EN BANC

[G.R. No. 496. December 31, 1902. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, v. WILLIAM FOWLER ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for Appellant.

William Lane O’Neill, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CRIMES ON HIGH SEAS. — Courts of First Instance of the Philippines
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes committed on the high seas on board of a
transport or other vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of
$20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas,
which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property
of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same,
without violence or intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the
case made and provided.

The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on
behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court
of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the
information that the crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within
the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the
jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.

This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month’s imprisonment, or a fine of
over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission
admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessels flying the flag of the United States
has been vested in the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he
cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He
argued that the President of the United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the
commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial system with authority to take
cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this Archipelago, which is now analogous
to the status of some of the States of the Union during the Mexican was and the war of secession.

The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was without
jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the high seas,
sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the
Government. Against this order the prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought
before this court.

This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No.
136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed
the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take
cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law
are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to
criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the
case, Act. No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.

This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands
were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph
numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, on bard a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands
in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the
Courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed
in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.

Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de
oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this
court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this
case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was
then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N.
Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and
city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and
seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail
to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said
animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by
means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported
loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all
without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to
provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and
hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying
such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of
shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that
the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof
the following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such
animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and
suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from
vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby
made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side
by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails
to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a
penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States
money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First
Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was
sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over
certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any
of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed
in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or
water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had
this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no
doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance
with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is
conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We
have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character,
committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles
of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p.
255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew
were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political
agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that
part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the
high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to
the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial
waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power
without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local
jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In
1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect
that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the
jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice
Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably
be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory
she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal,
which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been
admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the
principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip
de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official
exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and
finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports
by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628;
Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome
2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she
has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial
Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to
restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —

It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that
so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign
port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15
Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law
Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government
to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided
by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as
judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb
the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order
and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general
public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the
ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the
cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the
vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the
United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have
the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and
Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for
the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault
and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there
was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic
channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to
Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:

I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with
the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the
last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is
conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be
held amenable under the local criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews
of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to
a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving
the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to
take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances
in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty
voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in
fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint
is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the
offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the
place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on
board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the
language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the
country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference
between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country
into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public
law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals
were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of
the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into
which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but
it does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act
was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or
intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show,
in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I
think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly'
conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a
certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests
upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was
conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to
state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must
be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is
good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this
. . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks
and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge
him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes"
and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and
that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between
foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with
its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People
(Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of
the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.

The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it
has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress
to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express
terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon
the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union,
the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by
its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers
required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure.
Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly
acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with
the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an
organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should act.
The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been
formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature
was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has
delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature
and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of
the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no
longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although
the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell,
182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by
those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective
of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell,
182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197
U. S., 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws
of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all
the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United
States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this
section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of
the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on
August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government
of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and
on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed
December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of
the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine
Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the
future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States.
During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the
interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was
governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The
military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or
civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
 commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the exercise of
the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed
and the rights determined.

President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment
of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be
prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the
raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public
funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil service;
the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and
departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now
competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to
the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and
subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to
bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of
our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine
Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were
found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post
facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress
of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by
Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised previously
by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the
authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the
affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress
assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions
of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President
had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the
President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on
the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending
to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President
in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the
Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain
executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the
President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified
and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370;
Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should
read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of
time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or
non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the
viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United
States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In
neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of
the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and
the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power
enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement
of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.

In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject
to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the
States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions,
must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State
judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government
of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that
the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution
of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central
government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act
of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express
or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State
constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the
Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its
subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to
specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to
exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is
conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply
as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen.
of U. S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of
the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of
the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The
situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported
to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress,
July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until
approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of
Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners
Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has
been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the
United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of
the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of
its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to
which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the
Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the
reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express
limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority
with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the
Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
(Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and
the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce
between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended
by Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be
left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court
from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the
port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully
sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
 was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and
risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship
by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any
provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming
into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and
cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms,
which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without
slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of
panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain
Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that since the
introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of
animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has
testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or
common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle
supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely
and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is
against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might
produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in
the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:

The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he
"carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that
"he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."

