Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA

Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the
consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that
carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both
the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the Court
ruled in the affirmative. The principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its
barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody
of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate
and only cause of the loss and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence.
HCISED

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.

RULING: YES.

Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled
manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a
common carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the
case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its
barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation..offering their services to the public. Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a
private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not bound to carry
goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of
competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its
cargo. Petitioner claims that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the loss of
the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss
of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the
typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that, even before the towing bits of the barge
broke, it had already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked at the
Engineering Island. It even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The
partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch
work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to sail safely. Thus, when petitioner
persisted to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.

Cruz vs. Sun Holidays

Facts:
In 2000 newly weds Ruelito and his wife brought a package tour contract from Sun Holidays. The tour
was scheduled from September 9-11, 2016 inclusive of transportation to and from the resort. On the
last day, due to heavy rains the day before and heavy winds, the couple along with other guests trekked
to the other side of the beach where they boarded M/B Coco Beach III. Shortly after the boat sailed, it
started to rain and when the reached the open seas the wind got stronger causing the boat to tilt from
side to side and eventually capsized putting all passengers underwater. Ruelito and his wife perished
from the accident which, prompted his parents to filed a complaint for damages against Sun Holidays
alleging that the latter failed to observed extraordinary diligence as common carrier in allowing the boat
to sail despite a storm warning. Sun Holidays denied responsibility claiming that they are not a common
carrier hence they are only required to observe ordinary diligence and the accident was due to a
fortuitous event.

Issue:

W/N Sun Holidays is a common carrier within the ambit of the law hence liable for damages.

YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making
distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent of the law is thus to
not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be
concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid
the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings
for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon, which
would also affect the province of Mindoro. By the testimony of Dr. Frisco Nilo, supervising weather
specialist of PAGASA, squalls are to be expected under such weather condition.
A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and
put other people’s lives At risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that
they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent
failed to do.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 101089, April 07, 1993

Facts:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE), entered into a hauling contract
with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Laguna.

CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita M. Bascos (petitioner) doing
business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from Manila to
Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo.

As a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency of the amount of the lost goods and
demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the latter refused to pay, causing him to file a complaint.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court is now faced with the following issues:

Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier.

Whether or not hijacking is a force majeure.

Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carrier as a person, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is”
whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out
to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.

In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the
provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability
arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible
threat, violence, or force.
The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to
overcome it.

Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption
conclusive against her.

AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA and FGU Insurance

(Dec 21, 2004)

Facts:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate
customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for the cargoes. Part also of
the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the
consignee upon the instruction of the shipper.

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment
to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out
that at least 44 cartons containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett
claimed insurance from FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims
damages against AF Sanchez who delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez
contended that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.
Issue:
Is AF Sanchez a common carrier?

Held:
SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does not
distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a principal activity or merely as an
ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF Sanchez is principally engaged
as a broker, it cannot be denied from the evidence presented that part of the
services it offers to its customers is the delivery of the goods to their respective
consignees.

Addendum: MAY NEGLIGENCE X E.DI OF GOOD FATHER KASI:

AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is improper packing.
Under the CC, improper packing of the goods is an exonerating circumstance. But in
this case, the SC held that though the goods were improperly packed, since AF
Sanchez knew of the condition and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or
reservation, the defense is deemed waived.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA

Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the
consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that
carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both
the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the Court
ruled in the affirmative. The principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its
barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody
of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate
and only cause of the loss and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence.
HCISED

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.

RULING: YES.

Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled
manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a
common carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the
case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its
barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation..offering their services to the public. Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a
private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not bound to carry
goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of
competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its
cargo. Petitioner claims that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the loss of
the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss
of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the
typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that, even before the towing bits of the barge
broke, it had already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked at the
Engineering Island. It even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The
partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch
work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to sail safely. Thus, when petitioner
persisted to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.

Cruz vs. Sun Holidays

Facts:
In 2000 newly weds Ruelito and his wife brought a package tour contract from Sun Holidays. The tour
was scheduled from September 9-11, 2016 inclusive of transportation to and from the resort. On the
last day, due to heavy rains the day before and heavy winds, the couple along with other guests trekked
to the other side of the beach where they boarded M/B Coco Beach III. Shortly after the boat sailed, it
started to rain and when the reached the open seas the wind got stronger causing the boat to tilt from
side to side and eventually capsized putting all passengers underwater. Ruelito and his wife perished
from the accident which, prompted his parents to filed a complaint for damages against Sun Holidays
alleging that the latter failed to observed extraordinary diligence as common carrier in allowing the boat
to sail despite a storm warning. Sun Holidays denied responsibility claiming that they are not a common
carrier hence they are only required to observe ordinary diligence and the accident was due to a
fortuitous event.

