Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO
T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER
ORASCION AND ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La
Trinidad, Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.

G.R. No. 80018 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and
LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.

G.R. No. 80258 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH,
AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Angeles City, and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA
JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents.

Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United
States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions
by the respondent judges.

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark
Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said
base.

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force,
solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who
submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C.
del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao
for 50 years.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he
had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the
invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its
representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering
concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was
already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration of the
contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the
solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private respondents
would be notified.

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the
individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop
concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating
the concessions pending litigation. 1

Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual
petitioners to maintain the status quo.

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had
not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were
also immune from suit.

On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:

From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court's attention is
called by the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US
Government, in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding
contract between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government. By
virtue of said contract of concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US
Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the employer/s of the
plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the
employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the
Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would become in effect when the
Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the questioned barber shop
concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has been entered,
and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be entered between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants.

The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not
cover such kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as a barber shop
concession. 2

On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below. 3

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo
Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the
John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla
and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators
conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file Ms
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners. 4

On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit
for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States,
which had not given its consent to be sued.

This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order which read in part:

It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint — which have been
hypothetically admitted by defendants upon the filing of their motion to dismiss — that although
defendants acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what their functions called for
brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the
beginning. Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were illegal, done. with extreme bad faith
and with pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff, gains significance. 5

The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark
Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi
J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for
violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge,
Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual
petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. 6

During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro a special counsel assigned to the International Law
Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and
moved for an extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was that the Attorney
General of the United States had not yet designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being sued for
their official acts. Within the extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority from the
U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they had only done
their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement.

On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent the defendants, filed
with leave of court a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the
defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against
them was in effect a suit against the United States without its consent.

The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed
immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants
had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer.7

Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued on
October 14, 1987, a temporary restraining order. 8

In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners
(except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the
defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up,
handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive
injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs
because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the
plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their wounds.

In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named defendants argued
that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The
defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of
their official functions.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10, 1987, reading in part as follows:

The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are immune from suit. The allegations, of the complaint
which is sought to be dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted and whatever ground the defendants may have,
had to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. The complaint alleged criminal acts against the
individually-named defendants and from the nature of said acts it could not be said that they are Acts of State, for
which immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves are duty bound to respect, obey and submit
themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the members of the United States Armed Forces who are
being treated as guests of this country should respect, obey and submit themselves to its laws. 10

and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer as required but subsequently
filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary
restraining order on October 27, 1987. 11

II

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law
of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international
community.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
"there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are
other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in
the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants
the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in
democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the
doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the
rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied
in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 15 a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the
government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. 17

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through
the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. 19 As
for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative
relief from the defendant. 20

In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed
with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are
necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the
bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate for their control.

The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other decisions, to support their position that
they are not suable in the cases below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is
emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:

The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate. More
specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In
dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice
Hilado speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: 'It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government
or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v.
Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of
the following authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and
Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the
point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General of the United States
Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned leased to the United
States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed and
upheld by respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the
ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the 4 action must be considered as one against the
U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: 'It is clear that the courts of the Philippines
including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this
is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen
firing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such
general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof then came Marvel Building
Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, where respondent, a United States Agency established to
compensate damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as falling within the above doctrine
as the suit against it would eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government
because ... , the Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.' The Syquia
ruling was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor
launch, plus damages, the special defense interposed being 'that the vessel belonged to the United States
Government, that the defendants merely acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States
Government is therefore the real party in interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo,
where it was held that a suit against Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States
involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the United States. To
the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the opinion of justice Tuazon clearly shows:
'It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3
of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own
courts without its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v. Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding
General, Philippine Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision ordering the return to plaintiff of
the confiscated military payment certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the lower court decision, this
Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, explaining why it could not be sustained.

It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are
also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling
in UnitedStates of America v. Ruiz, 22 where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in
the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not
operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the
United States, the United kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

xxx xxx xxx

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense
of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which
has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in
which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority whatsoever, appropriated private land and
converted it into public irrigation ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had not given its
consent to be sued. This Court sustained the denial of the motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was
not applicable. The director was being sued in his private capacity for a personal tort.

With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.
III

It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in
the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of
Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and
use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were
acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government,
and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible
for their acts.

The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a
special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated
"special agents," the United States government should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that
the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if
it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the
case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its
inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our
courts.

We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff
Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted
in Republic v. Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but
must be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of
consent as earlier discussed.

But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their
official functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations
in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager
to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when
the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed
inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the
basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity
the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the
doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air
Force Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this
complex, petitioner Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual income of $2
million. Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a
coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which
maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was
Genove, with whom the United States government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the
Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on
the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio
City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility
pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly
reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity.

The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that
they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.

But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must
still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages
cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined.

The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation where it was
established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop
there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and
recommended Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that
he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.

Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United
States government are commercial enterprises operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as
required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar
indulgences. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent
abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not
more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
respective areas.

This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in
the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States
of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we have done in G.R. No. 79470,
except for the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions is not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent court will have to
receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they
seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

IV

There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the question of the immunity of the
United States from the jurisdiction of the Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional
friendship between two countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the so-called "irritants" in
their relations will be resolved in a spirit of mutual accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and
asperity of litigation and always with justice to both parties.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing
and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.

3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.

4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing
and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.

All without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Civil Case No. 4772.

2 Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 36-38.

3 Rollo, p. 88.

4 Civil Case No. 829-R(298).

5 Annex "A", Rollo, p. 38.

6 Civil Case No. 115-C-87.

7 Annex "A," Rollo, p. 33.

8 Rollo, p. 69.

9 Civil Case No. 4996.

10 Annex "A," Rollo, p. 58.

11 Rollo, p. 181.

12 Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349.

13 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171.

14 Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120.

15 4 Phil. 311.

16 Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281; Lyons v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593.
17 Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. 6060, September 30, 1950.

18 Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470.

19 United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487.

20 Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345.

21 57 SCRA 1.

22 136 SCRA 487.

23 50 O.G. 1556.

24 162 SCRA 88.

25 Supra.

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by
the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a
prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988,
Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of
Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the
University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché
for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.

"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and introduced to him
by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by
plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the
anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.

"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant
expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid
P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was
his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction
in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy
in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United
States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in
defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.

"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of
a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per
visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant
promised to see plaintiff again.

"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati.
He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was
not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however,
came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics
and business.

"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The
defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at
$24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come
back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff,
and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.
1awphi1.nét

"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly
proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess.
Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee
in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and
requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab.
Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant
where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a
drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He
was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was
made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the
bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff.
They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian,
who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he
was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was
not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant
told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.

"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was
opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also
placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he
bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the
defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.

"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers,
particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an
international drug trafficker. x x x

In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in
America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.

"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they
were detained for three days without food and water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for
extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and
Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo
filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the
Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied
by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to
file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise
be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court
order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent
to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United
States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to
the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised
and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo
denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.

Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial.
In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The
petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added,
Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.

Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his
failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March
1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the
motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint
and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that
Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to
answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States
Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification,
dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its
original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and
entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-
45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No.
22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the
Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a
decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed
the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on
the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over
his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the
complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal
capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s
diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.

The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a
decision; it adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who
successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the
sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus
costs.

`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to
answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper
litigant.’"2

While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a
diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts
complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his
term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the
terms of the Vienna Convention.

Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should
have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether
or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the
prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it,
3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of
the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however,
has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -

"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990,
unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation
and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his
right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren
self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair
resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4

Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants
him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement
Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the
source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the
Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of
documents -

1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;

2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;

3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;

4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and

5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.

6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27
June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);

7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through
Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5

The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the
Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United
States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August
1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity
of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to
inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate
that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the
diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to
all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs
itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his
reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to
the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of
his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo
to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on
14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine
law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for
alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that
Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an
Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government
of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs
Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement
agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain
liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal
investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time
of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece,
among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of
India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were
universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were
published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international
law.8Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself,
as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually
entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic
presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna
Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the
sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited
to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d'
affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the
diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as
members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the
mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for
immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be
restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic
immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear
stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and
perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of
documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in
political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of the United States
diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of
officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs.
There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than
the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the
embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the
like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to
observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit
reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government.14 These officials are not generally regarded
as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.

In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued
post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did
nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:

"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the
private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his
person.

"x x x x x x x x x

"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the
moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact
that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed
on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer
because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the
purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila,
and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner
cannot be peremptorily dismissed.

"x x x x x x x x x

"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity.
Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then
should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper
and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated
issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent
Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."

A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of
Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary,
certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in
the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United States
diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No
certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government.
In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts
are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain
exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of
Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam
issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The
government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for
recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who
possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for
accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a
diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-
immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time
basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which
currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the
appropriate functional category.19

But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that,
indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of
suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the
present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but
also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing
a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the
benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet
imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in
broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.23

In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of
prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled -

"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as
agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not
given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of their
authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."25

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates:

"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is
not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State
within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is
that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

"x x x x x x x x x

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in
his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle
of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers
and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the
United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The
official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but
they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of
Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target,
to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in
the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function
or duties.

All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the
problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 39-42.

2
Rollo. p. 51.

3
Linzag vs. CA, 291 SCRA 304.

4
Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 242.

5
For documentary Exhibits Nos. 1-8, see Rollo, pp. 143-155.

6
For Documentary Exhibits Nos. 9-13, See Rollo, pp. 156-168.

7
Eileen Denza, "Diplomatic Law, A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations," 2nd Edition,
Claredon Press, Oxford, 1998, at 210.

8
Ibid.

9
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention enumerates the functions of the diplomatic mission as
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;

(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted
by international law;

(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;

(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the
Government of the sending State;

(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic,
cultural and scientific relations.

Ambassadors are diplomatic agents of the first class, who deal, as a rule with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the
10

Secretary of State, as the case may be. (Melquiades J. Gamboa, "Elements of Diplomatic and Consular Practice, A
Glossary," Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., 1966, p. 19.)

Envoys are diplomatic agents of the second class. This is the title of the head of legation as distinguished from an
11

embassy, the head of which is called Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Like the Ambassador, the
envoy is also accredited to the Head of State. (Gamboa, p. 190.)

12
Charges d' Affairs are either en titre or ad interim. Charges d' Affairs en titre are appointed on a permanent basis
and belong to the fourth class of diplomatic envoys, the other three being ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary
and envoys extraordinary, and ministers resident. He is the head of the legation in his own right and is not
accredited to the head of State but to the foreign office. According to Radloric, charges d' affairs are sometimes
used to described a person who has been placed in custody of the archives and other property of a mission in a
country with which formal diplomatic relations are not maintained. Charges d' affairs ad interim, in contrast are
usually those second in command of the diplomatic mission – minister, counselor or first secretary, who are only
temporarily in charge of the mission during the absence of the head of the mission. He is not accredited either to the
Head of State or the Foreign Office. (Gamboa, Ibid., pp. 51-52.)

13
The classification of diplomatic representatives was considered significant before because direct communication
with the head of state depended on the rank of the diplomat and, moreover, only powerful states were regarded as
entitled to send envoys of the highest rank. At present however, diplomatic matters are usually discussed not with
the head of state but with the foreign secretary regardless of the diplomat's rank. Moreover, it has become the
practice now for even the smallest and the weakest states to send diplomatic representatives of the highest rank,
even to the major powers. (Cruz, International Law, 1985 Edition, p. 145.)

14
Gamboa, supra., pp. 32-33.

15
48 SCRA 242.

16
J.L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations," Oxford University Press, 6th Edition, 1963, p. 244.

17
Denza, supra., at 16.

18
Ibid.

19
Ibid., at 55.

20
Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1948, p. 307-308.

The international law on sovereign immunity of states from suit in the courts of another state has evolved from
21

national court decisions with good deal of variance in perspectives. Even though national cases have been the
major source of pronouncements on sovereign immunity, it should be noted that these constitute evidence of
customary international law now widely recognized. In the latter half of the 20th century, a great deal of consensus
on what is covered by sovereign immunity appears to be emerging, i.e., that state immunity covers only acts which
deal with the government functions of a state, and excludes, any of its commercial activities, or activities not related
to "sovereign acts." The consensus involves a more defined differentiation between public acts (juri imperii) and
private acts (jure gestionis). (Gary L. Maris, "International Law, An Introduction," University Press of America, 1984,
p. 119; D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)

The United States for example, does not claim immunity for its publicly owned or operated merchant vessels. The
Italian courts have rejected claims of immunity from the US Shipping Board, although a state body, as it could not be
identified with the American government on the ground that undertaking maritime navigation and business as a
commercial enterprise do not constitute a sovereign act. (D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London Butterworths,
1970, p. 221.)

See Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), cited in Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law,"
22

New York, 3rd Edition (1948), p. 307.

23
United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 76607, 26 February 1990.

24
182 SCRA 644.

25
At pp. 653-659.

26
191 SCRA 713

27
At pp. 727-728.

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was
reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated
February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba,
and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates
led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They
detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as
well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with
registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast
Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue
operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised
around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to
return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained
at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10,
1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to
government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch
was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at
midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the
latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas
City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in
Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of
P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor
launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine
waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members,
employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to
Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation
of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to
where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective
sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a
red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work
was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked
beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned
the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that
the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00
each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There
was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10,
1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney,
Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name
was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the
former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the
aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the
vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and
was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities
before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass
through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the
vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met
the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed
that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the
cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo."
Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March
29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to
"Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there
were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten
hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to
cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong
went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this
time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of
Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the
name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco
himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel
was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and
the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the
principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court
cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The
accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr.
and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly
and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with
interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the
"M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are
hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San
Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the
City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs
against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them
to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them.
However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was
not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for
the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the
opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their
rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered
by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants
conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the
trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had
no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of
the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine
courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced
during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part
in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the
seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the
vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal
under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that
he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the
act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the
fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and
implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified
piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can
accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However,
it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of
the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of
law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the
more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make
them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph
[3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According
to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case,
the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence
against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco
(Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to
commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the
"M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo,
and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough
Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong
San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about
$500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no
scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the
seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed
their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they,
in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its
destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v.
Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently
desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the
seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then
anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite
period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of
their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly
not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second
Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a
completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of
work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.
Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-
appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable
to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial
courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine
whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial
court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others,
were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas
after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money
for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed
his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of
Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six
or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has
known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant
Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol
in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as
defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act
No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered
"superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws,
the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of
the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted
upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor
a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger
or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall
be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered
by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with
the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed
in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong
since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not
with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here
since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of
said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b)
that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and
that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial
court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio
Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any
doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes
that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he
knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit
therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for
Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity
of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and
Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied,
the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished
and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to
avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the
Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have
resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to
"Navi Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos
boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm
submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong;
that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH"
and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the
vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with
Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic
meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the
word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival
at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it
acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same
irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio
Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no
knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he
should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it
was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of
sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative
to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor
did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine
transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even
aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of
the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange
rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should
have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to
the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm
was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some
lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent
violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and
immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial,
Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain.
These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim
Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of
the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his
actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P.
Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.

Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of
murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs
(Criminal Case No. 3280).

The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention
prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after
posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go
to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug
municipal building where there would be more security.

Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix
Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his
prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's
recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help.
Nobody came to succor him.

Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his departure,
Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night. From
the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron
ore and went home.

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice,
sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back
(Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death
would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause death",
she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there
would be complications.

Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause
of death (Exh. B).

The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and
the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as witnesses
Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed
a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder.1

It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who should have been
presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae.2

In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or the sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He
heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of
Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to
Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.

Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar", testified that she
heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to
be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.

Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July
31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.

The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's
alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the
consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.

Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he
was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.

Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted that the accused
was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police
investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why it was
not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.

The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are compatible with the
prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given credence,
Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior
on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not
find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.

This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended".
The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131,
Rules of Court).

The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran
la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la
predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos,
la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed.,
1968, p. 335-336).

The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the cause of death, no
more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp,
which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle,
which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there was a
sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide
(Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).

There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in the death of
the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical
attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the
victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty
days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded
man. The person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result thereof.

The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal
Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he
had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking
advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by
medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the
police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual
from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken
condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official
position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the
penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of
Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention
them in order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly
presented in court, I concur.

Fernando, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of
Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention
them in order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly
presented in court, I concur.

Fernando, J., concurs.

Footnotes

1 Republic of the Philippines ...

Province of Zamboanga del Sur ...)

Municipality of Pagadian

JOINT-AFFIDAVIT

WE, ERNESTO OGOC married, and JUANITO DE LA CERNA, single, both of legal age, farmers, residents of
Lakewood, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur and at Buug Zamboanga del Sur, respectively, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and say:

That both of us were confined inside the municipal jail of Buug Zamboanga del Sur on July 31, 1966 for offenses
allegedly committed by us and on same date our companions inside the said jail were Anisio Siton and Felix Napola,
the latter being confined for being drunk;

That at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less on July 31, 1966, our policeman guard by the name of
Domingo Ural entered the jail and called for Felix Napola. He called for him and told him that Felix Napola is
aggressive. When Felix Napola went near Domingo Ural, the latter boxed him at his lower chin and he fell to the
cement floor of the jail. He kicked him also at the same spot after Felix Napola fell to the floor. Because Felix Napola
cannot stand anymore, Domingo Ural got a bottle and poured the contents of said bottle to the dress of Felix
Napola. Domingo Ural lighted a match and burned the spot where the substance in the bottle was poured in the
dress of Felix Napola. The dress of Felix Napola got burned and Felix Napola got burned. He was forced to stand up
and asked mercy from Domingo Ural. Instead Domingo Ural locked the jail and went out and Domingo Ural
threatened us not to talk about the burning of Felix Napola to anybody or else he will burn us also.

When Felix Napola was already suffering much from the burns he sustained, Ural became frightened and he and
Anisio Siton helped put out the fire.

Affiants further sayeth none.

(SGD.) Ernesto Ogoc (SGD.) Juanito de la Cerna

ERNESTO OGOC JUANITO DE LA CERNA

(Affiant) (Affiant)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1966 here at Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.

(SGD.) Basilio T. Roque

BASILIO T. ROQUE

Special Counsel

2 Mrs. Napola (Mapola) testified at the preliminary investigation conducted by Basilio T. Roque, a special counsel,
that she learned from a neighbor that her husband suffered burns in the municipal jail in the evening of July 31,
1966. Her husband told her that Policeman Ural had burned him. Ural allowed her to bring Napola to the dispensary
where he was treated. Because of the injuries on his mouth and his swollen gums, he could not eat and move his
head. He was confined in jail due to drunkenness. He was burned from the waist up to the neck and on the back
and right arm. She reported the case to the mayor. That functionary said that he would not take any hand in the
case. Mrs. Napola was cross-examined by Ural's counsel.

At the same preliminary investigation the witnesses, Ernesto Ogoc and Juanita de la Serna, testified and were
cross-examined by Ural's counsel. The accused presented evidence at the preliminary investigation.

3 "Un sujeto, despues de cohabitar con una prostituta, encendio un mixto que aplico a uno de los latones de
petroleo que habia proximos a la cama en que yacieron, inflamandose el contenido de aquel y cayendo el liquido
sobre la prostituta, que fallecio a consequencia de las quemaduras.

El Tribunal Supreme declara:

Que segun el articulo 418 del Codigo penal, es reo de asesinato el que por medio de incendio mata a persona que
no le este ligada por alguno de los vinculos familiares senalados en el art. 417, entendiendose empleado el
incendio en este concepto juridico cuando se mata o intenta matar por medio de fuego aplicado directa o
immediamente sobre la persona objeto de la accion criminal, siempreque lo sea con riesgo de propagacion a cosas
distintas, en cualquiera de las condiciones previstas en el capitulo 7, titulo 13 del libro 2. del Codigo penal; cuyo
medio de ejecucion de aquel delito, principal en la intencion del culpable estima la ley con el grave caracter que
atribuye tambien a la inundacion y al empleo del veneno, no solo por los peligros que implica, sino igualmente por
la notoria malicia, semejante a la alevosia, que revela la accion que para su exito no se detiene ante el respeto de
otros derechos que pone en inminente riesgo o quebranta y lesion a impulso de decidia resolucion.

Que todas estas consideraciones aparecen manifiestas en el acto ejecutado por el procesado, puesto que
voluntariamente empleo el petroleo inflamado para lesionar a la interfecta, poniendo el fuego, que por su natural
poder se propago al local en que se cometio el delito, al servicio de su proposito punible; constituyendo por esto el
incendio, elemento integrante del delito de asesinato, ... (Sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1887, 11 Hidalgo,
Codigo Penal, 175).
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which
is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions
dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile
argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further
be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right.
Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application
for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the
maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors
this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his
physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix
the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to
fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty
and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot
be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
 Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[[21] The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.
The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail
is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that
a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for
it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong
objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of
whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35

Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion
temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in
Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense
that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long
years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but
which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-
PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risk s to the
life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could
indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could
be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by
the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in
your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we
have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v.
The People’s Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion
to admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually
suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in
said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine
are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for
the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.
Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14
CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some
other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Sick Leave)

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA***
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On official leave.

**
On sick leave.

***
No part.
1
See Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to
Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1 (2009), pp. 307-309.

2
Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and concurred in by Associate Justice
Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justi ce Alex L. Quiroz.

3
Id. at 89-102.

4
Id. at 107-108.

5
Id. at 103-157.

6
Id. at 163-192.

7
Id. at 193-221.

8
Id. at 222-241.

9
Id. at 241.

10
Id. at 242-243.

11
Id. at 244-247.

12
Id. at 249-256.

13
Id. at 13.

14
Id. at 84-88.

15
Id. at 89-102.

16
Id. at 16-19.

17
Id. at 526-542.

18
Section 14, (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

19
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623
where the Court said that the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence,
Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72 (2011), p. 728.

20
Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.

21
Id. at 731.

22
Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572.

23
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.

24
As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

25
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
26
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan , supra note 19, at 693.

27
Id.

28
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment.

29
Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

30
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.

Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA
31

535, 536.

32
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.

33
Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.

34
Id. at 18.

35
Rollo, pp. 252-253.

36
Id. at 260.

Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15,
37

2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution for parricide in which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and consequently lowered the penalty imposed
on the accused to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521
38

SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

39
Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No.157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.

40
Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41
Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

42
Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

43
Id. at 334-335, 374-375.

44
Id. at 244-247.

45
Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

46
77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the petitioner was for treason.

47
Id. at 462.
48
Id. at 465-466.

49
Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the Court observed:

To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the
evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There
would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the
case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan ( Second Division ), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton
50

Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc ., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.

Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 467, 478; Duero v.
51

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17.

