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601
April 2008
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AR 380-5 and as specified in DCS G-3 Message DTG 091913Z Mar 04. This determination was made on
28 February 2007. Contractor and other requests must be referred to ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence
Center, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via e-mail at ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil
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Destroy by any method that prevents disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
Contents
Page
PREFACE ..............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS.............................................................................................. 1-1
Operational Environment.................................................................................... 1-1
Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................ 1-1
Improvised Explosive Device ............................................................................. 1-2
Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device ................................................. 1-2
Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare .... 1-3
Chapter 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND CREW BASICS ............................................. 2-1
Electronic Warfare .............................................................................................. 2-1
The Electromagnetic Spectrum .......................................................................... 2-3
Radio Communications ...................................................................................... 2-5
Defensive Electronic Attack Components .......................................................... 2-6
Chapter 3 PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CREW EMPLOYMENT....................... 3-1
Electronic Warfare Officer .................................................................................. 3-1
Basic Electronic Warfare Officer CREW Responsibilities .................................. 3-1
Spectrum Management ...................................................................................... 3-2
Crew and Electronic Warfare Staff Planning...................................................... 3-4
CREW Threat Load Process .............................................................................. 3-5
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only because it requires
protection in accordance with AR 380-5 and as specified by DCS G-3 Message DTG 091913Z Mar 04. This
determination was made on 28 February 2007. Contractor and other requests must be referred to ATTN:
ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via email at
ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE––Destroy by any method that prevents disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
Figures
Tables
Table 2-1. Radio frequency bands ......................................................................................... 2-5
Table 2-2. High- and low-power threats ...............................................................................2-10
Table A-1. CREW system capability comparison...................................................................A-1
Table A-2. Primary control unit functions ...............................................................................A-7
Table A-3. Remote control unit functions ...............................................................................A-8
Table A-4. DCU controls ..................................................................................................... A-23
Table A-5. LX panel indicators ............................................................................................ A-26
Table A-6. Remote control unit actions ............................................................................... A-33
This Training Circular (TC) provides guidance concerning the implementation of the Army’s Counter-Radio
Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) program. This publication does not
replace technical manuals for the individual CREW systems, but outlines roles and responsibilities for tactical
commanders, electronic warfare officers (EWOs), and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) supporting
operations in various theaters.
To make this publication useful to all Soldiers involved in combat operations, regardless of where these
operations may occur, the guidance contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to
various theaters. Even though this TC is not designed to focus on one specific region or country, the most
recent experience comes from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation.
This TC––
• Was quickly developed to immediately fill a gap in existing knowledge on how to implement a
CREW program.
• Provides guidance for commanders and staff in planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing
radio-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) environments.
• Outlines the critical roles and responsibilities of the CREW EWO.
• Introduces the term “CREW” into doctrine.
This TC includes an overview of the operational environment and the threat’s use of RCIEDs as one of their
weapons of choice. It briefly discusses basic electronic warfare (EW) principles, and defines the role of the
Army EWO and staff in planning and employing CREW systems. CREW system specifics are listed in the
appendixes as follows:
• Appendix A – Army Warlock CREW Systems.
• Appendix B – Non-Warlock CREW Systems.
• Appendix C – CREW Antennas.
• Appendix D – CREW Compatibility.
• Appendix E – Additional Sources of Information.
• Appendix F – Training Strategy.
This TC is the second-phased publication from the US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
(USAIC&FH) to address combating threat IED operations. The first phase was released as TC 2-91.701,
Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter IED Operations.
This TC applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United
States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing
agency is the Directorate of Doctrine, United States Army Intelligence Center. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to
Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85613-7017. You can also leave your comments or changes electronically at ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil.
The term “threat” is used throughout this manual to refer to enemy, insurgent, terrorist, combatant, or
adversary.
CAUTION
Because of the nature of the evolving IED TTP and technologies, it is
imperative that the reader be cognizant of the date of this publication.
IED information must be cross-checked against the most up-to-date
information. Included in this TC, as appendix E, is a list of additional
sources of information to assist the reader in locating the most current
information.
OPSEC IS CRITICAL!!
CAUTION!
z All CREW systems are high value sensitive items and require safeguarding.
z Use caution when working around ALL electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipment.
z High voltage and radio frequency (RF) radiation are present in CREW
systems.
z Keep systems dry.
z CREW systems are not a substitute for good tactical standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and situational awareness.
z CREW systems provide an additional layer of protection.
z CREW systems interfere with communication devices.
z Always check power cables, antenna cables, nuts, bolts and lock-washers,
cable tie-downs, and security fasteners. Inspect the antenna locations for
missing or broken parts.
z Operator must receive interoperability distances before convoying with
vehicles using CREW devices. Convoying with systems that are NOT
compatible can cause system performance degradation. See your Joint
CREW Field Office representative or your S-6/S-2 or EWO for
interoperability and current program load information.
WARNING
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander (JP 3-0). The operational environment includes physical areas—the air, land, maritime, and
space domains. It also includes the information environment and enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral
systems relevant to that joint operation.
1-2. Military planners describe the operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational
variables are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from
one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Operational variables describe
not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population’s influence on it. Joint
planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables Army doctrine adds two
more: physical environment and time. As a set, these operational variables are often abbreviated as
PMESII-PT (FM 3-0).
1-3. It is this conceptual framework which will assist Soldiers, leaders, and commanders alike, not only in
understanding the specific operational environment in which RCIEDs are employed but also in
understanding the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the threat and their use of RCIEDs. For
further information concerning the operational environment concept, see FM 3-0.
1-4. The rise of international terrorist networks, religious radicalism, ethnic genocide, sectarian violence,
criminal networks, and failing nation-states provides the United States (US) with a distinct set of problems
and threatens its national interests. This increasingly complex range of threats compels the US military to
become ever more versatile.
IRREGULAR WARFARE
1-5. The increase of American conventional military supremacy is driving adversaries to employ
asymmetric methods of engagement. Irregular warfare (IW) favors indirect and asymmetric approaches in
order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Asymmetry may reflect differences in equipment,
the structure and composition of forces, and technology. Examples of asymmetric approaches to IW can
include the use of terrorism; suicidal attacks; integration of low- and high-technology means into weapons;
the use and/or threat of use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) devices to disrupt military operations and create panic and/or fear among the civilian population.
US forces have dominated their adversaries in conventional operations. It is not surprising that adversaries
respond asymmetrically by avoiding conventional armies’ strengths and attacking their weaknesses.
Lessons learned concerning insurgent tactics in Afghanistan and in Iraq since 2003 have shown us how the
threat is highly adaptive and can exploit weaknesses to reveal conventional force vulnerabilities.
1-6. To be successful, US and Coalition Force leaders must develop organizations which can be adaptive
and master the complexities of the spectrum of conflict and their specific operational environment. Recent
Army experience in counterinsurgency operations demonstrates this need. Commanders must train and
educate Soldiers to operate in dynamic environments. These environments are often urban, culturally
unfamiliar, and of interest to nongovernmental organizations, government and private sector officials, news
media, and other nonmilitary individuals and groups. Operations are as much intellectual activities as they
are physical undertakings. Thinking and adaptive organizations develop an appreciation of all aspects of
their operational environment. This appreciation then guides the leaders’ use of military capabilities.
RCIEDs are cost-effective weapons used to counter more advanced weapons technology. They provide
stand-off and do not require the threat to commit forces. See Chapter 2 for further information on RCIEDs.
1-13. Due to the impact of IEDs on US and Coalition Forces, an effort was initiated to leverage existing
technologies to counter the effectiveness of RCIEDs. Material solutions were one facet of several
addressed by JIEDDO, whose mission is to develop both material and procedural solutions to the IED
problem. One result of those efforts was the fielding and deployment of an array of CREW system
capabilities.
Increment-1
1-17. CREW Increment 1 (CREW-1), also known as the Warlock Family of Systems (FOS), began
fielding in FY 04. The CREW-1 systems were developed and deployed to counter specific RCIED threats
that were prevalent in FY 04. As the threat quickly exposed their use of various RF initiating devices,
several different CREW technologies were deployed, including––
z Warlock – GREEN.
z Warlock – RED.
z Warlock – RED/GREEN COMBO.
z Warlock – IED Countermeasures Equipment (ICE).
z Warlock – Modified ICE (mICE).
z Warlock – Self-Screening Vehicle Jammer (SSVJ).
z Warlock – Multimode Broadband Jammer (MMBJ).
z Warlock – BLUE.
z Warlock – LX.
Increment-2
1-18. CREW Increment 2 (CREW-2) consolidated the capabilities of the CREW-1 FOS, enhanced
operational flexibility and was intended to mitigate the need for multiple hardware platforms, maintenance,
and planning. Initial CREW-2 efforts included the development and deployment of three different systems:
Duke, Chameleon, and Hunter.
Note. Nomenclature for post-Increment 2 systems became JCREW in accordance with DODD
5101.14 assigning single manager of CREW technologies for the Joint Services to the US Navy.
Increment 2.1
1-19. JCREW 2.1 will be a mounted capability for all ground, air, and seaborne non-human tactical
platforms, as well as fixed sites to include defensive positions, command posts, and controlled points of
entry.
Increment 2.2
1-20. JCREW 2.2 will be a dismounted light (man-wearable) and dismounted heavy (man-transportable)
capability.
Increment-3
1-21. JCREW Increment 3 (JCREW-3) will be an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) driven increment to
develop a system of systems approach to address the global long-term requirements for RCIED protection.
JCREW-3 will expand the employment in multiple configurations, including JCREW 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Increment 3.1
1-22. CREW 3.1 will be a dismounted light (man-wearable) and dismounted heavy (man-transportable)
capability. It is intended to fill gaps between legacy dismounted CREW capabilities and the desired
endstate dismounted capabilities for Increment-3.
Increment 3.2
1-23. CREW 3.2 will be a mounted capability for all ground, air, and seaborne non-human tactical
platforms, as well as fixed sites to include defensive positions, command posts, and controlled points of
entry. It is intended to fill gaps between legacy-mounted CREW capabilities and the desired endstate
mounted capabilities for Increment-3.