The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the more than
one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the
complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the
unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated
one charge from the other and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause
concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.

The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:

The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month
(stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of
the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went
abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near
the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack
referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack,
also contained several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in
Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely and of his own
will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found
in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he
had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several
times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.

It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly
constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was
the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department
of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually
sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen
after the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels,
pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore.

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important as
evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf

FISCAL. What is it?

WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent
and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession
to sell.

On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it refers to
a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given
this testimony, to wit:

FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?

WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a
sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the
steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.

The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence,
and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel"
be stricken out.

The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B,
and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English
nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and
that he had them in his possession.

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the
presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because
the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the
vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for
each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera
Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had
tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500;
that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his,
and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80
cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong,
and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try
the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of
his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view
of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch
as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the
principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being
taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
released from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of
the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found:
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that
said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the
present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by
the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively,
we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

46 Phil. 729

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it
will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over a crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on
the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory
they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in
the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], U6), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"* * * When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were
not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. * * * "

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
" * * * No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of
a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana
ed.], p.. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sees. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as
have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency.* * *"

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of
the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said that:
" * * * The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb only the peace of
the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship,
but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede
that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it."

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of the Islands, such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty."

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come,
to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also
to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and
security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by our courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. .It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
" * * * The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of
Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign
ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board."

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
Order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it
will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on
the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient
and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the
government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
 . . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La
Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the
proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of
the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace
of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home
of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all
times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must
concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere
to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable
by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the
Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the
laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force
at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said
place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of
His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two
countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners
are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the
said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes
of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively
shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always
to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him,
is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible
to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was
rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case,
to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them
in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again
done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation
not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain,
it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the
crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical

injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen
and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain
is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according
to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character,
continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock
Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions
of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This
enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official
Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of
August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.
(U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of
articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards"
are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States
vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited
meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public
officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
 The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital
punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is
not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime.
It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No.
00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and
40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro
near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members
to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the
vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the
name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all
the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the
Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine
Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship
arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel
which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles
from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on
March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo
to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On
April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to
report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise
they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger
jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them
to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of
April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to
the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the
incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was
arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI
agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No.
532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of
qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with
high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and
seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to
proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their
testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed
the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and
Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of
March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told
that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of
employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed
at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of
trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international
markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts,
Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel
"Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to
sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid
over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations
Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the
contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on
board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port
of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the
quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the
purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed
toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and
did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the
Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and
the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned
out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did
he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took
samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under
the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon
arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the
cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from
"M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong
was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the
crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan
was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to
offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of
the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who
laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told
that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by
the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in
at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not
arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters
defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of
said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is
hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same,
the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the
value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at
the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to
said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the
Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine
Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong
has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
 All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of
Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail
of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr.
Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due
process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel
for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court
discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had
presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during
the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements
without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of
counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the
pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The
crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed
by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and
seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or
robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of
1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial
court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which
in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal
by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any
participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he
had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of
qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified
piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In
the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory.
For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and
implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what
are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?;
(3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they
were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of
the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only
be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants,
as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-
appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and
that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment
(Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is
not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were
sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the
record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally,
knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul
Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of
rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

 SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called
Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-
appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit
from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to
convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial
court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial
judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the
crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as
among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30
o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said
vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough
Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the
Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao"
to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
1991. . .
 xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the
vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more
than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader.
In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias
Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted
to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and
remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the
port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of
participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were
hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T
Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to
work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their
families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal
effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with
human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second
Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and
venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was
at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice
it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy
to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to
have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to
prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest
respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284
SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are
times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal
design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro,
while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew
from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to
provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not
be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in
view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant

Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto
Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said
corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their
families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a
relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off
Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while
Loyola at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in

Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out
that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any
person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage
of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part
of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
 ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in
Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and
hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen
the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-
appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence,
the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under
a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is
likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a
principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery

brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or
highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or
other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates
or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or
indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be
considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with
Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete
evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v.
Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of
the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had
failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo
by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by
buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even
tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine
Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal
transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food,
beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List
was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in
the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-
appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered
the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not
have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant
Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991,
Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH",
Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record)
falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there
were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that
the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T
Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor
prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to
the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel,
he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record);
that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco
also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on
March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said
voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second
transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by
accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that
he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of
the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a
highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the
very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed
or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did
not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check
the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi
Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor;
he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should
also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less
than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity.
Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for
transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in
addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware
that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his
superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior
if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said
order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of
Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover,
the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and
immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts.
During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent
and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and
the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow
orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do
so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163267 May 5, 2010

TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, one does not have to be in
actual physical possession thereof. The law does not punish physical possession alone but possession
in general, which includes constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to the owner’s
control.1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the October 15, 2003 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 which affirmed the January 23, 1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista for violation of Section
1, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866,5as amended, as well as the April 16, 2004 Resolution which
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

In an Information6 dated January 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD
1866 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following
items:

1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine;

2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;

3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.

without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a) Suspension of
Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A Preliminary Investigation.7 The RTC granted the motion and,
accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution8 dated March 6, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict
petitioner and thus recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable cause and the
dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, a Motion to Withdraw Information9 was filed but it was denied
by the trial court in an Order10 dated March 26, 1996, viz:

Acting on the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed by State Prosecutor Aida Macapagal on the
ground that [there exists] no probable cause to indict the accused, the Information having been
already filed in Court, the matter should be left to the discretion of the Court to assess the evidence,
hence, for lack of merit, the same is hereby denied. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed.

When arraigned on March 26, 1996, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police assigned at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was informed by his superior that a
certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing with
him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly after lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and
Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube area where they were met by a crewmember who introduced
to them herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter
answered in the affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon, Acierto was
summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms
and ammunitions were turned over to him. Petitioner was then escorted to the arrival area to get his
luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination room where the luggage was examined and
petitioner was investigated. In open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.

During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that he
bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities, which
turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai. Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office
(FEO) in Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither registered with said office 11 nor licensed
holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but
his effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally purchased. Among the documents
Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form12 and Customs
Declaration Form.13 A referral letter14 was prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of
Justice. Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he
bought the firearms in Angola.

SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder. His office issued a certification15 to that effect which he identified in court as Exhibit "A".

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to
Evidence,16 the resolution of which was deferred pending submission of petitioner’s evidence.17

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward narration of the
event was synthesized by the CA as follows:

x x x On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who informed
him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a passenger of PAL flight from Dubai
to Manila, was being detained as he was found in possession of firearms; that if said passenger will
not be able to board the airplane, he would be imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only
release the passenger if the Captain of PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein
petitioner] and the firearms. Capt. Nadurata agreed to take custody of the firearms and the
passenger, herein appellant, so that the latter could leave Dubai. The firearms were deposited by the
Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and allowed the appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival in
Manila, Capt. Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the airport authorities.

Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defense’s intended witness, Nilo Umayaw (Umayaw),
the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed and stipulated on the
following points:

1. That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that firearms and
ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger coming from Angola going to
the Philippines;

2. That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin Nadurata, the
Pilot in command of PAL Flight 657;

3. That the subject firearms [were] turned over at Dubai;

4. That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused Teofilo
Evangelista and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who in turn submitted
[them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already testified;

5. That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2)
magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.

The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and is
ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.19

On April 4, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial20 which the RTC granted.21 Forthwith, petitioner
took the witness stand narrating his own version of the incident as follows:

