DUE PROCESS On members of the survey team:
Engr. Cortez submitted a report stating that the actual field
Sps. Leon Casimiro et al., vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: This case is about a land dispute between Casimiro
(petitioners) and Paulin (respondents). Some time in
1979, a relocation survey was prompted by the Paulin and
was conducted by Geodetic Engr. Emilio Paz. Here, it was
discovered that petitioners’ Casimiro Village Subdivision
encroached their land by 3,110 square meters.
Respondents notified the petitioners and demanded that
they desist from making further development in the area
and subsequently demanded that they remove all
constructions in the land. Failing to regain possession of
the disputed land, the Paulins filed with the CFI of Pasay
an action for recovery of possession with damages against
the Casimiros and their lot buyers.
In their defense, the Casimiros presented Geodetic
Engineers Lino Reye and Felipe Venezuela from the
Bureau of Lands, claiming there was no encroachment in
respondents’ land. At first, the CFI ruled in favor of the
Paulins, but later reversed its ruling in favor of the
Casimiros, stating that the report from the Bureau of
Lands were more credible and accurate and enjoy the
presumption of regularity and accuracy.
On appeal, the CA ordered a relocation survey to be
conducted by a team of:
1. A surveyor designated by the respondents (Engr.
Lopez);
2. A surveyor designated by the petitioners (Engr.
Bernardo); and
3. Third member chosen by the said two surveyors
(Engr. Cortez from the Land Registration
Commission)
Petitioners complained of the following irregularities:
1. The actual field work was conducted by a separate
survey team composed of employees of the LRC
without the knowledge and presence of Engr.
Bernardo
2. Relocation plan and computations were done
without consultation and coordination among
members of the survey team
CA found nothing irregular in the relocation survey and
ruled in favor of the Paulin.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling in favor of
the Paulin
Ruling: YES.
work will be undertaken by five technical personnel, three
of whom shall come from the LRA and the remaining two
would be Engineers Bernardo and Lopez. The Casimiros
filed with the CA a motion to require Cortez to comply
with the terms of the CA’s resolution where they
complained that the actual survey was done without the
knowledge and presence of Engr. Bernardo.
Subsequently, Engr. Cortez submitted a report saying that
the actual field work was undertaken by a survey team
created by the administrator of the LRA who found that
the Casimiro property encroached on respondents’
property by 3,235 sqm which was signed by Engineers
Lopez and Cortez and not Bernardo who stated that he
never received the notice of the time and exact date of the
field survey.
Representation and Notice Requirements of Due
Process Of Law.
The reason for the requirement of representation of both
parties in the survey team is to ensure that the interests of
both sides are protected. If this requirement is breached,
serious prejudice can result. The requirement of notice
and representation in the proceedings is an essential part
of due process of law.
The field work was performed solely by engineers from
the LRA without the representatives of both parties—this
is in violation of the agreement of the parties that the
actual field work should be done by five technical
personnel. Also, the failure of Engr. Cortez to notify Engr.
Bernardo of the actual field work is a serious violation of
petitioners’ right to due process, especially because it
resulted in a deprivation of their property.
Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon
Facts: Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as
Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the
suspension of Mayor Joel Miranda, appointed the
respondents to various positions in the city government.
Their appointments were with permanent status and based
on the evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection
and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) approved the appointments.
When Mayor Joel Miranda reassumed his position after
his suspension, he considered the composition of the
PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he
belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a
three-man special performance audit team, to conduct a
personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously
screened by the PSPB and those on probation.
After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted
to him a report stating that the respondents were found
"wanting in (their) performance." three months after
Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an order
terminating respondents’ services because they
"performed poorly" during the probationary period.
Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being
employees on probation, they can be dismissed from the
service on the ground of poor performance only after their
probationary period of six months, not after three (3)
months. They also denied that an evaluation on their
performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from
the service violated their right to due process.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the respondent by
the petitioner, violated their right to due process
Ruling: YES. The dismissal of the respondent by the
petitioner, violated their right to due process, Respondents
vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing
regarding the status of their performance, neither were
they warned that they will be dismissed from the service
should they fail to improve their performance.
Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents’
assertion. The records show that what respondents
received was only the termination order from Mayor Joel
Miranda. Obviously, respondents’ right to due process
was violated.
Gov’t. of the USA vs. Guillermo G. Purganan
Facts: The US Government, through diplomatic
channels, requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. The
secretary of foreign affairs transmitted this to the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) for appropriate action.
The US Government, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition. They alleged that Jimenez was the subject of
an arrest warrant issued by the District Court for the
District of Florida in connection with the following
charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States; (2)
tax evasion; (3) wire fraud and 2; (4) false statements; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions. The Petition prayed
for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest."