Increment 3.3
1-24. CREW 3.3 will be the full spectrum capability desired as a suite (system of systems) of fixed site,
mounted, and dismounted systems intended to satisfy all current and expected gaps. This increment may
have the ability to receive threat frequency updates dynamically via over-the-air reprogramming.
FUTURE INCREMENTS
1-25. The capabilities of future increments will be refined based on the evolution of the threat and desired
US capabilities. Indications from OIF and OEF show the potential for attacks using radio-controlled IED
technology beyond the RF spectrum. Such capabilities could include passive infrared, laser-initiated
devices, or acoustic spectrum initiation, which would require capabilities not covered by previous CREW
increments. Additionally, CREW systems have the potential to support counter-fuse threats, emitter
mapping, and networked fusion if required by a formal AoA. (See appendix A for descriptions of specific
Army Warlock CREW systems.)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-1. EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) or directed energy to
control the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). EW includes three major subdivisions:
electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). See figure 2-1 for
an EW overview.
ELECTRONIC ATTACK
2-2. EA is the subdivision of EW involving the use of EM energy, directed energy (DE), or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or
destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-09). EA includes––
z Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EM spectrum, such as
jamming and EM deception.
z Employment of weapons that use either EM energy or DE as their primary destructive
mechanism (lasers, RF weapons, or particle beams).
z Both offensive and defensive activities to include countermeasures (CM):
Offensive EA activities are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. Examples
include jamming an adversary’s radar or command and control (C2) systems; using anti-
radiation missiles to suppress an adversary’s air defenses; using electronic deception
techniques to confuse an adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems; and using DE weapons to disable an adversary’s equipment or capability.
Defensive EA activities use the EM spectrum to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and
equipment. Examples include self-protection and force protection (FP) measures such as
use of expendables (for example, flares and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, DE
infrared CM systems, and CREW systems.
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION
2-3. EP is the subdivision of EW involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment
from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the EM spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly
combat capability. Examples include spectrum management, EM hardening, emission control, and use of
wartime reserve modes.
2-4. EP includes actions taken to ensure friendly use of the EM spectrum (such as frequency agility in a
radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in a radar). EP should not be confused with self-protection. The
use of flare rejection logic on an infrared missile to counter a threat’s use of flares is EP. The flare rejection
technique ensures friendly use of the EM spectrum to track the intended target despite the threat’s self-
protection or defensive EA actions (for example, the flare) to prevent or reduce friendly use of the EM
spectrum.
2-5. While defensive EA actions and EP both protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment,
EP protects from the effects of EA (friendly and/or adversary); defensive EA is primarily used to protect
against lethal attacks by denying adversary use of the EM spectrum.
2-8. Light exhibits properties of waves and can be focused and bent like waves in a pond. Just as a wave
traveling through water has a wavelength (the distance between wave peaks) and a frequency (the number
of wave peaks passing a point in a unit of time); light has a wavelength and a frequency.
2-9. The EM spectrum extends in both directions from the visible range. Shorter-wavelength, higher
frequency “light” includes ultraviolet, x-rays, and cosmic rays. Longer-wavelength, lower-frequency
“light” includes first infrared light then, as wavelengths become longer and longer, radio waves. Figure 2-2
shows the EM spectrum.
2-10. Electrons traveling through wires are surrounded by both electric and magnetic fields, and that a
wire carrying an alternating current is surrounded by electric and magnetic fields varying in intensity at the
same frequency as the electric current. Furthermore, the wire radiates energy that propagates just as do
light waves with a frequency and wavelength corresponding to the frequency of the alternating current in
the wire. Figure 2-3 provides a visual example of different frequencies.
2-11. The Federal Government uses the spectrum for a variety of purposes. Figure 2-4 shows examples of
this. The uses include Voice of America broadcasts, weather radio services, radars and voice communication systems used to
control both commercial and private aeronautical and maritime traffic, weather satellite systems, flood warning and water
control systems, and time signals.
2-12. Almost 93 percent of the assignments authorizing government radio stations are below 3.1 gigahertz
(GHz). The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a significant portion of the Federal Government spectrum for national
security purposes. The Federal Government uses only the portions of the spectrum that it needs to provide critical public
services, and seeks to deploy the most efficient technology consistent with available resources. Chapter 3 discusses spectrum
management in more detail.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
2-13. Radio communications use radio waves at different frequencies, grouped within bands, which are
part of the radio spectrum. Radio waves are the basic building block of radio communications. Like waves
on a pond, a radio wave is a series of repeating peaks and valleys. The entire pattern of a wave, before it
repeats itself, is called a cycle. The number of cycles, or times that a wave repeats in a second, is called
frequency.
FREQUENCY
2-14. Frequency describes how often radio waves cycle per second through the air, which is measured in
hertz (Hz). Typical measurements are in kilohertz (kHz) (or thousands of cycles per second), megahertz
(MHz) (or millions of cycles per second), and 1 billion hertz as a GHz. Think of frequency as how often a
signal is sent in one second. The CREW system frequency needs to be programmed to cover the frequency
of the RCIED receiver to stop it from detonating.
RADIO SPECTRUM
2-15. A radio spectrum is the complete range of frequencies from approximately 3 kHz up to more than
300 GHz that can be used for radio communications. Frequencies are often grouped in ranges called bands
(see table 2-1). Bands of interest to public safety include high frequency (HF), VHF (very high frequency),
UHF (ultrahigh frequency), and most recently SHF (superhigh frequency). Radio systems operating in the
806 to 824 MHz and 851 to 869 MHz portion of the UHF band are often referred to as “800 MHz systems”
and are distinguished from systems in the other parts of the UHF band. Frequencies above 1 GHz are often
referred to as “microwave” bands.
2-16. A radio wave is generated by a transmitter and then detected by a receiver. An antenna allows a
radio transmitter to send energy into space and a receiver to pick up energy from space. Transmitters and
receivers are typically designed to operate over a limited range of frequencies within a specific frequency
band (or bands).
Table 2-1. Radio frequency bands
FREQUENCY DESIGNATION WAVELENGTH
3-30 kHz Very low frequency (VLF) 100,000-10,000 m
30-300 kHz Low frequency (LF) 10,000-1,000 m
300-3000 kHz Medium frequency (MF) 1,000-100 m
3-30 MHz High frequency (Short wave) (HF) 100-10 m
30-300 MHz Very high frequency (VHF) 10-1 m
300-3000 MHz Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) 1 m-10 cm
3-30 GHz Superhigh frequency (SHF) 10-1 cm
30-300 GHz Extremely high frequency (EHF) 1 cm-1 mm
*kHz = kilohertz, or 1,000 Hz; MHz = megahertz, or 1,000 kHz; GHz = gigahertz, or 1,000
MHz.
Note. When a jammer is in use, the target transmitter is still sending a signal at the same power
as before; therefore, turning off the jamming device will allow the target receiver to receive the
RCIED initiating signal. Also, jammers can adversely affect other jammers as well as friendly
communications. Proper planning and spectrum management will help mitigate these adverse
effects.
Active Jamming
2-19. Active jamming constantly transmits jamming signals on one or more frequencies or bandwidths
programmed into the system (barrage jamming). Since each jammer is loaded with multiple programmed
frequencies, it is able to defeat multiple threats simultaneously.
2-20. However, active jamming effectiveness is dictated by the limitations of power sharing. As the
number of programmed frequencies increases, the available power for each targeted frequency is reduced.
Ultimately, there is a limit to the available power that can be dedicated to the CREW capability. Active
jamming can be effective against both high- and low-power RCIEDs; however, they are most commonly
employed against low power threats due to the considerations mentioned above.
Reactive Jamming
2-21. Reactive jamming utilizes detection technologies and algorithms to minimize radiated jamming
signals. Reactive jamming scans programmed frequency ranges or sets of individual frequencies to detect
signal activity. When a potential threat is detected, the jammer processes the signal data and only then
transmits a jamming signal against that perceived threat. This method of reactive jamming enables the
system to focus more power on the targeted frequency.
2-22. Since increased power on a target normally provides more reliable suppression of the RCIED,
reactive jamming is more effective in defeating high-power RCIEDs. The limitation of reactive jamming is
the ability of the CREW system to detect the threat signals. Since many RCIED transmission signals are at
power levels below the resident EM environment, reactive jamming must be coupled with active jamming
to provide full coverage against an array of high- and low-power RCIEDs. See figure 2-6 for a jamming
example.
TECHNIQUES OF JAMMING
2-23. A jammer may be programmed to work on individual or multiple frequencies within RF bands or to
cover a range of frequencies (band). In the CREW environment, this program, or “loadset,” is designed to
focus the jammer on known or suspected areas of the RF spectrum used by the threat. Also, since a jammer
has a maximum power output, it is necessary to have an effective method to manage available power assets
against targets within the RF spectrum. Two basic techniques of active jamming are described below.
2-24. Active jammers are programmed to continuously jam on pre-programmed frequencies. Active
jammers can either spread available power across all programmed frequency bands (barrage jamming), or
they can cycle power through programmed frequency bands (sweep jamming) at a revisit rate quick
enough to deny service of the target. In barrage jamming, when systems are programmed to jam all
frequencies simultaneously (figure 2-7), the available jamming power is shared over a desired frequency
range (notional program load). It is imperative that the system’s programming load considers the available
power on each target, as reduced power on target may severely effect system effectiveness.
2-25. In sweep jamming (figure 2-8), the power of the transmission is swept across the programmed
frequency range (notional program load). The sweep technique enables maximum watts per MHz;
however, when it is moving in a sweep pattern with a cycle rate, it is possible for a signal to “sneak” in
during the time period that a frequency is not actively jammed.
2-26. A variation of sweep jamming is to use a receiver to scan a frequency range to detect signal activity.
Upon detection of an active signal the jammer focuses its transmission power directly on the active signal’s
frequency. This power-sharing technique allows the jammer to bring the maximum amount of power on
target at any one time.
2-27. Jamming systems are not restricted to a single method of jamming and may integrate multiple and
varying methods into a single system. A system that utilizes barrage jamming may actually vary the power
on each target, based on the loaded mission profile. Likewise, a system utilizing a sweep technique may
also incorporate an element of barrage jamming. In determining the appropriate mission profile for
jamming, the operational planners will take into consideration the effectiveness of various techniques and
the capabilities and limitations of the jamming system.