August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic
Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined
were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying
to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in
paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being
contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which
offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it
"is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in
paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165
prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City,
Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a
"rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in
effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the
mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to
rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs
because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused
charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No.
191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to
rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23
of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the
law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional
questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have
on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition
raising the issues as follows:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON

THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
 III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition should
be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a
petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of
judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the
case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado,
1âw phi 1

it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper
conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the
supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final
arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has
reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic,
and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially
our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug
problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as
mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link
to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally
eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us
from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
constitutional issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this
tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its
evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by
our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure
are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so.
Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law
in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for
the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x
x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it
the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the
rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly,
the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design,
vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which,
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it
now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the
Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether
or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the
sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court.
Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with
the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved,
thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and
the Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure.x x x.24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall
that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have
rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules
of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary
case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions
on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors
Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National
Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees
imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which
prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of
the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the
1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead
guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint
or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a
1âwphi 1

lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118
mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116
was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent
to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially
adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a fair and
expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4,
Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3,
Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of
the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon.
Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence
within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be
procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive
is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means
of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example,
in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State
and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless
it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State
and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were
no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if
he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which
dominant cases have been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to
prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost.
Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.
The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case.
The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his
family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to
suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to
defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an
accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of
the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled
date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the
probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the
practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden
of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal
cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are
denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a
speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is
protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the
chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take
away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against
him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case,
whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion"
inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to
be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference
are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and
importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government
enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice
system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions
"are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep
in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter
of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should
not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested
its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon
as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional
right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory
provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea
bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On wellness leave
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

1
With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

2
Approved on June 7, 2002.

3
This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as amended by R.A. No.
7659 ("Death Penalty Law"), which was approved on December 13, 1993. It provided: SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining
Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

4
Rollo, p. 47.

5
Id. at 49-51.

6
Id. at 52.

7
Id. at 53.

8
Id. at 44-45.

9
Id. at 46, 54-55.

10
Id. at 3, 15-16.

11
See Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84(2013).

12
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).

See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 31 I, 323 (1994); People v.
13

Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258 (1992); Peopie v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161, 166 (1991); People v. Taruc, 241 Phil. 177,
186 (1988); and People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87 (1986).

14
People v. Tantiado, supra, as cited in People v. Camba, supra, and People v. Caco, 294 Phil. 54, 65 (1993).

15
People v.Quintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).

See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261 (2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632 (1999); and People v.
16

Arcega. G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.

17
See GMA NETWORK, Inc. v COMELEC, supra note 12 at 210.

18
Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil 554, 579 (2002)

Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd Generation Heirs
19

Foundation, Inc., 731Phil.269, 292 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics supplied)
 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for Recognition of the
20

Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010) and Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549 (2010).

21
Supra.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 20, at 85-88. (Citations omitted). See also RE: Petition for
22

Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20, at 106- 108 and In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629 Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).

23
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

24
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra, at 505-508. (Citations omitted).

25
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of legal Fee, supra note 20, at 108.

26
Id.

27
356 Phil. 787 (1998).

28
738 Phil. 37 (2014).

29
Supra note 20.

30
Supra note 20.

31
Supra note 22.

32
638 Phil. 353 (2010).

33
Supra note 23.

See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 517-518, citing Baguio Market Vendors
34

Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, supra note 20, at 550.

35
Approved on February 12, 1998.

Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of parties, and waiver of objections to
36

admissibility of evidence.

37
Effective December 1, 2001 (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003]).

38
CONSTITUTION, A1t. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288 (2015) and San Ildefonso
Lines, Inc. v. CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).

39
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 516-517.

40
Supra note 27.

41
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supranote 23,
at 517; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239, 269-270 (2015): Jaylo, et
al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503
(2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).

42
448 Phil. 317 (2003).
43
See Los Banos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).

44
People v. Lacson, supra note 42, at 387-389. (Citations omitted).

45
Supra note 41.

46
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143. (Citation omitted).

47
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of'Appea/s, 506 Phil. 613, 626 (2005) and San
Ildefonso lines, Inc. v. CA, supra note 38, at 415-416.

See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (l 977); and the Majority
48

Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

49
People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 103 7. See
also Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al, 694 Phil. 52, 106 (2012); Atty. Amante-Descallar
v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008); and People v.
Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75.

50
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

51
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).

52
See Santobello v. New York, supra note 48 and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48.

53
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

54
Id.

See Brady v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York,
55

supra note 48, at 264.

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion in Lafler v.
56

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).

57
The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 732
the Court ruled:

"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they
infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is
malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious
effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is
endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public
interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense
(see United States v. Samia, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state,
will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government."

58
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.

59
Id.

60
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
 Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199 Phil. 230, 234 [1982], citing In
61

Re: Hirsh's Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:

"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under
ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility."

62
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 377 and People v. Vil/arama, Jr, supra note 49, at 730.

See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75; Ladino v. Hon.
63

Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.

64
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 378.

65
Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.

66
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 252, as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines,
et al., supra note 49, at 106 and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 76.

67
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.

68
See People v. Villarama, supra.

69
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba," respondents.

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p

I. Statement of the Case

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file
the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow
the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits
of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.

That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:

(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;

(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.

(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as
amended, reads:

The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to
collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby
accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO
GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose
identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
committed as follows:

That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means among which are the following:

1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein
the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and
toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.

2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting
members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.

On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
him the equal protection of the laws.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the
statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil
action for certiorari.

II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement
the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.7 History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars
and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act,
the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill
of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never
hope to overthrow."

1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10

This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:

(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist

Party ... shall serve —

(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent,
manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial
duties) of any labor organization.

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....

(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership in
the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing
body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:

Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to
bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them
likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what
persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to
our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50
USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:

[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign
government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.)

A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets
forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-
action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:

In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist
Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the
Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other
illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred
to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.

2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render
it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as
officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be
subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill
of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku
Klux Klan. 17

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the
Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this
ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.

But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination. 25

In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-
bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a
member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the
law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku
Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku
Klux Klan. The Court said:

The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the
classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that
the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its
purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the
absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the
Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to
strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes
are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret.
But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others."
Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the
relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our
citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a
recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received
legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them
beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in
that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while
not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."

We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available including the published report
of a hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation,
purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing
and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites;
that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the
Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white
supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in
the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was
striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national
affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to
be crimes. 27

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In
1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the
objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the
Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently,
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the
New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have
thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter
observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the
historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is
also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive
that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31

Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City
of Los Angeles which provided:

... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los
Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective,
become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force
or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:

... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the
Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become
affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to
protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United
States.

... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett
case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.

Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe
demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is
describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is
found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons
who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of
their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines
and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members
of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law
expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.

III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process

1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4.
Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:

... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien dominationand control;

... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present
andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;

... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.

In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe
statute, Congress omitted to do so.

In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper
account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial
distinction, thus:

... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require
supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is
intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of
course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria
of judgment for weighing them.

A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will
not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found
according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio."
The recital of legislative findings implements this test.

With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950
(that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist
movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S.
Supreme Court said:

It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the productof
extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them,
as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not
only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we
must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.

That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif
a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As
Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial
governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change.
We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried
to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.

2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof),
Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:

Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is
acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44

3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the
Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section
2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.

Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What
thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it
wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his
audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45

IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence
orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial
as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of
democraticinstitutions in his country.

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe
Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for
emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.... 46

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47

It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech,
and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports
to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.

Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-
preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because
the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it
restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court
stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49

V. The Act and its Title

The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50

What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:

And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the Government of the Republic
ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal
means,for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided
therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power
likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwanor Indonesia."

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject
matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime
in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is
a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin
order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the
Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following
elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of
the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that
he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich
led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached upholding thevalidity
of the Anti-Subversion Act.1 It is to be admittedthat the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe
impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stressin the
concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect
for their constitutional rights is to be commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting
the bill of attainder clause2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-latitudinarian constructionof the
guarantees of freedom of belief and expression3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto
which they may be exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.

1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and security shouldbe
ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment
fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation against its sworn enemies. In a
simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless
sophisticated than those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus.
Force has to be met with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods of
inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch
problems. There must be then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the
governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act isto
be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is
the most realistic, I feel that there was an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands
against bills of attainder and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my view
prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained
by the fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a setback would be
occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.

2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by
the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of
Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of
Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in court,
without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or
corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill of
pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the
name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform
activities."5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v.
Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply
either to named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them
punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof attainder
prohibited by the Constitution. 8

Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby
the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers, and
otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of the
nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of
perjury.If they engaged in their professions without theoath, they were criminally liable. The United States Supreme
Court condemned the provision as a bill of attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment
withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why
such a conclusion was unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa
legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than death, the actis termed
a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of
judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon theguilt of the party,
without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,whether
conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own
notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we
have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed
hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service
of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to
teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a bill of attainder
within themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared that all
priestsand clergymen within the state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and
hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to objection. And further, it these
clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided
they didnot, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of the Federal
Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment creating the deprivation, without any of
theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen in the administration of justice by the
establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also decided.
Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court. Petitioner Garland
wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865,
the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of
1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne arms against the
UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue
inpractice contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any rate,he
was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new punishment to that before
prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post
facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length the
meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof the Constitution forbidding their passage by
the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the
Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12

There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it
was shown that in 1943 the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several yearsworking for
the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully satisfiedwith the quality of
their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of
the Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after
November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of any moneythen or thereafter
appropriated except for services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15,
1943, again appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such
Congressional enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the
respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt
entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to whether theaction in the light of
proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether Section304 is a bill of
attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.

After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304 fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional
actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the
sameday the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds
anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases
has ever been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their form,that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on
them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. Adherenceto this principle requires
invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14

United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the Labor-
ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist Party to serve
as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a
longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a
centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of theInternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-
countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing as a member of an executive board of a
labororganization while a member of the Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question
ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted
in the opinion by Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of
attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary problems,
must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the architectsof our constitutional system,
indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded)
prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against legislative
exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply — trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland,
and Lovett,Chief Justice Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth a generally applicable rule
decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics
whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts
and juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed the specifiedacts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead,it designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and
therefore cannothold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17

Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained, the
opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been
different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for legislatively prescribed
punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in terms of conduct
which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities
ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the Act,are
found to be under the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance
certain objectives. This finding must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens
the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as tofact are supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute attaches legal
consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably designated by
the legislature." 19

The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the mindsof the
framers of the 1934 Constitutional Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls within
the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases upholding theCummings and
Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren
is, of course, different but I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage
appearing in Lovett. This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such aholding of its
explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill
of attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without more, would
suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The
Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Governmentby force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and
domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there
was a criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there was an
indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory
provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the constructionI would place on theoff-repeated
pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to
outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the
taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute not suffering
fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.

3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual
libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be
admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian brand
then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then President. Its shadow fell squarely across
thelives of all. Subversion then could neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those
conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies
toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother
way. The apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to
be, but not at the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one
can express dissatisfaction with things as theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such dissent
can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority,
to those who wield powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the
content of such dissent is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to
such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such dissentmay, for those not so
adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of
government cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where scholars competentin their line
may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for the system of government now favoredby Western
democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to
the point of advocary of such adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a
penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us
who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand undisturbed as monuments of
the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by
the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be
absolute — for even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still seems wise to tolerate the
expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies,
and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23

The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor
rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus
is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof
views affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not
require as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.

Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental
purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may notbe achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over
breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the
constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-
Subversion Act.

There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party
casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment
ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe
First Amendment it is that this Amendment was designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public
matters and that, of course, means the interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries
and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring about. Now,
when this country is trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are revolutionary in
many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country.
The same arguments that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an
outlawry of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First
Amendment that the internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of
force by Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single subject.
Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and
progress which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation of publicopinion by groups,
organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety. Such groups,
like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in this
country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James
Madison — said, in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party,that had that law been in
effect during the period beforethe Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies,
groaning under a foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending
upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with fear and dreadof the power of Government.
The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been dwindling
even before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a vast
majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year
after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is not the
way to protect the Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution
which we would bewise to follow. They gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation
of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27

With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe
conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree
speech and freedom of association grounds.

4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of the
challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart
of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That certainly could not havebeen the
thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme
measure susceptible as it is to what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to
ignore what previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in many
directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to accept the view then
that a resort to outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted evil. There could
have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack
of fealty to reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no opposition.
It is thus,in a realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of
course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is up to it then to
takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that direction.What
is important for those at the bottom of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter
life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a
mockery and a tragic illusion. Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not
completely eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be
more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a doctrine of object
surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions
of our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of
regret that it could not have been more impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.

It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written
opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached upholding thevalidity
of the Anti-Subversion Act.1 It is to be admittedthat the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe
impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stressin the
concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect
for their constitutional rights is to be commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting
the bill of attainder clause2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-latitudinarian constructionof the
guarantees of freedom of belief and expression3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto
which they may be exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.

1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and security shouldbe
ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment
fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation against its sworn enemies. In a
simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless
sophisticated than those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus.
Force has to be met with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods of
inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch
problems. There must be then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the
governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act isto
be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is
the most realistic, I feel that there was an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands
against bills of attainder and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my view
prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained
by the fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a setback would be
occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.

2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by
the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of
Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of
Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in court,
without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or
corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill of
pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the
name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform
activities."5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v.
Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply
either to named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them
punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof attainder
prohibited by the Constitution. 8

Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby
the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers, and
otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of the
nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of
perjury.If they engaged in their professions without theoath, they were criminally liable. The United States Supreme
Court condemned the provision as a bill of attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment
withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why
such a conclusion was unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa
legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than death, the actis termed
a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of
judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon theguilt of the party,
without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,whether
conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own
notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we
have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed
hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service
of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to
teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a bill of attainder
within themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared that all
priestsand clergymen within the state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and
hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to objection. And further, it these
clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided
they didnot, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of the Federal
Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment creating the deprivation, without any of
theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen in the administration of justice by the
establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also decided.
Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court. Petitioner Garland
wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865,
the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of
1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne arms against the
UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue
inpractice contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any rate,he
was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new punishment to that before
prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post
facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length the
meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof the Constitution forbidding their passage by
the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the
Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12

There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it
was shown that in 1943 the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several yearsworking for
the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully satisfiedwith the quality of
their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of
the Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after
November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of any moneythen or thereafter
appropriated except for services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15,
1943, again appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such
Congressional enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the
respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt
entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to whether theaction in the light of
proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether Section304 is a bill of
attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.

After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304 fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional
actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the
sameday the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds
anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases
has ever been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their form,that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on
them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. Adherenceto this principle requires
invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14

United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the Labor-
ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist Party to serve
as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a
longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a
centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of theInternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-
countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing as a member of an executive board of a
labororganization while a member of the Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question
ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted
in the opinion by Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of
attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary problems,
must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the architectsof our constitutional system,
indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded)
prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against legislative
exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply — trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland,
and Lovett,Chief Justice Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth a generally applicable rule
decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics
whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts
and juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed the specifiedacts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead,it designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and
therefore cannothold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17

Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained, the
opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been
different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for legislatively prescribed
punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in terms of conduct
which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities
ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the Act,are
found to be under the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance
certain objectives. This finding must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens
the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as tofact are supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute attaches legal
consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably designated by
the legislature." 19

The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the mindsof the
framers of the 1934 Constitutional Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls within
the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases upholding theCummings and
Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren
is, of course, different but I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage
appearing in Lovett. This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such aholding of its
explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill
of attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without more, would
suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The
Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Governmentby force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and
domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there
was a criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there was an
indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory
provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the constructionI would place on theoff-repeated
pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to
outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the
taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute not suffering
fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.

3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual
libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be
admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian brand
then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then President. Its shadow fell squarely across
thelives of all. Subversion then could neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those
conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies
toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother
way. The apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to
be, but not at the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one
can express dissatisfaction with things as theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such dissent
can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority,
to those who wield powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the
content of such dissent is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to
such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such dissentmay, for those not so
adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of
government cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where scholars competentin their line
may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for the system of government now favoredby Western
democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to
the point of advocary of such adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a
penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us
who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand undisturbed as monuments of
the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by
the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be
absolute — for even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still seems wise to tolerate the
expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies,
and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23

The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor
rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus
is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof
views affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not
require as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.

Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental
purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may notbe achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over
breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the
constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-
Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party
casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment
ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe
First Amendment it is that this Amendment was designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public
matters and that, of course, means the interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries
and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring about. Now,
when this country is trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are revolutionary in
many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country.
The same arguments that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an
outlawry of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First
Amendment that the internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of
force by Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single subject.
Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and
progress which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation of publicopinion by groups,
organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety. Such groups,
like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in this
country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James
Madison — said, in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party,that had that law been in
effect during the period beforethe Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies,
groaning under a foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending
upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with fear and dreadof the power of Government.
The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been dwindling
even before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a vast
majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year
after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is not the
way to protect the Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution
which we would bewise to follow. They gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation
of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27

With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe
conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree
speech and freedom of association grounds.

4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of the
challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart
of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That certainly could not havebeen the
thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme
measure susceptible as it is to what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to
ignore what previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in many
directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to accept the view then
that a resort to outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted evil. There could
have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack
of fealty to reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no opposition.
It is thus,in a realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of
course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is up to it then to
takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that direction.What
is important for those at the bottom of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter
life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a
mockery and a tragic illusion. Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not
completely eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be
more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a doctrine of object
surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions
of our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of
regret that it could not have been more impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.

It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written
opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
Footnotes

1 Rep. Act. No. 1700, 12 Laws & Res. 102 (1957). The text of the statute is hereunder reproduced in full:

"AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS
PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

"WHEREAS, the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also
by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien domination and control;

"WHEREAS, the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and

"WHEREAS, in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international
in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country: Now, therefore,

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

"Section 1. This Act shall be known as Anti-Subversion Act.

"Section 2. The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and place the Government under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party
and any other organization having the same purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed.

Section 3. As used in this Act, the term 'Communist Party of the Philippines' shall me and and include the
organizations now known as the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong
Mapagpalayang Bayan, formerly known as HUKBALAHAPS, and any successors of such organizations.

"Section 4. After the approval of this Act, whoever knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive
association as defined in section two hereof shall be punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be
disqualified permanently from holding any public office, appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to
vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision correccional, and in all subsequent
convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed; and any alien convicted under this Act shall be deported
immediately after he shall have served the sentence imposed upon him: Provided, That if such member is an officer
or a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association as defined in section
two hereof, or if such member takes up arms against the Government he shall be punished by prision mayor to deal
with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code: And provided, finally, That one who
conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the government
of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means, for the purpose of
placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power, shall be
punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same
Code.

"Section 5. No prosecution under this Act shall be made unless the city or provincial fiscal, or any special attorney or
prosecutor duly designated by the Secretary of Justice as the case may be, finds after due investigation of the facts,
that a prima facie case for violation of this Act exists against the accused, and thereafter presents an information in
court against the said accused in due form, and certifies under oath that he has conducted a proper preliminary
investigation thereof, with notice, whenever it is possible to give the same, to the party concerned, who shall have
the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and
to cross-examine witnesses against him: Provided, That the preliminary investigation of any offense defined and
penalized herein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the property Court of First Instance.
"Section 6. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under this Act shall be
punished by prision correccional.

"Section 7. No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless
on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.

"Section 8. Within thirty days after the approval of this Act, any person who is a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines or of any such association or conspiracy, who desires to renounce such membership may do so in
writing and under oath before a municipal or city mayor, a provincial governor, or a person authorized by law to
administer oaths. Such renunciation shall exempt such person or persons from the penal sanction of this Act, but
the same shall in no way exempt him from liability for criminal acts or for any violation of the existing laws of the
Republic of the Philippines committed before this Act takes effect.

"Section 9. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction to freedom of thought, of assembly and of
association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.

"Approved, June 20, 1957."

2 Delegate Jose P. Laurel (of the 1934 Constitutional Convention) referred to the Anglo-American origin of this right
thus:

"No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. This provision is found in the American Federal
Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 9) and is applicable to the States (id. Sec. 10). An ex post facto law is a law which makes
an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed. It creates or aggravates the crime or
increases the punishment, or changes the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. The prohibition against
the passage of ex post facto laws is an additional bulwark of personal security — protecting the citizen from
punishment by legislative act which has a retrospective operation.

"The phrase ex post facto has a technical meaning and refers to crimes and criminal proceedings. It is in this sense
that it was used in England. It was in this sense that the convention of 1787 understood it. (Calder v. Bull, supra;
Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Suterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters, 380; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221.) This
interpretation was upheld by our Supreme Court (U.S. vs. Ang Ken Ko, 6 Phil. 376.).

"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings vs. United States, 4
Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356.) In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was tried,
convicted and sentenced to death without a jury, without a hearing in court, without hearing the witnesses against
him and without regard to the rules of evidence. His blood was attained or corrupted, rendering him devoid of all
heritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property by descent. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed 366.) If
the penalty imposed was less than death, the act was known as a "bill of pains and penalties." Bills of attainder,
like ex post factolaws, were favorite methods of Stuart oppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was
included in a bill of attainder presented to Parliament because of his reform activities.

"Often, such bills were 'stimulated by ambition or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.' (Calder v. Bull, supra.)
A well known case illustrating the ruthless manner in which a bill of attainder was resorted to was that of Thomas
Wentworth, chief adviser of Charles I. He was brought to impeachment charged with attempting to subvert the
liberties of England. He defended himself so ably that his enemies, fearing his acquittal, withdrew the impeachment
and a bill of attainder was passed instead. Wentworth was beheaded. Bills of attainder were also passed in the
Colonies (North, The Constitution of the U.S., its Sources and Applications, p. 85.) The prohibition in the Bill of
Rights, therefore, seeks to present acts of violence and injustice brought about the passage of such bills." (3 J.
Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 661-663 [1966]).

3 Cummings vs. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1867); accord, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).
This definition was adopted by this Court in People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 544 (1947) and in People vs.
Montenegro, 91 Phil. 883,885 (1952).

4 De Veau vs. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 615, (1946).
5 Chief Justice Warren referred to the Bill of Attainder Chause as an implementation of the separation of powers, "a
general safeguard against legislative exercise of judicial function, or more simply, trial by legislature." United States
vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1964).

6 "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the
application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher vs.
Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.)87, 136 (1810).

7 "The legislative body in enacting bills of attainder exercises the powers and office of judge, it pronounces upon the
guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial...it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance
with its own notions of the enormity of the offense." Cummings vs. Missouri, supra note 3.

8 Bills of this sort, says Mr. Justice Story, have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion or gross
subserviency to the crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well as
free as the enslabe) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others." Comm. sec. 1344,
in re Young Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 347, 440. During the American revolution legislative punishments had been
continued by state legislatures, when numerous bills of attainder were enacted against the Torries. 1C.
Antieu, Modern Constitutional Law, 425.

9 C. Antieu, supra note 8 at 423.

10 The Supreme Court of the United States said in Fleming vs. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1960):

"In determining whether legislation which bases a disqualification on the happening of a certain past event imposes
a punishment, the Court has sought to discern the objects on which the enactment in question was focused. Where
the source of legislative concern can be thought to be the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the
disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly upon one affected."