On January 28, 1996, he was at Dubai International Airport waiting for his flight to the Philippines. He
came from Luwanda, Angola where he was employed as a seaman at Oil International Limited.
While at the airport in Dubai, Arab policemen suddenly accosted him and brought him to their
headquarters where he saw guns on top of a table. The Arabs maltreated him and forced him to
admit ownership of the guns. At this point, PAL Station Manager Umayaw came and talked to the
policemen in Arabian dialect. Umayaw told him that he will only be released if he admits ownership
of the guns. When he denied ownership of the same, Umayaw reiterated that he (petitioner) will be
released only if he will bring the guns with him to the Philippines. He declined and insisted that the
guns are not his. Upon the request of Umayaw, petitioner was brought to the Duty Free area for his
flight going to the Philippines. When he was inside the plane, he saw the Arab policemen handing
the guns to the pilot. Upon arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police and brought to
the arrival area where his passport was stamped and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration
Form without reading its contents. Thereafter, he was brought to a room at the ground floor of the
NAIA where he was investigated. During the investigation, he was not represented by counsel and
was forced to accept ownership of the guns. He denied ownership of the guns and the fact that he
admitted having bought the same in Angola.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After new trial, the RTC still found petitioner liable for the offense charged but modified the penalty of
imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 23, 1998 reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine; One (1)
Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19)
9mm bullets and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8)
Years and a fine of ₱30,000.00.

The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and [are]
ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.22

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its Decision dated October 15, 2003. It
ruled that the stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner. As regards possession of subject
firearms, the appellate court ruled that Capt. Nadurata’s custody during the flight from Dubai to
Manila was for and on behalf of petitioner. Thus, there was constructive possession.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but it was denied by the appellate court in its April 16, 2004
Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors:

a. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.

b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in possession
of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have
committed the crime charged against him.

c. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a continuing
crime.
 d. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary
investigation.24

We find the appeal devoid of merit.

At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review
on certiorari shall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of fact of the CA are, as a
general rule, conclusive upon and binding on the Supreme Court.25 In this recourse, petitioner
indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence adduced by the parties and to re-evaluate the
credibility of their witnesses. On this ground alone, the instant petition deserves to be denied outright.
However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake and following the principle that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, we are inclined to delve into the merits of
the present petition.

In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime imputed
against him for he was never in custody and possession of any firearm or ammunition when he
arrived in the Philippines. Thus, the conclusion of the appellate court that he was in constructive
possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions is erroneous.

We are not persuaded. As correctly found by the CA:

Appellant’s argument that he was never found in possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions
within Philippine jurisdiction is specious. It is worthy to note that at the hearing of the case before the
court a quo on October 8, 1996, the defense counsel stipulated that the subject firearms and
ammunitions were confiscated from appellant and the same were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo
Umayaw who, in turn, turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is
binding on appellant, for the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client.
Granting that Nilo Umayaw was merely told by the Dubai authorities that the firearms and
ammunitions were found in the luggage of appellant and that Umayaw had no personal knowledge
thereof, however, appellant’s signature on the Customs Declaration Form, which contains the entry
"2 PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE," proves that he was the one who brought the
guns to Manila. While appellant claims that he signed the Customs Declaration Form without reading
it because of his excitement, however, he does not claim that he was coerced or persuaded in
affixing his signature thereon. The preparation of the Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for
all arriving passengers in an international flight. Moreover, it cannot be said that appellant had
already been arrested when he signed the Customs Declaration Form. He was merely escorted by
Special Agent Acierto to the arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only
after he signed the Customs Declaration Form that he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for
investigation. Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject firearms. As held
in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused
possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess
the same. Animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused,
as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the
surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.

Appellant’s witness, Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to Manila on
January 30, 1996, testified that he accepted custody of the firearms and of appellant in order that
the latter, who was being detained in Dubai for having been found in possession of firearms, would
be released from custody. In other words, Capt. Nadurata’s possession of the firearm during the flight
from Dubai to Manila was for and on behalf of appellant.26

We find no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings, especially considering petitioner’s
admission during the clarificatory questioning by the trial court:
Court: So, it is clear now in the mind of the Court, that the firearms and ammunitions will also be with
you on your flight to Manila, is that correct?

A: Yes, your honor.

Court: [You] made mention of that condition, that the Dubai police agreed to release you
provided that you will bring the guns and ammunitions with you? Is that the condition of the
Dubai Police?

A: Yes, your honor.

