = Lukasiewicz
B~ = ~AB(A') = {O'75,O'55, I}
B~ = GRI(A') = {O'5,O'5, I} }
=
B~ ~AB(A') =
{I, 1, I}
T = Minimum.
SUMMARY
As a conclusion, we must emphasize the fact that, working with the natural
indistinguishability as a measure of similarity between fuzzy sets, all the
inference processes by means of eR!, become extensional. This is so with
independence from the relation used to model the conditional.
Moreover, as it is shown in Theorem 16, the problem of determining
an extensional inference operator that interpolates the rule has an unique
optimal solution without additional conditions about this rule.
Our future work is focused on the natural inference operator <tAB namely
in two points:
1. The study of the classical inference models with respect to which <tAB
is its fuzzified version.
2. The study of extensional inference operators that interpolate a set of

rules 'H Ai then Bi', i E I.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Research partially supported by DGICYT project n. PB94-1208.
Univ. Politecnica de Catalunya, Spain.
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FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLuIS GOnO
ABOUT SIMILARITY-BASED LOGICAL

SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
Similarity is the basic tool in at least three cognitive tasks: elassification,

case-based reasoning and interpolation. In elassification tasks, objects are
put in the same elass insofar as they are indistinguishable with respect
to suitable criteria. Similarity is meant to describe indistinguishability.
Case-based reasoning [Kolodner, 1993; Aamodt and Plaza, 1994] exploits
the similarity between already solved problems and a new problem to be
solved in order to build up a solution to this new problem. Interpolation
mechanisms can be understood as reasoning methods to adapt solutions
of already solved problems taking into account the proximity (similarity)
between the new problem and the solved ones. Then, it is worthwhile to
formalize the similarity based reasoning underlying these cognitive tasks by
means of Logical Systems.
In the scope of similarity modeling, a basic reasoning pattern, called
extrapolative syllogism in [Dubois et al., 1997], can be expressed informally
as folIows,
"H p entails q, and we obseroe p', then it is plausible,
to some extent, to conclude q whenever p' is elose enough to p" .
This kind of patterns have been the focus of a huge amount of research in
the field of fuzzy logic, where, in general, the statement "if p approximately
entails q" has been modelIed as a fuzzy rule whereas p, q and p' are mod-
elled as fuzzy facts (see for instance [Zadeh, 1979]). However, terms like
'approximately' or 'elose', although fuzzy, denote notions of resemblance or
proximity among propositions which must not be necessarily fuzzy. One
way of proceeding is to equip the set of interpretations or possible worlds
with a fuzzy similarity relation, that is, a reflexive, symmetrie and t-norm
transitive fuzzy relation [Trillas and Valverde, 1984]. This kind of investi-
gation was started in [Ruspini, 1991] with a view to cast fuzzy patterns of
inference such as the generalized modus ponens [Zadeh, 1979] into a log-
ical setting. Namely, given a fuzzy similarity relation S on the set n of
interpretations of a Boolean language L, two measures, the implication and
consistency measures, are proposed in [Ruspini, 1991] to account for the
degree with which a proposition q is an approximate consequence from, or
is consistent with, another proposition p, respectively, as folIows:
Is(q I p) Infwl=p SUPwll=qS(w,w').
Cs(q I p) = SUPwl=p SUPwll=qS(w,w').
269
D. Dubois et al. (ells.), Fu~ Sets, Logics and Reasoning abou' Knowledge, 269-287.
270 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLuis 0000
Such measures were the basis for Ruspini to provide a formalization of

the generalized modus ponens in fuzzy logic. This framework was later
extended in [Esteva et al., 1994b] and [Esteva et al., 1994a] and compared
to the possibilistie approach in [Dubois and Prade, 1995] and [Esteva et
al., 1995]. See also [Klawonn and Kruse, 1993] for another approach to
similarity-based reasoning.
From a logical point of view, several formalisms can be envisaged to cap-
ture a notion of similarity-based reasoning system. First in [Dubois et al.,
1995] and later in [Dubois et al., 1997] the authors consider different types of
graded consequence relations which make sense in similarity-based reasoning
as weH as the framework of sphere semantics. [Ying, 1994] and [Biacino and
Ying, 1996] are also interesting works on similarity/ approximate reasoning
with crisp propositions but allowing partial matching when applying dassi-
cal rules of inference. Modallogic has possibly been the most advocated logi-
cal framework to model similarity reasoning. [Lewis, 1973] and [Williamson,
1988] are earlier works on (modal) qualitative similarity reasoning. Modal
similarity, in the sense of indiscernibility, has been tackled from the rough
sets theory point of view in [Orlowska, 1985; Fariiias deI Cerro and Prade,
1986; Dubois and Prade, 1992; Nakamura and Gao, 1991] and [Nakamura,
1992]. In the latters they propose a fuzzy S5 modal logic with equiva-
lence relations as accessibility relations whereas in [Nakamura and Gao,
1992] they consider only fuzzy reflexive and symmetrie accesibility relations.
More recently, [Thiele, 1993] has already proposed definitions for similarity-
based fuzzy modal operators that have been independently considered and
axiomatized in [Esteva et al., 1997] as graded modal operators for crisp
propositions. Similar graded modal operators are used [Liau and Lin, 1992;
Liau and Lin, 1996] and in [Liau, 1996] for possibilistic reasoning. In this
paper we describe the two logieal approaches to similarity based reasoning
which presently are the dosest to the authors:
• In the first one two types of graded consequence relations I=a and ~a
.based on similarity are defined. They are based on the implication
measures introduced above. This approach is developed in Section 2
and covers part of the material present in [Dubois et al., 1997].
• In the second one we shall be concerned with a multi-modal approach

to similarity-based reasoning in the following sense: given an arbi-
trary set of possible worlds W, a similarity relation S on W induces
two pairs of dual modal operators (D~, O~) and (D~, O~) whose se-
manties defines a consequence relation extending I=a. This approach
is presented in Section 3 and covers most of the results in [Esteva et
al., 1997].
Finally, we end up with some conclusions.

ABOUT SIMILARITY-BASED LOGICAL SYSTEMS 271
2 GRADED CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS
First of all we set up our notation conventions for this section.

• We shall consider a formal propositional language L buHt up in the
usual way from a set of finitely many propositional variables and con-
nectives (..." -+). We shall also use the usual abbreviations p V q for
""p -+ q,p 1\ q for ...,(...,p V ...,q), T for p -+ P and 1- for ...,(p -+ p)
• n will denote the set of elassical (two-valued) interpretations of Land

[q] will stand for the set of interpretations satisfying a proposition q.
Classical entailment will be denoted by 1=.
• If w denotes an interpretation of n, we shall use the symbol ~ to

denote the proposition which is the maximal elementary conjunction
ofliterals made true by w (this proposition always exists since we have
a finite number of literals).
Furthermore, our working definition of a fuzzy similarity relation is the

following one [Trillas and Valverde, 1984].
DEFINITION 1. Let W be a set and let ® be a t-norm1 on [0,1]. An
®-similarity relation on W is a function S : W x W -+ [0,1] satisfying the
following properties:
• Rejlexivity: S(w, w) =1
• Symmetry: S(w,w') = S(w',w)
• ®-transitivity: S(w, w") 2:: S(w, w') ® S( w', w").
Similarity relations and fuzzy sets can be elosely related. Namely, given an
®-similarity relation S on n, each proposition q of the language L induces
a fuzzy set, denoted [qJ", of interpretations elose to [q] by defining:
/L[q)*(w) = SUPW/E[q)S(w,w') = Is(q I ~).

In other words, we have /L[q)* (w) ~ a, that can be read as w is a-c1ose to
[q], if there exists a model w' of q which is a-similar to w. Intuitively [q]*
describes the fuzzy notion of something being 'approximately q', 'not far
from q', where 'approximately', 'not far from' is mathematically expressed
by the similarity relation S. From now on, and for the sake of an easier
notation, [q*)o: will stand for the a-cut of the fuzzy set [q)", Le. [q*)o: =
{w E n I Is(q I~) 2:: a}.
1 At-norm on [0,1] is a binary operation ® : [0,1] x [0, 1]-t [0,1] which is associative,
commutative, non-decreasing in each place, and fulfilling the boundary conditions O®a =
o and l®a = a, for any a E [0,1].
272 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLuis GODO
Reciprocally, any non-empty fuzzy set F on n can be viewed as deriving

from an ®-similarity relation SF which is defined as [Valverde, 1985]:
SF(W,W') = min(I'F(w)®---+ I'F(W'),I'F(W')®---+ I'F(W»
where ® ---+ is the multiple-valued implication obtained via residuation from
the t-norm ®, i.e. a®---+ b = sup{c E [0,1] I c ® a ~ b}.
2.1 Approximate Entailment

fu this subsection we define a graded consequence relation based on simi-
larity by means of the implication measure defined above. The graded con-
sequence relation will be denoted F~ and will be defined from the following
graded satisfaction relation between interpretations of n and propositions
of L:
W F~ q Hf 1s(q I ~) ~ o.
°
That is, W satisfies q at least at degree if there exists a model w' of q
which is o-similar to W (or equivalently, if I'[q).(w) ~ 0). Thus, one may
have W F~ w' for w' :f. w. Indeed it means that W and w' are elose enough to
each other in the sense that S(w,w') ~ o. Note that w F~ ~' is equivalent
to w' F~ ~ since S is symmetrie. For the sake of simplicity, the subscript S
will be omitted from the symbol F~ whenever no confusion is possible.
The previous graded satisfiablity relation can be extended over to a
graded semantieal entailment relation between propositions of L:
DEFINITION 2. A proposition p approximately entails a proposition q at
degree 0, written p Fa q, if and only if each model of p satisfies q at least
at degree 0, i.e.:
PF~ a iff w F~ q, for all w E [P].
Equivalent conditions for p /=a q are [P] ~ [q*]a or 1s(q I p) ~ o. By

°
convention 1s(q I .1) = 1, and 1s(.1 I p) = 0 if [P] '" 0. When > O,p /=~ q
means that p (elassieally) entails a proposition qa whieh is the disjunction
V{~ I 1s(q I ~) ~ o} and can be interpreted as being 'approximately
equivalent' to q (see Figure 1) in the following sense: the set of models of
qa is just the o-cut of the fuzzy set [q*] of interpretations elose to models of
q. It is obvious that {/=~}aE[O,l) is a nested family of consequence relations,
i.e. p /=~ q implies p /=~ q for any ß ~ o. Besides, the family is continuous
from below in the followng sense: if p /=~ q for every ß < 0, then p F~ q.
Moreover, when the similarity relation satisfies the separating property,
S(w, w') = 1 iff w = w', F1is just the elassieal logie consequence rela-
tion. Obviously, the relation /=~ is the universal one because, for any p and
q,1s(q I p) ~ 0 always holds. Remarkable properties of the approximate
entailment relation /=~ are (see [Dubois et al., 1995]):
[q*]Cl
Figure 1. Proximity entailment p I=~ q
®- Transitivity: If p 1='" r and r I=ß q then p I="'®ß q

Rejlexivity: p 1='" p, for all Cl
Right weakening: if q 1= r and p 1='" q then p 1='" r
Left strengthening: If p 1= r and r I=a q then p I=a q
Left OR: p V q 1='" iff p I=a r and q I=a r
Right OR: ~ 1='" p V q Hf ~ I=a p or ~ I=a q
Consistency preservation: If [P] =I 0 then p 1='" .1 only when Cl= o.
Continuity from below: If P I=ß q for every ß < Cl, then p I=a q
where we have supressed the symbol S from 1=5 for a simpler notation. The
most remarkable property is the ®-transitivity, proved in [Ruspini, 1991].
The left OR is necessary to handle disjunctive information. The right OR
is a consequence of the truth-functionality for the disjunction connective
in similarity logic. It must be noticed that 1='" does not satisfy the Right
And property, Le. from p 1=5 q and p 1=5 r it does not follow in general
that p 1=5 q "r. Indeed [s(r I p) 2:: Cl only expresses the inclusion of the
set of models of p into the set of neighbours of the models of r, but not
necessarily into the subset of the models of r. A characterization of the
similarity-based approximate entailment in terms of the above properties
[Dubois et al., 1997] is given in the next theorem.
THEOREM 3 (Characterisation of the aproximate entailment). Suppose we
have a nested /amily 0/ consequence relations {l- a }aE[O,l] on L (i.e. I-a~ L
xL) fulfilling ®- Transitivity, Left OR, Right OR, Consistency preservation,
Continuity from below, plus
• 1- 1 is exactly the classical logic consequence relation and 1-0 is the
274 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLuIS GODO
universal one,
• symmetry: !:!? 1-0< !:!?' iff!:!?' 1-0< !:!?

Then, there exists a 0-similarity relation S on the set n such that p 1-0< q
iff Is(q I p) ~ a, for each a E [0,1]. And conversely, for any 0-similarity
S on n, the consequence relation defined as p I=~ q iff Is(q I p) ~ a verifies
the above set of properties.
The basic step to prove this theorem (the full proof is given in [?]) is the
postulated identity between S(w,w') ~ a and !:!?I-O< !:!?'. So, it is natural to
define S(w,w') = sup{a I !:!?I-O< !:!?'}, and to check that the axioms make it a
similarity relation, the one that generates the family {I-O<}. The continuity
condition makes it sure that !:!?I-O< !:!?' can be derived from S(w,w') ~ a.
A natural question about the similarity-based entailment I=~ is how to
deal with some prior information or background knowledge available under
the form of a proposition K or a subset of worlds E = [K] (the so-called
evidential set in [Ruspini, 1991]). Several extensions of the graded entail-
ment notions studied above can be envisaged. The first and more direct
option is to take the set [K] as a restriction on the set of p-worlds, and thus
considering the following extension I=~,K of the approximate entailment I=~.
DEFINITION 4. Let K be a proposition.- A proposition p approximately
entails a proposition q at degree a given a background knowledge K, written
p I=~,K q, if and only if K 1\ P approximately entails q at degree a, that is
P I=~,K q Hf K 1\ P I=~ q.
In other words, we have that p I=~,K q iff Is(q I K 1\ p) ~ a. This amounts
to expressing that the set of worlds [q] must be stretched to the degree
a (at least) in order to encompass the models of K which are models of
p. Although the entailment I=S,K verifies properties like Reßexivity, Right
Weakening or Left Strengthening s I=~ does, it does not satisfy the previous
0-Transitivity property. Only the following restricted 0- Transitivity holds:
Restricted 0-Transitivity: if p I=~,K r and r F~,K q then p I=~~ q,
provided that r 1= K.
A full characterization of FS,K' an extension of Theorem 3, can be found
in [Dubois et al., 1997].
2.2 Proximity Entailment

In the context of the extrapolative pattern introduced in the Introduction
section, the previously considered approximate entailment 1=8 evaluates to
what extent p is dose to being true, given that another proposition p' is
known to hold. Within the same pattern and similarity reasoning context,
the intended understanding of 'p entails q' is as follows: p (dassically) entails
q and, moreover, if p is elose to being true then q is elose to being true as

weIl. In other words, not only the models of p must be models of q but also
the neighbourhood of the models of p should He in the neighbourhood of the
models of q. This can be formally expressed as [p*] ~ [q*], where ~ is in
the sense of fuzzy set inelusionship [Zadeh, 1965], that is, J.t[p*) ~ J.t[q*). This
kind of entailment will be called proximity entailment and will be denoted
as ~s. Obviously, p~sq Hf
(1) 'Vw E 0, Is{P I f!l) ~ Is(q I f!l)
In principle, a 'proximity entailment' relates not only the models of p to the
models of q, but also relates the interpretations elose to the models of p with
those elose to models of q see Figure 1. Nevertheless it can be checked that
~sis nothing else but the elassical entailment. However a elear advantage
of ~s is that one can easily think in relaxing (a) by using a residuated
implication function -t and defining a graded counterpart of ~s as follows:
(2) p ~~ q iff infwEoIs{P I f!l) -t Is(q I f!l) ~ 0
Notice that for a residuated implication function x -t y = 1 iff x ~ y,

and thus ~1 recovers the nongrated ~s, and thus F as weIl. It seems
natural to take -t as the residuation of the t-norm ® for which S is ®-
transitive. Such an implication will be denoted as ®-t, Le. x®-ty =
sup{c E [0,1] I x ® c ~ y}. It is easy to show that ~:§ is a stronger
notion than F:§ (even for any -t), but again surprisingly, if we take -t to be
®-t, ~~ and F:§ become completely equivalent (see [Dubois et al., 1997]).
However both kinds of graded entailment are no longer equivalent when we
consider a background knowledge K in (2). Namely, if we restrict the set
of interpretations to those satisfying K we get the following definition.
DEFINITION 5. The o-proximity entailment of q by p, given background
knowledge K, written p ~:§,K q holds when
infwE[K)Is{p I f!l®-tIs(q I f!l) ~ o.
The proximity entailment p ~:§,K q means that for any W of [K] in the
vicinity of a model w' of p there is a model of q, say w", that is elose to w
at least at level 0 ® S(w, w'). This notion of graded entailment can be also
related to another implication measure
JS,K(q I p) = InfwE[Kj(Is{p I w}®-t Is(q I w»,
in the obvious sense that p ~:§,K q if and only if JS,K(q I p) ~ o. The
implication measure JS,K is related to the so-called 'conditional necessity
distributions' introduced in [Ruspini, 1991]. In general, ~:§,K is stronger
than F:§,K and, as already commented, only when K = T (i.e. when [K] =
0) or when 0 = 1 they are equivalent. It is also interesting to remark that
JS,K(q I T) = Is{P I K).
276 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLUis GODO
Figure 2. Approximate entailment p ~s q.
PROPOSITION 6. The consequence relations ~S,K fulfil the following prop-

erties:
• P ~~,K q äff K "p ~ q;

• P ~~,K is the universal consequence relation;
• P ~S,K q implies p ~~,K q for every ß :$ Cl; (Nestedness)
fro m P FS,K
~<> d ~f3 . I. 1=<>®f3. (®-Transitivity)
• r an r FS,K q mJer P FS,K q,
• p V r ~S,K q iff P ~S,K q and r ~S,K q. (Left-OR)
However, ~S,K so defined does not verify the Cut property. The decom-
position property does not hold neither, that is, it may be that ~ ~S,K pVr
without ~ ~S,K p nor ~ ~S,K r being true. A theorem of characterisation
of the proximity entailment can be found in [Dubois et al., 1995].
Finally, getting back to the extrapolative syllogism mentioned in the
Introduction,
"If p entails q, and we observe p', then it is plausible,

to some extent, to conclude q, whenever p' is elose enough to p".
we show how one ean get a logical model of that inferenee pattern using the
approximate and proximity entailments, and the following proposition that
shows how both types of entailment ean be eombined together.
PROPOSITION 7 (Extrapolative syllogism). From p' 1=8 P and p F~,K q
we can derive p' /\ K I=~®ß q.
Proof. On the one hand, p' I=:S p expresses that Is{P Il:!l. ~ a for each w 1='.
Ont he other hand, p F~,K q expreses that I{p Il:!l.)® --+ I(q Il:!l.) ~ ß, for
each w 1= K. Therefore, for each w 1= p' /\ K we have that I(q Il:!l.) ~ a ® ß,
that is, it holds that p' /\ K I=~®ß q. •
Now, given a similarity S, if we model how elose is p from p' by the degree
of implication Is{P I r/) = a, and the entailment relation between p and q
as a graded proximity entailment p F~,K q for some background knowledge
K, then the above proposition allows us to eonelude that the degree of im-
plieation of q given the observed p' and the background knowledge K is at
least a ® ß. Moreover, due to the definition of the approximate entailment
I=/(, the modelling of the extrapolative syllogism admits an even more at-
traetive formulation, allowing to deal with different background knowledge
in the approximate and the proximity entailments.
COROLLARY 8. From p' 1=8,K P and p F~,KI q we can derive p' 1=~~nKI
q.
Applieations of this extrapolative pattern are proposed in [Dubois et al.,
1997] for interpolative reasoning and in [Dubois et al., 1998] for ease-based
reasoning.
3 SIMILARITY-BASED MULTI-MODAL SYSTEMS
In this seetion we turn our attention to another proposal [Esteva et al.,

1997] of formalization of a similarity-based reasoning based on multi-modal
logics with a sort of generalized Kripke model semanties where similarity
is taken as aceesibility. In this modal framework we shall make use of the
notion of (G, ®)-similarity relation. Given a subset G of the unit interval
[0,1] such that 0,1 E G and a binary operation ® on G with the same
properties of at-norm, a (G, ®)-similarity relation S on a set W is a funetion
S : W x W --+ G whieh is, symmetrie, ®-transitive and satisfies separation
property, i.e. S(w, w' ) = 1 iff w = w' . Obviously, the ®-similarity relations
on the set of interpretations n eonsidered in the previous seetion satisfying
separation property are ([0, 1],®)-similarity relations.
Given a range G, a similarity Kripke model is a strueture (W, S, 11 II)
in whieh W is a set of possible worlds, 11 11 represents an assignment of
possible worlds to atomic formulas, and S is a (G, ®)-similarity. We provide
soundness and completeness results for these systems with respect to some
classes of the above structures.
3.1 Semantics
The language LG of the multi-modal systems we are going to describe is
generated in the usual way from a denumerable set of atomic formulas,
connectives --', -+ and modal operators (>~, (>~ for each a in a denumerable
subset G ~ [0,1] such taht 0,1 E G.
As a matter of notation, we shall use in this section p, q, . .. to denote
propositional variables and A, B, . .. to denote arbitrary formulas. Also we
shall use the usual standard definitions of the conjunction (1\), disjunction
(V) and equivalence (t7) connectives in terms of --, and -+, and D~, D~ will
denote the dual modal operators of (>~ and(>~ respectively. Finally, the
symbols T and .L will be used as abbreviations for A V --,A and A 1\ --,A
respectively.
DEFINITION 9. Similarity Kripke models are structures M = (W, S, 11 11)
where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• S is a (G, ®)-similarity fuzzy relation on W, for some range G and

some t-norm ® on Gi
• 11 11 is a function that, given an atomic formula p, returns the set of

worlds where p is true. .
It will be written (M, w) F A to mean that A is true in the possible world

w ofthe model M. Intuitively, (M,w) F (>~A is meant to denote that A is
true in some world w' which is at least a-similar to w, Le. S(w, w') :::: a,
whereas the inequality is taken to be strict when considering (>~A instead of
(>~A. Analogously with the approximate entailment, these truth conditions
are defined below by means of the implication measure (on sets of worlds)
induced by the similarity Kripke model M = (W, S, 11 11) :
jM(U I V) = InfwEv SUPw/EUS(w, w')
for all U, V ~ W. The notion of satisfiability is then formalized as folIows.

DEFINITION 10. Let w be a world in a model M = {W, S, 11 11> then:
• (M, w) F p if wEIlplI, for all propositional variables p
• (M, w) F --,A and (M, w) F A -+ B are defined as usual.
REMARK. <>~ is a normal modal operator in the sense that it has an as-
sociated accessibility relation R~, defined by (w,w') E R~ iff S(w,w') > a,
which provides it with the standard Kripke semantics2 :
(M,w) 1= <>~A iff (M,w') 1= A for some w' such that (w,w') E R~.
This is not the general case for the operators <>~. However they have a
corresponding accessibility relation when IM ([All {w}) becomes max{ S( w, w') I
(M, w') 1= A}, i.e. when the 'sup' turns out to be a 'max'. In particular, this
is the case when either the range G is finite or the set of possible worlds W
is finite. In these particular cases the corresponding accessibility relation to
<>~ is the one defined by (w,w') E R~ iff S(w,w') 2: a.
Given a range G and at-norm 0 on G, henceforth we will denote by cg

the dass of similarity Kripke models M = (W, S, 1111) where S is a (G,0)-
similarityon W. We shall also use the notation FCg to denote the subdass
of cg consisting of similarity structures with a finite set of worlds W.
3.2 The multi-modal systems MS5(G, ®)

The basic multi-modallogic MS5(G,0) is defined by the following axiom
schemes:
PL: Propositional tautologies
O~(A -t B) -t (O~A -t O~B), Va E G
O~(A -t B) -t (O~A -t O~B), Va E G

O~A -t A, Va E G
A -t O~<>~A, Va E G
O~®ßA -t O~OßA, Va, ßE G

O~A -t OßA, for ß 2: a
<>gA,
--.<>r A ,
CO: O~A -t O~A, Va EG
oC: O~A -t OßA, for a < ß,

and by the following inference rules:
2Notice that, in particular, if we take ® = min, the similarity functions in the Kripke
models are min-transitive and therefore, for each a, R:', is an equivalence relation. This
means that 0:', and 0:', is a pair of dual S5 modal operators.
280 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLUis OODO
RN°: from A infer o~A, Va EG

MP: from A and A""""* B infer B.
In this axiom system some axioms and rules can be redundant. For
instance, the schemes TC could be reduced to the axiom oi A """"* AasweIl
as the necessitation inference rules RN° could be reduced to only one rule:
from A infer ogA. We shall write f-CG.0) A to mean that A is a theorem of
MS5(G,®), i.e. if A foIlows from the above axioms and inference rules.
LEMMA 11. The sehemes
TO; o~A """"* A, for any a <1

NO; o~A""""* oßA with ß ~ a.
are theorems of MS5( G, ®), and the rule
RNc ; from A infer o~A, fo rany a >0

is a derived inferenee rule.
Notions of deducibility and consistency are defined as usual. A sentence
Ais MS5(F, ®)-deducible from a set of sentences r = {Al, ... ,An}, written
r f-(G.0) A, if and only if MS5(G, ®) contains a theorem of the form Al 1\
... 1\ An """"* A. A set of sentences r is consistent in MS5(G,®), written
Con(G.0)r, just when r If(G.0) .1.
It is easy to show that, for any G and ®, MS5(G, ®) is sound with
respect to the dass of structures C~. When restricted to some particular
classes of models, we can prove the validity of some more schemes.
PROPOSITION 12. The sehemes
BC; A""""* o~Oz.A, for all a E G

CC; A""""* DiA,
are always valid in FCg and they are valid too in C~ if G is finite. Fur-
thermore, the seheme
4° ; 0~0ßA """"* oßo~A, for all a, ß E G
is valid in C~ if ® is strongly monotonie. 3

Notice that the schemes K*, T*, B* and 4*, being * either e or 0, Are
direct counterpart, for the graded modal operators, of the weIl-known
axioms of the dassical S5 modal logic. Scheme ce corresponds to the fact
that, under the assumption of finite range G or finite set of worlds W,
IM ([Al I {w}) = 1 only if A is true in w. Schemes N* correspond to the
3By strongly monotonie we mean that if 01 > 02 and ß1 > ß2 then 01 ®ß1 > 02 ®ß2.
nested properties of the graded modal operators, while schemes EX· set up
the boundary conditions for them. Finally, schemes OC and CO establish
the obvious relations between strict and non-strict inequalities. All these
schemes, except B* and 4*, already appear in [Liau and Lin, 1992].
The question about completeness of MS5(G,®) has been partially an-
swered. Namely, it has been possible to get completeness in particular
cases. Next subsections show that the system MS5(G,®), augmented by
the scheme ce, is complete w.r.t. C~ whenever the range G is finite and
complete w.r.t. to the dass FC~ for ® = min, provided the system is
further augmented with B C and 4°.
3_3 The case 0/ G finite and ® arbritary

Let G be a finite range {al = 0 < a2 < ... < an = I} and let ® be
at-norm on G. In this situation it can be proved that the graded modal
system MS5(G,®) is complete with respect to the dass cg of similarity
structures, provided that we add to the system the axiom scheme
ce: A -+ D~A.
The resulting system is denoted by MS5+(G, ®). This system can be quite
simplified since, as an immediate consequence of the CO and OC axioms,
we have that D~i A is provably equivalent to D~i+l A, for i = 0, ... ,n - 1.
Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to only dosed modal operators and we
will write Da for D~. Thus axioms of MS5+(G, ®) reduce to
PL: Propositional tautologies
K: Da(A -+ B) -+ (DaA -+ DaB), Va E G
T: DaA -+ A, Va E G
B: A -+ DaOaA, Va E G
4: Da®ßA -+ DßDaA, Va E G
C: A -+ DaA
N: DaA -+ DßA, for ß~ a
EX: OoA
plus the modus ponens and necessitation inference rules.
THEOREM 13. For any finite range G, the system MS5+(G,®) is sound
and complete with respect to the dass 0/ models cg.
Soundness of MS5+(G, ®) is obvious due to Proposition 12. To prove
completeness, the standard technique of building a canonical model is used.
282 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLUis GODO
We shall write Max(G,otimes)+r to mean that r is MS5+(G,®)-maximally

eonsistent.
DEFINITION 14. The eanonieal model of MS5+(G,®) is the strueture
M* = (W*, S*, IIII*) where the set ofworlds W* is the set {r I Max(G.®)+r}
of maximally eonsistent sets, S* is a (G, ®)-similarity relation on W* de-
fined as S*(w,w') = max{a E G I {A I Oa:A E w} ~ w'}\ and the truth
set evaluation is defined as IIpll* = {r I pEr and Max(G.®)+r}.
It is dear that M* belongs to the dass cg of models. Then, the main
step to get eompleteness is proving the truth lemma.
LEMMA 15. For every w in M* and every /ormula A, it holds (M*, w) F A
iJJ A E w.
A fuIl proof of this completeness theorem ean be found in [?].
3.4 The case 0/ G dense and ® = min

Now we take a range Gwhich is dense in [0,1], and we let ® be the minimum
operation on G, Le. a ® ß = min(a,ß) (also denoted a 1\ ß), and we add
to the system MS5(G, min) the foIlowing axioms
BC : A ~ O~O~A, for all a E G.
Cc: A ~ D~A, and
4°: O~®ßA ~ 0ßD~A, for all a, ß E G.

These axioms may be not valid for arbitrary similarity struetures, but they
are indeed valid in the sub dass FC~in of struetures with finite sets of worlds
and min-transitive similarity relations (see Proposition 12 and notice that
min is strongly monotonie). The resulting multi-modal system is called
MS5++(G, min).
In eontraposition to MS5+(G, ®) for G finite, MS5++(G, min) for G
arbitrary may not be eompaet. For instanee, ifwe take the rationalsof [0, 1]
as G, the infinite set of formulas {O~_.!A}nEN U {...,O~A} is not satisfiable
in any model but any finite subset is indeed satisfiable in some model of
FC~in. This faet forbids to prove eompleteness by building an standard
eanonical model as in the previous seetion. Instead, the teehnique used
here (inspired from [Liau and Lin, 1992]) is to build, for any eonsistent
formula A, a (G, min)-similarity strueture MA with a finite set of worlds
in which A is satisfiable.
THEOREM 16. For any range G, the system MS5++(G, min) is complete
with respect to the dass FC~in 0/ similarity Kripke structures.
4Note that, for any w,w' E W·, the set {a E G I (w,w') E ~} is non-empty since,
by construction, at least 0 always belongs to the set.
A basic fact that is needed for the proof is that in MS5++(G, min) any
modal formula of degree 5 2 can be shown to be provably equivalent to a
modal formula of degree 1, except for the following modalities:
• O~Dß and D~Oß' if 0: :$; ß =f:. 1
• O~Dß,D~Oß,D~Oß and O~Dß' if 0: <ß
• O~Oß and O~Dß' if 0: < ß =f:. 1
In particular, the only modalities of order two with the same grade (Le.
0: = ß) for which we have not proved their reducibility are O~D~ and D~O~
if 0: =f:. 1. Therefore any non reducible modality is achain of modal oper-
ators whose sub-indexes form a non-increasing sequence with at most two
equal successive indexes. When G is finite, the set of irreducible modalities
are finite and the degree of the irreducible modalities is at most twice the
cardinal of G.
The sketch of the completeness proof is as follows. Let A be a formula,
let Sub(A) be the set of all subformulas of A closed by negation and define
G(A) = {o: E Gleither O~B,O~B,O~B,
or O~B is in Sub(A)} U {O, I}.
Obviously, both Sub(A) and G(A) are finite. Then the closure ModSub(A)
of Sub(A) by the modalities with indices in G(A) is recursively defined as
follows:
• if B E Sub(A) then B E ModSub(A)
• if B E ModSub(A) then O~B,D~B,O~B,O~B E ModSub(A) , for
every 0: E G(A)
Then, a model MA = (WA, SA, 11 11 A) is built according to the following
steps:
• Let G(A) = {0:1 = 0 < 0:2 < ... < O:n-1 < O:n = I}
• Let u S; ModSub(A). Then u is maximally consistent in ModSub(A)
if u is MS5++(G, min)-consistent and uU {B} is inconsistent for any
other B E ModSub(A) such that B '/. u.
• Define WA = {u I u is maximally consistent in ModSub(A)}
• For each 0: E G(A) and u E WA define
NC(u,o:) = {B I D~B E u}
N°(u, o:) = {B I D~B E u}
Due to axiom CO, it is clear that NC(u, 0:) S; N°(u, 0:).
5The modal degree of a modal formula is the number of nested modal operators (do
not confuse nested with iterated).
284 FRANCESCO ESTEVA, PERE GARCIA AND LLuIS GODO
• As in [Liau and Lin, 1992], any similarity on W A should verify, for all
oE G(A):
S(u,u') ~ 0 iff NC(u, o) ~ u'

S(u, u') ~ 0 Hf N°(u, 0) ~ u'
• Now define HC(u,u') = max{o I NC(u,o) ~ u'} and HO(u,u') =

max{o I N°(u,o) ~ u'}. It is dear that HC(u,u') ~ HO(u,u'), and
that if HC(u,u') > HO(u,u') = 0i, then HC(u,u') = OiH'
• Define the function SA : WA x W A -t Gasfollows:
- SA(U,U') = OiH, if OiH = HC(u,u') > HO(u,u') = 0i
- SA(U,U') = at, if HC(u,u') = HO(u,u') = 0i,
where ot is an element ofthe open interval (O"OiH)' This is always
possible due to the density of G.
• S A so defined is a min-similarity relation on W A.
Finally, it is easy to prove that the model MA = (WA, SA, 11 IIA), where
IIBIIA = {u E WA I B E u} belongs to the dass FC~in and the truth lemma
holds for MA, i.e. for every u in WA and every formula B E ModSub(A),
it holds (MA,U) F B iff BE u. As a direct consequence then, the system
MS5++(G, min) is complete with respect to the dass FC~in'
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have been concerned with two formalisations of some as-
pects of similarity-based reasoning. The former is given by means of graded
consequence relations induced by a similarity fuzzy relation. The latter pro-
vides a general system of multi-modallogic for which there are completeness
results for two particular cases. It remains to investigate completeness for
more general cases.
Both approaches are of course related. On the one hand, it is dear that
the approximate entailment introduced in Section 2 is fuUy captured in-
side the multi-modal systems introduced in Section 3. Namely, given an
®-similarity S on the set of interpretations n of a propositionallanguage L,
if A, B and K are non-modal formulas, then we have the following equiva-
lences:
A F~ B Hf FML A -t O~B
A F~,K B iff FML K" A -t O~B,
where ML = (n, S, 11 11). On the other hand when the range Gisfinite, it
is possible to capture the proximity entailment in our modal framework as
weIl. Indeed, if G is finite then it holds that JS,K(B 1 A) ;::: a iff, for any
ß E G and any w E [K], Is(A 1 ~) ;::: ß implies Is(B 1 ~) ;::: ß ® a, the
following relationship also holds:
A I=S:,K B iff FML K ~ /\ (OßA ~ O~®ßB)

ßEG
Obviously, this relationship is no longer valid when G is not finite. In

that case, in order to capture proximity entailments, new binary modalities
[ 1 la should be introduced to specifically account for this kind of graded
consequence relations. Roughly, the semantics required to such modalities
should be this one: a formula [B 1 Al a is true in a world w of a similarity
Kripke model M = (W, S, 11 11) if the conditional implication of B given A,
taking {w} as background knowledge, is greater or equal than a. In other
words:
(M,w) F [B 1 Alu iff IM ([Al 1 {w})®~IM([Bll {w});::: a.
In this way, the proximity entailment could be captured in the sense that
it would hold that A I=S:,K B iff FM K ~ [B 1 Alu. The logical analysis of
this extended modal framework is a matter of future work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are indebted to Didier Dubois, Henri Prade and Ricardo O.
Rodriguez with which they have shared most of the work described in this
paper. The authors also thanks the comments, suggestions and references
by Helmut Thiele, Stefan Lehmke and anonymous referees that helped the
authors in improving the paper. The authors have been partially supported
by the DGICYT project SMASH n e 275 TIC96-1038-C04-01 and COST ac-
tion n e 275 15.
Institut d'Investigaci6 en Intel·ligencia Artificial, Barcelona, Spain.
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HELMUT TRIELE
ON SIMILARITY-BASED FUZZY CLUSTERINGS
1 INTRODUcnON
Let {O, I} be the set of a1l real numbers r with 0 ~ r ~ 1. For the following
considerations we fix a non-empty set U called universe. Fuzzy sets on U are
mappings F : U -+ {O, I}. By F1P(U) we denote the (crisp) set of all fuzzy sets
onU. -
Following James C. Bezdek the terms 'pattern recognition' and 'cluster analy-
sis' mean 'the search for structure in data sets. .. ' [Bezdek, 1981, pp. 1-4] where
'structure' is defined as a partition of the given data set into crisp or fuzzy subsets.
In generalization of this approach, by a 'fuzzy clustering on U' we understand an
arbitrary set j offuzzy sets F ('fuzzy clusters') on U, Le. j ~ F1P(U).
Fuzzy clusters and fuzzy clusterings on U are constructed on the basis of 'simi-
larities' between elements x, y E U where similarities can be defined by common
properties of x and y or by a distance function d on U, for instance. More gen-
erally speaking, this method means that fuzzy clusters and fuzzy clusterings on
U are constructed by using (fuzzy) similarity relations on U where the foUowing
correctness condition must be fulfilled: the mutual definability of the clusterings
and the similarity relations, which are considered within a certain context, must
hold. If this condition is satisfied then there exists a one-to-one correspondence
between the two classes of objects considered.
Following Zadeh's approach [1971] several authors restriet similarity relations
to fuzzy equivalence relations [de Baets and Mesiar, 1996; Gottwald, 1993; Kla-
wonn, 1994; Klawonn, 1995; Klawonn and Kruse, 1993; Kruse et al., 19941 As
we have shown in [Thiele and Schmechel, 1995; Schmechel, 1995] this approach
leads to a very restricted concept of clustering which is too special in many appli-
cations.
Taking into consideration these observations we define a (fuzzy) similarity re-
lation on U as an arbitrary binary relation R : U x U -+ (0, I). In [Thiele, 1996a;
Thiele, 1995] we have studied fuzzy tolerance relations, i.e. relations which fulfill
the conditions
reßexivity on U: Vx(x EU -+ R(x,x) = 1)
synunetry on U: VxVy(x,y E U -+ R(x,y) = R(y,x»
We could show that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the set of all
fuzzy tolerance relations on U and the set of all so-called fuzzy tolerance coverings
on U, on the one hand, and the set of all so-called subset closed, strongly compact
coverings on U, on the other hand.
In the paper presented we introduce a very general concept of fuzzy clustering
and show that these clusterings can be characterized by a special type of fuzzy
similarity relations which are more general than fuzzy equivalence relations.
289
290 HELMUT THIELE
2 A ONE-TO-ONE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FUZZY

CLUSTERINGS AND FUZZY SIMILARITY RELATIONS
We consider an arbitrary fuzzy clustering ~ on U. For characterizing the cluster-

ings considered we fix a tripIe [a, b, cl of 'cutpoints' where a, b, cE (0,1).
DEFINITION 1.
1. ~is said to be a-disjoint on U
=def VFVGVx (F,G E ~ A xE U A F(x) > a A G(x) > a -+ F = G)
2. ~is said to be b-nonnal on U
=def VF(F E ~ -+ 3x(x E U A F(x) b» >
3. ~is said to be a c-covering of U
=def Vx(x E U -+ 3F(F E A F(x) > c»
~
4. CL(U, a, b) =def {~I~ ~ FlP(U) A ~ is a-disjoint and b-nonnal on U}

5. CL(U, a, b, c)
=def {~I~ ~ F1P(U) A ~ is a-disjoint, b-nonnal and a c-coveringon U}
For characterizing corresponding fuzzy similarity relations R on U we define

DEFINITION 2.
1. R fulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U
=defo VxVyVz (x, y, z E U A R(x, y) > a -+ R(x, z) = R(y, z»
°
2. R is left-side conditioned a-reftexive on U
=def VxVy (x,y E U AR(x,y) > -+ R(x, x) > a)
> °-+
3. R is said to be conditioned b-total on U
=defVXVy(x,y E U AR(x,y) 3z(z E U AR(x,z) > b»
4. R is said to be c-surjective on U
=def Vy(y E U -+ 3x(x E U A R(x, y) > c»
5. RE(U,a, b)
=def {R IR: U x U -+ (0,1) AR fulfills the conditions 1,2 and 3}
6. RE(U, a, b, c)
=def {R IR: U x U -+ (0,1) /\ R fulfills the conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4}
For fonnulating the mutual definability of fuzzy clusterings on U and fuzzy
similarity relations on U we define for r, sE (0,1) and x, y E U.
DEFINmON3.
1. fa(r, s) =def {o ifr:5 a

.-
s Ifr > a
ON SIMILARITY-BASED FUZZY CLUSTERINGS 291
2. RELa(~)(x,y) =dej Sup {Ja(F(x), F(y» IF E ~}
3. (Rx)(y) =dej R(x, y)

4. CLUSTa(R) =dej {Rxlx EU I\. R(x, x) > a}
REMARK. Definition 2 and Definition 3, and some of the following theorems are
inspired by N. Schmechel [19951.
LEMMA 4.
Ifl.aE(O,l)
2. ~ is a-disjoint on U, i.e.
VFVGVx (F,G E ~ I\. x E U I\. F(x) > al\. G(x) > a -+ F = G)
then
2. RELa(~) fulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U, i.e.
VxVyVz
(x, y, z E U I\. RELa(~)(x, y) > a -+ RELa(~)(x, z) = RELa(~)(Y, z»
3. RELa(~) is left-side conditioned a-rejlexive on U, i.e.
VxVy(x,y E U I\.RELa(~)(x,y) > 0 -+ RELa(~)(x,x) > a).
LEMMAS.
If 1. a, b E (0, I) and a ~ b
2. ~ is a-disjointon U, i.e.
VFVGVx(F,G E ~I\.x EU I\.F(x) > aI\.G(x) > a -+ F = G)
3. ~ is b-normalon U, i.e.
VF(F E ~ -+ 3x(x E U I\. F(x) > b»

then
292 HELMUT THIELE
2. RELa(~) is conditioned b-total on U, i.e.
VxVy(x,y E U I\RELa(~)(x,y) > 0 --t 3z(z E U I\RELa(~)(x,z) > b».
THEOREM 6.
If 1. a, b E (0, 1) and a ~ b
2. ~ is a-disjoint on U, i.e.
VF'<IG'Vx (F,G E ~ 1\ xE U 1\ F(x) > a 1\ G(x) > a --t F = G)

3. ~ is b-normalon U, i.e.
VF(F E ~ --t 3x(x E U 1\ F(x) > b»
then
1. CLUSTa(RELa(~» = ~
2. RELa(~) fulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U, i.e.
VxVyVz
(x,y,z E U 1\ RELa(~)(x,y) > a --t RELa(~)(x,z) = RELa(~)(Y,z»
3. RELa(~) is left-side conditioned a-reJlexive on U, i.e.
VxVy (x, y E U 1\ RELa(~)(x, y) > 0 --t RELa(~)(x, x) > a)
4. RELa(~) is conditioned b-total on U, i.e.
VxVy (x, y E U 1\ RELa(~)(x, y) > 0 --t 3z(z E U 1\ RELa(~)(x, z) > b».
Proof. By using Lemmas 4 and 5.

