Ontological Security and The Positive Potential of Anxiety

Ontological
Security and the

positive
potential of
anxiety
An exploration into the role of
ontological security within the
Kurdish conflict in Turkey
Inge van der Spek

UNIVERSITY OF KENT – BRUSSELS SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
MA DISSERTATION – MA INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY
ACADEMIC YEAR: 2016-2017
NUMBER OF WORDS: 15.046
1
Abstract
This dissertation argues for a more widespread use of and research into the new approach to
ontological security that steps away from securitisation and rather emphasises the positive
potential of anxiety and change (Rumelili, 2015a), the importance of adaptability instead of
stability (Browning et al., 2016), the importance of being critical of one’s own ontological
security (Rossdale, 2015) and the related focus on processes of de-securitisation (Rumelili,
2015a) followed by thick recognition, and simultaneous self-transformation and other-
transformation. (Strömbom, 2014) It will be shown that there is currently a very limited use of
the positive potential of anxiety, due to a strong focus on securitisation and physical security
rather than ontological security within IR. The theoretical framework concerning the positive
potential of anxiety must be further developed through the conduct of more academic research.
Within such research, it must be taken into account that different state institutions have
different identities and different ontological security needs. Furthermore, the individual
dimension of identification and its relation to ontological security of the state must be further
explored. These conclusions are reached on the basis of application of the theoretical framework
and analysis of its role within the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.
2
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my dissertation supervisor Professor Maria Mälksoo for her support and
guidance in writing this dissertation. Many thanks also go out to my closest friends and family,
for supporting me in the stressful days of writing.
3
Title Ontological Security and the positive potential of anxiety: an exploration
into the role of ontological security within the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.
Author Inge van der Spek
Institution University of Kent – Brussels School of International Studies
Study programme MA International Conflict and Security
Academic Year 2016-2017
Number of words 15.046
4
Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... 3
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 7
2. Theoretical framework.................................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Ontological security: an overview ............................................................................................ 10
2.2 Anxieties and fears .................................................................................................................... 11
2.3 The positive potential of anxiety .............................................................................................. 13
2. A historical background: collapse of the Ottoman Empire ....................................................... 17
3. The Kemalist era: 1923-1983 ..................................................................................................... 20
4.1 The first years of Turkish independence ................................................................................. 20
4.2 Kemalist policies and identity formation................................................................................. 21
4.3 Increased Kurdish mobilisation ............................................................................................... 23
4.4 Theoretical analysis ................................................................................................................... 25
4. Turgut Özal: 1983-1993 .............................................................................................................. 27
4.1 Özal as a ruler............................................................................................................................. 27
4.2 Özal and the Kurds..................................................................................................................... 28
5. A return to Kemalism: 1993 – 2002 ........................................................................................... 34
5.1 A return to restrictive policies .................................................................................................. 34
6. Erdoğan and the AKP: 2002-now ............................................................................................... 39
6.1 An introduction to Erdoğan and the AKP ................................................................................ 39
6.2 Developments in the first period of AKP rule.......................................................................... 40
6.3 The Democratic Opening ........................................................................................................... 42
6.4 The nationalist turn ................................................................................................................... 45
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 50
Appendix 1: Poem by Ziya Gökalp (English) ..................................................................................... 53
Appendix 2: Poem by Ziya Gökalp (Turkish) ..................................................................................... 54
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 55
5
List of Abbreviations
AKP Development and Justice Party