POWER
2-28. For the sake of developing and deploying CM, RCIED threat devices are designated as either high
power or low power (table 2-2). While an RCIED consists of a threat transmitter and a threat receiver,
designation of high- and low-power threats evaluates the transmit signal of the threat transmitter. An
RCIED designated as a low-power RCIED has a transmitter that emits signals measured at less than one
watt. An RCIED designated as a high power RCIED has a transmitter that emits signals measured at one
watt or greater. Figures 2-9 through 2-12 provide examples of high- and low-power RCIEDs.
Table 2-2. High- and low-power threats
High Power Threats Low Power Threats
Narrow frequency bandwidth signal between Short data stream signals with high/low signaling,
RCIED transmitter and RCIED receiver (varying frequency within bands, due to design)
LINE OF SIGHT
2-29. Line of sight commonly refers to RF communication links that rely on an unobstructed straight line
(a clear path) between a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna. Other types of IED triggers (for
example, pressure plate or trip wire) do not need a clear line of sight. They rely on other methods of
transmitting the detonate commands. CREW protection is effective for vehicles and personnel that are in
direct line of sight of the jammer; however, CREW protection is reduced by objects that mask (block) the
jammer’s line of sight.
MASKING
2-30. RF waves radiating from antennas cannot penetrate solid objects; for example, buildings, equipment
placed around vehicle antennas, other vehicles in the convoy—this is called masking. Blocking the direct
line of sight between CREW antennas and RCIED receivers reduces CREW effectiveness.
Note. Keep areas around antennas clear of materials to ensure maximum effectiveness. See
figure 2-13.
Note. Buildings mask protection, which causes the lead vehicle to be unprotected.
z Monitor and advise the command on the proper employment of assigned CREW assets and
personnel.
z Monitor and advise the command on current status and maintenance issues relating to CREW
assets.
z Manage and oversee employment of assigned CREW assets and personnel.
z Ensure lost, stolen, or destroyed CREW systems procedures are in place.
z Be the representative for all other CREW-related issues.
z Act as a liaison for the following efforts: counter-IED, spectrum management, airborne EW
assets, electronics officer, communication officers, frequency managers, combat engineers,
EOD, combined explosives exploitation cell (CEXC), weapons intelligence team (WIT), Joint
Command Control System-1 (JCCS-1), and JIEDDO.
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
3-6. Spectrum management involves planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the EM spectrum
through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. EM waves propagate outward in all
directions. An antenna radiates signals at lower levels and can receive signals from all directions. An
interfering signal will be amplified and detected just like the desired signal once it enters the receiver. If the
interfering signal is large enough, it can prevent the desired signal from being properly demodulated and
understood.
3-7. Soldiers operating radio communication devices and other EW devices in a given area must
understand the system’s operating environment if they are to avoid interference problems. If they operate
on the same frequencies at the same time and in the same area, their transmissions will produce
interference with each other’s receivers.
3-8. The goal of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to perform their functions in the
intended environment without causing or experiencing unacceptable interference. Spectrum managers are
concerned with the process of obtaining regulatory access to spectrum resources and influencing the
development of statutory and regulatory policy, rules, regulations, and procedures. It involves coordinating
new and emerging Army spectrum requirements, participating in national and international spectrum
regulatory bodies, radiation hazard protection, and developing long-range spectrum management plans.
Spectrum management requires active participation in all phases of the combat development and materiel
development cycle. Spectrum management centers on obtaining access to the spectrum and managing it
primarily through the establishment of frequency allocations and frequency allotments.
3-9. The primary focus of spectrum management, at the tactical level, is to obtain an approved frequency
license from the controlling authority at the international, national, host nation, unified command, allied, or
military department level. This process includes the application of operational, engineering, and
administrative procedures to allotted RF bands to maximize reuse and sharing of the available spectrum
area. The process also enables electronic equipment to perform their functions in their intended
environment using EM compatibility measures, without suffering degradation from or causing
unacceptable degradation to other equipment. It centers on managing discrete frequencies or frequency
bands through use of frequency allotments and frequency assignments; assuring compliance with local
radio regulatory policy, rules, and procedures; application of sound practices; resolution of harmful
interference at the lowest operational level possible; and timely reporting of incidents of harmful
interference that cannot be resolved locally.
z Resolve interference.
z Advise the commander in spectrum prioritization and implementation.
3-12. For an in-depth discussion on spectrum management functions and tasks, see FMI 6-02.70.
PLANNING FACTORS
3-14. Development of the EW appendix to the operations plan (OPLAN) requires consideration of a
number of diverse factors about the proposed operations. Some of these planning factors include the
following:
z Requirements for friendly communications nets, EM navigation systems, and radar. These
requirements should be considered with respect to the anticipated operations, tactical threat
expected, and EM interference considerations. Once identified, these requirements should be
entered into the JRFL under appropriate categories (for example, TABOO). TABOO
frequencies, also known as guarded frequencies, are any friendly or enemy frequency of such
importance that it must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces.
z Identification of communications security and electronic security measures necessary to deny
operations security (OPSEC) indicators to enemy passive EM sensors.
z Determination of what prior coordination and precautions will be necessary when conducting
EA in order to ensure continued effective ES. Development of the JRFL is a critical preliminary
step to ensuring deconfliction of EA and ES activities. Coordination and identification of
specific resources are required for interference deconfliction.
z Identification of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) that support
commanders and EW operations. These CCIRs must be included in the intelligence annex
(Annex B) of the OPLAN to facilitate generation of ES.
z Coordination and establishment of procedures to ensure timely fulfillment, including tactical
real-time dissemination.
z Review of rules of engagement (ROE) to determine what restrictions (if any) apply to EW
operations.
Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of disrupting communications over defeating RCIEDs.
(Chapter 4 discusses compatibility and communications alternatives.)
z Staff officers to—
Provide technical coordination, which ensures CREW systems are appropriately programmed
for the mission profile.
Provide operational coordination to ensure that systems are employed effectively in convoy and
other combat operations.
z EWOs to—
Ensure coordination, employ information from all sources, disseminate data, and develop the
CREW threat load based on derived intelligence and reporting.
Manage the entire process for counter-RCIED efforts and synchronize those efforts with other
EW efforts including EA, EP, and ES.
COMPATIBILITY
4-1. CREW system compatibility with other systems is essential to the effective use of EW as an element
of joint military power. There may be occasions when CREW systems could interfere with other CREW or
friendly systems (ground or aerial) or communications (for example, Blue Force Tracker). In any
operational environment, commanders should assign CREW a high priority in mission planning.
Commanders and EWOs should develop procedures for deconflicting frequencies and work cooperatively
to solve compatibility issues to ensure CREW can operate at maximum capability and effectiveness.
Having Soldiers turn off their CREW system to achieve improved communication capabilities denies them
the protection against RCIEDs offered by CREW.
4-2. CREW systems may interfere with other CREW systems. Figure 4-1 is an example of a compatibility
scenario. Specifically, reactive systems are not always compatible with active systems. Active systems are
not affected by other CREW systems because they are constantly transmitting. Reactive systems do not
have the ability to distinguish RF energy emitted from a threat transmitter, or RF energy emitted by another
CREW system. Therefore, an active system can be perceived by a reactive system as a potential threat.
When this scenario presents itself, the reactive jammer utilizes critical resources in an attempt to defeat the
RF signal being emitted from the active jammer. This may cause a reactive CREW system to be
considerably less effective against actual RCIEDs.
4-3. The materiel developers for CREW are developing timing protocols to assist in the compatibility
issues. As the common timing protocol (CTP) initiatives mature, compatibility among jammers will
significantly improve. Unit commanders, staff officers, and EWOs supporting CREW technologies should
maintain awareness of CTP initiatives and update TTP and employment considerations as necessary.
DANGER
CREW systems will not identify the differences between friendly
communications and threat communication devices. It will work
to defeat them both.
Turning off CREW for communications will increase the
vulnerability of an RCIED attack.
CREW antennas must be separated from each other and other
antennas (for example, global positioning system [GPS] or single-
channel ground and airborne radio system) by at least 36 inches.
Do not make modifications to antenna placement (only trained
engineers should alter the placement of antennas) or place
anything near the antennas as the signals being received and
broadcasted may be adversely affected.
CREW cables must be separated by at least 3 inches to avoid
crossover interference.
FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION
4-5. Friendly, adversary, and civilian operations that use or affect the EM spectrum (communications,
non-communications, jamming) have the potential to interfere with communications and other electronic
systems. To mitigate this interference, the US military has established spectrum management and EW
frequency deconfliction procedures. EW frequency deconfliction can be considered a subset of spectrum
management and is defined as a systematic management procedure to coordinate the use of the EM
spectrum for operations, communications, and intelligence functions.
4-6. EWOs should be prepared to examine cases where CREW conflicts with the JRFL or where JRFL
changes might affect CREW loadsets. The extent of conflict analysis depends on the tools and time
available to the EWO. EW personnel should attempt to resolve or diffuse the conflict by working within
the staff and subordinate EWOs. If the deconfliction effort is successful, the operation is conducted as
planned or modified.
COMMUNICATIONS ALTERNATIVES
4-7. If unable to deconflict frequencies between the CREW system and communication equipment, the
following are some example alternatives to consider to help restore communications:
z Notify EWOs of communications conflict. They may know of a technical solution, which may
include moving the antenna to a different location.
z Use Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracker ability to transmit
information as primary means of communication in accordance with mission execution
checklist.
z Coordinate with signal officer or communications NCO to change communications antenna type
from omnidirectional to more focused transmission capability.
z Coordinate with signal officer or higher for alternate means to communicate (for example,
tactical satellite, HF).
z Use pre-planned hand-visual signals.
PRE-CONVOY MEASURES
5-1. Commanders and leaders need to plan the placement of CREW systems within a convoy to
maximize protection against RCIEDs. This process is essential to ensure the commands’ requirements for
use of the EM spectrum are balanced with the specific mission needs. This planning responsibility starts
with the––
z Convoy commanders.
z EWOs.
CONVOY PLANNING
5-2. Pre-convoy planning considerations include the following:
z Electronic countermeasure insight.