Issue:

W/N Sun Holidays is a common carrier within the ambit of the law hence liable for damages.

YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making
distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent of the law is thus to
not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be
concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid
the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings
for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon, which
would also affect the province of Mindoro. By the testimony of Dr. Frisco Nilo, supervising weather
specialist of PAGASA, squalls are to be expected under such weather condition.

A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and
put other people’s lives At risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that
they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent
failed to do.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 101089, April 07, 1993

Facts:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE), entered into a hauling contract
with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Laguna.

CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita M. Bascos (petitioner) doing
business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from Manila to
Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo.

As a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency of the amount of the lost goods and
demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the latter refused to pay, causing him to file a complaint.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court is now faced with the following issues:

Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier.

Whether or not hijacking is a force majeure.

Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carrier as a person, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is”
whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out
to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.

In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the
provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability
arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible
threat, violence, or force.
The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to
overcome it.

Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption
conclusive against her.

AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA and FGU Insurance

(Dec 21, 2004)

Facts:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate
customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for the cargoes. Part also of
the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the
consignee upon the instruction of the shipper.

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment
to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out
that at least 44 cartons containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett
claimed insurance from FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims
damages against AF Sanchez who delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez
contended that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.
Issue:
Is AF Sanchez a common carrier?

Held:
SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does not
distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a principal activity or merely as an
ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF Sanchez is principally engaged
as a broker, it cannot be denied from the evidence presented that part of the
services it offers to its customers is the delivery of the goods to their respective
consignees.

Addendum: MAY NEGLIGENCE X E.DI OF GOOD FATHER KASI:

AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is improper packing.
Under the CC, improper packing of the goods is an exonerating circumstance. But in
this case, the SC held that though the goods were improperly packed, since AF
Sanchez knew of the condition and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or
reservation, the defense is deemed waived.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA

Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the
consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that
carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both
the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the Court
ruled in the affirmative. The principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its
barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody
of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate
and only cause of the loss and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence.
HCISED

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.

RULING: YES.

Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled
manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a
common carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the
case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its
barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation..offering their services to the public. Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a
private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not bound to carry
goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of
competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its
cargo. Petitioner claims that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the loss of
the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss
of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the
typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that, even before the towing bits of the barge
broke, it had already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked at the
Engineering Island. It even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The
partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch
work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to sail safely. Thus, when petitioner
persisted to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.

Cruz vs. Sun Holidays

Facts:
In 2000 newly weds Ruelito and his wife brought a package tour contract from Sun Holidays. The tour
was scheduled from September 9-11, 2016 inclusive of transportation to and from the resort. On the
last day, due to heavy rains the day before and heavy winds, the couple along with other guests trekked
to the other side of the beach where they boarded M/B Coco Beach III. Shortly after the boat sailed, it
started to rain and when the reached the open seas the wind got stronger causing the boat to tilt from
side to side and eventually capsized putting all passengers underwater. Ruelito and his wife perished
from the accident which, prompted his parents to filed a complaint for damages against Sun Holidays
alleging that the latter failed to observed extraordinary diligence as common carrier in allowing the boat
to sail despite a storm warning. Sun Holidays denied responsibility claiming that they are not a common
carrier hence they are only required to observe ordinary diligence and the accident was due to a
fortuitous event.

Issue:

W/N Sun Holidays is a common carrier within the ambit of the law hence liable for damages.

YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making
distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent of the law is thus to
not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be
concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid
the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings
for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon, which
would also affect the province of Mindoro. By the testimony of Dr. Frisco Nilo, supervising weather
specialist of PAGASA, squalls are to be expected under such weather condition.

A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and
put other people’s lives At risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that
they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent
failed to do.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 101089, April 07, 1993

Facts:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE), entered into a hauling contract
with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Laguna.

CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita M. Bascos (petitioner) doing
business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from Manila to
Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo.

As a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency of the amount of the lost goods and
demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the latter refused to pay, causing him to file a complaint.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court is now faced with the following issues:

Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier.

Whether or not hijacking is a force majeure.

Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carrier as a person, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is”
whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out
to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.

In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the
provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability
arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible
threat, violence, or force.
The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to
overcome it.

Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption
conclusive against her.

AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA and FGU Insurance

(Dec 21, 2004)

Facts:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate
customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for the cargoes. Part also of
the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the
consignee upon the instruction of the shipper.