CHP Republican People’s Party
CUP Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress
DTP Democratic Society Party
GNA Grand National Assembly
ICG International Crisis Group
IR International Relations
KADEK Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan
KGK Kurdistan People’s Congress
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
RECH Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts
6
1. Introduction
This dissertation offers an exploration into the theoretical concept of ontological security, and
argues for a more widespread application of and research into the concept. The concept of
ontological security originally comes from psychology and was thus first applied to individuals.
Individuals have a need for security of the self. Security of the self is argued to be constituted of
“a biographical continuity; the construction and maintenance of a web of trust relations; self-
integrity and dread.” (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2016) In the early 2000s, ontological security
as a concept was picked up by the International Relations (IR) scholarship for the first time.
Within IR, the concept of ontological security is applied mostly to states and other major political
actors. (Mitzen, 2006) Within IR there are different approaches to ontological security such as
the interactional approach (Mitzen, 2006), the social constructivist approach (Steele, 2001) and
the narrative approach (Kinvall, 2004; Somers, 1994; Subotić, 2016)
Many scholars have criticised the focus on securitisation within studies of ontological security in
IR. Criticisms of securitisation go hand in hand with criticisms on the focus on stable identities
and the portrayal of change as negative. Browning and Joenniemi (2016) write that “the
concept’s [ontological security] use to date has been too much geared to questions of identity-
related stability, with change viewed as disturbing and anxiety-inducing.” In the general
conception of ontological security, change is seen as undesirable as it can have a destabilising
effect on the identity and security of being. (Browning and Joenniemi, 2016) Within this
dissertation, a theoretical framework is presented that steps away from this focus on
securitisation and stability.
The framework presented is based on the assumption that the ultimate goal is to achieve a
situation of ontological security combined with physical asecurity for all actors in the conflict.
Physical asecurity is defined as a situation in which there is no perceived threat or danger, and
therefore there is no need for policies countering threats. (Rumelili, 2015a) In order to move
7
towards this ideal situation, it is important to look at ontological security in a radically different
way.
The presented theoretical framework emphasises the positive potential of anxiety and change
(Rumelili, 2015a), the importance of adaptability instead of stability (Browning et al., 2016), the
importance of being critical of one’s own ontological security (Rossdale, 2015) and the related
focus on processes of de-securitisation (Rumelili, 2015a) followed by thick recognition, and
simultaneous self-transformation and other-transformation. (Strömbom, 2014)
This dissertation argues for a more widespread use of and research into this new approach to
ontological security. It will be shown that there is currently a very limited use of the positive
potential of anxiety, due to a strong focus on securitisation and physical security rather than
ontological security within IR. The theoretical framework concerning the positive potential of
anxiety must be further developed through the conduct of more academic research. Within such
research, it must be taken into account that different state institutions have different identities
and different ontological security needs. Furthermore, the individual dimension of identification
and its relation to ontological security of the state must be further explored.
The usefulness and suitability of the presented theoretical framework will be explored and
demonstrated through an application of the theoretical framework on the case of the Kurdish
conflict in Turkey. An overview of different periods in Turkish history will be given, starting
from Turkish independence until the current day. Explanations of developments in these
different periods will be combined with theoretical analyses. This dissertation will start off with
a presentation of the theoretical framework. This is followed by a short background giving
information about the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.
The third chapter concerns the first 60 years of Turkish independence from 1923 until 1983.
1923 was the year in which the Ottoman Empire ended and Turkey became an independent
country. By that year, it had become clear that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – the new Turkish leader –
had a policy of creating a strong Turkish identity based on secularism, nationalism and unity.
8
Other religions and cultures were therefore seen as a threat to Turkish existence. (Bozarslan,
2008) Since the declaration of Turkish independence, the Turkish government has therefore
followed a strong policy of “assimilation, repression and containment” with regard to the
Kurdish people. (Yeğen, 2015) In 1978, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was formed, and
violent clashes between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces followed. (Ünal, 2016)
Following this will be a chapter about the period of Özal’s rule from 1983 until 1993. The
Turkish position towards the Kurds changed when President Özal came to power in 1983.
President Özal opted for “weak recognition” of the Kurdish problem which led to the
implementation of more accommodative policies. In March 1993, a ceasefire was established
between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. However, President Özal died on the 17th of
April of that same year, after which the ceasefire collapsed. (Yeğen, 2015)
Chapter 5 concerns the period from 1993 until 2002. During the period after Özal’s death,
successive governments returned to more restrictive policies with regard to the Kurds. Such
policies were the “intensification of cross-border operations into northern Iraq, increased village
evacuations in the Southeast, and extrajudicial killings conducted or tolerated by the security
forces.” (Pusane, 2014)
The final chapter focuses on the period of AKP rule that started in 2002. The current governing
party in Turkey started off with a more open approach to the Kurds as well as to other cultures
and religions in general. In the first years of AKP rule, the Turkish government implemented
accommodative policies towards the Kurds. However, over time this changed and the AKP has
returned to restrictive policies and oppression of the Kurds. (Polat, 2009)
9
2. Theoretical framework
This chapter will explain the development of the concept of ontological security. An overview of
the scientific debate and criticisms will be followed by the presentation of a new approach to
ontological security.
2.1 Ontological security: an overview
The concept of ontological security originally comes from psychology and was thus first applied
to individuals. Individuals have a need for security of the self. Security of the self is argued to be
constituted of “a biographical continuity; the construction and maintenance of a web of trust
relations; self-integrity and dread.” (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2016) In the early 2000s,
ontological security as a concept was picked up by the International Relations scholarship for
the first time. Within IR, the concept of ontological security is applied mostly to states and other
major political actors. (Mitzen, 2006)
Within IR, there are different approaches to ontological security. Mitzen (2006) has an
interactional approach to ontological security. Within this approach, it is argued that political
actors try to minimise their ontological insecurity through routinizing practices. An important
aspect of the routinisation of practices has to do with structuring relations and interactions with
significant others. This helps political actors in making sense of who they are and where they
stand in relation to these significant others. The routinisation of practices decreases the
conscious awareness of political actors, which makes it easier to take decisions, build trust and
predict future actions of other actors. The other actor can then adapt its own identity to these
predictions. The identity of political actors is dependent on their relationship. (Mitzen, 2006)
Steele (2001) has a more social constructivist approach to ontological security. He argues that
states “pursue social actions to serve identity needs.” (Steele, 2001) Social actions directed at
self-identity are seen as strategic actions just like actions aimed at safeguarding physical
security. Maintenance of ontological security is in the interest of the state. Shame occurs when a
state’s vision of self-identity is not in line with its actions. Shame signifies a lack of ontological
10
security. The feeling of shame then serves to confront these disrupted visions and once again
gain ontological security. (Steele, 2001)
A third approach to ontological security is the narrative approach. Within the narrative
approach, political actors use stories to define who they are and to decide what to do. Somers
(1994) has explained that “this ‘doing’ will in turn produce new narratives and hence, new
actions; the relationship between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually
constitutive.” Subotić (2016) explains that narratives are normative in nature. This is how they
can guide policy actions and choices. Especially when there is stress and therefore ontological
security, narratives can be useful to alleviate ontological insecurity. (Kinvall, 2004)
Ontological security is different from the more traditional concept of physical security, which is
related to state sovereignty. Physical security is about the tangible security of one’s own
territory and property as a political actor. Ontological security is often referred to as the security
of being, whereas physical security is referred to as security of survival. (Rumelili, 2015a)
Maintenance of physical security is mainly and most clearly expressed through the protection of
borders. (Mitzen, 2006) Although inherently different, Steele (2011) argues that social actions
directed at self-identity are seen as strategic actions just like actions aimed at safeguarding
physical security. Maintenance of ontological security is thus in the interest of the state.
2.2 Anxieties and fears
In order to better understand ontological security – and its relation to physical security – it is
important to distinguish between anxieties and fears. This is a distinction that Rumelili (2015b)
puts forward in the introduction to her book called “Ontological security and conflict resolution:
peace anxieties.” Rumelili (2015b) first of all writes that both anxiety and fear are individual
emotions. However, if such emotions are felt by many citizens it has an impact on the state and
its ontological security as well as on its physical security. The feeling of anxiety is a general
feeling of the individual that is not directed towards a clear object. It is therefore mainly
experienced internally. Fear, on the other hand, is an emotion that is aimed at a specific object or
11
threat. As a result, clear actions can be undertaken to counter this fear thereby taking the
emotion into the external sphere. (Rumelili, 2015b)
Rumelili (2015a) has created a scheme that shows all the possible combinations of levels of fear
and anxiety relating to different states of both ontological and physical security. A high level of
anxiety corresponds to a state of ontological insecurity whereas a low level of anxiety
corresponds to a state of ontological security. A high level of fear corresponds to physical
(in)security – whether it is security or insecurity depends on the policies in place to counter
threats - whereas a low level of fear corresponds to physical asecurity. In the case of physical
asecurity there is no perceived threat or danger, and therefore there is no need for policies
countering threats. (Rumelili, 2015a) Waever (1998) has written that in a situation of physical
asecurity, the “security community is defined by the impossibility of imagining violence.”
Combinations of each of these states of ontological and physical security are possible. The ideal
combination “from a normative perspective”, according to Rumelili (2015a) – and I agree with
this – is a combination of ontological security and physical asecurity. She writes that “in this
state of security, conflicts are sustainably resolved; issues that have propelled conflict in the past
are either settled or have shed their physical security-ness, and are negotiated in normal
political channels. Yet, identity differences maintain their ontological security-ness as groups
reproduce their distinct identities through various social and cultural practices.”1 (Rumelili,
2015a) The different combinations are shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Combinations of Ontological (in)security and Physical (in)security/asecurity. (Rumelili, 2015a)
1
Physical asecurity, of course, is a theoretical analytical category. This is not to say that situations of
physical asecurity exist in real life. It is, however, still possible to strive towards a situation that
resembles as accurately as possible a situation of physical asecurity.
12
Anxieties can challenge the ontological security of political actors. This is why political actors
often try to turn anxieties into fears. Political actors prefer feelings of fear over feelings of
anxiety because it is more easy to return to a state of ontological security when there is fear. The
move from anxiety to fear is made through practices of securitisation. (Rumelili, 2015b) Like
Waever (1998) has explained: “Security is a practice, a specific way to frame an issue.” By
labelling something as a security issue, “the actor has claimed a right to handle it with
extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.” (Waever, 1998) Within
such securitisation practices, other political actors are often presented as dangerous and actions
of these political actors as threats. Through such securitisation practices, the sense of self and
stability returns thereby safeguarding the ontological security. Anxieties are replaced by fears,
thereby creating a situation of physical (in)security. (Rumelili, 2015b)
Such securitisation practices, thus, also have an impact on the physical security of the concerned
political actor. Physical security and ontological security are thus concepts that are inherently
different but that still influence one another a lot. (Rumelili, 2015b) Mitzen (2006) writes that
ontological security is defined in interaction with significant others. In a conflict situation, this
can mean that a state derives its ontological security from the conflictual relationship with the
other conflict party. About such cases, Mitzen (2006) writes that “on a deep level, they prefer
conflict to cooperation, because only through conflict do they know who they are.” This shows
that sometimes – and especially in conflict situations – ontological security is obtained at the
expense of physical security. Steele (2001) confirms this. He writes that “states pursue social
actions to serve self-identity needs, even when these actions compromise their physical
existence.”
2.3 The positive potential of anxiety
Many scholars have criticised the focus on securitisation within studies of ontological security in
IR. Criticisms of securitisation go hand in hand with criticisms on the focus on stable identities
and the portrayal of change as negative. Browning and Joenniemi (2016) write that “the
13
concept’s [ontological security] use to date has been too much geared to questions of identity-
related stability, with change viewed as disturbing and anxiety-inducing.” In the general
conception of ontological security, change is seen as undesirable as it can have a destabilising