11 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. sec. 504 (1958 ed. Supp. IV).

12 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (5-4 vote).

13 Keyishian vs. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);Elfbrandt vs. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).

14 Cf . Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto vs. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).

15 During the Senate deliberations on the bill, Senator Cea remarked: "I have inserted the words 'overt acts'
because we are punishing membership in the Communist Party. I would like that membership to be proved by overt
acts, by positive acts, because it may happen that one's name may appear in the list of members." Senate Cong.
Rec. May 22, 1957, p. 1900.

16 Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System vs. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441.

17 New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63(1928).

18 Repealed by Rep. Act 4241.

19 Philippine Ass'n of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 40.

20 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).

21 Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1867).

22 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).

23 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).

24 United States vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

25 The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L. J. 330,
351-54(1962).

26 278 U.S. 63 (1928).

27 Id. at 75-77.

28 People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 375 (1932); see also People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil., 372 (1932); People vs.
Capadocia, 57 Phil. 364 (1932); People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 354 (1932); People vs. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451 (1932);
People vs. nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1932).

29 People vs. Lava, L-4974-78, May 16, 1969.

30 L-33864, Dec. 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.

31 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946).

32 341 U.S. 716 (1951).

33 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1960).

34 Sec. 8.

35 E. g., Kovacs vs. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Vera vs. Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351.

36 Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 47-48 (Cahn ed. 1954).

37 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).

38 L-33964, Dec. 11, 1971, 41 SCRA 448.

39 Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367 U.S. 94 (1961).

40 Dennis vs. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).

41 Id. at 501.

42 Shelton vs. Tucker, 364 U.s. 479 (1960).

43 Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see also Noto vs. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).

44 Frankfeld vs. United States, 198 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir. 1952).

45 People vs. nabong, 57 Phil. 455, 458 (1932).

46 18 U.S.C. sec. 2385. (emphasis added).

47 367 U.S. 203 (1961).

48 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).

49 P. A. Freud, The Supreme Court of the United States 75 (1961).

50 Const., art VI, Sec. 21 (1).

51 Government vs. Hongkong & Shaihai Banking Corp., 66 Phil. 483 (1938).

52 Lindasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28089, Oct. 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 496.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1 Rep. Act No. 1700 (1957)..

2 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 11: "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted."

3 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 8: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peacebly to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."

4 According to Art. III, Sec. 1 par. 4: "The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired."

5 Footnote 2, p. 9 of Opinion of the Court.

6 4 Wall. 277 (1867).

7 4 Wall. 333 (1867).

8 Cf. United States v. A Lovett, 328 US 303 )1946).

9 4 Wall. 277 (1867).

10 Ibid, 323, 325.

11 4 Wall. 333 (1867).

12 Ibid, 377-378.

13 328 US 303.

14 Ibid, 315-316.

15 381 US 437.

16 Ibid, 442.

17 Ibid, 449-450.

18 367 US 1 (1961).

19 Ibid, 86-87.

20 Opinion of the Court, p. 15.

21 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 6: "The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged." Paragraph 8 of this section reads as follows: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peacebly to assemble and petition the Government for redress
of grievances."
22 Jefferson's First Instance Address, March 4, 1801, in Padover, ed., The Complete Jefferson, 385 (1943).

23 Hook, Heresy, Yes-Conspiracy, No. 71 (1953).

24 Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835,871(1969) citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960) and
NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963).

25 NAACP vs. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964).

26 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 148.

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City,
and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their
wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders
from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of
a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the
other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod
City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted
him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter
leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7)
days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told
private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them
in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with
his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from
her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with
him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which
he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the
Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by
private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the
bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of
the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
 Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is
quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from
the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to
the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family
home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the
danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out
about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance
of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts,
cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's
firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and
educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations
from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller,
must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to
the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial
resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the
Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty
(30) days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van
which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the
Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the
matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day
notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one
vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and
(2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to
his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children
to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment
of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application24 for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was
purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private
respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven
policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-
Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home
of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her
things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified
theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners
Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita
Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that
respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the
TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period
from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No.
FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner
another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14,
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in
Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of
these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie
J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie
that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed,
extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that
petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already
been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
 xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued
on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed
for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered
by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to
raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction
to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER
TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first
tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues
that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said
law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court
in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262
now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in
the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
 xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new
kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall
verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally,
a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed
out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could
be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from
raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows
the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order
containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible,
within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may
extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the
parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional
issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section
22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this
case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and
it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal
of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is
valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the
same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from
acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as
final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her
Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And
so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could
very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while
the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what
she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence
Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence
and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We
quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed
concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as
well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the
efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the
spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by
women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to
families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a
broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I
believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope
to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it
is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why
the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized
and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No.
7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate.
Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we
have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived
at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the
"men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that
proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa
lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we
remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to
minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance
and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we
dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment.
The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal
by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men
as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences
... is the essence of true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of
men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women
is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262
and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened
the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been
quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the
late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871,
the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to
beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the
wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated
it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse.
Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however,
their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded
in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults
by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted
their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in
institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree
that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted
women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner
or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal
Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by
their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen,
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than
Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building
and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as
well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004,
enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children
show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent
54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the
total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester
of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women
across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the
different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the
Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four
or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury
than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil
rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and
then of the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever
violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict
themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for
fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO
under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an
"illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices
and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing
or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound
itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines
VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the
same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical
or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner
insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional
anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper
respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater
risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ
of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover,
the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice
upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of
the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
"stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support
of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal
of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order
dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed
or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed
to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of
the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property
rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership,
only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling,
the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in
a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
1âw phi1

protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and
to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there
is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence
shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind,
law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion: See: Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See Separate Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

* On official leave.

1 "Philippines still top Christian country in Asia, 5th in world," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21, 2011.

2 Ephesians 5:25-28.

3RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, citing
statistics furnished by the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women.

4 Id.

5 Section 3(a), R.A. 9262.

6 Rollo, pp. 63-83.

7 Id. at 66-67.

8 Id. at 64.

9 Id. at 67-68.

10 Id. at 68-70.

11 Id. at 70-71.

12 Id. at 72.

13 Id. at 73.

14 Id. at 74.

15 Id. at 65-66.

16 Id. at 66.

17 Id. at 70.

18 Id. at 84-87.

19Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Issuance of Modified TPO. Id. at 90-
93.

20 Id. at 94-97.

21 Id. at 98-103.

22 Id. at 138-140.

23 Order dated May 24, 2006. Id. at 148-149.

24 Id. at 154-166.

25 Id. at 156.

26 Id. at 157.

27 Id. at 158-159.

28 Id. at 167-174.

29 Id. at 182.

30 Id. at 183-184.

31 Id. at 185.

32 Id. at 186-187.

33 See Manifestation dated October 10, 2006. Id. at 188-189.

34 Id. at 104-137.

35 Id. at 151-152.

36Decision dated January 24, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices
Arsenio J. Magpale and Romeo F. Barza, concurring. Id. at 47-57.

37 Id. at 60-61.

38 Petition, id. at 22.

39ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19,
2009, 576 SCRA 262, 289.

40 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, 503 Phil. 917, 932 (2005).

41 Petition, rollo, p. 24.

42SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:

xxxx

k) Cases of domestic violence against:

1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and
coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and

2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

43 Sec. 17, R.A. 8369.

44 Manalo v. Mariano, 161 Phil. 108, 120 (1976).

45 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 504.

46 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140.

47 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, supra note 45, at 505, citing Mirasol v. CA, 403 Phil. 760 (2001).

48 G.R. Nos. L-18128 & L-18672, December 26, 1961, 3 SCRA 696, 703-704.

49 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULES ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN.

Korea Exchange Bank v. Hon. Rogelio C. Gonzales, 496 Phil. 127, 143-144 (2005); Spouses Sapugay v. CA, 262
50

Phil. 506, 513 (1990).

51 Sec. 8, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

52 Sec. 11, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

53See People of the Philippine Islands and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Vera, 65 Phil 199 (1937);
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012,
663 SCRA 514, 594.

54 Recreation and Amusement Association of the Philippines v. City of Manila, 100 Phil 950, 956 (1957).

55 Secs. 22 and 31, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

56 Sec. 26 (b), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

57 Sto. Domingo v. De Los Angeles, 185 Phil. 94, 102 (1980).

58 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), cited in The Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27, 56-57 (2004).

59 Rollo, pp. 214-240, 237.

60 Petition, id. at 26-27.

61An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Members of the Family, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims and for Other Purposes.

62 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, p. 27.

63 Id. at 25.

64 Id. at 27.

65 Id. at 43-44.

66 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 51, January 14, 2004, pp. 141-147.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987,
67

April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 391.

68 Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993, 227 SCRA 100, 113-114.

69 158 Phil. 60, 86-87 (1974).

70 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, p. 169.

71Philippine Commission on Women, National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment,
"Violence Against Women (VAW)," <http://www.pcw.gov.ph> (visited November 16, 2012).

72 <http://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/dec_dec_1993.html> (visited November 16, 2012).

As reported by Senator Loi Estrada in her Sponsorship Speech, Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45,
73

December 10, 2003, p. 22.

74Philippine Commission on Women, "Statistics on Violence Against Filipino Women,"

<http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201210/statistics-violence-against-filipino-women> (visited October 12, 2012).

Women's Aid, "Who are the victims of domestic violence?," citing Walby and Allen, 2004,
75

<www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp? section=00010001002200410001&itemid= 1273 (visited

November 16, 2012).

Toronto District School Board, Facts and Statistics <www.tdsb.on.ca/site/viewitem.asp?siteid=15&

76

menuid=23082&pageid=20007> (visited November 16, 2012).

77 People v. Solon, 110 Phil. 39, 41 (1960).

78 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, supra note 69, 90.

79Biden, Jr., Joseph R., "The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense," 37 Harvard
Journal on Legislation 1 (Winter, 2000).

80 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, pp. 22-23.

81 Benancillo v. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 1, 8.

82"General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures"

<www.un.org/womenwatch/.../recommendation> (visited January 4, 2013).

83 Petition, rollo, p. 27.

84 Article 5(a), CEDAW.

85"The Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," Remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A.
9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004 at the Session Hall of the Supreme Court.

86 Supra note 49.

87 Article 15.

88 Article 16.

89 Supra note 49.

90 Supra note 49.

91 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil 290, 351-352 (2001).

92 Petition, rollo, p. 35.

93 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , supra note 91, at 352-353.

94 G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231.

95 Petition, rollo, p. 31.

96 Sec. 4 (o), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

97 Supra note 49.

98 Sec. 7, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

99 Supra note 49.

100 Id.

101 Supra note 85.

102 Cuartero v. CA, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260, 265.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994, 231 SCRA 292,
103

307, citing Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112.

104 Sec. 15, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

105 Sec. 16, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

106 Sec. 20, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

107 Esperida v. Jurado, Jr., G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 66, 74.

108 Petition, rollo, pp. 30-31.

109 Id. at 36.

110 Supra note 49.

111 Petition, rollo, pp. 130-131.

112 Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

113 Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658 (2002).

People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 899 (2004), citing Section 389, Chapter 3, Title One, Book III, Local
114

Government Code of 1991, as amended.

115 Lovina and Montilla v. Moreno and Yonzon, 118 Phil 1401, 1406 (1963).

Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011, 653
116

SCRA 154, 258.

117 Supra note 91.

ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 161032

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA,* and

and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, BRION, JJ.

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, G.R. No. 161176

JOCELYN BARLIZO, and

PHILIP PICHAY,

Petitioners,

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Promulgated:

CARLOS SO,

Respondents. September 16, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect
and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line
between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been
crossed.

The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed
on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112
and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer,
Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip
Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in
connection with the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May
12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.1 The four informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-1598

That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 11, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS

Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata na
government official sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.

Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.

Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.

Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.

Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having
illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.2

Criminal Case No. 99-1599

That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 12, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

SI ATTY. SO NG BOC

"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara ang
totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.

Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng salapi
yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa mga buwayang
taga BOC.

Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.

Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng
mas mabilis.

Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka korbata at
holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!"

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having
illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.3

Criminal Case No. 99-1600

That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 19, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

xxxx

"Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel
Aquino ng Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa South Harbor.

Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.

Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.

Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-release ng kanilang kargamento."

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having
illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.4

Criminal Case No. 99-1597

That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" T. SO,
and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on June 25, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT",
quoted hereunder, to wit:

xxxx

Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang
opisyales ng Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at
inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.

Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang
iyong kaluluwa sa impyerno.

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having
illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and
ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.5

On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned, while Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on
December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.

At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the four dates of the publication of the
questioned articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the accused and
complaining witness did not know each other during all the time material to the four dates of publication; (3)
that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness
of the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein and its authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well as
the editorial post containing the designated positions of the other accused; and (6) the prosecution’s qualified
admission that it is the duty of media persons to expose corruption.6

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla,
and complainant Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well.

Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue because he
had known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked with him in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
Division of the Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the articles written by Tulfo, he
concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject articles identified "Atty. Carlos" as "Atty. ‘Ding’
So" of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one
Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs.7

Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she issued a certification in connection
with these cases upon the request of Atty. So.8 This certification stated that as per records available in her
office, there was only one employee by the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who was also known as "Atty. Ding
So" in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service or in the entire Bureau of
Customs.9

Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that
having read the articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos "Ding" So.10

Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated cases. He further testified that he is
also known as Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of Customs since October 1981,
and that he was assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
Division at the Manila International Container Port since December 27, 1999. He executed two complaint-
affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999 and the other dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600.
Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases of libel against Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified
that petitioner Tulfo’s act of imputing upon him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him
dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and
superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said articles. He said it
also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and
embarrassment. He further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such as the
publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the articles. He
also testified that "Ding" is his nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs who
goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding" So.11

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither
knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty.
So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty.
"Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people’s
names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor
dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted.
He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a
columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in
the South Harbor.12

Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos "Ding" So when the latter filed a case against them.
He testified that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.; that he was designated as the national editor
of the newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of the position are to edit, evaluate, encode, and
supervise layout of the news from the provinces; and that Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice
President for Editorial and Head of the Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in
the subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he anything to do with the latter’s column.13

Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written by the
reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as
news and city editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her subordinate, whose
duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned to her, the Metro page.
She further testified that she had no participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo
because the column was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-accused from the Remate newspaper
edited the columns of Tulfo, that the publication and editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of
Tulfo, and that he was given blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page
wherein Tulfo’s column appeared was supervised by Bueno as news editor.14

Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since December 1998.
He testified that the company practice was to have the columnists report directly to the vice-president of
editorials, that the columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that the vice-president for editorials
is the one who would decide what articles are to be published and what are not. He further testified that Tulfo
was already a regular contributor.15

The Ruling of the RTC

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN
BARLIZO and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as
defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the
same Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences EACH of the accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, for EACH count with accessory penalties provided by law.

Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay wrote
and published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the Court, of
whether it was false or not, the said articles libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE
MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all with subsidiary imprisonment, in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.16

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE

APPELLANT THAT HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WORKING AT THE
NAIA. HE CRITICIZED ANOTHER PERSON WORKING AT THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE, THE
ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS LACKING.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
DISCREDIT OR DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY JURISPRUDENCE.

3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO.17

His co-accused assigned the following errors:

The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay
liable for the defamations contained in the questioned articles despite the fact that the trial court did not have
any finding as to their participation in the writing, editing and/or publication of the questioned articles.

The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was committed by all of the accused on the basis of its
finding that the elements of libel have been satisfactorily established by evidence on record.

The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the one referred to by Erwin Tulfo in his articles
in question.18
In a Decision19 dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo, while the rest
of his co-accused filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution dated December 11,
2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.20

Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25318 which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought
a similar petition docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same CA decision.

In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were consolidated since both cases arise from the same set
of facts, involve the same parties, assail the same decision of the CA, and seek identical reliefs.21

Assignment of Errors

Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:

Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not
declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the court’s
having incorrectly reasoned out that malice was presumed in the instant case.

II

Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not privileged, the lower court, nonetheless,
committed gross error as defined by the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its misappreciation of the
evidence presented on matters substantial and material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.22

Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their own assignment of errors, as follows:

A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By
Holding Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For The Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June 25,
1999 Issues Of Remate Simply Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And City Editor
Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was The President
Of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. Without Taking Into Account The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had
No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.

B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion In Manifestly Disregarding The Unrebutted
Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In
Question.

C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence In Holding That The Person Referred To In
The Published Articles Was Private Complainant Atty. Carlos So.23

Our Ruling

The petitions must be dismissed.

The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed first.

In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals.24 In
essence, he argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged communication" under Borjal and
that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact.

This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal stemmed from a civil
action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in Borjal was that there was
no sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated from the present case in discussing
the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present
case, the subject is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were
"fair commentaries on matters of public interest."25 It shall be discussed and has yet to be determined whether or
not the articles fall under the category of "fair commentaries."

In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo’s articles being qualifiedly privileged communication is
raised for the first time in the present petition, and this particular issue was never brought before either the RTC
or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly consider and evaluate this defense. Tulfo
now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal, and argues that the prosecution should have proved
malice in fact, and it was error on the part of the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in
law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to
refute a defense that Tulfo had never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are privileged
communications must first be established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the
CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review.

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the time of
the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at the Bureau of
Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the
articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with malice,
for which he would be liable.

Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press

The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries
made on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given
greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute
and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an
equal burden of responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one
claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.

The Journalist’s Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows that the
press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties
and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists "recognize the duty to air the other side and the
duty to correct substantive errors promptly." Art. VIII states that journalists "shall presume persons accused of
crime of being innocent until proven otherwise."

In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist’s Code of Ethics and exercised his
journalistic freedom responsibly.

In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal
activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty.
So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro
nito."26 He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities.27 And when
Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong
tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."28

In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him
prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research
of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of Customs.

In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal
gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been
someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the
target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for even with the knowledge that he may be in
error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So’s name, as Tulfo surmised, he
made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he
was accusing.

The trial court found Tulfo’s accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of
contents of articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of the articles does not
prove malice. Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications. It cannot be
said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged
communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v.
Noel we held –

A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one
group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules
governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrinerequires that liability for defamation of a
public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the
person making the libelous statement.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with good faith and
reasonable care." This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of
mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and
instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their
profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in
the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.

Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances given in
Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified
privileged communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public interest." While Borjal places fair
commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the
article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability.
Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the
allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information before
publishing his articles.

Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs and relied
only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records of the case are bereft of
any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo’s articles related no specific
details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns were
unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged simply because the target
was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in
connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties, or against public officials in relation to
matters of public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit
of constitutionally protected speech.31 Journalists still bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing
their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. As held in In Re: Emil P.
Jurado:

Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth;
or that a newsman may ecape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or
entity, but recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and
refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process,
and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists’ Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the
potential of his profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to make shameful and offensive
charges destructive of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same,
cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his
word for the reliability of those sources.32

The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations against Atty. So, only citing his one
unnamed source. It is not demanded of him that he name his source. The confidentiality of sources and their
importance to journalists are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists making no efforts
to verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw wild accusations and
besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and in
doing so must at least investigate their stories before publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof.
The rumors and gossips spread by unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists
who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some foundation
to their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.

Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care even when writing about public
officials. The case stated:
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that
matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated
one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is
precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which
are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining
the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what
he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm
represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear
from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism
profession in the Philippines.33

Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged
communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of
malice "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative,
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions." This
particular provision has several elements which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from the
presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the following
conditions must exist:

(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;

(b) That it is made in good faith; and

(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.34

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of
the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the
word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his
story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling
him a disgrace to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art.
354 of the RPC is present in Tulfo’s articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified privileged
communications under the RPC.

Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfo’s articles do not meet the
standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and honesty."35 "True" is defined as
"conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest."36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he
did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless.
The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely wild accusations.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged
communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.

In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the
presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the prosecution the
burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have been evidence that
he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,37 and reiterated in Flor v. People,
which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.38

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard of
whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to
verify the information on which he based his writings, and that the defense presented no evidence to show that
the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty.
So, personally, there was no malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the "reckless disregard" test,
and Tulfo has failed to meet that test.

The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as further
evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,39 wherein publication after the commencement of an action
was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to
consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his
intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.

Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court
misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding"
So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty.
Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of doubt as to the identity of the
real party referred to in the articles.

This argument is patently without merit.

The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfo’s
articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning
to Tulfo’s case is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against him by Atty. So of the
Bureau of Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was
due to the exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This
last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot now
point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real
subject of his attacks, when he did not investigate the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor,
nor investigate the alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is
doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points to one Atty. So,
the complainant in the present case.

Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication and the matter of the identity of the person
referred to in the subject articles, there remains the petition of the editors and president of Remate, the paper on
which the subject articles appeared.

In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in the editing or
writing of the subject articles, and are thus not liable.

The argument must fail.

The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:

Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.

The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not
provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those
involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in
preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were
the author.

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by
simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone
in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold
positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.

As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the
other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as
editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its
management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication
therein of a libelous article.40 On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the
contents of the paper,41 it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees,42 so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the
publication.43 In Fermin v. People of the Philippines,44 the Court held that the publisher could not escape
liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of a libelous article. The Court cited
U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally
liable, and it is worth reiterating:

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing
libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the
contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all
other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers.

xxxx

In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the
responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other things
(pp. 782, 783):

"The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal
responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent.
When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the
manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.

"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever
appears in his paper; and it should be no defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or
consent, x x x.

"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears,
and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in the publication or not, x x x.
Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies
some degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.
"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the
knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such
proprietor or manager."

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the court
held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie
presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove that he never
saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and
retraction were afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this same case,
Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:

"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the publication of improper
communications, to use reasonable caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be published."
(Wharton’s Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishop’s Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64
Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)

The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp.,
21) Lord Kenyon said that he was "clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable
criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the management of the
paper."

This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.

Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:

"An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers, although he did not know of its being put
into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as he discovered it."

In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that –

"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly
and criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it."45

Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too
must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.

Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must still be tempered with justice.
Petitioners are to be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply for probation to avoid service of
sentence possibly in the belief that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v. People,46 the Court, in a
criminal case for libel, removed the penalty of imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v.
Court of Appeals,47 the accused was merely fined in lieu of the original penalty of imprisonment and fine.
Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press may not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in
too harshly. In light of this, considering the necessity of a free press balanced with the necessity of a responsible
press, the penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000 for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, should suffice.48 Lastly, the responsibilities of the members of the press notwithstanding, the
difficulties and hazards they encounter in their line of work must also be taken into consideration.

The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides, "Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages."
There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss
that can be measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.
In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual and moral damages:

A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
or actual damages are borne.

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.
These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to
the sound discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the
claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code
which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other
hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof.49

It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty. So deserves the award of moral
damages. Justification for the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code, which states
that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. As the cases
involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art. 2219(7).

Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. The fact that no actual
or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended party’s right
to recover moral damages.50

And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at this juncture that Tulfo’s libelous
articles are abhorrent not only because of its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself, but also
because of their impact on members of his family, especially on the children and possibly even the children’s
children.