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment
to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out
that at least 44 cartons containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett
claimed insurance from FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims
damages against AF Sanchez who delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez
contended that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.
Issue:
Is AF Sanchez a common carrier?

Held:
SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does not
distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a principal activity or merely as an
ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF Sanchez is principally engaged
as a broker, it cannot be denied from the evidence presented that part of the
services it offers to its customers is the delivery of the goods to their respective
consignees.

Addendum: MAY NEGLIGENCE X E.DI OF GOOD FATHER KASI:

AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is improper packing.
Under the CC, improper packing of the goods is an exonerating circumstance. But in
this case, the SC held that though the goods were improperly packed, since AF
Sanchez knew of the condition and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or
reservation, the defense is deemed waived.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA

Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the
consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo, however, never reached the consignee as the barge that
carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus, as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both
the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the Court
ruled in the affirmative. The principal business of petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its
barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody
of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate
and only cause of the loss and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence.
HCISED

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.

RULING: YES.

Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled
manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a
common carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In the
case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its
barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation..offering their services to the public. Petitioner contends that it is not a common carrier but a
private carrier. Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any person. It is not bound to carry
goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold out its services to the general public. In De Guzman vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that the definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach: Art. 1734. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of
competent public authority.

In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its
cargo. Petitioner claims that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not be held liable for the loss of
the cargo. However, petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss
of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the
typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence show that, even before the towing bits of the barge
broke, it had already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken object while docked at the
Engineering Island. It even suffered a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the typhoon. The
partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch
work was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to sail safely. Thus, when petitioner
persisted to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.

Cruz vs. Sun Holidays

Facts:
In 2000 newly weds Ruelito and his wife brought a package tour contract from Sun Holidays. The tour
was scheduled from September 9-11, 2016 inclusive of transportation to and from the resort. On the
last day, due to heavy rains the day before and heavy winds, the couple along with other guests trekked
to the other side of the beach where they boarded M/B Coco Beach III. Shortly after the boat sailed, it
started to rain and when the reached the open seas the wind got stronger causing the boat to tilt from
side to side and eventually capsized putting all passengers underwater. Ruelito and his wife perished
from the accident which, prompted his parents to filed a complaint for damages against Sun Holidays
alleging that the latter failed to observed extraordinary diligence as common carrier in allowing the boat
to sail despite a storm warning. Sun Holidays denied responsibility claiming that they are not a common
carrier hence they are only required to observe ordinary diligence and the accident was due to a
fortuitous event.

Issue:

W/N Sun Holidays is a common carrier within the ambit of the law hence liable for damages.

YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making
distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent of the law is thus to
not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be
concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid
the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings
for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon, which
would also affect the province of Mindoro. By the testimony of Dr. Frisco Nilo, supervising weather
specialist of PAGASA, squalls are to be expected under such weather condition.

A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and
put other people’s lives At risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that
they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent
failed to do.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 101089, April 07, 1993

Facts:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE), entered into a hauling contract
with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Laguna.

CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita M. Bascos (petitioner) doing
business under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from Manila to
Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo.

As a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency of the amount of the lost goods and
demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the latter refused to pay, causing him to file a complaint.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court is now faced with the following issues:

Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier.

Whether or not hijacking is a force majeure.

Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carrier as a person, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is”
whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out
to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.

In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the
provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability
arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible
threat, violence, or force.
The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to
overcome it.

Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption
conclusive against her.

AF Sanchez Brokerage vs CA and FGU Insurance

(Dec 21, 2004)
Facts:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate
customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for the cargoes. Part also of
the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the
consignee upon the instruction of the shipper.

Wyett engaged the services of AF Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment
to Hizon Laboratories upon instruction of Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out
that at least 44 cartons containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett
claimed insurance from FGU. FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims
damages against AF Sanchez who delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez
contended that it is not a common carrier but a brokerage firm.

Issue:
Is AF Sanchez a common carrier?

Held:
SC held that Art 1732 of the Civil Code in defining common carrier does not
distinguish whether the activity is undertaken as a principal activity or merely as an
ancillary activity. In this case, while it is true that AF Sanchez is principally engaged
as a broker, it cannot be denied from the evidence presented that part of the
services it offers to its customers is the delivery of the goods to their respective
consignees.

Addendum: MAY NEGLIGENCE X E.DI OF GOOD FATHER KASI:

AF Sanchez claimed that the proximate cause of the damage is improper packing.
Under the CC, improper packing of the goods is an exonerating circumstance. But in
this case, the SC held that though the goods were improperly packed, since AF
Sanchez knew of the condition and yet it accepted the shipment without protest or
reservation, the defense is deemed waived.