•
COROLLARY 7. For a, b E (0,1) with a ~ b, REL a is an injection from
CL(U, a, b) into RE(U, a, b).
PROBLEM. The question whether the mapping REL a is a surjection is still open.
A positive answer will be given by the following Lemmata 8 and 9, and Theorem
10.
LEMMA 8.
If 1. a E (0, 1)
2. Rfulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U, i.e.
VxVyVz(x,y,z E U A R(x,y) > a -+ R(x,z) = R(y,z»

3. R is left-side conditioned a-rejlexive on U, i.e.
VxVy(x,y E U AR(x,y) > 0 -+ R(x,x) > a)

then
1. RELa(CLUSTa(R» ~ R
2. CLUSTa(R) is a-disjointon U, i.e.
VFVGVx (F, GE CLUSTa(R) A xE U A F(x) > a A G(x) > a -+ F = G)
LEMMA 9.
lI 1. a, b E (0, I)

3. R is conditioned b-total on U, i.e.
VxVy(x,y E U A R(x,y) > 0 -+ 3z(z E U A R(x,z) > b»
then
I. R ~ RELa(CLUSTa(R»
2. CLUSTa(R) is b-normal on U, i.e.
VF(F E CLUSTa(R) -+ 3x(x E U A F(x) > b».
THEOREM 10.
lI 1. a,b E (0, I)
2. Rfulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U, i.e.
VxVyVz(x,y,z E U A R(x,y) > a -+ R(x,z) = R(y,z»


4. R is conditioned b-total on U, i.e.
VxVy (x, y EU" R(x, y) > 0 -+ 3z(z E U A R(x, z) > b»

294 HELMUT THIELE
then
1. REL,,(CLUST,,(R» =R
2. CL UST" (R) is a-disjoint on U, i.e.
VFVGVx (F, GE CLUST,,(R) /\ xE U /\ F(x) > a /\ G(x) > a -+ F = G)
3. CLUST,,(R) is b-normal on U, i.e.
VF(F E CLUST,,(R) -+ 3x(x E U /\ F(x) > b».
Proof. By usiog Lemmas 8 and 9. •
COROLLARY 11. For a, b E (0,1), CLUST" is an injection /rom

RE(U, a, b) into CL(U, a, b).
THEOREM 12.
1. For every a, b E (0, 1) with a ~ b,
V~(~ E CL(U, a, b) -+ 3R(R E RE(U, a, b) /\ ~ = CLUST,,(R)))
2. For every a, bE (0,1),
VR(R E RE(U,a,b) -+ 3~(~ E CL(U, a, b) /\ R = REL,,(~)))
Proof.
ad 1. Assume
(1) ~ E CL(U, a, b) where a ~ b.
Theo by Theorem 6
(2) REL,,(~) E RE(U, a, b)
and
(3) CLUST,,(REL,,(~)) =~.
ad2. Assume
(4) RERE(U,a,b).
Theo by Theorem 10
(5) CLUST,,(R) E CL(U, a, b)
and
(6) RELa(CLUSTa(R» = R.
•
COROLLARY 13.
1. If a, b E (0, I) and a ~ b, then REL a is a bijection from CL(U, a, b) onto

RE(U,a,b).
2. CLUSTa is the inversion 01 REL a with respect to RE(U, a, b) and

CL(U, a, b), and vice versa.
3 INCORPORATION OF THE COVERING PROPERTY
Now, we aspire to incorporate the third parameter c in order to characterize fuzzy

c1usterings and fuzzy similarity relations.
LEMMA 14.
11 1. a ~ cand
2. ~ is a c-covering olU, i.e.
Vx(x E U -+ 3F(F E ~ 1\ F(x) > c»
then
1. RELa(~) is c-surjective on U, i.e.
Vy(y E U -+ 3x(x E U 1\ RELa(~)(x,y) > c»
2. RELa(~) is left-side conditioned a-rejiexive on U, i.e.
VxVy (x, Y E U 1\ RELa(~)(x, y) > 0 -+ RELa(~)(x, x) > a)
REMARK. The assumption REL a (~) (x, y) > 0 is not necessary in the case con-
sidered.
296 HELMUT THIELE
THEOREM 15.
11 1. a, b, c E (0, I) and a ~ b, a ~ c
2. ~ is a-disjointon U
3. ~ is b-normal on U
4. ~ is a c-covering olU
then
2. RELa (~) fulfills the left-side a-replaceability on U
3. RELa(~) is left-side conditioned a-reflexive on U
4. RELa(~) is conditioned b-total on U
5. RELa(~) is c-surjective on U.
Proof. By using Theorem 6 and Lemma 14.

•
COROLLARY 16. For every a, b, c E (0, I) with a ~ band a ~ c, REL a is an
injectionfrom CL(U, a, b, c) into RE(U, a, b, c).
LEMMA 17.
11 1. a,c E (0, I)
2. R is c-surjective on U, i.e.
Vy(y E U ~ 3x(x E U A R(x,y) > c»

3. R is left-side conditioned a-reflexive on U, i.e.
VxVy(x,y E U AR(x,y) > °

~ R(x, x) > a)
then CLUSTa(R) is a c-covering olU, i.e.
Vx(x E U ~ 3F(F E CLUSTa(R) A F(x) > c»

THEOREM 18.
lf 1. a, b, C E (0, I)
2. RfuljiUs the left-side a-replaceability on U
3. R is left-side conditioned a-reflexive on U
4. R is conditioned b-total on U
5. R is c-surjective onU
then
2. CLUSTa(R) is a-disjointon U
3. CLUSTa(R) is b-normal on U
4. CLUSTa(R) is a c-covering olU
Proof. By using Theorem 10 and Lemma 17.

•
COROLLARY 19. For every a, b, c E (0,1), CLUSTa is an injection from
RE(U, a, b, c) into CL(U, a, b, c).
THEOREM 20.
1. For every a, b,c E (0, I) with a ~ band a ~ c,
V~(~ E CL(U,a,b,c) -? 3R(R E RE(U,a,b,c) A~ = CLUSTa(R))).

2. For every a, b E (0, I),
VR(R E RE(U, a, b, c) -? 3~(~ E CL(U, a, b, c) A R = RELa(~))).
Proof. Like the proof ofTheorem 12 by using Theorem 15 and Theorem 18. •
COROLLARY 21.
1. 11 a, b E(0, 1) and a ~ b, then REL a is a bijection from CL(U, a, b, c) onto

RE(U, a, b, c).
2. CLUST a is the inversion 01 REL a with respect to RE(U,a,b,c) and

CL(U, a, b, c), and vice versa.
298 HELMUT THIELE
4 CONCLUSIONS
There are several modifications of the definitions and theorems formulated above.
In forthcoming papers, we shall present further respective results (see [Thiele,
1996c], for instance).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to thank Stephan Lehmke for useful discussions on the subject
and his help in preparing the manuscript.
University 0/ Dortmund, Germany.
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STEPHANE DEMRI AND EWA ORLOWSKA
INFORMATIONAL REPRESENTABILITY:
ABSTRACT MODELS VERSUS CONCRETE
MODELS
1 INTRODUCTION
Information logics are modal formalisms for representation of and reason-

ing about concepts derived from data that describe an application domain.
Traditionally, concepts are determined by defining their extension or de-
notation and intension or connotation. The extension of a concept con-
sists of the objects that are instances of this concept and the intension
of a concept consists of the properties that are characteristic for the ob-
jects to which this concept applies. For example, to define the. concept
'organism' we should list the earmarks of organism and the typical species
of organisms [Bunge, 1967]. Let a set OB of objects be given, and sup-
pose that properties of those objects are articulated in terms of attributes
from a set AT and values of these attributes. For example, property of
'being green' is represented as a pair (colour, green), where 'colour' is an
attribute, and 'green' is one of its values. Nondeterministic information
about an object is of the form (attribute, a subset of values). For in-
stance, if the age of a person is known approximately, say between 20 and
25, then this information is represented as a pair (age, {20, ... , 25}). By
an information system S we understand a pair (OB,AT) where OB is a
non-empty set of objects and AT is a non-empty set of attributes. Each
attribute ais a mapping a : OB ~ P(Va1a) \ {0}. For each a E AT, the
non-empty set Val a is the set of values of the attribute a [Pawlak, 1983;
Orlowska and Pawlak, 1984]. We write IS to denote the dass of infor-
mation systems. An information system S' = (OB', AT') is said to be a
subsystem of the information system S = (OB, AT) iff 0 B' ~ OB and
{aoB' : a E AT} = AT' where aOB' denotes the restriction of a to OB'.
In various application areas acquisition of concepts is carried on in the sit-
uation when the complete information about objects that are supposed to be
their instances is not available. There are two major types of incompleteness
of information which is given in the form of an information system: indis-
cernibility and orthogonality. The indiscernibility paradigm emerged from
the observation that characterization of objects in terms of their properties
might result in indistinguishability: some objects are 'the same' as far as the
admitted properties are concerned. Hence, instead of crisp entities we rather
grasp dasses of objects such that each dass contains those objects that can-
not be distinguished one from another in terms of the given properties. It
301
302 STEPHANE DEMRI AND EWA ORLOWSKA
also follows that membership of an object in a set can only be defined mod-
ulo the properties of objects, and we might not be able to determine a sharp
boundary between a set and its complement. As a consequence we might
not be able to assert membership of objects in the extensions of concepts
in a two-valued (yes or no) manner. The objects from the classes that are
included in a boundary region of the concept can be classified neither as its
positive nor negative instances. It follows that we need at least three valued
means of reasoning in the presence of indiscernibility-type incompleteness
of information. To model types of incompleteness of information of this
kind we introduce a farnily of relations that reflect impossibility of discern-
ing all the individual objects. The information relations from this group
model degrees of indistinguishability in a nonnumerical way and they en-
able us to define a hierarchy of definability classes of sets [Orlowska, 1988b;
OrJowska, 1989; Pawlak, 1991).
However, in many situations it might be more suitable to ask not for in-
distinguishability but for its opposite. To model in a nonnumerical way
degrees of distinguishability we consider a farnily of orthogonality type
relations. The concept of orthogonality plays a crucial role in quantum
logic and various classes of logical and algebraic systems have been intro-
duced in this connection [Cattaneo and Nistico, 1989; Cattaneo et al., 1993;
Goldblatt, 1991). In those systems orthogonality is a semantic counterpart
of negation or complement. In this paper we consider modeling of orthogo-
nality that is related to representation of incomplete information [OrJowska,
1994). Both the information relations from the indiscernibility group and
the orthogonality group are relative to subsets of attributes. In general,
both indiscernibility-type and orthogonality-type incompleteness of infor-
mation lead to non-numerical many-valuedness of assertions about objects.
The truth value of each assertion depends on a subset of properties of ob-
jects that are involved in expressing that assertion. Thus we can view the
subsets of properties as non-numerical measures of degrees of truth.
Information logics enable us to represent both extensions and intensions
of concepts, and moreover, they exhibit a relevant type of incompleteness of
information from which the extensions and the intensions are derived. There
are two kinds of semantic structures for information logics: general (or ab-
stract) models and standard models. General models are based on Kripke
frarnes that, however, differ from the usual ones in that their accessibility
relations are relative to subsets of a set. This set is intuitively interpreted
as the set of attributes that are relevant for the objects from the universe of
the frarne [OrJowska, 1988a; Balbiani, 1997). The relations are assumed to
satisfy various properties, for example indiscernibility relations are equiva-
lence relations, (right) orthogonality relations are the relations whose com-
plements are tolerances, etc. Standard models are based on frarnes derived
from information systems. In these frarnes the accessibility relations are
defined explicitly in terms of the attributes from these systems. Hence,
INFORMATIONAL REPRESENTABILITY 303
the standard frames are the 'concrete' structures derived directly from data
that describe an application domain. A broad family of abstract and stan-
dard information frames is presented in [Vakarelov, 1989; Vakarelov, 1991b;
Vakarelov, 1991a; Vakarelov, 1997; Orlowska, 1985; Orlowska, 1995].
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate a formal framework for express-
ing and proving informational representability of abstract frames. Let a
similarity relation I> in a dass C of frames be given, for example relation
of 'being isomorphie' or 'being modally equivalent'. Intuitively, a frame K
from the class C is informationally I>-representable if there is an informa-
tion system and a frame K' derived from this system such that K' is in dass
C and, moreover, K is I>-related to K ' . The first theorem of this kind has
been proved in [Vakarelov, 1987; Vakarelov, 1989]. In [Orlowska, 1993] it
has been observed that a property of informational representability might
be meaningful in investigations of nondassical logics, and a notion of in-
formational representability has been proposed. In the present paper we
introduce a general notion of informational representability, we develop a
method of proving informational representability and we give examples of
informational representability and non-representability of frames.
An extended version of this paper will appear in [Orlowska, 1998].
2 FRAMES WITH PARAMETERIZED ACCESSIBILITY RELATIONS
In this section we introduce .a general notion of frame that captures all

the types of frames considered in connection with information logies. This
notion is an extension of the notion of frame used in the theory of modal
logics (see e.g. [Kripke, 1963; Chellas, 1980; van Benthem, 1984; Hughes
and Cresswell, 1984; Goldblatt, 1992]). We shall consider frames with sev-
eral (finitely many) families of Accessibility relations of different arities,
and moreover each of these families will be indexed with subsets (and not
individual elements) of a set, referred to as the set of parameters. Param-
eters are intended to be abstract counterparts of entities that determine
relations. For example, if we are interested in information relations of an
information system, then we should take the attributes of the system as
the parameters. If we deal with a logic of knowledge, then the parameters
are knowledge agents. Instead of ordinary frames of multimodallogics that
contain just several relations, we will be dealing with frames with families
ofrelations. Intuitively, each family consists of relations of the same type,
that is all the relations in a family satisfy the same conditions e.g. they
are equivalence relations, and in general there are several relations in every
such family, each· of which is determined by a subset of parameters. For
example, the family of indiscernibility relations of an information system
consists of relations that reflect indiscernibility of objects with respect to
any subset of attributes in that information system. Each of these relations
is an equivalence relation.
A signature E is a pair (p, (nI, ... , nk)} where P is a non-empty set of
parameters and (nI, ... ,nk) is a non-empty sequence of natural numbers
greater than 2. Classes of frames indexing the relations by sets of param-
eters have been intensively studied in the past (see e.g. [Orlowska, 1988bj
Halpern and Moses, 1992; Balbiani, 1997]). Let E = (p, (ni, ... ,nk» be
a signature. By a E-frame we understand a structure (U, {R,(P) : P ~
P, 1 E {1, ... ,k}}) where U is a non-empty set and for all P ~ P, for all
1 E {1, ... , k}, R, (P) is a n,-ary relation on U.
We write :Fr. to denote the class of E-frames. We also write == (resp. ==m)
to denote the isomorphism relation (resp. the modal equivalence relation)
between two frames. It is clear that =~==~==m.
EXAMPLE 1. Let S = (OB, AT) be an information system. Consider the
signature Eo = (AT, (2». Two objects 01 and 02 are said to be indiscernible
with respect to A ~ AT (in short 01 ind(A) 02) Hf for all a E A, a(or) =
a(02). In the Eo-frame (OB, {ind(A) : A ~ AT}), ind(A) is an equivalence
relation on OB for every A ~ AT and for any A, A' ~ AT, ind(A U A') =
ind(A) n ind(A').
A E-frame K' = (U',{RHP) : P ~ P, 1 E {1, ... ,k}}) is said to be
a subframe ofthe E-frame K = (U,{R,(P) : P ~ P, I E {1, ... ,k}}) Hf
U' ~ U and for alll E {1, ... ,k}, P ~ P, R,(P) n (U' x U') = RHP).
3 FRAMES DERlVED FROM INFORMATION SYSTEMS
In order to derive E-frames from information systems, a first task consists

in relating the set of parameters with a given set of attributes. That is why
any derivation of frames shall be defined modulo a contribution junction.
DEFINITION 2. Let S = (OB, AT) EIS and E be a signature (P(nl,""
nk». A contribution junction for S is a mapping I : AT ~ P(p) such that
UaEAT I(a) = P.
Forany P ~ P, wewriteI-l(p) to denotethe set {a E AT: I(a)nP:F 0}.
The intended meaning of I is the following: every attribute a contributes to
the construction of relations involving some parameters in I(a). Moreover,
every parameter p has at least one attribute that contributes to p.
3.1 A language fOT information systems

The language LS is determined by seven sets which are supposed to be pair-
wise disjoint: the set of constants CONS = {O, 1}, the non-empty countable
set of variables VAR, the non-empty set of unary function symbols FUN, the
set of constructors OR = {n, u, -} (of respective arity 2,2,1), the set of
predicate symbols PRE = {==, ~}, the set of quantifiers {'v',3} and the set
of propositional logical operators OP = {." I\}. Function symbols are in-

tended to represent the attributes and variables will range over the set of
objects of an information system. The set T of terms is the smallest set
that satisfies the following conditions: (1) CONS ~ T; (2) if f E FUN and
xE VAR then f(x),-f(x) E T and (3) for all ffi E OR \ {-} if h,t2 E T
then ffi(tl, t2) E T. The set Fo of atomic formulae is the set of expressions
{ffi(tt.t2) : t l ,t2 E T, ffi E PRE}. The set F offormulae is the smallest set
that satisfies the following conditions: Fo ~ F and if c is any n-ary propo-
sitional operator and F l , ... , Fn E F then c(FI , ... , Fn ) E F. An extended
form'll.la is an expression of the form ql!t ... qnfnF (also written Q F) with
FE F, {ql, ... ,qn} ~ {3, V} and {!t, ... , fn} ~ FUN. The set of extended
formulae is written Fe. The extended formula qI!l ... qnfnF is said to be
weak (resp. strong) Hf {ql, ... , qn} = {3} (resp. {ql, ... , qn} = {V}). For
any syntactic set X, and for any syntactic object 0, we write X(O) to denote
the set consisting of those elements of X that occur in O. An extended for-
mula Q F is said to be well-closed Hf for all f E FUN(F), f occurs exactly
once in Q. We shall adopt the convention F ~ Fe by considering that a
formula is an extended formula with an empty string of quantifications.
Let S = (OB, AT) be an information system. A function interpretation
in S is a mapping m : FUN --* AT. An object interpretation in S is a mapping
v : VAR --* OB. The interpretation of terms generated by m and v is the
mapping Im,v : T --* P(UaEAT Val a ) such that:
• Im,v(f(x» = m(f)(v(x», Im,v( - f(x» = Valm(f) \ Im,v(f(x»,
Im,v(O) = 0,
• Im,v(l) = UaEAT Val a , Im,v(ffi(tl,t2» = ffi(Im,v(h),Im,v(t2» when
ffi E OR \ {-}. By abusing our notation, as usual n, U, - denote the
Boolean operations on sets.
It follows that terms represent sets of values of attributes. Let S =
(OB, AT) be an information system, m be a function interpretation and v
be an object interpretation. We say that an extended formula F is satisfied
in S v.nder the interpretation Im,v (written S,Im,v t= F) when the following
conditions are satisfied.
• S,Im,v t= ffi(tt.t2) iff ffi(Im,v(h), Im,v(t2» when ffi E PRE
• S,Im,v t=...,F Hf not S,Im,v t=
F, S,Im,v t=F 1\ G Hf S, Im,v t=
F and
S,Im,v t= G,
• S,Im,v t= t=
Vf F iff for all a E AT, S, Im~,v F where m~ is defined
as follows: m~ (f) = a and for all f' ::j:. f, m~ (f') = .",,(f')
• S,Im,v t=
3f F iff there exists a E AT such that S, Im~,v t= F where
m~ is defined as above.
Let S = (OB, AT) be an information system and F E Fe such that the

variables occurring in F are Xl,." ,xn (in the order of enumeration). For
all function interpretations m for 8, we write ms(F) to denote the set
ms(F) = {(v(xt}, ... , v(x n )} : 3v : VAR --* OB, 8,Im ,v 1= F}

If F has the form Vf G (resp. 3f G) then ms(F) = naEAT(m~)s(G)
(resp. ms(F) = UaEAT(m~)s(G)).
EXAMPLE 3. (follows Example 1) Consider the formula f(Xl) = f(X2),
say F Q • Let 8 = (OB, AT) EIS. It is easy to show that for all A ~ AT,
01, Oz E OB, 01 ind(A) Oz iff for all a E A, (01,02) E m(OB,{a})(FO) where
m is the unique function interpretation in (OB, {a }).
3.2 E-specijication
The language LS enables us to express definitions of relations derived from
information systems. These definitions will be referred to as specijications.
Let ~ be the signature (P,(nI, ... ,nk}). A ~-specijication S is a sequence
of k well-closed extended formulas, say (Fl , ... , Fk) such that for all 1 E
{I, ... , k}, card(VAR(Fl)) = nl. A ~-specification S is said to be strang (resp.
weak) iff S is a sequence of strong extended formulae (resp. S is a sequence
of either strong or weak extended formulae). Since every extended formula
occurring in a ~-specification (QlFl , ... , QkFk) is closed with respect to
the function symbols, for all 1 E {I, ... , k}, for all information systems
8 = (OB, AT) and for all function interpretations m,m' in 8, ms(QIFt) =
ms(QIFl).
Observe also that when card(FUN(F)) = 1, for all P, P' E PCp) \ {0},
if qt!lF is strong (resp. weak) then m(OB,I-l(PUP'»(qt!lF) = nQE{p,p'}
m(OB,I-l(Q»(qt!lF) (resp. m(OB,I-l(PUP'»(qt!lF) UQE{P,P'}
m(OB,I-l(Q»(qt!lF)). Moreover, for any information system 8 = (OB, AT)
and for any contribution function I for 8, if card(AT) = 1 then for all ex-
tended formulae QlF and Q2F and for all 0 f:. P ~ P, m(OB,I-l(P»(QlF) =
m(OB,I-l(P))(Q2F) = m(OB,I-l(P»(F). In the sequel, we write spec~ to
denote the set of ~-specifications (Fl , ... , Fk) such that for all 1 E {I, ... , k},
card(FUN(Fl)) = 1.
3.3 A frame derived from an information system

We are now in position to define a family of derivation functions parametrized
by signatures and specifications.
DEFINITION 4. Let ~ = (p, (nI, ... , nk)} be a signature, 8 = (OB, AT) E
IS, I be a contribution function for 8 and S = (Fl , ... , Fk) be a ~
specification. We write D E S(8, 1) to denote the ~-frame (OB, {RI(P)
P ~ P, 1 E {I, ... ,k}}) such' that
Vi E {I, ... k}, "10 f:. P ~ P, RI(P) = m(OB,I-l(P))(Fl)

By convention, for alll E {1, ... k}, if FI is weak then RI(0) = 0 otherwise
RI(0) = OB x OB
It is important to remember that the correctness of Definition 4 rests on
the fact that each F I is dosed with respect to the function symbols.
4 INFORMATIONAL REPRESENTABILITY OF ~-FRAMES
In this section we present a notion of informational representability of a

dass of frames and a general method of proving representability. Next, the
method will be applied to some particular dasses of frames.
DEFINITION 5. Let ~ be a signature, X ~ :FE, Y ~ IS, and S =
(FI , ... , Fk) be a ~-specification. The dass of ~-frames X is said to be
=,
(r>, S)-inf-representable (r> E {=, =m}) in Y iff
1. (soundness) for all S E Y and for all contribution functions I for S,
DE,S(S,I) EX;
2. (completeness) for all K EX, there is S E Y and a contribution
function I for S such that DE,S (S, 1) r> K.
4.1 Nice pair prooj technique

This technique has been originally introduced in [Vakarelov, 1987] for the
logic NIL. For all non-empty sets X, for all (p, Y) E P x P(P(X», we write
at(P'y} to denote the mapping X -t P( {p} x Y) such that for all x EX,
at(P,Y}(x) = {(p,Z) : xE Z E Y}. Hence for all Z E Y, x E X, x E Z iff
(p, Z) E at(P,Y) (x).
DEFINITION 6. Let K = (U, {RI(P) : P ~ P, l E {I, ... , k}}) E :FE
and S = (FI , ... , Fk) E spec~. A nice pair with respect to K and S, say
.AI = (p,X), is a member ofp x P(P(U» such that (1) U{Y: Y E X} = U
and (2) for alll E {1, ... ,k}, RI({p}) ~ mCU,{at<P,X)})(FI) where m is the
unique function interpretation in (U, {at(P,X}}).
Definition 7 below presents different kinds of nice pairs and sets of nice
pairs.
DEFINITION 7. With the notations of Definition 6, a nice pair .AI is (K, S)-
complete with respect to the parameter p iff the indusion in Definition 6(2) is
replaced by an equality, A set of nice pairs X is said to be (K, S)-complete
iff for all pEP, there is (p, Y) E X such that (p, Y) is (K, S)-complete
with respect to p. A set of nice pairs X is said to be P-full iff for all
pEP, {(p', Y) EX: p = p'} =/: 0. A set of nice pairs X is minimally
(K, S)-complete iff Xis (K, S)-complete and for all Y c x, Y is not (K, S)-
complete.
Definition 8 shall be mainly needed in Section 4.2.

DEFINITION 8. Let 1:: be a signature, 8 = (FI , ... , H) E spe4 and
X ~ FE. A (resp. minimal) nice pair function with respect to 8 and X is
a mapping truc such that for all K EX, truc(K) is a (resp. minimally)
(K, S)-complete set of nice pairs
EXAMPLE 9. (Example 3 continued) Consider the 1:: o-specification 80 =
(Vf Fo) with 1::0 = (P, (2» for some set of parameters P = {p}. Let K =
(U,{RI(P) ; P ~ {p}, 1 E {I}}) be a 1:: o-frame such that R 1 (0) = U x U
and R I ( {p }) is an equivalence relation. Consider the pair (p, {RI ( {p}) (u) ;
U E U}) = (p, X). Since R I ( {p}) is reflexive, then UYEX Y = U. Moreover,
for all u,v E U
(u,v) E RI({p}) iff R 1 ({p})(u) = R 1 ({p})(v)
iff {Y ; u E Y E X} = {Y ; v E Y E X}
iff {(p, Y) ; u E Y E X} = {(p, Y) ; v E Y E X}
iff at(P,X) (u) = at(P,X) (v)
iff (u,v) E m(U,{at<p,x}})(Fo)
So (p, X) is (K, 80)-complete with respect to p and {(p, X)} is a minimally
(K, So)-complete set of nice pairs.
PROPOSITION 10. With the notations of Definition 6, let X be a P-full set
of nice pairs. Then, (1) Sx = (U, {at(P,Y) ; (p, Y) EX}) is an information
system and (2) Ix ; {at(P,Y) ; (p, Y) EX} --+ P(p) with Ix (at(P,Y») = {p},
is a contribution function for S x.
Observe that for any (p, Y), (p', Y ' ) E X with p :f:. p', at(P,Y) :f:. at<P' ,Y').
Sx is a set-theoretical information system following Vakarelov's terminology
(see e.g. [Vakarelov, 1995; Vakarelov, 1997]). Lemma 11 below can be seen
as the main technical result of the paper since it establishes correspondences
between I;-frames and set-theoretical information systems obtained from
complete set of nice pairs (using the language LS). Proposition 12 states
some consequences for the informational representability.
LEMMA 11. Let 1:: be a signature, K = (U, {R/(P) ; P ~ P, 1 E {I, ... , k}})
E FE, S = (H, ... , Fk) be a weak 1::-specification in spe4 and X be a
set of nice pairs with respect to K and S. Moreover, assume that for all
1 E {I, ... , k}, for all 0 :f:. P ~ P, if Fz is strang then R/(P) = npEP Rl( {p})
otherwise R/(P) = UpEp R1({p}).
1. If 8 is strong and X is (K, S) -complete then
(*) Vl E {I, ... , k}, V0:f:. P ~ P, R/(P) = m(U,Ix'(p»(Fz)
2. If X is minimally (K,8)-complete then (*),
Proposition 12 below states sufficient conditions to establish informa-

tional representability.
PROPOSITION 12. Let ~ be a signature, S = (F1, ... , Fk) be a strong

(resp. weak) ~-specification in spe4. Let X ~ :FE such that for all l E
{l, ... ,k}, for all 0 =fi P ~ P, for all K = (U,{R/(P): P ~ P, l E
{I, ... ,k}}) EX, if Fl is strong then R/(P) = npEP RI({p}) and R/(0) =
U x U otherwise R/(P) = UpEp RI({p}) and RI(0) = 0. Let Y ~ IS and
I> E {=, =, =m} such that:
1. For all 8 E Y, for all contribution fu,nctions I for 8, we have D E S (8, I)
EX. '
2. there is a (resp. minimal) nice pair fu,nction with respect to Sand X,
say truc, such that {8truc (K) : 3K E X} ~ Y. 8truc(K) is defined
as in Proposition 10.
Then X is (I>, S) -inf-representable in Y.

EXAMPLE 13. (Example 9 continued) We write X o to denote the set of
Eo-frames such that R 1 (0) = U x U and R 1 ({p}) is an equivalence relation.
We show that X o is (=,So)-inf-representable in IS. For any information
system 8, and for any contribution function I (actually there is only one),
it is easy to check that DEo,so (8, I) E X o. For each K E X o, we build the
pair truc(K) = (p, X) as in Example 9. From Example 9, for each K E X o,
{truc(K)} is a minimally (K, So)-complete set of nice pairs. {8truc(K) :
K E X} ~ IS by Proposition 10 and by Proposition 12, X o is (=, So)-inf-
representable in IS.
4.2 Negation and reordering lemmas

In this section, we present two ways to obtain (minimal) nice pair functions
from existing ones by relating adequately the specifications and classes of
frames. In that way, we facilitate the application of Proposition 12.
Let F E Fe such that VAR(F) = {X1, ••• ,Xn }, X1, .•• ,X n being in the
order of enumeration. For any permutation a of set {I, ... , n} we write Fa
to denote the formula obtained from F by substituting simultaneously in
F, Xi by Xu(i) for all i E {l, ... , n}. Moreover, for any n-ary relation Rand
for any permutation a of set {I, ... , n} we write Ra to denote the following
n-ary relation:
Observe that for any information system S = (OB, AT), for any function
interpretation m in S, ms(F)a = ms(Fa). For any ~-specification S =
(F1 , ••• ,Fk), for any set of permutations {al: {l, ... ,nz} -t {l, ... ,nZ},
I E {l, ... ,k}}, for any E-frame K = (U,{RI(P): P ~ P, l E {l, ... ,k}})
we write Kal ... ak = (U,{R;(P) : P ~ P, I E {l, ... ,k}}) to denote the
E-frame such that for any l E {I, ... , k}, for any P ~ P, R;(P) = Rl(P)al.
310 STEPHANE DEMRl AND EWA ORLOWSKA
LEMMA 14. (Reordering) Let E be a signature, S = (F1, ... , Fk) be a weak

E -specification in spec~, X ~ :Fr., and truc be a minimal nice pair jv.nction
with respect to Sand X. Let U, be a permutation of the set {1, ... , n,} for all
I E {1, ... , k}. Then truc' is a minimal nice pair jv.nction with respect to
S' = (F1Ul, ... ,FkUk) and {KU1 ... Uk: K E X} where truc'(Kul ... Uk) =
truc(K) for all K EX.
The starting point of Lemma 15 below rests on the fact that for any
S = (OB, AT) EIS, for any function interpretation m in S, ms(-.F) =
OBcard(VAR(F»\ms(F) with FE F. For any E-specification S = {F1, ... , H},
for any E-frame IC = (U,{R,(P) : P ~ P, I E {1, ... ,k}}) we write
IC""" = (U, {RHP) : P ~ P, I E {1, ... ,k}}) to denote the E-frame such
that
• if F, is weak then R; (0) = 0 otherwise R;(0) = U x U,
• for all 0 i- P ~ P, if F, is strong then R;{P) = npEP RH {p}) other-
wise R;(P) = UpEp R;({p }),
• for all p E Pj R;({p}) = -R,({p}).
LEMMA 15. (Negation) Let Ebe a signature, S = {qdl F 1,.··, qkfk Fk}
be a weak E-specification in specb X ~ :Fr. and truc be a minimal nice
pair jv.nction with respect to Sand X. Then truc' is a minimal nice pair
jv.nction with respect to S' = {qdl -.Ft, ... ,qk!k -.Fk} and {K""": 31C E X}
where truc'(IC""") = truc(lC) for alllC E X.
5 EXAMPLES OF INFORMATIONAL REPRESENTABILITY
We present examples of informational representability theorems for frames

with information relations from the indiscernibility group and the orthogo-
nality group. The analogous representability results for many other classes
of frames can be obtained using the method developed in the paper.
In the rest of the section, E is assumed to be a signature (p, (2)) for
some non-empty set of parameters P, unless otherwise stated. Concerning
the indiscernibility relation extensively used in the literature, the reader is
invited to check the previous examples.
5.1 Complementarity
Let S = (OB, AT) EIS. Two objects 01 and D2 are said to be in relation
of complementarity with respect to A ~ AT (in short 01 comp(A) D2) iff for
all a E A, a(ot} = Val a \ a(D2). With LS, comp(A) = m(OB,A)(Fo) with
Fo = Vf f(xt}= - f(X2). Observe that comp(A) is symmetrical, irreßexive
and intransitive. When 01 comp(A) D2 holds, for all a E A, Val a is uniquely
determined by a(ol) and a(D2) (Va1a is then the union of a(ol) and a(D2».
This may explain why the representation of complementary relations has

been an open problem until now [Vakarelov, 1997]. We define a dass of
abstract ~-frames related to the ~-specification So = (Fo). First, some
preliminary definitions are needed. Let R be a binary relation over the set
U, R is said to be complementary iff R is symmetrical, R does not contain
cydes of odd length and for all u, v, w, Z E U, if (u, v) E R, (v, w) E R
and (w,z) E R then (u,z) E R (3-transitivity). Itr can be shown that
comp(AT) is a complementary relation. We write FS o to denote the set
of !;-frames (U,{RI(P) : P ~ P, 1 E {I}}) such that, R 1 (0) = U x U,
n
for an 0 =1= P ~ P, R1(P) = pEP R1({p}) and for an pEP, R1({p}) is
complementary. The rest of the section is devoted to showing that FS o is
(=, So)-inf-representable in IS. For any binary relation R over the set U,
for an u E U we write Cu,R to denote the largest subset of U such that
u E Cu,R and for an v E Cu,R \ {u}, there is a RI-path between u and v
where R 1 is the symmetrical dosure of R. Observe that {Cu,R : u E U} is
a partition of U. For an u E U, we write C~,R (resp. C~,R) to denote the
largest subset of Cu,R such that for all v E C~,R' there is a RI-path of even
(resp. odd) length between u and v where R 1 is the symmetrical dosure of
R. Moreover, for an U 1 ~ U, we write c"'!'n to denote C~ R if u E U /, C~ R
otherwise. Observe that for all u,v,w E'U, when R is ~omplementary,'if
{v, w} ~ Cu,R then {C.~,R' C~,R} = {C~,R' C~,R}·
LEMMA 16. Let R be a complementary relation over the set U. The set
{C~ R : u E U, i E {O, I}} is a partition of U.
Let truc be the mapping such that for an K = (U, {RI(P) : P ~ P, 1 E
{I}}) E FS o '
truc(K) = {(p,{ U C~~l({P}) : 3U 1

~ U, 3Y E Wp }}: pEP}
uEY
with W p = {Y ~ U : Vu, v E Y, Cu ,'Rl({P}) =1= C V ,'R 1 ({P})' UUEY CU,'Rl({P}) =

U}. It is easy to show that for all (p, X) E truc(K), for all Yo E Wp ,
X = {UuEYo C~~l({P}) : 3U1 ~ U}. It is worth mentioning that, for all
u, v EU, (W EX, either u E Y and v f/. Y or u f/. Y and v E Y) iff (u, v) E
m(U,{al<p,x)})(Fo). Moreover, for all (p,X) E truc(K), UYEx Y = U. '
LEMMA 17. Let K = (U,{RI(P) : P ~ P, 1 E {I}}) E FS o • For all
(p,X) E truc(K), for all u,v E U, (u,v) E R1({p}) iff for alt Y E X,
either (u E Y and v f/. Y) or (u f/. Y and v E Y).
LEMMA 18. Let K = (U,{RI(P): P ~ P, 1 E {I}}) E FS o • truc(K) is a
minimally (K, So)-complete set of nice pairs.
COROLLARY 19. FS o is (=,So)-inf-representable in IS.
For any pEP the dass of frames F p (in the standard sense for modal
logics) defined by F p = {(U,R1({p})) : (U,{RI(P) : P ~ P, 1 E {I}}) E
FSo } is not closed by the p-morphism construction. It follows that F p is

not modally definable (see [Goldblatt and Thomason, 1975]). The condition
of being a complementary relation can be expressed by a set r of formulas
from the classical first-order logic.
Let S = (OB, AT) EIS. Two objects 01 and 02 are said to be in relation
of incomplementarity with respect to A ~ AT (in short 01 incomp(A) 02) iff
for all a E A, (Val a \ a(01» :f. a(02). With LS, incomp(A) = ms(FJ) with
FJ = Vf --,(-f(X1)=f(X2»' Using Lemma 15 and the above construction,
{K~ : 3K E .rSo } is (=, (FJ»-inf-representable in IS.
5.2 Positive and negative similarity