It is essential to understand the basic theory on how the CREW system suppresses the enemy
threat devices.
CREW is a line-of-sight system and its employment in respect to possible threat device locations
and danger zones is analogous to a medium-range direct fire weapon. Maintaining CREW’s
line of sight and avoiding masking by either terrain, buildings, vehicles and other objects is
an important part of successful system employment.
Note. Planners must understand the basic principle that the CREW system targets the threat
receiver not the transmitter. The geographic relationship between the transmitter to receiver and
the CREW system to receiver plays a significant role in successful suppression.
z The known RCIED threats. Through proper IPB, planners must know the types of RCIED
threats used in the AO. This data, in concert with the electronic countermeasure insight, drive all
the other planning considerations.
z Selection of the appropriate CREW system. Planners must verify that the installed load set on
the system(s) is the most effective against the prevailing threat.
z The number of CREW systems required to support the operation is based on mission parameters
and number of vehicles involved in the operation. Ideally CREW systems will be installed in
every vehicle of the convoy. However, if this is not possible, then convoy commanders should
ensure a minimum ratio of one CREW system per every two convoy vehicles.
z Placement and separation of CREW equipment. Not all CREW systems are compatible with
each other, thus it may be necessary to consult the latest CREW interoperability chart for
required separation distances. An example interoperability chart is shown in appendix D.
Additionally, based upon the mission requirements, IPB, and the number and type of vehicles,
the convoy commander should place the CREW systems in a manner that affords CREW
protection for all elements.
z Maintain vehicle dispersion and distance. Vehicle dispersion and distance are based on pre-
mission planning or analysis and unit SOP. The ideal CREW solution is to keep all entities
within the effective suppression range of the CREW systems.
z If movement is stopped, survey the immediate area using the 5/25 method of surveillance:
5-meter surveillance is conducted to search for IEDs in your immediate vicinity. A 25-meter
search is conducted to identify secondary IEDs or triggermen.
CONVOY MOVEMENT WITH CREW
5-7. To ensure maximum protection in a convoy movement with CREW, all Soldiers must do the
following:
z Map reconnaissance and terrain analysis should identify danger areas along the primary and
alternate routes. This analysis supports MDMP and IPB for the number of CREW systems
required and optimal CREW placement.
z Lead with CREW vehicles when approaching higher threat areas. Conducting operations in the
vicinity of an RCIED is most effective when the CREW system is given the opportunity to
suppress the threat receiver as early as possible.
z Vehicles turning a corner may be masked from CREW coverage until the vehicle with the
CREW system approaches the corner. This is not an absolute and depends on a number of
variables (for example, building and vegetation type, threat device type, convoy interval, other).
z Do NOT round off corners when making turns.
z A CREW vehicle may be placed in an overwatch position where it can provide the most
coverage before turning a corner.
z If you are within an IED kill radius, you need CREW system protection (figure 5-1).
z CREW jams the receiver at the RCIED, not the transmitter.
z Figure 5-3 is an example as to why a ratio of one CREW system per more than two vehicles is
unwise. In this figure, the CREW system is in the middle vehicle.
z This disposition places the lead vehicle in the RCIED blast area before suppression can be
established and maintained.
z If this configuration is necessary, the convoy should tighten up its interval to maximize
effectiveness of the CREW protection.
z Figure 5-4 depicts the preferred CREW system to vehicle ratio where each vehicle is equipped
with a CREW system.
z In an urban environment, buildings mask the effectiveness of the jammers.
z Another example of the attendant risk to exceeding a ratio of one CREW system per every two
vehicles. The center vehicle is CREW equipped (figure 5-5).
Note. When meeting another convoy, determine if there is a compatibility conflict. If none,
proceed with mission. If a conflict is determined, talk with the other convoy commander and
decide who will shut down their CREW equipment. If convoys have to operate in the same area,
one of them must back out of range of the other’s jammers. The CREW device will not identify
any difference between legitimate communications and threat devices and will work to defeat
them both.
DANGER
Do not attempt to move the IED. Do NOT hug the curb at potential
IED locations but stay in the middle of the road. Never drive over
a suspected IED.
z Confirm:
Scan the immediate surrounds from a 360-degree perspective.
Use optics for standoff and protection.
Conduct surveillance, from a safe distance, of both the suspected IED and for a triggerman. DO
NOT ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE POSSIBLE IED.
Indicate location of suspected IED using unit-designated marking system.
The first vehicle in the patrol to identify the suspected IED should attempt to alert other vehicles
of the suspected IED location and mark it in accordance with the unit SOP.
The nearest vehicle to the IED with a radio must transmit the location of the IED to the
remainder of the patrol using vehicle internal call signs and indicate the distance and
direction of the threat.
Use available hard cover to the maximum extent.
Conduct checks of the immediate surroundings to ensure that there are no secondary devices.
Use theater-specific methods, such as the 5/25 method.
Detain a suspected triggerman if one was detected.
Give as much information as possible, to include a safe route or approach to the incident control
point (ICP) for EOD and other responding agencies.
Call higher headquarters using the 9-line explosive hazard (EH) spot report:
• Line 1: Date-time group (DTG) Discovered: (Command policy will dictate local or
Zulu time). Line 1, DTG. Provide the DTG that the item was discovered (for
example, 181230ZMAY05).
• Line 2: Reporting Activity (Unit Identification Code [UIC]). Location: Mandatory 8-
digit grid (include landmarks, reference points, or street addresses). Provide the UIC
of the reporting activity unit and the location of the EH in an 8-digit grid coordinate.
• Line 3: Contact Method: Radio Frequency/Call Sign or Telephone Number. (If using
phone number, provide name.) Provide the RF, the call sign, the point of contact,
and the telephone number.
• Line 4: Type of Munition: (Dropped, Projected, Placed, or Thrown). Note the size,
the quantity, the type of ordnance (dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, or
thrown), and the subgroup, if available. If anti-handling devices were used, indicate
the emplacement method and type of initiation device.
• Line 5: CBRNE Contamination: Yes or No, known or suspected CBRNE
contamination. If yes, report type of agent if known or identified. Be as specific as
possible.
• Line 6: Resources Threatened: (What resource is threatened – is it a critical asset?)
Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened.
• Line 7: Impact on Mission: (How the unexploded ordnance is affecting the
mission). Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how the
presence of the EH affects the status (for example, delayed, diverted, cancelled).
• Line 8: Protective Measures taken: (Unit emplaced protective measures). Describe
any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment (for example, marked).
• Line 9: Recommended Priority: (Immediate, Indirect, Minor, or No Threat).
Recommend a priority for response by EOD technicians. Ensure that the priority
requested corresponds with the tactical situation you described on line 7 of the report
(Impact on Mission). These priorities refer only to the EH impact on the current
mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT does not mean that the EH is not
dangerous.
z Clear:
Clear all personnel from the area to a minimum safe distance of 300 meters from a potential
IED.
Vary minimum distance (beyond 300 meters) to avoid establishing predictability, because of
possible secondary IED.
Avoid using any communications or electronic equipment (other than CREW devices).
Use mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops and support, time available and civil considerations
factors.
z Cordon:
Cordon off the area.
Position CREW devices to best protect the element.
Direct personnel out of the danger area, allowing entry only to EOD personnel.
Follow existing ROE procedures to detain, search, and question suspects.
Direct people out of the 300-meter minimum danger area.
Check suspicious personnel exiting the cordoned-off area to suppress the enemy within the
danger area.
Identify, clear, and establish an area for an ICP.
Establish an ICP for follow-on agencies.
Focus Soldiers outward in cordoned positions and the ICP to provide protection and security
against other IEDs.
Control media reporters and reduce civilian distractions.
z Check:
Check the immediate area for secondary devices from the ICP or cordoned positions.
Conduct 5/25 meter checks, and 100-meter checks (if possible) of the area for IED materials,
indicators, and equipment that may lead to other IEDs flanking the unit.
z Control:
Control the area inside the cordon to ensure only authorized access.
• Allow only authorized emergency vehicles to enter the cordoned area.
• Ensure all personnel and vehicles enter and exit the cordoned area through the ICP.
Scan for other enemy indicators such as a cameraman, triggerman, or any other observer.
POST-CONVOY ACTIVITIES
5-9. After return to the convoy’s compound, the convoy commander is required to close out the mission.
In order to accomplish this, several steps must be performed:
z Conduct post-convoy debriefing. Normally, the convoy commander is debriefed by the S-2 and
provides the S-2 with any new information observed about the enemy while traveling in the
convoy.
z Conduct post-convoy PMCS. The convoy noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) ensures
after-action PMCS of the convoy vehicles. The NCOIC also ensures that Soldiers conduct
maintenance of all individual weapons, crew-served weapons, and convoy-related equipment, to
include CREW systems.
z Immediately notify FSR or appropriate personnel of any equipment damage or failure.
z Ensure CREW equipment is secure.
OPSEC IS CRITICAL!!
CAUTION!
z All CREW systems are high value sensitive items and require safeguarding.
z Use caution when working around ALL electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipment.
z High voltage and radio frequency (RF) radiation are present in CREW
systems.
z Keep systems dry.
z CREW systems are not a substitute for good tactical standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and situational awareness.
z CREW systems provide an additional layer of protection.
z CREW systems interfere with communication devices.
z Always check power cables, antenna cables, nuts, bolts and lock-washers,
cable tie-downs, and security fasteners. Inspect the antenna locations for
missing or broken parts.
z Operator must receive interoperability distances before convoying with
vehicles using CREW devices. Convoying with systems that are NOT
compatible can cause system performance degradation. See your Joint
CREW Field Office representative or your S-6/S-2 or EWO for
interoperability and current program load information.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active and Reactive jammer
• Effective against high- and low-power
threats
• Threat event logging
TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range....................... Line of sight
System weight.............. 70 lbs including mount
Temperature range…...……. -40° C to 65° C
MTFB……………………………… 4,000 hours
AN/VLQ-12 DUKE
FUNCTION: Jammer
SYSTEM COMPONENTS: You may not have all of these DUKE components in figure A-1.