The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino family,
such that the whole family usually suffers or rejoices at the misfortune or good fortune, as the case may be, of
any of its member. Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and reputation of the head of the
family, as here, invariably puts the other members in a state of disrepute, distress, or anxiety. This reality adds
an imperative dimension to the award of moral damages to the defamed party.

The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party." No aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of the libelous acts; thus, no
exemplary damages can be awarded.

Conclusion

The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the information it imparts, it can mold and
shape thoughts and opinions of the people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can
build up heroes or create villains.
It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion and dissemination of ideas, and to
encourage people to engage in healthy debate. It is through this that society can progress and develop.

Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also acknowledge the corollary duty to
publish responsibly. To show that they have exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go beyond merely
relying on unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further investigation conducted,
some shred of proof found to support allegations of misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy
for journalists to destroy the reputation and honor of public officials, if they are not required to make the
slightest effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed to be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must
be able to back up their stories with solid research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to
exercise that power judiciously cannot be understated.

But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not mean that it be totally unfettered. It
is still acknowledged that the freedom can be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a
corresponding sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It may be a cliché that
the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be learned is that such a mighty
weapon should not be wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and careful
thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective checks on government power and
abuses. Hence, it behooves government functionaries to respect the value of openness and refrain from
concealing from media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their backyard. On the other
hand, public officials also deserve respect and protection against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of
official wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of
press freedom. The common but most unkind perception is that government institutions and their officers and
employees are fair game to official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is just
as disconcerting. Reports and accusation of official misconduct often times merit front page or primetime
treatment, while defenses set up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory
coverage. The unfairness needs no belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not enough.

Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is the fact that a maliciously false
imputation of corruption and dishonesty against a public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only
on the person but also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service also unduly
suffers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED. The
CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of
six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
while the award of actual damages and exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision dated November 17,
2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600 is modified to read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN
BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as
defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to pay a fine of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.

Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote
and published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said
articles being libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and
severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000) as moral damages. The claim of actual and
exemplary damages is denied for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
_ftnref1* Additional member as per August 27, 2008 raffle.
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 39.
2
Id. at 38-39.
3
Id. at 39-40.
4
Id. at 40-41.
5
Id. at 41-42.
6
Id. at 42.
7
Id. at 43.
8
Id. at 44.
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 88.
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 44.
11
Id. at 45-46.
12
Id. at 46-47.
13
Id. at 48-49.
14
Id. at 49-50.
15
Id. at 50-51.
16
Id. at 38-39.
17
Id. at 52.
18
Id. at 53.
_ftnref20[19] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and
concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
Rosemari D. Carandang.
20
Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 68.
21
Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 168.
22
Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), pp. 16-17.
23
Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 20.
24
G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1.
25
Id. at 22.
26
Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 10.
27
Id. at 11.
28
Id. at 12.
29
Supra note 24, at 30-31.
30
Borjal, supra at 23.
31
Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October
19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 574.
32
A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 299, 332.
_ftnref34[33] Id. at 327.
_ftnref35[34] 2 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code 858 (13th ed.,
1993).
35
Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (6th ed., 1990).
36
Id. at 1508.
37
376 US 254, 11 L ed. 2nd 686.
38
G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 440, 456.
39
29 Phil. 595 (1915).
_ftnref41[40] Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis 133, 65 NW 744; Faulkner v.
Martin, 133 NJL 605, 45 A2d 596; World Pub. Co. v. Minahan, 70
Okla 107, 173 P 815.
_ftnref42[41] Faulkner, supra.
_ftnref43[42] World Pub. Co., supra.
_ftnref44[43] Faulkner, supra; Goudy v. Dayron Newspapers, Inc., 14
Ohio App 2d 207, 43 Ohio Ops 2d 444, 237 NE2d 909.
_ftnref45[44] G.R. No. 157643, March 20, 2008.
_ftnref46[45] U.S. v. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, 50-52 (1910).
_ftnref47[46] G.R. No. 142409, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 275.
_ftnref48[47] G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 692.
_ftnref49[48] Administrative Circular No. 08-2008. See Fermin v.
People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008.
49
G.R. No. 1045676, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
50
Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 774,
781.

G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and
HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.
 DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered constitutional safeguard against
exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the
accused was acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and frustrated murder
(although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged did not
constitute a violation of law. But the State through this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.

We narrate a brief factual backdrop.

The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in
rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi
who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his
right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by
surgical procedure.

As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were
originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San
Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December
1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to
murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor
Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of
firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.

After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-
55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime
Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to respondent
Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.

On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the
accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder.
However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved
him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the
submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent
Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in
favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the
evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and
substituted with a verdict of guilt.

The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private respondent
Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the
Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
retrial is required should judgment be overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced
from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United
States,2and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is
reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges
the Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy
Clause" in the Philippines3 and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a century ago are
still germane and useful today in view of certain modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American
cases of United States v. Wilson4 and United States v. Scott.5

Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as
an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the
reversal of the acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a
judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.

The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins (not discounting too the earlier
dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic,
thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of
the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering especially the
alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to
respond to the issues advanced by petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and
implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive rulings.

For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the constitutionally ensconced
rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a
person not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same offense.6 This prohibition does not consist merely of
one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of exceptions.7 It must
have been this unique transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme
Court to remark in Albernaz v. United States8 that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in
forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on double jeopardy and the rules so far
established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a compendious review of its historical
growth and development be undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing
landmark interpretive applications of the doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu under which it
evolved.

Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word,"9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke, jest or game,10 and also from the
French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or
"jupartie" means an uncertain game.11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian
view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and
judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the
same man to be tried twice on the same issue."12 The Justinian Digest13 providing that "(a) governor should not permit
the same person to be again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted,"14 suggests certain philosophical
underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C.
reflecting man’s "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously
pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense
of man passing from one misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities.
Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a final
triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the same misfortune was anathema to
ancient thought.

The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that humans could err in prosecuting
and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of
preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the Hammurabic
Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not proved [it against
him], his accuser shall be put to death."15

The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is consistent with the interpretation by
St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God to his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not
rise up the second time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no more."17 Taken to mean that God
does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim insinuated itself into canon law as early as 847 A. D., succintly
phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for the same act."18

The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the dispute between the English King
Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance
of certain customs initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the known purposes of which
was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted
in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the king’s punishment. This was met with
stinging criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the
clergy to double jeopardy. The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-
ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king.19

It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized "as a maxim of common
law"20 based on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero
commented: "Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the future, but among all
nations, it is the same."21 But even as early as the 15th century, the English courts already began to use the term
"jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials.22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of
Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.).23 Lord Coke for instance described the protection
afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and
pardon.24 In Vaux’s Case,25 it was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same
offense is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is
grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his
life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly
found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction of the
offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."26

The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal
procedure," became an integral part of the legal system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts
Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes and common law of England,
grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same crime, offence or
Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall
causes shall be briefly and destinctly entered on the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."27 Ineluctably,
this pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the First Congress of the United States that double
jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition against placing an individual twice in
danger of a second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in English law and legislation
derived from colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in the US
Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an acquittal from perjury, declaring
that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of
common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this
salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by repeated attempts to carry on a
prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant
is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him."28 Verily, these concepts were founded upon
that great fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in substance
expressed in the Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense, to be
twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common law, embodied in the
Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in
criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State.29

The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to order a new trial following
conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of controversy in United States v. Gibert.30 There, Mr. Justice Story,
on circuit, declared that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had been duly had on a valid
indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was that the prohibition against double
jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had been acquitted or convicted.

But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the most serious cases was already
being exercised by many American courts, the practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of
provisions of law against double jeopardy.31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted.32 As if to
taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen33 declared that the constitutional provision did not prohibit a new
trial on defendant’s motion after a conviction. In Hopt v. Utah,34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following
reversals of his convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball35 affirmed that the double jeopardy rule did not prevent
a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on
appeal a reversal of a judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon another
indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of autrefois convict was expanded
nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States36 where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines by holding that "since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order to
secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court
that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine
is that which does not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of the
lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the judgment of conviction
opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been."37 It was ratiocinated
that the result was justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried but also
on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x
which has been annulled at the request of the accused x x x x"

It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been settled under the Fifth Amendment
that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a
bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law that
the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an acquittal may appear to be
erroneous."

In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the
district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction
of the Constitution. The following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges38 on whether this Act
conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules on
double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States Supreme Court observed that while English law was
vague on the matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a
writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with
express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination by the
court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a
judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him
twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional provision.39 Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit
legislative authority, the United States Government had no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as
it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy.

Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to recommend the passage of
legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a
single district judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution
instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt
in his annual message to the US Congress demanded the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on
2 March 1907 such legislative authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law40 Ch. 2564, 34
Stat. 1246.40 permitting the United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision
dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictments is
founded."41 The law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of the District
Court’s decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict
in favor of the defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal
theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it made no difference whether the verdict be the result of
the jury’s decision or that of the judge. In other words, Government could appeal from a decision dismissing an
indictment or arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal
statute and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not be put in jeopardy.42

On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule
until the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military government issued
General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others, extending to
the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to
the 7 April 1900 Instructions of President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard
Taft. The Instructions read in part: "x x x the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should
be made to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of
our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their islands for the
sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with
which they are familiar x x x x Upon every division and branch of the Government of the Philippines therefore must
be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense x x x
x"43

General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by the government after acquittal.
The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the
same principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in McKinley’s Instructions by
providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not take long however for the meaning
and significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinley’s Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.

In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was charged with embezzlement of funds
(estafa). He was tried by a court of first instance, minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S.
Government appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was reversed. Kepner was
sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public office or place of trust.

Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the appeal by the US government to
the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing
US jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the Solicitor General of the
United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the prohibition against double
jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its
cession to the United States. Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a
judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a new trial but an extension of
preliminary proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the
jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been rendered by
the Audiencia. Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real44 as: "After a man accused of
any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense (except in certain
specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas45 which provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any
offense of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x" Under this
system of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in
the court of last resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction
only, and the accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in
the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in Madrid (Spain) for
errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.

The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government’s argument and held that the proceedings after
acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the
judgment of conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of
Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to the
Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question
therefore that Kepner soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been
acquitted by the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no other action than to order his discharge.
"x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict
duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The
protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same offense."46

This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the Court further clarified that "jeopardy implies an
exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of which a person has already been acquitted x x x x" It was reiterated
in 1957 in Green v. United States48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, professed that the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial
and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of
acquittal was considered final, ending the accused’s jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an
offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge.

American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy since then sailed on, following the
main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not without encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be
mentioned, albeit en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause some amount of judicial soul-shaking in
1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in Illinois and was later
acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts
substantially identical to those of the federal charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by
the Illinois Supreme Court.

On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the conviction. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to
states so that an acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based on the same charge.
Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the federal authorities in the Illinois state
prosecution was of such nature as to render the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render
the state indictment essentially a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.

Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice
Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that the Court’s ruling by a majority of one only resulted in
"further limiting the already weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution," citing the earlier case
of United States v. Lanza,50 where the Court allowed the federal conviction and punishment of a man previously
convicted and punished for identical acts by a state court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for
the first time in its history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the same
offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable, for as the Court previously found
in Palko v. Connecticut,51 "double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country
that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and immunities
of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by process of
absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered
particularly obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction."

Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views on double jeopardy is open to
question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United States,52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements
in Ball and Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed x x x without putting (the
petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."

In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent significant alterations. The 1942
amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining
demurrer to indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme Court.53 However, due to the many
modifications the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation became more laborious, effectively
transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial
"bete noire," for even the U.S. Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of
the said Act."54 In one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that
has not improved with age."55

The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with a new Criminal Appeals Act
intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that
the legislative body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than
define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for
the same offense.56

In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus,
when a defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality
require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same
offense.58 And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be
permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty."59 It can thus be inferred from these cases that the policy of avoiding
multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only in few
instances and under rigid conditions.
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott60 the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerable principles of double
jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge;
and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the
evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would
be necessitated by a reversal.61 It would seem that the conditionality of "when a second trial would be necessitated
by a reversal" was attached thereto because ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of
acquittal is reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of the case for another trial may be
allowed if needed.

At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not
only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes
loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve determination of
evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of law
after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than
insufficiency of evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c) conducts a
judicial process that is defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of
evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act of a
trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that
rendered the judgment;62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that does
not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which is set up as a special defense relating to an outside
matter but which may have been connected with the case.63 Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of
dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which
consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals
therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are allowed under American rules of
procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an
acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a defendant’s liability to be tried
again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong
Foo illustrate, the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior
resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x x x On the
other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of
appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the x x x
Clause was intended to protect."

In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner insists

that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated
by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible
provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at bar
because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial
inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the
culpability of the accused.

Petitioner’s own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which solely adverts to a proceeding before
a competent trial court that rehears the case and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has
been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and,
for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before the American colonization,
that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final
disposition by the Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned
by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a
judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially, a new trial.
In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as
equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple
prosecutions.64 Although Kepner technically involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding,
that is, the review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the
Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil of successive trials.65

No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioner’s main anchor for its propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court
emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes
in Kepner that " a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may
be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It declared
unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate
against permitting the Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if
acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause.

To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling of law issued by the trial judge
resulting in the acquittal of the defendant due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the
indictment prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury. But it was not an acquittal
that involved "factual resolution." It was one anchored on an extraneous cause. Factual resolution is defined
in United States v. Sorenson67 following the rulings in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government
failed to prove all the elements of the offense." It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on
evidence, could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge holds for the defendant on a
ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution may appeal
the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law.68 This is so since no second
trial will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jury’s verdict.69 And if the prosecution is upheld,
the case simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson,
no double jeopardy problem was presented because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of
the trial judge, could simply order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated, no new factfinding would be necessary, and the
defendant would not be put twice in jeopardy.70

The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused who, having been indicted for
several offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense
was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government appealed the dismissals
but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a
mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is
deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by
the first trier of facts."

The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The dismissal of the charges against private
respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be
considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits was held during
which both government and accused had their respective day in court.

We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s concept of "another trial" because, as discussed
above, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the
double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us, the records show that
respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the
evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to
the extent that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of
facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The same observation holds true
for Scott. That it was the defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to
either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-
indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.

Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still behooves us to examine if at this time
there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy on double jeopardy vis-à-vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be
instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since Kepner. Has the principle since then
beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not improved with age?"

The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran observed in People v. Tarok,71 are
not indigenous but are a matter of constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United
States, from there it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902, then in the Jones Law of 1916,
and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and
adopted from the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the
same line of development - no narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this observation considering the variety of
offsprings begotten, at least in the United States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not
much deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be said to have been the
lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The cases
of People v. Bringas,72 People v. Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,75 Republic v.
Court of Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,77 to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason behind
this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking,
but to maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early
as Julia v. Sotto78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against double jeopardy secured in favor of the
accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might
repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.

The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are
enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to
make an appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the
defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus -

MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The amendment is commendable, but we
submit that the reason against far outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity of
suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be expensive if we meet fiscals who
have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or more amor propio. In the third
place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of
academy of consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be
one-sided. In the fifth place, as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural rather than
constitutional. And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the
judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would walk around under a
veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.

PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in favor of the amendment
please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is
rejected x x x x

(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. 361)

The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided under this Constitution pertinent to the matter at
hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way80 against the
right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he has been
brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether his discharge was based upon the trial
court’s conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged.

The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof, reproduced verbatim the same
double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986
Constitutional Commission.

Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission attempts were made to introduce
into the Fundamental Law the right of government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The
proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows -
Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the
discretion of the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the
evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.81

This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by Commissioner Rustico de los
Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power, situation and advantage in criminal cases where the
government, with its unlimited resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned in the law, stands
arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted with their officers or attorneys,
often without means and frequently too terrified to make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life,
liberty or property rested upon the result of the trial."82

Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be subjecting an accused individual to a
very serious danger of harassment from a prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this
flag of possibility of appeal x x x could be much more than letting a guilty person go."83 Put to a vote, the proposal
was defeated.84

Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the Bill of Rights of the Constitution,
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the
Judiciary. The following exchanges ensued:

MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide resolution which allowed an appeal in a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided that
in such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been deleted by the Commission x x x x

FR. BERNAS. Yes.

MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented and approved by the
Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I
recall, the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did not violate double jeopardy but it was
unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of double jeopardy or is it
just because it need not be stated in the Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?

FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we considered the matter in the Article on
the Judiciary. The position I took was that it was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more
strict than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion but it also required that the judgment
be clearly against the evidence.

MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make the exercise of that right by the state
or offended party restrictive not only through a petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court
which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are really covered by "in excess or lack of
jurisdiction."

But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the opinion that when a judgment of
acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that is final, executory and not appealable.

Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary judgment of acquittal rendered by a
few corrupt judges of the offended party or the state will improve the administration of justice?

FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we voted on Third Reading on the
Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a
motion on the floor.

Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.85

The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere
strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide -
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information x x x x

From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.86 It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do
not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly
establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens
at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court
on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the
trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the
acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that
double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where
the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham
trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to
rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and
absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people
were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A
dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is ‘a lawless thing which
can be treated as an outlaw.’ It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase
Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he
invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy.’ The contention of respondent-accused that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or reopened without being put in
double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:88

x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent
Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor
bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke
'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone. The interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of
justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a
1âwphi1

vital role. They render justice where justice is due.

Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the
"criminal trial was a sham" because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was
denied due process.89 The Court in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy."91

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of
the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State
x x x x"92 Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."93

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection
of the innocent against wrongful conviction."94 The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability.95 With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.96

Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal.97 This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the
initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.98 The ultimate goal is prevention of
government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding.99 As observed in Lockhart v.
Nelson,100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.101

Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative process on the
ground that the principle is endemic to the American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts
of acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying rationale of jury acquittals, a special
feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is a rather
strained if not facile approach to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective
of factfinding is concerned, factfinding forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a
difference between a jury acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine version." To support its contention, petitioner
sedulously explains that in the United States there is an "emerging consensus to differentiate the constitutional
impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis-à-vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench." While this consensus
may have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of countless
instances of conflict between jury verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural
statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each
other at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of, petitioner’s
hypothesis is inappropriate.

Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner’s argument lies in its focus on the instrumentality empowered to rule
against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its
proposition with the phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function of
factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of factfinding is
concerned, there exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of
facts. This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability of the finality
rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that, universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is
the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus
on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved our own doctrine that acquittals
by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds
of double jeopardy having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal
of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused
against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally put to rest.

Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent with the material facts and
evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo,102 it alleges that "respondent aggravated his
indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence already presented for a proper assessment x x x x It is in completely
ignoring the evidence already presented x x x that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It
adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, i.e.,
after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness."103
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner’s certiorari as a mode of impugning the judgment
of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment and evaluation by
respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge to warrant issuance of the great writ of certiorari.

We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the
proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether
the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential requirements of the
law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions.
It is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning
the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the
prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights
are being thus encroached upon.104

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in determining
the standing of the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has
favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of certiorari are found
together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some
indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other
adequate remedy available,105 and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should not
be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.106 Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed
was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial court, the
standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an order as
one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict
of guilty.107

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has
viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions
acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez
goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A
reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These
consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the
trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution.
While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not
detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from
the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the
exercise of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., agree with J. Panganiban’s separate opinion.
Melo, J., in the result.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1
Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5.1

2
195 U.S. 100.2

3
Petition, p. 24; Rollo, p. 25.3

4
420 U.S. 332, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 95 S. Ct. 1013.4

5
437 U.S. 82, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65, 98 S. Ct. 2187.5

6
Moss v. Jones, Ky., 352 S.W. 2d 557-558.6

7
Notes and Comments, Twice In Jeopardy, Yale L. J., Vol. 75 at 262.7

8
450 U. S. 333, 67 L. Ed. 2d 284.8

9
Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Made Simple, The Yale L. J., Vol. 106, Nos. 5 and 6, March-April 1997.9

10
Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1961.10

11
The Oxford English Dictionary, 214 (2d., 1989).11c

12
George C. Thomas III, Double Jeopardy, The History, the Law, New York University Press, 1998, p. 73.12

13
Digest 48, 2.7.2., translated in Scott, The Civil Law, 17.13

14
Bartkus v. Illinois, 309 U. S. 121, 3 L. Ed. 2d 706.14

15
Thomas, supra.15

16
1 Nahum 9.16

17
Id. at 12.17

18
Bartkus, supra.18

19
See Note 12, p. 74; The Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 678.19

20
Cooley's Blackstone, 4th Ed., 1899.20

21
Batcheldeer, Former Jeopardy, 17 Am. L. Rev. 735, cited in Bartkus, supra.21

22
Jeopardy During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U Pa L. Rev. 602 (1934).22

Notes and Comments, Twice in Jeopardy, Yale L. J., Vol. 75 at 262, 1965, citing Sigler's A History of Double
23

Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. Legal History, 283-297, 1963.23

24
Ibid.24

25
4 Co Rep 44a, 45a.25

26
4 BI Comm 335, cited in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 1842, L. Ed. 2d 199, 61 ALR 2d 1119.26

27
Green, supra.27
28
State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw. (Tenn. 110).28

29
State v. Jone, Ga. 422, 424-425.29

30
2 Summ 19, F. Case No. 15204, 1287, 1294-1303 (1834, CC Mass).30

31
United States v. Fries, 1 L. Ed. 701.31

32
United States v. Williams, (CC Me), 1 Cliff 5, F. Case No. 16707, pp. 636, 641.32

33
(CC Ind) 1 McLean 429, F Case No. 155510, pp. 686, 687-690.33

34
104 U.S. 631.34

35
163 U.S. 662-671.35

36
199 U.S. 521, 50 L. Ed. 292, 26 S. Ct. 121.36

37
Id. at 533.37

38
144 U.S. 310-323.38

State v. Anderson, 3 Smedes & M. 751; State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169; State v. Burris, 3 Tex. 118; Peo. v. Webb, 38
39

Cal. 467; Peo. v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529, 541.39

40

41
U.S. v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65, 98 S. Ct. 2187.41

42
U.S. v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 95 S. Ct. 1013.42

43
1 Public Laws of the Philippine Commission, p. 66.43

44
A. D. 1255, Lib. Iv., Title xxi, I 13.44

45
A.D. 1263, Part vii, Title, i. XII.45

46
Ibid.46

47
36 F 2d 855. 47

48
355 U.S. 184, 2 L. Ed. 199, 78 S Ct 221, 61 ALR 2d 1119.48

49
359 U. S. 121, 3 L. Ed. 2d 684.49

50
260 U. S. 377, 67 L. Ed. 314, 43 S. Ct. 141.50

51
302 U.S. 319, 326, 82 L. Ed. 288, 58 S. Ct. 149.51

52
369 U.S. 141, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629, 82 S. Ct. 67.52

53
United States v. Wayne Pump Co., Ill. 1942, 63 S. Ct. 191, 317 U. S. 200, 87 L. Ed. 184.53

54
United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254.54
55
Wilson, supra, citing United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 307, 26 L. Ed. 2d 608.55