effect on the identity and security of being. Therefore, Browning and Joenniemi (2016) argue
that ontological security until now has been studied in a very restrictive way, focusing too much
on identity and securitisation.
They claim that ontological security should also be related to adaptability instead of solely to
stability. Identity is not to be seen as one and the same thing as ontological security, but rather
as a means towards achieving it. Being able to adapt one’s identity, therefore, can safeguard
one’s ontological security. Based on the mistake of seeing identity as similar to ontological
security, the assumption is often made that securitisation – which is defined as “the construction
of identities on the basis of the negative difference provided by radical otherness and enmity” –
and locking up of identities is helpful in maintaining ontological security. This assumption is
thus criticised by Browning and Joenniemi. (2016)
Rossdale (2015) has argued that being critical of one’s own ontological security, can lead to
positive change. This is, however, impeded by the current focus on stability and routine in
creating ontological security. Kinvall and Mitzen (2016) mention that “ontological security
scholarship focuses disproportionately on negative security dynamics.” They therefore advocate
for a bigger focus on the “non-securitising dynamics of ontological security-seeking in world
politics.” (Kinvall and Mitzen, 2016)
Rumelili (2015a) has, in accordance with the above criticisms of securitisation, tried to
emphasise the positive potential of anxiety. Anxiety creates space for new possibilities and
positive change. This is often overlooked. A state of anxiety can create a moment of freedom and
choice. The option of choosing anxiety over fear in the short run opens up the possible prospect
of new systems of meaning in the long run. These new systems of meaning are central in the
establishment of a new identity and re-creation of ontological security.
14
As mentioned before, in the most ideal situation there would be a combination of ontological
security and physical asecurity. Ontological security necessitates low levels of anxiety, and
physical asecurity necessitates low levels of fear. Currently, the standard reaction to anxiety is to
start processes of securitisation. However, this creates fears and therefore prohibits the
attainment of this ideal situation. Anxieties must thus be dealt with in a different way. What is
necessary in such a situation is a short period of ontological security, combined with non-
securitising processes of meaning constitution through alternative channels.
Taking even a further step, there is a need for de-securitisation. In many conflict situations,
securitisation practices have already created feelings of fear. This has led to situations of
ontological security combined with physical (in)security. De-securitisation processes will lead to
the replacement of existing fears by anxieties. The replacement of fears by anxieties creates a
situation of physical asecurity, combined with ontological insecurity. It is then necessary to treat
anxieties in such a way that they lead to non-violent and non-securitising processes of identity
transformation and routinisation leading to ontological security.
This relates to what Strömbom (2014) has written about thick recognition. Thick recognition as
a concept can help better understand intrastate conflict dynamics. Such conflicts are often
identity conflicts, in which there is mutual misrecognition between the conflict parties. In the
path towards conflict transformation, this misrecognition must be replaced by recognition.
Thick recognition is more than the official granting of rights and policies. It is rather about deep
acknowledgement and acceptance of differences. Key are empathy and an understanding of the
identity of the other. When such thick recognition is established, this can be the first step
towards conflict transformation. (Strömbom, 2014)
In obtaining thick recognition between conflict parties, it is important that self-transformation
and other-transformation go hand in hand. The way a conflict party sees the other, must align
with how the other sees himself. In this way, the identity of the other is recognised. Strömbom
(2014) argues that “it is important to emphasise that the aim is to accept and recognise
15
difference, rather than to achieve forced unification and joint narratives.” This also relates to the
interconnection between collective identity and commemorative narratives, as these form
understandings of history.
In order to obtain the ideal combination of ontological security and physical asecurity, there thus
needs to be a low level of anxiety and a low level of fear. This can be achieved through de-
securitisation processes followed by non-securitising meaning constitution and identity
transformation. What such processes need to look like exactly is not something I will address in
the rest of this dissertation. What I will focus on is a case-study of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.
Throughout Turkish history, there have been different government approaches to the Kurdish
issue. The different approaches will be looked at in the light of the theoretical framework laid
out in this chapter.
16
2. A historical background: collapse of the Ottoman Empire
This chapter provides a concise historical background of the Turkish state, by describing the last
decades of the Ottoman Period.
With regard to the Ottoman Period, it is important to note that minorities were recognised on
the basis of religion rather than ethnicity. The Kurds were part of the Muslim majority, and
within that majority, they had a great level of autonomy. Also, there was a lot of room for
diversity and difference during the Ottoman Empire in general. (Pusane, 2014)
In the beginning of the 20th century, there was a lot of instability in the Ottoman Empire. The
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 aimed at achieving democracy, which brought the Ottoman
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to power. Only some years after this uprising, the First
World War broke out in 1914. The CUP, during these years, worked on creating a more Turkish
identity as opposed to an Ottoman identity. They only started considering Turkish independence
as a feasible possibility towards the end of the First World War. The First World War ended with
the signing of the Mudros armistice in October 1918. (Hanioğlu, 2008)
After the armistice of Mudros was signed in October 1918, fighting continued. This would later
be called the Turkish War of Independence. The Allied forces violated the agreement in order to
gain power geopolitically. Ottoman leaders attempted to keep as much power as possible. The
CUP’s power in government was weakened because the cabinet resigned just before the
armistice of Mudros was signed. Meanwhile, civil society flourished and gained strength. Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, who would later become the first president of independent Turkey, started
organising a movement against the Allied occupation of the Ottoman Empire. He joined forces
with officers of the disarmed Ottoman army and local opposition movements that had been
formed directly at the end of the Great War. In 1920, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) of
Turkey was formed, with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its president. (Kayali, 2008)
17
During the Turkish War of Independence, the Kurds were afraid of a revenge from the
Armenians2, and preferred to be on good terms with the Turks. (Bozarslan, 2008) Many Kurds
supported Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his resistance against the international occupants, and the
Kemalist movement promised fraternity between Turks and Kurds. (Massicard, 2009)
Simultaneously, however, an independence movement emerged mostly focused around the
Society for Kurdish Elevation. There were negotiations with the Armenians to assure the future
independence of both Armenia and Kurdistan. The Sèvres Treaty of 1920 provided a good
possibility in this regard. (Bozarslan, 2008) The treaty stated that a “part of Anatolian Kurdistan
was to be recognised as the new state immediately” (Sèvres Treaty, 1920) and it stated that “if
within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the
areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in
such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence
from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such
independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to
execute such recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.” (Sèvres
Treaty, 1920)
The Sèvres Treaty, however, was rejected by notable Kurdish leaders (Bozarslan, 2008) and by
the GNA. The GNA opposed occupation of Ottoman territories by the Allied forces as well as
Kurdish attainment of territory. The signing of the Sèvres Treaty therefore caused more
opposition amongst Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers, as it was inherently opposing the
beliefs and ideas of the movement. (Kayali, 2008)
In the first period after the Sèvres Treaty was signed, there was quite some political unrest.
Different political centres were challenging each other. Also, several groups were standing up
against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s resistance movement. Rebels from the Koçgiri tribe in the
similarly named Koçgiri region where prominent in this. The Koçgiri region was more
2
Between 1894 and 1896, at least 100,000 Armenians were massacred. Also, the Kurds decided to occupy
many Armenian villages leaving the original inhabitants displaced. (Bozarslan, 2008)
18
economically underdeveloped than other Kurdish regions, and it was inhabited by Alevi
Muslims. When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Ankara government claimed that an independent
Kurdistan and related conditions in the Sèvres Treaty could not be realised, the rebels decided to
start a revolt (1921). The military reacted with force. Burning and plundering of villages took
place, and many civilians were either killed or forcedly displaced. Kemalist sources claim that
these events were a necessary reaction to the rebellion, but more critical sources argue that this
is part of the more widespread Kemalist policy of homogenisation. (Massicard, 2009)
19
3. The Kemalist era: 1923-1983
This chapter will give a historical overview of the first 60 years of Turkish independence. This
will be followed by a theoretical analysis.
4.1 The first years of Turkish independence
In 1922, the GNA voted on “a motion providing for the separation of the office of the sultanate
from the caliphate, and the abolition of the former.” (Kayali, 2008) This decision marked the end
of the Ottoman Empire. Ankara then sent a delegation to Lausanne for international negotiations
with the Allied forces. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk continued to silence opposition within its own
government, by organising new elections in 1923 and making sure they would not gain any
seats. In the same year the Lausanne treaty was signed and the borders of modern-day Turkey
were agreed upon. In comparison with the Sèvres agreement, Turkey had gained a lot from the
armed struggle. It was, however, subject to a certain level of international supervision under the
Lausanne Treaty. (Kayali, 2008) As part of the Lausanne Treaty, it was agreed that minority
status would be granted only to non-Muslim minorities. As the Kurds are Muslim, they are not
legally recognised as a minority in Turkey resulting from this treaty. (Polat, 2009)
By 1923, it had also become clear that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a strong policy of putting in
place a Turkish identity in which different religions and cultures were seen as a threat to the
existence of Turkey. The multiple identities that were once part of the Ottoman Empire now all
had to become Turkish citizens with one Turkish identity. The new Turkish state was to be
based on an identity of secularism, nationalism and unity. This was later to be called the
Kemalist ideology or Kemalism. (Bozarslan, 2008)
Existence of the caliphate had been a main reason for cooperation between the Kurds and the
Kemalist movement. Also, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had promised earlier that after the War of
Independence, southern Kurdistan would be liberated. This promise was not kept, however, as
the region was left to the British. This is where the alliance between the Kurds and the Kemalist
state ended. Following the end of this alliance, there were several revolts. In 1925 the Şeyh Said
20
revolt took place; in 1930 there was the Ararat revolt; and 1936-1938 were the years of the
Dersim revolt. (Bozarslan, 2008)
Armed forces reacted violently in order to suppress these revolts using methods such as the
destruction of villages, killing of civilians and forced displacement of entire populations. Co-
optation of tribal leaders was furthermore a commonly used strategy. The end of the Dersim
revolt in 1938 was followed by a long period of silence on the side of the Kurds. This was a result
of several factors. Firstly, there was strong policing and state coercion that kept down armed
conflict. Also, the Second World War started, and affected both Turkish and Kurdish-inhabited
areas. Thirdly, there was once again more political pluralism and the Kurdish elite was allowed a
way into Turkish politics as long as they subdued strong Kurdish nationalist discourse and
adopted a certain level of Kemalism. This led to more integrative policies. This period of silence
lasted until 1961. (Bozarslan, 2008)
4.2 Kemalist policies and identity formation
In 1935, Prime Minister Ismet Inönü published his Kurdish report. In this report, he stated that
“the situation in the province of Dersim (today’s Tunseli) was particularly critical, and there was
therefore a need to set up particularly in that province a rather repressive regime.” (Heper,
2007) He proposed putting in place civil servants in the region with wide powers. (Heper, 2007)
In more general terms, he suggested to put in place an assimilation policy. At the same time he
asked for a movement of Kurdish people from the east to the west, and a movement of Turks
from the Black Sea area eastwards. Investment and improvement of education facilities would,
according to him, be an incentive for Kurds to move closer to the Turkish identity and devote
themselves to the Turkish state. Also, in this period, the Turkish government spoke of the
Kurdish issue as a security issue thereby moving it out of the political arena and into the military
sphere. (Efegil, 2011)
Since the declaration of Turkish independence, the Turkish government followed a strong policy
of “assimilation, repression and containment” with regard to the Kurdish people. (Yeğen, 2015)
21
Bozarslan (2008) writes that the trajectory of the Kurdish issue has been determined by two
features: “the state’s denial of its existence; and the emergence of its radical challenge to the
state. Official state policy either denied the very existence of a distinct group called Kurds, or
presented the Kurds as a threat to Turkey and the Turks as a national entity.” On top of this,
Loizides (2008) describes an “absence of a culture of accommodation involving collective rights
for minorities in Turkey despite admittedly some progress on cultural rights for the Kurds in the
past decade.” Cavanaugh and Hughes (2015) write that “all public expressions and institutions of
Kurdish identity were banned along with Kurdish schools (madrassas), associations,
newspapers, and religious fraternal organisations were closed.”
Mills (2011) also writes that denial and ignorance of the Ottoman history was an important
strategy in creating a new Turkish identity. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG,
2016), the Turkish state and the PKK have both used their own different narrative in describing
the same history. According to Mills (2011), “the Ottoman legacy is much more than an
imagination of a local past; it is, rather, an ongoing dynamic intersection of global discourses,
local histories, and competing visions of the future.” Avedian (2012) mentions that it was mostly