Court: The condition of his release was that he will have to bring the guns and ammunitions to
the Philippines and this arrangement was made by the PAL Supervisor at Dubai and it was Mr.
Umayaw the PAL Supervisor, who interceded in his behalf with the Dubai Police for his flight in
the Philippines.27

To us, this constitutes judicial admission of his possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions. This
admission, the veracity of which requires no further proof, may be controverted only upon a clear
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no admission was made.28 No such
controversion is extant on record.

Moreover, we cannot ignore the Customs Declaration Form wherein it appeared that petitioner
brought the firearms with him upon his arrival in the Philippines. While there was no showing that he
was forced to sign the form, petitioner can only come up with the excuse that he was excited. Hardly
can we accept such pretension.

We are likewise not swayed by petitioner’s contention that the lower court erroneously relied on the
Customs Declaration Form since it is not admissible in evidence because it was accomplished
without the benefit of counsel while he was under police custody.

The accomplishment of the Customs Declaration Form was not elicited through custodial
investigation. It is a customs requirement which petitioner had a clear obligation to comply. As
correctly observed by the CA, the preparation of the Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for
all arriving passengers in an international flight. Petitioner was among those passengers. Compliance
with the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation is, therefore, not applicable in this case.
Moreover, it is improbable that the customs police were the ones who filled out the declaration form.
As will be noted, it provides details that only petitioner could have possibly known or supplied. Even
assuming that there was prior accomplishment of the form which contains incriminating details,
petitioner could have easily taken precautionary measures by not affixing his signature thereto. Or he
could have registered his objection thereto especially when no life threatening acts were being
employed against him upon his arrival in the country.

Obviously, it was not only the Customs Declaration Form from which the courts below based their
conclusion that petitioner was in constructive possession of subject firearms and ammunitions.
Emphasis was also given on the stipulations and admissions made during the trial. These pieces of
evidence are enough to show that he was the owner and possessor of these items.

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him. He claims
that his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his
possession thereof has ceased when he left for the Philippines. He insists that since Dubai is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and his situation is not one of the exceptions provided in
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not applicable. In short, he had not
committed a crime within the Philippines.1avvphi1
Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.29 In order for the courts to acquire
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. If the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.30

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines.
The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is
very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no license or
authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the crime penalized under PD
1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license to possess the firearm. The fact of lack or
absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Since it has been shown that petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in
possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an
essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated
and completed in no other place except the Philippines.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on
or about January 30, 1996 petitioner was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, certainly a territory within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present
charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation
between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is
no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the
discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason
that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegation applies.31

Petitioner finally laments the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
investigating prosecutor due to the latter’s finding of lack of probable cause to indict him. He argues
that such denial effectively deprived him of his substantive right to a preliminary investigation.

Still, petitioner’s argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the
trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on
the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion, the trial court just
followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v. Judge Mogul32 that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound by such
finding of the investigating prosecutor. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How33we held:

It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and
may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone
on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and
jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.
Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result of the
preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.

In fine, we find no reason not to uphold petitioner’s conviction. The records substantiate the RTC and
CA’s finding that petitioner possessed, albeit constructively, the subject firearms and ammunition
when he arrived in the Philippines on January 30, 1996. Moreover, no significant facts and
circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which if considered would have
altered the outcome of the case.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the Court has
reiterated the essential elements in People v. Eling34 to wit: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and,
(2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding
license for it.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The
existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established through the testimony of
Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner when he entered into stipulation and
through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the
firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of
petitioner does not appear in the list of registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As
proof, he submitted a certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of
SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the FEO would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element.35

A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 829436 took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the commission of the
crime on January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given
retrospective application insofar as the penalty is concerned.

Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years. Hence, the
penalty imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21805 affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109
dated January 23, 1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista of violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of six years and one day to eight years and to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Fajardo, 123 Phil. 1348, 1351 (1966).

2 Rollo, pp. 3-37.

3CA rollo, pp. 181-194; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Sergio L. Pestaño and Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court).

4 Records, Vol. II, pp. 133-141; penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez.

5Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In

Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives.