Essential Equipment
System Cables
GPS Antenna
R-PDA:
z Ruggedized
z New Threat Programmability
z Field Configurable Downloader
z Graphical User Man-Machine Interface (MMI)
Laptop:
z Ruggedized
z DVD ROM
z CD-R/RW Drive
z Field Configurable Downloader
z Diagnostics
z Graphical User MMI
Antennas:
z Vehicle Antenna
z Broadband
z Frequency-Bands A and B
z Single Mount
z Spring Mount
5 System Connector Used to connect the RCU Cable to (J1) on the RCU and (J2) on
the Primary Unit.
6 PDA Connector Used to connect the PDA Interface Cable to (J2) on the Primary
Unit and (J2) on the RCU. The PDA enables the operator to
remotely transfer new configuration data or download event logs
remotely from the front of the vehicle.
DEVICE OPERATION:
Note. When the Primary Unit is powered on, the four blower assemblies (located under the
shroud cover) will start and the operator will feel air blowing out from under the cover. If the
fans are not functioning properly, a maintenance action should be initiated, as required, during
pre-mission. Ensure there is a 1-inch clearance on the sides and rear of the Primary Unit to allow
for adequate air flow.
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning on the Duke device.
2. Ensure all System Cable connections are properly connected.
3. Ensure RUN/STANDBY switch (13) is in the STANDBY (Down) position.
4. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR ON (Up) position. System will run
through an Initial 16-second Built-in Test (BIT) which will be evident with the lights blinking
in sequence. The green LED (1) will illuminate ON-Blinking.
5. Set the RUN/STANDBY (13) switch on the Primary Unit to the RUN (Up) position. The green
LED (1) will be ON-Solid.
If a fault occurs during a mission, the red LED will light or blink and the system will not
function properly. To clear the fault:
1. Cycle the power from either the Primary Unit (or RCU) if being operated remotely) by setting
the PWR switch (12) to the PWR OFF (Middle) position, waiting 10 seconds, and then setting
the PWR switch (12) back to the PWR ON (Up) position.
2. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
3. If the fault does not clear after cycling power (red LED remains lit or blinking), remove power
and check the Primary Unit and Antenna cable connections.
4. Restore power to the system.
5. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
6. If the red LED is lit or blinking, the fault has not been cleared. The operator should initiate a
maintenance action and contact an FSR, as required.
Follow unit TTP when RED Fault indictor is illuminated during mission.
1. To place the Primary Unit in standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) to the
STANDBY (Down) position. The green LED will blink while in Standby mode.
2. To take the Primary Unit out of the standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) to the
RUN (Up) position. The green LED will return to a solid state.
1. Set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) on the Primary Unit to the STANDBY (Down) position.
2. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR OFF (Middle) position. The green
LED will go out, indicating the power has been removed from the primary unit.
1. Ensure all AN/VLQ-12 Countermeasures Set cable connections are properly connected.
2. Ensure the RUN/STANDBY (13) switch on the Primary Unit is in the RUN (Up) position.
3. Ensure the PWR Switch (12) on the Primary Unit is in the REMOTE (Down) position.
4. Set the PWR Switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR ON (Up) position. SYSTEM WILL RUN
THROUGH AN INITIAL 16-SECOND BIT WHICH WILL BE EVIDENT WITH THE
LIGHTS BLINKING IN SEQUENCE. The green LED (4) will illuminate.
5. Set the RUN/STANDBY (2) Switch on the RCU to the RUN (Up) position.
If a fault occurs during a mission, the red LED (4) will light or blink and the system will not
function properly. To clear the fault:
1. Cycle the power from either the Primary Unit (or RCU if being operated remotely) by setting the
PWR switch (1) to the PWR OFF (Middle) position, waiting 10 seconds, and then setting the
PWR switch (1) back to the PWR ON (Up) position.
2. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
3. If the fault does not clear after cycling power (red LED remains lit or blinking), remove power
and check the Primary Unit and Antenna cable connections.
4. Restore power to the system.
5. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
6. If the red LED is lit or blinking, the fault has not been cleared. The operator should initiate a
maintenance action and contact an FSR, as required.
Follow unit TTP when RED Fault indictor is illuminated during mission.
1. To remotely place the Primary Unit in Standby, set the RUN/STANDBY (2) switch on the RCU
to the STANDBY (Down) position. The green LED (4) will blink while in Standby mode.
2. To take the Primary Unit out of the Standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY (2) switch on the
RCU to the RUN (Up) position. The green LED (4) will return to a solid state.
Set the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR OFF (Down) position. The green LED (1) will go out
indicating the power has been removed from the Primary Unit.
Zeroize/Emergency Erase:
Note. Power must be applied to the Primary Unit in order to disable it using the ZEROIZE (10)
switch.
Note. If the Primary Unit is inadvertently zeroized, it must be reconfigured by reloading the .c2f
file from the PDA.
Zeroizing the Primary Unit will delete all critical systems information.
1. Lift the red cover, press down and hold the ZEROIZE switch (10) on the Primary Unit for 10
seconds before releaing the switch.
2. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR OFF (Middle) position.
3. Wait 10 seconds before setting the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR ON (Up)
position. All of the LEDs (1) will blink.
1. Lift the red cover and press down on the RCU ZEROIZE switch (3) for 10 seconds before
releasing the switch.
2. Set the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR OFF (Down) position.
3. Wait 10 seconds before setting the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR ON (Up) position.
All of the LEDs will blink.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active jammer
• Effective against low- and
some high- power threats
• Utilizes a Notch Filter to
prevent communications
fratricide.
TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range. .................Line of sight
mICE
FUNCTION: Jammer
ANTENNAS:
z Vehicle Antenna
Turn ON Procedure
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Ensure STANDBY/RADIATE switch is in the up position (STANDBY).
3. Place MASTER power switch in the down (ON) position.
4. Fault light should illuminate and stay on for 3 to 5 minutes. If the light does not go out after 5
minutes – possibly longer in cold weather – there is a fault. Inform your supervisor and/or FSR.
5. Ensure exhaust fans are operating and clear of debris.
6. When FAULT light goes out, place STANDBY/RADIATE switch down in the (RADIATE)
position.
CAUTION
Verify whip antennas are in upright position
Zeroize/Emergency Erase
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active jammer
• Operates on 12v-36v DC Power
• 10 Programming channels
TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range..................................Line of sight
MMBJ
PROJECT NAME: Mobile Multi-Band Jammer (figure A-5).
FUNCTION: Jammer
ANTENNAS:
z Vehicle Antenna
DEVICE OPERATION:
Turn ON Procedure
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Pull and move power switch to the up (ON) position.
3. The display will come on and cycle through its initialization and BIT.
4. Press “soft key” RF ON.
5. Press “soft key” YES to confirm RF ON.
6. Ensure fans are turning and moving air.
7. If display reads “UNIT ZEROIZED,” unit is non-functional. Contact FSR for reprogramming
MMBJ software/firmware.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
ANTENNAS:
Vehicle Antenna
Red & Green Blanking Cable Configuration (figures A-6, A-7, and A-8).
Turn ON Procedure
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Place both switches on the Low- and Mid- Band transmitters in the down (ON) position.
3. Ensure both power indicator lights are lit.
4. If not lit, inform your supervisor and/or FSR.
Turn ON Procedure
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning on Green.
2. Ensure user data module (UDM) card is installed.
3. Pull and move power switch to the up (ON) position.
4. Screen will display INIT WARLOCK.
5. The display will change as the Green goes through its initialization and BIT.
6. When the display shows a Floating Star (******), the Green is scanning ready to jam.
7. As it detects signals, the display will show which channel(s) it is transmitting on.
8. If the display shows a fault, turn it off and turn it on again.
9. If the display still shows a fault, inform your supervisor and/or FSR.
1. Ensure Green is in Operate mode and press MENU, then press DOWN arrow. Once STANDBY is
observed, press SEL.
2. Press MENU then DOWN arrow until CHANNEL is observed. Press SEL.
3. Press UP or DOWN arrows to scroll to the desired channel, then press SEL.
4. Press UP arrow, FOR is seen, press SEL.
5. Press the MENU then press SEL, OPERATE is observed.
6. The system is now in the Force Jam mode for the selected channel; an audible tone will sound and
(FOR Channel #) will appear after 10 seconds.
7. If additional channels are required for Force Jam mode, repeat Steps 1 through 6.
8. To return to the normal Operation Mode, perform steps 9 and 10.
9. Repeat Steps 1 through 3, then press the down arrow once (ON is observed).
10. Then Press SEL, Press MENU, Press SEL; the Forced Channel is restored to normal operation.
Note. Up to three channels can be selected for Force Jam mode. Check with the program office
or S-6/S-2 for Force Jam Channels.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active jammer
• Effective against specific high
power threats
• System has 5 RF cards
TABULATED DATA:
SSVJ-L
PROJECT NAME: Self-Screening Vehicle Jammer-L Band (figures A-9 and A-10).
FUNCTION: Jammer
SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
ANTENNAS:
Vehicle Antenna
DEVICE OPERATION:
Turn ON Procedure
1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Center position is OFF.
3. Switch up position is ON and switch down position is ON / BLK OUT.
4. Press switch to UP / ON position (power lamp illuminates bright).
5. System is transmitting in UP or DOWN position.
6. Press switch to DOWN / BLK OUT (power lamp is dim).
7. Amp meter on DCU should read 3.8 to 5.3 Amps.
8. If red light does not come on, recheck power leads.
9. If Amp meter reads low or high, contact FSR.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Reactive jammer
• Effective against high- and low- power
threats
• Scan and jam over 20 channels
simultaneously WARLOCK LX
ANTENNAS:
Vehicle
WARNING
The system will not operate correctly with the chassis front panel
removed. The Warlock LX remote control operates exactly the
same as the Front Panel interface.
DEVICE OPERATION:
Turn ON Procedure:
3. Once system power has been applied, the LEDs on the Front Panel and the Remote Control will flash
on briefly.
4. The system then begins a boot-up sequence ends with the system entering the Standby state and with
the BIT passing.
This condition is noted by viewing the STBY and BIT OK LEDs illuminated. This
process takes approximately 40 seconds.