Let S = (OB, AT) EIS. Two objects 01 and 02 are said to be in relation
of positive similarity (resp. negative similarity) with respect to A ~ AT (in
short 01 psim(A) 02 -resp. 01 nsim(A) 02 ) ifffor all a E A, a(Ot}na(02) :f. 0
(resp. (Val a\a(01»n(V ala \a(02» :f. 0). With LS, psim(A) = m(OB,A) (Fo)
(resp. nsim(A) = m(OB,A)(Fo» with F o = Vf f(xt} n f(X2) :f. 0 (resp.
F o = Vf - f(xt) n - f(X2) :f. 0). Let truc be the mapping such that for all
K = (U, fR.,(P) : P ~ P, I E {I}}) E .rE,
truc(K) = {(p,{{u,v}: (u,v) E 'R.1 ({p})}}: pEP}
(resp. truc(K) = {(p, {U \ {u,v} : (u,v) E 'R.1 ({p})} U {U}) : pEP} )

We write FS o to denote the set of ~-frames (U, {'R., (P) : P ~ P, I E {I}})
n
such that, 'R.1 (0) = U x U, for all 0:f. P ~ P, 'R.1 (P) = pEP 'R.1({p}) and
for all pEP, 'R.1 ({p}) is (resp. weakly) reflexive and symmetrical. Following
the lines of the previous sections, it can be shown that truc is a minimal
nice pair function with respect to So and FSo ' Hence .rSo is (=,So)-inf-
representablein IS. Moreover, let S = (OB, AT) EIS. Two objects 01 and
02 are said to be in relation of right orthogonality (resp. left orthogonality)
with respect to A ~ AT (in short 01 rorth(A) 02 -resp. 01 lorth(A) 02 )
Hf for all a E A, a(01) ~ (Val a \ a(02» (resp. (Vala \ a(ot}) ~ a(02».
With LS, rorth(A) = m(OB,A)(FJ) (resp. lorth(A) = m(OB,A)(FJ» with
FJ = Vf f(xI) ~ - f(X2) (resp. FJ = Vf - f(xt) ~ f(X2»' Using
Lemma 15 and the above construction, {K~ : 3K E FSo } is (=, (FJ»-inf-
representable in IS.
6 AN EXAMPLE OF NON-REPRESENTABILITY
Until now, only representability results have been shown. However non
representability results are also very interesting in order to understand the
relevance of the notion of representability we introduced. The example
below provides some insight into classes of information systems closed un-
der subsystems and classes of ~-frames closed under subframes. Although
Proposition 20 might appear quite natural, it has some unexpected conse-
quences (see for instance Corollary 21).
PROPOSITION 20. Let ~ be a signature, S be a ~-specification, X ~ TE
and Y ~ IS closed under subsystems. If X is (=, S) -inf-representable in Y
then X is closed under subframes.
COROLLARY 21. Let ~ be a signature, S be a strong ~-specification and
X be a set of ~-frame such that for all 1 E {I, ... , k},
• 'R.,(0) = u x U, for all 0 =f. P ~ P, 'R.,(P) = npEP 'R.,({p})

• for all pEP, 'R.,( {p}) is serial (resp. atomic, weakly dense, discrete).
X is not (=,S)-inf-representable in IS.
Some relationships might exist between subframe logics (see [Wolter,
1993}) and the logics characterized by classes of frames informationally rep-
resentable by frames derived from a class of information systems closed
under subsystems. However it is not in the scope of this work.
S. Demri
Laboratoire LEIBNIZ, Grenoble, France.
E. Orlowska
Institute of Telecommunications, Warsaw, Poland.
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GERT DE COOMAN
FROM POSSIBILISTIC INFORMATION TO

KLEENE'S STRONG MULTI-VALUED LOGICS
1 POSSIBILISTIC EXTENSION LOGICS
Possibilistic logic in general [Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1989; Dubois, Lang
and Prade, 1994; Dubois and Prade, 1990; Esteva, Garcia and Godo, 1994]
investigates how possibilistic uncertainty ab out propositions is propagated
when making inferences in a formallogical system. In this paper, we look at
a very particular aspect of possibilistic logic: we investigate how, under cer-
tain independence assumptions, the introduction of possibilistic uncertainty
in classical propositional logic leads to the consideration of special classes
of multi-valued logics, with a proper set of truth values and logical func-
tions combining them. First, we show how possibilistic uncertainty about
the truth value of a proposition leads to the introduction of possibilistic
truth values. Since propositions can be combined into new ones using logi-
cal operators, possibilistic uncertainty about the truth values of the original
propositions gives rise to possibilistic uncertainty about the truth value of
the resulting proposition. Furthermore, we show that in a limited number
of special cases there is truth-functionality, Le. the possibilistic truth value
of the resulting proposition is a function of the possibilistic truthvalues
of the original propositions. This leads to the introduction of possibilistic-
logical functions, combining possibilistic truth values. Important classes of
such functions, the possibilistic extension logics, result directly from this
investigation. Finally, the relation between these logics and Kleene's strong
multi-valued systems is established. This paper is intended as a brief sum-
mary of the much more detailed account that can be found in [de Cooman,
1995].
Let us first define the most common notations. By (L, ~), we denote
a complete lattice [Birkhoff, 1967] with top 1 and bottom 0, where we as-
sume that 0 "I- 1. The meet of (L,~) is denoted by """, its join by '-". By
T we denote a triangular norm on (L,~) that is completely distributive
w.r.t. supremum [de Cooman, 1993]. We also use the set = {false, true} r
of truth values in classical propositional logic. On r,
we define the to-
tal order relation ~ = {(false,false), (false, true), (true, true)}. (r,~) is a
Boolean chain of length 2, with top true and bottom false. On this chain,
we may define as usual the complement .." called negation; the meet 11.,
called conjunctionj the join V, called disjunction and the implication :::}.
We also consider a universe X. A X - L-mapping h is called sup-normal
iff SUP"'EX h( x) = 1. The set of all X - L-mappings is denoted by LX. With
315
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), FuzzY Sets, Logics anti Reasoning about Knowledge, 315-323.
316 GERT DE COOMAN
a subset A of X, we may associate its characteristic X - 'T-mapping XA,

with, for any x in X: XA(X) = true if xE A and XA(X) = false if x f/. A.
Next, we introduce the notion of a possibilistic extension, which is related
to Zadeh's extension principle, but is here only used within a possibilistic
context, without reference to fuzzy sets. By X, Xl, '" , X n and Y we
denote arbitrary universes. First of all, with a X - Y-mapping cp we can as-
sociate a LX - L Y -mapping 'P, defined as follows. For any X - L-mapping h
the Y -L-mapping 'P(h) is given by, for any y in Y: 'P(h)·y = sup",(x)=y h(x).
'P is called the (L, ~)-possibilistic extension of cp.
Also, with a Xl x ... X X n - Y-mapping cp we can associate a LX, x
... x LXn - LY-mapping 'PT, defined as follows. For any (hl, ... ,hn ) in
L X , x ... x LX n the Y - L-mapping 'PT(h l , ... , h n ) is given by, for any
y in Y: 'PT(hl, ... ,hn)·y = sup",(x1, ... ,Zn)=yTt:lhk(Xk). 'PT is called the
(L, ~}-possibilistic T -extension of cp.
We are now ready to proceed to the main part of the paper. Pos-
sibilistic information about the values that a variable ~ mayassume in
X is represented by its possibility distribution function 7r{, a sup-normal
X - L-mapping [de Cooman, 1997a]. When p is a clear (non-vague) prop-
erty, with extension [Pp] = {x I x E X and x is p}, this possibilistic infor-
mation can be transformed into possibilistic information about the truth
value X[pp](~) of the proposition variable Pp(~) = '~is p'. This informa-
tion can be represented by the possibility distribution function 7rX[Pp ]({) of
the variable X[Pp](e) in T It is easily verified that the sup-normal 'T - L-
mapping 7rX[Pp ]({) is given by 7r X [Pp ]W = X[P,:J(7r{). Therefore 7rX[Pp ](ü(v) =
sUPX[Pp ] (x)=v 7r{(x) is the (L, ~)-possibility that the proposition variable is
true (v = true) or false (v = false). 7rX[Pp ]({) can be generally called a
(L, ~)-possibilistic truth value.
DEFINITION 1. We call (L, ~)-possibilistic truth value any sup-normal
T - L-mapping. The set of the (L, ~)-possibilistic truth values is denoted by
f. We also introduce three (L, ~)-possibilistic truth values with a special
meaning: ~ = {(true, 0), (false, I)}, true = {(true, 1), (false, O)} and
--------- = {(true, 1), (false, I)}.
unknown
When a proposition variable '~ is p' has the (L, ~)-possibilistic truth
value trUe, this means that it cannot be false, and is therefore necessarily
true, taking into account the information about the value~at ~ may as-
sume in X. An analogous interpretation can be given to false. W~he
proposition variable '~is p' has the (L, ~)-possibi1istic truth value unknown,
this means that, taking into account the information about the values that
~ mayassume, it is completely possible that the proposition variable is true,
and equally possible that it is false. The truth value of this proposition vari-
able is then completely unknown, because of insufficient information about
POSSIBILISTIC INFORMATION AND KLEENE'S LOGICS 317
the values that ~ may assume in X.

Above, we have shown how possibilistic information about the values a
variable ~ may assume in a universe X can be transformed into possibilis-
tic information ab out the truth value of a proposition about this variable.
Next, we observe that, in general, propositions can be combined to form
new propositions, using logical operators. In this way, a proposition P can
be transformed by the logical negation operator into a proposition NOT P.
By extension, the proposition function Pp can be transformed into a propo-
sition function NOTP" by the pointwise application of the logical negation
operator: (NOTPp)(x) = NOT(Pp(x» = 'x is not p', x E X. In a com-
pletely similar way, the proposition variable Pp(~) = '~is p' is transformed
by the logical negation operator into the proposition variable (NOT Pp)(~),
defined as '~ is not p'. Analogously, the proposition variables '~ is p' and
'~ is q' can be transformed into the proposition variable (PpANDPq)(~),
defined as '~ is p and ~ is q', using the logical conjunction operator AND,
and into the proposition variable (PpORPq)(€), defined as '~is p or € is q',
using the logical disjunction operator OR.
As is weH known, classical propositional logic is truth-functional, and
the behaviour of logical operators can be characterised by classical-Iogical
functions.
DEFINITION 2. Let n be strictly positive natural number. A Tn - T-
mapping is called a classical-Iogical function of arity n. The set of classical-
logical functions of arbitrary arity is given the notation .c.
The conjunction /\, the disjunction V and the implication =>, defined
on T, are classical-logical functions of arity 2, characterising the truth-
functional behaviour of respectively the logical conjunction, disjunction and
implication operator in classical propositionallogic. The negation -', defined
on T, is a classical-Iogical function of arity 1, characterising the truth-
functional behaviour of the logical negation operator in that logic. More
explicitly, the behaviour of the logical negation operator is mirrored in the
behaviour of -, in the foHowing sense: X[NOTPpJ(X) = --'X[PpJ(x), x E X,
where, of course [NOTPp] = {x I x E X and x is not p} = co[Pp]. In a
coinpletely analogous way, the behaviour of the logical disjunction 'operator
is mirrored in the behaviour of V in the foHowing sense: X[PpORPqJ(X) =
X[PpJ(x) V X[P.J(x), x E X, where [PpORPq] = {x I x E X and (x is p OR
x is q)} = [Pp] U [Pq].
Generally, we can start with n clear predicates Pt, ... , Pn with extensions
[pp,], ... , [PpJ, and with a n-ary logical operator LOP. This logical opera-
tor transforms the proposition variables Pp, (~), ... , Ppn (~) into the proposi-
tion variable LOP(Ppt , ... , ppJ(~), defined as LOP('~ is Pt', .. . , '~ is Pn'),
with extension [LOP(Pp".", Ppn )]. The behaviour of LOP is mirrored
by a Tn - T-mapping cjJ, in the following sense, with obvious notations:
X[LOP(Pp".",Ppn )] = cjJ 0 (X[pp,J"" ,X[Ppnl)'
318 GERT DE COOMAN
What we now want to do is to eJctend the classical, truth-functional

approach: formally consider T as a set of (epistemic) truth values, and
look at how these truth values can be combined into new ones. After that,
we intend to show that at least for some of these combinations, there is
a dear and definite link with combinations of propositions through logical
operators. In this way, we intend to prove that, in some cases, possibilistic
logic is also truth-functional.
DEFINITION 3. Let n be a strictly positive natural number. A (f)n - T-
mapping is called a (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical function of arity n. The set
of the (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical functions of arbitrary arity is given the
notation C.
We can associate a (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical function with every dassical-
logical function, simply by looking at its (L, $)-possibilistic T-extension.
Of course, this extension must be properly restricted, because we only work
with sup-normal T - L-mappings as possibilistic truth values.
DEFINITION 4. Let n be a strictly positive natural number and let ljJ
be a classical-Iogical function of arity n. The (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical T-
extension ~lT of ljJ is defined as the restrietion of the (L, $)-possibilistic
T-extension ~T of ljJ to the set (f)n, Le. ~lT = ~TI(T)n. We call (L, $)-
possibilistic T-e)!:tension logic the set CT = {~lT IljJ E C }.
(L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical T-extensions are (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical func-
tions: (YljJ E C)(~iT E C). We now give the rationale for the introduction
of extension logics. We do so by addressing the following question: how,
starting with possibilistic information about the values that a variable ~ may
assume in X, can we derive the possibilistic trnth value of the combined
proposition variable LOP('~ is PI',' .. , '~ is Pn')?
It is easily verified that if the variables X[PPll(~)' ... ,X[Pp.. l(~) in T
are possibilistically independent [de Cooman, 1997bj de Cooman, 1997cj
de Cooman, 1995], the (L, $)-possibilistic truth value 7rX[LOP(PPI •...• Pp.. )](e) =
X[LOP~.,pp .. )l(7r~) ofthe proposition variable LOP('e is PI',""'~ is Pn'),
is given by 7rX[LOP(PP1 ..... Pp.. )]W = ~iT(7rX[PP1)(~)'"'' 7rX[PP")(~»' where
7rX[PPk)(~) = ~(7r~) is the (L, $)-possibilistic truth value of the propo-
sitionvariable '~ is Pk', k = 1, ... , n. Indeed, in the case of possibilistic
independence, there is truth-junctionality for possibilistic logic.
In the rest of this section, we study the most important properties of some
special (L, $)-possibilistic-Iogical functions of arity 1 and 2: ='lT, ALT, VLT
and =?lT. First of all, it will help us if we can find simple expressions for
these operators.
PROPOSITION 5.
1. (='lT t) . true = t(false) and (='lT t) . false = t(trne).
2. (h AtT t2) . true = T(tl (true) , t2(true» and (tiAtT t2) . false =
tl (false) '--" t2 (false».
9. (tl VlT t2) . true = tl (true) '--" t2(true} and (h VlT t2) . false =
T(tl (false) , t2 (false ».
4. (t1=>lT t2)' true = tl(false) '--" t2(true) and (tl=>lTt2) ·false =
T(tl (true) , t2(false».
Let us now give abrief survey of the most important properties of the
above-mentioned possibilistic-Iogical functions. It should be noted that the
equalities in these properties are equalities of (L, ~)-possibilistic truth val-
ues, and therefore pointwise equalities of T - L-mappings. Also, t, tl, t2
and t3 denote arbitrary elements of f.
PROPOSITION 6.
( Commutativity)
2. t AlT trüe =t and t VlT false = t. (Neutral elements)
9. tlAI.T (t2AI.T t3) = (tl AlT t2) ALT t3 and h VlT (t2 VlT t3) =
(tl VlT t 2) VlT t3' (Associativity)
4· :::;I.T (h AlT t2) = (:::;lT h) VI.T(:::;lT t2) and :::;lT (h VlT h) =

(:::;lT h) AlT (:::;lT t2)' (De Morgan's Laws)
(Absorbing elements)
(Involutivity)
(Implication)
8. (tAlT(:::;lTt})· true = T(t(true), t(false» , (tAlT(:::;lTt» ·false = 1,

(t VlT (:::;lT t»·true = 1 and (t VlT (:::;lT t»·false = T(t(true), t(false».
( Complementation)
9. tl =>lT t2 = (:::;lT t2) =>lT (:::;lT tt}. (Contrapositive symmetry)
10. (trüe=>lTt) = t. (Neutrality principle)
11. tl =>lT (t2 =>lT t3) = t2 =>lT (tl =>lT t3). (Exchange principle)
12. t l AlT t2 = trüe {::} (tl = trüe and t2 = trüe), tl VlT t 2 = false {:}
(tl = false and t2 = false) , :::;lT t = trüe {:} t = false and :::;lT t =
false {::} t = trüe. (Boundary conditions)
320 GERT DE COOMAN
Note that AlT andVlT are idempotent iffT is, Le. iffT = '""' [de Cooman,
1993]. Furthermore, AlT and VlT are mutually distributive Hf T and sup
are mutually distributive. This is again only possible if T = '""' [de Cooman,
1993]. Thus, it appears that the choice T = '""' is a rat her special one. In
this respect, note also that if we consider the lattice (r, ~), where ~ is the
partial order relation on T, introduced in the following section, then AlT is
at-norm and VlT is a t-conorm [de Cooman, 1993] on this structure. These
operators are dual [de Cooman, 1993] w.r.t. the negation ::::;lT on (T, ~).
AlT is the meet and VlT the join of the lattice (T,~) iff T = '""'. We
therefore devote the next section to the study of this special case.
2 AN INTERESTING SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we intend to take a closer look at the notions introduced

above, in the special case T = '""'. This means that we assume that (L,~)
is a complete Brouwerian lattice [Birkhoff, 1967].
PROPOSITION 7. (T, Al~, Vl~) is a bounded distributive lattice (as an
algebra) with top triie and bottom false. The partial order relation;; on T
that corresponds with this structure satisfies:
Besides the binary operators meet Al~ and join Vl~ of (T, ;;), there
also exists the unary operator ::::;l~. Its properties are studied in the next
proposition, which also establishes the relationship between possibilistic ,"",_
extension logics and a special dass of multi-valued logics [Rescher, 1969]. By
a negation operator on a bounded poset, we mean a dual order-automorphism
on that structure [de Cooman, 1993].
PROPOSITION 8.
1. ::::;t~ is an involutive negation operator, but not a complement operator,

on (T, ;;).
2. (t, At~, Vt~, ::::;t~) is a Morgan algebra [Skala, 1978J, i.e. (T, Al~,
Vt~) is a bounded distributive lattice (as an algebra), with a unary
operator ::::;t~ satisfying (i) ::::;t~ is involutive; and (ii) At~, Vl~ and
satisfy de Morgan's laws.
::::;t~
3. (t, At~, Vt~, ::::;h) is a Kleene algebra [Skala, 1978J, i.e. (T, Al~,
Vl~, ::::;t~) is a Morgan algebra with furthermore ('v'(tl, t 2) E (T)2)
(tl At~ (::::;t~ tt) ~ t2 Vt~ (::::;l~ t2».
The operators ::;l~, 7\l~ and Vl~ on 7 therefore satisfy the characteristic
properties of the negation, conjunction and disjunction in the multi-valued
strang Kleene logics with truth domain (7,~) [Rescher, 1969]. For the
implication we have, taking into account Proposition 6, that tl ~l~ t 2 =
(::;l~ tl) Vl~ t2, tl, h E 7, which implies that this implication is a typical
instance of a Kleene-Dienes implication [Rescher, 1969].
At the same time, if (L,~) is a Boolean chain (of length 2), we recover
Kleene's strang ternary logic. Let us briefly study the exact relationship
between possibilistic ,......,-extension logics and Kleene's strong ternary logic.
We consider a universe X and two clear properties p and q with extensions
[Pp] = {x I x E X and x is p} and [Pq } = {x I x E X and x is q}. Also,
e
we consider a variable in X. Let us assume that we have the following
e e
information about the values that may assume in X: must be an element
of A, with A ~ X. This information can be represented in the form of the
normal ({O, 1}, ~)-possibility measure IIA, with for arbitrary B ~ X:
IIA(B) = {1° .; BnA:10

, BnA=0
e
is the possibility that belongs to B. Indeed, if B n A = 0, then cannote
e
belong to B, since we already know that E A. Remark that the distribu-
tion of IIA, and therefore also the possibility distribution function of is e,
the characteristic X - {O, 1}-function XA of A [de Cooman, 1997a].
Starting from this possibilistic information XA, we now ask ourselves
what can be deduced about the truth values of the proposition variables
'e is p','e is q' and a few of their combinations. In order to ans wer this
question, we simply apply the theory developed above in the special case
(L,~) = ({O, 1}, ~). The only tri angular norm on ({O, 1},~) is the meet ,.......
[de Cooman, 1993}, which immediately leads us to the special case discussed
in this section. Note that in this particular case 7 = {~, u~n, true}
and (7, ;) is a chain of length 3, with bottom ~, top true and in between
u~n. In this chain, 7\l~ is the meet, Vl~ is the join, and ::;l~ is the
unique and involutive negation operator. (7, 7\l~, Vl~, ::;l~) is a Kleene
algebra and is as such isomorphie to the corresponding structure of the
strong ternary logic introduced by Kleene [Rescher, 1969].
It is readily verified that the ({ 0, 1}, ~)-possibilistic truth value t Pp =
'e
X[P;:J (XA) of the proposition variable is p' is determined by t Pp (true) =
IIA([Pp]) and tpp(false) = IIA(co[Pp]), where X[Pp] is the characteristic X-
T-mapping of [Pp}. For tpp there are therefore three possibilities, since
tpp E 7. We have that tpp = true {:} A ~ [Pp], or equivalently, Hf it is
e
necessary that is p. On the other hand, tpp = ~ {:} An [Pp} = 0,
e
or equivalently, Hf it is impossible that is p. Finally, we have that tpp =
u~n {:} An [Pp] :1 0 and Anco[pp] :1 0, or equivalently, iff it is possible
322 GERT DE COOMAN
but not necessary that e is p, in other words, it is uncertain whether e is p.

Let us now turn our attention to the ({O, I}, ~)-possibilistic truth value
of the proposition variable 'NOT(e is p)', or equivalently, (NOTPp)(e) , or
'e is not p'. It is obvious that [NOTPp] = co[Pp], whence tNoTPp(true) =
t Pp (false) and tNOTPp (false) = t Pp (true). We may therefore write, taking
into account Proposition 5, that tNOT Pp = :;t. . . . t pp. We conclude that for
the logical negation operator of classical propositional logic, there is always
truth-functionality as far as the ({O, I}, ~)-possibilistic truth values are con-
cemed.
Let us now investigate the proposition variable' e is p and e is q', or equiv-
alently, (PpANDPq)(e), where PpANDPq is a proposition function that is
the pointwise conjunction of the proposition functions Pp and Pq. It is obvi-
ous that [PpANDPq] = [pp]n[Pq], whence tppANDPq(true) = II A ([1J>]n[Pq])
and, also taking into account proposition 5, t PpANDPq (false) = (t Pp At ....... t Pq)·
false. Only if
we have, taking into account Proposition 5, that tppANDPq(true) = (tpp

At. . . . tpq) . true. Only in this case there is truth-functionality for the logical
conjunction operator in classical propositionallogic as far as the possibilistic
truth values are concerned, or equivalently, tppANDPq = tpp At . . . . tpq.
Let us now briefly discuss the meaning of (1). It is easily shown that (1)
does not hold Hf A n [PpANDPq] = 0 and at the same time An [Pp] i:- 0,
A n co[Pp] i:- 0, A n [Pq] i:- 0 and A n co[Pq] i:- 0; in other words, Hf
it is uncertain (i.e. not impossible and not necessary) whether e is p and
whether e is q, and at the same time impossible that e is p and e is q.
Indeed, in that case, we have that tppANDPq = j;;i;;, whereas tpp At. . . . tPq =
u~n At . . . . u~n = u.;:;;;;;;;:wn. A similar argument can be given for
the disjunction. We conclude that there is not necessarily truth-functionality
for the logical disjunction and conjunction operators of classical proposi-
tional logic, as far as the ({ 0, I}, ~) -possibilistic truth values are concemed.
The possibilistic approach therefore only results in a strong ternary Kleene
logic if a number of independence properties are satisfied. Indeed, it is
shown in [de Cooman, 1997c] that condition (1) is related to the conditions
for the possibilistic (or logical) independence of the events [Pp] and [Pq]. In
some cases these conditions are not satisfied, and the possibilistic approach
is therefore not truth-functional, and therefore does not lead to a strong
ternary Kleene logic. In these cases however, the strong ternary Kleene
logic does provide us with a conservative approximation, since wherever it
--------
goes wrong, it results in the possibilistic truth value unknown, where the
possibilistic approach yields the possibilistic truth values iTUe or ~.
3 CONCLUSION
Possibilistic logic can be described as a set of techniques that enable us

to incorporate possibilistic uncertainty in a formal logical system. It turns
out that under a number of independence assumptions, possibilistic logic
leads to the special case of a possibilistic extension logic. A special sub-
dass of these, the possibilistic-Iogical ,,",-extensions, are related with strong
multi-valued Kleene logics. Thus, a possibilistic justification is given for the
introduction and use of these Kleene systems.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders (Bel-

gium).
Universiteit Gent, Belgium.
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cations, Providence, RI, 1967.
[de Cooman, 1993] G. de Cooman and E. E. Kerre. Order norms on bounded partially
ordered sets. The Journal 0/ Fuzzy Mathematics, 2,281-310, 1994.
[de Cooman, 19951 G. de Cooman. Towards a possibilistic logic. In D. Ruan, editor,
Fuzzy Set Theory and Adtlanced Mathematical Applications, pages 89-133. Kluwer
Academic, Boston, 1995.
[de Cooman, 1997a] G. de Cooman. Possibility theory I: The measure- and integral-
theoretic groundwork. International Journal 0/ General Systems, 25, 291-323, 1997.
[de Cooman, 1997b] G. de Cooman. Possibility theory II: Conditional possibility. In-
ternational Journal 0/ General Systems, 25,325-351,1997.
[de Cooman, 1997c] G. de Cooman. Possibility theory III: Possibilistic independence.
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[Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1994] D. Dubois, J. Lang and H. Prade. Possibilistic logic.
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Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 3, pages 439-513. Oxford
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[Dubois and Prade, 1990] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Fuzzy sets in approximate reasoning
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[Esteva, Garcia and Godo, 1994] F. Esteva, P. Garcia and L. Godo. Relating and ex-
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[Rescher, 1969] N. Rescher. Many- Valued Logic. McGraw-HiII, New York, 1969.
[Skala, 1978] H. J. Skala. On many-valued logics, fuzzy sets, fuzzy logics and their
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D. DUBOIS, L. FARINAS DEL CERRO, A. HERZIG
ANDH.PRADE
A ROADMAP OF QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE
1 INTROOUenON
The notion of epistemic independence naturally arises in the framework of reason-

ing under uncertainty and belief change. Most prominently, probabilistic condi-
tional independence (between variables) plays a key role in Bayesian nets.· Several
authors [Delgrande and Pelletier, 1994; Benferhat et al., 1994; Oubois et al. , 1994;
Fariiias deI Cerro and Herzig, 1995] have advocated the interest of qualitative inde-
pendence notions for nonmonotonic reasoning. Gärdenfors [1990] has investigated
the complementary notion of relevance in relation with belief change; continuing
in this spirit, Fariiias deI Cerro and Herzig [1996] have related independence and
belief contraction. In the framework of possibility theory, new forms of indepen-
dence between variables have been studied by Fonck [1993], and Oe Campos et
al. [19951, who develop possibilistic counterparts of Bayesian nets. The aim of
the paper is to provide an exhaustive typology of the forms that independence and
relevance can take in the setting of an ordinal approach to uncertainty. Such an
approach underlies major belief change and nonmonotonic inference theories.
In the paper we focus on epistemic independence between events. A, B, C,
... stand for events (propositions) belonging to a Boolean algebra of subsets of a
set W. (Hence we do not distinguish between logically equivalent formulas.) T
and F are propositions denoting the true and false events respectively; --,A denotes
the negation of proposition A, representing the complement of A in W. Let us
assume that our representation framework enables us to distinguish between three
cognitive attitudes regarding C:
• C is an accepted belief,
• --,C is an accepted belief (i.e. C is refuted),
• neither C nor --,C is accepted (i.e. total ignorance about Cl.
In partlcular C and --,C cannot be held as accepted beliefs simultaneously. Clas-

sical logic offers such a framework since a formula can either be deduced from
a knowledge base, or its negation can be deduced, or none of the two can be
deduced. Beyond these options, qualitative possibility theory (e.g. Dubois and
Prade, [1991; 1992; 1998]) offers an ordinal setting for representing uncertainty.
It direct1y extends the temary structure for belief of cIassical logic to levels of
acceptance.
In this paper, we start from the intuition that an event C is independent of
another event A when one's opinion about C is not affected by learning A. Then
325
D. Dubois et al. (eds.), Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 325-350.
326 D. DUBOIS, L. FARINAS DEL CERRO, A. HERZIG AND H. PRADE
Table 1. Forms of epistemic independence and relevance
0 o givenA
o is qualitatively independent of A accepted accepted
A is qualitatively I A cancels 0 accepted ignored
relevant for 0 I A refutes 0 accepted refuted
A justifies 0 ignored accepted
A does not inform about 0 ignored ignored
any definition of independence or relevance in such a framework can be expressed

in terms of five basic notions corresponding to the possible effects of learning A
on the belief status of 0 (Table 1). As already said, an important distinction has
to be made between propositions 0 that are apriori believed and those which
are apriori ignored. Independence may then refer either to the lack of inftuence
of input A on a believed proposition 0 that remains accepted (line 1), or on the
contrary, to the lack of inftuence of A on an ignored proposition that remains
ignored (line 5). We shall speak of 'qualitative independence' in the former case,
and of 'uninformativeness' in the latter.
Relevance then may mean either that A negatively affects an agent's belief in
0, or that A makes the agent start to believe O. This covers three situations:
o was an accepted belief and upon learning A, 0 becomes ignored (line 2), or
refuted (rejected) (line 3); if 0 was previously ignored, 0 may become accepted
on learning A (line 4). In the following we reserve the name 'qualitative relevance'
for the first two cases (lines 2 and 3), keeping the third one apart since the belief
change then does not point into the same direction. It can be checked that all
the other situations can be obtained from these 5 cases changing 0 into -,0, or
exchanging C and A.
What are the properties of such independence and relevance notions? Can they
be characterised in a precise way? How are they related to theories of uncertainty?
It is the purpose of this paper to answer these questions. In particular, it turns
out that these notions are generally non-symmetric and negation sensitive. How-
ever, they can be preserved via conjunction or disjunction, and this behaviour is
the one that was found natural by philosophers of probability such as Keynes or
Gärdenfors. It is also worth noticing that due to the ternary structure of states of
belief, it cannot be expected that independence and relevance be complementary
notions.
For the sake of simplicity, definitions of independence and relevance are not
given here with respect to contexts. The extension to ternary relations ('A is rel-
evant/independent w.r.t. 0, given evidence E') is straightforward and is used in
Section 7.
The present paper elaborates an idea initially presented in lDubois et al., 1994].
It is an extended version of a more recent paper [Dubois et al., 1997].
A ROADMAP OF QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE 327
2 QUESTIONING PROBABILISTIC INDEPENDENCE
Suppose that a cognitive state is represented by means of a probability-like set-

function. The standard definition of probabilistic independence is via the multi-
plication law: events A and C are independent iff P(A A C) = P(A) . P(C).
However interpreting this equality in terms of epistemic independence is far from
being straightforward. and it is more intuitive to express probabilistic indepen-
dence in terms of invariance with respect to conditioning: C is independent of
A iff P(CIA) = P(C). Nevertheless, it turns out that due to Bayes rule, this
definition is equivalent to the multiplication law.
It follows from the axioms of probability theory that independence then satis-
fies:
(symmetry) If C is independent of Athen A is independent of C.
(negation) If C is independent of Athen C is independent of --,A.
(truth) A and T are independent.
These three above properties are not enough to completely characterize probabilis-
tic independence. For that, we need two more axioms suggested by Kolmogorov
([1956], cited in [Fine, 1973]), that explicitly involve a comparative probability
relation. These axioms govem the interplay of independence with conjunction and
disjunction, which is quite involved. For instance, suppose A is independent of C
and B is independent of C. Then it is neither true in general that A ABis inde-
pendent of C, nor that A V B is independent of C. Neither does it hold that if A
is independent of C and A is independent of B, then A is independent of C AB,
nor that A is independent of C VB.
Probabilistic independence has been criticized quite early by several authors: its
symmetry and the lack of properties with respect to conjunction and disjunction
have been found debatable in an epistemic perspective. A formal objection to the
multiplication law has been given by J. M. Keynes ([19211, cited in [Gärdenfors,
19781). According to Keynes, the following property is natural: if C depends on
A and B does not contradict A, then C depends on A AB. The intuition behind
this postulate is that since A affects C, the conjunction of A and B should also be
considered as relevant to C, even if P( C) = P( CIA AB). Keynes notes that his
postulate is not validated by the multiplication law. He proposes a stronger defi-
nition of probabilistic independence that sanctions it. Unfortunately, [Gärdenfors,
1978] has shown that it leads to trivialisation results in the probabilistic framework.
A special case of Keynes' postulate is the so-called conjunction criterion for
dependence :
(CCD) If C depends on A, and C depends on B, and A ABI- F, then C
depends on A A B.
Gärdenfors [1978] has also suggested a conjunction criterion for independence
dual to (CCD):
328 D. DUBOIS. L. FARINAS DEL CERRO. A. HERZIG AND H. PRADE
(CCI) If C is independent of A, and C is independent of B, then C is indepen-

dent of A 1\ B.
More reeently, Gärdenfors [1990] has proposed that the eoneept of relevance
should satisfy four l minimal requirements :
Rl A is relevant for C iff C is not independent of A
R2 If A is relevant for C then ..,A is relevant for C
R3 T is independent of C
R4 If Cis eontingent (Le. neither T nor F) then C is relevant to C.
These postulates equate relevanee with dependenee (Le. the eomplement of in-
dependence), and insist on negation insensitivity (so that F is not relevant for C).
Later on, we shall object to negation insensitivity for some views of dependence,
and we shall question the postulate that there is no middle way between relevance
and independenee. Gärdenfors shows that underRI-R4, CCI + CCD is equivalent
to Keynes' postulate. Sinee the eonjunction of CCI and CCD leads to trivialisa-
tion, one has to abandon one of them. Gärdenfors argues that CCD should be given
up because it leads to sanction some events as relevant to C while intuitively they
are not. This is due to postulate R2. Namely assurne A is relevant for C, then
generally A V D is also relevant for C even if D is not. Due to R2, ..,A V D is
also relevant for C so that by CCD, we conclude that D is also relevant for C,
even if it is not! This remark leads Gärdenfors [1993] to accept CCI. He proposes
a probabilistic concept of independence that satisfies it: C is independent of A
iff P(A) = O. or P(CIA 1\ B) =
P(C) for a11 B such that P(A 1\ B) > 0 and
P( CIB) = P( C). Note that Gärdenfors' independence relation is non-symmetrie.
An alternative attitude is, rather than rejecting CCD, to accept regularities w.r.t.
conjunction and disjunction (sueh as CCD and CCI) and drop Rl and R2. This
is the type of choice we shall be led to in the fo11owing. Namely, we shall object
to negation insensitivity in some contexts, and we shall question the postulate that
there is no middle way between relevance and independence. We show that in an
ordinal setting where uncertainty is described by ordering the states of the world
(i.e. the elementary events) according to their plausibility, we can capture proper-
ties similarto CCI and CCD in terms of disjunction, with much simpler definitions
of independence than the above probabilistic ones. This framework is the one of
possibility theory, which has strong connections with belief change [Dubois and
Prade, 1991; Dubois and Prade, 1992] and ordering-based nonmonotonic reason-
ing [Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Benferhat et al., 1997].
I Gärdenfors also introduces a fifth axiom stating that relevance is syntax-independent when cast in
the setting of a fonnallanguage. Such an axiom is superftuous in our representational setting.
3 POSSIBILITY THEORY
In this section, we briefty recall the notions of possibility measure and distribution
[Zadeh, 1978] and of conditional possibility [Dubois and Prade, 1988]. Possibility
theory provides a simple uncertainty representation setting where ordinal informa-
tion about events derives from a complete preordering of elementary events (that
correspond to the interpretations of a formallanguage). Dual rankings of events
(or formulas ) are induced in terms of possibility and certainty. 2
Possibility measures allow to associate an uncertainty degree to each element
of a set of events &, here assumed to be finite. A function 11 from & into any finite
totally ordered set L (with top 1 and bottom 0) is a possibility measure if it satisfies
the following decomposability axiom: II(A V B) = max(II(A), II(B». L acts as
a possibility scale.
This axiom enables an ordering on events to be recovered from an ordering of
elementary events. In the finite case a possibility measure can always be repre-
sented by a possibility distribution 'Ir on the set of elementary events W, such that
'Ir(w) = II( {w}). Then II(A) = max{'Ir(w)lw E A}. 'Ir encodes a complete tran-
sitive preorder of interpretations, with the intended meaning that if 'Ir ( w) > 'Ir ( w'),
then w is a more plausible (or normal, expected, ... ) situation than w'. Reason-
ing in the setting of possibility theory comes down to assuming that the current
situation is always one of the most plausible ones, among those that are left pos-
sible. This is reftected by the fact that II(A) is computed on the basis of the
most plausible situation(s) where A is true. The quantity N(A) = 1 - II(-,A)
is called the necessity of A, and represents a level of certainty (or acceptance) of
A. 1 - (-) is just a notation for the order-reversing function on L (if L {1 = =
Al > A2 > ... > An = O}, 1 -Ai = An+1-i, for all i). It can be checked that
min(N(A), N(-,A)) = 0; Ais said to be accepted iff N(A) > N(-,A). Hence
N(A) > 0 means that A is accepted. And we have the reasonable axiom of ac-
ceptance saying that if A is accepted and so is B, then A ABis accepted, too,
since N(AAB) = min(N(A), N(B» holds. If Ais notaccepted (N(A) = 0), it
does not entail that it is rejected (N (-,A) > 0). This makes it clear that possibility
theory can express the three possible attitudes that we want to distinguish.
N(A) = 1 means that A is fully certain, in the sense that A is asserted as
strongly as a tautology. A necessity measure such that N(A) < 1, VA f. T
(equivalently II(A) > 0, VA -:j:. F) is called non-dogmatic. This paper deals with
non-dogmatic possibility and necessity measures.
There are many reasons why this setting is interesting for the representation of
uncertain cognitive states. Indeed, every possibility measure can be viewed as an
encoding of a comparative possibility relation on events '2:' defined by A 2: B
if and only if II(A) 2: II(B). Tbe only functions mapping events into L which
2possibility theory can also be described in tenns of numerical set-functions, in which case they
are special cases of belieffunctions [Shafer, 1976] and probability envelopes. Related to possibility
theory are Spohn's [1988] kappa functions where the scale ofnatura1 integers is used instead ofthe unit
intervaI.
330 D. DUBOIS. L. FARINAS DEL CERRO. A. HERZIG AND H. PRADE
thus strictly agree with qualitative possibility orderings are possibility measures
[Dubois, 1986]. As shown in [Farifias deI Cerro and Herzig, 1991] and [Ha-
jek et al., 1994], such a notion of comparative possibility can be cast into modal
logic and is equivalent to that underlying Lewis' [1986] logic of conditionals. The
dual necessity orderings lie at the core of the AGM theory of belief revision (un-
der the name 'epistemic entrenchment' [Gärdenfors, 1988], or 'expectation order-
ings' [Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994]), as weIl as of theories of nonmonotonic
reasoning that exploit a partial or complete ordering of interpretations of a lan-
guage (such as that of Shoham [1988], Kraus et al. [1990], Goldszmidt and Pearl
[1992], Lehmann and Magidor [1992] and Boutilier [1994l). Tight links between
possibility theory and preferential inference in the sense of Kraus et al. [1990]
have been established by Boutilier [1994], Farifias deI Cerro et al. [1994] and
Dubois and Prade [1995a). Moreover it has been proved in [Benferhat et al., 1992;
Benferhat et al., 1997] that possibilistic logic can capture the so-called ratio-
nal inference relations, satisfying a weak form of monotony known as 'rational
monotony' [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992].
The above discussion suggests that the major trends in the theory of belief re-
vision and plausible reasoning are based on an ordinal framework for representing
uncertainty, encoded as a complete preordering, or as a set of complete preorder-
ings, of interpretations. That is exactly what possibility theory, in its qualitative
version, is about.
Conditional possibility can be defined similarly to conditional probability, chang-
ing the Bayes identity P(A A C) = P(CIA) . P(A) into a more qualitative coun-
terpart:
ll(A AC) = min(I1(CIA), ll(A».
The use of minimum is justified by the ordinal nature of the possibility scale. Prod-
uct would require a numerical scale and lead to Dempster conditioning [Shafer.
1976], or Spohn's [1988] conditioning. Moreover this definition obeys Cox's re-
quirements for a conditioning function (see e.g. [Paris, 1994]), except that min is
only increasing in the wide sense. The conditional possibility ll(CIA) is then
defined as the maximal solution of the above equation. This choice of the maximal
solution is due to the principle 0/ minimal specijicity, which urges to select the
least informative or committed possibility measure, i.e. the one which allows each
event to have the greatest possibility level:
11(CIA) = 1 if I1(A) = ll(A A C) and C #F
I1(CIA) = ll(A A C) otherwise.
By duality the conditional necessity is N( -'ClA) = 1 - I1(CIA). Hence
N(CIA) _ { 0 if N(-,A) = N(A -+ C) and C # T

- N(A -+ C) if N(-,A) < N(A -+ C)
where -+ denotes material implication. This is called qualitative conditioning. The
following noticeable property expresses that C is accepted in context A iff A A C
is more plausible than A A -,C:
N(CIA) > 0 iffll(A A C) > ll(A A -,C).