nationalistic political actors who have influenced the formulation of modern-day Turkish history
as it is written in Turkish history books.
Abbas and Yigit (2016) argue that Kurdish nationalism arose simultaneously with Turkish
nationalism. After periods of strong repression of the Kurdish identity, the transition to political
pluralism in Turkey provided an opportunity for a Kurdish nationality to develop. Kurdish
media and political manifestations were main ways through which people developed their
Kurdish identity. One way of repressing the Kurds was through the forced displacement of
Kurds to Anatolia. (Abbas and Yigit, 2016)
According to Gunes (2013), the formation of a Kurdish national identity is a reaction to the
Turkish national identity which is based on Kemalism. He also speaks of “antagonistic relations
between the Kurds and Turkey.” Inherent to the Turkish nationalist discourse is the oppression
22
and assimilation of Kurds that are regarded as simply Turkish. The Kurdish reaction to this
discourse is the framing of their own national discourse, emphasising their distinct culture and
history of exploitation by the Turkish. As a result, the Kurds started regarding Kurdistan as an
occupied territory that could only be liberated by a “revolutionary movement led by the Kurdish
working class.” (Gunes, 2013)
The Kurdish minority have posed “the greatest threat to the creation of a homogeneous Turkish
nation-state.” Denial of existence of the Kurds has been a major strategy of the Turkish
government. Other policies were those of Turkification and assimilation. The Kemalist ideology
has been central in the creation of a Turkish common identity. Kurdish language and culture
have been criminalised. (Yildiz, 2012)
4.3 Increased Kurdish mobilisation
As mentioned before, the end of the Dersim revolt in 1938 set off a long period of silence on the
side of the Kurds. This period of silence lasted until 1961. (Bozarslan, 2008) In the 1960s, there
was increased Kurdish non-violent mobilisation due to Kurdish revolts in Iraq and a rise of left-
wing political activism in Turkey. As a reaction to this increased Kurdish mobilisation, the
Turkish state arrested Kurdish intellectuals and started a military offensive in Kurdish-inhabited
regions in 1968. Kurdish youth also increasingly started organising independently of the left-
wing movement, more strongly focusing on decolonisation of Turkish Kurdistan. In 1970, a new
organisation was formed called the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts (RECH). Initially, the
RECH was non-violent but when the Turkish left-wing movement started a guerrilla warfare
some militant factions started to develop in the RECH as well. (Bozarslan, 2008)
The Turkish military used force to silence the Kurdish movement. The state saw the Kurds “as an
ontological threat to its very existence, a threat that is capable of undermining the constructed
‘Turkish national’ bond between the Turkish state and society.” (Ercan, 2013)
Several military coups took place during these years. These coups always resulted from military
concerns about possible threats to state secularism. There were military coups in 1960 and
23
1980. Also, in 1971 there was a military memorandum, which is a softer type of military coup.
(Geri, 2016) In the military coup of 1971, several hundreds of Kurdish activists were captured
and tortured. They lost faith in the legal system and further radicalised while in prison. Kurdish
prisoners were released in 1974. In 1978, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was formed. The
PKK believed that violence was the only way of achieving an independent Kurdish state. This led
to increased violence and insecurity in Kurdish-inhabited areas. (Bozarslan, 2008) Military
action and repressive measures by the Turkish state have intensified civilian support for the
PKK. This thus means that the way that the Turkish government views the PKK influences their
own policies. These policies then influence the way that Kurdish people view the Turkish
government, and the way they view the PKK and its actions. (Unal, 2012)
Since 1971, four political parties have been abolished because they supposedly posed a threat to
state secularism. Also, 13 political parties have been abolished because they advocated
separatism thereby posing a threat to the state unity. The political parties that were abolished
for promoting separatism were pro-Kurdish political parties. (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015)
This shows how the Kemalist principles of secularism, nationalism and unity manifest
themselves in practice.
Ercan (2013) writes that “until the 1980s, the Turkish state’s deployed a strategy of containment
to deal with the Kurdish question, which included several elements: (1) denying the existence of
Kurds as a separate people and imposing severe policies of cultural assimilation, (2) silencing
Kurdish political actors advocating for collective rights, and (3) obstructing any attempts of
bringing the Kurdish question to the attention of the Turkish public.” He writes that on the one
hand, these harsh policies made sure that the Kurdish struggle was indeed contained. However,
as a result Kurds increasingly started supporting the PKK as a legitimate actor and started
seeing the Turkish government as illegitimate. The Turks, however, started to be radically
opposed to the Kurds and the PKK as a direct result of Turkish policies. (Ercan, 2013) This thus
created a polarisation and solidification of conflictual relations.
24
As mentioned above, there was a military coup in 1980. The military coup happened because of
concerns in the military about threats to state secularism and unity. The Turkish army took
control, and the country was ruled militarily until 1983. In that year, the military decided to
open up elections for a transition to democratic rule. The elections were, however, not
completely democratic. Many existing political parties were not allowed to participate in the
elections. In the end, only 3 parties were allowed to participate in the elections. One of these
parties was the newly established Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal. This is the party that
finally won the elections with 45% of the votes. (Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy, 2008)
4.4 Theoretical analysis
The rulers of the ‘new’ Turkey started creating an own Turkish identity for the new state. The
fact that a Turkish state had not existed before that meant that there was not yet a Turkish
identity. There was thus a high level of anxiety, which is a symptom of ontological insecurity. The
groundworks of the ‘new’ Turkey then were presented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He decided
that the Turkish state would be built upon secularism, nationalism and unity. The presentation
of these principles can itself be seen as a securitisation practice aiming to reduce anxieties,
create an identity and obtain ontological security. At the same time, this creates fears. These
fears were clearly directed at the Kurdish people who posed a threat to the established Turkish
identity of secularism, nationalism and unity. The fact that, as written in the Lausanne Treaty,
only non-Muslim minorities could gain minority status in Turkey is a clear policy aimed at
safeguarding the Turkish ontological security by silencing the Kurdish identity.
The fears created by the Turkish government were further fed through subsequent policies. As
mentioned in the earlier parts of this chapter, there was a period of relative silence from 1938
until 1961. This is a result of different factors. One factor is strong Turkish state policing and
repression. This is again a practice of securitisation. As a result of the policing and repression it
was difficult for the Kurds to destabilise the Kemalist state identity. Also, Kurdish politicians
were allowed into office as long as they subdued to a certain level of Kemalism. This thus means
25
that there was a slight recognition of the existence of the Kurds and that they could – to a certain
extent – express themselves and their concerns. During this period, it seems that the
securitisation policy of the Turkish government was strong enough to effectively repress the
Kurds and to stabilise the Turkish ontological security as well as the physical security.
The Kurdish revival after 1961 was again a challenge to the Turkish national identity. The
Turkish government once again turned ontological anxieties into fears through securitisation
policies. The Turkish government thus continued to put in place violent and repressive policies
towards the Kurds. The violence on the side of the Turkish state compromised the physical
security of the Kurds, which is argued to be a main reason why the Kurds increasingly supported
violent Kurdish organisations – mainly, the PKK. The PKK used violent methods and thereby
compromised Turkish physical security. It is thus clear that states of ontological security and
physical security influence one another. At this point in time, there was a situation of physical
insecurity for both the Turkish state and the Kurds. The Turkish state can be argued to have had
a relative state of ontological security, obtained through securitisation practices.
The abolishment of Islamist and (Kurdish) separatist political parties once again is a government
practice to safeguard the ontological security of the Turkish state and that compromises the
ontological security of the Kurds. It is a securitisation practice, as these political parties are
presented as a threat to the Turkish state and its principles of secularism, nationalism and unity.
26
4. Turgut Özal: 1983-1993
This chapter describes the period in which Turgut Özal ruled Turkey as leader of the Motherland
Party. A historical overview is followed by a theoretical analysis.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was a military coup in 1980. In this year, the
Turkish army took control and then ruled the country militarily until 1983. In 1983, the military
decided to open up general elections to start a transition to democratic rule. The general
elections were, however, not completely democratic. Many existing political parties were not
allowed to participate in the elections. In the end, only 3 parties were allowed to participate in
the elections. One of these parties was the newly established Motherland Party led by Turgut
Özal. This is the party that finally won the elections with 45% of the votes. (Aydin-Düzgit and
Gürsoy, 2008) Turgut Özal was then prime minister from 1983-1989 and president from 1989-
1993. (Al Qurtuby, 2015)
4.1 Özal as a ruler
For Özal, the Islam was very important. For his time, Özal was considered a modern Muslim as
he drank, smoked and showed affection in public. His idealism and drive stemmed from religion,
but the way he tried to achieve his goals was mostly secular. During his term as president, he
didn’t put in place any specifically beneficial policies for Islamist people. He was against political
Islam, and strongly subscribed to science and rational knowledge. He was a follower of more
moderate Islamist intellectuals, amongst whom Gülen. (Heper, 2013)
It is argued that Özal made significant contributions to further development of democracy and
consensual politics3 in Turkey. (Heper, 2013) Özal did not want to use or fit into the traditional
categories of left-wing and right-wing, although he was considered centre-right by others. He
wanted to be innovative, break taboos and move the country forward. Because of this, he could
talk with people from many different ideological backgrounds. (Çandar, 2013) However, at some
3His party, in the beginning, aimed to unite people from the center-right, center-left, the ultra-nationalists
and the Islamists. (Heper, 2013)
27
point (when he became prime minister and later president) he started focusing more on one-
person rule. He wanted to take all decisions himself. (Heper, 2013)
Özal’s main goal as a president was to liberalise the Turkish economy, so to do away with the
protectionist economic policies. (Heper, 2013) Özal believed that economic liberalism and
political democracy are results of the same political process and developments in society.
Economic individualism and independence create more possibilities to defend one’s own
political rights. (Özal, 1987) Also, he wanted to challenge the active secularism that prohibited
people from publicly practicing their religion, to increase religious freedom and create a “passive
laicism.” (Heper, 2013) He tried to combine Islamist cultural values with Western economic
development. (Heper, 2013) During the time of Özal’s rule, many policies were put in place that
led to economic development. Some of these policies were the liberalisation of foreign trade and
policies aimed at establishing a realistic exchange rate and a positive interest rate. (Özal, 1987)
4.2 Özal and the Kurds
On the Kurdish issue - which was a real taboo at the time (and maybe still) – Özal’s opinion was
that “all possible solutions to deal with that problem, including federalism, should be freely
debated.” (Heper, 2013) For Özal, “the Kurdish question was first and foremost a matter of
humanity and conscience.” (Çandar, 2013) Özal wanted to implement social, political and
cultural rather than military policies, and he didn’t frame his policies within public security
concerns. (Efegil, 2011) Abramowitz (2013) – a former US ambassador to Turkey during the
time of Özal’s rule – observed that Özal “was also preoccupied with the Kurdish problem and
recognised the inherent existential problem created by the denial of Kurdish identity in Turkey.
Here too he was the first Turkish leader to begin to seriously address the problem, which also
made the military and other nationalists more suspicious of him.”
Özal made steps away from the policy of assimilation, repression and containment towards
acknowledgement of the Kurdish identity. He advocated for peaceful, non-violent approaches
and dialogue with regard to the Kurdish question. He tried to restore relations between the
28
Turks and Kurds. His policies were less Kemalist than policies implemented by earlier
governments. He brought the Kurds and Turks closer together, but also caused great division
within the Turkish elite with regard to the issue. (Al Qurtuby, 2015) Özal did not only implement
accommodative policies towards the Kurds, however.
The PKK – officially established in 1978 – started fighting in 1984, one year after the election of
Özal’s Motherland Party. The Turkish government, as a reaction, established so-called ‘village
guards’. These village guards consisted of local Kurdish groups that then had to fight the PKK.
(Ercan, 2013) Starting in 1990, it became more and more common to openly support the PKK
and express Kurdish identity claims. The Kurdish movement became increasingly vocal. (Gunes,
2013) One way in which this manifested itself was the creation of a legal pro-Kurdish political
party in 1990, which entered into parliament in 1991. (Ercan, 2013) Next to this, there were
several uprisings between 1990 and 1993. Many Kurdish people participated in these uprisings
in eastern Turkey, and they were confronted by the police. There was heavy fighting. (Gunes,
2013) Ercan (2013) also writes that the heaviest period of fighting took place in 1991 until
1995.
Even though Özal openly acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish identity and allowed for the
establishment of a pro-Kurdish political party, he also passed the Law to Fight Terrorism (Act
no. 3713) in 1991. This law officially defined ‘terrorism’ as a crime and - as Bjorkheim (2013)
writes – “the fight for Kurdish cultural rights were effectively defined as ‘terrorist’ acts.”
The listing of the PKK as a terrorist group has legal implications. Even when a group is
recognised internationally to fight for self-determination, once it is listed as a terrorist group the
law of armed conflict does not apply anymore. In the definition of terrorist organisation, there is
no room for the political reasons for certain actions. Sentas (2015) argues, therefore, that law