6 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

7 Id. at 54-59.

8 Id. at 75-79.

9 Id. at 73-74.

10 Id. at 86.

11 Exhibit "G", records, p. 174.

12 Exhibit "I", id. at 177.

13 Exhibit "J", id. at 178.

14 Exhibit "H", id. at 175-176.

15 Id. at 171.

16 Id. at 187-199.

17 Id. at 212.

18 Id. at 293-294.

19 Id. at 303-304.

20 Records, Vol. II, pp. 1-8.

21 Id. at 25.

22 Id. at 133-141.

23 CA rollo, 198-206.

24 Rollo, p. 16.

25 Dacut v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169434, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 260, 267.

26 CA rollo, pp. 191-192. Citations Omitted

27 TSN, June 30, 1997, pp. 22-23.

28 Rules of Court, Rule129, Section 4.

Sec. 4 - Judicial admissions. – An admission verbal or written made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.

29 People v. Macasaet, 492 Phil. 355, 370 (2005).

30 Uy v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 329, 337 (1997).

31 Samson v. Daway, 478 Phil. 784, 795 (2004).

32 235 Phl. 465, 476 (1987).

33 393 Phil. 172, 181 (2000).

34 G.R. No. 178546, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 724, 738.

35 Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 450, 468-469.

36 An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36275 October 26, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, JACINTO G.
MANAHAN and DOMINADOR J. AMBROSIO, Defendants-Appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto G. Manahan, and Dominador J. Ambrosio were charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila with a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Legislature upon
the following information:chanrobles virtual law library

That on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto up
to the date of the filing of this information, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above-named
accused were the founders, organizers, promoters, directors and leading members of a society,
association or organization called the Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas (Communist Party of the
Philippines), the principal object of which is to incite a revolt of the proletariat or the laboring class
and which advocates, urges, and preaches, among other things, the following:

The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has to revolt
under the leadership of the laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

. . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-Consolidado,

Democrata, etc.) are no different from one another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and
exploit, with independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a government
which is procapitalist and proimperialist.

"Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary. Only by
revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of one man by another and of one nation by
another nation . . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in its desire to head the
Philippine Government is different from that of the burgess political parties. Its aim is not to strengthen
the capitalist government but to engender - as it cannot be avoided - the war of the classes and to
bring about its downfall. Therefore, the aims of the C. P. P. are the following:

"1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the
Philippines;chanrobles virtual law library

"2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the
Philippines;chanrobles virtual law library

"3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests;chanrobles virtual law
library

"4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet government under the laborers;chanrobles virtual law library

"5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
"6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm hands, -
to embrace communism.

"With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And inasmuch as
these ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International), the C. P. P. will extend its full
help for the redemption and welfare of the laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

". . . Here in the Philippines, American imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of the Moros in
paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers resisting the
owners and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students, the uprising of the colorums, and
the oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which
if carried on with unity, will perforce bring about the downfall of American imperialism and the
obtaining of Philippine independence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First, to
overthrow American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow capitalism
and feudalism; third to seize the power in the government; fourth, the establishment of labor
dictatorship; fifth, the bringing about of class consciousness and class struggle and the prompt
establishment of communism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indispensable. This struggle may be peaceful or violent, but just
the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be
staked.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism, and for the purpose of opening the eyes of
the people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject peoples their
independence - because independence is an enemy of oppression and exploitation - unless their
downfall is brought about, it is necessary to struggle, not only during
elections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"The difference of the revolutionary movement advocated by the C. P. P. is not found only in its
principal ideal but in the steps that it will take. While the reformists advocate understanding and
cooperation with the burgesses or capitalists, the movement of the laborers is based on the principle
of class struggle. Instead of cooperating with the enemy we should muster our own strength and fight
our enemies. And in order to achieve this union, strong and powerful, it is necessary that we should
counteract every move that will tend to prejudice the laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

"In view of the revolutionary campaign of the C. P. P. for the sake of the laborers and farm workers,
the capitalist and imperialists will become more violent and antagonistic toward them. And
inasmuch as the capitalists and imperialists have control of the government, it is not impossible that
they will use their power to more violently oppress us; in such a case they will make it clear that their
ideals are inconsistent with those of the laborers. When that day comes, the class struggle and the
revolution will redouble their force, for they will be forced to defend themselves by rising in revolt
against the oppression they are being subject to by means of the power of the
state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"For the obtaining of the partial demands to be made by the C. P. P., it is necessary that all the
laborers and farm hands, now divided by their different industrial organizations, be united. . . . If the
factory laborers and farm hands organizations are already established and ready for the struggle,
and if their movement is already under the leadership of the proletariat thru the C. P. P., it will
endeavor to make the movement more vigorous for the purpose of obtaining its partial demands
until the time comes when the factory laborers and farm hands are able to wrest the control of the
Government from the capitalists and imperialists and place it in the hands of the sons of the sweat."