Note that if ll(A A C) > ll(A A -,C) then N(CIA) = N(-,A V C) = 1 -
ll(A A -,C) ~ 1- ll(-,C) = N(C). Hence if N(C) > 0, the situation N(C) >
N( CIA) > 0 (anenuation of acceptance) can never happen. So the input informa-
tion A either confirms C or totally destroys our confidence in it. This is typical of
the ordinal conditioning. Note that N(C) = 1 implies that N(CIA) = 1 as well,
ifll(A) > O. Hence N(C) = 1 means that C can be questioned only by asserting
impossible facts.
4 A TYPOLOGY OF QUALITATIVE RELEVANCE AND INDEPENDENCE
It is tempting to define independence via conditioning in possibility theory, in a

way similar to probability theory, namely to define Casindependent of A when
the (conditional) measure of C given A is equal to the unconditional measure
of C. Our investigation focuses on the qualitative, min-based conditioning. In
possibility theory there are two uncertainty functions II and N. Hence we can
define independenceeither as ll(CIA) = ll(C) or as N(CIA) = N(C).
If ll(CIA) = ll(C) < 1 then we are in the situation where C is plausibly re-
jected(sincell(-,C) = 1> ll(C». HencethemeaningofII(CIA) = ll(C) < 1
is that learning that A is true does not affect the plausible rejection of C. This
expresses the negative statement that accepting -,C is independent of A. It sug-
gests to use N (CI A) = N (C) in order to express the positive statement that A is
irrelevant to (the level of acceptance of) C. It turns out that this notion of irrele-
vance is not uniform because it expresses the disjunction of two distinct forms of
irrelevance:
PROPOSITION 1. N(CIA) = N(C) is equivalent to the disjunetion ofthe fol-
lowing properties
1. 1 = max(ll(-,A A -,C), ll(A A -,C» and ll(A A -,C) ~ ll(A AC), or
2. ll(A A C) > ll(A A -,C) ~ ll(-,A A -,C).
Proof. N(CIA) = N(C) iffII(-,CIA) = II(-,C). Naturally, two situations arise:
• i)N(ClA) = othenll(AA-,C) ~ ll(AAC) andll(-,C) = 1 ~ ll(C);
• ii) N(CIA) > 0 then ll(-,C) = ll(-,CIA) = ll(A A -,C) < ll(A" C) ~
ll(C) = 1. Hence ll(A AC) > ll(A A -,C) ~ ll(-,A A -,C).
•
The two situations (1) and (2) correspond to (almost) reversed orderings of in-
terpretations. Case (1) corresponds to the situation where N(CIA) = N(C) = 0,
that is, C is either ignored or rejected both apriori and in the context A, which
is again a composite situation. In possibility theory, the full knowledge about C
is expressed by the pair (N (C), N (...,C) ), and it covers the three situations where
C is accepted, rejected or unknown. This leads to recognize three situations of
independence in the absolute form:
• absolute independence of C w.r.t. A
N(CIA) = N(C) > 0 (hence N(""ClA) = N(...,C) = 0)

• absolute independence of ...,C w.r.t. A
N(...,CIA) = N(...,C) > 0 (hence N(CIA) = N(C) = 0)

• uninformativeness
N(ClA) = N(C) = N(""CIA) = N(...,C) = O.

The first (resp. second) condition means that believing C (resp. ...,C) is not affected
by A, whiIe the third condition means that A does not inform about C. In the two
first situations we shall say that believing C (resp. ...,C) is absolutely independent
of A, where the term 'absolute' refers to the stability of the level of acceptance,
and the expression 'believing C' indicates that it is assumed that C is an accepted
apriori belief. The last situation, which cannot be expressed in the probabilistic
framework, means that in the presence of A, the piece of belief C, which was orig-
inally ignored, is still ignored. In this case, we shall speak of uninformativeness of
A about C (or equivalently about ...,C), a notion that is negation-insensitive with
respect to C. This is formalised by the following definitions:
DEFINITION 2. Believing C is absolutely independent of A (denoted
Al". C) iff N(CIA) = N(C) > 0. 3
Note that A l". C iff II(A /\ C) > II(A /\ ...,C) ~ II(...,A /\ ...,C). This is just
case ii) of Proposition 1. The absolute independence relation is thus character-
ized without using conditional necessities. It is easy to show that other interesting
characterizations exist:
COROLLARY 3.
1. Al".' C iffII(A) > II(...,C) = II(A /\ ...,C).
2. A l". C iff II(A /\ ...,C) = min(II(A), II( ...,C» and II( ...,C) < II(A).
3. If Al". C then II(A /\ C) = min(II(A), II(C».
3We used -4- instead of .l,., in [Dubois et al., 1994] and [Dubois et al., 1997].
4. If II(-,C) ~ II(A) then A .l.". C does not hold.
Proof. Tbe only if part of (1) is obvious. Now if II(A) > II( -,C) = II(A A -,C),
it writes max(II(A AC), II(A A -,C» > max(II(A A -,C), II( -.A A -.C» =
II(A A -.C). Just use the fact that max(a, b) > max(b, c) implies a > c. Tbat (1)
implies (2) is obvious since II (A A -.C) ~ II (-.A A -.C). (2) implies (1) because
II(A A -.C) ~ II(A A C) does not hold when A .l.". C. Tbe other points are
obvious. •
DEFINITION4. AdoesnotinformaboutCiffN(CIA) = N(C) = N(-.CIA) =
N(-.C) = O.
PROPOSITION 5. A does not inform about C iff II(A 1\ C) = II(A A -.C) = 1
or II( -,A A -.C) = II( -,A A C) > II(A A C) = II(A 1\ -.C).
Proof. Using the proof of Proposition 1 for C and -.C and the definition of pos-
sibilistic conditioning, C is not informed by A iff II(C) =II(-.C) =1 and
II(A A -.C) = II(A AC). So if II(A A -.C) = II(A A C)= 1 then II(C) =
II( -.C) = 1 holds as weIl. Otherwise we get II( -.A 1\ C) = II( -.A A -.C) = 1
since II(C) = max(II(A AC), II(-.A AC» = 1 and II(-.C) = max(II(A A
-.C), II(-.A A -.C» = 1. •
Now in order to investigate the opposite notions of relevance, simply taking
the complement of the absolute independence or uninformativeness relation is not
satisfactory. For instance the negation of 'believing C is absolutely independent
of A' is 'either N(C) = 0, or N(CIA) =F N(C) > 0'. But it is hard to see
why N (C) = 0 alone would mean that A is relevant to C. So in the possibilistic
framework, we must give up the idea that 'relevance' is just the negation of 'in-
dependence'. If we investigate relevance, we must keep the acceptance condition
(N(C) > 0) and only negate the other equality condition. So A is said to be rel-
evant to believing C iff N(C) > 0 but N(CIA) =F N(C). Again, this situation
splits into three cases:
• N(C) > 0 and N(C[A) > N(C) (confirmation)
• N(C) > 0 andN(CIA) = N(-.CIA) = 0 (cancellation)
• N(C) > 0 and N(-.CIA) > 0 (refutation)
Each of these cases corresponds to the following relative plausibility ordering
on elementary situations:
PROPOSITION 6. A confirms C iff
max(II(A 1\ C), II(-.A A C» > II( -.A A -,C) > II(A A -,C).
Proof. Use the fact that N(CIA) > N(C) > 0 iff 1 = II(C) > II(-,C)
max(II (-,A A -.C), II (A A -.C» > II (A A -.C). Tbe inequalities clearly show
that the most abnormal situation is A A -.C so that when learning A, the level of
acceptance goes up from 1 - II( -.A A "'C) to 1 - II(A A -.C). •
PROPOSITION 7. A cancels C iff

II(.,A A C) > max(II(A AC), II(A A .,C), II(.,A A .,C»
and II(A A C). = II(A A .,C)
Proof. N(CIA) = N(.,GjA) reads II(A A C) = II(A A .,C) and N(C) > 0
reads max(II(A A C),II(.,A A C» > max(II(A A .,C),II(.,A A .,C) so that
II(.,A A C) > II(A A C) as weIl. •
PROPOSITION 8. A refutes C iff
II(.,A A C) > max(II(A AC), II(A A .,C), II(.,A A .,C»
and II(A A C) < II(A A .,C)
Proof. As above except for the strict inequality II(A A C) < II(A A .,C) induced
by N(CIA) < N(.,GjA). •
In the first situation,learning A confirms C by increasing its level of acceptance.
In the second case, learning A leads us to forget about C, and we say that A cancels
C. In the third case, the agent's belief in C is reversed: we say that A refutes C.
RememberthatthemissingcaseN(C) > N(CIA) > o(attenuation)cannotoccur
here.
The two cases when A confirms C, and when believing C is absolutely inde-
pendent of A, are those where learning A neither cancels nor refutes the agent's
apriori acceptance of C. In the purely ordinal case where levels of belief are
represented in a relative fashion only, it is not really meaningful to distinguish
confirmation from absolute independence. This argument is reinforced by the fact
that attenuation of acceptance can only occur in a drastic way: namely if A con-
firms C, but B subsequently does not and on the contrary weakens our belief in
C, then A AB necessarily either cancels or refutes C. To sum it up, it means that
there will not be any compensation effect between the confirmation of C by A and
the subsequent negative effect of B: the latter will prevail in any case. So it is
legitimate to consider the disjunction of the two cases when A neither cancels nor
refutes C (in other words either A confirms C or believing C is absolutely inde-
pendent of A) as expressing a single form of qualitative independence of C w.r.t.
A. This leads to purely ordinal notions of relevance and independence:
DEFINITION 9. Believing C is qualitatively independentof A (denoted A ~ C)
iff N(C) > 0 and N(CIA) > 0. 4
DEFINITION 10. A isqualitativelyrelevantforC (denotedA ~ C) iff N(C) >
oand N(CIA) = 0.5
Hence A is qualitatively relevant for C iff A cancels or refutes C. Mind that
relevance cannot but negatively affect beliefs.
PROPOSITION 11. A ~ C iff
II(A A C) > ll(A A .,C) and max(ll(A AC), II(.,A A C» > ll(.,A A .,C).
4We used ~ instead of .l;. in [Dubois et al., 1994] and [Dubois et aL, 1997].
5We used R1> instead of"" in [Dubois et al., 1994] and [Dubois et al., 1997].
Proof. Indeed A ~ C is equivalent to TI(A /\ C) > TI(A /\ ,Cl, TI( C) = 1 =

max(TI(A/\C),TI(,A/\C)) > TI(A/\,C) andmax(TI(C /\A),TI(C /\,A)) >
TI (,A /\ ,C), the first of which is redundant. •
Tbe following results compare absolute and qualitative independence, and point
out that the independence notions used here are stronger than the possibilistic
counterpart of the probabilistic product rule:
PROPOSITION 12.
1. A J... C iff A ~ C and TI(A /\ ,Cl = TI( ,C).

2. A ~ C implies TI(A /\ C) = min(TI(A), TI(C)). Tbe converse does not
hold.
Proof. For fact 1 note that A J... C iff TI (A /\ C) > TI (A /\ ,Cl 2': TI (,A /\ ,C).
The result is obvious noticing that TI(A /\ ,Cl = TI( ,Cl is equivalent to TI(A /\
. . . C) 2': TI (...... A /\ . . . C). and that adding the latter condition to A ~ C, the condition
TI(C) > TI(,A /\ ,Cl becomes redundant. Fact 2 is obvious since II(A /\ C) >
TI (A /\ . . . C), and then TI (A) = TI (A /\ C) ::; TI (C) so the minimum rule applies to
A and C. However it is weaker since TI(A /\ C) = min(TI(A), TI(C)) if and only
if TI(A /\ C) 2': min(TI(A /\ ...... C), TI( . . . A /\ C)) (See [Dubois et al., 1994]). •
Tbe minimum rule is only a weakening of the logical notion of consistency be-
tween two propositions. Tbe situation of independence in possibility theory is
thus very different from the situation in probability theory, where standard dis-
symmetric formulations of independence are basically equivalent to the product
rule.
A last form of dependence is the one obtained when neither C nor ,C is an
accepted belief but C becomes accepted in the context where A is true. Tbis is a
form of direct relevance of A for C akin to causality, or at least an epistemic form
of it, since it means that A is a reason for starting to believe C.
DEFINITION 13. Ajustifies C iff N(C) = N( . . . C) = 0 and N(ClA) > o.
PROPOSITION 14. A justifies C iff TI( C) = TI( ,A /\ . . . C) > TI(A /\ ,C) and
TI(A /\ C) > TI(A /\ ,C).
Proof. Ajustifies C reads TI(C) = TI( ...... C) and TI(A /\ C)> TI(A /\ . . . C). hence
max(TI(A /\ C),TI(,A /\ C)) = max(TI(A /\ ......C),TI( ...... A /\ ,C)). But since
TI(A/\ . . . C) < TI(A/\C). it comes max(TI(A/\C), TI(,A/\C)) = TI(,A/\,C) >
TI(A/\ . . . C). •
Figure 1 is the counterpart of Table 1. It exhaustively summarizes the various

cases of relevance and independence that can be expressed in an ordinal setting.
(Dual cases can be expressed in terms of those which appear in the table. changing
A into . . . A or C into ,C.) Figure Ilays bare the fact that two distinct concepts
y~N(0~;!.>:(-C)ClA) ..
qualitative
independence
qualitative
relevance Ajusti C ~-.GIA)
I A~r
refutcs~
A.l,.C N(-.GIA) =0 / >0_
N~CA >0 -0
N(CIA) >61utc
(confinnation)
N(CIA) = N(C)
independence)
( I)
A C A cancels C
.. . .
A Justifies -.G urunfonnat.veness
AJ....C
Figure 1.
of independence exist: uninformativeness, and qualitative independence that ex-

presses that an accepted belief C resists an input information A. The latter notion
has absolute independence as a particular case.
As checked from above, these various notions of independence and relevance
can be characterized solely in terms of the relative plausibility of the elementary
situations described by A and C.
5 PROPERTIES OF ABSOLUTE AND QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE
The following proposition describes the behaviour of absolute independence with

respect to logical connectives such as conjunction, disjunction and negation.
PROPOSITION 15. The following properties hold:
1. If A J..". Band A J..". C then A J..". BA C.

2. If A J..". BA C then A J..". Bor A J..". C.
3. If AJ..". C and B J..". C then A V B J..". C.
4. A A B J..". ..,B A C does not hold.
5. At least one of A J..". C and ..,A J..". ..,C does not hold.
6. At least one of A J..". C and ..,C J..". ..,A does not hold.
Proof. Facts 1 and 2 are based on the min-decomposability of necessity rneasures:

N(B A CIA) ~ min(N(BIA), N(CIA)) = min(N(B), N(C)) = N(B A C) >
O. Fact 1 is then obvious. Fact 2 sterns frorn the fact that the situation where
0< N(BIA) = N(C) < min(N(CIA),N(B)) is irnpossible (lackofattenuation
property in possibility theory, as pointed out at the end of section 3). Necessarly
if A J..". BA C either N(BIA) = N(B) > 0 or N(CIA) = N(C) > O.Fact 3
can be proved using the property Al."" C iff II(A) > II(..,C) = II(A 1\ ..,C).
Then Al."" C and B l."" C imply max(II(A), II(B)) = II(A V B) > II( ..,C) =
II(A I\..,C) = II(B 1\ ..,C) = II«A V B) 1\ ..,C). Fact 4 just points out that
N(..,B 1\ CIA 1\ B) = O. Fact 5, only reflects the equality min(N(C), N(..,C)) =
0; so, if N(CIA) = N(C) > 0 then N(..,C) = O. For Fact 6, just recall that
II(A 1\ -,C) 2: II(..,A 1\ ..,C) as soon as A.1= C holds. Hence N(..,AI..,C) = o.
•
Let us comment on these properties. Fact 1 looks similar to the CCD axiom of
section 2, except that the conjunction does not appear at the same place. Fact
2 is a weak reciprocal to it. They remind us that the necessity function repre-
sents acceptance which is closed by conjunction ([Dubois and Prade, 1995b)).
Fact 3 is similar to the CCI axiom except that disjunction is used instead of con-
junction. Note that the converse of Fact 3 does not hold even in a weak form:
we may have A V B .1= C without having A .1= C nor B .1= C. For instance
consider the case when II(A 1\ ..,B 1\ C) > II(..,A 1\ B 1\ ..,C) > II(D) for
other elementary events D. Then II(A V B) > II( ..,C) = II«A V B) 1\ ..,C),
but II( -,C) > II(A 1\ ..,C) and II(B) = II( ..,C). Fact 4 is natural since mutu-
ally exc1usive events cannot be independent. Fact 5 expresses a negative state-
ment: the reason why ..,A .1= ..,C does not hold when A .1= C is because ..,C is
not accepted. But we may have the weaker form of simultaneous independence:
N(CIA) = N(C) and N(..,CI..,A) = N(..,C). Fact 6 is a bit debatable since it
forbids any kind of negation-proof behaviour of absolute independence: the lat-
ter is always negation-sensitive. In the following we give properties of absolute
independence with respect to tautologies, contradictions, and extreme beliefs.
PROPOSITION 16. The following properties hold:
1. F l."" C does not hold.

2. T l."" C iff N (C) > O.
3. A.1= F does not hold.
4. A.1= T iff II(A) > O.
5. A.1= A iff N(A) = 1.
6. If A .1= C for some A and C then II(T) > II(F).
Proof. Just use the ordering of elementary events induced by A .1= C: II(AI\C) >
II(A 1\ ..,C) 2: II(..,A 1\ ..,C). For fact 1, F l."" C would imply II(F) > II(F),
which is impossible. T .1= C writes II(C) > II(..,C). If A .1= F held, it would
imply II(F) > II(A), which is impossible. A l."" T iff II(A) > II(F) = O.
A .1= A iff II(A) > II(A 1\ ..,A) = II(F) 2: II( ..,A), that is, II( ..,A) = O. As for
6, just use II(T) 2: II(A 1\ C) > II(A 1\ ..,C) 2: II(F). •
Proposition 16 points out that adding a contradiction to a set ofbeliefs destroys

all previously accepted propositions. On the contrary tautologies never affect the
plausibility of already plausible propositions (Fact 2). Fact 3 is simply due to the
impossibility to accept self-contradictory propositions. Fact 4 says that impossible
propositions (II(A) = 0) added to our beliefs cancel even tautologies. Fact 5
claims that the only case when the truth of A is independent of itself is when A is
a tautology or when A is fuHy certain. If the possibility measure is non-dogmatic,
A 1:, T always holds if A =I F and A 1:, A holds only if A = T. Fact 6 says
that the absolute independence relation is empty when the possibility measure is
trivial.
We now examine the validity of Keynes-Gärdenfors-like criteria of Section 2
for qualitative independence and relevance. Tbere will be several versions of the
criteria. Tbe original formulations are renamed as foHows:
(CCD,) If A ~ C and B ~ C then A A B ~ C.

(CCIl ) IfA~ CandB ~ CthenAAB ~ C.
As we do not generally have symmetry, we must investigate the counterparts of
CCDl and CCI, with conjunction on the right:
(CCDr ) If A ~ B and A ~ C then A ~ BA C.

(CCIr ) If A ~ Band A ~ C then A ~ BA C.
We also consider the corresponding disjunction criteria (DCD, DCI, etc.):
(DCI,) IfA~ CandB~CthenAVl1~C.
(DCD,) If A~ C andB~ CthenAv B~ C.
(DCIr ) IfA~ BandA~ CthenA~ BvC.

(DCDr ) If A~ B andA~ CthenA~ BvC.
In the above properties named XCZz , X stands for disjunction or conjunction,
C for Criterion, Y for independence or dependence, and z stands for left or right.
Tbere are also stronger versions of these criteria in terms of equivalences, for some
of the notions:
(CCIt) A~ BandA~ CiffA~ BAC.
(CCDt) A~ B andA~ C iff A"-+ BA C.
Here we shaH not prove all possible such properties. As an example let us prove
some properties of qualitative independence:
PROPOSITION 17. Tbe foHowing properties hold:
1. A ~ B A C iff A ~ B and A ~ C (CCIt).

2. If A -S C and B -S C then A V B -S C (Deli).
3. If A V B -S C then A -S C or B -S C.
4. If A V B -S C then A -S C or A V B -S ...,A.
Proof. The if part of Fact 1 is Fact 1 of Proposition 15 whose proof still works
with qualitative independence. For the only if part: A -S BA C reads N(B A
CIA) 2': N(B AC) > 0 which is equivalent to min(N(BIA), N(ClA» 2':
min(N(B), N(C)) > O. Hence N(BIA) > 0; but since N(B) > N(BIA) > 0
is impossible, it follows that N(BIA) 2': N(B) > 0, and A -S B holds; similarly,
A -S C holds as weIl.
ForFact2II(AAC) > II(AA""C) andII(C) > II(...,AA...,C) andII(BAC) >
II(BA...,C) andII(C) > II(...,BA...,C) implyII«AvB)AC) > II«AvB)A""C)
using the max decomposability. Moreover II( C) > II(...,B A ...,C) 2': II( ...,(A V
B) A ...,C).
For Fact 3 suppose that A V B -S C but A -S C does not hold. So the two
inequalities hold:
• II«A V B) A C) > II«A V B) A ...,C)

• II(C) > II(...,(A V B) A ...,C)
Note that they imply II(C) > II(...,C) 2': II(...,A A ...,C). So the only way of
assuming thatA -S C does not hold is to let II(AAC) :::; II(AA...,C). Then the first
inequalityenforcesII(BAC) > II(BA""C). MoreoverII(C) 2': II«AVB)AC) >
II( (A V B) A ...,C) 2': II(A A ...,B A ...,C) and II( C) > II(...,A A ...,B A ...,C) imply
II( C) > II(...,B A ...,C), so B -S C holds. But A V B -S C does not imply that
both A -S C and B -S C hold.
For Fact 4, assume A V B -S C but A -S C does not hold. This means
N(C) > 0, N(CIA V B) > O,N(CIA) = O. It corresponds to assuming the
following inequalities:
• II(C) > II(...,C)

• II«A VB) A C) > II«A V B) A ...,C)
• II(A AC) :::; II(A A ...,C)

WemustthenprovethatAVB -S ...,A, thatisN(...,A) > 0 andN(...,AIAV B) > O.
In other words, II( ...,A) > II(A) and II«A V B) A ...,A) = II(...,A A B) > II«A V
B) A A) = II(A). First note that II( C) > II( ...,C) and II(A A C) :::; II(A A ...,C)
implyII(...,AAC) > max(II(AAC),II(AA...,C),II(...,AA""C). HenceII(...,A) >
II(A). Moreover the second and the third inequality can be exploited as folIows.
The second one writes max(II(A A C),II(B AC» > II«A V B) A ...,C) but
since II(A A C) :::; II(A A ...,C) :::; II«A V B) A ...,C), it leads to II(B A C) >
II( (A V B) A ...,C). But noticing that II(B A C) = max(II(A A B AC), II(...,A A
Table 2. Properties of independence and relevance relations
OCI, DeO, CCI r ccrr DeIr CCOr ccot DeO,

l;qual. maepenaent ot A
y Y Y n Y y Y n
(N(C) > O,N(CIA) > 0)
A does not mtorrn about (J
(N(C) = N(~C) = Y n n n n n n n
N(CIA) = N(-,CIA) = 0)
A cancels /.;
(N(C) >0, Y n n n n n n n
N(CIA) = N(-,CIA) = 0)
A retutes l;
y y n n n y n y
(N(C) > O,N(-,CIA) > 0)
AJustmes Li
(N(C) = N(-,C) = 0, y y n n n n n n
N(CIA) >0)
B 1\ C» and Il(A 1\ B 1\ C» ~ II(A 1\ C) ~ 1l«A V B) 1\ ...,C), it finally

leads to 1l(...,A 1\ B 1\ C) > max(II«A V B) 1\ ...,C),Il(A 1\ C». Noticing that
«AV B) I\...,C) V (AI\C) = AV(...,AI\...,B I\...,C) we concludethatll(...,AI\B) 2:
1l(...,A 1\ B 1\ C) > Il(A). Hence 1l(...,A 1\ B) > Il(A). •
The equivalence A -S B 1\ C iff A -S B and A -S C indieates that qualitative

independence is fully transparent to conjunction on the right side and this is again
related to the idea of acceptance: if A does not undermine B nor C it should not
undermine their conjunction. The second property expresses that independence is
partially transparent to disjunction on the left and this is related to reasoning by
cases: If neither A nor B can undermine C then their disjunction will not. Fact
3 is related to the disjunctive rationality of non-monotonie inference (Makinson,
1994). Fact 4 is stronger than the third one since one cannot have at the same time
A V B -S ...,A and A VB -S ...,B. It is related to the property of rational monotony
of non-monotonie inference (Makinson, 1994). Fact 4 does not hold for absolute
independence: we may have Av B 1: C, while none of A 1: C and A VB 1.= ...,A
hold: namelythethreestatementsN(CIA V B) = N(C) > O,N(CIA) > N(C),
andN(...,A) > N(...,AIAV B) = Oareconsistent.
Tbe systematie study of all stability properties with respect to conjunction and
disjunction leads to results given on Table 5 above. Whenever the relation is one
of independence, the respective criteria DeD/, DeDr , eeD/, CCDr , CCD;: refer
to its complement dependence relation. In turn, whenever the relation is one of
relevance, the respective criteria DCI" DCIr , CCI;: refer to its complement irrel-
evance relation. All relations satisfy DCI. In the case of uninformativeness and
cancellation it is the only property that holds. (Formally, this is due to the pres-
ence of negations in the definition of the former.) 'Qualitative independence' and
'uninformativeness' are the most regular notions, due to their simple definition.
Noticeably, the conditions CCI/ and CCDl are never satisfied. This apparent para-
dox will be explained in Section 6. Note that Proposition 16 holds for qualitative
independence -S except for Fact 5. It is easy to verify indeed that A -S A if and
only if N(A) > O. For non-dogmatic necessity measures, A ~ A holds except if

A=F.
Let us consider the situation with respect to negation. A noticeable feature of
both cancellation and refutation of C by A is that it occurs provided that ,A 1\ C is
the only most normal situation, and in particular, provided that A is not plausibly
true. As a consequence, it is easy to check that if A cancels or refutes C then in
turn C neitherrefutes norcancels ,A (since the inequality II( ,AI\C) > II(AI\C)
must hold), nor does ,A cancel or refute C (since the inequality II(,A 1\ C) >
II(A 1\ ,C) must hold). Stated formally, we have proved that
if A "-t C then both ,A ~ C and C ~ ,A.
6 REPRESENTATION OF QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE
The above regularities do not completely characterize the respective notions. It can
be proved that absolute independence, qualitative independence and qualitative
relevance can be axiomatized in such a way as to recover qualitative possibility
theory.
THEOREM 18 (Construction of II from ..1= ). Let II be a possibility measure,
and let the absolute independence relation ..1= be defined from II. Then II(A) >
II(C) iff A V C ~ ,C, and N(A) > N(C) iff,A V ,C ..1= A, where A ~ C
means N(ClA) = N(C) > O.
Proof. We know that A..1= C iffII(A 1\ C) > II(A 1\ ,C) ~ II(,A 1\ ,C). So
A V C ..1= ,C iffII(A 1\ ,C) > II(C) 2: II(,(A V C) 1\ C) = II(F) = O. Hence
II(A) > II(C). Conversely, II(A) > II(C) iffmax(II(A 1\ C),II(A 1\ ,C)) >
max(II(A 1\ C), II( ,A 1\ C)) iff II(A 1\ ,C) > II( C)(~ 0). Just use duality
between possibility and necessity for the other result. •
COROLLARY 19. If A V C ..1= ,C, then A V B ~ ,B or B V C ~ ,C.
Proof. Using Theorem 18 it reads: if II(A) > II(C) then II(A) > II(B) or
II(B) > II(C). By contraposition it means: II(C) ~ II(B) and II(B) ~ II(A)
implies II(C) ~ II(A). . •
THEOREM 20 (Axiomatic equivalence of ..1= with possibility theory). Let 9

be a function from a finite Boolean algebra of events to a totally ordered scale L.
Let ~ be the associated absolute independence relation on events (A ~ C iff
g(CIA) = g(C) > 0 where g(CIA) is the conditional set-function defined from
9 using qualitative conditioning of necessity measures). Then 9 is a non-trivial
necessity measure iff the relation ~ satisfies the following axioms:
(All) T..1= T;
(AI2) A .1= F never holds 6 ;

(AB) if A V C .l..: ..,C, then A V B .l..: ..,B or B V C .l..: ..,C
(restricted transitivity);
(AI4) A.l..:..,A does not hold7 ;
(AIS) if A .l..: B and A .l..: C, then A .l..: B A C
(stability under conjunction for acceptance, Le. CCIr ).
Proof. On the one hand one must prove that the above axioms are valid when
.1= derives from a necessity measure. This has been proved earlier in this paper.
On the other hand, we prove that the axioms for qualitative necessity orderings
are derivable from the above axiomatics (and then we use the completeness of
qualitative necessity orderings w.r.t. possibility theory).
Using the previous theorem in terms of necessities, define A > C iff ..,A V
..,C .l..: A, and C ~ A otherwise. Let us show that ~ expresses a non-trivial
qualitative necessity:
1. (non triviality) (AII) also writes (..,F V ..,T) .1= T, that means T > F.
2. (transitivity) (AI3) translates into if..,C > ..,A then ..,C > ..,B or..,B >
..,A, and this is equivalent to ..,A ~ ..,B and ..,B ~ ..,C then ..,A ~ ..,C
3. (top) (AI2) is also the negation of..,A V..,T .1= T and thus means T ~ A.
4. (conjunctiveness) AI4 is instanciated by the negation of
..,A V ..,C .l..: A A C. From AIS it follows that one of..,A V..,C .l..: A or
..,A V..,C .1= C does not hold. This also writes ..,(A A C) v..,A .1= A or
..,(A A C) V ..,C .l..: C, and this means A A C ~ A or A A C ~ C.
5. (dominance) is equivalent to A ~ A A C and comes down to prove that
..,A V..,(AA C) .l..: AAC does not hold. But this is an instance of AI4 since
it is really ..,A V..,C .l..: A A C.
Then we can use the soundness of qualitative necessity orderings w.r.t. possibility
theory. We know ([Dubois, 1986]) that the only set functions representing such
orderings are necessity measures. •
Clearly, the above representations theorem does not use the full absolute indepen-
dence relation. Only part of it is enough to represent the necessity measure since
we only use .1= for events D, E such that D V E = T. The following remarkable
property tells us that for such pairs of events absolute independence is equivalent
to qualitative independence:
LEMMA 21. For all A and C we have A V C .l..: ..,C iff A V C -4 ..,C iff
II(A) > II(C).
6 since F cannot be believed
7 since N(~AIA) = 0
Proof. We already know that A V G J..,., -.G iffII(A) > II(G) from Theorem 18.
Using fact 1 of Proposition 12 we know that A V G J..,., -.G iff A V G -S -.G and
II ( (A V G) 1\ G) = II (G). The latter equality clearly always holds. •
Qualitative independence does obey axioms All-Al5, but they are not enough
to characterize it:
THEOREM 22 (Axiomatic equivalence of -S with possibility theory). Let 9
be a function from a finite Boolean algebra of events to a totally ordered sc ale L.
Let -S be the associated qualitative independence relation on events (A -S G iff
g( G) > 0 and g( GIA) > 0, where g( GIA) is the conditional set-function defined
from 9 using the qualitative conditioning of necessity measures). Then 9 is a non-
dogmatic necessity measure iff the relation -S satisfies the following axioms
Qll T -S T
(tautologies do not undermine tautologies);
QI2 if A -S G then A -S B V G
(right weakening);
QB if G =j:. F then G -S G
(if G is not contradictory, then it cannot undermine itselt);
QI4 A -S -.A never holds;

QI5 if A -S G and B -S G then A V B -S G
(left OR rule, i.e. DCI);
QI6 if A V B -S G then either A -S G or A V B -S -.A or both

(similar to rational monotony);
Q17 if A -S B and A -S G, then A -S B 1\ G

(stability under conjunction for acceptance, i.e. CCIr ).
Proof. On the one hand, it is sufficient to notice that the above axioms are valid
for a qualitative independence relation constructed from a non-dogmatic necessity
measure. This has been done earlier. On the other hand, we prove that the axioms
for absolute independence are derivable from the above axiomatics (and then we
use the completeness of absolute independence w.r.t. possibility theory proved in
Theorem 20, since due to Lemma 21 N(A) > N(G) iff -.A V -.G J.", A iff
-.A V -.G -S A. Clearly it is enough to prove Al2 and AB for -S . For Al2
we must prove that A -S F does not hold. Indeed should it hold, QI2 implies
A -S -.A which contradicts QI4. For AB we can try to prove that if A VG -S -.G,
then A V B -S -.B or B V G -S -.G, by establishing that when none of A V
B -S -.B or B V G -S -.G hold then A V G -S -.G would not hold either.
So assume that the latter holds while the two former do not. lt is obvious that
if B 1\ -.G = F, A V G V B -S G holds as weIl. If B 1\ -.G =j:. F then from
344 D. DUBOIS. L. PARINAS DEL CERRO. A. HERZIG AND H. PRADE
QI3, B 1\ ...,0 ~ B 1\ ...,0, and thus B 1\ ...,0 ~ ...,0 using QI2. Applying QIS to
B 1\ ...,0 ~ ...,0 and A V 0 ~ ...,0 leads to A V B V 0 ~ ...,0. Then apply QI6
to A V B V 0 ~ ...,0 and the assumption that B V 0 ~ ...,0 does not hold and
conclude A V B V 0 ~ ...,B 1\ ...,0. By QI2 one gets A V B V 0 ~ ...,B. Apply
again QI6 to A V B V 0 ~ ...,B and the assumption that A V B ~ ...,B does not
hold. It yields A V B V 0 ~ ...,A 1\ ...,B. Lastly apply QI7 to A V B V 0 ~ ...,0
and A V B V 0 ~ ...,A 1\ ...,B and obtain A V B V 0 ~ ...,A 1\ ...,B 1\ ...,0, which
contradicts QI4. Hence the qualitative independence ~ verifies All-AIS. The
non-dogmatic property of N is due to QI3. •
Note that absolute independence does not obey QI2, QI3, nor QI6, due to the
fact that they involve a confirmation effect. Clearly, the above results imply that
from the partial qualitative independence relation ~ between events D, E such
that D V E = Tone can reconstruct both a qualitative independence relation
on all events and a absolute one. To do it, first construct the induced necessity
measure, and then use definitions based on conditioning for events D, E such that
D V E =f. T, that is Definitions 9 and 2 respectively.
Lastly, it is possible to axiomatize qualitative relevance A ~ O. Note that
A ~ 0 is not equivalent to ...,(A ~ 0), so that Gärdenfors' RI does not hold.
We have that A ~ 0 iff ...,(A ~ 0) and T ~ O. It is thus easy to see that
A V 0 ~ ...,0 iff n(...,O) > neO) ~ n(A). So the axiomatization ofrelevance
does not follow immediately from that of independence.
THEOREM 23 (Axiomatic equivalence of ~ with possibility theory). Let g
be a function from a finite Boolean algebra of events to a totally ordered scale L.
Let ~ be the qualitative relevance relation on events associated to g (A ~ 0 iff
g(OIA) = 0 and g(O) > 0, where g(OIA) is the conditional set-function defined
from g using the qualitative conditioning ofnecessity measures). Then gis a non-
trivial necessity measure iff the relation ~ satisfies the following axioms:
QRI It does not hold that A ~ A V 0;
QR2 F ~ A iff A = T or there exists 0 such that ...,A ~ 0;
QR3 if A ~ 0 and ...,B ~ B then A ~ B 1\ 0;

QR4 if ...,A ~ 0 then ...,A ~ A;
QR5 if A V B ~ 0 then A ~ 0 or B ~ 0;
QR6 if A V B ~ A and A ~ 0 then A V B ~ 0

(restricted transitivity);
QR7 if A ~ B 1\ 0 then A ~ Bor A ~ O.
The proof can be done by translating the relevance relation into the qualita-
tive independence relation, while taking care of the preservation of the condition
N(C) > O. AIthough Gärdenfors' Rl does not hold, QRl is related to QIl, QR3
to QI2, and QI4 is related to QR4. QR5-QR7 are contraposed forms of QI5-QI7.
The contraposed forms of QI3-QI4 especially do not hold for~.
7 QUALITATIVE INDEPENDENCE AND BELIEF CHANGE
Several notions of independence and relevance studied above, arnong which quali-
tative independence, can be fuHy expressed in the framework of revision of propo-
sitional theories also called belief sets [Gärdenfors, 1988]. Revising a belief set K
by a sentence A means to add A to K and to res tore consistency so as to keep A.
Gärdenfors [1990] proposes the following criterion for the revision of a belief set:
If a belief state K is revised by a sentence A, then all sentences in

K that are independent of the validity of A should be retained in the
revised state of belief.
This seems to be a very natural requirement for belief revision operations, as weH
as a useful tool when it comes to implementing belief change operations. As noted
by Gärdenfors [1988], 'a criterion of this kind cannot be given a technical formu-
lation [... ] in a simple propositionallanguage because the notion of relevance is
not available in such a language'. However the above criterion does make sense in
the ordinal setting of possibility theory.
Given a belief set K, that is, a set of propositional formulas closed under de-
duction, and a revision operation *, K * A represents the result of revising K by a
formula A. According to Gärdenfors and Makinson 's [1988] characterization the-
orem, if the revision operation satisfies the so-called AGM8 postulates [Alchourron
et al. , 1985], then K and * can be represented by an epistemic entrenchment order-
ing, which in turn is nothing but a qualitative necessity ordering [Dubois and Prade,
199IJ. Conversely, any qualitative necessity ordering leads to an AGM revision
operation. Narnely, given a necessity function N, the set K = {C : N(C) > O}
is a belief set. This is because N is an acceptance function [Dubois and Prade,
1995b], i.e. K is closed under conjunction and logical consequence. Moreover, it
can be proved that the revision operation * can be defined in terms of possibility
theory as folIows: C E K * A is equivalent to N(CIA) > 0 [Dubois and Prade,
1992].9 If we translate the various definitions of independence and relevance in
terms of revision we get the following facts:
1. C is qualitatively independent of A (A ~ C) iff C E K and C E K * A;