should be seen as a political practice. The goal of listing then is to delegitimise support for the
listed group. Listing aims to disrupt the social relations that allow for the self-organisation of a
Kurdish movement aiming for self-determination. Listing thus leads to the absolute de-
29
politicisation of armed conflict and undermines emancipatory forms of conflict transformation.
This fits within the broader Turkish policy of containment of the Kurdish issue. (Sentas, 2015)
At the end of 1991, Özal legalised public use of the Kurdish language. According to him, past
repressive policies against the Kurds were a mistake. In 1992, Özal granted amnesty to some
Turkish Kurds, and he started more structured negotiations with the PKK. He was respected by
Turkish Kurds which was one of the main reasons why Öcalan was open for negotiations with
him. Possibly as a reaction to this accommodative approach on the side of the Turkish
government, Öcalan declared that he was open for reaching a diplomatic solution instead of
secession for the Kurds. (Al Qurtuby, 2015) In 1991, the PKK officially decided that a federalist
solution to the Kurdish question was acceptable for them. Özal argued already in 1992 that it
was important to involve the PKK in the political process. (Abbas and Yigit, 2016) At the same
time, Özal started secret negotiations with Iraqi Kurdish leaders. (Pusane, 2014)
One step back in the relationship between the Turks and the Kurds is the incident around the
Nevruz celebrations. Nevruz is originally a Persian/Iranian New Year’s celebration, that
celebrates the arrival of Spring around the 21st of March. Since the 1980’s, Nevruz has also been
associated with Kurdish culture. In 1991, the Turkish government decided to introduce Nevruz
as a Turkish national holiday. Hereby, it took over this cultural practice from the Kurds, taking
away the cultural meaning it had for the Kurds. (Yanik, 2006) This led to violent clashes, in
which many people died. Öcalan and the Kurds were of the opinion that the previous
accommodative policies were only a show but not a practical reality. (Al Qurtuby, 2015)
Later, on March 16th 1993, Özal managed to achieve the first-ever ceasefire with the PKK. The
PKK declared to be willing to cooperate on achieving a political solution. A month later, the
ceasefire was renewed unconditionally and for an indefinite period of time. Öcalan once again
declared his willingness to work on achieving a political solution. He stated that “the Kurds in
Turkey want peace, dialogue, and free political action within the framework of a democratic
Turkish state.” (Al Qurtuby, 2015) Özal died a day after this declaration, and the cause of his
30
death was unclear for a long time. Some speculate that the military killed him because they did
not agree with his reconciliatory policies. (Al Qurtuby, 2015) In 2012, additional research
proved that Özal’s body had been poisoned. (Butler, 2012) Still, it remained unclear by whom he
had been poisoned. A court case followed against former General Levent Ersoz, as he was
suspected to be responsible for poisoning Özal. He was, however, not judged guilty. (Cevik,
2013)
The ceasefire ended quickly after this, and the next period was the most violent one in the entire
Kurdish conflict. (Çandar, 2013) Following leaders returned to Kemalist and military approaches
to the Kurdish issue. Kurdish people as well as people in favour of reconciliation were
imprisoned. (Al Qurtuby, 2015) After the death of Özal, the Turkish government returned to
Kurdish repression that was harsher than ever before. (Yeğen, 2015)
The military coup and subsequent 3-year long military rule is an extreme example of
securitisation. The military coup happened because of concerns in the military about threats to
state secularism and unity. Resulting anxieties were turned into fears of these threats, that were
to be countered through military rule. It must be noted that this was of course not a government
policy, but one specifically of the military. This demonstrates the fact that the state and the
military are two different institutions, with different identities and that can therefore challenge
one another’s ontological security. Even though the state might - depending on the government
in power - take small steps away from the strong Kemalist ideology, this ideology is still deeply
ingrained in the military identity. Just like the 3-year long military rule should be seen as a
securitisation practice, the transition to a democratic government that occurred in 1983 is to be
seen as a de-securitisation process. However, it is a de-securitisation process only to a limited
extent as the military had strong control over the parties that were able to participate in the
elections.
31
As mentioned before, Özal was a Muslim but he tried to obtain his political goals in a secular
way. One of his political goals, however, was to challenge the active secularism that prohibited
people from publicly practicing their religion, to increase religious freedom and create a “passive
laicism.” (Heper, 2013) Özal thus tried to challenge and partly change the existing state identity
of strong secularism. His aim was to take away the image of religion as a threat to the state. By
taking away this perceived threat or fear, he would create anxiety instead. As explained in the
theory chapter, this de-securitisation and removal of fears is a first step towards reaching the
ideal situation that combines ontological security with physical asecurity.
General democratisation processes combined with economic liberalisation started off during
this period should also be seen as de-securitisation processes. As stated, Özal believed that
economic individualism and independence creates more possibilities to defend one’s own
political rights. Such democratisation for example led to the entering into parliament of a legal
Kurdish political party in 1991.
Özal’s general attitude towards and approach to the Kurdish issue was different from
approaches of previous governments. Özal “recognised the inherent existential problem created
by the denial of Kurdish identity in Turkey”. (Abramowitz, 2013) This means that Özal
understood that the Kurds also had a need for ontological security, and that this ontological
security was compromised by the repressive Turkish government policies. Özal understood that
there was a need for other type of policies that would not be such a challenge to the Kurdish
ontological security, and that would not in the end lead to violence against the Turkish state.
Özal didn’t frame his policies within public security concerns. He rather looked at the issue from
a humanist perspective. He believed that the Kurdish issue should not be addressed through
military policies but rather through the political, cultural and social policies that have been
described. This therefore indicates a de-securitisation process. By not looking at the issue as a
security threat, he took away the fears thereby moving towards a situation of physical asecurity.
The anxieties on the side of the state were addressed through the new narrative that Özal used.
32
This was the narrative focusing on liberal economy, western principles, more openness to
religion and to other cultures such as the Kurdish one.
The approach that was taken by Özal led to suspicion on the side of the military. As mentioned
above, the military and the state are clearly two different entities with different identities. The
military strongly adheres to a Kemalist identity based on secularism, nationalism and unity. The
process of identity transformation of the Turkish state started by Özal challenged these
principles and therefore created anxieties on the side of the military. It compromised their
ontological security. Özal’s possible assassination fits within this military practice of
securitisation.
Özal had a two-fold policy with on the one hand an accommodative approach, but also several
fear-based policies have been implemented during the period of Özal’s rule. The Turkish
government was thus still addressing fears. It is possible that these fears were pre-existing fears
resulting from previous periods when there were many more securitisation practices. Özal’s de-
securitisation practices, in this case, haven’t been sufficient to turn all fears into anxieties. The
case of the Nevruz celebrations is especially illustrative of securitisation. Existing anxieties on
the side of the Turkish state were turned into fears of the Nevruz celebrations as a threat to
Turkish culture. The policy of taking over the celebrations and making it something Turkish took
away this threat.
33
5. A return to Kemalism: 1993 – 2002
This chapter describes the period from 1993 until 2002, in which there were different
governments. An overview of developments in this period will be followed by a theoretical
analysis.
5.1 A return to restrictive policies
After the death of Özal, the Turkish government held new elections. During the period described
in this chapter, there were many different ruling governments that all were in power for
relatively short periods.4 These governments were minority governments and coalitions. This
chapter describes the period until 2002, when the AKP party led by Erdoğan came to power.
(Pusane, 2014)
During the period after Özal’s death, successive governments returned to more restrictive
policies with regard to the Kurds. Such policies were the “intensification of cross-border
operations into northern Iraq, increased village evacuations in the Southeast, and extrajudicial
killings conducted or tolerated by the security forces.” (Pusane, 2014)
As mentioned before, the Kurds had formed a legal political party 1990, that entered into
parliament in 1991. In 1994, however, Kurdish members of parliament were put in prison by the
military as they were regarded a threat to the unity of the Turkish state. This happened right
after the PKK had decided in 1993 to put in place a ceasefire as an effort towards peace. (Ercan,
2013) The military was not open for this reconciliatory approach, and Kurds as well as non-
Kurdish people openly in favour of reconciliation were put into prison. (Al Qurtuby, 2015)
In 1996, the first pro-Islamic government came to power since 1923. It was a government led by
the Welfare Party. The Welfare Party is the precursor of what would later become the AKP.
4
Çiller government (25-6-1993 until 15-10-1995), Çiller government (15-10-1995 until 5-11-1995), Çiller
government (5-11-1995 until 12-3-1996), Yilmaz government (12-3-1996 until 8-7-1996), Erbakan government
(8-7-1996 until 30-6-1997), Yilmaz government (30-6-1997 until 11-1-1999), Ecevit government (11-1-1999 until
28-5-1999), Ecevit government (18-5-1999 until 18-11-2002). (Turkish Politics & Elections, n.d.)
34
Erdoğan was the party leader. The Welfare Party and Erdoğan were openly Islamist and
challenged state secularism. The military indeed saw this government as a threat to state
secularism. As a reaction, the military initiated the so-called post-modern coup on 28 February
1997. This was a soft coup, that involved a campaign against the government that was then led
by the Welfare Party. (Polat, 2009)
In April of the same year, the National Security Policy Document – a document stemming from
the military – referred to Kurdish separatism and reactionary Islam as “the most important
threats to national security.” (Polat, 2009) It was written in the document that “internal threats
against the territorial integrity of the country and the founding principles of the Republic have
become graver than external threats of military intervention.” (Polat, 2009) Interesting in this
respect is also the way in which citizens view the military and how much they trust it as a state
institution. Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1999 and 2004 show that the
military was the most trusted state institution by citizens. (Polat, 2009)
In December 1997, Erdoğan – leader of the Welfare Party and at the time mayor of Istanbul –
held a public address in Siirt. At this public address, he recited part of a religious poem by Ziya
Gökalp5. Erdoğan did not exactly recite the entire poem as it was once written. Instead, he
replaced the first part of the original poem – which is a part that aims to strengthen the military
morale – by a religious stanza. The sentence he recited was: “The minarets are our bayonets, the
domes our helmets, the mosques our barracks and the faithful our soldiers.” (Sebnem, 2003) The
rest of the recital was identical to the original poem.6 One year after this recital, in 1998,
Erdoğan was convicted for reciting this poem with a special focus on the part that he replaced.
(Sebnem, 2003) He received a jail sentence of 10 months. (Heper, 2013)
5
Ziya Gökalp was a “Turkish sociologist and political activist” who lived from 1876 until 1924. Dressler (2015)
writes that “Gökalp strove for a social and political order in which religious norms and modern institutions
complemented each other harmoniously.” Gökalp was also a poet. (Dressler, 2015)
6
The entire poem, as written by Ziya Gökalp, can be found in the Appendices. Appendix 1 contains the original
poem in English, and Appendix 2 contains the original poem in Turkish. Please note that Erdoğan replaced the
first verse of the original poem with the sentence: “The minarets are our bayonets, the domes our helmets, the
mosques our barracks and the faithful our soldiers.” (Sebnem, 2003)
35
Also in 1998, Erdoğan’s Welfare Party was banned as it was not secular enough. (Cavanaugh and
Hughes, 2015) After this, Islamist parties were banned from Turkish politics until 2002. (Geri,
2016) A new party that stemmed from the Welfare Party was the Virtue Party. This party was,
however, also quickly banned. The Welfare Party and Virtue Party are predecessor parties of the
AKP. (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015)
In 1998, Öcalan – the leader of the PKK who was at the time hiding from Turkish security forces
in Syria - rejected separation but underlined the importance of true democracy. In exchange for
dropping the claims for a separate state, Öcalan demanded “the recognition of the Kurdish
identity, practising cultural rights, the right to have education in Kurdish, and the lifting of
Emergency Rule and the village guard system.” The Turkish military, however, was still in favour
of a more military approach instead of reconciliatory policies. (Al Qurtuby, 2015) At the start of
1999, the Turkish government managed to convince the Syrian government to expel Öcalan.
After this happened, Turkish security forces managed to capture Öcalan who was on the run in
Kenya. (Pusane, 2014) Some months after being captured, there was a court case against Öcalan.
During his defence, Öcalan redefined the goal of the Kurdish movement.7 Like Ercan (2013)
writes, “the movement restructured its ideological and political orientation and started more
centrally organising in the legal field and civil society for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.” In
line with this redefined goal, the biggest part of the Kurdish militia stopped fighting. However,
the Turkish army kept fighting. In fact, after Öcalan’s capture, military violence intensified.
(Ercan, 2013)
7
Since this event, the official goal of the Kurdish movement is to achieve democratic confederalism. Öcalan
(2011) describes this as “non-state political administration or a democracy without a state.” He has written that
“democratic confederalism is open towards other political groups and factions. It is flexible, multi-cultural, anti-
monopolistic, and consensus-oriented. Ecology and feminism are central pillars. In the frame of this kind of self-
administration an alternative economy will become necessary, which increases the resources of the society
instead of exploiting them and thus does justice to the manifold needs of the society.” (Öcalan, 2011)
Democratic confederalism is in contrast with the political organisation of nation-states. Öcalan (2011) argues
that “neither total rejection nor complete recognition of the state is useful for the democratic efforts of the
civil society. The overcoming of the state, particularly the nation-state, is a long-term process. The state will be