WARNING
WARNING
System Bypass:
Zeroize/Emergency Erase:
1. Press the AUDIO and BYPAS buttons simultaneously for more than two seconds.
2. When ZEROIZE is initiated, all classified data is purged and the system is rendered unusable until it is
reconfigured with the laptop computer.
3. The BIT and STBY LEDs will blink continuously once the Zeroize function is complete.
1. With the laptop connected to the LX system, go to the Windows Control Software -TW System
Summary menu.
2. Select Reset Hardware.
3. Select YES to DECLASSIFY system, which will erase the configuration stored in the electronically
erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM).
4. Select NO to leave the system CLASSIFIED.
5. Exit the software program.
WARNING
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active/Reactive jammer
• 22v-36v DC Power
• Effective against high and low power
threats
• Holds up to 15 mission loads
TABULATED DATA:
DESCRIPTION: The CVRJ is a US Army Warlock system. The system operates on 24v DC and has a RCU
to operate the system. The CVRJ is effective against high- and low- power threats.
MODES OF OPERATION:
1. Initialization Mode is where the system will perform its bootload processing and initialization functions.
2. The system will transition to Initialization Mode immediately after power is applied to the system. Power will be
applied to the system whenever the RCU power button is pressed, or if the RCU is not connected to the system,
whenever the power switch (SW2) on the CVRJ Assembly’s front panel is turned to its ON position.
3. If the RCU is connected to the system, the system will complete its initialization functions and transition into
Standby Mode or Fail Mode depending on whether critical failures have been detected during Initialization Mode.
4. If the RCU is not connected to the system, and no critical failures were detected during Initialization Mode, the
system will transition into Operate Mode within 45 seconds of system power-on, and will execute the default
mission. If the RCU is not connected to the system, and critical failures were detected during Initialization Mode,
the system will transition into Fail Mode within 45 seconds of system power-on.
CVRJ Assembly Operate Mode: Operate Mode is when the system is fully mission capable. To enter Operate
Mode, press OPR on the RCU.
1. Standby mode is where the all RF transmissions are disabled but the system receives and reports threats.
2. To enter Standby mode, select STBY on the RCU.
3. If the RCU is not connected to the system, the system cannot be put into the Standby mode.
1. Power-Off Mode is when no external power is applied to any of the system components.
2. To enter Power Off Mode, select PWR on the RCU or move the power switch (SW2) on the CVRJ Assembly’s
front panel to the OFF position.
1. Fail Mode is where the system can no longer be relied upon due to detected critical errors.
2. The system will transition into Fail Mode each time it detects a critical failure (for example, voltage standing
wave ratio [VSWR]) regardless on whether the RCU is connected to the system.
WARNING
The CVRJ Assembly performs a BIT during system start up and continuously monitors the health of the system
during operation. When the system detects a fault, the fault string will be reported to the operator on the RCU.
If a critical fault is detected (for example, VSWR), the system will enter fail mode until the fault is cleared and
the system is rebooted.
1. When power is applied, the RCU will enter its Self-Test Mode, and begin its internal self-test, this
checks RCU random access memory (RAM) and internal functions.
2. Self-Test begins by illuminating all pixels of the RCU display text area and all annunciators for 3
seconds before extinguishing them (Self-Test Display).
3. The RCU will then clear its display screen, including all annunciators, and then display the “TESTING
RCU” message on the second line of the RCU display screen (Testing RCU Display).
4. If the RCU completes its self-test successfully, it will transition into its Testing COMM message on
the second line of the RCU display screen. If the RCU fails its self-test, it will first clear its display
screen, save its failure code, and then display the “RCU FAIL - XX” message on the second line of the
RCU display screen where XX is the failure code in hex decimal language and transitioning into Idle
Mode (RCU Fail Display).
5. The RCU will then await the Start Host Communications Test control from the CVRJ Assembly to
begin its COMM Test transmit/receive message sequence with the CVRJ.
6. If the RCU does not receive the Start Host Communications Test control from the CVRJ Assembly
within 5 seconds after completion of its self-test, it will first clear its display screen, including all
annunciators, save its failure code, and then display the “COMM FAIL” message on the second line of
the RCU display screen (COMM Fail Display), and finally will transition into its Idle Mode.
7. If the RCU completes its Host Communications Test successfully, it will transition into its default
Mission processing and will display the Loading Mission in progress screen on the RCU (Loading
Mission Display). The first line of the RCU displays the Status, the second line displays the specific
Mission Identification being loaded, the third line displays the mission of the day filename, and the
fourth line displays the mission of the day file date.
8. Following a successful load, the RCU will display Mission Load Complete screen (Mission Load
Complete screen). If the load was unsuccessful, the RCU will display the Load Fail display and
illuminate the front panel fault indicator (Load Fail Display). On the RCU, the Load Fail display on
line three (the slot number (first digit) and FPGA number (second digit)) that did not load properly
will be displayed. The identification of the Enhanced Red Field Programmable Gate-Array (FPGA)
that did not respond, or did not respond correctly is displayed with the capital letter “R”.
9. Once the Mission load is complete, the RCU will transition into Standby mode.
Note. Selecting the mission profile can be performed in either the Operate or Standby mode.
Once the mission load is complete the CVRJ will resume processing in the Mode it was
processing (for example, Operate, Standby).
The CVRJ can store up to 15 separate mission loads. If the RCU is not present, the CVRJ will default to the
most recent mission programmed into the system.
Operating Procedures
1. On the RCU, press and hold the “PWR” until the system turns on. Once the CVRJ Assembly
completes its initialization, the CVRJ will transition into Standby mode and light the STBY
Annunciator on the RCU (figure A-16 and table A-5).
2. Select Operate Mode by pressing “OPR” on the RCU.
3. Verify the OPR Annunciator is displayed on the RCU.
4. To change the desired Mission Load, perform the following:
a. Press “SEL” on the RCU.
b. Press the Up “↑” or Down “↓” Arrow keys on the RCU to select the mission desired.
c. Press “Load” on the RCU to load the selected mission.
d. Once the load is complete, the CVRJ Assembly will resume in Standby mode.
e. Select OPR on the RCU to Operate with the newly selected mission.
Note. The default Mission Load is automatically loaded during the Initialization Mode.
Operating Display
During normal operations, the system status will be displayed on the RCU display with information describing
any threats detected and threats jammed.
z Each Channel on the agile threat killer circuit card asset that is currently jamming will be shown
on lines 1 and 2 of the RCU, along with the code to describe the threats being jammed.
z If the STBY Annunciator was illuminated instead of the OPR Annunciator, the reported threats
would be interpreted as detected threats rather than jammed threats, and the JAM Annunciator
would be off.
z Each Channel is represented by a Capital letter A through H and the threat code for each channel
is a hexadecimal number format that represents the threats that have been detected and are being
jammed.
z The display position of each channel is fixed on the RCU display. Channels that have no threats
detected or jammed will not be displayed, and the positions of the channels that do have threats
detected or jammed will be unchanged.
If the “F1” key is pressed, the RCU will display the first page of the System.
Configuration Details:
z If the operator presses the “↑”up or “↓” down arrow keys while the system is in the
“Configuration” state, the RCU will display more System Configuration Detail pages, if they are
available.
z When the operator presses the “Exit” key while in the “Configuration” state, the display on the
RCU will return to normal.
In the event that an operational RCU becomes non-operational (for example, umbilical cord disconnected), the
system will continue processing under its current mode (that is, Operate or Standby). If the system is powered
down and powered back up, the CVRJ will default Mission (Mission 0) in Operate Mode.
Zeroize
In the event that the CVRJ system may be compromised, proceed with the following: On the RCU keypad,
press Zero key or on the CVRJ lift the Zeroize switch on the front panel.
Note. Both the Zero button on the RCU and the Zeroize switch on the CVRJ Assembly front
panel will be functional even when no power is applied to the system.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
• Active Jammer
• 24v DC Power
• Effective low-power threats
• 20 Direct Digital Synthesizer Mobile Multi Band Jammer (MMBJ-1B)
(DDS) cards
PROJECT NAME: MMBJ-1B
TABULATED DATA:
FUNCTION: Active Jammer
Jamming range …..............Line of sight
DESCRIPTION: The Mobile Multi Band Jammer-1B is a US
Army system. The system operates on 24v DC and has an RCU to
operate the system. The system is effective against low-power
threats.
DEVICE OPERATION:
POWER UP:
1. Pull the DC Power Supply PWR ON switch toward you, lift it up to the ON position and release it.
You should hear the cooling fans running. Use your hand to feel the air flow and ensure both fans are
running.
2. Pull the Transmitter POWER ON/OFF switch toward you, lift it up to the ON position and release it.
3. Approximately 6 seconds after power up, the “INITIALIZING” message should appear on the RDU.
4. About 4 seconds after the INITIALIZING page, the CONFIG page will appear for approximately 3
seconds.
5. When the main screen initialization is complete, the RDU display will appear with the following:
z PROGRAM 1 – represents the current preset program.
z RF OFF – shows that the unit is not transmitting.
z SYNC OK – shows that the GPS system is working and synchronized.
z BIT OK – shows that MMBJ-1B has passed BIT checks and that no errors were found.
z RF ON – labels the “soft-key” immediately below RF ON as the button to press to begin
transmitting. Labeling of the soft-keys will typically be located on the third and fourth lines of
the display during operation.
z SEL PGM – labels the select program soft-key button. Press this button to enter the select
preprogrammed menu screen.
z PAGE – press the fourth soft-key to cycle through additional control screens. The operation is
“one-way.” The operator must go through all screens to get back to the first one.
Amplifier Status
z Temperature and overall status for each amplifier is shown.
z An over-temperature is indicated by “BAD” verses an acceptable range having an indication of
“OK.” This will cause a "*CHK BIT*" indication on the main page.
z Maximum amplifier temperature is 90°C (194°F) (A, B, and E) and 85°C (185°F) (F).
z Amplifiers will be automatically disabled upon exceeding temperature limit; amplifiers are
automatically re-enabled when temperature falls 5°C (9°F) below limit.
z Maximum ambient air operating temperature is 65°C (149°F) with no direct sun loading.