2. A cancels C iff C E K and C (j. K * A and -,C (j. K * A;
3. A refutes C iffC E K and -,C E K * A;
8 After Alchourr6n, Gärdenfors and Makinson, who first introduced this notion.
9lt is also equivalentto N( -,A V C) > N( -,A).
4. A is qualitatively relevant for C (A ~ C) iff C E K and C f/. K * A;

5. Ajustifies C iffC f/. K andC E K * A;
6. A does not inform about C iff C f/. K, -.C f/. K, -.C f/. K * A and C f/.
K*A.
Qualitative independence exactly expresses Gärdenfors' above requirement for
independence-based revision.
Tbe operation opposite to revision is contraction. Contracting a belief set K by
a sentence A means to delete A from K, as weIl as those sentences that enable A to
be derived so as to obtain a belief set K - A that does not contain A. Tbe Harper
identity [Gärdenfors, 1988] defines contraction in terms of revision as folIows:
K - A = (K * -.A) n K, i.e. first revise K to accept -.A and then keep only those
formulas that were already in K. Conversely K * A = Cn(K - -.A) U {A},
where Cn is the consequence operation. Tbis is the Levi identity whereby revising
by A means deleting -.A first and then adding A.
Companion definitions of qualitative independence and relevance relations ~c
and ~c can be associated to a contraction operation' -' via the following defini-
tions:
A ~c C iffC E K andC E K - A( iffC E K - A)
A "-+c C iff C E K and C f/. K - A
where A ~c C reads: forgetting A does not affect the belief in C, and A ~c C
reads: forgetting A destroys the belief in C. It is easy to check that Levi and
Harper Identities can be written in terms of independence relations between events
as follows:
A ~c C iff -.A ~ C, and A ~c C iff -.A "-+ C.
Farifias deI Cerro and Herzig [1996] have proved the equivalence between ~c sat-
isfying QRI-QR7 (where A is changed into -.A) and AGM contraction operators.
Similarly, postulating the equivalence between -.A ~ C and C E K - A, it can
be proved that axioms QI l-Q17 are equivalent to the AGM postulates. Indeed, with
the Harper identity, C is qualitatively independent of A (A ~ C) when C E K
and C E K - -.A (because K - -.A is K n (K * A». Due to the set inclusion of
K - A in K, this is just equivalent to C E K - -.A, which makes this independence
notion particuIarIy simple: in fact, we are able to express that CE K by F ~ C.
This permits to obtain a complete axiomatization of qualitative independence ~
by just rewriting the AGM postulates for contraction, turning A into -.A.
If A either cancels or refutes C then we have that C E K and C f/. K * A. With
the Harper identity this is equivalent to C E K and C f/. K - -.A. This corresponds
to a dependence notion proposed in [Farifias deI Cerro and Herzig, 1996]. If we
had presented dependence and independence this way in terms of belief contrac-
tions instead of revisions, the conditions CCD, and CCI, would have been fulfilled
whenever the corresponding revision-based notion (via Levi or Harper identity)
satisfies DCI, and DCD" respectively. In this way, we can recover the original
Keynes-Gärdenfors criteria in terms of conjunctions (whose absence from our list
in Table 2 seemed to be paradoxical).
8 TOWARDS APPUCATION TO EXCEPTION-TOLERANT REASONING
Possibility theory is a natural framework for nonmonotonic reasoning, because it

embeds what Lehmann and Magidor [1992] call rational closure inference (see
[Benferhat et aZ., 1997]). Namely let ß be a conditional knowledge base contain-
ing exception-prone roles of the form Ai r-- Bi (read 'if Ai is true, Bi is plausibly
true'). For instance Ai = Birds, Bi = Fly. Each role is interpreted as the constraint
N(BiIA i ) > 0, or equivalently II(A i ABi) > II(A i A ...,Bi ). Then the ranking
of interpretations obtained by considering the maximal element of the set of pos-
sibility distributions {'Ir : II(A i ABi) > II(A i A ...,Bi ) , i = 1, n} is unique. Let it
be denoted by 'Ir*. This is the least committed possibility distribution obeying the
constraints. Then given evidence A, and knowledge ß, B is a plausible conclu-
sion of A in the context B in the sense of rational closure inference if and only if
N* (BIA) > 0, i.e. II* (B A A) > 11* (...,B A A) (computed from 'Ir*).
This paper indicates that the notions of independence introduced here can be
modelIed as extra constraints on the ordering of interpretations of a language, and
have the same expressive power as the AGM theory ofbelief revision. However the
latter is in turn equivalent to the rational closure approach to plausible inference
[Gärdenfors and Makinson, 19941. So, a revision operation generates a conditional
knowledge base ß * = {A r-- B : B E K * A}. Moreover any AGM-like revision
operation * on a belief set there corresponds to a possibility distribution 'Ir on
interpretations such that II(A A B) > II(A A ...,B) iff B E K * A iff A r-- B E ß *
(A plausibly infers B). So ß* = {A r-- B : II(B A A) > II(...,B 1\ An.
It follows that independence assumptions can be expressed by means of suppIe-
mentary conditional assertions, provided that the above introduced independence
notions are extended to conditional independence:
ConditionaZindependenceincontext D: (A -S C)D iff N(CID) > oand N(CIAA
D) > O.
So if a piece of knowledge comes under the form 'C is independent of A in the
context D', it can be expressed by the set of default roles {D r-- C, A A D r-- C}.
Note that the corresponding conditional relevance (A ~ C)D (i.e. A refutes or
cancels C in the context D) corresponds to Delgrande and Pelletier's [1994] idea
that A is relevant to a conditional assertion D I'" C. However their definition is
more specific than ours: it can be expressed in our terminology by 'A refutes C
in context D or A refutes ...,C in context D'. They do not seem to consider the
possibility of a mere cancellation of C.
Conversely, the rational monotony axiom RM: D I'" C implies D I", ...,A or
A A D I", C (underlying rational closure), present in the possibilistic approach
to default reasoning, does express a condition for conditional qualitative indepen-

dence: in the context D, C is qualitatively independent of A as soon as -.A is not
an accepted belief in this context. This nice interaction between the basic laws
ofplausible inference (embedded in Lehmann's axiomatic framework), beliefre-
vision, and possibilistic independence leads to cope with the defects of the above
modelling of exception-prone rules. Indeed, the rational closure approach suffers
from the problem of property inheritance blocking: if a class of objects has a sub-
class which is exceptional with respect to some attribute, objects in this subclass
can no longer inherit other properties from the mother class. For instance from
~ = {Birds fly, birds lay eggs, penguins do not fly, penguins are birds}
modelIed as above, the rational closure inference cannot conclude that penguins
lay eggs (nor that they do not). It has been suggested elsewhere that a natural way
of overcoming this difficulty is to introduce conditional independence assump-
tions [Benferhat et al., 1994]. Here we can add to ~ the well-known fact that for
birds, laying eggs and flying are independent. In fact, it appears that it is possible
to repair conditional knowledge bases: all inappropriate conclusions or cautious
behaviours that are due to the rational closure inference seem to be removable
by a suitable addition of default rules derived from conditional independence as-
sumptions (or equivalently, a choice of a ranking of interpretations more coherent
with the actual knowledge); this topic is investigated at length in Benferhat et al.
[I996a; 1996b; 1998]).
9 CONCLUSION
It has been known for some time that the AGM revision theory and the preferential
approach to nonmonotonic reasoning are two sides of the same coin. In recent
years we have shown that this tight link could be explained in the setting of pos-
sibility theory, using the single axiom II(A V B) = max(II(A), II(B» together
with qualitative conditioning. The contribution of this paper is to show that there
is a 'third side' of the coin, viz. qualitative independence. Wehave established
the equivalence between the statements 'the agent's belief in C is independent of
proposition A' (A ~ C) and 'the agent still believes C if his belief set is revised
by A'. This notion of independence can be expressed in terms of possibilistic
conditioning, thus laying bare the analogy with probabilistic independence. These
results are promising in the scope of exception-tolerant inference because they sug-
gest that a set of conditional statements along with a set 0/ conditional indepen-
dence assumptions can be expressed by means of a set of conditional assertions or
conditional objects [Benferhat et al., 1998] in the setting of preferential inference.
These results open the road to asound, feasible and computationally reasonable
treatment of exception-tolerant plausible inference that might cope with most, if
not all, counterexamples to rational closure.
[RIT, Toulouse, France.

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[Spohn, 19881 W. Spohn. Ordinal conditional functions: adynamie theory of epistemic states. In
Causation in Decision, Belief Change and Statistics, W. Harper, B. Skyrms, eds. pp. 105-134,
1988.
[Zadeh, 19781 L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,
1,3-28, 1978.
LUCA BOLDRIN AND CLAUDIO SOSSAI
TRUTH FUNCTIONALITY AND

MEASURE-BASED LOGICS
1 INTRODUCTION
The key concepts of vagueness and uncertainty identify two dasses of logics
• logics for vague reasoning [Pavelka, 1979],
• plausibility-measure based logics [Höhle, 1995], Le. possibilistic, prob-
abilistic and belief-function logics.
Each dass is characterized by a function from the language to the real inter-
val [0,1]: the interpretation function for the first dass and the plausibility
measure for the second dass.
Indeed, deep and important properties differentiate the two dasses of
functions:
1. the interpretation functions for the dass of vague reasoning are com-
positional, i.e. the interpretation function of a sentence is the compo-
sition of the interpretations of the atomic predicates that appear in the
formula, while all the plausibility measures are noncompositional, in
fact the probability of a conjunction is not, in general, a composition
of the probabilities of the components;
2. as pointed out in the literature [Dubois et al., 1991], another difference
between the two dasses lies in the presence vs. absence of 'complete
information': truth functionality appears when dealing with complete
information, while it is absent in measure-based systems [Dubois and
Prade, 1994].
The lack of truth functionality makes the description of the logical structure
of the uncertainty reasoning more complex.
Although plausibility measures are not truth functional, we will present a
technique that allows us to discover a truth-functional semantics also for the
dass of uncertainty reasoning. We will focus our attention on a particular
dass of measures: the necessity measures, although we believe that this
method can be applied to other dasses of measures. To describe the method
we propose in this paper, let us analyze the meaning of a property A as
formalized in the necessity framework: A = 'John is tall with degree (of
necessity) at least a', usually written: N(Tall(john)) ~ a.
In what sense can we say that A gives us a partial information on the
tallness of John?
351
D. Dubois er al. (eds.). FuuySets. Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge. 351-380.
352 LUCA BOLDRIN AND CLAUDIO SOSSAI
To answer this question, let us remember that a possibilistic distribution

7f satisfies the property A if N 1r (Tall(john)) ~ a, i.e. the necessity degree
of Tall(john) , computed using the distribution 7f, is greater than a.
Using this observation, we can say that there is a relation, the forcing
relation, between informational states, i.e. possibilistic distributions, and
properties: in the informational state 7f we can say that A is true, or 7f
forces the truth of A, in the sequel written 7f Ir A.
At this point we discover a fundamental duality, which is the central idea
of this work, between informational states and properties:
• given a possibility distribution 7f, we can associate to it the set of
properties true in that informational statej
• dually, given a property, we can associate to it the set of possibility
distributions where the property is true.
An important consequence of this duality is that the dual of a property
can be seen as the semantical meaning of the property, i.e. its truth value.
In fact, remember that every possibility distribution defines a preference
relation over the possible values of the tallness of John, meaning that if
7f(1.80) > 7f(1.20) then 7f says that it is much more possible that the tallness
of John is 1.80 than 1.20.
Moreover, consistently with the partial information hypothesis that un-
derlies measure-based logics, a set of possibility distributions can be seen as
an approximation of the preference relation that describes the property, in
this case the tallness of John.
Note that in the usual many-valued approach to fuzzy logic the truth
value would be a precise real number.
More formally, we can say that the information about the tallness of John
given by A can be mathematically described as the neighborhood of all
possibility distributions 7f that satisfy the constraint: N 1r (Tall(john)) ~ a.
This is the idea that allows us to find a truth-functional semantics for a
measure-based logic.
Behind the idea of neighborhood there is that of topological space, but
to have a good set of truth values we need an algebraic structure. Thus the
problem becomes: how can we mathematically move from the topological
structure to the algebraic one? A solution to this problem is given by
the 'local' idea of truth as described in the forcing framework [Bell, 1985j
Mac Lane and Moerdijk, 1992).
In the forcing semantics, a proposition can be true or not depending on
the information possessed, hence different informational states support the
truth of (i.e. force) different sets of propositions. Classical semantics turns
out to be a special case when all the information is available, i.e. when
we deal with complete information. For these reasons, forcing allows for a
formal system where the two conditions of partial and total information can
TRUTH FUNCTIONALITY AND MEASURE-BASED LOGICS 353
be compared. In this paper we make possibility distributions play the role

of informational states.
More precisely, we will give a formal definition, by induction on the length
of the formulae, of the following concept: 'in the informational state given
by the possibility distribution 7r the senten ce A is true', usually abbreviated
by '7r forces A', Le. the 'local' concept of truth.
The sets of all 7rS that force A, varying the sentence A, form the elosed
sets of a suitable topological space. Moreover, we will see that the elosed sets
of this topological space give rise to a known algebraic structure, a Girard
Quantale (see [RosenthaI, 1990)). Hence we build a logic elose to Girard's
Linear Logic, that we describe using the technique of algebraic semantics
for sub-structural logics. Once this semantics is defined, a few observa-
tions about the algebraic properties of this particular Quantale allow us to
produce a valid and complete proof system in the form of a substructural
sequent calculus.
It must be noticed that our system presents some peculiarities with re-
spect to the usual algebraic semantics:
• the algebraic semantics looks like a formal technique to describe what

we are really interested in, Le. the duality between information and
sentences. As a consequence, we are not interested in defining validity
and completeness with respect to a dass 0/ algebraic structures, as it
is usually the case with algebraic semantics.
• Moreover, our algebraic structure contains a Boolean algebra; this is

a very special circumstance, which can be explained by considering
that we are performing 'reasoning under uncertainty': as long as un-
certainty decreases, truth values move eloser to the Boolean algebra,
restoring elassical reasoning.
• Usually, possibility distributions are assumed to be normalized, Le.

VwEn 7r(W) = 1, because otherwise we would have that, for every
sentence A, N,,(A /\ .A) = 1 - VwEn 7r(W) = t > o. This is usually
considered as a condition of inconsistency of the logic. In our context
we allow for a threshold that accounts for the lack of unhomogeneity
of the informational source t E (0,1), so that no formula can be proved
to be 1-necessary (or, the other way around, every formula will be at
least t-possible). Ideal 'noise-free' reasoning is approached as t moves
toward 0 (this case has been investigated in [Boldrin and Sossai, 1995],
[Boldrin and Sossai, 1997]).
• Our system naturally allows for a syntactic connective representing a

t-norm composition of possibility distributions. It can be understood
as a connective for 'strong' merging of uncertain information com-
ing from distinct and independent sources (see [Dubois and Prade,
1985}) : strong composition of two formulae is more informative than

their simple conjunction [Boldrin and Sossai, 1995]. Moreover, since
we accept non-normalized distributions, we will be able to merge con-
trasting uncertain information, obtaining partial unhomogeneity of
the informational source. A similar feature, although embedded in a
modal framework, is present in [Boldrin, 1996].
2 THE LANGUAGE
We assurne the following first-order language, where a for any a E [0,1] are
propositional constants. C is the set of individual constants and n that of
predicate symbols. An atomic formula has the form R(tb ... , t n ), where ti
are either individual constants or variables. Co is the set of atomic formulae.
formula ::= atomic.Iormula I a I -. formula I formula & formula I

formula ® formula I "Ix formula
°
We take C to be the set of formulae; once chosen < ~ < 1, it is conve-
nient to define Cl as the set of formulae with no occurrences of a constants
for any a E (~, 1). Notice that ~ and 1 are in Cl. We use uppercase latin
letters A, B, C for formulae, while reserving L, M, N for Cl-formulae, and
uppercase greek letters r, ~ for multisets of formulae; lowercase greek let-
ters a,ß,,,(,5 always represent real numbers in [0,1].
We introduce some new symbols via the definitions:
A-tB =dej -.(A ® -.B)

A$B =dej -.(-.A&-.B)
A~B =dej -.(-.A ® -.B)
3xA(x) =dej -.Vx-.A(x)
3 THE SEMANTICS
Let MD denote the set of classicalfirst-order structures for the language Cl

on the domain D; each element w E MD has the form (D, Fe, FR) where Fe
and FR are particular interpretations of individual constants and predicate
symbols. Let PD = {'lrl1r : MD -+ [0, In denote the set of functions from
MD to the real intervaI [0, 1], which we interpret as unnormalized possibility
distributions. The set PD is equipped with the usual order ~ (1rl ~ 1r2 iff
for any w it holds that 1rl (w) ~ 1r2 (w)); the lattice operations V and A on
possibility functions are defined with respect to the order ~; (PD, V,A) is
a complete lattice.
We also want to provide this structure with a monoidal operatorj for our
purposes it is useful to use t-norm operators. A continuous t-norm (see e.g.
[Dubois and Prade, 1985]) is a function x : [0,1] x [0,1] --+ [0,1] with the
following properties: 1
1. (a x b) xc = a x (b x c) (associativitY)j
2. a x b = b x a (commutativitY)j
3. a xl = aj
4. a x 0= Oj
5. continuity
For our purposes we introduce the further condition of quasi-strictness:
6. if a °
> b and c x b > then c x a > c x b.
Quasi-strictness is needed to show property 2 of Theorem 5 and Lemma 6.

Quasi-strict continuous t-norms include strict operations (like the ordi-
nary real product) and nihilpotent operations (like Lukasiewicz product).
For a given t-norm x, the operation x : PD x PD --+ PD is defined on pos-
sibility functions as follows: (11"1 X1l"2)(W) = 1r1(W) X1l"2(W) for any W EMD.
For any continous t-norm, we also introduce its adjoint operator, usually
named residuation, defined as: a -t ß = V{x E [0,1] : x x a ~ ß} which
is naturally extended to possibility distributions: (11"1 -t 1I"2)(W) = 1I"t{w) -t
1I"2(W) for any W EMD.
Let (]' be an arbitrary assignment for the variables on Dj by (]'[x/u] we
mean the function which differs from (]' only at x, which is mapped to u.
We first introduce some notation for ease of writing:
DEFINITION 1.
1. For any .c1 -formula L: ModD,u(L) =deJ{W E MD: w,(]' F L}

2. For any a E [0,1], a E PD is the function identically equal to a (in
°
particular I(w) = 1 and Q(w) = for any w).
Now we can present the central definition of jorcing or loeal truth:

DEFINITION 2. Let D be a domain, x a quasi-strict t-norm, (]' an assign-
ment and c E (0,1). The forcing relation I+-D,u,x,e ~ PD x.c is defined by
induction as follows (we write 1I"I+-D,u,x,eA instead of (1I",A) E I+-D,u,x,e):
1 Note that we use the same symbol (x) for t-norm operations and Cartesian productj
we believe that the context will make the meaning clear.
1T ft- D,u,x ,gR(tl' ... , tn) iff Nec 7r «ModD,u(R(tI, ... , tn))) ~ 1- c
1T ft- D,u,x,eO iff 1T:::;7'iVe
1T ft- D,u,x,eA 0 B Hf (31TI ft-D,u, X ,eA) (31T2 ft-D,u,x,gB)
(1T :::; (1TI X 1T2) Ve)
1Tft- D,u,X,g...,A iff ('v'O'ft-D,u,x,gA)(O' x 1T:::; e)
1T ft- D,u,x,eA&B iff (31TI ft-D,u, x,eA) (31T2 ft-D,u, X ,eB)(1T :::; 1TI 1\ 1T2)
1T ft- D,u,x,g'v'xA(x) Hf ('lu E D)(1Tft-D,u[x/u],X,eA(x»
where Nec7r : 2MD ~ [0,1] is the necessity function associated to the

possibility distribution 1T: N ec7r (X) = 1 - VwilX 1T(W).
The statement 1T ft- A must be read as 'the information al state 1T is in-
formative enough to support the truth of the formula A'. The variable c
represents a threshold of unhomogeneity of the informational source we are
willing to tolerate, as will appear in the following. It is obvious from the
definition that, if 1T :::; €, then 1T will force any formula of the language C.
3.1 The topological-algebraic structure

We need the following further definitions:
DEFINITION 3.
1. For any 1T E P D,.J..1T = {O' E PD: 0':::; 1T}.
2. For any c E (0,1), ..L e =.J.. ei

3. For any G ~ PD and H ~ PD, G => H = {1T ~ 0' E PD : 1T E G,O' E
H}.
4. For any G ~ PD, G1.· = G => ..L e .
It can be easily verified that for any fixed c, 1..1.. is a closure operator
on 2PD (see [Girard, 1987]).
LEMMA 4. 1f x is any continuous t-norm, then (a V ß) x (a ~ ß) = ß.
Proof. We have to consider two cases:
• if a:::; ß then a ~ ß = 1, hence (a V ß) x (a ~ ß) = ß xl = ßi
• if a > ß then a ~ ß < 1. Suppose a x (a ~ ß) < ßi by the continuity

of x, there exists 8 > 0 such that for any 8' :::; 8, a x ~ ß) + 8') <«a
ß, but then a ~ ß would not be the maximum number such that
(a ~ ß) x a:::; ß. •
THEOREM 5. For any G ~ PD, let 'lrG = V1rEG 'Ir; then:

1. G.L· = {'Ir E PD: 'Ir x 'lrG E .le};
2. G.L·.L· =.j.. ('lrG Ve).
Proof.
1. 2) Take 'Ir such that 'Ir x 'lrG ~ ej then, for any u E G, u ~ 'lrG implies
'Ir x u ~ 'Ir X 'lrG ~ e, so 'Ir E G.L·.
~) Take 'Ir such that 'Ir x 'lrG 1:. ej then there is a Wo such that 'Ir(wo) x
'lrG(wo) > e, or 'lrG(wo) > 'Ir(wo) --+ e. Since 'lrG(wo) = VuEG u(wo),
there exists auE G with u(wo) > 'Ir(wo) --+ ej for this u, 'Ir x u 1:. e,
hence 'Ir (j. G.L· .
2. 2) Take 'Ir E.j.. ('lrG Ve), that is 'Ir ~ 'lrG Ve. We have to prove that
'Ir E G.L·.L·, i.e. that u x 'Ir ~ e for any u E G.L· j by the previous
point, u E G.L· is equivalent to u x 'lrG ~ e. Hence we have:
u X 'Ir ~ U X ('lrG Ve) = (u x 'lrG) V (u x e) ~ eV (u x e) ~ e.

~) Take 'Ir (j..j.. ('lrG Ve)j then 'Ir 1:. 'lrG Ve, so there exists a Wo such
that 'Ir(wo) > 'lrG(wo) Ve. We have to prove that 'Ir (j. G.L·.L·, i.e. that
there exists auE G.L· such that u X 'Ir 1:. e. Take now u defined as
u = 'lrG --+ ej clearly u x 'lrG ~ e, hence u E G.L·. Eventually, we have
u(wo) x ('lrG(Wo)Ve) = ej by quasi-strictness, since 'Ir(wo) > 'lrG(Wo)Ve,
we conclude
u(Wo) X 'Ir(wo) > u(wo) x ('lrG(wo) Ve) = cj

so 'Ir X u 1:. e, hence 'Ir (j. G.L·.L· . •
The structure (PD, x, 1) isa commutative monoid with unit, and .le ~
PD. Hence the structure (PD, x, 1, .lg) is aphase space in Girard's sense.
The closure operator is exactly the one of Girard, so the set QD,e = {G ~
PD : G = G.L·.L·} is the set of facts, and belongs to the class of Girard
Quantales as defined in [Rosenthal, 1990].
The following lemma shows that the forcing relation reflects the informa-
tional content of the possibilistic distributions, this means that if a possi-
bility distribution 'Ir forces a sentence A and if u contains more information
than 'Ir then also u forces A. When the context is clear, we will omit some
or all the subscripts to improve readability.
LEMMA 6. Let 'Ir, u be two possibilistic distributions and C a sentence, if
u ~ 'Ir and 'Ir It-C then also u It-C.
Proof. By induction over the length n of the formula C.
1. n=O then either C = P(tl, ... , t n ) or C = a.
(a) let C = P(h, ... , t n ):

»
if 11" It- P(tI, ... , t n ), by definition we have that N,.(P(tI, ... , t n ~
» »
1- € hence Nu (P(tl , ... , t n ~ N,,(P(tI, ... , t n ~ 1- € and this
means that ult-P(tl, ... , t n ).
(b) let C = a:
if 11" It-a then 11" :::; a V € and u :::; 11" implies u It-C.
2. n > 0 then C = A ® B, or C = ..,A, or C = A&B, or C = 'v'xA(x).
(a) C = A®B:
easy, applying the definition.
(b) C = ..,A:
Note that in the above definition of 11" It-..,A it is not restrictive
to assume that T x 11" :::; e holds for all T that force A and such
that T x 11" > O. In fact for all T that force A such that T x 11" = 0
the condition T x 11" :::; € is trivially satisfied.
If 11" It--,A, using the property of quasi-strictness of the t-norm
we have that for every T that forces A and such that T x 11" > 0:
u x T :::; 11" X T :::; e, thus we can conclude that u It-C.
(c) C = A&B:
same as case a.
(d) C = 'v'xA(x):
if 1I"1t-'v'xA(x) then for all u E D we have that 1I"It-A(u). By
inductive hypothesis from u :5 11" we have that ult-A(u). Hence,
using again the definition of forcing, we can conclude that u It-C .
•
DEFINITION 7. For any domain D, assignment u, quasi-strict continuous
t-norm x and constant e: E (0,1), we define a function 1I·IID,u,x,e : C -t QD,e
as follows:
IIAIID,u,x,e =ded1l": 1I"It-D,u,x,eA }.
We can show that the following relations hold:

THEOREM 8. 1/ R(t 1, ... , t n ), A, B are sentences then:
IIR(tb ... , tn)IID,u {1T E PD: Nec,,(ModD,u(R(h, ... ,tn ))) = l}J..·J..·
lIallD,u .j.. (aVl)
II-,AIID,u IIAIIJ..·
D,u
IIA&BIID,u = IIAIID,u n IIBIID,u
IIA®BIID,u (IIAIID,u X IIBIID,u ).1.. • .1...
IIV'xA(x)IID,u =
uED
n IIA(x)IID,u[xju).
Proof.
1. {1T: 1TIt-R(tl, ... ,tn )} = {1T E PD : Nec,,(ModD,u(R(tI, ... ,tn») =

l}J..·J..· .
Let us divide the proof into two parts:
(a) Prove that if rlt-R(tl, ... ,tn ) then r E {-1T E PD: Nec,,(ModD,u
(R(tl, ... ,tn») = l}J..·J.. e • Due to Theorem 5, part 2, to prove
this it is sufficient to show that r ~ 1T* V"€, where 1T* is defined
as follows:
Following the definition of forcing, we have that Necr(ModD,u

(R(h, ... , t n») 2:: 1- €, hence r satisfies the following inequality:
Thus r ~ 1T* V "€.

(b) On the other hand, note that if r E {1T E PD : Nec,,(ModD,u
(R(t1, ... ,tn »)
= 1V·J..· then as before r ~ 1T* V"€; this means
that Necr(M odD,u(R(t1 , ••• , t n))) 2:: 1- € and hence r It- R(h, ... ,
t n ).
2. The proof of lIallD,u =.j.. (a V "€) is easy, following the definitions.
3. As for the case II,AIID,u = IIAII~:u simply note that: {1T: 1TIt-,A} =
{1T: (V'r E IIAIID,u)(r x 1T ~ "€)} which is exactly the definition of
IIAII~>
4. Let us prove that {1T: 1TIt-A&B} = IIAIID,u n IIBIID,u.
360 LU CA BOLDRIN AND CLAUDIO SOSSAI
(a) Assume that 11" It- A&B, then, by definition, there exist 11"1, 11"2 s.t.
11"1 It- A, 11"2 It- B and 11" ~ 11"1 /\ 11"2. Hence 'Ir ~ 11"1 and from this
and Lemma 6 we have that 'Ir It- A, thus by inductive hypothesis
11" E IIAIID,,,.. Similarly we can prove that 11" ElIBIlD,,,., so that
we can conclude that 11" E IIAIID,,,. nIlBIlD,,,..
(b) On the other hand, note that if 11" E IIAIID,,,. nIlBIlD,,,., by induc-
tive hypothesis we have that 11" It- A and 11" It- Band, from the triv-
ial observation that 11" ~ 'Ir /\ 'Ir, we can conclude that: 11" It- A&B.
5. The next case to prove is {11": 11" It- A 0 B} = <lIAIID,,,. x IIB Il D,,,. ).t • .t•.
(a) If 11" It-A 0 B, then there exist 11"1,11"2 s.t. 'lr 1 It-A, 1I"2 lt-B and 11" ~
(11"1 x 'lr2) V"€. By inductive hypothesis we have that 11"1 E IIAIID,,,.
and 11"2 ElIBIlD,,,.. By Theorem 5 we have that
where
1I"IIAllxllBil = V 11"1 X 11"2
"'lEIIAII, "'2EIIBII
hence 11" E.J,. (1I"IIAllxllBil V"€).
(b) If 11" E (IIAIID,,,. X IIBIID,,,.).t·.t· using Theorem 5 we have that
there exist 11"1 E IIAIID,,,. and 11"2 ElIBIlD,,,. s.t. 11" ~ (11"1 x 11"2) V"€
and hence 11" It- A 0 B.
6. The proof of IIVxA(x)IID,,,. = nuED IIA(x)IID,,,.[z/u] comes easily from

the definitions. •
The x product between sets is the point-to-point product. It also holds

that:
IIA -+ BilD,,,. = IIAIID,,,. => IIBIID,,,.

IIA ffi BilD,,,. = IIAIID,,,. vII BIlD,,,.
113xA(x)IID,,,. U II A (x)IID,a[z/u]
uED
IIL 11 D,,,. = {11" E PD : Nec,..(ModD,a(L» ~ 1- c}
for any L E Cl
110 -+ LIID,a = {11": Nec,..(ModD,a(L» ~ 1- (a -+ c)}
for any L E Cl
11-,(1 - 0) -+ LIID,,,. {11" : Nec,..(ModD,,,.(L» ~ a}
for any C1 -formula L.

This last equality suggests a natural way of representing standard possi-

bilistic logic inside our logic: the possibilistic distributions in 11-,(1 - 0:) -+
LIID,Q" are exactly the ones satisfying the constraint Nec 1r (L) ~ a. So the
token ofinformation Nec(ModD,Q"(L» ~ a can be represented here by the
above formula. The same token of information is represented by the couple
(L, a) in [Dubois et al., 1994]. Note that, due to the duality between in-
formation and properties, we could have assumed Theorem 8 as a primitive
definition and then the definition of forcing would have been: 'Ir H- A if and
only if'lr ElIAll.
It also holds that:
THEOREM 9. For any A E .c, IIAIID,Q",e is a fact (i.e. belongs to QD,e).
Proof. The proof is by induction. For atomic sentences the proof is trivial
(by definition) and so is for ®. We only have to notice (see [Girard, 1987])
that the negation of any fact is a fact:
and that facts are c10sed under arbitrary intersections, since
nGi = (U Gt<)-L<·
iEI iEI
•
Note that the above construction defines a compositional truth assign-
ment for formulae in.c into the Quantale QD,g. We show now that the just
defined truth values can be easily represented by means of a single ·possi-
bility distribution (the top of the set IIAII, Le. the least informative 'Ir that
satisfies the forcing constraints), which can be recursively built as follows:
THEOREM.I0. Given a quadrupie (D,O", x,c), define: UD,IT,x,e(A) =del
V IIAIID,IT,x,e. Then the following statements hold:
1. UD,Q"(o:)=aVe
2. UD,IT(L)(w) = { ! ifw E ModD,Q"(L)

otherwise for any .cl -formula L
3. UD,IT(-,A) = UD,IT(A) -+ e
4· UD,IT(A & B) = UD,IT(A) A UD,u(B)
5. UD,u(A®B) = (UD,IT(A) x UD,u(B» Ve
6. UD,IT(VxA(x» = l\uEDUD,IT[x/u](A(x»
7. UD,u(A E9 B) = UD,u(A) V UD,u(B)

8. UD,u(A -+ B) = UD,u(A) -+ UD,u(B)
9. UD,u(3xA(x» = VuEDUD,u[z/u](A(x».
Proof. Let UD,u(A) = V IIAIID,ui we have:

A= a. Clearly, U(a) = a V 6:, since lIail = (t a)l.·l.· =t (V(t a) V 6:) =t
(a Ve).
A = L. Where L is an Cl-formula (in particular A = R(tI, ... , tn»: we want
1 if W E ModD u(L)
to show that U(L)(w) = { c if w (j MOdD:u(L)
• For any 7r E IILII = {7r: Nec",(ModD,,,.(L» = 1- c} it must be

the case that V w!/.ModD,,,(L) 7r(w) = c. This means that for any
w (j ModD,u(L), 7r(w) ::; ci for w E ModD,u(L), it is certainly
7r(w) ::; L
• The function above belongs to IILII (easy to verify).
A = .,B. We show that U(.,B) = U(B) -+ 6::
• For any 7r E II...,BII, (Theorem 5.1), 7r x U(B) ::; 6:, and so 7r ::;
U(B) -+ e.
• U(B) -+ 6: E II.,BII = IIBlll.· (Theorem 5.1), since U(B) x
(U(B) -+ 6:) = e.
A = B & C. We show that U(B & C) = U(B) 1\ U(C):
• Take 7r E IIB&CII; by definition, 7r E IIBII and 7r E IICII. SO it is

7r::; U(B) and 7r ::; U(C) and, eventually, 7r ::; U(B) 1\ U(C).
• U(B) 1\ U(C) ::; U(B) and U(B) 1\ U(C) ::; U(C); by Lemma 6,
U(B) 1\ U(C) E IIBII and U(B) 1\ U(C) E IICII, hence U(B) 1\
U(C) E IIB & CII·
A = B ® c. We show that U(B ® C) = (U(B) x U(C» V e:
• Take 7r E IIB ® CII = (IIBII x IIClDl.·l.·; by Theorem 5, 7r ::;

V(IIBII x IICID Ve. Now V(IIBII x IICID = V{7rl x 7r2 : 7rl E
IIBII,7r2 E IICII} = V IIBII x V IICII = U(B) x U(C). (We used
distributivity of x over V)
• (U(B) x U(C»V6: E IIB®Clli by Theorem 5.1 it suffices to prove
that «U(B) x U(C» V 6:) x V«U(B) x U(C»)l.· ::; e, i.e. that
«U(B) x U(C» V e) x «U(B) x U(C») -+ 6:::; 6:, which is true
by Lemma 4.
A = VxB(x). We show that UD,tT(VxB(x» = l\uED UD,tT[z/uj,e(B(x»:

• Take 7r E IIVxB(x)IID,tT = l\uED IIB(x)IID,tT[z/uj,e; then 7r <
UD,tT[z/uj,e(B(x» for any u E D, hence 7r :::: l\uED UD,u[z/uj,e
(B(x» .
• I\UED UD,tT[z/uj,e(B(x» :::: UD,u[z/uj,e(B(x» for any u E D. By
ind. hypo UD,u[z/uj,e(B(x» E II(B(x»IID,u[z/uj,e for any u E
D; l\uED UD,u[z/uj,e(B(x» E II(B(x»IID,u[z/uj,e for any u E D,
n
and so l\uED UD,u[z/uj,e(B(x» E uED 11 (B(x»IID,u[z/uj,e =
IIVxB(x)IID,u.
The proof by induction is over; using definitions we ean also caleulate:
U(B ES C) = U(-o(-..,B&...,C» = U(B) V U(C)
U(B ~ C) = U(B) ~ U(C)
U(3xB(x» = VUED UD,u[z/uj,e(B(x».
DEFINITION 11. 7r E PD is a e-possibility distribution on MD Hf for any
•
W EMD, 7r(w) ?: e. Pb is the set of e-possibility distributions on MD·
It is worth noting that, by the previous theorem, we ean direetly use

the space of e-possibility distributions as the truth spaee, Le. we have a
eompositional truth assignment:
UD,u,X,e : C ----t P'b.

We state now the following:
FACT 12. For any domain D, the set Bb = {7r E Pb I for all W E
M D,7r(w) E {e, I}} is a Boolean algebra eontainedin the strueture P'b.
Proof. Simply follows from the observation that Bb is isomorphie with the
powerset of MD. •
C1-formulae are mapped into the Boolean algebra, so it is natural to
expeet that they provide an exact eopy of the first-order logie embedded
inside the language C.
Notiee that, if Ais a closed formula, then IIAIID,u does not depend on 0";
so for a closed formula A we let UD(A) = UD,u(A). We ean give the notion
of semantic entailment:
DEFINITION 13. For any closed formula A and B:
A FD,e B ifffor any 7r E P'b, 7rft-D,eA implies 7rft-D,eB
and
A Fe B iff for any D, A FD,e B.
Since in this context the notion of forcing is linked with the order on
possibility distributions, we also have (this is the most comfortable way of
proving validity and completeness):
A ~e B iff for any D, UD,e(A) ~ UD,e(B).
The notion of local validity defined by the forcing relation corresponds

to the notion of validity in [Dubois et al., 1994]. This approach sheds some
light on the link between the compositionality of the logic and the amount
of information available. It is easy to see that forcing is not compositional
when dealing with partial information. In fact let us assume that we know
that the information state 7r H- A without knowing the truth value of A (i.e.
IIAII). If the forcing semantics were compositional then there would exist a
function f such that f(7r) ft--,A (see [Dubois et al., 1991]). But f(rr) H-..,A
iff J(7r) x (J' ~ € for every (J' ElIAll, hence to define f we need the knowledge
of all the informational states that force A, i.e. we are in astate of complete
information.
Note that, differently from standard algebraic semantics, we are here con-
fining our interpretation to a restricted dass of structures (namely, the PD);
moreover, we do not allow any freedom on the choice of the interpretation
function, which is uniquely determined for any fixed D and c.
At this point it comes natural to ask whether we can have more freedom
in the choice of the interpretation for the connectives of the language; for
instance, it would be interesting to interpret negation in the usual fuzzy way:
-'11" = 1 - 11", and 'lf! in the t-conorm 11"1 'lf!1I"2 = 11"1 + 11"2 - 11"2 ·11"1 (a similar
problem is taken into consideration by Hajek and colleagues in [Hajek et al.,
1995] for fuzzy logic).
However, in our framework we have not the freedom of choosing arbitrary
interpretations for all of the connectives: we can just choose the monoidal
operator and a set of inconsistent elements (-L e ). Even if we were to start
from the choice of the algebraic operators corresponding to the connectives,
there is a result in [Avron, 1988] which states that the interpretation above
doesn't give rise to an algebraic structure for Linear Logic (basic relevant
disjunction structure with truth subset): if '" is the interpretation of nega-
tion, and x the one of ®, the following two conditions should be satisfied:
• a ~ b xc implies '" b ~'" a x C;
These conditions are satisfied by the structure PD with the product 11"1 Xe
7r2 = (11"1 x 11"2) V € and the negation'" 11" =
11" -+ €; they would not be
satisfied by the negation'" 7r = (1 - 7r) V €, unless the x were defined as
the Lukasiewicz product.
4 THE PROOF SYSTEM DPLx,e
The DPLx,e calculus consists of four parts: structural rules, logical rules,
an axiom for distributivity, and three further 'numerical' axioms. The t-
norm x plays its role in ® def and --, def, while the constant value g is
taken into account in the rules e and --, def. The dependence of the calculus
on these parameters is quite circumscribed, and limited to numerical rules
(the rule e is in fact 'numerical'j it has been inserted among logical rules
by analogy with the 0 rule in Linear Logic) , so that the parameters do
not affect the logical core of the system. Moreover, since numerical rules
would most probably be managed by some external procedure in any real
impiementation, it would be possible to cope with ease with different t-
norms and g values. Note that classicality of the sub-Ianguage LI is taken
into account by the absorption ruie.
1. Structural rules:
r I- B,~ r',B I-~'

id) AI-A cut)
r r' I- ~ ~'
r,B,A,~ I- A r?- ~,B,A,A
exchange L) exchange R)
r,ArB,~ I- A r I- ~!-A,iB, A
I-~
weakening L) weakening R)
r,A I- ~ r I- ~,A
r,AI-L,~
absorption) if L E Cl
r,AI-A®L,~
2. Logical rules:
r,AI-Ll. r,BI- Ll. rl-A,Ll. rl-B,Ll.