56
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072.56

57
420 U.S. 332, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 95 S. Ct. 1013.57

58
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 21 L Ed 872; In re Nielsen 131 U.S. 176.58
59

60
Ibid.60

61
Id., 74.61

62
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 307, 26 L. Ed., 2d 608.62

63
Id., 652.63

64
See Note 42.64

Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18; 64 L. Ed. 103, 40 S. Ct. 50; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326, 82
65

L. Ed., 288, 58 S. Ct. 149.65

66
Id., 246.66

67
504 Fed. Rep. 2d 410.67

68
18 USCS Sec. 3731.68

69
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 332.69

70
Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 106 S. Ct. 1745.70

71
73 Phil. 260 (1941).71

72
70 Phil 528 (1940).72

73
94 Phil. 49 (1953).73

74
No. L-29599, 30 January 1969.74

75
No. L-31842, 30 April 1970, 32 SCRA 601.75

76
202 Phil. 83 (1982).76

77
G.R. No. 54904, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 518.77

78
2 Phil. 247 (1903).78

79
See Note 72.79

80
21 Phil. 67 (1911).80

81
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 438.81
82
Id., 463-464.82

83
Id., 503.83

84
Id., 504.84

85
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, Rex Book Store, 1995, pp. 234-235.85

Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA
86

386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v.Court of Appeals
and Maquiling, G. R. No. 18986, 21 June 1999.86

87
G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986, 144 SCRA 43.87

88
G.R. No. 54641, 28 November 1980, 101 SCRA 450.88

89
See Note 87.89

90
G.R. No. L-27935, 16 August 1985, 183 SCRA 166.90

91
People v. Bocar, No. L-27935, 16 August 1985, 138 SCRA 166.91

92
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310. 92

93
355 U.S. 1842, L. Ed. 2d 199, 61 ALR 2d 1119.93

Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and Unreasonable Sentences,
94

18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 69 [1980].94

Paul Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences,
95

78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1018, 1022 [1980].95

Comments, Tulane Law Review, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and The Government’s Right to Appeal
96

Sentences: After The Supreme Court’s Green Light - Dare We Proceed? [Vol. 56, No. 2, Feb, 1982, at p. 702].96

97
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28, 36.97

98
Notes on Double Jeopardy, Mich. L. Rev. Vol 94: 1346, quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 486.98

99
George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, U. Ill. L. Rev. 827, 840 (1988).99

100
488 U. S. 33, 42.100

101
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497.101

102
No. L-37271, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 289, 298.102

103
Petition, p. 3, quoting People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155, 161.103

91 ALR 2d 1101. See State v. Todd, 224 NC 776, 32 SE 2d 313; State ex rel. Douglas v. Stratiner, 119 Wash 667,
104

206 P 353.104

105
United States v. Dickinson, 213 U. S. 92, 53 L. Ed. 711, 29 S. Ct. 485.105

106
See Note 101.106
107
Ibid.107

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with Justice Josue N. Bellosillo that the Petition at bar should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the private
respondent (defendant in the criminal case below) is already dead, so this Petition has become moot and
academic;1 and, in any event, (2) the petitioner has failed to show that public respondent, in issuing the assailed
Decision, had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I write, however, to stress that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a proper remedy to
challenge an acquittal on the ground that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is a hornbook doctrine. As held by the Court in People v.
Court of Appeals & Maquiling:2

"To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly
show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.3 ‘By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’4

xxx [H]owever, xxx no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the public respondent on the ground of
misappreciation of facts and evidence.5 A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal’s evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rules 45 of the Rules of Court.6

In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court.7 As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment, which are reviewable by timely
appeal, not by a special civil action for certiorari.8

By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is
elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged
under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has
jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the
case is dismissed without their consent.9

Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued
without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.10 In criminal cases, it
cannot be the source of an acquittal.

The instant Petition for Certiorari, however, fails to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Rather, it effectively urges this Court to re-evaluate the lower court’s
appreciation of the evidence, which cannot be done by certiorari. As held also in Maquiling:
"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an
ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated.
Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction
of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy."

WHEREFORE, I VOTE TO DISMISS the Petition.

Footnotes

1People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994; People v. Yanson-Dumancas, GR Nos. 133527-28,
December 13, 1999.

2 308 SCRA 687, June 21, 1999.

3Naguiat v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564, March 13, 1997; Camlian v. Comelec, 271 SCRA 757, April 18, 1997; Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 391, July 28, 1997; PMI Colleges v. NLRC, 277 SCRA 462, August 15, 1997;
Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218, September 16, 1997; Building Care
Corp. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 666, February 26, 1997; Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 259, April 16,
1997; Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; National Federation of Labor v.NLRC, 283 SCRA 275,
December 15, 1997; Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757, September 16, 1996.

4Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4, 1996, per Kapunan, J.;
quoted in Santiago v. Guingona Jr., GR No. 134577, November 18, 1998. See also Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA
518, July 31, 1997; Republic v. Villarama Jr., 278 SCRA 736, September 5, 1997.

5 Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10, June 2, 1997.

6Medina v. City Sheriff, Manila, 276 SCRA 133, July 24, 1997; Jamer v. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632, September 5, 1997;
Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387, January 25, 1996.

7Chua v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 546, April 18, 1997; Santiago Land Development v. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 535, July 19, 1996.

8 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, June 4, 1996.

9People v. Court of Appeals & Maquiling, supra, citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 1985; Gorion v.Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138, 1992; Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703, June 28, 1996; Paulin v.
Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386, January 21, 1993.

10 People v. Court of Appeals & Maquiling, supra; Soriano v. Angeles, GR No. 109920, August 31, 2000.

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR.,
NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No.
13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest
and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to
pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's
decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of
Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice,
Parole Division. 3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It
modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for
review.6

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed
Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared
with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal
Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on
duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales
spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where
Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio
Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada,
clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during
which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in
Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C.
Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting
their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise
taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after
completed, a report was made with the following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed
upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in
width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located
1.5 inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd
axilla left.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.

11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming
out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the
aspex of the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial border of the right
scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED
WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they
penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the
poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for
"having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters
in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company,
an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and
taking advantage of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided
at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as
shown by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death
of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to
Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an
Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein
appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as
earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador
Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo
of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the
victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised
wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one
weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined
that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation
they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she
incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the
accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to
Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February
21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr.
Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where
the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and
hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the
accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales
spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way
home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to
sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered
by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him
likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his
volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where
Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape
her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating
his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court
held that:

. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of
Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a
distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant
were moving around the victim.

As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He
said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The
natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. .
. the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared
not to affect credibility.'"

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he
and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said
that he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is
beyond question. 33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the
sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:

Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity
for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v.
Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed
being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of
the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21,
1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various
blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their
quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of
the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the
ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field
near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon
who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible
revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the
participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C.
investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their
criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have
conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy
report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed
instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And
then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the
sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can
only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and
stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan"
while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the
crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene
was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or
hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein
accused as identified by you?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not determine who did the
hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms,
Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the
stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because according to you it
was just flashing?

A Yes, sir.39

(Emphasis supplied)

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would
categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by
inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof.
What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by
the Court of Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit
or fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony
in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant.
It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown
an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his
death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who
"hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or
"stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted,
as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six
accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia
argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the
oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument
to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have
inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is
possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by
Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of
evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove
the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in
October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the
failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in
Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for
several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute for eight months.
Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His
lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they were
not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and
present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was
a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim
was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd
Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim
was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of
his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like
Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter.
In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which
would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good
graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as
May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite
sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was
taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided
lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable
witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture,
aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is
therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon
the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one
kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio
and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the
participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look
with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to
acquit the accused. 52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rendered by Judge Constancio E. Jaugan.

2 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 9.

3 Rollo, 54 and 67.

4 Mendoza, Vicente V., J., ponente; Herrera, Manuel C. and Imperial, Jorge S., JJ., concurring.

5 No. L-49818, February 20, 1979, 88 SCRA 486; see also People vs. Galang, G.R. No. 70713, June 29, 1989;
People vs. Centeno, L-48744, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 710; and People vs. Daniel, No. L-40330, November
20, 1978, 86 SCRA 511.

6 Rollo, id., 114.

7 T.S.N., session of June 6, 1983. 5-9.

8 Id., Session of May 10, 1983, 34-35.

9 Original Records, 149.

10 T.S.N., Id., session of July 27, 1982, 11.

11 Autopsy Report, Original Records, id., 2-3.

12 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, id., 3.

13 T.S.N., id., session of July 27, 1982, 17-19.

14 Original Records, id., 32.

15 Interchangeably mentioned in the Records of the case as Jose Juntoria, Jose Hontoria, and Jose Huntoria.

16 Original Records, Id., 81-82.

17 T.S.N., session of June 16, 1982, 3.

18 Id., 24.

19 Id., session of July 27, 1982, 37; see also T.S.N., of the Reinvestigation, session of January 8, 1982, at 2,
Original Records, at 187, where Huntoria gave his age as 29 years old.

20 Id., session of July 27, 1982, 41.

21 Id., 55.

22 Id., 41.

23 Id., 44, 56-57.

24 Id., 45.

25 Id.

26 Id., 48, 63.

27 Id., 64.

28 Id., 51.

29 Id., 52, 66.

30 Id., session of July 18, 1984, 12.

31 Id., 6.

32 Id., 14-15.

33 Rollo, id., 112.

34 Id., 113.

35 Id., 113-114.

36 Original Records, id., 7, 14-16.

37 Id., 4-5.

38 Id., 1.

39 T.S.N., session on July 27, 1982, 57-59.

40 REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1977), vol. 1, 68-69.

41 People vs. Punzalan, No. 54562, August 6, 1987, 153 SCRA 1; People vs. Coronado, No. 68932, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 250.

42 People vs. Delavin, Nos. 73762-63 February 27,1987, 148 SCRA 257, citing People vs. Madarang, No. L-22295,
January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 148.

43 People vs. Tulagan, No. 68620, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 107.

44 T.S.N., session of July 27, 1982, 50-51.

45 Original Records, id., 32-33.

46 T.S.N., session of July 27, 1982, id., 51-52.

47 Id., 67.

48 Id., 67-68.

49 The appellant was already 68 years old on July 18, 1984; T.S.N., session of July 18, 1984, 3.

50 T.S.N., id., 6.

51 People vs. Arnel Mitra, et al., No. 80405, November 24, 1989; People vs. Berbal and Juanito, No. 71527, August
10, 1989; People vs. Nolasco, No. 55483, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 623; People vs. Pecato, No. L-41008, June 18,
1987, 151 SCRA 14.

52 People vs. Santos, No. 62072, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 583.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087,
was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered
by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent
bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very
dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events,
it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior
to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with
his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest
house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped
at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino
and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his
way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was
being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling
and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but
one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well
as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting
the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm
and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or
another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con
malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included
in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . .
. in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects
of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of
an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive
judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime,
shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum
degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to
the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than
those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree
which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful"
as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word
"willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a
little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the
word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies
between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime
proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment
would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently
has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty
unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not
my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate
others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be
what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent."
The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public
voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve
punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to
suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it
elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification
of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be
accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no
man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to
290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the
intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and
77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to
be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will
justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the
life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-
defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he
is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning
them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be
he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by
law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of
the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and
under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be
murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report
of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol
in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the
same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged;
and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet
in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the
assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right
of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of
the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep.,
p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife,
without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire,
there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a
contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he
had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the
unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who
died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed
the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having
acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that
there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and
87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon
appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from
the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his
house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish
with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger
his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should
have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits
of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given
him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon
arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face
down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh!
they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel,
Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a
reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in
favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed
to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against
his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery
of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent
to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on
the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility
as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice
or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief
of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty
by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty
of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta,
and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper
clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the
house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place
and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately
returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to
who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when
he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated
the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in
the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If
you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit
up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if
you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying
on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the
door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from
the floor, he fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory.
Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking
up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about
to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the
latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to
exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments
dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson
when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting
her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination
of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia
of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness
having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves
justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they
may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson
was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared
them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by
circumstances to be mentioned below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that
precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-
mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night
and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances,
there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no
time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant
case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort
to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not
to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by
him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S.,
par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109).
It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to
the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which
he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal
offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot
see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can
justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost
an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a
reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another
act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un
hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa
intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente
el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed.
pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There
are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the
instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of
their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in
the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him
and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5)
years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces.
Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25,
1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio
Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram
received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a
Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him
and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of
Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks
in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell
where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon
reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas,"
started shooting the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and
Galanta have appealed.

In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by
the Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or
alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with
revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary
authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by
the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly
believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the
appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they
should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and
thereby exposed their lives to danger.

The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being
overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in
violation of the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the
appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the
authority to have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In
the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and
proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior
Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.

The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only
of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of
Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to
follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order,
enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.

In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo
Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally
liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under
an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).

It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable
since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.

The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the
defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake,
would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious
design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in
point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and
allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to
capture Almasan dead or alive.

The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which
confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938,
was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or
alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial
inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to
take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod
stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his
guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met
upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are
Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily
explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants
to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according
to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid
down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time
to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.

The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-
appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore,
according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5
of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose
the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of
exemption present or lacking.

This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which
was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the
Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the
justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are
the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere
accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.

The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:

Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza
inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el
ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna
omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos.
Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de
una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no
violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para
declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de
estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que
falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor
numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.

It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not
be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There
are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that
these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to
the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a
bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.

If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the
acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit
Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L).
He so testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica.
According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his
equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and,
according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks
on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the
witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by
Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of
December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the
non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired
only one shot and missed. This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets
exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report
Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from
any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have
substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the
deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no
reason why Galanta should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand,
aside from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber
revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a
.45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32
and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will
produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found by the surgeon who
performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be
stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he
should be declared criminally responsible for said death.

G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014

EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the
May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol
(Magsumbol), questioning his conviction for Theft.

The Facts

Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio
Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The
Information indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real identities are still unknown and whose
physical descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and who are all still at large, and mutually
helping one another, with intent togain and without the consent of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees
from the coconut plantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(₱44,400.00), Philippine currency, belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the
aforesaid amount.3

Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr.
Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00
o’clock in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land
located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting
down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did
not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal
left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident.

On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied
by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject
trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They took photographs of the stumps left by
the men.

The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol,
Barangay Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its claim of
innocence for all the accused.

Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees
within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that
he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting
incident happened.

Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and
Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.

All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the
coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down
on that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to
sell the coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees
but merely supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or
a share from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the
coconut treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the accomplishment of
the work being done thereat. Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees
were planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint for
theft due to his refusal to accede to latter’s request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present
criminal charge.4

Ruling of the RTC

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude
the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by the
accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not
believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on account of his relationship with
accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo
Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby
sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of
Norberto Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to
accused Ramirez.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC before the CA insisting that the
prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged.
They posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime of
simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of law by
the RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the view, however,
that the crime committed in this case would not fall under the general definition of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes theft of damaged
property. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who
was not shown to have been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC
that Atanacio’s testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with Magsino and
Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of intent to
gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them
into coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The falloreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants
Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of
Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱13,200.00).

SO ORDERED.7

The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but their motion was denied by the CA
on May 6, 2013.

Issues:

Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court and imputes to the CA the following

ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN
THAT:

NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT

TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and

II

MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE
AT HAND.8

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is true that the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is observed if there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that would have
cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.

It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench,
petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of damaged property under
paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. xxxxx;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.

[Emphasis Supplied]

To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter,
removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional
felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or
malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed.10 Was criminal intent substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?

It does not so appear in this case.

There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The
prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro.
The defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by
Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that delimit the boundaries between
the adjacent lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks were just etched on the trunk of
the trees to delineate the boundary of his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and
competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims
and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled
coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent
to gain.

At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent
could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important
point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon,
to cut down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.

Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his
land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the felled trees; that he informed
Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the damages that he might have sustained as some of his
(Menandro’s) trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his offer of
compensation and replied that a case had already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an
audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him anymore.13

Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable
and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family
relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight.14To
warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the
relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the
witness to incriminate the accused falsely.15

The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his credibilty. It bears stressing that while
1âw phi 1

Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacio’s brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the accused
and the accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his decision, why would
then Atanacio support one over the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed ordered
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.

If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on the
land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down
some of Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following pronouncement in
the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:

If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent
can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule,
ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The
exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to
criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and
imprudence.17

[Emphasis supplied]

The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought prior
permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad
daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused would still
approach the barangay captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals
would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the
commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.

The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize
the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony,
that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced must be
closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows from moral certainty
that guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied. The prosecution miserably failed to establish proof beyond
1âwphi1

reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice
and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.

Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in
favor of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo
Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO BIENVENIDO L. REYES*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion or the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1881, dated
November 25, 2014.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, concurring; rollo pp. 18-30.

2
Id. at 31-32.

3
Id. at 19.

4
Id. at 20-21.

5
Penned by Judge Bienvenido A. Mapaye; record, pp. 488-499.

6
Id. at 24.

7
Rollo, p. 29.

8
Id. at 5.

9
People v. Alvarado, 429 Phil. 208, 219 (2002).

10
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 591, 596 (2006).

11
TSN, dated September 17, 2003, p. 30.

12
TSN, dated June 7, 2006, p. 7.

13
TSN, dated February 8, 2006, pp. 6-7.

14
People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 96 (1997).

15
People v. Lusabio, Jr.,G.R. No. 186119, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 565, 585.

16
364 Phil. 890 (1999).

17
Id. at 905.

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and Gale for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads
as follows:

Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall
expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem,
or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion
against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies
of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan
Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for
more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After
hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him
under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be
paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a
small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or
banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased
the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the
sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his
stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of
the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the
display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are
admitted.

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems
actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many
crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.
This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect
which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and
result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration
of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government
tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as
effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the
intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the
common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the
person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act
depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged
intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security
violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern
in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society
and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do
not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however,
the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the
banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the
intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the
intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have
been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the
intention of the legislature.

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk
under a statute reading as follows:

No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to
contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the
facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of
criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the
court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he
knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health
and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed
to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that
repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to
deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation
which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him
to know and certain.

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an
inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the
officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and
further provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a
misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was
arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the
opinion from which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice
Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:

In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence
offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts
offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from
any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the
commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in
those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?

xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that
the act was knowingly and intentionally done.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the
inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act
would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought
the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.

xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof
of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall
constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to
secure.

In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:

But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:

In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in
which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands
the facts that give character to his act.

In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the
legislative prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the
enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in
interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an
essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is
prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.

In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose
under a statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or
other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the
purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law
by voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from
which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:

When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and
effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good
faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.

xxx xxx xxx

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or
motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is
to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in
looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has
been the judicial guide.

In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing
from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act
was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall
transpose or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.

In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory
offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies
conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates.
When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and
purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.

In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant
from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any
person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his
possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury
that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or
knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine
butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is
the only point upon which the defendant appealed.

The court says:

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or
willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is
plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of
the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.

The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen,
489); Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal
Law, section 2442; Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The
State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal
intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word
implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it
says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act,
and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the
intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window.
Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical
banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.

It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in
the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed
without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of
its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of
construction not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular
provision, nullify the statute altogether.

The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed
rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag
which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used
because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be employed,
according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete
word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a
legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the
insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had
upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was
used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act,
describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the
words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not
describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army — a flag under
which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it
appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle.
They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where
or form in which it was used.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this
is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the
intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter
of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be
construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7
Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515;
Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State,
330.)

The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to
control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning
is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the
enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)

Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.

The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in
the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than
one meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be
used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48;
Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South
Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106
Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport,
91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be
construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect
substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U.
S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)

It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers
must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent
rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes
are to be construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature.
(U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)

In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage"
a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative
and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity,
the construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should
place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then
give such construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be
ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken
from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable
meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

Gervasio Diaz for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty
days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:

A eso de las once de la mañana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las elecciones generales en el
precinto electoral numero 4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de Pilar, Provincia de Capiz, el aqui
acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era entonces el representante del Departamento del Interior
para inspecionar las elecciones generales en la Provincia de Capiz, y por el comandante de la Constabularia F.B.
Agdamag que iba en aquella ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de
calibre 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado colegio electoral
numero 4 y a una distancia de 22 metros del referido colegio electoral. Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto
del revolver en cuestion.

La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de establecer que el aqui
acusado paro en la calle que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a invitacion de dicho Jose D. Benliro y con el
objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya
habian terminado de votar, y que cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui
acusado estaba en la calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el
acusado cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una distancia de 27 metros.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del cerco de la casa
escuela del Barrio de Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como colegio electoral.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral querrellada y, por
consiguiente, al condenarle a prision y multa.

As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record shows that both
Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine
Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the Province of Capiz, testified positively that
the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the
defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that part of the argument under the second assignment of error based
on the theory that the defendant was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter
part of the argument under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of
the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend and
merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many people
in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile,
which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.

As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of losing it
because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to
leave his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record
show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that occasion.

The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for electoral
precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election precincts are within fifty
meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd, because members of the police force or
Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not use the road in question if
they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning
or handling their firearms within their own residences on registration and election days;

That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way
the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;

That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should
only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them
directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of
People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had
been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors,
was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to
vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no
intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the
election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the
defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.

We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which
the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be
conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when
he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed
the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The
intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally
responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New
Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public
policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14
Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil.,
577.)

The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the
law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place,
he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and
the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons
living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on
election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the
case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p.
169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election inspectors for the
purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not proved that he
tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a
cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.

As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question, that is a matter
for the Chief Executive or the Legislature.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-37762 December 19, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO B. NERI defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Eduardo B. Neri was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and after trial, the City Court of
Cagayan de Oro found him guilty thereof. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court finds the accused Eduardo B. Neri guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm as defined and penalized under Sec. 878 in relation
to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, and sentences him to I year
and 1 day of imprisonment and to pay a fine of Pl,000.00, in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P8.00 a day but in no case shall exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and the
accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.

Exh. 'A', revolver, Colt. Cal. 38 bearing Serial No. 898685 and Exhs. 'B', 'B-1, 'B-2' and 'B-3' four live ammunitions
Cal. 38 are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government.

After this judgment has become final, the City Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deposit and deliver the revolver
Exh. 'A' and the four rounds of live ammunitions Cal. 38 Exhs. 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2' and 'B3' to the Provincial Commander
of Misamis Oriental properly receipt. 'Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of this case and shall
form part of the record.
From this judgment, the accused appealed, raising the issue of "whether the accused, Eduardo B. Neri, can carry
the above-described firearm without license except the one issued to him by the Provincial Governor on January 16,
1970, marked as Exh. '3' and a Special Permit issued by the Provincial Commander marked as Exh '4' without
violating the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code."