That the said accused as such founders, organizers, promoters, directors and leading members of the
said Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another
for the purpose of carrying out the objects of said society, association or organization, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and at various public meetings or gatherings held in different
parts of the City of Manila, under the auspices of the aforesaidPartido Komunista sa Pilipinas, utter,
make and deliver seditious words and speeches, such as, that the laborers in the Philippines had a
common cause with the revolting peoples of the colonies of the different nations and they must
prepare to fight in getting the Government into their hands and to run it by themselves and for
themselves like the poor people in Russia; that it was time for the poor and laboring class to realize
that the present administration was for the rich people only, neglecting the welfare of the poor and
the laboring class, and the said laboring class should stand as the Russian laborers did; that when the
laborers were united, neither the Constabulary, nor the United States Army, nor the Imperialist
Governor-General could stop them when they rose up as one body in order to free themselves from
slavery by the capitalists; that America was cunning and coward, as evidenced by the fact that
when she entered the World War, her enemies were already weak; that the Philippine Government
was an institution for the rich and for the higher-ups and not for the laborers and the poor; that the
Constabulary and the police were the ones who made troubles to the laborers because they were
the agents of the American Imperialists in the Islands and they were used as instruments by the
American Imperialist Government; that uniting together the laborers could down the American
Imperialist Government, and other terms and expressions of similar tenor and import;chanrobles
virtual law library

That the said accused read and caused to be read to the crowd attending their public meetings or
gatherings, the constitution and by-laws of the said Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas and solicited
subscriptions for membership in their said society, association or organization;chanrobles virtual law
library

That the contents and spirit of said constitution and by-laws of the said Partido Komunista sa
Pilipinas as well as the words and speeches uttered, made and delivered by the said accused as
hereinabove stated constitute scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and of
the Philippine Islands, and are highly seditious in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies,
and tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawfully purposes; to stir up the people
against the lawfully constituted authorities, and to disturb the peace of the community and the
safety and order of the Government, as well as to disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in
executing their office.

The assignments of error relate only to questions of fact. It appears that on the night of November 7,
1930, a large meeting was held in the City of Manila to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the Union of
Socialist Republics of the Soviets. The herein accused Dominador J. Ambrosio read the constitution
and by-laws of the Communist Party of the Philippines. From the documents it appeared among
other things, that the purpose of the Communist Party of the Philippines is to promote the struggle
and antagonism of classes, and to establish an independent Philippine Government; that a
revolution like that initiated by Andres Bonifacio is necessary; that the State was created to serve as a
tool for tyranny; that through the laws the people are compelled to submit to the wicked means of
exploitation of the capitalists; that the duty of the Communist Party is to teach the people to fight
and overthrow the government established in the Philippines; and that in order to seize the power of
the State by the use of force, the laborers must be united.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
At the same meeting the accused Crisanto Evangelista also spoke. He explained the advantages of
the Russian Government and the means which had been employed by the laboring class of Russia to
establish its present government, citing certain insurgent colonies of different nations as other
examples.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the same meeting pamphlets were distributed, and in one of them, which is the manifesto of
the Katipunan nang mañga Anak Pawis sa Filipinas, appear the following statements:

Due to the success of Soviet Russia, revolutions were incited in the whole world. . . . The idea of
revolution spreads itself, struggles become more and more serious but the labor movement continues
on the path travelled by the Russian laborers - the Bolsheviks. What is that path? The seizure of the
power of the government from the hands of the burgesses and the establishment of a government
by the laborers. . . .