& L) &R)
r,A&BI-Ll. r,A&BI-Ll. rI-A&B,Ll.
r,A,BI-Ll. rI-A,Ll. r'I-B,Ll.'
® L) ®R)
r,A®BI-Ll. r,r' I- A®B,Ll.,Ll.'
r,AI-Ll. r,BI-Ll. rl-A,Ll. rI-B,Ll.
$ L) $R)
r,AffiBI-Ll. rI-A$B,Ll. rI-A$B,Ll.
r,AI-Ll. r',BI-Ll.' rI-A,B,Ll.
1?L) 1?R)
r,r',A1?B I- Ll.,Ll.' r I- A1?B,Ll.
rI-A,Ll. r',BI-Ll.' r,AI-B,Ll.
-t L) -t R)
r,r',A -t B I- Ll.,Ll.' rI-A-tB,Ll.
r,A(t) I-Ll. rl- A(x),Ll.
VL) VR) (*)
r,VxA(x) I- Ll. rI-VxA(x),Ll.
r,A(x) I- Ll. r I- A(t),Ll.
3 L) (*) 3 R)
r,3xA(x) I- Ll. rl-3xA(x),Ll.
,1) rl-A,Ll. r,AI-Ll.
, R)
r"AI-Ll. rl-,A,Ll.
e L) r,e I- Ll. 1 R) r 1-1,Ll.
(*) if x is not free in r and ß

3. Distributivity:
®-& distr) (A ® C) & (B ® C) I- (A & B) ® C
® - V distr) VxA(x) ® C -11- Vx(A(x) ® C) if x is not free in C
4. Numerical rules:
S') ßI-o for any ß ::; a
® def) o ® ß -11- '"Y where 'Y = a x ß
-. def) -'0 I- '"Y where 'Y = a -+ c.
Soundness of this calculus is easily proved by induction on the proof

lengthj to prove completeness we use the following theorem, which provides
a normal form to the formulae of the language DPL x ,e. To prove the normal-
form theorem we need some technicallemmas.
LEMMA 14. Let B -11- &iEI(ß.. -+ Li) where Li are Cl -formulae, and, for
any J ~ I, 0J = -. Eaj!i!J ßj, aI = 1 and MJ = -. (&jEJL j & &j!i!J-.Lj)
(MJ E Cl). Then the following derivation holds:
Proof. We show the two directions separately:
1-) First, we prove that
for an i E land for all J ~ I. In fact, we have:
ßi ® 0J ® -.L i ® -.MJ I- €
ß.. ® 0J ® .Li I- MJ
ßi ® -.L i I- 0J -+ MJ
.(ßi -+ Li) I- 0J -+ MJ
At this point, we must consider two cases:
i E Jj then, since -.MJ = (&jEJL j & &jIlJ-.Lj), we have -.Li®.MJ -11-

.Li & -.MJ -11- 1:, and we are done (remember that in Cl, ® coincides
with &).
i f/. Jj then, since aJ = -.EajIlJßj, we have

ßi I- ~j~J ßj
ßi &; aJ I- €
Once established that, we have the following derivation:

-(ßi --t Li) 0--'(0.1 --t M.1) I- f for all i E I and for all J ~ I
EBiEI.1CI (--'(ßi --t Li) 0 --'(0.1 --t M.1» I- f EB - 0distr)
• SE)
EBiEI--.(ßi --t Li) 0 EB.1CI "'(0.1 --t M.1) f- f
~~--------~~--------- SE)
"'&iEI(ßi --t Li) 0 "'&JCI(OJ --t M.1) I- f
"'&iEI(ßi --t Li) f- &.1t;.I(O.1 --t M.1)
-l) Select, for any J c I, the index iJ such that iJ rt J and ßiJ ~ ßj for
any j rt J; the sequent ßiJ -ll- ~j!i!J ßj can be derived as follows:
ßiJ I- ßiJ ßj I- ßiJ for any j rt J

ßiJ I- E9ßj E9ßj I- ßiJ
j!i!J j~J
hence ßiJ'l'iaJ -ll- 1. Furthermore, observe that (MJ ffi LiJ) -ll- MJ,
since iJ rt J; it should be also noted that aI -ll- 1 and that Li -+
MI -ll- MI'
Then we have the following:
cJassicai tautology
&JCIMJ I- €
&iEI«aI -+ (Li -+ MI)) & &JCI •.1#-!«a/1?ßiJ) -+ (MJ E9 LiJ» I- €
&.1CI,iEI«aJ -+ (Li -+ MJ» & &JCI,iEI«a/1?ßi) -+ (MJ E9 Li» I- €
&JCI,iEI«aJ -+ (Li -+ MJ» & (ßi -+ (MJ --+ Li» & «aJ~ßi) --+ (MJ E9 Li))) I- €
&JCI,iEl«aJ --+ MJ) 0 (ßi --+ Li» I- €

&JCI(aJ --+ MJ) ® &iEI(ßi -+ Li) I- €
&Jr;I(aJ --+ MJ) I- --'&iEI(ßi -+ Li)
•
LEMMA 15. The following sequent can be obtained in PL x ,. for Land M
in Ll:
«0: ~ (M ~ L» ® (ß ~ (L ~ M))) &

(ß~ (L~ M»&
I- «0: ~ (M ~ L» ® (ß ~ (L ffi M))) &
(o:~ (M ~L»&
«0: ~ (M ffi L» ® (ß ~ (L ~ M))) &
«o:~ß) ~ (L ffi M»
«0: ~ (M ffi L» ® (ß ~ (L ffi M)))
Proof. Before starting we prove the following rules which we shall use in
the course of the derivation:
LI-A
(A & B) & L I- A ® B R1) for any Cl-formula L
A & C I- B A & D I- B I- C ffi D R2)

AI-B
0: ~ L -11- ""(0: & ...,L) R3) for any Cdormula L
The proofs of the first two rules go as followsj the ihird one comes in one
step from the rule ..., red) of Lemma 17:
L~L B~B
A&B&L~L L~A A&B&L~B
A&B&L~L®(A&B&L) abs) L,A&B&L~A®B
A&B&L~A®B
A~A C~C A~A D~D

A,C~A A,C~C A,D~A A,D~D
~C~A&C ~D~A&D
~C~~&0~~&m ~D~~&0~~&m
A &C ~ B A &D ~ B ~C~D A, C ~ D ~ (A & C) ~ (A & D)
(A & C) ~ (A & D) ~ B ------:A-:-~--:(,...,.A-:-&-'-::C=-)-~,...,.(A....,....".;&'-=D:-:-)~---'-----'-
A~B
Now we prove the lemmaj the idea is to prove each of the conjuncts in
the right-hand side from the left-hand side, and then use & R to merge the
proofs:
M-+Lf-M-+L L-+Mf-L-+M
M---+L,orM--+L L--+M,fjt-L-+M
M -+ L f- Q -+ (M -+ L) Rl) L -+ M f- ß -+ (L -+ M) Rl)
(ß -> (L -+ M))& (0 -+ (M -+ L»® (ß -> (L -+ M»& (0 -+ (M -> L))®
(Q -+ (M -+ L))& f- (ß -+ (L -+ M)) (Q -+ (M -+ L»& f- (ß -+ (L -+ M» f- (L -+ M) EIl (M -+ L)
~(M~-I~L~) __________~ __~~~(~L~-+~M~) ______________________________ R2)
(ß --+ (L -+ M»&
~->W--+~ f-~-+W-+~®~-+~-+~
(ß--+(L--+M»&
(Q--+ (M --+L))& f- (Q--+ (M --+ L»®
«Q'fß) -+ (L EIl M)) (ß --+ (L -+ M))
M--+Lf-M--+L LEIlMf-LEIlM
M--+L,of-M-+L LEIlM,ßf-LEilM
M--+Lf-Q-+(M .... L) Rl) LEIlMf-ß-> (LEIlM) Rl)
(ß->(LEIlM))& (Q--+(M-+L))® (ß--+(LEIlM»& (Q->(M .... L))®
(Q->(M .... L))& f- (ß .... (L-+M)) (a-+(M->L»& f- (ß->(LEIlM)) f-(LEIlM)EIl(M .... L)
~(M~....~L~) __________________~(~LEIl~M~)_____________________________ m)
(ß--+(LEIlM))&
(Q--+(M--+L)) f- (a--+(M--+L))® (ß->(LEIlM))
(ß -> (L -> M))&
(Q--+(M .... L»& f- (Q->(M .... L))®
(ß--+ (LEil M» (ß -> (LEIl M))
to conclude the derivation of the second conjunct, we must consider that

(o:~ß) --t Cf- ß --t Cj in fact:
ßf-ß
ß f- o:~ß Cf- C
ß, (o:~ß) --t C f- C
Proof of the derivation of the third conjunct is exactly symmetrical to

this last one, so we skip it. We come to the last, Le.:
(ß --t (L --t M)) &

f- (0: --t (LEBM))0
(0: --t (M --t L)) &
(ß --t (LEBM»
«0:~ß) --t (LEBM»
we prove the more general fact that (o:~ß) --t N f- (0: --t N) 0 (ß --t N) as
folIows, where SE) stands for substitution of equivalents and N E Cl:
('0: EB N) 0 ('ß EB N) f- (,0: EB N) 0 (,ß EB N) EB - 0distr)

SE)
(,0: 0 ,ß) EB N f- ('0: EB N) 0 (,ß EB N)
_'-'-'.((0:_7i_ß-C.)&_,_N_)..,-f--:-::'_(,.-0:_&_,_N....:...)..,..0_'--.:.(ß_&_,N-,-'-)_-,-_ _ _
R3....:...) SE)
(o:~ß) --t N f- (0: --t N) 0 (ß --t N)
•
LEMMA 16. The following equivalence can be proved in DPL for any Cl -
formulae Land M:
370 LUCA BOL DRIN AND CLAUDIO SOSSAI
® red) (0 --+ L) ® (ß --+ M) -Ir (ß --+ (L --+ M)) & (0 --+ (M --+ L)) & «0'l'iß) --+ (L EI) M))
Proof. Let us prove the two directions:

f-) first we prove (a ~ L) ® (ß ~ M) f- ß ~ (L ~ M):
ßf-ß Mf-M
ß~M,ßf-M
(a ~ L) ® (ß ~ M),ß,L f- M
(a ~ L) ® (ß ~ M),ß f- L ~ M
(a ~ L) ® (ß ~ M) f- ß ~ (L ~ M)
The proof of (a ~ L) ® (ß ~ M) f- a -+ (M ~ L) is completely
analogous; we have to prove (a -+ L)®(ß -+ M) f- (a'l'iß) -+ (LffiM):
of-o Lf-L ßf-ß Mf-M

0-+ L,o f- L ß~M,ßf-M
a ~ L, ..,L, 0 f- f ß ~ M, ..,M, ß f- f
o ~ L, ..,L f-..,o ß ~ M, ..,M f- ..,ß
..,L & ..,M f- ..,L ® ..,M 0 -+ L, ß -+ M, ..,L ® ..,M f- "'0 ® ..,ß
o -+ L, ß -+ M, ..,L & ..,M f- ..,a ® ..,ß
a -+ L, ß -+ M, o'l'iß, ..,(L ffi M) f- f
(0 -+ L) ® (ß -+ M),o'l'iß f- L ffi M
(0 ~ L) ® (ß ~ M) f- (o'l'iß) -+ (L ffi M)
At this point we have just to use & R to conclude:
(0 --+ L) ® (ß --+ M) I- ß --+ (L --+ M)

(0 --+ L) ® (ß -t M) I- 0 --+ (M --+ L)
(0 -t L) ® (ß -t M) I- (o'l'iß) -t (L EI) M)
(0 --+ L) ® (ß --+ M) I- (ß -t (L -t M))&(o --+ (M --+ L))&«o'l'iß) -t (L EI) M))
-I) We prove this direction in three steps:

1. By Lemma 15 we have that
«0 -t (M -t L)) ® (ß --+ (L -t M))) &

(ß -t (L --+ M)) &
I- «0 --+ (M --+ L)) ® (ß --+ (L EI) M))) &
(0 -t (M --+ L)) &
«0 -t (M L)) ® (ß -t (L --+ M))) &
«0 --+ (M EI) L)) ® (ß --+ (L EI) M)))
EI)
«o'l'iß) -t (L EI) M))
2. By &-® distr (twice) we have the following:

«O! -+ (M -+ L» ® (ß -+ (L -+ M») &
«O! -+ (M -+ L» ® (ß -+ (L E9 M))) & I- «O! -+ (M -+ L» & (O! -+ (M E9 L)))
«O! -+ (M E9 L» ® (ß -+ (L -+ M))) & ®«ß -+ (L -+ M» & (ß -+ (L E9 M»:
«O! -+ (M E9 L» ® (ß -+ (L E9 M)))
3. Last, we prove that:

«0: -t (M -t L» & (0: -t (M 6:) L)))
®«ß -t (L -t M» & (ß -t (L 6:) M))) I- (0: -t L) ® (ß -t M)
To show this one it suffices to see that (0: -t (M -t L» & (0: -t

(M 6:) L» I- 0: -t L and (ß -t (L -t M» & (ß -t (L 6:) M» I- ß -t
M since we can use then ® R. We prove the first one, since they
are symmetrieal. Note that the following sequent can be proved
using absorption:
(0: -t L) & (ß -t M) I- (o:&ß) -t (L&M).

M -+ L -n- (LeM) -+ L (0 -+ «LeM) -+ L»&(o -+ (LeM» f- (0&0) -+ L
--------~~--~~------~~------------SE)
(o&a) -n-.. (a -+ (M -+ L»& (a -+ (M eL» f- (a&a) -+ L
~~----------~~~--~~~~~~~~-------------SE)
(a -+ (M -+ L» & (a -+ (M (t) L» f- a -+ L
LEMMA 17. The following equivalence can be proved in DPL for any C I
• -
formula L:
..., red) ""(0 -t L) -11- 0 &...,L
Proof. We prove the two directions as folIows:

LI-L
ad- 0 L,o I- L
01- o,L Ll-o-tL
I- 0,0 -t L I- ...,L,o: -t L
-'(0: -t L) I- 0: ""(0: -t L) I- -,L
""(0 -+ L) I- o&-,L
01-0
...,L I- -,L 0: & -,L I- 0 ...,L I- -,L
0: & ..,L, ..,L I- 0 ® ...,L
0& -,L I- -,L abs) 01-0 LI-L
o & -,L I- (0 & ..,L) ® -,L (0 & -,L) ® -,L I- 0 ® ..,L 0,0 -+ L I- L
o ® -,L, 0 -t L I- t
& ...,L, 0 -+ L I- t
0:
0:& -,L I- ""(0 -+ L)
•
LEMMA 18. If B(x) -11- &iEI(ß. --+ Mi(X», then

VxB(x) --11-- &iEI(ß. --+ VXMi(X»
Proof. We prove the two directions:

1--) we show first that for any j E I we have:
ßj I-- ßj Mj(x) I-- Mj(x)
ßj ® (ßj --+ Mj(x» I-- Mj(x)
ßj ® &iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x» I-- Mj(x)
Vx(ßj ® &iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x») I-- Mj(x) (x is not free in the left handside)
Vx(ßj ® &iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x))) I-- VxMj(x) ')
-..:.......:.--=------'--'--'-'---....:...........;", V - ®dlstr
ßj ® VX&iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x» I-- VxMj(x)
VX&iEI(ßi --+ Mi(X» I-- ßj --+ 'r/xMj(x)
hence we can infer:

VX&iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x» I-- ßj --+ 'r/xMj(x» for any j E I
VX&iEI(ßi --+ Mi(X» I-- &iEI(ßi --+ 'r/XMi(X»
--I) (this direction holds in Linear Logic as weIl). Consider that, for any
jE I we have:
Mj(x) I-- Mj(x)

ßj I-- ßj VxMj(x) I-- Mj(x)
ßj,ßj --+ 'r/xMj(x) I-- Mj(x)
ßj --+ VxMj(x) I-- ßj --+ Mj(x)
and so we can infer:

&iEI(ßi --+ VxMi(x» I-- ßj --+ Mj(x) for all jE I
&iEI(ßi --+ VXMi(X» I-- &iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x»
&iEI(ßi --+ VxMi(x» I-- VX&iEI(ßi --+ Mi(x»
Using the above lemmas we can now prove the normal-form theorem:
•
THEOREM 19. Any closed formula A is provably equivalent in the calculus
DPLx,e to an &-formula, i.e. a formula A' = &iEI(O:i --+ Li) where Li
are C1-formulae.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on A:

A= 0 is provably equivalent to ß ~ E, where ß = ""0, which is an &-
formula. In fact, using the e rule it is easy to prove that contraction
holds for e, hence e behaves classically.
A = p is provably equivalent to 1 ~ p, which is an &-formula.
A = ...,B. H B -n. . &iEI(ßi ~ Li) then, by Lemma 14:
where OJ = ..., E9j~J ßi and MJ = . ., (&jEJL j & &j~J""Lj).

A = B & C. H B and C are &-formulae, so is A.
A = B ® C. Assurne B -11- &iEI(ßi ~ Li) and C -11- &jEJ(-yj ~ Mj)j

then, choosing Oi,j = «ßi ~ c:) x (-yj ~ c:)) ~ c:, we have
B -n- &;El(ß; --t L;) C -n- &;EJ('Y; --t M;)

B ®C -n- &;El(ß; --t L;) ® &iEJ(-Yi --t Mi) ® - &distr)
B ®C -n- &;El,;EJ«ßi --t Li) ® ("I; --t M;)) ®red) (Lemma 16)
B ® C -n- &iEl,;EJ«'Y; --t (Li --t Mi)) & (ßi --t (Mi --t Li)) & «ßi"h;) --t (L; $ M;))) (ßil'/'Yj) -n- 6i,j
B ® C -n- &iEIJEJ«-Y; --t (Li --t Mi» & (ßi --t (Mi --t Li» & (6iJ --t (Li $ Mi)))
A = VxB(x) By Lemma 18, if B(x) -11- &iEI(ßi ~ Mi(x)), then
VxB(x) -11- &iEI(ßi ~ VXMi(X»
•
Before considering completeness, let us spend some words on the above
theorem, which plays a central role in our system.
The normal form looks particularly attractive if we remember that the ob-
ject ",,(1-0) ~ L correspondstothe semantical constraint Nec(Mod(L» ~
0. A conjunction of tokens of this form represents then just a list of con-
straints on the necessity of some formulae. The fact that any formula has
such anormal form means that any composition of tokens of information
in this form (even the x and the ..., compositions) gives rise to a new list of
necessity constraints.
The connective ® provides an effective method for merging information.
Assurne you are given two tokens of information from two sourceSj to merge
them, you simply connect the tokens by 0. Reduction of a formula to
the normal form (the &-formula) can be seen as the effective process of
merging information. The fact that the reduction process is not so trivial
(although constructive, see the proof of Theorem 19) makes it clear that
there is some work to do for the combination of information, and this work
is automatically performed by the proof system of MPLx.
The proof of completeness now folIows:
THEOREM 20. The DPLx,e calculus is sound and complete with respect
to the given semanties, i.e. for any closed multiset rand ß, the sequent
r I- ß is proved in DPLx,e iJJ (g) r Fx,e 7<iß.
Proof. Soundness is easy to prove, by induction on the derivation; as a
matter of fact, logical and structural rules (apart from weakening and ab-
sorption) are sound because the interpretation structure is a Girard Quan-
tale (see [Girard, 1987]), with the proviso that 1 coincides with T. For the
others the proof is straightforward:
weakening)
ßI-B
ß,A I- B
Assurne U«(g) ß) ::; U(B); then U«(g) ß 0 A) = U«(g) ß) x U(A) ::;
U«(g)ß)::; U(B) by monotonicity of x.
absorption)
r,A I- L,ß
r,AI-A0L,ß
for any C1-formula L.
We prove that if U(A) ::; U(L) then U(A) x U(L) U(A). By
Theorem 10 U(L)(w) E {O, I}, hence we have
(U(A) x U(L»(w) (U(A)(w) x U(L)(w» V"t

= {U(A)(W) if U(L) = 1
E: if U(L) = E:
U(A)(w) 1\ U(L)(w) = U(A)(w)
0-& distr) (A & B) 0 C -11- (A 0 C) & (B 0 C)
U«A & B) 0 C) (U(A & B) x U(C» V"t

= «U(A) 1\ U(B» x U(C» V"t
= «(U(A) x U(C» 1\ (U(B) x U(C))) V"t
= (U(A0C) V"t)1\ (U(B0C) V"t)
U«A 0 C) & (B 0 C»
® - V distr) VxA(x) ® C --n- Vx(A(x) ® C) if x is not free in C.

For any D,
UD,.,.(VxA(x) ®C) = (UD,.,.(VxA(x» x UD,.,.(C» Ve

= (A uED UD,.,.[z/uj(A(x» x UD,.,.(C» V e
= (AuED(UD,.,.[z/uj(A(x» x UD,.,.[z/uj(C))) Ve
= AUED«UD,.,.[z/uj(A(x» x UD,.,.[z/uj(C» Ve)
= AUED(UD,.,.[z/uj(A(x) ® C»
= UD(Vx(A(x) ® C»
S') ß I- a for any ß ~ a
U(ß) = ßVe ~ liVe = U(a)
® def): a ® ß -11- 'Y where 'Y = a x ß
U(a ® ß) = (U(a) x U(ß» V e =

= «liVe) x C!3Ve» Ve = (li x ß) Ve = Uh)
-, def) -,a -11- 'Y where 'Y = a -t c
U(-,a) = U(a) -t e
= (liVe) -te
= {li ifa~c
1 -te otherwise
= Uh)
Let us now come to completeness; we prove firstthe fact that:
The proof is by induction on the number of elements in 1:
111 = 1) We have then U(a -t L) ~ U(ß -t M). There are just two cases
in which this can happen:
case 1: ModD,.,.(L) ~ ModD,.,.(M) and ß ~ a. Then by classical
completeness we have L I- M, and by rule S' we have ß I- a;
hence:
ßI-a LI-M
a -t L,ß I- M
a-tLI-ß-tM
case 2: ß ~ c. In this case, trivially,

ßI-e el-M
ßI- M
I-ß-+M
a-+LI-ß-+M
111 = n) We have U(&i~n-l(ai -+ Li) & (an -+ Ln» ~ U(ß -+ M).

Using Theorem 10 we have:
U(&i<n-l(ai -+ Li) & (an -+ Ln»(w) =

-{ U(&i<n-l(ai -+ Li»(w) if w E ModD,u(L n )
(-,an)-A U(&i~n-l(ai -+ Li»(w) otherwise
if w E ModD,u(M)
U(ß -+ M) = { ~ß otherwise
It follows that there are two possibilities:
• U(&i<n-l(ai -+ Li»(W) ~ ...,ß for any W such that W ~ ModD,u

(Ln) and W ~ ModD,u(M). In this case it happens that
U(&i<n-l(ai -+ Li» ~ U(ß -+ M). Then, by inductive hyp.,
we ha;e &i~n-l(ai -+ Li) I- ß -+ M, and we can make the
simple derivation:
• If the first possibility does not hold, then it must be the case that
-,a n ~ -,ßj we also have (this is true in any case):
U(ß -+ (M E9 -,L n » = U(ß -+ M) V U(ß -+ -,Ln )

Now, we can see that U(&i<n-l (ai -+ Li» ~ U(ß -+ (M E9
-,Ln»j in fact: -
- if w E ModD,u(L n ), it is:
= U(&i<n(ai -+ Li»(w)
~ U(ti -+ M)(w)
~ U(ß -+ (M E9 ...,Ln»(w)
- if W ~ ModD,O'(L n ), then
U(&i~n-l(Oi --+ Li))(w) ~ 1 = U(ß --+ -,Ln)(w)

~ U(ß --+ (M ffi -,Ln»(w)
By inductive hypothesis we have &i<n-l(Oi --+ Li) ~ ß --+

(M $ -,L n ). -
Then we can perform the following inference (notice that from
-,a n ~ -,ß we have ß ~ on):
ß ~ an Ln ~ Ln
&i~n-l(Oi --+ Li) ~ ß --+ (M ffi -,Ln) an --+ Ln ~ ß --+ Ln
&i<n-l(Oi --+ Li) & (On --+ Ln) ~ (ß --+ (M ffi -,Ln »& (ß --+ Ln)
&i~n(Oi --+ Li) ~ ß --+ ((M ffi -,L n ) & Ln)
&i~n(Oi --+ Li) ~ ß --+ M
Assume now UF(A) ~ UF(B); using Theorem 19 we have A --1~ &iEI(ai --+
Li) and B --1~ &jEJ(ßj --+ Mj). By validity of the calculus we have
and
U(B) = U(&jEJ(ßj --+ M j »= 1\ U(ßj --+ M j )

jEJ
hence
From what we have just proved, we have
and so
&.E1(ai -t Li) f- ßj -4 M j for any j E J
A -lI- &iEl(ai -t Li) B -lI- &jEJ(ßj -t Mj) &iE1(ai -4 Li) I- &jEJ(ßj -t Mj) SE)
AI-B
•
Let us end this section with a short note on the meaning of the nega-
tion connective. To this aim we must remember the main property of the
semantics of uncertainty: the shift from global to local idea of truth.
Moreover, let us note that a sentence A can be seen also as an informa-
tional state i.e. the possibilistic distribution U(A).
Following these two observations, the negation of a formula can be un-
derstood as a shift from an informational state to the opposite (negated)
one, meaning that the same event can have a high degree of necessity if
observed from the informational state U(A) while a low degree of necessity
if observed from U(.A) .
.Forexample we havethat NU(-'O-tL)(L) = l-a while NU(-,(-'O-tL»(L) =
1- (.aV €). In fact using Lemma 17 we have that '('0 --+ L) -11- .0&.L,
hence by Theorem 20 U(-.(-.o --+ L) = U(.o&.L) = (-.CiVe) A U(.L).
If as t-norm we take the product, € = 0.01 and a = 0.011 then it is easy to
see that N(L)u(-'O.Oll-tL)(L) = 0.989 while N(L)u(-,(-'O.Oll-tL»(L) = 0.09.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a logical system based on possibility functions, which is

richer than standard possibility logic [Dubois et al., 1994] in that it allows
for the combination of tokens of information coming from distinct and in-
dependent sourees. We showed that algebraic semantics is a comfortable
way to deal with this kind of logics, since the new connective for the com-
bination of information has a natural semantical counterpart in at-norm
product among possibility functions.Moreover, it is possible to recognize
a Quantale in the resulting algebraic structure, and so we are allowed to
adopt the calculus of Linear Logic, which is ensured to be sound. We prove
that it suffices to add weakening, 'cl-contraction, distributivity and numer-
ical rules (depending on the t-norm we have chosen) to obtain a complete
system.
The calculus also depends on a threshold parameter e, which we have
been forced to introduce to allow for abiorthogonal closure operator; the e
value can be interpreted as a noise, due to the lack of homogeneity of the
informational source, so that we have to attribute to each possible world at
least that possibility - no world can be categorically excluded.
Further improvements of this work could be considered, among which:
• an in-depth study of this calculus (cut elimination);
• the integration of fuzziness and uncertainty (see [Hajek et al., 1994])

in an algebraic framework like the present one;
• the study of logics based on more complex measures, like probabilities

or belief functions;
• the study of non-monotonie connectives forpossibility functions like

the ones explored in [Dubois and Prade, 1994].
It would also be interesting to develop a logic where negation were inter-
preted in the usual fuzzy way: -'11" = 1 - 11", and ~ corresponds to the fuzzy
operation 11"1 ~11"2 = 11"1 + 11"2 - 11"1 • 11"2. This interpretation completely rules
out the use of Linear Logic.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was partially supported by a CNR-CNRS joint project (CNR

Code 132.3.1) and by the Fusion Project of the European Community. We
are indebted to Didier Dubois, Jeröme Lang and Henry Prade for their
enlightening discussions at IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse. Thanks also to Gio-
vanni Sambin, Silvio Valentini and Alessandro Saffiotti for their acute ob-
servations. We are grateful to Nino Trainito for his careful reading of the
manuscript.
L. Boldrin
Sodalia, Trento, Italy.
C. Sossai
LADSEB-CNR, Padova, Italy.
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[Boldrin and Sossai, 1995) L. Boldrin and C. Sossai. An algebraic semantics for possi-
bilistic logic. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Uncertainty in Arti-
ficialInteliigence (UAI 95), Montreal, Canada, August 1995. An extended version in
LADSEB-CNR Tech. Rep. 03/95.
[Boidrin and Sossai, 1997) L. Boldrin and C. Sossai. Local Possibilistic Logic, .Journal
of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 7, 309-333, 1997.
[Boldrin, 1996) L. Boldrin and A. Saffiotti. A modal logic for merging partial belief
of multiple uncertain reasoners. Tee. Rep. TR/IRIDIA/95-20. Universite Libre de
Bruxelles. October 1996.
[Dubois and Prade, 1985) D. Dubois and H. Prade. A review of fuzzy set aggregation
connectives. Information Sciences, 36, 85-121, 1985.
[Dubois et al., 1991) D. Dubois, J. Lang and H. Prade. Fuzzy sets in approximate rea-
soning, part 2: logical approaches. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 40, 203-244, 1991.
[Dubois and Prade, 1994) D. Dubois and H. Prade. A survey of belief revision and up-
dating rules in various uncertainty models. Int. J. of Intelligent Systems, 9, 61-100,
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[Dubois et al., 1994) D. Dubois, J. Lang and H. Prade. Possibilistic logic. In Handbook of
Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, vol. 3. D. Gabbay, C. Hogger
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[Girard,1987} J. Y. Girard. Linear logic. Theoretical Computer Science, 50, 1-101, 1987.
[Hajek et al., 1994)- P. Hajek, D. Harmancova and R. Verbrugge. A qualitative fuzzy

possibilistic logic. Int. J. 0/ Approximate Reasoning, 7, 1994.
[Hajek et al., 1995) P. Hajek, L. Godo and F. Esteva. A complete many-valued logic with
product-conjunction. Tech. rep. lIlA 95/15, Institut d'lnvestigaci6 en Intelligencia
Artificial, Conseil Superior d'lnvestigacions Cientlfiques, 1995.
[Höhle,1995) U. Höhle. A survey on the fundamentals offuzzy set theory. To appear in
Handbook 0/ Mechanical Enrineering. Kreith, ed. GRC Press, 1995. .
[Mac Lane and Moerdijk, 1992 S. Mac Lane and I. Moerdijk. SheaIJes in Geometry and
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[Pavelka, 1979) J. Pavelka. On fuzzy logic I, 11, 111. Zeitsehr. f. Math. Logik und Grund-
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[Rosenthal, 1990) K. I. Rosenthal. Quantales and their Applications. Longman, 1990.
GERHARD BREWKA
LOGIC PROGRAMS WITH

CONTEXT-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES
1 INTRODUCTION: WHY DYNAMIC PREFERENCES ARE

NEEDED
Preferences among defaults play a crucial role in nonmonotonic reasoning.

One source of preferences that has been studied intensively is specificity
[Pooie, 1985; Touretzky, 1986; Touretzky et al., 1991]. In case of a conßict
between defaults we tend to prefer the more specific one since this default
provides more reliable information. Also in other application domains, like
model based diagnosis or configuration, preferences playafundamental role.
The relevance of preferences is weH-recognized in nonmonotonic reason-
ing, and prioritized versions for most of the nonmonotonic logics have been
proposed, e.g., prioritized circumscription [Lifschitz, 1985], hierarchic au-
toepistemic logic [Konolige, 1988], prioritized default logic [Brewka, 1994].
In these approaches preferences are handled in an 'external' manner in the
foHowing sense: some ordering among defaults is used to control the gen-
eration of the nonmonotonic conclusions. For instance, in the case of pri-
oritized default logic this information is used to control the generation of
extensions. However, the preference information itself is not expressed in
the logical language. This means that this kind of information has to be
fuHy pre-specified, there is no way of reasoning about (as opposed to rea-
soning with) preferences. This is in stark contrast to the way people reason
and argue with each other. In legal argumentations, for instance, prefer-
ences are context-dependent, and the assessment of the preferences among
involved confiicting laws is a crucial (if not the most crucial) part of the
reasoning.
What we would like to have, therefore, is an approach that allows us
to represent preference information in the language and derive such i~for
mation dynamically.l In arecent paper [Brewka, 1994] the author has
described a variant of normal default logic in which reasoning about pref-
erences is possible. Although the version of default logic presented in this
earlier paper produces reasonable results in most cases, this approach has
several drawbacks:
1. The approach is computationally extremely demanding as it involves
the construction of theReiter extensions and an additional compati-
bility check for each extension guaranteeing that the preference infor-
mation was taken into account adequately.
10ur use of the term dynamic is intended to express change from context to context
rat her than change over time.
381
D. Dubois et al. (eds.J, Fuzzy Sets, Logics anti Reasoning ahout Knowledge, 381-394.
382 GERHARD BREWKA
2. It may happen that consistent default theories, Le. theories whose

strict part is satisfiable, possess no extensions at all. This is aston-
ishing since in that paper we only dealt with normal defaults. The
non-existence of extensions is due to defeasible preference information.
It is highly questionable whether such information should be able to
destroy all extensions.
3. The earlier paper did not take non-normal defaults into account, it is
thus not general enough to cover normallogic programs with negation
as failure.
The approach presented in this paper will be based on extended logic pro-
grams with two types of negation. This means that in comparison with our
earlier proposal we are more restrictive in one respect and more general in
another: we are more restrictive since we do not allow arbitrary first order
formulas as in normal default logic; we are more general since we admit nega-
tion as failure and hence rules which correspond to non-normal defaults in
Reiter's logic. We also switch from the extension based semantics of default
logic to well-founded semantics [van Gelder et al., 1990; Przmusinski, 1991;
Lifschitz, 1995], Le. to an inherently skeptical approach where the nonmono-
tonic conclusions are defined directly, not through the notion of extensions.
It is well-known that well-founded semantics sometimes loses intuitively ex-
pected conclusions. This is also the case in our proposal. However, this is
outweighed by a tremendous gain in efficiency: the well-founded conclusions
can be computed in polynomial time.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as folIows: in Section 2 we first
review adefinition of well-founded semantics for logic programs with two
types of negation which is based on the double application of a certain
anti-monotone operator. The definition extends Baral and Subrahmanian's
formulation of well-founded semantics for normallogic programs [Baral and
Subrahmanian, 1991] and was used by several authors [Baral and Gelfond,
1994; Lifschitz, 1995]. We show that this definition suffers from an unnec-
essary weakness and present a reformulation that leads to better results.
Section 3, the main section of the paper, introduces our dynamic treatment
of preferences together with several small motivating examples. We show
that our conclusions are, in general, a superset of the well~founded conclu-
sions. Section 4 illustrates the expressive power of our approach using a
more realistic example from legal reasoning. Section 5 concludes.
2 WELL-FOUNDED SEMANTICS FOR EXTENDED LOGIC