The fact that the firearm in question was issued to the accused by the Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte to be
used in the performance of his duties as Deputy Governor and that the accused had been issued a permit by the
Acting PC Provincial Commander to carry said firearm outside his residence is not a valid defense in this case. We
cite with approval the following findings of the trial court:

It is to be noted that Sec. 879 of Article IV, supra, speaks of exceptions as to firearm issued to officers. Officials and
employees of the government who are allowed to possess firearm for use in the performance of their official duties
without incurring criminal responsibility, but nowhere among the officers, officials and employees listed thereon
could be found the Deputy Governor: hence, the accused does not fall within the exception. It is true that the
accused was granted permit by the acting provincial commander of the Lanao del Norte to carry firearm outside his
residence as shown in Exh. '4'. Now, may we ask, is this the permit contemplated under Sec. 881 of Article IV of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which exempts the possessor thereof from criminal responsibility? The
aforementioned section reads as follows:

Sec. 881—Special permit for possession of arms by civil employees.—The chief of any Bureau of the National
Government may apply to the President of the Philippines for a special permit for any subordinate official or
employee of the Bureau to possess firearms and ammunition for personal protection in the performance of his duties
as such official or employee, and the President of the Philippines may issue, or cause to be issued, such special
permission under such terms and conditions as he may deem proper.

The above-quoted law is clear. It refers to special permit which the President of the Philippines may issue or cause
to be issued to any subordinate official or employee of any Bureau of the National Government upon application of
the Chief of the Bureau, under such terms and conditions as the President may deem proper. It is evident that the
permit granted to the accused by the Acting Provincial Commander of Lanao del Norte to carry firearm outside
residence, Exh. 4' is not the permit referred to under said Sec. 881. Moreover, the revolver Exh. 'A', a homemade
firearm commonly known as 'paltik', the manufacture and/or possession of which is explicitly prohibited by law (Sec.
878, supra) and, therefore, it cannot be the object of a proper license or special permit, otherwise it would defeat the
very purpose of the law. Neither the provincial governor nor the provincial commander could legalize an act which
is per se illegal. Much less, this Court could sanction violations of law committed, wittingly or unwittingly, by public
officials. To do so, it would tantamount in abetting the proliferation of infractions of law. The accused being a deputy
governor ought to know that an act which is illegal per se cannot be given a semblance of legality either by the
provincial governor or the provincial commander. 'Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith'
(Art. 3, Civil Code). The fact that the accused has a permit to carry firearm outside his residence is immaterial in the
case at bar since the essence of the crime of illegal possession of firearm is the lack of the proper license or special
permit to possess firearm issued in accordance with law. The herein accused, therefore, cannot seek protection
under the mantle of said permit Exh. '4' which was issued beyond the pale of law. At most, said permit may be
considered as mitigating circumstance in his favor.

The appellant relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of People vs. Asa, 1 where members of a
civilian guard organization were acquitted because they had no intention to commit the offense charged and
believed in good faith that, as civilian guards, they could possess firearms issued by the head of the civilian guard
organization.

Good faith and absence of criminal intent, however, are not valid defenses since the offense committed is malum
prohibitum punished by special law,

It is well to note in this connection that the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang, 2 that the
appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaign and detection of
crimes sufficiently puts him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code so that he incurs no criminal liability for
possession of firearms issued to him by the governor, has been revoked in the case of People vs. Mapa. 3

WHEREFORE, the judgment should be, as it is hereby. AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.

Footnotes

1 50 O.G. 5853.

2 106 Phil. 713.

3 127 Phil. 624.

G.R. No. L-32477 October 30, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO APOSAGA and CONSTANCIO MONTE, accused-appellants.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Automatic review of the decision dated April 28, 1969 of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in
Criminal Case No. 1625 for murder, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants Francisco Aposaga and
Constancio Monte for the murder of Atty. Jose Barranda.

The victim, who was popularly called "Attorney", was a law practitioner in Cotabato and Agusan. At the time of his
death, he lived in his 36-hectare farm at Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with his common-law wife Gloria
Salongcong and their four children namely, Ruth, Samuel, Ester and Jose, Jr. Gloria had four other children by a
previous liaison, namely, Fe, Noe, Felomena and Fely, all surnamed Cabrera, who were likewise staying with the
couple at their house on the said farm. In the same barrio live the two accused-appellants as well as Sotera
Salongcong Resaba a sister of Gloria, whose house near the highway is about 1/2 kilometers away from the
Barrandas', Jesus Francisco, an ousted ex-tenant of "Attorney" and a nephew of Gloria and Sotera, whose house is
also along the highway; and Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of accused-appellant Aposaga.

Monte was recruited by the deceased from his former employment as security guard of Lianga Industries, Inc. in
Tumbis ,Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to be the administrator of his farm. He arrived in Polomolok with his family in July,
1965 and stayed in a house owned by the Barrandas near their own.

From the house of the Barrandas there were three then as now possible routes to the provincial highway, one
passing through the house of Sotera and Jesus on the General Santos side, another through the house of Aposaga
and Estorque on the Marbel side, and the third was a short cut through a small road, to the highway.

The deceased was last seen alive in the morning of December 13, 1965. lie had summoned Monte to their house at
about six o'clock that morning, and they conferred about the farm. Afterwards, Monte had breakfast with "Attorney's"
family before leaving the house. "Attorney's also left shortly thereafter to go to Dadiangas, taking the second route
(Marbel side) described above. Gloria Salongcong also left the house one minute later for Dadiangas, taking the first
route on the General Santos side, to pass by the house of her sister Sotera to fetch her daughter Fe, who was then
staying with Sotera, to bring her to Dadiangas for her medical examination.
While walking on the trail to the highway, Atty. Barranda was chased by 3 men armed with bolos or knives, who
acted concertedly in hacking or stabbing the victim to death. His lifeless body was later buried inside a dry well,
while his portfolio and personal papers were buried around 300 meters away from the body,

Nothing was mentioned or heard about the death of Atty. Barranda until on January 20, 1966, Pio Francisco came to
Barrio Palkan to barter fish and visit his son Jesus. The latter told his father that he could hardly sleep at night
because he was being "abused" or raided by Aposaga, Monte and alias Calbo, and that these three had killed the
attorney. Pio verified the matter from Sotera Salongcong, who confirmed the killing of the deceased. He decided to
report to the authorities, but waited for the picture of accused Aposaga in the possession of Gloria Salongcong
before he made a report.

Pio first mentioned the matter to a Sgt.Edoria of the Philippine Constabulary when he saw him in front of their house
on January 30, 1966 or 48 days thereafter. Sgt. Edoria immediately brought him, together with Felomena Cabrera,
to the office of Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the 101st PC Company. They showed Sgt. Vargas a newspaper clipping
about a certain Francisco Lozada, who was wanted by the authorities with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a
series of robbery and murder cases After being told that the wanted man was in barrio Palkan, Sgt. Vargas lost no
time in going to the said barrio, together with other PC soldiers. When they reached the said barrio, Felomena
pointed to them the house of Aposaga. But when he confronted Aposaga, he found out that his name was Francisco
Aposaga and not Francisco Lozada, and that his physical features did not tally with the description in the newspaper
clipping. He therefore returned to headquarters without making an arrest.

At noon of the same day, Felomena Cabrera came to see him again, this time with Jesus Francisco, informing him
that Aposaga was the killer of Atty. Barranda. It was only then that he learned of the murder of Atty. Barranda. He
therefore returned to Palkan with 2 other PC officers to conduct an investigation. when they arrived there, Aposaga
was no longer in his house, having left for Norala to harvest palay, according to his wife. Nevertheless, he
proceeded with his investigation.

On February 1, 1966 he took the statements of Constancio Monte (Exh. "k", pp. 19-20, Folder of Exh. Vol. 1) and his
wife, Bienvenida Ferrer Monte (Exh. "M", pp. 24-25, Folder of Exh. Vol. I), both pointing to Aposaga and Calbo as
the killers, and of Noe Cabrera (Exh. "I ", p. 1, Folder of Exh. Vol. 11), naming Aposaga, Monte and Calbo as the
culprits. Thereafter he filed a motion to exhume the body of the deceased (Exh. "D", p. 10, Folder of Exh. Vol. I).

The examination was conducted on February 2, 1966 in the presence of Dr. Teodoro J. Reyes, municipal health
officer of Polomolok, the PC provincial commander, the chief of police, and members of the Rural Health Unit of
Polomolok. They found the already decomposing body of Atty. Barranda, which was Identified through the
Identifying information furnished by his wife, like the dentures, the clothes he was wearing, his height and built, as
well as the I.D. and personal papers in his wallet and other things found on his body. After the exhumation, they also
unearthed the valise or portfolio of the deceased which was buried about 300 meters away from the body and 15
meters from the house of Jesus Francisco. The spot was pointed to them by Jesus Francisco himself who
admittedly buried the same. The valise contained the raincoat and other personal things of the deceased. They also
recovered a cellophane bag containing some legal documents and land titles purportedly removed from the bag of
the deceased. On the basis of the above, a criminal complaint dated February 1, 1966 was filed against Francisco
Aposaga, alias Calbo, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Constancio Monte (p. 5, CFI rec.).

On February 14, 1966, after more statements were taken, the complaint was amended (p. 4, CFI, rec.), such that
the name of alias Calbo was indicated as Alfredo Villanueva, that of alias Pedoy as Jesus Francisco, and Gloria
Salongcong was included among the accused. Of the six accused named in the amended complaint Aposaga
Monte, Villanueva, alias Calbo, Francisco, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong), Villanueva
remained at large and never faced trial; Gloria Salongcong was ordered excluded from the complaint on June 10,
1966 for insufficiency of evidence (p. 29, CFI rec.); and Jesus Francisco alias Pedoy was likewise dropped from the
complaint on January 10, 1967 upon motion of his counsel (pp. 45-48, CFI rec.) for the purpose of utilizing him as a
state witness (p. 54, CFI rec.); and Sotera Salongcong was also excluded from the complaint upon her own motion
(pp. 5051, CFI rec.) on January 27, 1967. The warrant issued for Gloria Salongcong was therefore recalled, while
Francisco and Sotera, who had been under detention, were ordered released. On August 4, 1967, Jesus Francisco
was ordered re-included in the complaint and a new warrant issued for his arrest (p. 76, CFI rec.). Yet, despite his
appearance in court as a witness for the prosecution, he was never re-arrested. Thus, only Aposaga and Monte
faced trial after they waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation (p. 79, CFI rec.), and an
information was filed against them on April 24, 1968 (p. 81, CFI rec.).
After trial, the trial court in its decision (pp. 136-179, CFI rec.) dated April 28, 1969, found the two accused guilty of
murder and sentenced them to the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of ?12,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.

The trial court noted that the evidence for the prosecution suffered from many flaws and some inconsistencies (p.
31, rec.). Nevertheless, it gave credence to the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses and other corroborative
witnesses for the state.

Noe Cabrera, 13 years old, student, and a resident of Pag-asa, General Santos City, testified that at about six
o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1965, while he was riding his carabao, he saw his stepfather, Atty.
Barranda, walking towards the highway. Paran (Francisco Aposaga) and Calbo (Alfredo or Jessie Villanueva) ran
after him. All at once Paran hacked him in the neck while Calbo thrust his knife at the victim. The deceased
("Attorney") was trying to parry their blows with the sweater he was carrying. Then Constancio Monte arrived and
also hacked the victim. When the victim stumbled and fell, Monte rode on him and thrust his knife through the
victim's stomach. He was just about 25 meters away from them. Later, the two dragged the victim's body to the
cogonal area, after which they approached the witness (Noe), and Paran threatened him that if he should squeal, he
and his mother, sisters and brothers were going to be killed. Monte got the bag carried by the deceased and they
left towards the direction of the highway. The witness went home to eat. His mother was not in the house yet, having
left earlier for Dadiangas.

When his mother arrived home in the afternoon, she asked him if he had seen his stepfather, to which he answered
no. She therefore asked him to accompany her in looking around for the victim. They went to the house of Dorot
(Doroteo Estorque) where they saw Dorot, Monte, Paran and Calbo, the wife of Monte, and others, drinking. His
mother made several inquiries about his stepfather.

The wife of Dorot said that Attorney rode a yellow bus going to Marbel. Dorot and his son Vicente also gave the
same information. She asked other persons, who gave negative information. When they went home, Monte and his
wife came also. His mother told them that she was going to San Francisco (Agusan) to look for Attorney. But Monte
advised her not to go any more because there were three persons who came to fetch him to go to Davao. Noe went
downstairs. Monte followed him to borrow his sledge, which he lent to him. Afterwards, he brought his horse to
Crossing Palkan to drink. When he was returning home, he saw Vicente, Calbo and Paran Vicente was riding the
carabao while Calbo and Paran were following the sledge, where the body of their stepfather was loaded. They
were going towards barrio Palkan. He let his horse run and headed for home. He did not tell his mother or his
brothers and sisters about the attack on Ms stepfather because he was afraid. It was only when he was brought to
the PC headquarters in Dadiangas that he talked of the incident for there he was no longer afraid (pp. 5-63, TSN).

Felomena Cabrera, 16 years old, student and residing at Pag-asa, Lagao, General Santos City, testified that she
was living with her mother, stepfather (the victim), brothers and sisters at their house in crossing Palkan on
December 13, 1965. In the morning of the said date, her stepfather summoned Monte to their house, and the two
talked for sometime. Thereafter, Monte ate breakfast with them before returning to his house. When he had gone,
Attorney prepared to leave for Dadiangas. He left via their kitchen towards the west to the national highway. One
minute later, her mother also left, leaving her to care for her younger brother. She cooked soup rice. While cooking,
she went to the balcony to get her younger brother. From there she saw Monte running towards the direction of
Attorney. She followed him with her eyes, and saw him hacking her stepfather with two others, namely Aposaga and
alias Calbo. She went to the house of Monte and asked Monte's wife, Bienvenida, why they killed Attorney.
Bienvenida answered "because the attorney is a bad man". The two of them went down towards the road. They met
Monte who warned them not to reveal, otherwise they will kill first Felomena's mother. She just went home and fed
her younger brother.

When her mother arrived home that afternoon, she (mother) asked if the Attorney had returned home, to which she
answered in the negative. Her mother then asked Noe to accompany her in looking for the Attorney. The two went
out and were away for more than an hour, while she stayed in the house to take care of her younger brother.

Drawing a sketch, the witness explained the relative position of their house with those of Dorot (D. Estorque), Sotera
and Monte, and the national highway, as well as the three (3) possible routes from their house to the highway (pp.
65-84, TSN).
On cross-examination, the witness indicated on the sketch prepared by her, the specific spot where she saw her
stepfather being hacked, and where she first saw Monte running. She also described the attacks on her stepfather
how Aposaga hacked him first while he was walking, followed by the thrusting by Monte. She averred that when she
later talked with her brother Noe, they agreed not to tell anyone about what they saw; otherwise they will all be killed
starting with their mother (pp. 85-135, TSN).

Dr. Teodoro Reyes, 51 years old, Municipal Health Officer of Polomolok, South Cotabato, testified that he has been
the Municipal health Officer of Polomolok for more than 10 years. On February 2, 1966, he was fetched by a
policeman of Polomolok to exhume the body of Atty. Jose Barranda. He went to a field about 500 meters north of
the residence of Atty. Barranda, together with a few policemen and PC soldiers. they found the already
decomposing body buried in a well 5 feet deep and about 3 meters in diameter, covered with bloodstained
newspapers, a jacket and soil about one foot deep. He established the Identity of the cadaver as that of Atty.
Barranda from the description furnished by Mrs. Barranda (Gloria Salongcong). Besides, he knew Atty. Barranda
when he was still alive as he had been handling cases in Polomolok. When he examined the body, he found 4 fatal
wounds, 3 of which were caused by sharp-bladed instruments and one by mauling. His findings are embodied in his
medico-legal post-mortem certificate (pp. 2-4, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1), as follows:

DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED:

Under this, are other pertinent findings on this cadaver and its clothings which have bearings on the injuries
sustained or direct causes of death. Premise or statement of the General Condition of the Cadaver during time of
examination: The cadaver although in a state of much decay there are still some or big portions of the skin left
specially on the chest, back and abdomen; big portions of muscles much softened and some parts melting; big
portions of abdominal viscerae are inside and soft; and semi-melted. So also is the condition in the chest,

(a) One stab wound of the right chest, entering into the interspace between the 5th and 6th costal cartilage. This
stab wound coincides with the cut through the polo shirt of the cadaver and that of his camiseta T-shirt he was
wearing. The cut is about four (4) cm. wide, going inside the chest to a depth of at least five (5) inches. The direction
is towards the back. The medial edge of the wound is 2-1/2 cm. lateral to the right lateral border of the typhoid. The
width of the cut is parallel to the direction of the rib. Wide area of old blood stain can be seen on the clothing over
the chest, also some part of the upper abdomen. This is a fatal wound.

(b) A big cross-wise cut of the left upper abdomen, with a length of about five (5) inches, as can be seen on the
intact part of skin of the cadaver, and cut portions of loops of intestine inside. The medial edge of this cut or wound
starts from about the middle portion of the front part of the abdomen going lateralwards to the left to a length of
about five (5) inches. This is a fatal wound.

Remarks: There is no evidence of cut on the clothing, for we found that all the clothings on the left side of the body
were lifted or raised that might have escaped the cutting.

(c) Fracture of the left part of the skull:

Description is divided into the upper portion of the skull and that of the lower mandible or jaw. Upper portion of the
skull:

There is a rounded depressed fracture of the bone beneath the left upper gum, about a ten centavo coin size. Its
medial border is about 1-1/2 inches distant from the center of the upper gum. Also, the zygomatic process of the left
temporal bone is broken (fractured) and detached. That completely broken piece is still attached only by a ligament.

Lower portion of the skull or lower jaw: The neck of the head (the posterior elevation for articulation) of the left
mandible or left side of the lower jaw is completely fractured, and the head portion is missing. The fractured head is
missing.

The picture taken for this is herewith attached. The back part of this picture is marked 'C'.
Remarks: I honestly believe the deceased was mauled on the left face so hard that caused the fatal fracture. The
rounded depressed fracture is most probably due to the elevated portion or the nail of the hard object used for
mauling. This is fatal The brain cannot escape big injury.

(d) A big cut on the apple green jacket the cadaver is covered (with) [picture taken of said jacket herewith attached.
The back part of the picture is marked "D")

Description: There is about 6-1/2 inch cut of the right shoulder of this jacket going medial-ward and more on its back
portion. The inner shirts on this part are stained with old blood stains. The jacket is somewhat loose for the cadaver.

Remarks: I strongly and sincerely believe that this cut involved the lower part and the base of the right side of the
neck. It is a big cut. This is a fatal wound.

With the big cut on the jacket the cadaver is covered on its right shoulder area and reaching up to the base of the
right side of the collar, with the corresponding cuts on the inner shirts the cadaver is wearing, but no evidence of cut
could be found on the bones as scapula and right clavicle, simply means that the big cut involved only the muscles,
big blood vessels and vital nerves of the right side of the lower part of the neck and shoulder area near that side of
the neck-in short, the soft tissues were cut, without cutting the bones (called the hard tissue).

Conclusion: (a) With all honesty and sincerity, it is very definite that the cadaver now exhumed is Atty. JOSE
BARRANDA'S.

(b) The causes of death are mentioned under the item

DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED.

(c) The causes of death are purely foul play or murder. All the cuts are due to sharp-bladed instruments; the fracture
on the face due to blunt hard object with hard protection on it.

xxx xxx xxx

According to the doctor, the wound described in paragraph (a) was a thrust wound inflicted while the victim was
standing in front of the assailant (p. 219, TSN); the one under paragraph (b) could have been inflicted while the
victim was lying down; the other one under paragraph (c) could have been caused by mauling while the victim was
lying down; and the wound in paragraph (d) was inflicted while the victim was standing, with the assailant at the
back of the deceased, probably ahead of the other wounds (p. 222, TSN).

Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to the 27th Traffic Team, 45 years old, and residing at
Cotabato City, declared (pp. 262-320, TSN) that in 1966 he was assigned to the 101st PC Company at General
Santos, Cotabato, having been transferred thereto since December 1, 1965. He did not know the accused before,
and he met them only on January 30, 1966. He first met Francisco Aposaga on said date when Felomena Cabrera
came to his office with Pio Francisco and Sgt. Edoria to report the presence in their barrio of a certain Francisco
Lozada who was wanted by the police with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of robbery and murder
cases. After being shown a newspaper clipping with a picture and description of Lozada, he went to Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato with 2 other PC soldiers to verify the report. The house of Aposaga was pointed to them
by Felomena when they were about 300 meters therefrom. Proceeding to said house, they called for Francisco
Lozada, but it was Francisco Aposaga who came and Identified himself as Aposaga, not Lozada. When Sgt. Vargas
compared the photo and description of Lozada from the newspaper clipping to the person of Aposaga, the
Description did not tally, as there was no mole, scar or tattoos at the back of his body. As a result, they returned to
the PC headquarters without making an arrest.

After lunch on the same day, Felomena Cabrera showed up again at the PC headquarters with Jesus Francisco, the
son of Pio. Jesus was ask; 'ng him why he released Aposaga when he was the killer of Atty. Barranda. That was the
only time he learned of the death of Atty. Barranda. He lost no time in returning to Palkan. But when he arrived
there, Aposaga was no longer in his house. His wife informed him that Aposaga went to Norala to harvest palay. He
(Sgt. Vargas) proceeded to the house of Monte, who informed him that Aposaga killed Attorney in the morning of
December 13 (1965). Sgt. Vargas invited Monte and his wife to the headquarters for investigation. While there, they
gave corroborative statements to the effect that Aposaga and a companion known as Calbo hacked and killed Atty.
Barranda upon inducement by Sotera Salongcong who paid them P 200.00 (Exhs. "K" and "L", pp. 19-21, Folder of
Exh. Vol. 1). He also took the statements of Noe and Felomena Cabrera, then filed a motion to exhume the body,
which was actually done by the municipal health officer in his presence as well as in the presence of their
commanding officer, Capt. Adriano Bulatao the Polomolok chief of police and some other persons.

Jesus Francisco, 36 years old, farmer and resident of Marbel Crossing, Tampacan, Tupi South Cotabato, declared
that on December 13, 1965, he was in his house near Crossing Awas in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Constancio
Monte passed by his house that morning, then left in the direction going to Sulit. At about 6:30 a.m., he went to his
sanguta (where tuba is extracted). He met Sotera Salongcong, who was going to Dadiangas. She gave him P
200.00 from Francisco Mendez, telling him to deliver it to Aposaga, which he did at the latter's house at about 8:00
or 9:00 o'clock. Aposaga was then with Constancio Monte and Wilfredo Villanueva, alias Calbo. After that he saw
these three again at about 11:00 a.m. near their house which was near his sanguta. The three told him that Atty.
Barranda was already dead, and gave him the bag of the Attorney with instructions to bury it. In the bag was a
cellophane folder containing papers and documents. He buried the bag in the land of Cestua and kept the papers in
the cellophane under a banana tree. These he did because the trio told him he will be killed if he didn't, which made
him afraid. When he asked them why they killed the Attorney, their answer was "Don't talk". He did not report the
matter to the authorities because they had been threatening him with death if he did so (pp. 322-350, TSN).