1. Press SEL PGM to select a preset combination of RF outputs: Goes to Program Change screen.
2. Press UP or DN to select a preset combination of RF outputs:
a. Each press changes the number after “PROGRAM” to a new number 1 through 30.
b. Programs 1 through 6 contain factory default programs and cannot be modified in the field.
c. Test programs A, B, E, and F are also provided for bench or open-air tests by FSRs.
3. Press DONE when complete.
4. Automatically shows this screen when the DONE key is pressed.
a. Or after the CONTINUE key is pressed from the empty program warning screen.
b. Prevents accidentally changing the selected program.
5. Upon pressing YES or NO, the screen returns to the main page.
Enable Jamming:
3. This screen is not displayed if the back-up RF Switch is used, since double-tapping the RF ON/OFF
switch serves as confirmation.
Disable Jamming:
1. The Confirmation screen appears when the RF OFF key is pressed, preventing accidentally entering
the OFF state.
3. Upon pressing YES or NO, the screen returns to the main page.
4. This screen is not displayed if the backup RF Switch is used, since double-tapping the RF ON/OFF
switch serves as confirmation.
1. Although the display has a built-in night vision (NV) filter, the display may still be overly bright.
2. The display and controls may be placed in a special NV mode by use of the DISP control.
3. The unit will switch between normal and NV mode displays each time the DISP control is pressed.
Zeroize: The ZERO switch on the RCU and the ZEROIZE switch on the Transmitter operate the same way:
POWER DOWN:
1. Lift and move the Transmitter POWER ON/OFF switch to the down position.
2. Lift and move the DC Power Supply PWR ON switch to the down position.
Note. When powering down, it is preferred if the jamming is disabled (RF is off) but this is not
required.
SYSTEM SUMMARY
FEATURES:
TABULATED DATA:
Spectrum Analyzer
PROJECT NAME: NA
POWER SOURCE: A rechargeable/field-replaceable battery, AC/DC power supply, and 12.5V automobile
cigarette lighter adapter. NOTE: The battery will not charge if the battery temperature is above 45° C or below
0° C. The NiMH battery will last longer and perform better if allowed to completely discharge before
recharging. For maximum battery life, it is recommended that the NiMH battery be completely discharged and
recharged once every 3 months. It is normal for NiMH batteries to self-discharge during storage, and to degrade
to 80 percent of original capacity after 12 months of continuous use.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS: The MS2711D includes data analysis software, soft carrying case,
rechargeable/field-replaceable battery, AC/DC power supply, and 12.5V automobile cigarette lighter adapter
and users guide.
DEVICE OPERATION:
Note. Refer to the Users Guide for the particular spectrum analyzer you are using.
FUNCTION: Jammer
DESCRIPTION: The QRD system is designed for deployment in a tactical man-pack configuration. The
system weight is 3 to 24 lbs. It is comprised of 3 manportable units. Each unit can be used alone; however,
when used as a suite of systems, protection is increased. Each system uses its own antenna.
z Guardian B1 (Low-Band).
z Guardian B (Mid-Band).
z Guardian C (High-Band).
DESCRIPTION: The Chameleon is a US Marine Corps 4-channel active jammer system which jams high-
and low-power threats. The system uses a ruggedized personal digital assistant (PDA) for programming and
operator interface.
HUNTER
DESCRIPTION: The Hunter is the US Marine Corps system active jammer which jams high- and low-power
threats. The Hunter has not undergone interoperability testing with other CREW systems.
ACORN
DESCRIPTION: The Acorn is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is used against high- and low-
power threats.
WILLOW
DESCRIPTION: The Willow is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is used by Navy and Army
EOD personnel. The system is used against low-power threats.
SPRUCE
DESCRIPTION: The Spruce is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.
PECAN
DESCRIPTION: The Pecan is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.
BEECH
DESCRIPTION: The Beech is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.
SYMPHONY
DESCRIPTION: The Symphony is not based on any existing CREW technology and therefore its loss and
potential reverse engineering will not jeopardize our own technologies. The primary user for this system are
Coalition Forces. The system is effective against low- and some high-power threats.
DUAL-BAND ANTENNA
maxRAD ANTENNA
SHAKESPEARE ANTENNA
SMITH ANTENNA
SNORKEL ANTENNA
WHIP ANTENNA
z The numbers provided represent the range at which interference will occur degrading one or
both of the system’s ability to suppress targets.
z The gray boxes with a distance inside list the required separation to avoid interference.
z The boxes depicting horizontal stripes represent no interference.
z The boxes with diagonal stripes (classified) have interference ranges. Consult your S-6/S-2,
EWO, Warlock FSR, or go to the CREW SIPRNET site at http://arat.army.smil.mil/SEPS-
WARLOCK/warlock
Note. ALWAYS check with your S-6/S-2 when multiple CREW systems are employed to avoid
potential conflict
CJTF-7
http://www.cjtf 7.army.mil
http://www.mccll.usmn.smil.mil
Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Support Center https://www.jeodnet.mil
http://tsc.jeodnet.smil.mil
While deployed, you can contact the JIEDDO Field Team in theater for up-to-date developments.
OPERATOR
F-4. Primary operators of the CREW system will be general-purpose users.
TRAINING
F-5. Initial operator training will consist of USAIC-provided mobile training teams (MTTs) which will
train CREW individual and collective tasks pertaining to the operational domain. Soldiers also receive
CREW training at combat training centers (National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and
Joint Mobilization Readiness Center) as well as home station. There will also be New Equipment Training
(NET) provided at the time of equipment installation.
MAINTENANCE
F-6. Level-one maintenance will be performed by the individual Soldier. All other maintenance will be
provided by materiel developer maintainers until a military MOS is agreed upon and trained at the
appropriate institution.
requirements necessary to execute the system training strategy, NET, institutional training, and unit
sustainment training. These training products constitute the system TSP and will be validated by the
system’s training proponent and tested during the developmental/limited user testing of the system.
F-8. The materiel developer will execute all system-related training development activities in support of
the proponent utilizing the TRADOC Systems Approach to Training process per AR 350-1 with all
training and doctrinal analysis data documented using Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT),
and/or any doctrinal analysis database that will replace the ASAT system in the future.
F-9. Familiarization training will be conducted at initial military training with the intent of integrating
CREW capabilities as part of Army culture. Initial operator training will consist of USAIC&FH-provided
MTTs which will train CREW individual and collective tasks pertaining to the operational domain. The
MTT will also conduct Instructor and Key Personnel Training for instructors at all centers and schools.
F-10. There will also be NET for operator and leader training provided at the time of equipment
installation. A Secret clearance is required for leader training at the time of NET and MTT. Doctrine and
tactics training will be presented by proponent personnel during NET and available online via NonSecure
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/SIPRNET.
F-11. The NET team will leave TSPs with the gaining unit. Unit commanders will be responsible for
providing operator sustainment training within their unit. Unit sustainment training reinforces and provides
any necessary additional training to support the unit’s Mission Essential Task List.
z Unit training can consist of field training exercises and Warfighter simulation exercises.
z Sustainment training will be supported by the creation of operator common task training,
modification of existing convoy-related common tasks, a CREW training device, and RCIED
simulator. Operator training will be integrated and trained at some level at all institutions and
sustained at combat training centers and home station.
z Leader training will be integrated into the existing Noncommissioned Officer Education System
(NCOES) and Officer Education System.
F-12. CREW leader training can be given to personnel with a Secret clearance by the training institution. If
leader personnel do not have a Secret clearance, then an unclassified version of CREW training can be
given in such cases.
F-13. CREW will be integrated into the existing virtual training environment and made available to the
operational training domain. CREW use and reinforcement training may occur in live, virtual, constructive
(LVC) environments: live at locations such as combat training centers; virtually in simulators such as the
Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer; and constructively in the Battle Command Training Program.
z Training schedule.
z Program of Instruction.
z List of training devices and embedded training components.
z Ammunition, targets, and ranges for training.
z Army training and evaluation program draft mission training plans or changes to the mission
training plans.
z Target audience description.
z Draft Soldiers training publications or changes.
z Lesson plans.
z System Critical Task List.
z Field manuals or changes to field manuals (when not provided with the Doctrine and
Organization Test Package).
TRAINING PUBLICATIONS
F-20. The materiel developer has developed an interactive technical manual (IETM) (TM 11-5865-359-
10). Institutions can access this information on Army Knowledge Online-Secret (AKO-S). The materiel
developer is responsible for developing a software users manual and Soldiers training publication for
CREW. Institutions will require multimedia computers with CD-ROM, web browser capability, and access
to the NIPRNET and SIPRNET and AKO. JCREW QRT has developed a JCREW Handbook that
describes EW principles, IED threats, EW staff planning, and types of CREW jammer systems. All training
publications will be updated by their respective developers when major modifications to CREW occur.
training devices to work with the TIED. Current TADSS available for use in the institutional domain are as
follows:
z XM-1.
z TIED/ TIED 2.
z Actual CREW Systems.
z DARWARS Ambush.
z Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer.
z Close Combat Tactical Trainer.
Training Aids
F-23. Graphic Training Aid 90-10-047, JCREW Handbook, has been developed for training of EW
principles, IED threats, EW staff planning, and types of CREW jammer systems.
Training Devices
F-24. Training devices in the institutional domain include the XM-1 CREW training device and actual
CREW systems. Level 3 IMI and an IETM are currently available with unlimited distribution under the For
Official Use Only classification for all levels of training. The XM-1 training device is simply a physical
representation of CREW capabilities with very limited functionality. The XM-1 has basic switches,
indicator lights, and an audible alarm initiated by an observer or controller. This device is needed at
TRADOC installations for familiarization training with the concepts and principles of CREW
characteristics and operation.
Simulators
F-25. The Training Improvised Explosive Device Increment 2 (TIED 2), which includes several different
size devices (M155 large IED simulator, pressure-sensitive landmine, and tripwire booby trap) is available
for training. It is a safe effective system that provides non-pyrotechnic signatures using carbon dioxide, and
is much improved over the initial TIED. All simulated systems that can be affected by CREW should be
updated to reflect the effects of CREW operation on their platforms. If a CREW level two/three
maintenance MOS is established, maintenance training devices will be required for institutional and
sustainment training.