PROGRAMS
A (propositional) extended logic program consists of rules of the form

LOGIC PROGRAMS WITH CONTEXT-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES 383
where the ai, bj and c are propositional literals, Le. either propositional
atoms or such atoms preceded by the classical negation sign. The symbol
not denotes negation by faHure (weak negation), ..., denotes classical (strong)
negation. For convenience we will sometimes use a rule schema. to represent
a set of propositional rules, namely the set of all ground instances of the
schema.
Extended logic programs are very useful for knowledge representation
purposes, see for instance [Baral and Gelfond, 1994] for a number of illus-
trative examples. Two major semantics for extended logic programs have
been defined: (1) answer set semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1990], an
extension of stable model semantics, and (2) aversion of well-founded se-
mantics [Przmusinski, 1991]. The second approach can be viewed as an
efficient approximation of the first.
Let us first introduce answer sets. We say a rule r E P of the form above is
defeated by a literall if 1= bi for some i E {I, ... ,m}. We say r is defeated
by a set of literals X if X contains a literal that defeats r. Furthermore,
we call the rule obtained by deleting weakly negated preconditions from r
the monotonie counterpart of rand denote it with Mon(r). We also apply
Mon to sets of rules with the obvious meaning.
DEFINITION 1. Let P be a logic program, X a set of literals. The X-
reduct of P, denoted p X , is the program obtained from P by
• deleting each rule defeated by X, and
• replacing each remaining rule r with its monotonie counterpart M on(r).
DEFINITION 2. Let R be a set of rules without negation as failure. Cn(R)

denotes the smallest set of literals that is
1. closed under R, and
2. logically closed, Le. either consistent or equal to the set of allliterals.
DEFINITION 3. Let P be a logic program, X a set of literals. Define an

operator ,,/p as folIows:
,,/p(X) = Cn(P x )
X is an answer set of P iff X = 'Yp(X).
A literal l is a consequence of a program P under answer set semantics,
denoted l E Ans(P), iff l is contained in all answer sets of P.
The second major semantics for extended logic programs, well-founded
semantics, is an inherently skeptical semantics that refrains from drawing
conclusions whenever there is a potential conflict. The original formulatiori
of well-founded semantics for generallogic programs in [van Gelder et al.,
1990] is based on a certain partial model. Przymusinski reconstructed this
384 GERHARD BREWKA
definition in 3-valued logic [Przymusinski, 1989]. The formulation using an

anti-monotone operator was first given in [Baral and Subrahmanian, 1991]
for general logic programs together with a corresponding definition for de-
fault logic. The straightforward extension of this formulation (respectively,
the restriction of the default logic definition) to extended logic programs
that will be introduced now was used by several authors, e.g. [Baral and
Gelfond, 1994; Lifschitz, 1995).2 Note that in this paper we will only con-
sider the literals that are true in the corresponding 3-valued semanties.
Like answer set semantics the well-founded semantics for extended logic
programs is based on the operator 'YP However, the operator is used in a
totally different way. Since 'YP is anti-monotone the function rp = (-yp)2
is monotone. According to the famous Knaster-Tarski theorem [Tarski,
1955] every monotone operator has aleast fixpoint. The set of well-founded
conclusions of a program P, denoted WFS(P), is defined to be this least
fixpoint of rp. The fixpoint can be approached from below by iterating rp
on the empty set. In case P is finite this iteration is guaranteed to actually
reach the fixpoint.
The intuition behind this use of the operator is as follows: whenever 'YP
is applied to a set of literals X known to be true it produces the set of
all literals that are still potentially derivable. Applying it to such a set
of potentially derivable literals it produces a set of literals known to be
true, often larger than the original set X. Starting with the empty set and
iterating until the fixpoint is reached thus produces a set of true literals.
It can be shown that every well-founded conclusion is a conclusion under
the answer set semantics. Well-founded semantics can thus be viewed as an
approximation of answer set semantics.
Unfortunately it turns out that for many programs the set of well-founded
conclusions is extremely small and provides a very poor approximation of
answer set semantics. Consider the following program Po which has also
been discussed in [Baral and Gelfond, 1994]:
1) b +- nohb
2) a +- noha
3) ~a +- not a
The set of well-founded conclusions is empty since "(Po (0) equals Lit, the
set of all literals, and the Lit-reduct of Po contains no rule at all. This is
surprising since, intuitively, the confiict between 2) and 3) has nothing to
do with .,b and b.
This problem arises whenever the following conditions hold:
2Pereira and Alferes [1992) later introduced aversion of well-founded semantics that
adheres to the so-called coherence principle which requires that strong negation implies
weak negation. We will show later in Sect. 3 how the coherence principle can be intro-
duced in our approach.
1. a complementary pair of literals is provable from the monotonie coun-

terparts of the rules of a program P, and
2. there is at least one proof for each of the complementary literals whose
rules are not defeated by Cn( PI), where P' consists of the 'strict' rules
in P, Le. those without negation as failure.
In this case well-founded semantics concludes I iff I E Cn(pI ). It should

be obvious that such a situation is not just a rare limiting case. To the
contrary, it can be expected that many commonsense knowledge bases will
give rise to such undesired behaviour.
We want to show that a minor reformulation of the fixpoint operator
can overcome this intolerable weakness and leads to much better results.
Consider the following operator
where CI(R) denotes the minimal set of literals closed under the (classi-
cal) rules R. CI(R) is thus like Cn(R) without the requirement of logical
closedness. Now define
Again we iterate on the empty set to obtain the well-founded conclusions

of a program P which we will denote WFS*(P).
Consider the effects of this modification on our example Po· 'Y;'o (X) =
{a, -,a, b}. Rule 1) is contained in the {a, -,a, b}-reduct of Po and thus
r po (0) = {b}. Since bis also the only literal contained in all answer sets of
Pt our approximation actually coincides with answer set semantics in this
case.
It is not difficult to see that the new monotone operator is equivalent
to the original one whenever P does not contain negation as failure. In
this case the X-reduct of P, for arbitrary X, is equivalent to P and for
this reason it does not make any difference whether to use 'YP or 'YP as the
operator to be applied first in the definition of rp. The same is obviously
true for programs without classical negation: for such programs Cn can
never produce complementary pairs of literals and for this reason the logical
closedness condition is obsolete.
In the general case the new operator produces more conclusions than the
original one:
PROPOSITION 4. Let P be an extended logic program. For anarbitrary
set 0/ literals X we have
rp(X) ~ rp(X).
386 GERHARD BREWKA
It remains to be shown that the new operator produces no unwanted

results, i.e. that our new semantics can still be viewed as an approximation
of answer set semantics.
PROPOSITION 5. Let P be an extended logic program. Let Ans(P) be the
set o/literals contained in all answer sets 0/ P. W F S* is correct wrt answer
set semanties, i.e. WFS*(P) ~ Ans(P).
For the rest of the paper a minor reformulation turns out to be convenient.
Instead of using the monotonie counterparts of undefeated mIes we will
work with the original mIes and extend the definitions of the two operators
Cn and Cl accordingly, requiring that weakly negated preconditions be ne-
glected, that is, we extend Cn and Cl to arbitrary sets of mIes P with weak
negation by defining Cn(P) = Cn(Mon(P» and CI(P) = CI(Mon(P)).
We can now equivalently characterize,p and ,;, by the equations
,p(X) = Cn(Px)
,;'(X) = CI(Px)
where Px denotes the set of mIes not defeated by X.
Before we turn to the treatment of preferences we give an alternative
characterization of rj, based on the following notion:
DEFINITION 6. Let P be a logic program, X a set of literals. A mle r is X-
safe wrt P (r E SAFEx(P» if r is not defeated by ,;'(X) or, equivalently,
if rE P"Ype X ).
With this new notion we can obviously characterize rj, as follows:
rj,(X) = Cn(p'Ype X ») = Cn(P'Ype X » = Cn(SAFEx(P)
It is this last formulation that we will modify later. More precisely, the
notion of X -safeness will be weakened to handle preferences adequately.
3 ADDING PREFERENCES
In order to handle preferences we need to be able to express preference

information explicitly. Since we want to do this in the logical language we
have to extend the language. We do this in two respects:
1. we use a set of rule names N together with a naming function name

to be able to refer to particular mIes,
2. we use a special (infix) symbol -< that can take rule names as argu-
ments to represent preferences among mIes.
Intuitively, nt -< n2 where nt and n2 are rule names means the rule with
name nt is preferred over the rule with name n2. 3
A prioritized logic program is a pair (R, name) where R is a set of rules
and name a naming function. To make sure that the symbol -< has its
intended meaning, i.e. represents a transitive and anti-symmetrie relation,
we assume that R contains all ground instances of the schemata
and
-.(N2 -< Nt) ~ Nt -< N 2
where Ni are parameters for names. Note that in our examples we won't
mention these rules explicitly.
The function name is a partial injective naming function that assigns
a name n E N to some of the rules in R. Note that not all rules do
necessarily have a name. The reason is that names will only play a role
in conflict resolution among defeasible rules, Le. rules with weakly negated
preconditions. For this reason names for strict rules, Le. rules in which
the symbol not does not appear, won't be needed. A technical advantage of
leaving some rules unnamed is that the use of rule schemata with parameters
for rule names does not necessarily make programs infinite. If we would
require names for all rules we would have to use a parametrized name for
each schema and thus end up with an infinite set N of names.
In our examples we assurne that N is given implicitly. We also define the
function name implicitly. We write:
to express that name(c ~ at, ... ,an, not bt , ... , not bm } = ni.
For convenience we will simply speak of programs instead of prioritized
logic programs whenever this does not lead to misunderstandings.
Before introducing new definitions we would like to point out how we
want the new explicit preference information to be used. Our approach
follows two principles:
1. we want to extend well-founded semantics, Le. we want thatevery
W FS*-conclusion remains a conclusion in the prioritized approach,
2. we want to use preferences to solve conflicts whenever this is possible
without violating principle 1.
Let us first explain what we mean by conflict here. Rules may be conflicting
in several ways. In the simplest case two rules may have complementary
3Note that for historical reasons we follow the convention that the minimal rules are
the preferred ones.
388 GERHARD BREWKA
literals in their heads. We call this a type-I conflict. Conflicts of this type
may render the set of well-founded conclusions inconsistent, but do not
necessarily do so. H, for instance, a precondition of one of the rules is not
derivable or a rule is defeated the conflict is implicitly resolved. In that case
the preference information will simply be neglected. Consider the following
program PI:
nl : b ~ not c
n2 : -.b ~ not b
n3 : n2 -< nl
There is a type-I conflict between nl and n2. Although the explicit prefer-
ence information gives precedence to n2 we want to apply nl here to comply
with the first of our two principles. Technically, this means that we can ap-
ply a preferred rule T only if we are sure that T'S application actually leads
to a situation where literals defeating T can no longer be derived.
The following two rules exhibit a different type of conflict:
a ~ not b
b ~ not a
The heads of these rules are not complementary. However, the application
of one rule defeats the other and vice versa. We call this a direct type-II
conflict. Of course, in the general case the defeat of the conflicting rule may
be indirect, i.e. based on the existence of additional rules. We say Tl and
T2 are type-lI conflicting wrt. a set of rules R iff
1. ei(R) neither defeats Tl nor T2,
2. el(R + Td defeats T2, and
3. ei(R + T2) defeats Tl
Here R + T abbreviates RU {T}. A direct type-II conflict is thus a type-lI

conflict wrt. the empty set of rules. The rule sets R that have to be taken
into account in our well-founded semantics based approach are subsets of
the rules which are undefeated by the set of literals known to be true. Note
that the two types of conflict are not disjoint, i.e. two rules may be in
conflict of both type-I and type-II. Consider the following program P2 , a
slight modification of PI:
nl : b ~ not c, not-.b
n2 : -.b ~ not b
n3 : n2 -< nl
Now we have a type-II conflict between nl and n2 (more precisely, a direct

type-II and a type-I conflict) that is not solvable by the implicit mechanisms
of well-founded semanties alone. It is this kind of confiiet that we try to

solve by the explicit preference information. In our example n2 will be
used to derive -ob. Note that now the application of n2 defeats nl and
there is no danger that a literal defeating n2 might become derivable later.
Generally, a type-II confiict between Tl and r2 (wrt. some undefeated rules
of the program) will be solved in favour of the preferred rule, say rl, only
if applying rl excludes any further possibility of deriving an rl -defeating
literal.
Note that every type-I confiict can be turned into a direct type-II confiict
bya (non-equivalent!) rerepresentation ofthe rules: if each confiieting rule r
is replaced by its seminormal form 4 then all confiicts become type-II confiiets
and are thus amenable to confiict resolution through preference information.
After this motivating discussion let us present the new definitions. Our
treatment of priorities is based on a weakening of the notion of X -safeness.
In Section 2 we considered a rule r as X-safe whenever there is no proof
for a literal defeating r from the monotonie counterparts of X -undefeated
rules. Now in the context of a prioritized logic program we will consider a
rule r as X-safe if there is no such proof from monotonie counterparts 0/
a certain subset of the X-undefeated rules. The subset to be used depends
on the rule r and consists of those rules that are not 'dominated' by r.
Intuitively, r' is dominated by r iff r ' is (1) known to be less preferred than
rand (2) defeated when r is applied together with rules that already have
been established to be X -safe. (2) is necessary to make sure that explicit
preference information is used the right way, according to our discussion of
PI.
It is obvious that whenever there is no proof for a defeating literal from
all X-undefeated rules there can be no such proof from a subset of these
rules. Rules that were X -safe according to our earlier definition thus remain
to be X -safe. Here are the precise definitions:
DEFINITION 7. Let P = (R,name) be a prioritized logic program, X a
set of literals, Y a set of rules, and r E R. The set of rules dominated by r
wrt X and Y, denoted Domx,y(r), is the set
{r' ER I name(r) -< name(r' ) EX and Cl(Y + r) defeats r/}
Note that Domx,y(r) is monotonie in both X and Y. We can now define

the X -safe rules inductively:
DEFINITION 8. Let P = (R,name) be a prioritized logic program, X a
set ofliterals. The set of X-safe rules of P, denoted SAFE1j!(P) , is defined
as folIows: SAFE1j!(P) = U:o R i , where
4The seminormal form of c +- al, ... , an, not bl, ... ,not bm is
c +- al, ... ,an, not bI, ... , not bm , not c'
where d is the complement of c. The term seminormal is taken from [Reiter, 1980).
390 GERHARD BREWKA
Ro = 0, and for i > 0,

R i = {r E R I r not defeated by Cl(Rx \ DomX,R._l (r))}
Note that X-safeness is obviously monotonie in X. Based on this notion we

introduce a new monotonie operator r~:
DEFINITION 9. Let P = (R, name) be a prioritized logic program, X a
set of literals. The operator r~ is defined as folIows:
r~(X) = Cn(SAFE1J!(P))
As before we define the (prioritized) well-founded conclusions of P, de-
noted W F spr (P), as the least fixpoint of r~. If a program does not contain
preference information at all, i.e. if the symbol ~ does not appear in R, the
new semantics coincides with W F S* since in that case no rule can dominate
another rule. In the general case, since the new definition of X -safeness is
weaker than the one used earlier in Sect. 2 we may have more X-safe rules
and for this reason obtain more conclusions than via ri>. The following
result is thus obvious:
PROPOSITION 10. Let P = (R, name) be a prioritized logic program. For
every set o/litemls X we have f'R(X) ~ r~(X).
From this and the monotonicity of both operators it follows immediately
that WFS*(R) ~ WFspr(p).5
Well-founded semantics has sometimes been criticized for being too weak
and missing intended conclusions. The proposition shows that we can
strengthen the obtained results by adding adequate preference information.
As a first simple example let us consider the following program P3 :
nl : b +- not c
n2 : c +- not b
n3 : n2 ~ nl
We first apply r~ to the empty set. Besides the instances of the tran-
sisitvity and anti-symmetry schema that we implicitly assume only n3 is in
SAFE;r(P3). We thus obtain
SI = {n2 ~ nl, ...,(nl ~ n2)}
5In [Pereira and Alferes, 1992] Pereira and Alferes argue that each extension of well-
founded semantics to two types of negation should satisfy what they call coherence prin-
ciple: a weakly negated precondition should be considered satisfied whenever the corre-
sponding strongly negated Iiteral is derived. To model this principle in our approach one
would have to weaken the notion of X -safeness even further. In the inductive definition, a
rule r would have to be considered a member of R; whenever for each weak precondition
notbofr
• b (l CI(R x \ DomX,R._1 (r)), or
• b' EX, where b' = ,b if b is an atom and a if b = ,a.
We next apply r~ to 8 1 . Since n2 --< n1 E 8 1 we have n1 E DamS1,0(n2).

n2 E 8AFE~:(P3) since Cl( P3 s 1 \ {nd) does not defeat n2 and we obtain
82 = {n2 --< nb...,(n1 --< n2),C}
Further iteration of r~ yields no new literals, Le. 8 2 is the least fixpoint.
Note that cis not a conclusion under the original well-founded semantics.
We next show that the programs P1 and P2 discussed earlier are handled
as intended. Here is P1:
n1 : b t- not c
n2 : ...,b t- not b
ns : n2 --< n1
Since 1;'1 (0) does not defeat n1 this rule is safe from the beginning, that is,
n1 E 8AFEr(P1). r~(0) yields {n2 --< n1, .,(n1 --< n2),b} which is also the
least fixpoint. The explicit preference does not interfere with the implicit
one, as intended.
The situation changes in P2 where the first rule in P1 is replaced by
n1 : b t- not c, not.,b
The new rule n1 is not in 8AFEr(P2) since it is defeated by the conse-
quence of n2 and n2 is not dominated by n1. r~ (0) yields
81 = {n2 --< n1,.,(n1 --< n2)}

Now n2 E 8AFE~:(P2) since n2 dominates n1 wrt. 8 1 and the empty set
of rules. We thus conclude .,b as intended. The least fixpoint is
8 2 = {n2 --< n1,.,(n1 --< n2),b}

In [Brewka, 1994] we used an example to illustrate the possible non-
existence of extensions in our earlier approach. This example involved two
normal defaults each of which had the conclusion that the other one is to be
preferred. The prioritized logic programming representation of this example
is the following:
n1 : n2 --< n1 t- not.,(n2 --< nt}
n2 : n1 --< n2 t- not.,(n1 --< n2)
It is straighforward to verify that the set of well-founded conclusions for
this example is empty.
4 A LEGAL REASONING EXAMPLE
In this section we want to show that the additional expressiveness provided

by our approach actually helps representing real world problems. We will
392 GERHARD BREWKA
use an example first discussed by Gordon [1993, p. 7]. We somewhat

simplified it for our purposes. The same example was also used in [Brewka,
1994] to illustrate the approach presented there.
Assume a person wants to find out if her security interest in a certain
ship is perfected. She currently has possession of the ship. According to
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC, §9-305) a security interest in goods
may be perfected by taking possession of the collateral. However, there
is a federallaw called the Ship Mortgage Act (SMA) according to which
a security interest in a ship may only be perfected by filing a financing
statement. Such a statement has not been filed. Now the question is whether
the UCC or the SMA takes precedence in this case. There are two known
legal principles for resolving conflicts of this kind. The principle of Lex
Posterior gives precedence to newer laws. In our case the UCC is newer than
the SMA. On the other hand, the principle of Lex Superior gives precedence
to laws supported by the higher authority. In our case the SMA has higher
authority since it is federallaw.
The available information can nicely be represented in our approach. To
make the example somewhat shorter we use the notation
as an abbreviation for the rule
where d is the complement of c, Le. -,c if c is an atom and a if c = -,a.

Such rules thus correspond to semi-normal or, if m = 0, normal defaults in
Reiter's default logic [Reiter, 1980].
We use the ground instances of the following named rules to represent the
relevant article ofthe UCC, the SMA, Lex Posterior (LP), and Lex Superior
(LS). The symbols d 1 and d2 are parameters for rule names:
UCC : perfeded <= possessian
SM A : -,per fected <= ship, -,fin-statement
LP(dl,~): d1 ...( d2 <= more-recent(d1 ,d2 )
LS(d1 , d2 ) : d1 ...( d2 <= fed-law(dt} , state-law(d2 )
The following facts are known about the case and are represented as rules
without body (and without name):
possessian
ship
-'fin-statement
more-recent(UCC, SM A)
fed-law(SM A)
state-law(UCC)
Let's call the above set of literals H. Iterated application of r~ yields the
following sequence of literal sets (in each case Si = (r~)i(0»:
SI = H
S2 = SI
The iteration produces no new results besides the facts already contained
in the program. The reason is that UCC and SMA block each other, and
that no preference information is produced since also the relevant instances
of Lex Posterior and Lex Superior block each other. The situation changes
if we add information telling us how conflicts between the latter two are to
be resolved. Assurne we add the following information: 6
LS(SM A, UCC) -< LP(UCC, SM A)
Now we obtain the following sequence:
SI = HU {LS(SMA,UCC) -< LP(UCC,SMA),
-,LP(UCC,SMA) -< LS(SMA,UCC)}
S2 = SI U {SMA -< UCC, -,UCC -< SMA}
S3 = S2 U {-,per fected}
S4 = S3
This example nicely illustrates how in our approach conflict resolution strate-
gies can be specified declaratively, by simply asserting relevant preferences
among the involved conflicting rules.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We presented in this paper an extension of logic programs with two types of

negation where preference information among rules can be expressed in the
logicallanguage. This extension is very useful for practical applications, as
was demonstrated using an example from legal reasoning. In the full paper
we show that the well-founded conclusions of prioritized logic programs can
be computed in polynomial time. The main advantage of our approach is
that also preference information is context-dependent and can be reasoned
upon and derived dynamically.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Franz Baader, Jürgen Dix, Tom Gordon, Henry
Prakken and Cees Witteveen for interesting comments which helped to im-
prove the quality of this paper.
6In realistic settings one would again use a schema here. In order to keep the example
simple we use the relevant instance of the schema directly.
394 GERHARD BREWKA
The fuH version of this paper was published in Journal 0/ Artificial In-
telligence Research, 4, 19-36, 1996.
Universität Leipzig, Germany.
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SALEM BENFERHAT, DIDIER DUBOIS AND HENRI
PRADE
AN OVERVIEW OF
INCONSISTENCY-TOLERANT INFERENCES IN
PRIORITIZED KNOWLEDGE BASES
1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of priority is very important in the study of knowledge-based

systems [Fagin et al., 1983]. In practice, knowledge bases are sometimes
inconsistent, due to the presence of rules having exceptions, or because the
available knowledge comes from several, not necessarily agreeing sources.
When priorities attached to pieces of knowledge are available, the task of
coping with inconsistency is greatly simplified, since conHicts have a better
chance to be solved. Gärdenfors [1988] has thus proved that upon arrival
of a new piece of propositional information, any revision process of a belief
set which satisfies natural requirements, is implicitly based on a priority
ordering. Then the handling of priorities has been shown to be completely
in agreement with possibilistic logic [Dubois and Prade, 1991]. One way of
tackling inconsistency is to revise the knowledge base and restore consis-
tency. However, as pointed out in [Benferhat et al., 1995a], in the case of
multiple sources of information, it does not always make sense to revise an
inconsistent knowledge base since it comes down to destroying part of the
knowledge. In the context of merging several knowledge bases, the intro-
duction of priorities between pieces of information can be explained by the
two following situations:
• Each partial knowledge base issued from a source of information is
'Hat' (i.e. without any priority between items). But there is a com-
plete pre-ordering between the sources of information according to
their reliability. In this case, merging different sources of informa-
tion leads to a prioritized knowledge base, where the priority level of
each formula reHects the reliability of the source which supplies it. A
particular case is when each piece of information is supported by a
different source.
• All sources of information are equally reliable, but inside each partial
knowledge base there exists a complete pre-ordering between pieces
of information given by an expert, who rank-orders them according
to their level of certainty or strength. Here again, the combination
of the different sources of information gives a prioritized knowledge
base, provided that the scales evaluating priority in each knowledge
base are commensurate.
395
D. Dubois er al. (eds.), Fuzl.)' Sets, Logics and Reasoning abour Knowledge, 395-417.
396 SALEM BENFERHAT, DIDIER DUBOIS AND HENRI PRADE
In [Benferhat et al., 1997], we have developed methods for inferring non-

trivial conclusions from inconsistent flat (non-prioritized) sets of sentences
in propositionallogic, here called belief bases. These approaches fall in two
categories: coherence-based methods use a selection of consistent subbases
and apply classical inference to themj argument-based approaches exploit
the belief base as it is and compute reasons to believe and to disbelieve
propositions of interest. This paper extends inconsistency-tolerant infer-
ence methods from the flat case to the prioritized case and investigates
other methods, specific to prioritized knowledge bases, for coping with in-
consistency. Section 2 gives the background needed for reading this paper,
and recalls the main results on the treatment of inconsistency for flat knowl-
edge bases, presented in [Benferhat et al., 1997). Section 3 compares sev-
eral coherence-based consequence relations that are inconsistency-tolerant,
including several ones that come from the nonmonotonic logic literature.
Two argument-based methods are presented in Section 4: an extension of
the argued inference, originally proposed in [Benferhat et al., 1993b], and
another approach which exploits a local treatment of inconsistency levels.
2 BACKGROUND
In this paper, we only consider a finite propositionallanguage denoted by

C. We denote the set of classical interpretations by n, by I- the classical
consequence relation, Greek letters a, ß, ... represent formulas.
Let r: be a multiset of proposition al formulas, possibly inconsistent but
not deductively closed. r: encodes the available knowledge base. Pieces of
information in the knowledge base r:, called beliefs, are all 'self-justifying',
namely all the beliefs are put in the knowledge base as they are and as
they come from their sources of information, and we do not add to the
knowledge base any derived beliefs. Hence, the same belief can be present
several times in r: if it comes from different sources and this explains why we
consider r: as a multi-set. Equivalent beliefs have different identification (the
identification can be simply an arbitrary numbering of the beliefs in r:).1 We
do not make these identifications explicit since it renders the notation heavy.
Self-justified beliefs are distinguished from plausible conclusions which are
derived from beliefs.
When the knowledge base r: is not deductively closed, we call it a 'belief
base', following Nebel [1991), while bases which are deductively c10sed are
called 'belief sets' after Gärdenfors [1988]. Cn(r:) denotes the deductive
closure of r:, i.e. Cn(r:) = {4> E C, r: f- 4>}. Cn(r:) is a set, not a multiset.
1 Another possible identifil;:ation is to encode each belief <Pi by ~Si V <Pi, where Si is
a symbol which explicitly points out the source which provides the belief <Pi (all Si are
different). This notation will allow us to only deal with sets and to encode the repetition
of beliefs.
INFERENCES IN PRIORITIZED KNOWLEDGE BASES 397
Clearly, if ifJ E ~ then ifJ E Cn(~).2 H ~ is inconsistent then Cn(~) = L..

In the presence of inconsistency, the approaches developed in this paper
must be syntactic in nature, since they use formulas that explicitly appear
in the belief base originally, while two inconsistent belief bases over the same
language are semantically equivalent (in a trivial way).
We now recall some basic definitions when the belief base is Hat, namely
made of equally reliable propositional beliefs.
DEFINITION 1. A subbase A of ~ is said to be minimal inconsistent (mI-
subbase, for short) if and only if: i) A f-l. and ii) VifJ E A,A - {ifJ} If 1.. A
subbase A is said to be maximal consistent (MC-subbase, for short) if and
only if i) it is consistent and ii) either A = ~ or adding any formula ifJ from
~ - A to A entails the inconsistency of A U {ifJ}. 3
DEFINITION 2 (Benferhat et al. [1992]). A formula ifJ is said to be free if
and only if it does not belong to any mI-subbase of~. The subbase of free
formulas in ~ is called the free base of ~, denoted by Free(~).
Another way of defining Free(~) is to take the intersection of all maxi-
mally consistent subbases of ~, namely:
Free(~) = n
A;EMC(E)
Ai.
We now recall several inconsistency-tolerant inferences in Hat belief bases

useful in the next sections:
DEFINITION 3. A formula ifJ is said to be a free consequence of~, denoted
by ~ f-Free ifJ, if and only if ifJ is logically entailed from Free(~), namely
Free(~) f- ifJ.
DEFINITION 4. A formula ifJ is said to be an existential consequence of~,
denoted by ~ f-3 ifJ, if and only if there exists at least one maximal consistent
subbase which entails ifJ. A formula ifJ is said to be a universal consequence
(or MG-consequence) of~, denoted by ~ f-Mc ifJ, if and only if ifJ can be
classically inferred from all maximal consistent subbases of ~.
When the belief base is Hat the MC-consequence, a proposal made by
Rescher and Manor [1970] (see also [Rescher, 1976]), is often used. However
this consequence relation is also very conservative hence rather unproductive
while the existential one is too permissive and leads to pairs of mutually
exclusive conclusions. A mild inference approach, called argumentation,
is proposed in (Benferhat et al., [1993b; 1997]), that is more productive
2 However since E is a multi-set E ~ Cn(E) will not hold because Cn(E) does not allow
for multiple copies. If E+ is a set of formulas derived from E by suppressing multiple
copies of formulas then E+ ~ Cn(E).
3 A - {t/>} means that we remove the belief t/> from A and not all the copies of t/> from
A.
than the universal consequence but does not lead to conclusions which are
pairwise contradictory.
DEFINITION 5. A formula 4> is said to be an argued consequence of E,
denoted by EA I- 4>, if and only if E 1-3 4>, but E 1-3 -,4> does not hold.
In this approach a conclusion can be inferred from an inconsistent belief
base if the latter contains a consistent subbase that entails this conclusion,
but no consistent subbase that entails its negation. In this paper, we extend
the above inconsistency-tolerant inferences and propose new ones so as to
deal with prioritized belief bases.
3 INCONSISTENCY-TOLERANT INFERENCE RELATIONS:

COHERENCE APPROACHES
Prioritized belief bases E are belief bases equipped with a complete pre-
ordering on all the beliefs of E. In this paper, prioritized belief bases are of
the form E = Sl U ... U Sn, such that beliefs in Si have the same level of
priority and are more prioritary than the ones in Si where j > i. Sl contains
the beliefs which are the most prioritary beliefs in E, and Sn contains the
ones which are the least prioritary in E. Each Si (called a layer or astratum)
is a multiset. Moreover copies of the same belief may appear in several
layers, and are considered as distinct. The notation 4> E E means that there
is a copy of 4> in sorne Si of E. We use the notation 4> Ei E for 4> E Si,
namely there is a copy of 4> in the ith layer of E. We also use the notation
E = {Sb ... Si, .. . , Sn} where the multi-sets Si contain beliefs of level i.
Throughout this paper, subbases are denoted by capital letters A, B, ...
and they are also represented in a prioritized way, namely A = Al U... U An
where Vj = l,n,Ai ~ Si (or Ai = An Si) and Ai may be empty. In
this section, we study several modes of inference based on the selection
of consistent prioritized subbases. First, only approaches where a single
consistent subbase is selected are reviewed. At the end of the section the
case when several subbases are selected is considered.
3.1 The Possibilistic Consequence Relation

Issued from Zadeh's [1978] possibility theory, possibilistic logic isa weighted
logic where each classical logic formula is associated with a weight under-
stood as a lower bound of a necessity measurej this weight accounts for
the level of certainty (or the priority) of the information represented by
the logical formula. A necessity measure N is a mapping from the lan-
guage to the unit interval [0,1], such that N(4) 1\ t/J) = min(N(4»,N(t/J»,
and N(4)) = N(t/J) if 4> and t/J are equivalent. A possibility measure 11 is
defined, by duality as 11(4)) = 1 - N(-'4». The priorities used in E are
modelIed in possibilistic logic by attaching a weight to each formula with
INFERENCES IN PRIORITIZED KNOWLEDGE BA SES 399
the convention that (c/J ai) encodes c/J Ei ~,Vi and 1 ~ a1 > ... > an > O.
In this section, we only recall how possibilistic logic addresses the problem
of inconsistency. See [Dubois et al., 1994b] for a complete exposition of
possibilistic logic. A possibilistic belief base is thus a multiset of weighted
sentences {(t/I aj), t/I E Sj, j = 1, n}, and all sentences in a layer Si receive
the same weight. The treatment of inconsistency is based on an entailment
dedicated to prioritized belief bases, named the 7r-entailment defined in the
following way:
DEFINITION 6. Let ~ = S1 u ... Sn be a prioritized belief base. A formula
c/J is said to be an i-consequence of ~, denoted by ~ h c/J, if and only if: i)
S1 U ... , Si is consistent, ii) S1 U .. . USi f- c/J, and iii) Vj < i, S1 U .. . USj 'rf c/J.
The definition of h is identical to the one proposed in possibilistic logic.
Namely the inference h comes down to non-trivially deducing (c/J ai) from
the weighted formulae {(t/I aj),t/I E Si,j = 1,i} using an extended modus
ponens rule. The condusion (c/J ai) inherits the smallest weight of the
premises [Rescher, 1976], in agreement with the necessity measure-based
semantics [Dubois et al., 1994b). From now on, we simply say that c/J is a
7r-consequence of ~ if c/J is an i-consequence of ~ for some i, and denote it
by ~ f-7I" c/J. It is dear that in the presence of inconsistency the 7r-entailment
and the dassical entailment have not the same behaviour. Indeed in dassi-
callogic if ~ is inconsistent then any formula can be deduced from ~. In a
prioritized base, the situation is better since it is possible to use a unique
consistent subbase of~, denoted by 7r(~), induced by the levels of priority
and defined in this way: 7r(~) = S1 U ... Si such that S1 U ... Si is consistent
and S1 U ... U Si+! is inconsistent. H ~ is consistent then 7r(~) = ~. The
level aH1 is called the inconsistency degree Inc(~) of~. The remaining
subbase ~ - 7r(~) is simply inhibited. It is not hard to check that:
~ f-7I" c/J if and only if 7r(~) f- c/J.
3.2 Non-defeated consequence relation

The possibilistic way of dealing with inconsistency is not entirely satisfac-
tory, since it suffers from an important drawback, named 'drowning prob-
lem' in [Benferhat et al., 1993a], as we can see in the following example:
let ~ = {{...,o V ...,ß}, {o}, {ß}, {8} }. This prioritized base is inconsistent,
and only the subbase 7r(~) = {{...,o V ...,ß}, {o}} is kept in the possibilistic
logic approach, and therefore 8 cannot be deduced despite the fact that
8 E Free(~) is not involved in the inconsistency. One way of solving the
drowning problem is to recover the inhibited free formulas, and to enlarge
the selected consistent subbase of 'E from 7r(~) to 7r(~) U Free(~). Then
the drowning problem is solved, if the consequences of 7r(~) U Free('E) are
derived. However, Free(~) is computed without taking into account the
400 SALEM BENFERRAT, DIDIER DUBOIS AND RENRI PRADE
priorities between the bellefs in ~. A natural extension of the free base to

the prioritized case is the so-called dominant subbase defined as folIows:
DEFINITION 7. The dominant subbase of ~ is ~. = Free(SI) U Free(SI U
8 2) U ... U Free(81 U ... U Sn).
PROPOSITION 8. 4 The dominant subbase ~* of a belief base ~ is con-
sistent. Moreover ~* ;2 1r(~) U Free(~).
Clearly, from the previous proposition, we have ~* ;2 1r(~) and ~* ;2
Free(~). Note that for a given i ~ 1, if a formula 4J does not belong to
Free(SI U ... U Si) then it will not belong to Free(SI U ... U Sk) for k ~ i.
Indeed, if 4J does not belong to Free(SI U ... U Si) then there is an mI-
subbase A of SI U ... U Si (and hence of any SI U ... U Sk>i) which contains
4J. In general, there is no inclusion relation between Free(SI U ... U Si)
and Free(SI U ... U Sk) where k > i. Indeed, since SI U ... U Si C SI U
... U Sk, SI U '" U Sk may include new free formulas but also some which
contradict formulas which were free in SI U ... U Si.
~* is the set of non-defeated beliefs in ~, in the sense that the dominant
subbase of a belief base ~ is made of all formulas not contained in the least
priority layer of any mI-subbase of ~, namely:
PROPOSITION 9. For any mI-subbase A let A = A - 1r(A) contain the
least prioritary beliefs in A. Then~· = {4J, ~mI-subbase A of~, 4J E A}.
REMARK H a given belief 4J does not belong to ~", then this does not
mean that no copies of 4J will be in ~.. Indeed, if 4J E Athen this means
that this copy will not belong to ~. and we do not say anything ab out
the other copies. Indeed, consider the following example ~ = SI U S2 U S3
where SI = {4J},S2 = {...,4J} and S3 = {4J}. Here, we have two MI-subbases
A = SI U S2 and B = S2 U S3. Clearly, B = {4J} means that the copy of 4J
which is in S3 will not belong to ~". However, it is easy to check that the
copy of 4J which is in SI will belong to ~ •.
This result shows that ~.. is the largest subbase of ~ containing non-
defeated beliefs. Clearly the non-defeated inference from ~, defined as
~ I-ND 4J if and only if ~* I- 4J is more productive than the possibilistic
inference.
The dominant subbase concept has been previously introduced for belief
sets by Alchourron and Makinson [1985] in the context of theory revision,
under the name of safe contraction. Their definition of safe contraction is
the same as the one given in Proposition 9. This paper provides two other
different ways of recovering the safe contraction of belief bases. The first
way is the one described above using the idea of free beliefs, and the second
way will be presented later using the notion of safe reasons (see Section
4Most of the proofs of the results reported in this paper are given in [Benferhat et al.,
1995b].
INFERENCES IN PRIORITIZED KNOWLEDGE HA SES 401
8). Beside these two characterisations, this paper stands in the context
of inconsistency handling, which departs from belief revision. Indeed, the
presence of inconsistencies is not necessarily due to the adding of new and
certain information, as in belief revision, but can be the result of concate-
nating several parallel knowledge bases issued from different sources. In this
case, all the sources play symmetrie roles while in belief revision the input
plays an asymmetric role. Moreover, in inconsistency handling problems
we can have two independent conßicts (i.e. without common beliefs), while
in belief revision all the confiicts contain the input. Lastly, the belief base
in inconsistency handling is not assumed to be deductively closed, which is
not the case in belief revision. This point can have a consequence on the
behaviour of the nonmonotonic entailmentj see [Benferhat et al., 1995b].
It can be argued that the non-defeated inference still deletes too many
beliefs, and hence in some situations remains too conservative. Indeed, let
~ = SlUS2US3 with Si = {..,o:V..,ß}, S2 = {o:,ß} and S3 = {..,o:v8, ..,ßV8}.
Clearly, ~ is inconsistent, and the inconsistency is caused by the three
first beliefs. Namely, we have one mI-subbase A = {..,o: V ..,ß, 0:, ß} with
A = {o:, ß}. The set ofundefeated formulas is ~* = {..,o:V..,ß, ",o:V8, ..,ßV6}.
Hence 8 cannot be entailed using the undefeated consequence relation, even
if it is enough to get rid of either 0: or ß to restore consistency (and not
necessary both) and get 8. It is clear that the undefeated consequence
relation does not fully exploit the idea of parsimony with respect to the
removal of inconsistency, since it removes more formulas than necessary to
restore consistency.
3.3 Inference based on ordering mI-subbases

The following example illustrates another limit of the undefeated belief
method: it does not take into consideration the ordering in which the con-
ßicts in mI-subbases are solved:
EXAMPLE 10. Let ~-SlUS2US3 with Si = {"'O:V..,ß,,,p},S2 = {..,,,pV..,ß}
and S3 = {o:, ß}. We have two mI-subbases:
with A = {ß} and B = {o:,ß}. To solve the mI-subbase A, the only pos-
sibility is to remove ß. For the mI-subbase B, we have two possibilities:
either removing 0:, or removing ß. It is clear that solving A first is more
parsimonious since it solves B as weIl. Unfortunately, the undefeated con-
sequence relation removes all the beliefs in A and in B and hence the belief
0: will not be kept.
In the previous example, we have seen that solving a mI-subbase (here the
mI-subbase A) can solve other mI-subbases (here the mI-subbase B). Hence,
for the sake of parsimonious coherence recovery, it is very important to
decide which mI-subbases must be solved first. The idea is then to first solve
all the conflicts which contain the most prioritary beliefs in E involved in the
conflicts. The following definition indicates the solving influence between
mI-subbases. Let R(A) = max{jlA n Sj 1= 0} be the rank associated to a
subbase A of E, then we have:
DEFINITION 11. A mI-subbase A has a positive inftuence on a mI-subbase
B (or solving A must be done before solving B), denoted by A <I B, if and
only if
1. R(A) < R(B), or

2. R(A) = R(B) but Li C B (where C corresponds to astriet set-
inclusion).
It is clear that the relation <I is transitive and irreflexive. Note that,
when Li C B, removing any belief from A neeessarily leads to solve B. For
any set A of mI-subbases of E, we denote by min(A) = {AIA E A s.t.
!JB E A s.t. B ~I A} the set of the first mI-subbases in A to solve.
The following procedure uses the previous definition for seleeting a eon-
sistent subbase of E, denoted here by RFS(E) (RFS for Removing the First
Solvable mI-subbases). Let C(E) be the set of all the mI-subbases of E (e
is for confliets). Then, the idea is that for each mI-subbase Gin min(C(E»,
we remove from E all the beliefs which are in G, and from C(E) all the
solved mI-subbases (mI-subbases eontaining at least one belief of G). We
repeat iteratively this step until solving all the mI-subbases. The selected
consistent subbase RFS(E) is constructed in the following way:
1. Let Dei = C(E) and RFS(E) = E.
2. Repeat until Dei = 0
(a) Remove from RFS(E) all the beliefs which are in G for all G E
min(Del)
RFS(E):= RFS(E) - UtQIG E min(Del)}
(b) Remove from Dei all the solved mI-subbases;
Dei := Del- {GIG EDel and G rt RFS(E)}.
A formula 'IjJ is said to be a RFS-consequence of E, denoted by E r-RFS 'IjJ,

if and only if 'IjJ is a classical consequence of RFS(E). Clearly, RFS(E)
contains both 1I"(E) and E*. In the example given above, from E = Sl =
{-,o:V-,ß,'IjJ}US2 = {-,'ljJV-,ß} US3 = {o:,ß}, we only remove ß to recover
the eonsisteney of the belief base.
INFERENCES IN PRIORlTIZED KNOWLEDGE BASES 403
The following example shows that the consistent subbase RFS(~) is not
always maximal, even it removes less formulas from ~ than ~". Indeed, let
us consider ~ = 8 1 U 8 2 U 8 3 with 8 1 = {a, t/J}, 8 2 = {ß, -.t/J Y -.ß} and
8 3 = {-.a Y -.ß}. We have two mI-subbases:
A = {t/J, -.t/J Y -.ß, ß} and

B = {-.aY-.ß,a,ß},
with A = {-.t/J Y -.ß, ß} and B = {-.a V -.ß}. Using the previous definition,
the mI-subbase A is first solved by removing both -.t/Jy-.ß and ß. By solving
A, B is also solved. Clearly, RFS(E) = {a, t/J, -.a Y -.ß} is not a maximal
consistent sub-base (we can add -.t/Jy-.ß without causing the inconsistency
ofRFS(~)).
Instead of focusing on minimal inconsistent subsets to be solved, one may
look for possible deletions of formulas. For any 41 E ~, denote:
r(41) = min {R(A), 41 E A and A E C(~)}
= n + 1 if ~ has n layers and 41 rt A, VA E q~).
1(41) = {A E q~),41 E A}.
r(41) is the highest priority level where 41 appears in a position to be deleted
from ~ (since belonging to the bottom layer of a mI-subset of ~). 1(41) is
the set of conflicts that 41 can solve. Then define a partial ordering between
beliefs in ~ as folIows:
41 -< t/J iff either r( 41) < r( t/J)
or r(41) = r(t/J) and 1(41) :J 1(t/J).
41 -< t/J means that 41 is more questionable than t/J (and should be deleted
prior to t/J when restoring the consistency of ~). The algorithm for deleting
formulas consists in deleting one formula minimal in the sense of -<, updating
the ordering on the set of remaining formulas, and repeating the process
until consistency is achieved. This method is more parsimonious on the
above example since:
= {A}, r( -.t/J Y -.ß) = 2,
1(-.t/J Y -.ß)
l(ß) = {A, B}, r(ß) = 2,
l(-.a Y -.ß) = {A}, r(-.a V -.ß) = 3,
then ß -< -.t/J Y -.ß -< -.a Y -.ß. The method only deletes ß and is the most
parsimonious.
Note that when r(41) = r(t/J) and neither 1(41) :J 1(t/J) nor 1(t/J) :J 1(41)
holds, we can refine the definition of -< by taking into account the idea of
cardinality, i.e.
41 -< t/J iff either r(41) < r(t/J)

or r(41) = r(t/J) and 11(41) 1>1 1(t/J) I·
Note that the consistent subbase RFS(~) is close to the one computed in
Williams' [1996] approach whose proposal is made in the context of belief
revision with a partial epistemic entrenchment. See also [Benferhat and
Garcia, 1997] who propose ways to solve inconsistency based on a priority
relation defined locally (inside each mI-subbases) and not globally between
all the beliefs of~. They show that this local way for defining priorities
is very important when the inconsistency of a knowledge base is caused by
the presence of rules having exceptions. Moreover, they use a modified,
nondeterministic version of the previous algorithm such that in Step 2a at
most one belief is removed from c.
3.4 Nebel's linear ordering

The consistent subbase composed of undefeated beliefs ~* differs from the
consistent subbase l(~) obtained by dropping layers Si when they are in-
consistent with the previous ones. Namely,
l(~) = l(S1 U ... U Sn)

i > 1: l(S1 U ... U Si) = l(S1 U ... U Si-1) U Si if
l(S1 U ... U Si-d U Si is consistent
= l(S1 U ... U Si-1) otherwise
l(S1) S1 if S1 is consistent
= 0 otherwise.
This idea, suggested by Dubois and Prade [1991] and more systematically
studied by Nebel [1994], leads to define ~ h <p if and only if l(~) f- <p. The
inference relation f-l does not solve the drowning problem, since if formulas
in Si cause an inconsistency, the whole sub base Si is inhibited, includ-
ing free formulas therein. It is clear that h is more productive than the
1r-consequence. However f-t remains incomparable with the non-defeated
inference. In fact this method is justified if each layer contains a single
belief. The following example illustrates that both h and f-RFS can lead to
inferring debatable conclusions:
EXAMPLE 12. Let ~ = S1 U S2 U S3 with S1 = {...,o V ...,ß}, S2 = {o, ß}
and S3 = {...,eS V ß, eS}. We have two mI-subbases:
with A = {o,ß} and B = {...,eSv ß,eS}. It can be checked that RFS(~) =

l(~) = {...,o V ...,ß,,,,,eS V ß, eS}. Hence, the conclusion ß (and then ""0) is
inferred using h or f-RFS! This conclusion can be viewed as debatable if
we consider that the reason why ß is recovered is only because of the least
prioritary layer of ~.
3.5 Inferences Based on Maximal Consistent Subbases

In the previous section, inconsistency-tolerant inference reHes on arevision
process that selects a suitable consistent prioritized subbase of E, and infers
from it. But this selection is generally not a MC-subbase of E. The presence
of priorities makes it possible to operate a selection among MC-subbases. A
MC-subbase is unacceptable if it exdudes high priority formulas unduly, and
it is acceptable otherwise. Rescher [1976] has proposed to rule out certain
MC-subbases which are considered as unacceptable. More formally, for each
maximal consistent subbase A, define a rank, denoted by BOMC(A) and
read Best Out of the MC-subbase A, in the following way:
BOMC(A) = min{i/4> Ei E and rjJ f/. Ai}.