Jimenez filed before it an "Ex-Parte Motion" which
prayed that application of US Government for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion
of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing,
the USA Government manifested its reservations on the
procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused
in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The RTC directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order. The US
Government filed for a Petition for Certiorari seeking to
set aside the assailed Orders of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to Notice and
Hearing before the Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest?
2. Whether or not extradition proceedings violate
Due Process?
Ruling: NO. Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,
which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation-- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There
is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before
the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge
and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his
witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the
rationale for the entire system. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence
during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting
his entire defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his
effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure
could convert the determination of a prima facie case into
a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard
but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition
case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. In the present case, Jimenez will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence,
there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
 Ceferino A. Soriano vs. Hon. Adoracion C. Angeles
Facts: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle,
Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police.
Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged
into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan
City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the
barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist
blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he
poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time
cursing him, “Putang ina mo cabeza” (“You son of a bitch
chief”). Although there were four barangay tanods
(Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson,
and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not
come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay
by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their
companions who had been waiting outside the hall.
Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital.
Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He
testified that he went to the barangay hall in the evening
of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had
been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It
appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl
with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were
arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys,
who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names
were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three
boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-
up.) As private respondent saw petitioner near the door
of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his
brother and the reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently
thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in
the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told
private respondent to lay off: “Walang pulis pulis dito”
(“Your being a policeman doesn’t pull strings here”).
When private respondent insisted on going inside the
barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed
him on the chest. Private respondent also pushed
petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and
injure himself. All the time, private respondent claimed
he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s
uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.
In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge
Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that petitioner
did not resist or even say anything when private
respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none of the
four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid.
She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he
would have suffered more serious injuries than a
contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a
lacerated wound on the lower lip.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that
respondent judge was "hell-bent on saving the private
respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case"
as shown by the fact that:
1. On August 26, 1992, before private respondent's
arraignment, she called the parties and their
counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle
the case, and, when petitioner refused, she did not
set the case for hearing until after 3 weeks allegedly
to provide a "cooling off" period;
2. On the following month, respondent judge again
called on the parties to settle the case. Petitioner
alleges that, while respondent judge stated in her
order of September 15, 1992 cancelling the hearing
on that date that this was done to enable Atty.
Sampaga to study the case as she had been
appointed as private respondent's counsel only on
that day, the same was actually a pretext, the real
reason being to give private respondent another
opportunity to persuade petitioner to settle the case.
The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had
been private respondent's counsel at the
arraignment;
3. That respondent judge excluded the testimonies of
petitioner and his witness, Manuel Montoya, for
failure of the prosecution to offer formally the same
when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this
was not so and that, at any rate, the defense waived
the objection based on this ground by cross-
examining petitioner and Montoya; and
4. That respondent judge failed to find private
respondent guilty despite the testimonies of three
eyewitnesses. Petitioner therefore prays that a
mistrial be declared and that the case be ordered
retried before another judge.
Issue: Whether or not the decision is void because it was
not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court stated that it was not
rendered by an impartial tribunal and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that
the parties were heard conformably to the norms of due
process, evidence was presented by both parties and duly
considered, their arguments were studied, analyzed, and
assessed, and judgment was rendered in which findings of
facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These
conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be
characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly
mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The
worst that may perhaps be said of them is that they are
fairly debatable and may even be possibly erroneous. But
they cannot be declared to have been made with grave
abuse of discretion. Clearly, there was no mistrial in this
case which would warrant the nullity of the assailed
judgment.
The court explained that it is pertinent to cite certain
principles laid down by the Court regarding the
disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that
due process requires. It is settled that mere suspicion that
a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there
should be evidence to prove the charge. Bias and
prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against
a judge’s sacred allegation under oath of office to
administer justice without respect to any person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a
showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case.
The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof
of respondent's judge's alleged bias are not persuasive and
nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided
the criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A
reading of her decision acquitting private respondent
shows that the same was made on the basis of her
evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the
defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the parties
as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily
based on her appreciation of the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. Finally,
petitioner's claim that respondent judge was biased is
belied by his failure to move for respondent judge's
inhibition.
Cruz & Paitim vs. Civil Service Commission
Facts: Petitioners were charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service after a fact-finding investigation disclosed that
Paitim impersonated Cruz in the non-professional career
civil service examinations conducted on July 30, 1989.
After receiving a tip-off from Esteban, CSC Chairperson
moved for an investigation and found that indeed, the
photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the
Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career
Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim.
Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said
document is totally different from the signature of Gilda
Cruz.