The statement of accused-appellant Monte (Exh. "K", pp. 17-18, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I) on February 1, 1966, may
be summarized as follows: that he has been a tenant of Atty. Barranda since July 1965; that sometime in the
morning of December 13, 1965, Atty. Barranda was hacked and killed by Francisco Aposaga and a companion
known to him only as Calbo; that Aposaga told him they were given P 200 by "Suterania" (Sotera) Salongcong; that
the latter hired them to kill Barranda because he had raped Fe Cabrera; that Fe Cabrera confirmed this raping to
him; that the cadaver of Atty. Barranda was thrown into a deep Japanese dug-out somewhere in the farm lot of
Alfredo Acejo that Aposaga used a bolo while Calbo used a knife (flamingo); that at the time of the killing, Barranda
was carrying a leather bag (portfolio) containing land titles and records of cases he was handling; that the said bag
was given to Pedoy a nephew of Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong; and that the said bag was buried while the
contents were wrapped in cellophane and covered by banana leaves among banana plants near the house of
Pedoy.

These allegations were mostly reiterated by Monte in Exhibit "L" (pp. 21-23, Folder of Exh. Vol. I ) In addition, he
stated that the killing was plotted by his family, as he accidentally learned when he overheard a conversation
between Gloria and Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong where the latter was saying "If in case somebody went up the
house Gloria and the children will just go upstairs and they will not be disturbed because the purpose is just Atty.
Barranda" (sic).

The other prosecution witnesses were:

(1) Gloria Salongcong, the common-law wife of the deceased who narrated that the latter failed to appear at their
appointed meeting in Dadiangas on December 13, 1965, and that she and her son Noe went out to look for him
upon her return to Palkan in the afternoon of the same day (pp. 137-173, TSN).

(2) Pio Francisco, who learned of the slaying of the deceased from his son Jesus on January 20, 1966, and who first
brought it to the attention of the authorities on January 30, 1966 (pp. 187-205, TSN).

(3) Epifanio Doria, the PC sergeant who was first told by Pio Francisco about the killing, and who brought him to the
PC headquarters for the actual reporting (pp. 178-187, TSN).

(4) Sotera Salongcong, who narrated that a certain Francisco Mendez gave her P 200 for delivery to accused
Aposaga without explaining what the money was for, and who delivered it to Aposaga through Jesus Francisco
without her asking for what purpose it was (pp. 230-260, TSN).

The theory of the defense is that the charge is a frame-up on the part of the victim's family, whose members plotted
his murder, with Jesus Francisco as the mastermind and alias Calbo the lone hatchetman. Testifying on their own
behalf, both accused- appellants denied knowledge of and participation in the commission of the crime, and
maintained that they never knew of the death of the deceased until investigations were already under way some two
to four months thereafter.
The testimony of accused-appellant Aposaga, 27 years old, farmer and resident of Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, dealt mainly in explaining about his sudden departure from Palkan on January 30, 1966, the date the PC
went to his house. He narrated that when Sgt. Vargas came to his house (the date of which he could not
remember), he was looking for Francisco Lozada. He informed Vargas that his name was Francisco Aposaga and
not Lozada. Vargas examined his body and was convinced that he was a different person. So Vargas left, but not
before he told him that he was going to Iloilo for a vacation. He proceeded to Norala (South Cotabato) that same
afternoon. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him that his mother was sick so he should proceed to Iloilo.
Because of such information, he left Norala hurriedly, taking MV Legaspi at Cotabato City and disembarking in Iloilo.
He learned of the murder of Barranda 3 or 4 months later when his wife wrote him informing that he was wanted for
the murder. He then went to the PC in Iloilo, requesting for an escort to Mindanao as he was afraid he might be
killed. But the PC in Iloilo could not provide him with any escort, so he stayed in Iloilo. He visited the PC in Iloilo for
about 5 times, until the PC from Polomolok came to get him. He admitted having been a tenant of the deceased, but
denied participation in his killing. He also denied having received P200.00 from Jesus Francisco. He did not know
the person of alias Calbo.

On cross-examination, he stated that he threw away the letter of his wife when he went to the PC because he did
not think it was important. He did not know what was the company or organizational unit of the PC he visited in Iloilo,
nor the name of its commanding officer. He stayed in Iloilo for 8 to 10 months.

His cousin, a certain Jose, who is married to his first cousin Clomia Viana fetched him at Palkan because his mother
was ill. He had to go to Norala, however, to inquire from his aunt, Paz Aposaga, how serious his mother was. His
aunt told him in tears to go home to Iloilo because his mother was serious, per information of the same Jose. He
never received any letter from his parents, brother or sister or any relative from Iloilo asking him to go home (pp.
440-462, TSN).

Defense witness Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of Aposaga, 58 years old, farmer, and resident of
Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato declared that on December 13, 1965, he and Aposaga were plowing
in the farm lot of the deceased from 6:00 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., stopping only for breakfast and lunch. There was no
unusual incident that transpired on said date, except that in the morning he heard someone call "wait, wait" and saw
Gloria Salongcong coming down their house. At that time Aposaga was 30 meters behind him, also plowing. The
place where they were plowing was about 150 meters from the house of Barranda. He did not see Atty. Barranda
that morning. He only learned about his death through the PC. He knows that Atty. Barranda and Gloria Salongcong
usually quarrelled about Gloria's children because the place he is working is near their house. On cross-
examination, he admitted having subscribed to an affidavit (Exh. "J", p. 16, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1) wherein he
had stated that he could not see Aposaga because of the tall talahibs, but he explained that such answer was wrong
and his real answer was, "I cannot see him when he was covered by talahibs but if we will be out from the talahibs I
can see him" (P. 386, TSN).

Vicente Estorque, 20, married, son of Doroteo and brother-in-law of Aposaga and likewise residing at Crossing
Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, corroborated his father's testimony about the whereabouts of Aposaga on
December 13, 1965. He testified that on that day, he had been plowing from 10:00 A.M. with his father and brother-
in-law Aposaga. In the afternoon he plowed from 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. Afterwards he met Vicente or Jesus Francisco
(Pedoy) on his way home. Francisco borrowed his sledge, so he had to carry his plow on his shoulder because he
lent his sledge to Francisco. The sledge was returned two hours later with bloodstains and with its bamboo breast
missing. He could not, however, recover the missing part because Francisco had been avoiding him. On questioning
by the court, he stated that they did not go back to plow in that field any more (p. 407, TSN); in fact, that land was
never planted because Aposaga left for Panay (p. 409, TSN).

Accused-appellant Constancio Monte, 38 years old, farmer and resident of Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, testified (pp. 463-525, TSN), that he met Atty. Barranda when the latter was a lawyer of Lianga Industry in
San Francisco, Agusan, where he used to work as guard of its bulldozer department. In July of 1965, Atty. Barranda
convinced him to go with him to Palkan, South Cotabato, to be the overseer of his 36-hectare farm, as a condition of
which he need not give any share of the harvest to Barranda as landowner but only to his wife, Gloria Salongcong.
In addition, he (Monte) will get 25% of the proceeds of the 18-hectare land in Matatum which was planted to
potatoes and cabbage, plus P5.00 monthly per head of the carabaos, horses and cattle he was supposed to care
for. When he arrived with his family in Palkan in the same month, Atty. Barranda called for Sotera Salongcong and
Jesus Francisco, his erstwhile tenants, and told them that it was their last day as Monte was taking over. Atty.
Barranda instructed him (Monte) to get the carabao and plow from Jesus Francisco.
In the month of December, Fe Cabrera informed him that she was raped by Atty. Barranda. Sometime later, while
he was under the Barranda's house to fetch the cow, he overheard a conversation among Jesus Francisco, Sotera
Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong, wherein Sotera was saying, "We better have Attorney killed ... so that we can
revenge of what he has done to your child who was being raped (sic).

Early one morning, about the second week of December, 1965 (he could not exactly remember the date), Barranda
called for him to instruct him to take care of the carabaos and cows because he was leaving for Agusan to become
a judge. After their talk, he took breakfast with the Barranda family. Thereafter, he brought the children Ruth, Fely,
Samuel and Noe to his house upon instruction of Atty. Barranda. He went to the toril with Noe to tie the carabao.
While there, Noe told him that Atty. Barranda was leaving. At the same instance he heard someone shouting, "wait
for me", and saw Jesus Francisco running, followed by Calbo. He did not know who Calbo was, but Noe told him
that he is from Polomolok. However, he did not know what transpired afterwards as he did not look anymore. From
the toril he could see Aposaga plowing with Doroteo Estorque. He stayed in the toril for about 30 minutes.

Monte admitted having gone to the PC headquarters for investigation and having executed an affidavit (Exh. "K", p.
19, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1); but when he appeared before Judge Mirabueno (municipal court of Polomolok), he
was made to sign by Sgt. Vargas although he told the judge that there was an error. The error was that when he
mentioned the name "Francisco" as the person who hacked and killed the deceased, he meant Jesus Francisco and
not Francisco Aposaga. However, since he had no lawyer then, he did not know how to go about the correction. It
was only when Francisco Aposaga, who is his friend, contacted his lawyer that he was accommodated in his
defense by Atty. Velarde, as he had no money. As for the second affidavit which he executed one week after (Exh.
"L", P. 21, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1), he was made to sign the same without appearing before Judge Mirabueno.

On cross-examination, he maintained that he did not know who is Pedoy whose name is mentioned in his affidavit
as the nephew of Sotera Salongcong to whom the killers gave the bag of Atty. Barranda. He denied having been
asked the question and having given the answers found in his affidavits referring to Aposaga. He did not know what
he was signing as he does not know how to read.

Against this background, the trial court promulgated its aforementione d decision on April 28, 1969 and denied the
defense's motion for reconsideration and new trial on May 31, 1969 (p. 200, CFI rec.).

Hence, this appeal.

Appellants now raise only one issue that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
try to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of the two eyewitnesses which, they
claim, are corrupt, bias, unreliable and incompetent because of their inherent improbabilities" pp. 86, rec.), as shown
by the following circumstances:

A. As to Noe Cabrera

1. If Noe really witnessed the murder of his stepfather, why did he not shout for help (pp. 32-33, TSN)? Why did he
not tell his mother about it when the latter arrived home from Dadiangas and was asking about the victim (p. 35,
TSN)? Why did he have to go with his mother around the barrio to look for his stepfather if he knew — after having
witnessed the killing — that his stepfather was dead (pp. 15-18, TSN)?

2. If he were really threatened by the culprits (p. 10, TSN) so as to produce fear in him, why did he have to go riding
his horse by himself that evening of the incident (p. 20, TSN)? Why did he consent to sleep in the house of Monte
after the PC arrived to conduct the investigation (p. 23, TSN)? Why did he continue to visit the houses of Monte and
Aposaga after December 13, 1965 (pp. 163-164, TSN)?

B. As to Felomena Cabrera

1. How could Felomena have witnessed the murder of her step- father from the kitchen of their house when,
according to the PC investigator, Sgt. Vargas, the place of the incident was not visible from the kitchen or balcony of
the Barranda house because it was covered by banana hills, talahibs and calamansi trees (pp. 301-302, TSN)?

2. Why did she not secretly tell her mother about the incident (p. 72, TSN)?
3. Why was her first report to the PC not about the murder of her stepfather but about the presence of a certain
wanted man in their barrio (p. 264, TSN)? Why did it take her 48 days to make such report?

WE find the above observations insufficient to warrant the exculpation of the appellants. While it is true that the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses may have suffered flaws and inconsistencies, the same refer only to minor
details which are not sufficient to destroy their credibility. Their actuations after witnessing the commission of the
crime (i.e., not shouting or running for help, not reporting earlier, etc.), do not indicate that they were not present
when the killing of their stepfather took place. Likewise, the testimony of the PC investigator that the place of the
incident is not visible from the kitchen of the victim's house, because of the presence of banana hills, talahibs and
calamansi trees, cannot overcome the positive assertion of Felomena that she saw her stepfather killed, especially
so since the investigation took place about 50 days after the incident and conditions obtaining them may be different
from those at the time of the offense.

A closer scrutiny of their testimonies shows convincingly that they had indeed witnessed the commission of the
crime. The only doubtful portion is their allegation that they were threatened with death—with their mother the first to
be killed—against revealing it. Because, even if there were such a threat, they could have secretly revealed it to
their mother who would certainly take steps to protect them. Besides, if the danger of the threat was real to them,
they should have stopped going to the houses of the accused, instead of maintaining normal relations with them
after the incident; Felomena should not have gone to the PC headquarters twice on January 30, 1966; and Noe
should not have slept in the house of Monte after his family had gone to Dadiangas to make the report,

These actuations are inconsistent with the reality of the threat. It is easier to believe that they discussed the incident
with their mother but had to deny it to protect her. The maxim "blood is thicker than water" must have prompted
these two (2) eyewitnesses to insist that their mother did not know anything about it. Otherwise, the involvement of
their mother and other close relatives will be an undeniable conclusion.

Besides, the trial court, while noting the same flaws and inconsistencies, gave credence to the testimonies of the
said eyewitnesses who, despite their minority, the excitement generated by the court proceedings and the long and
searching cross-examinations, firmly stuck to their testimonies which pointed to the appellants and a companion
known as Calbo as the killers of their stepfather. Time and time again WE have ruled that where the issue is
credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial judge, who heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless he has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This exception does not
obtain here. (People vs, Laguisma 98 SCRA 69 [1980]; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 386 [1980]; People vs.
Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465, 472 [1979]).

Furthermore, no motive was shown why the two eyewitnesses should testify against them falsely; hence, they must
be telling the truth. (People vs. Arevalo, 92 SCRA 207 [1979]; People vs. Lim 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).

The appellants likewise theorize that the prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco and probably
Gloria Salongcong must have plotted against the life of the deceased. Sotera and Jesus harbor resentment against
the victim for having ousted them from their tenancy in favor of Monte. Besides, Sotera wanted to revenge the
raping of her niece by the deceased. These are strong motives to do away with the victim, whereas the appellants
have no motive to kill him.

In the case of People vs. Veloso (92 SCRA 515, 524 [1979]), WE held that motive, as distinguished from criminal
intent, is not an essential element of a crime and hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is
essential to conviction in murder cases only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, something which
does not obtain in this case (also People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; People vs. Caggauan 94 Phil. 188
[1953]).

The defense vainly tried to utilize the apparent involvement of the prosecution witnesses Gloria and Sotera
Salongcong and Jesus Francisco in claiming a frame-up and a scheme to lay the blame on the two (2) accused-
appellants. While WE agree with the observation that these 3 witnesses are probably involved in various ways and
degrees, and their exclusion from the charge is questionable, WE cannot find any reason to believe that the
appellants are innocent as they pretend to be. As aptly held by the trial court, "that there were principals by induction
in the commission of a crime who were not prosecuted is no legal impediment to a finding of guilt of the principals by
direct participation for the same crime. ... [T)he non-prosecution of Gloria and Sotera Salongcong in the case at bar
did not make the indictees before us less guilty much more, innocent was to be blessed with a judgment of acquittal"
(pp. 52-53, rec.).

On the contrary, the guilt of both appellants appear to be a moral certainty, even without the testimonies of Gloria,
Sotera and Jesus. Aside from the positive Identification of the two eyewitnesses, the evidence even of the defense
tend to establish the guilt of the appellants.

The tale woven by Aposaga about his sudden departure from Polomolok as soon as the authorities started the
investigation, was not only uncorroborated but was also too improbable to believe. First, he said he told Vargas that
he was going to Norala for a vacation. When Vargas returned after he had gone, his wife told Vargas that Aposaga
went to Norala to harvest palay. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him to proceed to Iloilo because his mother
was ill. But the source of his aunt's information was the same cousin who allegedly fetched him from Polomolok for
the self-same reason the alleged illness of his mother. He allegedly stayed in Iloilo for about 8 to 10 months
although according to the records, he was there for more than a year until the policemen from Polomolok came to
arrest him. It should be pointed out that his sudden departure must have left his wife and child in Polomolok without
any means of support, as the land he was plowing was never planted after he left (p. 409, TSN). All these could lead
to but one conclusion that he had to flee and hide with his guilty conscience to avoid arrest. Flight and going into
hiding indicate a guilty conscience. (People vs. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 [1979]; People vs. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649
[1978]).

Defense witnesses Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, father and brother, respectively, of Aposaga's common-law wife,
tried to establish an alibi for Aposaga. Their testimonies, however, are inherently weak and doubtful in many
substantial aspects, and appear to be nothing more than vain attempts to save a "family member" from conviction.
For instance, they testified that Aposaga was plowing with them at the time of the incident. Doroteo, however, stated
that when he heard the shout "wait, wait", Aposaga was 30 meters behind him although he could not see him as he
was hidden by talahibs (p. 385, TSN; Exh. J-1). Vicente, on the other hand, plowed with Aposaga and his father only
from 10:00 to 10:30 that morning (p. 404, TSN), whereas the incident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. Doroteo
further declared that there was nothing unusual that happened on December 13, 1965 and he does not remember
what day it was. Yet, he could recall at the witness stand four (4) years later that he saw Gloria Salongcong running
at five o'clock that morning; what dress Gloria was wearing; what time they started plowing (6:00 A.M.); what time
they left the farm; what time they took their meals; what they ate for breakfast and lunch, and other minor details of
daily life. Doroteo claimed that he does not know Calbo but he admitted seeing him in the house of Monte that
fateful morning of December 13th (p. 394, TSN). He never tried to find out who uttered the words "wait, wait" (p.
394, TSN). He was surprised to learn of the death of the victim whom he had believed to be in Bislig (p. 386, TSN);
but he never visited the remains after exhumation when he already knew he was dead (p. 379, TSN). Is this the
natural reaction to a surprising death of barrio-mate who owned the land he was plowing? Vicente's testimony
likewise suffered from similar inconsistencies and improbabilities as to command little, if any, probative value. The
testimonies of these defense witnesses are mere concoctions that cannot neutralize the positive Identification of the
appellants by the two prosecution witnesses.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the
accused was alleged to be must be located at such a distance that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed (People vs. Tirol, L-30538, January 31, 1981; People vs. de la Cruz, 97
SCRA 387 [1980]; People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980]; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 [1979]). Such was
not the situation in this case; for the place where Aposaga was allegedly plowing was only about 150 meters from
the house of the victim (p. 368, TSN) and within hearing distance from the place of the incident. The place of the
incident in turn was only 60 to 70 meters from the victim's house (p. 314, TSN). It was therefore very convenient for
Aposaga to slip away from his plowing and participate in the murder of the deceased even if he actually plowed the
farm in the morning of December 13, 1965.

Furthermore, Aposaga was named as a killer of the deceased in two sworn statements executed by his co-accused
Monte (Exhs. "K" and "L"), which sworn statements were corroborated by his wife Bienvenida (Exh. "M"). Monte
tried to retract these statements on the witness stand by explaining that when he said "Francisco" he meant Jesus
Francisco, and not appellant Francisco Aposaga, and that the said affidavit was never read to him by Municipal
Judge Narciso Mirabueno, before whom he signed and swore to it. The latter claim was belied by Judge Mirabueno
who testified that he read the contents of all affidavits to the affiants and made sure they understood. He also asked
searching questions to determine the truth of their statements (pp. 557-569, TSN). Since it has not been shown that
the said judge has any interest in the case, it is not difficult to determine which of the two (2) testimonies deserves
consideration.

As to the claim of mistaken Identity of the person named "Francisco", it is obvious from the very substance of
Monte's sworn statements that the "Francisco Aposaga" he named therein as a killer of the deceased was different
and distinct from the "Jesus Francisco" (Pedoy) who buried the leather bag of the deceased. Besides, it is
understandable that Monte will try his best to save his co-accused who had so gallantly provided him a defense
counsel which he could not afford.

For his part, Monte tried to establish his innocence by pointing out that it was unnatural for him to kill Atty. Barranda
after the latter had satisfactorily explained about the problems of his work and after they had breakfast together (p.
82, rec.). Besides, he had no motive to kill his employer and benefactor who had given him better opportunities and
sufficient means to support his family by taking him as tenant and supervisor (pp. 89-90, rec.). Unfortunately, these
allegations cannot overcome the incriminating testimonies of the two (2) eyewitnesses. Besides, even from his own
testimony, the following circumstantial evidence appear to be inconsistent with his innocence:

1. Monte testified that he heard of a threat against the life of the deceased in a conversation among Gloria
Salongcong, Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco (p. 471, TSN). Yet, when he saw Jesus running after the
deceased carrying a bolo, he did not even look to see what Jesus intended to do (pp. 485486; 500-501, TSN).

2. He did not do anything about the disappearance of his employer for forty-eight (48) days, even though the last
time he saw him (deceased) was when somebody Jesus Francisco) was running after him (pp. 500-501, TSN).

3. If it were true that the deceased had told him he was going to Agusan to become a judge (p. 475, TSN), why did
he not remind Gloria of such fact when Gloria came looking for her husband (p. 489, TSN)?

4. Although he saw Jesus running after the deceased that morning, he did not say so when Gloria asked him about
the deceased; and when Gloria expressed the possibility that the deceased might have been waylaid, his answer
was, "Nobody could do that because it is daytime" (p. 490, TSN).

5. Monte escaped from the municipal jail on July 9, 1966, allegedly because his wife was sick in San Francisco,
Agusan, He explained that when he wired his wife to inform her that their hearing will be in May (1966), his father-in-
law replied that she was sick (p. 524, TSN). If that were true and this allegation was never corroborated, his escape
should have been timed around May, 1966, and not July of that year. The records do not disclose any hearing in
July 1966. Surely, it is more logical to conclude that Monte's flight, like that of his co-accused, indicated a guilty
conscience.

All the above could lead but to one conclusion, that the guilt of the two (2) accused-appellants has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

This case should, however, be further investigated to determine the participation of Sotera Salongcong, Jesus
Francisco and Gloria Salongcong in the perpetration of the crime. Their own respective statements implicate
themselves. Moreover, as pointed out by the appellants, these prosecution witnesses have strong motives to kill the
deceased: Sotera and Jesus for their ouster from tenancy, and Gloria for the rape of her daughter Fe.

However, for lack of necessary votes. the death penalty cannot be imposed,

WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT
APPELLANTS ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA, WITH COSTS AGAINST THEM.

LET A COPY OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR FURTHER
INVESTIGATION SO THAT OTHERS WHO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME MAY BE DULY
PROSECUTED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32276 September 12, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE ALVIAR Y TUAZON, defendant-appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor.

General Eduardo C. Abaya and Solicitor Salvador C. Jacob for plaintiff-appellee.

E.B. Garcia & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, in its Criminal Case No. 15358 finding the accused Jose Alviar y Tuazon guilty of the crime
of parricide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dolores Imson Alviar the sum of P12,000.00 and
to pay the costs.

The undisputed facts follow:

On November 6, 1965 the body of an unknown woman was found by members of the Makati Police Department
floating near the bank of the West Rainbow Area of the Pasig River. The corpse was brought to the morgue of the
Funeraria Quiogue, Manila, for possible identification, claim of any relative or friend, and autopsy.

Nobody appeared to claim the body, and after the fingerprints of the deceased were taken, autopsy was performed
by Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola, Jr., of the National Bureau of Investigation.

On November 7, 1965, the body was inferred in the South Cemetery of Makati, Rizal. The body was later exhumed
and transferred to the Pateros cemetery.

The fingerprints lifted from the cadaver were found identical with the fingerprints of Dolores Imson Alviar on file with
the Election Registrar of Pateros, Rizal.