Then a subbase A is said to be unacceptable if and only if there exists a
maximal consistent subbase B f. A such that: BOMC(B) > BOMC(A),
and A is said to be acceptable otherwise. A similar ranking on consistent
(not necessarily maximal) subbases has been defined in [Benferhat et al.,
1993b].
Brewka [1989] has introduced so-called 'preferred subbases', which further
restricts the dass of acceptable maximal consistent subbases. Preferred
subbases have also been rediscovered by Dubois et al. [1992a] in the setting
of possibilistic logic under the name of strongly maximal consistent subbases
(SMC-subbases for short), and are also discussed in [Cayrol et al., 1993]. In
the following, the terminology 'SMC- subbase' is adopted so as to emphasize
the fact that the selection is made among maximal consistent subbases of
E. A SMC-subbase is constructed by starting with a MC-subbase A of
SI, then we add to A as many formulas of S2 as possible (while preserving
consistency), and so on. Formally, a consistent subbase A is a SMC-subbase
of E if and only if it is of the form A = Al U ... U An, where Vj = 1, n, Al U
... A j is a MC-subbase of SI U ... U Sj. Let SMC(E) be the set of SMC-
subbases of E, then:
DEFINITION 13. A formula rjJ is said to be an SMC-consequence of E,
denoted by E f-sMc rjJ, if and only if it is entailed from each element of
SMC(E), namely: E f-sMc rjJ if and only if VA E SMC(E), A f- rjJ.
REMARK. The sub base l(E) discussed in Section 3.4 is a particular case of
preferred subbases proposed by [Brewka, 1989] when each Si in E contains
exactly one belief.
As it turns out, the set of dominating formulas of E is induded in the
intersection of all SMC subbases:
PROPOSITION 14. E* ~ n{A I A E SMC(E)} (the intersection is per-
formed level by level). The converse is false.
One of the main drawbacks of the SMC-consequence relation is the car-

dinality of SMC(~) which increases exponentially with the number of con-
flicts in the belief base. One may think of selecting a non-empty subbase of
SMC(~), denoted by Lex(~), and defined as:
A = Al U ... U An E Lex(E) if and only if

VB = BI U ... U B n E SMC(~), 3i,
S.t. 1Bi 1>1 Ai 1 and Vj < i, 1B j 1=1 A j 1
where 1 A 1 is the cardinality of A. A is said to be a lexicographically

maximal consistent subbase of~. The definition of Lex(~) is proposed in
another form in [Dubois et al., 1992a]. Once Lex(~) is computed, we define
a Lex-consequence relation in the following way: namely a formula cp is a
Lex-consequence of ~, denoted by ~ f- Lex cp, if and only if it is entailed from
each element of Lex(~). It is obvious that each SMC-consequence of ~ is
also a Lex-consequence of~. The converse is false since the Lex-consequence
generally uses a strict subset of SMC(~).
4 COMPUTING REASONS IN PRIORITIZED BELIEF BASES
The idea of argumentation is pervasive in artificial intelligence as testified

by the literat ure on reason-maintenance systems initiated by Doyle [1979]
and pursued by De Kleer [1986]. It goes back at least to Toulmin [1956], and
more recent proposals by Poole [1985], Pollock [1987], and Simari and Loui
[1992] suggested argumentation as a key tool for the modelling of exception-
tolerant defeasible reasoning. Fox et al. [1992] propose a typology of argu-
ments, and insist that reasoning under uncertainty should exhibit reasons
for uncertainty, and not only degrees of uncertainty. Argumentation is a
natural method for handling inconsistent belief bases that treat inconsis-
tency in local way. Namely, the approaches based on argumentation do not
reduce the belief base to one, or several, consistent subbases, but rather
estimate pros and cons for a conclusion and evaluate their strength. Two
notions of consequence based on arguments are described in the following.
One extracts and weights consistent subbases of a belief base viewed as rea-
sons that support conclusions, and the other evaluates beliefs both in terms
of priority and inconsistency so as to distinguish between safe and unsafe
reasons.
4.1 Argued Consequences

We suggest that a conclusion can be inferred from an inconsistent belief
base if the latter contains a reason that supports this conclusion with some
priority level, but there is no reason that supports its negation with a higher
or equal level of priority. More formally, the argumentation approach is

summarized in the two following definitions:
DEFINITION 15. A subbase A of E is said to be a reason of rank i for a
formula ifJ, if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. A If .L (consistency),
2. A I- ifJ (relevance), and
3. Vt/J E A, A - {t/J} If ifJ (economy).
4. R(A) = max{j jA n Sj i= 0} = i.
A reason A which supports ifJ to a rank i is a best reason for ifJ if and only if
each reason of rank j which supports ifJ is such that i ~ j. In this definition,
the higher the rank of the reason, the weaker it iso
DEFINITION 16. A formula ifJ is said to be an argued consequence of E,
denoted by E I- A ifJ, if and only if:
1. there mosts a reason of rank i for ifJ in E , and
2. all reasons for -,ifJ (if any) are of rank j > i.
Amgoud et al. [1996] have proposed a more refined way to compare
arguments. Each reason A is represented by a set (and not a multi-set)
SA of positive integers representing the rank of beliefs composing A in E,
namely SA = {iN E A and 4> E Sd. 5 Then a reason A is said to be
preferred to a reason B if and only if min{SA - SB} < min{SB - SA}.
Hence, Definition 16 can be slightly modified: ifJ is said to be astrongly
argued consequence of E if there exists a reason A for ifJ in E, and for each
reason B for -,ifJ (if any) we have min{SA - SB} < min{SB - SA}. Clearly,
argued consequences of E are also strongly argued consequences of E.
The next proposition shows that I- A is a faithful extension of the 1f'-
entailment.
PROPOSITION 17. 11 EI-,.. ifJ then E I- A ifJ. The converse is lalse.
However, the argued inference is neither comparable to the SMC-conse-
quence nor to the Lex-consequence.
4.2 Undefeated Beliefs and Safe Reasons

In the definition of the argued inference, there is no constraint on beliefs
used to build reasons in favor of plausible conclusions of the belief base.
Namely, one reason may for instance contain pieces of information which
5The same copy of t/J must belong to A and to Si.
are directly involved in the inconsistency of the belief base. Levels of priority
attached to formulas have only been used to distinguish between strong and
less strong reasons in favour of a proposition or of its contrarY. However it
is possible to go one step further in the use of the priority levels. The idea
is to attach to any formula in the prioritized belief base !; two ranks i and
j reflecting respectively the extent to which the formula can be considered
as true and to what extent the formula can be considered as false. More
formally, for each </J E !;, the tripie (</J, i, j) is computed, where
• i is the rank attached to the best reason for </Ji the highest is the rank
the more dubious is </Ji
• j is the rank attached to the best reason in favour of -,</J. H there is

no reason for -'</J then by convention j = OOi
When j = 00, then </J is free since it means that no reason for its negation
exists so that </J is not involved in the inconsistency of!;. When j f. 00, </J
is said to be paraconsistent or attacked by some reasons. max(i, j) is called
the paraconsistency rank of the belief </J.When j :::; i then </J is said to be
defeated by some reason.
Let ~p = {(</J, i,j), </J E ~}. Condusions from the set !;p of bi-ranked for-
mulas should be derived by propagation of the ranks i and j. Dubois et al.,
[1994a] already proposes an extension ofthe possibilistic resolution principle
which allows for the propagation of paraconsistency ranks from premises to
condusions. In the following, the propagation of paraconsistency ranks to
a condusion t/J is carried out directly from the set of reasons supporting it.
To see if a formula t/J is a plausible consequence of ~, first check if there
is a reason in favour of t/J in~. It is dear that if there is no reason in
favour of 1/J in !; then 1/J cannot be a consequence of!;. Assume that we
have a reason A for 1/J where all elements of A are free formulas, then t/J can
safely be considered as a consequence of~. The situation differs if some
elements of A are not free, and here we must be more careful. Indeed, let
</J be a formula in A (the reason for t/J) and consider (</J,i,j) E !;p. H j < i
then there exists a reason in !; which supports -,</J more strongly than those
supporting </J. The reason A is thus not reliable and cannot safely justify
the condusion 1/J. The idea is then to associate two ranks to subbases in !;:
Def(A), called the defeasibility rank of A, and Safe(A), called the safety A.
These two measures are computed in the following way:
Def(A) = max{i I (</J,i,j) E ~p and </J E A},

Safe(A) = min{j I (</J,i,j) E ~p and </J E A}.
Def(A) reflects the most weakly supported belief in A. Safe(A) reflects the
most strongly attacked formula in A. In general, we can have several reasons
which support 1/J and we denote the set of all reasons with their pair of ranks
thus obtained for 'IjJ by: Label('IjJ) = {(A, Def(A), Safe(A» lAis a reason
for 'IjJ}. From Label ('IjJ), we may think of two criteria to select the best reason
for 'IjJ: a defeasibility rank obtained from Def(A) and a safety rank obtained
from Safe(A) and induced by the reasons A. It is clear that the best reason
for 'IjJ is the one which allows to deduce 'IjJ with the lowest defeasibility
rank and the highest safety rank. But in general, such a reason does not
always exist. Then, we may: first either maximize the safety rank among
the reasons, or first minimize the defeasibility rank. These two possibilities
lead to two definitions of inconsistency-tolerant consequence relations. A
third inference is to consider that 'IjJ is a plausible consequence of ~ as soon
as it possesses a reason A such that Def(A) < Safe(A). More formally:
DEFINITION 18.
1. Let Label* ('IjJ) be the subset of Label('IjJ) obtained by choosing the
reasons with the highest safety rank. Let A be a reason of Label* ('IjJ)
such that Def(A) is minimal. Then 'IjJ is said to be SD-consequ.ence of
~ (SD: short for 'first safety then defeasibility'), denoted by ~ rSD 'IjJ,
if and only if Def(A) < Safe(A).
2. Let Label*('IjJ) be the subset of Label('IjJ) obtained by choosing the rea-
sons with the lowest defeasibility rank. Let A be a reason in Label*('IjJ)
such that A has the highest safety rank. Then 'IjJ is said to be a
D8-consequ.ence of ~ (DS: short for 'first defeasibility then safety'),
denoted by ~ I- DS 'IjJ, if and only if Def(A) < Safe(A)
3. 'IjJ is said to be a safely su.pported-consequ.ence of ~ (SS-Consequence
for short), denoted ~ rss 'IjJ if and only ifthere exists a tripIe (A, Def(A),
Safe(A» in Label('IjJ) such that Def(A) < Safe(A).
In order to assess the merits of rDs and rSD consider the following ex-
amples.
• Let ~ = 8 1 U 8 2 U 8 3 U 8 4 U 8 5 U 8 6 where 8 1 = {4>}, 8 2 = {""4> V 'IjJ},

8 3 = {""4>},84 = {""X},85 = {X},86 = {...,X V 'IjJ}. Then: ~p =
{(4), 1, 3), (--'4> V 'IjJ, 2, oo), (""4>,3,1), (...,X, 4, 5), (X, 5, 4), (--.X V 'IjJ, 2, oo)}.
Notice that only the formulas ...,4> V 'IjJ and ""X V 'IjJ are free in ~, all others
are paraconsistent. We are interested in knowing if 'IjJ can be deduced from
~. We have:
Label('IjJ} = {(A, 2, 3), (B, 5, 4})}
where:
A = {(4), 1, 3), (...,4> V 'IjJ, 2, oo)}, and
B = {(X,5,4), (""X V 'IjJ, 2,00)}.
Then maximizing the safety rank of 'IjJ will lead to select B as the best rea-
son for 'IjJ then 'IjJ will not be SD-inferred. This result is somewhat debatable
410 SALEM BENFERHAT, DIDIER DUBOIS AND HENRIPRADE
since using reason A, t/J is inferred from the two most prioritary beliefs in
!:. In contrast, minimizing the defeasibility rank leads to select A as the
best reason for t/J and hence t/J is a DS-consequence of!:. Notice from the
example, that the SD-consequence relationdoes not recover all the possi-
bilistic consequences of the knowledge base (e.g., here t/J is a 1r-consequence
of the knowledge base). In contrast, DS-consequences do recover all the
possibilistic consequences of the knowledge base.
• Let us now change the priorities between the beliefs, namely let:
Similarly, we have:
!:p = {(q" 1,2), (-,q" 2, 1), (-,q, V t/J,2, (0), (-,XV t/J,3, (0), (X,5,6), (-'X,6,5)}
and
Label(t/J) = {(A, 2, 2), (B, 5, 6))}
then we obtain t/J as a plausible consequence of I: if we first maximize the
safety rank in Label(t/J). In contrast, if we first minimize the defeasibility
rank, A is selected since A is the best reason of t/J in this case, but t/J is no
longer inferred. This result is somewhat debatable.
The above example suggests that I-sD is not so interesting as the pos-
sibilistic inference since some possibilistic consequences are not derived by
this inference method. On the contrary, if I: 1-,.. t/J then I: I-DS t/J. No-
tice that in the two above examples, t/J is a safely supported consequence
of!:. Indeed Def(A) < Safe(A) in the first case and Def(B) < Safe(B)
in the second case. Actually it is obvious that generally if I: I-SD t/J (resp.
I: I-DS t/J) then I: I-ss t/J (since if I: I-SD t/J (resp. I: I-Ds t/J) then there exists
a reason A for t/J such that Def(A) < Safe(A) which is enough to assert
that t/J is a safely supported consequence of !:).
Note that we may have (A,i,j) E Label(t/J) with i < j (in this case t/J is
a safely supported consequence), whiIe t/J is neither a SD-consequence nor
a DS-consequence of the knowledge base. Indeed, consider the following
example:
I: = 8 1 U 8 2 U 8 3 U 84 where
8 1 = {q"-,q,,q, V t/J},82 = {8,-,8 V t/J},
8 3 = {-,8},84 = {a,-,a,a V t/J}.
We have:
!:p = {(q" 1, 1), (-,q" 1, 1), (q, V t/J, 1, (0), (8,2,3), (-,8 V t/J, 1, (0),
(-,8,3,2), (a, 4, 4), (-,a, 4, 4), (a V t/J, 1,00H.
Moreover we have three reasons for t/J, which are:
A = {-,q" tP V t/J}, B = {8, -,8 V t/J}, C = {-,a, a V t/J}.
Then:
Label(1/J) = {(A,I,I),(B,2,3),(C,4,4)}.
Clearly, 1/J is neither a SD-consequence nor a DS-consequence of E, while 1/J
is a safely supported consequence due to the reason B.
The following result indicates that any set of safely supported conse-
quences is consistent:
PROPOSITION 19. Let K = {1/J I E I-ss 1/J}. Then the set of formulas K
is consistent.
This result contrasts with the case of argued inference, where a set of
three or more argued consequences can be inconsistent [Benferhat et al.,
1993b]. The following proposition positions the consequence relation I-ss
with respect to the ones proposed in the previous sections.
PROPOSITION 20. Let K = {1/J I E I-ss 1/J}. The set of non-defeated
consequences of E is the deductive closure of K, i.e. Cn(E*) = {1/J I E I-ND
1/J} = Cn(K).
There is another way to characterize the set of non-defeated consequences
of S using a dass of reasons composed only of non-defeated beliefs. A belief
4> E Si in E is called non-defeated if there exists no reason for -,4> of rank
less than i. 6 Then we have:
PROPOSITION 21. A formula 1/J is a non-defeated consequence of E if
and only if there exists a reason A for 1/J in E where all the beliefs in A are
non-defeated.
Proof.
• Let 1/J be a non-defeated consequence of E. Then there exists a reason
A for 1/J, such that A ~ Free(Sr) U ... Free(Sl U ... U Si) with i ~ n,
and A I- 1/J. Let 4> E A, then there exists a level j ~ i such that
4> E Free(Sl U ... U Sj), hence 4> is non-defeated.
• Let A be a reason for 1/J in E such that all the beliefs in A are non-
defeated. Let 4> E Sj be a belief in A, since 4> is non-defeated then
4> E Free(Sl U ... U Sj), therefore there exists i ~ n such that A ~
Free(St} U ... Free(Sl U ... U Si), and hence the thesis.
•
5 A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
All approaches which are at least as productive as the SS-consequence par-

tially avoid the drowning effect of standard possibilistic logic by salvaging
6Note that to check if a given belief tjJ is non-defeated or not, we do not compute the
certainty of the best argument which supports tjJ, but just take the level where tjJ is in :E.
SD-Consequence
I-sD
Figure 1. A comparative study of inference relations
sentences whose level of certainty is low but which are not involved in any
contradiction set. However, approaches which are more adventurous than
the SS-consequence relation can lead to debatable conclusions. Indeed, take
the following example E = {81 = {</>}, 8 2 = {-.</>} , 8 3 = {-.</> VtP }}, where tP
is a plausible consequence of E using I-SMC, I-Lex, I- A while tP is not a safely
supported consequence of E. Indeed tP is supported only by {</>, -.</> V tP}, a
reason of defeasibility rank 2, while Safe( {</>, -.</> V tP}) = 2.
The following example shows that the consequence relation I-t is incompa-
rable with all the approaches presented in this paper, except the possibilistic
entailment. To see that, consider the following example:
It is easy to check that 1-[ questionably produces -.tP while all the other
approaches give tP. Moreover, the RFS-consequence relation is neither com-
parable with SMC-consequence relation nor with the Lex- consequence rela-
tion and nor with the argued consequence relation (it is enough to consider
the belief bases given in the examples of the Sections 3.1.3.and 3.1.4).
Finally, we can show that non-defeated inference and the argued conse-
quence of E are incomparable.
Figure 1 summarizes the links existing between the different consequence

relations studied here, the edges mean the set inclusion relation between
the set of results generated by each consequence relation. The top of the
diagram thus corresponds to the most conservative inferences. Cayrol [1995]
has shown that most existing argumentation systems come down to the
consequence relations studied here.
The idea of the approaches presented in Figure 1 differs from the one
used in 'paraconsistent logics' [Da Costa, 1963]. These logics even if they
reject the 'ex falso quodlibet' principle (namely, ifJ 1\ -.ifJ ~ t/J is not a theo-
rem in these logies), are often monotonie in the sense that the addition of
new information never questions the validity of the previous consequences.
This means that paraconsistent logies still infer contradietory set of conclu-
sions from ineonsistent belief bases. This is not the ease with most of the
approaches developed in this paper since although they reject the 'ex falso
quodlibet' principle, they try not to infer contradietory conclusions. In this
paper, when a set of beliefs E is inconsistent, then we assume that at least
one belief in E is wrang. This assumption is not valid in paraconsistent log-
ies. Paraeonsistent logic seems to make sense when propositional symbols
can have more than two truth values (for instanee, a proposition can either
be true, false or half-true). For instance assume that we have two pieces
of knowledge: 'if Tom gets a high mark in Mathematics then he will be
happy' and 'if Tom gets a low mark in Physies then he will not be happy'.
Assume that Tom gets a high mark in Mathematics and also a low mark in
Physies. Then we are in the presence of ineonsisteney if we assume that the
proposition 'happy' admits exactly two truth values. The situation differs
if 'happy' is a multi-valued proposition.
Henee, paraconsistent logics do not solve inconsistencies (they only accept
ineonsistencies), and enjoy the following inclusion property, namely:
E C Cnp(E),
where Cnp(E) is the set of plausible conclusions obtained using some para-
consistent logic P. This property is satisfied by none of the approaches
given in Figure 1. Paraconsistent logies try to infer as many reasonable
conclusions from E as possible, without inferring trivial conclusions. But
the natural question is how to formally define which conclusions are trivial
and which ones are reasonable? For instance, one may consider a 1\ -.a to
be such a trivial formula.
Among the eonsequence relations discussed in [Benferhat et al., 1997] and
reealled in Seetion 2, the one which may share some ideas of paraconsistent
logies is the so-called the existential-consequence relation defined in Section
2. This consequenee relation is monotonie and enjoys the inclusion property.
In our opinion this eonsequence relation is the most productive eonsequence
relation that we ean eonsider as reasonable.
However, most of the paraconsistent logics are in general stronger than

the existential consequence relation. The reason is that the consistency con-
dition required in the definition of an argument is not necessary. To take an
example of paraconsistent logics, let us consider the so-called Quasi-classical
logic (QC- Logic) proposed by Besnard and Hunter [1995]. The authors pro-
pose a set of proof rules oriented towards reasoning with inconsistent beliefs.
These proof rules allow for instance to infer a conclusion from inconsistent
arguments. Indeed, let us consider the following belief base:
E = {a V b, ,a V c, a, ,a, ,b V ,e V d}
we can check that d is considered as a plausible conclusion of E, by QC-

logic, even if the inference of d is based on inconsistent beliefs (i.e. a and
,a). Indeed, the derivation of dis obtained by first applying the resolutions
between {,a V c, a} which leads to have c, next between {a V b, ,a} which
leads to have b, again between band ,b V ,e V d which leads to infer ,e V d
and lastly between C and ,e V d to get the conclusion d. Clearly, if we are
in the context where the presence of inconsistency is due to the fact that
at least one belief is wrong, then inferring d from the previous belief base
is debatable since it is based on inconsistent sub base. Of course, to avoid
inferring such debatable conclusions we need the consistency check. But
then we lose one of the most important advantage of paraconsistent logics,
namely their computational complexity which is attractive since it is not
based on any consistency check.
Lastly, paraconsistent logics and the approaches given in Figure 1 are
syntax-dependent (see [Benferhat et al., 1997] for details on how the ap-
proaches given in Figure 1 are syntax-dependent). For instance, the addi-
tion of beliefs which are already consequences of other existing beliefs can
alter the set of conc1usions. Namely, the set of conc1usions obtained from
E can be different from the one obtained from E' = E U {</>} where </> is
a classical conclusion of a consistent subbase of E. This remark appears
clearly in the definition of inference in Quasi-classical logic. Besnard and
Hunter [1995) mention that the 'disjunct introduction proof rule', defined
by: from a infer a Vß, must be used very carefully. Indeed, if we do not use
the disjunct introduction proof rule in the right way we will get trivial con-
clusions. For instance assurne that we have two contradictory beliefs </> and
'</>. Applying the disjunct introduction proof rule leads to add for instance
</> V '1/7 (which is classical consequence of a belief </», and hence applying the
resolution rule with '</> leads to get '1/7; similarly we could also get ,'1/7 using
the same disjunct introduction proof rule. And finally, we could generate
all the language in this way, which is of course undesirable.
6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Argued and SS-consequence relations are appealing for reasoning from in-
consistent belief bases storing multiple source information. Indeed, they
do not reduce the belief base to one, or several, consistent subbases, but
rather estimate pros and cons for a conclusion and evaluate their strength.
They differ from the other consequence relations since the latter produce
the classical consequences of one or several consistent subbases of the belief
base. Moreover, a specific weight accounts for the level of local contra-
diction, attached to each formula handled by the SS-consequence relation.
Only argued consequences look really faithful to the actual contents of the
knowledge base, and do not give up information contained in it, as opposed
to the approaches based on SMC and lexicographically preferred subbases
(see also [Benferhat et al., 1995a]).
Another advantage of some methods is that they are amenable to efficient
standard implementation methods based on classical resolution, especially
the non-defeated inference which is the most productive one among those
whose complexity is like the one of the possibilistic inference (once ~* is
computed). The SMC and Lex-inferences look more computationally com-
plex. All methods but one produce consistent sets of results from incon-
sistent belief bases. Argumentation inference avoids outright contradictory
responses (such as if> and -,if», although more than three deduced sentences
can be globally inconsistent [Benferhat et al., 1993b]. But as pointed out
earlier, the reasons supporting a set of more than two globally contradictory
sentences are distinct, so that the reality of this contradiction is debatable,
and only reflects the presence of different points of view. Anyway it seems
that it is the price to pay in order to remain faithful to an inconsistent
belief base. In a long version of this paper [Benferhat et al., 1995b], we
show how the argued inference can be applied for merging several knowl-
edge bases. More recently we have shown that all inconsistency-tolerant
inferences based on the selection of one or several subbases can be captured
by a syntactic fusion process [Benferhat et al., 1998].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
The authors wish to thank C. Cayrol and P. Besnard for their useful com-
ments.
This paper is a revised and updated version of a conference paper [Benfer-
hat et al., 1996J. For its main part, it is an abridged version of a long paper
[Benferhat et al., 1995b] which contains all the proofs of results reported
here.
Universite Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France.

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INDEX
[0, l]-valued set, 14 canonical model, 282

®-similarity relation, 271 categorical equivalence, 135
®-transitivity, 271, 272 CCD, see conjunction criterion for
3-valued logic, 384 dependence
CCI, see conjunction criterion for
a-inconsistency, 90 independence
a-disjoint on U, 290 chainability, 201
a-tautology, 93 Chang's completeness theorem, 135
a-theorem, 94 circumscription, 381
a-theorems, 94, 97 dause, 123
accessibility relation, 279, 303 dosure operator, 357, 378
affirmation of the consequent, 9 CLUSTa(R), 291
algebra of prescriptions, 130 coding procedure, 202
algebraic semanties, 353, 364, 378 compact condusion relation, 88,
algebraic strong De Morgan law, 95, 96
10 complementary relation, 311
answer set semantics, 383 Compositional Rule of Inference
antecedent fuzzy datum, 201 (CRI),258
approximate entailment, 272
concept,301
approximate reasoning, 259
conditional knowledge base, 347
assignment, 122, 140
conditional necessity, 330, see ne-
attributes, 301
cessity
autoepistemic logic, 381
conditional possibility, 330, see pos-
axiomatic system, 95, 97
sibility
b-normal on U, 290 conditional state, 164
Baral, C., 382 conditioned b-total on U, 290
Bayes rule, 330 conjunction criterion
Bezdek, J. C., 289 for dependence, 327
Boolean power construction, 139 for independence, 327, 336-
Boolean-valued models, 139 345
boundary region of the concept, for relevance, 336-345
302 consecutive Ulam games, 132
consequence relation, 87, 95, 96
CL(U, a, b, c), 290 consequent fuzzy datum, 201
c-covering on U, 290 consistency preservation, 272
c-surjective on U, 290 continuity from below, 272
CL(U,a,b),290 contraction
420 Index
and independence, see belief frame, 303

change free MV-algebra, 135
contraposition, 9 fuIl, faithful, dense functor, 135
correctness condition, 289 fuzzy clusterings on U, 289
covariant Galois connection, 146 fuzzy clusters, 289
fuzzy equivalence relations, 255
DCD, see disjunction criterion for fuzzy implication, 201
dependence fuzzy inference, 237
DCI, see disjunction criterion for fuzzy logic, 85, 86, 98
independence fuzzy predicate logic, 237
de Baets, B., 289 fuzzy set theory, 85
decomposition property, 276 fuzzy similarity relation, 271
deduction rules, 237 fuzzy tolerance coverings on U, 289
default logic, 381 fuzzy tolerance relations on U, 289
degree of consistency (CD), 90-92 fuzzy IF-THEN rule, 201
degree of inconsistency (ID), 90,
91 r functor, 122
dependence, see independence general fuzzy sets, 144
designated truth values, 140 generalised modus ponens, 237
desingularization algorithms for toric generator of a T -indistinguishability,
varieties, 127 256
Di Nola's theorem, 136 GL-monoid, 243
discrete fuzzy sets, 144 Gordon, T. F., 392
distribution(s) Gottwald, S., 289
least informative, 361 grade consequence (syntactic), 88
possibility, 352, 353, 355, 357, grade of completeness, 97
361, 363, 378 graded consequence, 95
Duns Scotus, 8 graded consequence (semantic), 96
epistemic Boolean algebra, 146 graded consequence (syntactic), 87
epistemic entrenchment, 345 graded consequence relation, 90,
equality relation, 245 272
equivalence relation, 303 graded consequence relations, 271
equivalent sets (of weIl formed for- graded consquence (semantic), 89
mulae),92
existential generalisation, 8 Harper identity, 346
exportation law, 8
extended logic programs, 382 importation law, 8
extensional inference operator, 260 incompatible, 131
extensional operator, 260 independence
extrapolative syllogism, 277 absolute, 332
and belief change, 345-347
faithful, 163 and nonmonotonic reasoning,
forcing, 352, 355, 357, 359, 361, 347-348
364 epistemic, 325, 326
Index 421
multiplieation law, 327 Lex Superior, 392

probabilistie, 327-328 linear logie, 353, 364, 365, 372,
qualitative, 334, 345 378, 379
uninformativeness, 332, 333, literal, 123
346 loeal truth, 353, 355, 378
indiseernibility, 301 lower speetral ehain, 147
indistinguishability, 7
infinite operations, 140 M-valued equality, 14
infinite-valued ealeulus of Lukasiewicz M-valued set, 14
122 ~S5+(G,®), 281,282
information logies, 301 ~S5(G,®), 279
information system, 301 maximum principle, 143
informational representability, 301 maximum satisfiability MAXSAT,
initial prescription, 131 121
interpretation function, 351, 364 measure(s)
intuitionistic logie, 11 necessity, 351
irrelevanee, see relevanee plausibility, 351
Menger, K., 7
Jacas, J., 256 Mesiar, R., 289
justifieation, see relevanee minimal speeifieity, 330
mixing,143
Klawonn, F., 289 modal logics, 303
knowledge base monoidallogie, 7
eonditional, 347 multi-modal systems, 277
Kruse, R., 289 multiple conclusion logic, 86
multiple-valued logie, 255
Los Theorem, 143 multiplieation law, see indepen-
Lukasiewicz disjunetion, 131 dence
Lukasiewicz logic, 9 MV-algebra, 134, 162
Lukasiewicz negation, 131
lattice-ordered group l-group, 135 naming funetion, 386
law of eontradiction, 12 natural inferenee operator, 263
law of divisibility, 9 natural T-indistinguishability, 258
law of double negation, 9 neeessity
law of idempoteney, 9 eonditional, 330
left OR, 272 measure, 329
left orthogonality, 312 qualitative, 345
left strengthening, 272 negative similarity, 312
left-side a-replaceability on U, 290 nestedness, 276
left-side conditioned a-reflexive on non-Boolean partitions, 121
U,290 nonmonotonie logies, 381
Lehmke, S., 298 nonmonotonie reasoning, 381
Levi identity, 346 andindependence, 347-348
Lex Posterior, 392 normal form, 366, 373
422 Index
objects, 301 Reiter, Ro, 381

octant, 125 RELa(J), 291
relevance
parallel Ulam games, 132 epistemic, 325, 326
parameterised accessibility relation, justification, 335
303 qualitative, 334, 346
partition of B, 135 representation theorem [Jacas, 1988;
partitions of MV-algebras, 133 Valverde, 1985], 256
Poincare Paradox, 7 residuated implication, 275
positive similarity, 312 residuated lattices, 150
possibility residuation, 355
conditional, 330 restricted ®-transitivity, 274
distribution, 329 revision
measure, 329 andindependence,345-347
qualitative, 330, 345 right and property, 273
theory, 329-331 right OR, 272
predicate language, 139 right orthogonality, 312
preferences, 381 right weakening, 272
prescription, 129
prescription determined by one an- BAT00 is in fact NP-complete, 126
swer, 130 SAToo , 123
prioritized Iogic program, 387 Schmechel, No, 289
proximity entailment, 274,275 Scott, Do So, 139
Przymusinski, To, 383 seminormal, 389
pseudo Boolean algebra, 86 separating property, 272
pseudo complemented lattice, 86 sequent calculus
pseudometric, 14 Iogical ruIes, 365
Iogicalal ruIes, 374
qualitative independence, 149, see numerical axioms, 365, 366,
independence 378
qualitative necessity, see necessity structural rules, 353, 365, 374
qualitative possibiIity, see possi- signature, 304
bility similarity Kripke model, 277
qualitative relevance, see relevance similarity relation, 289
Quantale, 353, 357, 361, 374, 378 specificity, 381
quantitative structures, 145 state, 162
strictness, 11
RE(u, a, b), 290 strong unit, 135
RE(u, a, b, c), 290 strongly monotonie, 280
reduction of MAXSAT to BAToo , Subrahmanian, Vo So, 382
124 subset dosed, strongly compact cov-
refinement, 135 erings on U, 289
reßexivity, 11, 272 syllogism, 9
reßexivity on U, 289 syllogism law, 8
Index 423
symmetry, 11
symmetry on U, 289
9-coding connective, 204

t-chainability, 204
t-chainable, 203
t-transitive, 205
t-conorm, 364
quasi-strict(ness), 355,358
t-norm, 353, 355, 356, 365, 378
quasi-strict(ness), 355, 358
tautologyhood-degree, 93
theoremhood-degree, 94
theory of identity and existence, 7
Thiele, H., 289
transitivity, 11
truth-functional(ity), 351, 352
type-I conHict, 388
type-II conHict, 388
Ulam game of Twenty Questions

with llies/errors, 127
ultrapower construction, 139
ultraproducts, 139
uninformativeness, 332, 333, 346
universal instantiation, 8
unsatisfiable in the infinite-valued
calculus, 123
V(Sn), 162
vaJuation system, 140
Valverde, L., 256
Wajsberg axioms, 9
well-founded semanties, 382,383
Zadeh, L. A., 289

APPLIED LOGIC SERIES
1. D. Walton: FallaciesArisingjromAmbiguity. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4100-7

2. H. Wansing (ed.): ProofTheory ofModalLogic. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4120-1
3. F. Baader and K. U. Schulz (eds.): Frontiers ofCombining Systems. First International
Workshop, Munich, March 1996. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4271-2
4. M. Marx and Y. Venema: Multi-Dimensional Modal Logic. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-4345-X
5. S. Akama (ed.): Logic, Language and Computation. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4376-X
6. J. Goubault-Larrecq and I. Mackie: ProofTheory and Automated Deduction. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4593-2
7. M. de Rijke (ed.): Advances in Intensional Logic. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4711-0
8. W. Bibel and P.H. Schmitt (eds.): Automated Deduction - A Basis for Applications.
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11. S.O. Hansson: A Textbook ofBeliefDynamics. Theory Change and Database Updat-
ing. 1999 Hb: ISBN 0-7923-5324-2; Pb: ISBN 0-7923-5327-7
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Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge

APPLIED LOGIC SERIES

seOPE OF THE SERIES

ERICH PETER KLEMENT

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

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Part I: Advances in Mutiple-valued Logics

Part 11: Aigebraic Aspects of Multiple-valued Logics

On Similarity-based Fuzzy Clusterings 289

INTRODUCTION: BRIDGING THE GAP

of interest in multiple-valued logic from AI is that in AI, the central prob-

in exploiting these constraints to compute optimal bounds on the valuation

generalized modus ponens. This property expresses that similar premises

among them as separate sentences. Benferhat et al. study various kinds

IRIT, Toulouse, France.

THE POINCARE PARADOX AND NON-CLASSICAL

At various occasions H. Poincare emphasized that the physical continuum is not

-.«x = y) /\ «y = z) /\ -.(x = z)))

1 MONOIDAL PREDICATE CALCULUS

(Tt> «0: ~ ß) ~ «ß ~ 'Y) ~ (0: ~ 'Y))) (Syllogism Law)

(T2 ) (0: ~ (0: V ß»

(T9 ) «(0: ® ß) ~ 'Y) ~ (0: -t (ß ~ 'Y))) (Exportation Law)

(TlO ) «0: ® ""0:) ~ ß) (Duns Scotus)

(Tu) «0: ~ (0: ® ""0:» ~ ""0:)

(VI) «Vv)o: ~ o:(v/r» (Universallnstantiation)

(EG) (o:(v/r) ~ (3v)0:) (Existential Generalization)

where 0:( v / r» denotes the result of replacing every free occurrence of v by r. As

(V) From (0: ~ ß) infer (0: ~ (Vv)ß) provided v is not free in 0: .

(3) From (0: -t ß) infer «3v) 0: -t ß) provided v is not free in ß .

(a) Ifwe add the lawo/idempotency

(Law o/Double Negation)

«a Aß) -+ (a ® (a -+ ß))) (Law o/Divisibility)

to the axioms of the monoidallogic, then the weIl-formed formulas

(a®ß) and ...,(a -+ ...,ß)

(I) (a -+ (ß -+ a» (Affirmation 0/ the Consequent)

(11) «a -+ ß) -+ «ß -+ ,) -+ (a -+ I))) (Syllogism)

(III) «(a -+ ß) -+ ß) -+ «ß -+ a) -+ a)))

and the following defining axioms

(V) «a ® ß) -+ ...,(a -+ ...,ß» (...,(a -+ ...,ß) -+ (a ® ß»

(VI) «a V ß) -+ «a -+ ß) -+ ß» , «(a -+) -+ ß) -+ (a V ß»

In particular, if we replace (V)-(Vll) by the corresponding definitions, then the

(T13 ) «0' --+ ß) V (ß --+ 0'» (Algebraie Strong De Morgan Law)

(T~;') «0' ® (0' --+ ß» --+ (0' /\ ß»

max(x +y - 1,0) , x --+L Y = min(1 - x + Y, 1).

2 FORMALIZED THEORY OF IDENTITY AND EXISTENCE

In various scientific fields identity (e.g. mathematical equations) or loeal existenee

prominent predicates, namely a unary predicate symbol e interpreted as extent 0/

(lEI) «Tl = T2) -t (eh)" e(T2))) (Strictness)

(1E4) (e(f(TI, ... , Ti, ... , Tn ) -t e(Ti)) ,

If we add a list A of additional axioms to the axioms of the monoidallogic (cf.

LEMMA 5. Let a, ß', 'Y are well-formedformulas. Then

Proof. We infer from (Tl), (T5 ), (T7 )-(Tg) :

I- « ( (a 1\ ß) -+ 'Y) 1\ (a 1\ ß)) -+ 'Y).

Referring again to (Tl), (T5 ) and (T7 ) we obtain

««a 1\ ß) -+ 'Y) 1\ «a 1\ ß) 1\ ""'Y)) -+ b 1\ ""'Y))

hence the assertion follows from (TlO ) and (Tu).

«x = y) -+ «(y = y) -+ (y = z)) -+ (x = z))),

I- «(x = y) -+ «(y = y) -+ (y = z)) -+ (x = z))) -+

«a 1\ ...,a) -+ (a @ ...,a)) (Law ofContradietion)

(i) (...,(a @ ß) -+ ...,(a 1\ ß))

~ < Ix - yl < i· € ~ < Iy - zl < i· €