overcome when democratic confederalism has proved its problem-solving capacities with a view to social
issues.” Therefore, the goal is not to pose a direct challenge to the nation-state but rather to develop
democratic confederalism within the current nation-state system to slowly overcome the system.
36
Also in 1999, Turkey was officially accepted as a candidate for EU accession. In order for
accession negotiations to be initiated, the country still had to fulfil certain criteria. Such criteria
were “a gradual ending of the emergency rule in the Southeast, allowing television and radio
broadcasts in Kurdish, making Kurdish language training possible, and removing the death
penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code.” (Pusane, 2014) These policies, as well as the policy of
facilitating return of displaced Kurds to their villages, were initiated from 1999 until 2005 when
the accession negotiations were started. (Pusane, 2014) According to Polat (2009), there was at
the time a perfect storm. She has written that the post-modern military coup in 1997, the
capture of Öcalan in 1999, and the official acceptance of Turkey as an EU accession country in
1999 have created conditions for de-securitisation. She argues that in the aftermath of these
events there were more open discussions on the re-definition of national security and about
accommodative policies towards minorities such as legalising headscarves and use of the
Kurdish language. (Polat, 2009) These are the circumstances with which Turkey would then
continue to move into the 21st century, the century of AKP leadership.
As described in the previous part of this chapter, this period is characterised by a return to more
restrictive policies towards the Kurds. It can, again, be seen that the Kurdish movement was
portrayed as a threat to the unity of the Turkish state. A clear example of this is the
imprisonment of Kurdish members of parliament. Kurdish identity claims and statements about
separatism by members of parliament created anxieties for the Turkish state, and therefore led
to ontological insecurity. Through securitisation, these anxieties were replaced by fears, as the
Kurdish parliament members and their ideas were presented as a threat to the Turkish state.
This could then be solved through the imprisonment of these members of parliament. Violent
policies by Turkish security forces should furthermore be seen as an extension of these fear-
based and securitised policies. These policies served to safeguard the ontological security of the
Turkish state, but violent policies undermined its physical security.
37
During this period in Turkish history, there were also many developments around the principle
of the secular state. The first pro-Islamist government created anxieties with the military. After
this, the military turned these anxieties into fears through securitisation. The Islam was
presented as a threat to the Turkish state and the principle of secularism. The Welfare Party was
presented as the embodiment of this threat. The military coup – even though it was ‘only’ a soft
coup – was a strongly securitising move. The imprisonment of Erdoğan was also a way of
securitising other voices that represented non-secular viewpoints. The moment that the Welfare
Party was banned and Islamist parties in general were banned from Turkish politics is one more
example of a securitisation policy, that secured the ontological security of the Turkish state.
38
6. Erdoğan and the AKP: 2002-now
This chapter will give an overview of developments under AKP rule. This overview will be
followed by a theoretical analysis.
6.1 An introduction to Erdoğan and the AKP
Erdoğan founded the Justice and Development Party in 2001, one year before the general
elections of 2002. Erdoğan could not directly become prime minister after winning the elections
in 2002, as a result of the jail sentence he had received some years earlier. He became prime
minister in 2003.8 (Heper, 2013) Erdoğan was prime minister from 2003 until 2014, when he
was elected as president. It was not allowed to be member of a party while being president so he
had to put down AKP leadership.9 (Geri, 2016)
Just like Özal, Erdoğan has an Islamist background – and so does the Justice and Development
Party. Erdoğan is religious. He adheres to Sufism, which is a current within the Islam that is
strongly self-focused. Sufism does not ask of its followers to convince others to become religious.
Accordingly, Erdoğan claims to be in favour of a secular state. Erdoğan, in the first period of AKP
rule, was described as a ruler with a basic respect for democracy. He found it important that
everyone could express their views. Erdoğan had a “non-ethnic approach to nationalism.”
(Heper, 2013) Heper (2013) writes that “according to him, all ethnic groups, including the Kurds
and Turks, should be able to freely express their secondary ethnic identities, and, at the same
time, take the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey as the primary identity of all ethnic groups.”
(Heper, 2013)
While attaching great importance to democracy and having an open approach to other cultures,
the AKP is also conservative and has a strong focus on stability. This becomes clear from what
8
The AKP-party had, by that time, made a constitutional change so that previously convicted people were once
again allowed to become Prime Minister. (Ercetin and de Graaf, 2017)
9
This changed since the referendum of 2017, which was a successful referendum for the ‘yes’ camp. This
referendum aimed to enlarge the powers of the President. Some amendments – among many more - were to
abolish the prime ministry, for the president to replace the prime minister as executive and for the president to
be able to be chairman of a party. (Gungen and Bag, 2017)
39
has been written in the first party programme: “It is necessary to avoid … revolutionary change.
Common-sense should substitute both the rationalism and the revolutionary change. Ideals are
important; yet they should be balanced with other equally important considerations… It is
necessary to avoid being against any kind of change. Everything that existed today cannot be
inappropriate, for they have developed through long centuries of trial and error. Tradition is
significant not because it is related to the past, but because it is a carrier of past experience and
wisdom. However, a nostalgic approach to tradition should be avoided.” (Heper, 2013)
6.2 Developments in the first period of AKP rule
In 2005, prime minister Erdoğan gave a speech in Diyarbakir in which he spoke of the
importance of giving more democratic rights to Kurdish people. (Efegil, 2011) During this
speech, Erdoğan recognised that Turkey had “a Kurdish ‘problem’, a problem that would be
“solved through democracy.” (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015) Also, he said that “the state had
made mistakes in regard to the Kurdish issue.” (Polat, 2009) Dalay (2014) explains that “coming
from an Islamic background, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) elites have had
a partial revisionist policy: they do not see Turkishness, secularism, and Western-orientation as
the primary foundations of Turkey’s identity nor do they see the Middle East, Islamism, and
arguably Kurdishness as a threat.” This focus on cultural pluralism made that Kurdish cultural
and identity claims were seen as reasonable, and as something to address in the political rather
than military sphere. The AKP saw the Islam as a bridging factor between Turks and Kurds. As
Pusane (2014) writes: “According to the AKP, granting cultural rights to the Kurds was not a
step that would impair national unity. Rather, cultural pluralism and social diversity would act
as a connective ingredient in Turkey and bring further richness to the society.” One could say
that the AKP’s approach to the Kurds had led to a normalisation of the Kurdish issue.
(Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015)
During the first period of AKP leadership, several accommodative policies towards the Kurds
have been implemented. For example, it was decided that broadcasting and education – to a
40
limited extent - should be allowed in the mother tongue. (Akdağ, 2016; Geri, 2016) Also, it was
decided that the emergency rule would be lifted in 13 Kurdish provinces. These policies were
implemented in 2004. Furthermore, amendments have been made to release former Kurdish
members of parliament from prison and the ban on Kurdish has been lifted. (Akdağ, 2016) The
Turkish government decided to change town-names in Kurdish regions back to their original
Kurdish names. (Efegil, 2011) The Qur’an was translated into Kurdish and the Nevruz
celebrations were recognised as being Kurdish celebrations. (Al Qurtuby, 2015)
The EU accession process has played an important role in the move towards more
accommodative policies. In order to be able to continue with the actual accession negotiations,
Turkey had to implement certain policies. Such EU demands were, for example, to “eliminate the
practice of torture and ill-treatment, extend the freedom of expression and association, amend
the broadcasting law to allow for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish by public and
private radio and television stations, and permit the granting of Kurdish names to children.”
(Pusane, 2014) Also, the EU wanted Turkey to abolish State Security Courts. (Cavanaugh and
Hughes, 2015) These policies have forced Turkey to look at the Kurdish issue mainly from a
perspective of rights and freedoms, instead of from the perspective of national security. Also, as
a result of the EU accession process, the decision-making power of the political elite has been
enhanced in order to limit the power of the military and enhance democracy. Also, development
of civil society has been stimulated. (Polat, 2009)
These accommodative governmental policies have caused some reaction from the state. This
reaction focuses on too accommodative policies as being a threat to state unity, and at the same
time referring to the Islamist AKP as a threat to the secular state. Cavanaugh and Hughes (2015)
write that “by labelling political parties as ‘Islamist’, the Turkish state engaged the Constitution
and the Constitutional Court in regulating democratic self-defense and gave legitimacy to
preventative state measures. These measures also served to marginalise communities (religious,
minority, left) who did not fit within the prescribed Turkish identity.” Also, the nationalist
sentiment has increased since 2005, as some people have the feeling that the EU accession
41
process is a threat to Turkish unity. 2005 is the year in which all criteria were fulfilled for
Turkey to be able to actually start accession negotiations. (Polat, 2009)
From 2004 onwards, PKK violence increased. (Pusane, 2014) On top of this, in the running-up to
the 2007 elections, the AKP slowed down its reformative policies. Next to the higher amount of
PKK attacks, there were also suspicions that the AKP had a secret agenda of promoting Islamism.
The existing government presented Abdullah Gül as the new nominee for the planned November
elections, which led to protests as he was seen as threat to state secularism. Actually, the
Islamist focus of the AKP has intensified since 2005. This is because the government decided in
that year to put more focus on developing stable and peaceful relations with its Islamist
neighbours. (Polat, 2009) Polat (2009) has written that “the President, the Constitutional Court,
the CHP10 and the Army all contributed to the securitisation of the presidential election by
consistently claiming that the government’s candidate was a threat to the secular regime.” There
were many demonstrations aiming to show support for state secularism. This led to the decision
to hold the general elections in July, 4 months ahead of plan. During the election campaigns,
almost all parties (except for leftist ones) used nationalist language and arguments with regard
to the Kurdish issue in order to gain votes from the nationalist citizens. (Polat, 2009) The AKP
also started using more harsh rhetoric regarding the Kurds. (Pusane, 2014) Finally, the AKP won
the general election with 47% of the votes. (Polat, 2009)
6.3 The Democratic Opening
In October 2007, the government decided to take military action in Northern Iraq at PKK camps.
Erdoğan simultaneously invested more money in socio-economic development of southeast
Turkey, and allowed 100% Kurdish broadcasting on one TV channel. The AKP also wanted to
allow headscarves in university, but this was overruled by the constitutional court. (Polat, 2009)
After this incident the AKP was almost banned, as it did not adhere to the constitutional
10
The CHP is the Republican People’s Party which was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. (Gülmez, 2013)
42
principle of secularism. In the end, it only received a financial penalty. (Cavanaugh and Hughes,
2015)
From 2002 until 2007, the AKP had ruled without confronting the power of the military or the
judiciary. After gaining more seats in the 2007 election, the AKP started being more critical. It
wanted to rewrite the constitution to make it more of a civilian document, as the previous one
had been written by the military in 1982. (Geri, 2016)
In line with this idea, the AKP also wanted to dedicate more energy into solving the Kurdish
issue. It presented a policy in 2009 called the Democratic Opening. The goal of this policy was to
find a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish conflict and disarm the PKK. (Pusane, 2014) The AKP
government wanted to tackle the problem through socio-economic development on the one
hand and by disarming the PKK (counter-terrorism) on the other hand. Socio-economic
development was a short-term policy while the disarmament of the PKK was a long-term policy.
(Efegil, 2011) The exact content of this policy was never completely clear but it is generally
understood as including practices such as “restoring the original Kurdish names of certain cities
in the Southeast, allowing elective Kurdish courses at schools, granting an amnesty to the PKK
militants, and eventually amending the constitution in order to redefine the concept of Turkish
citizenship.” (Pusane, 2014)
The military, however, still looks at the Kurdish issue as an issue of national security. The
military regards it as terrorism. From the military perspective, the constitution must not be
changed. 2 things should be sufficient namely to guarantee individual rights and freedom and to
strengthen socio-economic conditions. (Efegil, 2011) Al Qurtuby (2015) has written that
according to the army, “the use of Kurdish language in private and on national television is
viewed to be a violation towards the existing Turkish constitution which only grants Turkish as
the language of Turkish citizens. Granting any such constitutional right means give PKK a path to
separatism. Constitutional rights, the army believes, will lead first to claims for autonomy and
43
then federation, and finally separation.” This is an explanation for the military approach to the
Kurdish issue.
The Democratic Opening policy is generally regarded as a failed policy. Firstly, the AKP did not
want to recognise and incorporate the pro-Kurdish party and Öcalan in the peace negotiations,
despite their popularity amongst Kurdish people. (Akdağ, 2016) Also, the pro-Kurdish party
Democratic Society Party (DTP) was banned in 2009. Many party members as well as regional
Kurdish politicians have been arrested. (Çiçek, 2011) In October 2009, a group of PKK militants
arrived from an Iraqi refugee camp as part of the Habur process, as the first ones of a long
process of disarmament. However, this went different than envisaged by the AKP as the
militants arrived in guerrilla clothes and stated that they felt no remorse for their actions.
(Pusane, 2014) Finally, many negative reactions have come concerning the Democratic Opening
policy from the Turkish electorate, making the AKP unwilling to continue with the
implementation of the policy, at least until the elections of 2011. (Akdağ, 2016)
The AKP has even declared that “Kurdish education, the general amnesty and constitutional