Simulations
F-26. The DARWARS Ambush Simulation can emulate CREW capabilities and functions for
reinforcement of individual or vehicle crew tasks. The 2d and 3d visual representation of the CREW
devices and any impact of CREW devices on military operations must be reflected in all current
interoperable simulations (for example, Aviation Semi-Automated Forces, Brigade/Battalion Battle
Simulation [BBS], JANUS, and Joint Conflicts and Tactical Simulation [JCATS]) and current and future
semi-automated forces (Aviation Semi-Automated Forces, Objective One Semi-Automated Forces, other).
CREW source data covering the full operational capability and the logistic requirements must be provided
to the National Simulation Center for inclusion in all higher level constructive simulations.
OPERATIONAL VIEW
F-27. Table F-1 describes the battlefield tasks and activities the CREW system supports.
Table F-1. CREW tasks
Counter RCIED
SYSTEMS VIEW
F-28. Figure F-2 describes the interconnection of CREW systems in the systems view.
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
F-29. CREW will use existing facilities and support infrastructure. The staff training estimate in support of
CREW will focus on the most efficient use of existing resources and precisely identify and quantify any
expected shortfalls. Training development will focus on producing products that are capable of being used
both in the institution and in the operational training domain and focused only on combat critical tasks.
REQUIREMENTS GENERATION
F-31. The CREW system training plan supports the capabilities production document (CPD) which was
approved at the Army Requirements Oversight Council on 12 March 2007.
EVALUATION
F-33. The following feedback mechanisms will be used to measure, audit, and analyze the efficiency and
effectiveness of the CREW training.
Quality Assurance
F-34. Quality assurance plans will be used in accordance with each installation’s quality assurance plan.
The Standard Army After-Action Review System will be used to provide feedback on the course content
and the instructors. The quality assurance office at each center and school will receive feedback from the
users to ensure that the training meets the user’s need. Feedback will assist each center and school in
correcting training deficiencies and will provide information that may affect the next generation of
equipment or product improvement. This information will be used to revise the training courses and
materials.
Assessments
F-35. Assessments will be used, to include––
z Standard Army After-Action Review System.
z Training evaluation and analyses.
z Monthly status reports.
F-38. TSPs will be delivered as part of the MTT as well as at NET and be available on exportable media or
online. TSPs will include doctrine and tactics training and exportable Level 3 IMI. CREW is integrated
into all convoy-related common tasks as shown in table F-3. See figure F-3 for CREW operational skills,
knowledge and attributes.
Table F-2. CREW common tasks
Skill Level Task Number Title
Officer 171-620-0024 Conduct Convoy Escort Operations At Company/Team/Troop
Level
1 551-88M-0005 Operate a Vehicle in a Convoy
3 071-326-3013 Conduct a Tactical Road March
3 191-379-4407 Plan Convoy Security Operations
4 551-721-4326 Perform Duties as Convoy Commander
4 551-88M-0001 Lead a Convoy Serial/March Unit
TRAINING DEVICES
F-39. Training devices in the operational domain include the CREW 2 training system. Level 3 IMI and an
IETM are currently available with limited distribution (For Official Use Only) for all levels of training.
Level 3 IMI has been created in the form of a CBT. The IMI supports operator and leader training. An
IETM has been created by the materiel developer to serve as training tool for all levels of training by
operators and maintainers.
F-40. The actual live CREW systems will be used during MTT and Instructor and Key Personnel Training
events. The CREW 2 training system is a fully functional CREW device. It has actual physical components
utilized with RF propagation recreated in a virtual (software) environment. The CREW 2 training system
creates operationally realistic cause and effects of employing CREW capabilities. The CREW 2 training
system training devices are for use at home station and include the following:
z Physical representation of the current CREW-2 (DUKE) system.
z Primary Unit.
SIMULATORS
F-41. PEO-STRI has developed the TIED 2, which includes several different size devices (large, pressure-
sensitive mine, and booby trap). It is a safe, effective system that provides non-pyrotechnic signatures
using CO2, and is much improved over the initial TIED. The CREW 2 training system has the ability to
interface with an IED effects simulator:
z Current – TIED 2 (with Interrupt Device).
z Future – IED effects simulator.
F-44. Figure F-4 shows the skills, knowledge, and attributes that have been identified for the self-
development domain.
DEVELOPMENT
SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTRIBUTES
SELF-
CREW Familiarization X
CREW Principles and Fundamentals X
CREW System Operation X
CREW Capabilities and Limitations X
System Programming X
Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections X
CREW Maintenance Procedures X
Integration of CREW into the Battle Command/MDMP X
CREW Considerations in Convoy Planning X
CREW Employment Considerations X
Staying Current with an Adaptive Migrating Threat X
AC alternating current
AKO-S Army Knowledge Online-Secret
AM amplitude modulation
amp amplitude
ANCOC advanced noncommissioned officer course
AO area of operations
AoA Analysis of Alternatives
APCR adjacent channel power ratio
AR Army regulation
ARAT Army reprogramming analysis team
ARNG Army National Guard
ARNGUS Army National Guard of the United States
ASAT Automated Systems Approach to Training
BIT built-in test
BNC binary network connector
BNCOC basic noncommissioned officer course
BOLC basic officer leader course
BSNCOC battle staff noncommissioned officer course
C2 command and control
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
CBT computer-based training
CCC captains career course
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CD-R/RW compact disc-record/rewritable
CIED counter-improvised explosive device
CM countermeasures
CONUS continental United States
CPT convoy planning tool
CREW Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic
Warfare
CTP common timing protocol
D-CREW dismounted-Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
Electronic Warfare
DCU direct current unit
DE directed energy
DOD Department of Defense
DTG date-time group
DVD digital video disk
EA electronic attack
ECM electronic countermeasures
EH explosive hazard
EHF extremely high frequency
EM electromagnetic
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EP electronic protection
ES electronic warfare support
EW electronic warfare
EWO electronic warfare officer
FM frequency modulation
FMC fully mission capable
FOB forward operating base
FOS Family of Systems
FOUO for official use only
FP force protection
FRS family radio service
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSR field support representative
FTX field training exercise
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-6 assistant chief of staff, command, control, communications, and
computer operations
GHz gigahertz
GPS global positioning system
GTA graphic training aid
HF high frequency
Hz hertz
IAW in accordance with
ICE improvised explosive device countermeasures equipment
ICP incident control point
ID identification
IED improvised explosive device
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
FMI 6-02.70. Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 5 September 2006
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 13 November 2006. Available online at
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf
JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare. 25 January 2007. Available online at
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf
TC 2-91-701. Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
30 March 2007
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
AR 75-15. Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 22 February 2005
AR 350-1. Army Training and Leader Development. 3 August 2007
AR 350-38. Training Device Policies and Management. 15 October 1993
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004
FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006
FM 2-91.6. Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection. 10 October 2007
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008
FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 15 April 2005
FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006
FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 26 October 2006
FM 3-19.1. Military Police Operations. 22 March 2001
FM 3-19.50. Police Intelligence Operations. 21 July 2006
FM 34-2. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning. 8 March 1994
FM 3-90.119. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. 21 September 2007
FM 4-30.51. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. 13 July 2006
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 8 May 1996
FM 6-99.2. US Army Report and Message Formats. 30 April 2007
FM 7-0. Training the Force. 22 October 2002
FM 7-1. Battle Focused Training. 15 September 2003
self-development skills, H
A
knowledge and Hunter, B-3
active jammers, Table A-1
attributes, Figure F-4
Acorn, B-4
tasks, Table F-1 I
Beech, B-8
vehicle receiver/jammer, IED
Chameleon ECM, B-2
A-30 definition, vi
Hunter, B-3
threat use of,
Pecan, B-7
D 1-7 through 1-10
Spruce, B-6
dual-band antenna, C-1 impact of, 1-13
Symphony, B-9
Duke, A-3 types of triggers, 2-29
Willow, B-5
5/25 method, 5-6
additional sources, E-1
E 5 C's, 5-8
antennas,
Electromagnetic Spectrum, irregular warfare, 1-5
Dual-band, C-1
2-7 through 2-12
maxRAD, C-2
Electronic Attack, 2-1 J
Shakespeare, C-2
components, 2-17
Smith, C-3
Electronic Warfare, 2-2 Jammers
Snorkel, C-3
Electronic Protection, Acorn, B-4
Whip, C-3
2-3 through 2-5 Beech, B-8
Electronic Support, 2-6 Chameleon System, B-2
B
Employment, Guardian QRD, B-1
Beech jammer, B-8
convoy activities, 5-9 Hunter, B-3
convoy briefing, 5-3 Pecan, B-7
C
convoy measures, 5-5 Spruce, B-6
capability comparison
convoy planning, 5-2post- Symphony, B-9
Table A-1
force protection, 5-6 Willow, B-5
Chameleon, B-2
pre-convoy checks, 5-4 jamming. See also Jammers.
common tasks, Table F-1
pre-convoy measures, 5-1 active, 2-19
communication
movement with CREW, 5-7 barrage, 2-24, Figure 2-7
alternatives, 4-7
single vehicle, Figure 5-1 definition, Introduction
compatibility, 4-1, Figure 4-1
two vehicle, two jammer, JIEDDO, Introduction
convoy briefing, 5-3
Figure 5-2 material solutions, 1-13
convoy force protection, 5-6
multiple vehicles, single reactive, 2-21
convoy movement, 5-7
jammer, Figure 5-3 sweep, 2-25, Figure 2-8
definition, 1-14
multiple vehicles, multiple techniques of, 2-23
employment, 3-15
jammers, Figure 5-4 Warlock LX A-24
historical, 1-16
Electronic warfare officer
increments, 1-17 through 1-25
as principal EW planner, L
interoperability chart,
3-1 line of sight, 2-29
Table D-1
responsibilities, 3-3
operational skills, knowledge
pre-mission, 3-4 M
and attributes, Figure F-3
post-mission, 3-5 equipment (mICE), A-12,
planning factors, 3-14
EM spectrum, 3-13 Figure A-4
scenario, Table 4-1
CREW employment, 3-15 masking, 2-30, Figure 2-13
self-development skills,
threat load process, 3-16 maxRAD antenna, C-2
knowledge and attributes,
modified IED countermeasure
Figure F-4
staff planning, 3-13
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0807906
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS),
and the United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution
number (IDN) 115984, requirements for TC 2-22.601.