". . . Only in this way we would be victorious in the revolutionary movement of the laborers. . . ."
Subsequently to that date, November 7, 1930, and up to February 2, 1931, several meetings were
held under the auspices of the said Katipunan nang mañga Anak Pawis sa Filipinas, whereat Crisanto
Evangelista delivered speeches advocating revolution as a means for improving the condition of the
laboring class. Thus at the meeting held November 17, 1930, he said, among other things, "All the
laboring classes of the country should organize themselves into unions, and said unions must form
another bigger association, so that when that is accomplished, no armed force could prevent them
from uprising. No Constabulary would be able to prevent us from uprising, if we are united as one
single body." At the meeting held November 26, 1930, he said that, if a laborer is dismissed by his
employer and he has nothing with which to support his family, he could rob: that robbery is not
against the law. He further said: "It is necessary to overthrow the government of the capitalists,
imperialists and burgesses, and substitute it by another government like that of Soviet Russia. How can
we do so? By our union through theKatipunan nang mañga Anak Pawis and the Communist Party
because if we are united, we would not fear any cannon, gun, or sword, and they could not prevent
us from doing so because of our union and force." The same revolutionary tendency is noted in all his
speeches delivered at the other meetings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the accused Jacinto Manahan, the evidence shows that at the meeting held December 14,
1930 he delivered a speech, challenging any other person to a discussion as to what form of
government is good, wherein he would defend the Soviet Government of the
Bolsheviks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fact above stated clearly constitute a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act
No. 1692, which reads as follows:

SEC. 8. Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish, utter or make any statement, or speech, or do
any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officers in executing his office or in performing
his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which
suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment
not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The appellants have circulated pamphlets containing the constitution and by-laws of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, and delivered speeches, advocating the ideas of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, which are highly seditious and revolutionary, as expounded in said constitution and by-
laws and their speeches themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense contends that the expressions attributed to the appellants cannot be held to be
accurate reproductions or extracts of their speeches because the agents who made the extracts
were proven at the trial to be incapable of making an extract of the message of the Governor-
General. This contention is clearly untenable, because to make a report of the substance of a
speech delivered in popular meetings on simple matters such as revolution, fight, overthrowing of
government by violence and the like, there is no need of any skill at all. The orators themselves, knew
that the audience understood them and they spoke in the manner the common people could
understand. Besides, if those extracts were not accurate, it was not difficult for the appellants to
present evidence to contradict them; on the contrary, the testimony of some of the accused
confirmed said extracts and none of them denied the same. The defense made by the appellants
that section 8 of Act No. 292 was not violated because no disturbance or disorder took place is
clearly untenable in view of the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599). It is
not necessary that there should be any disturbance or breach of the peace in order that the act
may come under the sanction of the Penal Code. It is sufficient that it incites uprising or produces a
feeling incompatible with the permanency of the government. Nor can the acts charged be
considered as mere expositions of doctrines in abstracto, coming within the exemption set out in
Gitlow vs. People of New York (268 U. S., 652).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Another point set up by the defense in support of the proposition that the accused did not advocate
armed revolution is the fact that they presented themselves as candidates in the past elections. This
defense is also untenable. The evidence is conclusive that when the appellants and the Communist
Party advocated revolution, they did not mean any peaceful revolution, but specifically said that
they meant revolution like that initiated by Andres Bonifacio which led the Katipunan to take arms,
against the advice of Doctor Rizal who advocated peaceful means in the fight for
independence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellants finally contend that they should be acquitted because the acts charged in the
information do not constitute any crime under the Revised Penal Code. This is also untenable. Article
142 of the said Code punishes the act of inciting sedition by speeches, manifestos, emblems,
caricatures, and other means. And sedition, according to article 139 of the same Code, is the public
and tumultuous uprising to attain by force any of the purposes therein enumerated, among which, is
the act of preventing the government from freely exercising its own functions. The expressions
contained in the constitution and by-laws of the Communist Party, as well as the utterances made by
them in their meetings, incite the people to uprise and overthrow the Government by force and arm,
therefore under sanction of the Revised Penal Code. Nor can the appellants claim any other benefit
under the new Code because the penalty under article 142 of said Code, which is prision
correccional in the maximum degree, is higher than the penalty provided in section 8, of Act No. 292,
as amended by Act No. 1692, which cannot exceed two years'
imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with one-third of the costs against each of the appellants. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.