changes … are not on their agenda”. (Polat, 2009) The AKP has thus quickly returned to a more
Kemalist approach to the Kurds. It is true that, since the foundation of the AKP, one very
important aspect of Kemalism has always been present in the AKP ideology; namely nationalism.
Kemalist powers have used the Democratic Opening to criticise the AKP, and the AKP has not
shown the political courage to fully continue with it and to enhance their promised policies.
(Polat, 2009)
Çiçek (2011) writes that “the rise of pro-Kurdish politics both within Turkey and Iraq has nearly
closed the door on the sustainability of the traditional security policy. However, the AKP’s
Turkish nationalist ideological-political character, the lack of the deep democratic values in the
political tradition of neoliberal pro-Islamic politics and its weak administrative capacity about
the Kurdish issue have prevented it from going beyond the traditional national security policy to
solve the Kurdish issue and to disarm the PKK.”
44
6.4 The nationalist turn
During the election campaign for the 2011 elections, the AKP took a nationalist approach to the
Kurdish issue, possibly to try and obtain the nationalist votes. Erdoğan even stated that “there is
no Kurdish problem but Kurds have problems in Turkey.” (Akdağ, 2016) After the election in
2011, the AKP realised it could further increase its own power and minimise the say of other
parties. It decided to postpone the constitutional writing process to wait for a moment with less
opposition, expecting to gain more seats in the 2015 elections. However, in the 2015 elections,
the pro-Kurdish HDP was very successful and the AKP lost seats. This can be seen as the turning
point in the AKP approach towards the Kurdish issue. (Geri, 2016) Ercan (2013) also writes that
“the AKP’s democratisation discourse and dialogue with the PKK continued until it took the
army and other elements of Kemalist bureaucracy under its tight control in 2011. Although
Turkish liberals hoped that the control of the army would help to solve the Kurdish issue
peacefully, the AKP disappointed them by resorting to an increasingly authoritarian Kurdish
policy after it won its fight with the army.” Turkish policies towards the Kurds became
increasingly nationalistic after this event. It is possible that the military identity has co-opted the
previous state identity created by the ruling government. The AKP has stated that it is against
the adoption of Kurdish as one of the official state languages, and also does not want to make a
constitutional change guaranteeing the collective rights of any minority group. (Efegil, 2011)
After this switch, the AKP has obstructed the pro-Kurdish HDP party and has targeted human
rights organisations, bar organisations, academics, the press and activists. Furthermore, “the
AKP today says that there is a terrorist problem, not a Kurdish problem, in Turkey.” (Geri, 2016)
The fact that the PKK is seen as a terrorist organisation, is part of the reason why there is still a
lot of mistrust between the Turkish government and the PKK. PKK members complain that the
Turkish government doesn’t recognise them. Turkish citizens, on the other hand, are sceptic
about a possible peace deal because they see the PKK as a terrorist organisation and not a
partner for peace. (ICG, 2014) It is thus clear that this policy leads to more polarisation. It again
has to do with a lack of recognition of the Kurdish issue. Ercan (2013) describes the
45
characterisation of the PKK as a terrorist group as “an effective discourse of terrorism to
obstruct the visibility and diffusion of Kurdish grievances and demands”. This discourse thus
brings with it a lack of recognition of the Kurdish people and the root causes of the Kurdish
issue.
There is hardly any scholarly analysis of developments in recent years. However, it is at least
useful to mention these developments shortly. In 2013, there were the Gezi protests. These
protests started off as a protest against reconstructions in the Gezi-park in Istanbul, but they
transformed into huge protests against the increasingly authoritarian leadership of President
Erdoğan. More than 10,000 Turkish people went onto the streets. Because of harsh police
reactions, more than 2000 protestors were wounded and 9 people died. After this, institutions
that posed criticisms on Erdoğan’s government were put under strong pressure. This pressure
existed of fines, as well as the abolishment of these organisations and the firing of people.
(Gulsah and de Graaf, 2017)
Relations with the EU have deteriorated. However, in 2016, the EU made the well-known
refugee deal as part of which Turkey receives EU funds to host migrants. In 2016, there were
several terrorist attacks in Turkey. On the 15th of July, there was an attempted military coup. The
military did not succeed, but many people have died and been wounded. (Gulsah and de Graaf,
2017)
In the beginning of 2017, there was a referendum in Turkey that aimed and succeeded in
granting more powers to the president. The results of the referendum were controversial, as
there are rumours that the campaigning process was unfair. The relationship between Turkey
and the EU has cooled down, and Turkey has declared it doesn’t need Europe anymore. The door
is still open for trade, however. (Gulsah and de Graaf, 2017)
The initial open and inclusive AKP approach to the Kurdish issue should be seen as a de-
securitising process. The policies put in place by the AKP in the first years of its rule were
46
policies in the political, cultural and social sphere instead of military policies. Through this de-
securitisation, fears were turned into anxieties. These anxieties then were addressed through
the creation of a new identity. This identity was based on democracy, inclusion and diversity. As
described in the first part of this chapter, the AKP was at the same time a conservative party
with a strong focus on stability, stating in its party programme that “it is necessary to avoid …
revolutionary change.” (Heper, 2013) When adhering to such a conservative belief of preventing
change, it is difficult to be open to the positive potential of anxieties.
The EU accession process has, however, helped in creating a process of identity transformation.
It has stimulated and supported AKP attempts towards more accommodative policies. It has
helped in approaching the Kurdish issue as a legitimate political problem rather than an issue of
national security. This has thus set in motion a de-securitising process.
As mentioned, some have seen the EU accession process as a threat to Turkish unity. This has
gone together with concerns about threats to state secularism, because of the fact that the AKP is
an Islamist party. These are concerns mostly voiced and stimulated by the military. In order to
protect its ontological security, the military has started a securitising discourse and so-called
preventative security measures. These securitising policies have turned anxieties into fears,
thereby safeguarding the ontological security of the military but compromising the physical
security. Polat (2009), accordingly, has written that “the struggle between the civil/military
bureaucracy representing the centre and the political elite representing the periphery leads to
the framing of political issues as security issues to legitimise non/anti-democratic moves. The
de-securitising moves taken by the AKP has been challenged by the securitising actors including
the army, the higher education leadership and the judiciary.”
As has become clear later on in the previous part of this chapter, the AKP was strongly affected
by securitising moves of other actors such as the military. The fact that the AKP was affected by
these securitising moves relatively easily can be explained by the conservative and nationalist
identity of the party. As mentioned before, this conservative and nationalist identity can stand in
47
the way of positive change and non-securitising processes of identity transformation. Therefore,
when there are challenges to the ontological security of the AKP through the existence of
anxieties, it is easier to resort to securitisation practices that turn anxieties into fears. This is
exactly what has happened when the AKP started using nationalist rhetoric during election time,
and when they stopped the implementation of the Democratic Opening to replace it with an
approach to the Kurdish issue as a terrorist problem. Çiçek (2011) has confirmed that what has
limited the AKP in completely enhancing accommodative policies is their nationalist identity. He
has written that “the rise of pro-Kurdish politics both within Turkey and Iraq has nearly closed
the door on the sustainability of the traditional security policy. However, the AKP’s Turkish
nationalist ideological-political character, the lack of the deep democratic values in the political
tradition of neoliberal pro-Islamic politics and its weak administrative capacity about the
Kurdish issue have prevented it from going beyond the traditional national security policy to
solve the Kurdish issue and to disarm the PKK.” (Çiçek, 2011)
AKP discourse has then increasingly become securitising rather than de-securitising. The
moment when the AKP took more control over the military could have been a big step towards
de-securitisation. However, it rather seems that the military voices within the administration
have influenced the general approach to the Kurdish issue, as well as the general identity. The
government approach has securitised and the identity has become more focused on Kemalist
principles of secularism, nationalism and unity. It is clear that military’s securitisation of the
Kurdish issue has eventually led to the adaptation of the AKP to the same identity and discourse,
thereby falling back into securitisation practices.
During the last few years, the relationship between Turkey and the EU has deteriorated. The
relationship of the EU was one thing that offered the Turkish state a way to transform its
identity and use the positive potential of anxieties. The worsened relationship with the EU, now,
has rather pushed Turkey back towards nationalist and conservative discourse. The policies
aimed at silencing opposing voices that have taken place in the last few years, are again
48
securitisation policies. These ‘other’ opinions/voices are seen as a threat to the Turkish state.
Anxieties are thus turned into fear once again.
49
7. Conclusion
This dissertation has shown that the presented theoretical framework can be very useful in
analysing and understanding the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. However, the Kurdish case does not
stand alone. This theoretical framework can be successfully applied to other (protracted)
conflicts.
The research conducted has shown that in Turkish history, there have been moments of high as
well as low ontological security, and the state of physical (in)security/asecurity has also varied
over time. As has been explained and shown, these different states of security relate to different
levels of both anxiety and fear. Throughout history, there have been both processes of
securitisation as well as de-securitisation. It has become clear, however, than in the cases of de-
securitisation there has been only limited use of the positive potential of anxieties. Positive
identity transformation has only taken place to a very limited extent.
The reason for this can be found, firstly, in the lack of openness to change. Especially the period
of AKP-rule has been illustrative in this regard, showing that openness to change and identity
transformation is important for safeguarding ontological security. The AKP was not open to
(strong/revolutionary) change due to its strong conservative and nationalist identity. The AKP
put in place de-securitisation policies, but the problem is that the anxieties created by these
policies were not dealt with in a positive/non-securitising manner.
Another explanation relates to the role of the military. It has become clear that the military in
Turkey has a different identity than the state in general. The Turkish military has a different
identity than the Turkish state in general, because it is so much apart and has a lot of autonomy.
It has become apparent within this dissertation, that attempts at identity transformation and use
of the positive potential of anxieties by the Turkish state have been met with securitisation
measures from the military. The state has thus challenged the ontological security of the
military.
50
Taking this analysis to a more theoretical level, the fact that the positive potential of anxieties
has only been put to use to a very limited extent can be explained by the general focus on
securitisation and physical security rather than ontological security within (inter)national
politics as well as IR. Already in the theoretical chapter, it was explained that there are currently
criticisms on the strong focus on securitisation within IR-related theories of ontological security.
The lacking focus on positive identity transformation and emancipatory forms of conflict
transformation can lead to a lack of understanding and a lack of knowledge about these types of
conflict transformation.
When looking at the analysis of the Turkish case, it is interesting to think back to the general
conception of ontological security. In this general conception of ontological security, change is
seen as undesirable as it can have a destabilising effect on the security of being. However, it is
exactly this assumption that has been challenged within this analysis of the Turkish conflict. The
analysis has confirmed the usefulness of the presented theoretical framework, which is a
framework that steps away from this traditional view of ontological security and rather
emphasises the positive potential of anxiety and change, the importance of adaptability instead
of stability, the importance of being critical of one’s own ontological security and the related
focus on processes of de-securitisation followed by thick recognition, and simultaneous self-
transformation and other-transformation.
I would therefore like to use these concluding words to urge the IR-scholarship to continue
research on this approach to ontological security. More research needs to be done not because
the presented theoretical framework is perfect (this is unattainable anyhow), but rather because
this approach to ontological security has a lot of potential and urgently needs to be explored
further.
A few things that need to be taken into account, however, are the fact that different state
institutions have different identities and different ontological security needs. In the Turkish case,
the military was a clear example. Ontological security scholarship should thus not only be
51
applied to direct oppositional conflict parties, but also to different state institutions if they
indeed have different identities like in the Turkish case. Along the lines of the theoretical
framework proposed, anxieties then are to be addressed through thick recognition followed up
by simultaneous self-transformation and other-transformation.
It is important to realise that it is the ontological security of a state that must be secured.
However, the state in itself is a very abstract entity. One must realise that the government and
the state are not identical. The government, however, has an interest in safeguarding ontological
security for the state. Therefore, the ruling government is the actor implements policies aiming
to safeguard this ontological security of the state.
It is also important to take into account the individual level. Within this dissertation, I have
mainly looked into the level of the state and main political actors. However, such institutions are
always supported or made up of people. Central for the ontological security of a state or political
actor is the trust of citizens and their identification with the state or concerned political actor. A
state in itself does not have emotions or ideas, as a state is only an abstract and symbolic concept
that is set up by individuals in order to govern a society which is also made up of individuals.
52
Appendix 1: Poem by Ziya Gökalp (English)
Original Poem in English:

A Soldier’s Prayer
“A rifle in my hand, faith in my heart,

I have two desires: Religion and the homeland…
The army is in my heart, the sultan is great…
Aid the Sultan, oh God!
Prolong his life, oh God!
Our path is holy war, martyrdom is its end,

Our religion asks for loyalty and service,
Our mother is the homeland, our father is the nation,
Make the homeland prosperous, oh God!
Uplift the nation, oh God!
My banner is the Oneness of God, my flag is the Crescent,

One is green, the other is red,
Take bitter revenge on the enemy for Islam,
Make Islam prosperous, oh God!
Ruin its enemies, oh God!
Our commanding, powerful fathers,

Our sergeants, corporals, chiefs,
Our ordered and respected laws,
Make the army in good order, oh God!
Make our banner superior, oh God!
Many brave heroes in the battlefield,

Became martyrs for religion and country,
Let the hearth give off smoke, let hope not be extinguished,
Do not let the martyr be mournful, oh God!
Do not let his end be powerless, oh God!”
Source: Archer, A.L. (2015) Before Gökalp and after Gökalp: Ziya Gökalp and Literary Turkism,
1876-1923. https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1419950705&disposition=inline
(accessed on 18-7-2017)
53
Appendix 2: Poem by Ziya Gökalp (Turkish)
Original Poem in Turkish:

Asker duası
“Elimde tüfenk, gönlümde iman,

Dileğim iki: Din ile vatan...
Ocağım ordu, büyüğüm Sultan,
Sultan’a imdad eyle Yarabbi!
Ömrünü müzdad eyle Yarabbi!
Yolumuz gaza, sonu şehadet,

Dinimiz ister sıdk ile hizmet,
Anamız vatan, babamız millet,
Vatanı mamur eyle yarabbi! .
Milleti mesrur eyle Yarabbi!
Sancağın tevhid, bayrağım hilal,

Birisi yeşil, ötekisi al,
İslam’a acı, düşmandan öc al,
İslam’ı abad eyle Yarabbi!
Düşmanı berbad eyle Yarabbi!
Cenk meydanında nice koç yiğid

Din ile yurt için oldular şehid
Ocağı tütsün,sönmesin ümid
Şehidi mahzun etme Yarabbi!
Soyunu zebun etme Yarabbi!
Kumandan,zabit babalarımız.
Çavuş,onbaşı,ağalarımız,
Sıra ve saygı,yasalarımız.
Orduyu düzgün eyle Yarabbi!
Sancağı üstün eyle Yarabbi!
Minareler süngü,kubbeler miğfer,

Camiler kışlamız, müminler asker,
Bu ilahi ordu dinimi bekler,
Allahu Ekber,Allahu Ekber.”
Source: Gökalp, Z. (1912) Asker duası.

http://www.cetinkose.com/siirlerim_oku_do.php?siirID=1066 (accessed on 18-7-2017)
54
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Ontological Security and The Positive Potential of Anxiety

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Ontological

Security and the

Inge van der Spek

2015a) followed by thick recognition, and simultaneous self-transformation and other-

and analysis of its role within the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

for supporting me in the stressful days of writing.

Author Inge van der Spek

Institution University of Kent – Brussels School of International Studies

Study programme MA International Conflict and Security

Academic Year 2016-2017

Number of words 15.046

AKP Development and Justice Party

the narrative approach (Kinvall, 2004; Somers, 1994; Subotić, 2016)

conception of ontological security, change is seen as undesirable as it can have a destabilising

securitisation and stability.

focus on processes of de-securitisation (Rumelili, 2015a) followed by thick recognition, and

simultaneous self-transformation and other-transformation. (Strömbom, 2014)

a presentation of the theoretical framework. This is followed by a short background giving

information about the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

implementation of more accommodative policies. In March 1993, a ceasefire was established

forces.” (Pusane, 2014)

returned to restrictive policies and oppression of the Kurds. (Polat, 2009)

2.1 Ontological security: an overview

constituted of “a biographical continuity; the construction and maintenance of a web of trust

major political actors. (Mitzen, 2006)

gain ontological security. (Steele, 2001)

security, narratives can be useful to alleviate ontological insecurity. (Kinvall, 2004)

of being, whereas physical security is referred to as security of survival. (Rumelili, 2015a)

2.2 Anxieties and fears

emotion into the external sphere. (Rumelili, 2015b)

anxiety corresponds to a state of ontological insecurity whereas a low level of anxiety

corresponds to a state of ontological security. A high level of fear corresponds to physical

(in)security – whether it is security or insecurity depends on the policies in place to counter

asecurity, the “security community is defined by the impossibility of imagining violence.”

2015a) The different combinations are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Combinations of Ontological (in)security and Physical (in)security/asecurity. (Rumelili, 2015a)

thereby creating a situation of physical (in)security. (Rumelili, 2015b)

2.3 The positive potential of anxiety

conception of ontological security, change is seen as undesirable as it can have a destabilising

on identity and securitisation.

and locking up of identities is helpful in maintaining ontological security. This assumption is

thus criticised by Browning and Joenniemi. (2016)

scholarship focuses disproportionately on negative security dynamics.” They therefore advocate

for a bigger focus on the “non-securitising dynamics of ontological security-seeking in world

politics.” (Kinvall and Mitzen, 2016)

establishment of a new identity and re-creation of ontological security.

securitising processes of meaning constitution through alternative channels.

transformation and routinisation leading to ontological security.

path towards conflict transformation, this misrecognition must be replaced by recognition.

towards conflict transformation. (Strömbom, 2014)

In obtaining thick recognition between conflict parties, it is important that self-transformation

interconnection between collective identity and commemorative narratives, as these form

securitisation processes followed by non-securitising meaning constitution and identity

out in this chapter.

decades of the Ottoman Period.

the signing of the Mudros armistice in October 1918. (Hanioğlu, 2008)

Simultaneously, however, an independence movement emerged mostly focused around the

beliefs and ideas of the movement. (Kayali, 2008)

is part of the more widespread Kemalist policy of homogenisation. (Massicard, 2009)

will be followed by a theoretical analysis.

4.1 The first years of Turkish independence

Kemalist ideology or Kemalism. (Bozarslan, 2008)

Dersim revolt. (Bozarslan, 2008)