They submitted an Answer denying the charges against
them and moved to dismiss the case on the ground of
denial of due process because the Civil Service
Commission was the complainant, investigator, the
prosecutor, and the judge all at the same time. However,
the motion was denied. CSC found petitioners guilty as
charged and ordered their dismissal from the government
service. Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
case, contending that the it is vested with appellate
jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office
and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen
against the government employee. Both their petition for
review and motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
this recourse.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was denial of due process.
2. Whether or not CSC has original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the administrative case at bar.
Ruling:
1. NO. The petitioners merited the penalty of dismissal
because of the factual findings in the investigation
CSC conducted. The fact that the complaint was
filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could
not be an impartial judge. As an administrative
body, its decision was based on substantial findings.
Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the
Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the
petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. It
cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally
charged after a finding that a prima facie case for
dishonesty lies against them. They were properly
informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer
and were given the opportunity to defend
themselves.
2. YES. It must be noted that the acts complained of
arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in
the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination.
The examinations were under the direct control and
supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The
culprits are government employees over whom the
Civil Service Commission undeniably has
jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were duly
investigated and ascertained whether they were
indeed guilty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was
dismissal from the office. Section 28, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
explicitly provides that the CSC can rightfully take
cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
connected to the examinations.
 People of the Phils. vs. Conrad De Leon
Facts: This case is an appeal of the Regional Trial Court
(of Malabon) decision convicting Conrado de Leon of
murder with treachery, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua.
In June 1995 in Navotas, Conrado de Leo and two others
(Andring de Leon and a certain Rudy Manlapaz alias
Talakitok), armed with bladed weapons, attacked Crispin
de la Pea by hitting and stabbing him on different parts of
his body.
Simeona de la Pea narrated that around 3 in the early
morning, the bloodied body of her son, Crispin, was
brought to their house. She immediately embarked
Crispin on a tricycle before transferring him into a
jeepney to bring him to the nearest hospital. While on the
tricycle, Crispin identified accused Conrado de Leon,
along with the other accused, as among the persons who
stabbed and ganged up on him.
After Crispin died due to the stabbing wounds, the trial
court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. The
appellant was arrested but his co-accused remained at
large. De Leon pleaded not guilty, denying involvement
in the stabbing incident and claiming the trial court erred
for having given probative value to the supposed dying
declaration of the victim.
It must also be noted that the trial judge started cross-
examining the witness even before the public prosecutor
could ask his first question, thereby taking over from the
prosecution the task of impeaching Armando Roque's
credibility, when the latter testified that in his own
investigation as Brgy. Captain, only Andring de Leon and
Talakitok were implicated.
In finding appellant guilty of murder, the RTC gave full
faith and credence to the testimony of the prosecutions
witness, Reynaldo de la Pea, who had positively identified
the former as one of the perpetrators of the crime. It
likewise accepted the dying declaration of the victim
regarding his death and deemed such declaration to have
been made under the consciousness of his impending
death. These circumstances were held to prevail over
appellants defense of denial and alibi. Finally, the lower
court also ruled that the killing was attended by treachery.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it directly
participated in the cross-examination of the defense
witness
Ruling: NO. As this Court has held, the participation of
judges in the conduct of trials cannot be condemned
outrightly. They cannot be expected to remain always
passive and stoic during the proceedings. After all, they
are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and
necessary. In fact, this Court has repeatedly ruled that
judges "must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking
[witnesses] questions x x x as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts and to bring out the truth.
This means that questions designed to clarify points and
to elicit additional relevant evidence are not
improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and
prevent unnecessary waste of time.
Trial judges may examine some of the witnesses for the
defense for the purpose of ferreting out the truth and
getting to the bottom of the facts. That they do so would
not justify the charge that they assist the prosecution with
the evident desire to secure a conviction, or that they
intimidate the witnesses.
Verily, they are judges of both the law and the facts. They
would be negligent in the performance of their duties if
they permit a miscarriage of justice through their failure
to propound questions that have some material bearing
upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion,
they may cross-examine these witnesses or ask them such
questions as will enable the former to formulate sound
opinions on the ability of the latter to tell the truth, and to
draw out relevant and material testimonies that may
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. Even if the clarificatory questions they propound
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the
theory of one of the parties, bias is not necessarily
implied.
In the present case, the only purpose of the trial judge was
to arrive at the truth and do justice to both parties. An
accusation of unfairness cannot be supported when his
intention was merely to elicit the truth. As this Court has
already ruled, judges may ask questions that would elicit
the facts of the issues involved, clarify ambiguous
remarks by witnesses, and address the points that may
have been overlooked by counsel.