An information was later filed in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, charging Jose Alviar Tuazon together
with Antonio Cotas with parricide, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of November, 1965, in the municipality of Pateros, province of Rizal, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, confederating and conspiring together did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Dolores Alviar (lawfully wedded wife of Jose Alviar y Tuazon) by beating
her to unconsciousness and then by throwing her unconscious body into the river, where she was later on fished out
dead.

The evidence for the prosecution follows:

Crisanto B. Gonzales, first witness for the prosecution testified on direct examination that at about ten minutes to
1:00 o'clock a. m. of November 5, 1965, when he was going home walking from a gambling den at Pateros,
Rizal,1he saw Dolores running in Tabacalera St. and her husband, the accused, Jose Alviar, was running after her;
that when Jose Alviar overtook her, he pulled her hair, twisted her right arm behind her, and pushed her back to
their house;2 that he was able to identify Dolores and Jose because of a post that was brightly lighted in the place
where he stayed3 . On cross examination, he admitted that he had never told anybody, not even his wife and nine
children, about what he saw4 before he was presented as witness5
Loida Buenaventura, the second prosecution witness, testified on direct examination that at about 9:00 o'clock p.m.
of November 4, 1965, she was at her house located at C. Sexon Street, Pateros, Rizal6 and which was about 4 to 5
meters from the accused's house; that she heard the accused, Jose Alviar, and Dolores Imson Alviar quarreling in
their house about an umbrella and notebook which Dolores claimed she left in the house7 ; that afterwards Dolores became
jealous, and said that the umbrella and the notebook might be with Jose's girl8 ; that Dolores said she would leave and go to her mother's house, but Jose warned
her not to go otherwise something would happen9 ; that Dolores cried, and then there was silence; that Jose later left the house and went alone to his parent's
house which was just across the street 10 ; that after a few moments, Jose returned to their house, and they continued quarreling, but she could not understand
what they were saying 11 , and that Dolores stopped talking, and there was silence; and that she (witness) went to bed and slept at about past 10:00 o'clock
p.m. 12 ; that between 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock a.m. the following day, she was awakened by the rain entering the windows, so she got up to close the windows; that
when she was to close one panel, she saw Dolores going out the street followed by Jose who was chasing her 13 ; that after 10 minutes, they came back, Dolores'
left arm being held by Jose 14 ; that when they reached the door of their house, Jose pushed Dolores who fell in a prone position ("pasubsob") to the floor 15 ; that
Jose later entered the house and closed the door, after which she heard a loud sound ("kalabog") as if a heavy object was thrown against the wall, and Dolores
moaning "Ina ko po", and then there was silence 16 ; that she then saw Jose going out of their house with Dolores' left hand over his shoulder and his right hand
around Dolores' waist and Dolores' head was hanging ("nakalungayngay") 17 ; that Jose happened to look at her window and saw her, so Jose returned to his
house and closed the door; and that she left the window and remembered that Dolores told her that if they happened to quarrel again, she should keep watch 18 ;
that after Dolores was brought to the house, she did not hear any more sound and saw nothing more; that after that witness sat down on her trunk and did not
sleep anymore 19 ; that at about dawn of November 5, 1965, she went near the river to throw garbage, and she saw at about 16 yards from her Jose with a
flashlight focused on the bank of the river 20 ; that after throwing the garbage she went home; that between 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock a.m. also of November 5, 1965,
Jose called up her house and asked her if she saw something at 3:00 o'clock a.m., because Jose said Dolores left at around 3:00 o'clock a.m., to which she
answered that she saw nothing as she was already sleeping; that she said this because she did not want, Jose to know that she knew what had happened 21 . On
cross examination, witness Loida Buenaventura admitted that she never told what she saw to her children, or to her husband who went home at about 4:00 o'clock
a.m. of November 5, 1965, or to the police 22 ; that the first time she narrated the incident was when she went to the National Bureau of Investigation where she
executed an affidavit 23 ; that she could not remember what Jose was wearing or the color of the dress or pants of Jose, or if Jose had something on his feet that
evening of November 4, 1965 24 ; that she did not have a clock or wristwatch in her house; that she could not calculate how long an hour was; that she only
calculated the time when she said that Jose Alviar left his house at about 9:00 o'clock p.m. 25 ; that she did not notice the color of Dolores' dress when the latter left
her house for the first time 26 and that her hair was not disheveled and not completely groomed 27 ; that almost every night Jose and Dolores quarreled because of
jealousy 28 ; that she could not be sure of what Jose was wearing when she saw him with a flashlight 29 , nor what Jose and Dolores were wearing the third time
she saw them 30 ; that on several occasions, she rode in the car of Mrs. Young. 31

Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola, medicolegal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, and third prosecution witness, on
direct examination, identified Exhibit "C", the Necropsy Report, and testified that he conducted the post-
mortem examination at 3:00 o'clock p.m. of November 6, 1965 32 ; that before said examination, the fingerprints were
taken; that he was informed at about noon of November 6, 1965 that he was to perform an autopsy 33 ; that the body,
because of its foul smell, was buried immediately after the autopsy 34 ; that the clothing taken from the body was
identified by one Asuncion Dayco; that pictures (Exhs. F and F-1) were taken before the autopsy 35 ; that the body
was in an advanced state of decomposition; that the woman must have died from 36 to 48 hours before the autopsy;
that she died of drowning 36 ; that there were no injuries in the bones 37 and that it was dangerous to state whether
there were external injuries 38 . On cross examination, he admitted that one of the purposes of the autopsy was to
determine whether there was foul play 39 ; that in the whole skeletal framework, including the skull, of the body, he
did not find any injury 40 ; that there were no open wounds on the body 41 ; that the cause of death was asphyxia,
which could be true also if a person committed suicide 42. On re-direct examination, he testified that it was dangerous
to say, because of the decomposition, if there were any hematoma 43 ;that there were no signs of ante
mortem contusions or abrasions 44 ; that his findings would also be true, if at the time the victim was submerged, she
was conscious or unconscious 45 ; that a person who knows how to swim can also kill himself by drowning 46 ; that
even if a person knows how to swim, the tendency of the body is to go down 47 ; that the body was also wearing a
panty, but he did not think she was wearing any brassieres 48 ; that from the contents of the stomach, death must
have occurred five hours after her last meal. 49

Captain Federico Bautista, a Makati police officer, and fourth prosecution witness, testified that on or about 10:00
o'clock a.m. of November 6, 1965, they took pictures (Exhs. "H", "H-1" and "H-2") of the dead body of an
unidentified woman floating at the river bank of West Rainbow area in Fort Bonifacio. 50

Ceferino Cuevas, fifth prosecution witness, testified on direct examination that at about 7:00 o'clock a.m. of
November 6, 1965, while he and his wife were riding on a motor banca, coming from West Rainbow, they saw the
body of a woman floating on the river; and that there was piece of cloth tied to the left wrist of the woman. 51

Damaso Cruz, sixth prosecution witness, testified on direct examination that on his way home from the gambling
place which he left between 1:00 and 1:15 o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965, he noticed "kalabugan" inside the
house of Jose Alviar 52 as if some persons were quarreling; that because he had stomach ache at that time, he
entered the premises of Peping Garcia, went near the river, to move his bowels 53 ; that while he was moving his
bowels, he saw at the back of the house of Peping Alviar three persons, that is, a woman in the middle with her
arms over the shoulders of two men 54 ; that the woman was unconscious, and her head was hanging sidewards,
("nakalungayngay') 55 ; that he recognized the accused Jose Alviar, but did not recognize the other man or the
woman 56 ; that he saw them coming towards the river, but they turned back 57 ; that he recognized Jose Alviar by the
lighted post near the bank of the river 58 ; that he saw only one banca at that time between the boundary of the
premises of Peping Garcia and Jose Alviar 59 ; that after he saw the three coming, he went home. 60 On cross
examination he admitted that he never narrated or reported what he saw to the police 61 ; that he was investigated in
the National Bureau of Investigation 62 and in the Municipal Court of Pateros 63 ; that the signature in Exh. "5" was his;
that the banca was owned by Pepe Garcia 64 ; that he could not remember what Jose Alviar and the woman were
wearing 65 and that he could not remember if he had a wristwatch at that time. 66

Asuncion Dayco Ymson, the prosecution's seventh witness, testified on direct examination that Dolores was her
daughter; that the relationship between Dolores and Jose was good before they begot children, but after they had
children the relationship became different 67 ; that she saw only once Jog boxing Dolores 68 ; that the spouses Jose
and Dolores had separated twice 69 ; that on one occasion, Jose tried to make Dolores drink iodine 70 for which
reason Dolores went to see Dr. Borja who advised her to go to the hospital 71 ; that Dolores knew how to swim 72 ;
that the last time she saw Dolores alive was on a Thursday when she was fetched in a tricycle by Jose Alviar at
night; that on the following Sunday, her brother-in-law informed her that a certain woman was found dead in West
Rainbow 73 ; that she never saw Jose again except two days later, at 4:00 o'clock a.m. when she saw him inside her
compound standing on top of the septic tank and trying to peep through the room where they used to sleep 74 ; that
she saw the body of Dolores, when it was exhumed from the Makati cemetery 75 ; and that she identified the clothing
of Dolores at the National Bureau of Investigation. 76 On additional direct examination, she identified the clothing. 77

On cross examination, she admitted that he hated Jose for harming her daughter 78 ; that during all the time that
Dolores and her children were in Mindanao, Jose Alviar used to send P60.00 a month 79 ; that when they returned,
Jose brought his wife and children to the Tuazon apartment in Herrera St., Pateros 80 , where they lived until their
house was constructed; that she inquired from her daughter why she was forced to take iodine and her daughter
answered that was her problem 81 , and that after that incident, Jose brought Dolores to the Rizal Provincial
Hospital 82 ; that sometime in July 1964, she chased her daughter Dolores who was knee-deep in the river 83 ; that
she was informed that if her daughter committed suicide, she would not get anything out of the deceased's
insurance policy. 84

Virgilio Pabalan, the prosecution's eighth witness testified on direct examination that he was an autopsy attendant of
the medico-legal division, National Bureau of investigation; and identified the duster (Exh. "I-1") and a mutilated
panty (Exh. "I-2") that was given to him by Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola. 85

Generoso Dangca, fingerprint examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified on direct examination that
Dactiloscopic Report FP 65-231 (Exhibit "D-1") was his report; that he took the fingerprints (Exh. "D-1-A") of the
unknown cadaver, compared them with finger prints on file with the Election Registrar of Pateros, Rizal, and found it
identical with those of Alviar, Dolores Dayco.

Ernesto Manalo 86 , a tricycle driver, testified for the prosecution that he knew the spouses Jose and Dolores 87 ; that
early in the morning of November 5, 1965, at about 1:35 o'clock a.m. he went to the Pateros River to move his
bowels; that while so doing he saw a woman, Dolores Alviar, being placed in a banca by two men whom he did not
know 88 ; that the woman was being forced to make steps and her hands were hanging downwards 89 ; that the
woman's right hand was resting on the shoulders of one of the men and the other was supporting her waistline 90 ;
that the men rode in the banca and paddled away 91 ; while Dolores was lying down 92 ; that he was investigated by
the National Bureau of Investigation in connection with the case 93 ; that he was forced to give a statement to the NBI
but it was Atty. Lasal who gave the answers in that statement 94 ; that he was ordered to state in his previous
statements that he recognized one of the men as Jose Alviar. 95

On cross examination, witness Ernesto Manalo admitted that he was taught in the house of Mr. Young what to
testify 96; that he was told to tell even lies to the NBI that 97 ; it was Fiscal Sarmiento who forced him to identify Jose
Alviar 98 ; that he was always accompanied by a policeman or bodyguard paid by Mr. Young 99 ; that he was also
accompanied by that policeman to the National Bureau of Investigation 100 ; that what he said before that he saw a
woman placed in a banca by two men was not true and that he was told or taught only to say so 101 , that the truth
was that he did not see the woman 102 and that he lied to the court 103; that he corrected what he said before because
he could no longer bear the burden suffered by his conscience 104; that Mr. Young paid all the witnesses 105, namely,
Loida Buenaventura who was given money weekly by Mr. Young 106; Damaso Cruz was paid P2,000.00 107, Crisanto
Gonzales was paid P700.00 108; that he was present when the money was given to them by Mr. Young 109; that Mr.
Young was the owner of Philippine Iron Works and married to a cousin of Dolores Alviar. 110
Emiterio Manalo of the National Bureau of Investigation, and the prosecution's eleventh witness, testified on direct
examination that he was the one who investigated Ernesto Manalo at the NBI on November 29, 1965; that Ernesto
gave a statement (Exh. "J") and the signature and thumbmark thereon were Ernesto Manalo's 111;that he typed the
questions; that he and NBI agent Benjamin Antonio propounded the questions 112; and that Atty. Lasal, who
accompanied Ernesto Manalo, did not interfere with the investigation. 113

The evidence for the defense follows:

Lydia Castillo, first defense witness and employee of Rizal Provincial Hospital, identified Exhibit 6, "Temporary
Medical Certificate" 114 and Exhibit "9" Outside Patient's Record Card" of Dolores Alviar. 115

Perpetuo Garcia, another defense witness residing at C. Sexon Street, Pateros, Rizal, testified on direct
examination, that he knew Jose Alviar, Damaso Cruz, and Loida Buenaventura 116; that his house was fenced, with a
locked gate, and that he had a big dog which he did not hear barking between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. of November 5,
1965 117; that he did not remember having heard any noise in the house of Jose Alviar at about 1:00 o'clock a.m. of
November 5, 1965 118; that he slept 9:00 o'clock p.m. on November 4, 1965 and woke up at 12:30 o'clock in the
morning of November 5, 1965 119; that he slept again at about 2:00 o'clock a.m. and woke up at about 4:00 o'clock
a.m. 120; that he did not know anything about a post with electric bulb at the back of his house as testified to by
Damaso Cruz 121; that in December, 1965, Loida Buenaventura told him that she would testify against Jose Alviar
and would be paid by a Chinaman who was the husband of a cousin of Dolores Alviar. 122 On cross examination, he
said that he did not remember anything unusual that took place on November 5, 1965 123

The appellant Jose Alviar Tuazon, testified on direct examination that the late Dolores Alviar was his wife 124; that on
May 22, 1964 he received a letter (Exhibit "10") from his wife; that in July 1964, his wife went down the river beside
the apartment where they were residing, and was already knee-deep in the water when he caught up with her, and
that after that he recalled the contents of Exhibit "10" that his wife intended to commit suicide 125; that on August 27,
1964, he received from his wife another letter (Exhibit "11") wherein his wife charged him with having relations with
another woman 126; that in November, 1964, his wife went to Bambang Bridge, and when he found her, his wife told
him, that she did not succeed in committing suicide because when she was about to slip, she saw a policeman and
she became afraid 127; that on February 21, 1965, he received another letter (Exhibit "12") from his wife and on
March 6, 1965, his wife took iodine 128, because she was jealous 129; that he brought his wife to the hospital where she
was given emergency treatment 130; that the attending physician advised him to submit his wife to physical therapy in
the National Mental Hospital 131 and a medical certificate, Exhibit "6", was issued; that in the evening of November 4,
1965, he arrived at his home between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock; that his wife, who was living with his mother-in-law,
arrived at their house with a bowl of noodles; that his wife refused to dine with him; that later his wife began looking
for a notebook and umbrella, which she was unable to find; that in the discussion then ensued, his wife accused him
of living with another girl, which he denied; that after that she hang her clothes and went to sleep; that at about 2:00
o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965, his wife told him that she would go down for personal reasons, but he did not
mind her and he continued to sleep; that thirty minutes later he found out that his wife was gone; that he looked for
her in their room and downstairs 132; that he never talked to Loida Buenaventura in the early morning of November 5,
1965; that there was no "kalabugan" in his house at 1:00 o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965 133; that he never hit his
wife; that there was no light at the back of the house of Perpetuo Garcia; that he never went out of his house with a
woman on that date 134; that it was not true that on that night, Dolores left the house and he followed her 135; that he
was not able to locate his wife in the morning of November 5, 1965; that when he came from work the next day, he
did not find his wife at home so he looked for her all around the place, and in the place of his mother-in-law 136; that
Mrs. Dayco saw him on November 5, 1965 standing on the septic tank at her house 137; and that he did not go inside
the house because he was not in good terms with his mother-in-law. 138

On cross examination, the accused admitted that his wife knew how to swim a little 139; that in May, 1953, his wife
filed a case against him for slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Pateros to which he pleaded guilty
(Exhs. K and K-1) 140; that his wife filed a complaint against him for support when they were separated 141; that on
November 7, 1965 he went, on the advice of a relative, to the National Bureau of Investigation, to identify the body
or the personal belongings of his wife, and he identified the dress 142; that he was investigated by the National
Bureau of Investigation before the case was filed against him 143; that he informed the National Bureau of
Investigation that his wife was missing 144; that he was informed where the body was and he went to the cemetery
where she was interred 145; that he informed orally the caretaker of the cemetery that he intended to exhume the
cadaver, but he was informed that there was another ahead of him and he found out that there was already a
certificate for transfer of the remains 146; that he reported that his wife was missing to the relatives of his wife, parents
and the police of Pateros on November 6 147; and that he wanted to attend the funeral, but the Chief of Police
prevented him. 148

The trial court believed the prosecution's witnesses and, having previously dismissed the case against the co-
accused Antonio Cotas, rendered its decision, finding appellant guilty of the crime of parricide, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000. From
this decision, appeal was interposed to this Court.

In his brief, appellant assigned the following errors, to wit: that —

I. The lower court erred in the appreciation and application of the rule on conspiracy, circumstantial evidence and
procedure;

II. The lower court erred in considering the testimony of the prosecution witness Ernesto Manalo as retraction and
sentenced him to suffer thirty (30) days imprisonment for contempt; and

III. The lower court erred in convicting the accused based on circumstantial evidence.

I. In support of his first assigned error, appellant argued that the information alleged confederation and conspiracy
between him and his co- accused Antonio Cotas, in the commission of the crime charged, patently, due to the
impossibility under the circumstances prevailing, for one man alone to commit the crime; that when the alleged co-
conspirator was acquitted, the allegation of conspiracy necessarily failed, for the simple reason that there could be
no conspiracy unless at least two are united in a criminal design 149; that consequently appellant must also be
acquitted. .

The first assigned error that because conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused Cotas was alleged, the
acquittal of his co-accused Cotas must necessarily result in the acquittal of the appellant cannot be seriously
defended. It is to be noted that the two accused were not charged with conspiracy as a distinct and separate
offense. Conspiracy was alleged in the information as one of the means in the commission of parricide. Evidence of
conspiracy in the commission of the offense may be wanting, but, from that it does not necessarily follow that there
cannot be sufficient evidence regarding the commission of the crime charged.

II. Appellant's second assignment of error was that the court erred in considering the testimony of prosecution
witness Ernesto Manalo as retraction and in sentencing him to suffer 30 days imprisonment for contempt. We do not
think that the trial court committed an error in finding Ernesto Manalo guilty of direct contempt, for he gave false
testimony while acting as a witness, and his misbehavior was committed in the presence of or so near the judge or
court, as to obstruct the proper administration of justice. The punishment meted against Ernesto Manalo of
imprisonment for 30 days was, however, excessive for according to Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
direct contempt is punishable by fine not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be committed against a superior court
or judge thereof; or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
committed against an inferior court.

III. Appellant complained in his third assignment of error that the trial court convicted him on the basis of
circumstantial evidence and argued that the court erred in saying that the evidence for defense consisted merely of
the denial of the accused; that the accused's theory of suicide was flimsy for the suicidal letters Exhs. 10, 11, and 12
were not theories but facts; that the three attempts of the deceased to commits suicide as borne by the evidence
and admitted by the mother of the deceased, Asuncion Dayco Ymson, were neither mere theories but facts; that the
appellant was made to answer for the crime by the mother-in-law because of her demonstrated loathe against him
and her fear that she would not receive the proceeds of the insurance policy if the deceased committed suicide; and
that there are many missing links in the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.

Appellee contended that appellant's guilt of the crime charged had been sufficiently and satisfactorily established by
the prosecution witnesses, as evidenced by the trial court's decision.

We believe that, candidly considering all the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense,
appellant's guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Our conclusion is based on the following reasons:
1. First, some facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked by the trial court; their
significance has been misinterpreted; and the prosecution's evidence suffered from an inherent fatal weakness. We
have noticed in the transcript of stenographic notes that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the vital
incidents that constituted, according to the trial court, the chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime charged, are so surprisingly harmonious and fitting with one another, such that not even
the slightest inconsistency can be detected in them. Such perfect dovetailing of the witnesses' testimonies cannot
but generate a suspicion that the various material circumstances the prosecution witnesses testified to were integral
parts and parcels of a well thought of and pre-fabricated story. The prosecution witnesses appear to have been
willing pupils diligently instructed on how to make their several testimonies fit in with each other. In other words, the
testimonies have the earmarks of a manufactured story which clearly appear upon scrutiny of the facts which the
court held to have been proven by the prosecution. We quote hereunder the very words of the trial court, but with
such insertions from the transcript and context that show how perfectly they fit each other, to wit:

The accused and the victim had not been living harmoniously as husband and wife having quarreled on several
occasions and even leading to separation and filing of a criminal case against the accused; ... On November 4,
1965, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening," [as testified to by Loida Buenaventura] "the accused and the victim
quarreled and the latter threatened the former that she will go home to her mother's house but the accused dared
her not to go saying 'huwag kang maka-alis-alis' with threats that should she go, something would happen. Between
1:00 and 2:00 [o'clock] in the early morning of November 5, 1965 the victim was seen" [by Loida Buenaventura]
"coming out of their gate going to the street and followed by the accused a minute later." [It so happened at that very
moment] that "witness Crisanto D. Gonzales" [who was then going home from a gambling den which he left at about
1:00 a.m. of November 5, 1965] "saw the victim walking towards the direction of her mother's house but the accused
caught up with her. The accused pulled the victim's hair; and twisted her hand and forced her to go back to their
house. Upon reaching home, the accused pushed the victim against the door causing the victim to fall in a prone
position (pasubsob). The quarrel continued and a loud sound (kalabog) was heard followed by the moaning of the
victim. [This "kalabog" or loud sound was also heard by Damaso Cruz on his way home from the gambling place
which he left between 1:00 and 1:15 a.m., November 5, 1965] [Between 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock a.m., the following day
as testified to by Loida Buenaventura] "the accused was seen coming out of their house with the victim on his
shoulder but went back inside the house upon noticing Loida Buenaventura still awake and was in her house. On
the same early morning, witness Damaso Cruz [who, as said earlier left the gambling place between 1:00 and 1:15
o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965, providentially and luckily had stomach ache, entered the premises of Peping
Garcia, and went near the river to move his bowels] "saw the accused and another unidentified man carrying in-
between them an apparently unconscious woman. He categorically identified the accused as one of the men
referred to. He recognized the accused as they knew each other very well having lived together in the same locality
and considering that there was an electric light at the time." [The other prosecution witness, Ernesto Manalo,
providentially and coincidentally also went at about 1:35 o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965 to the Pateros River to
move his bowels and there saw two men carrying the deceased Dolores.] [At about dawn of November 5, 1965]
"witness Loida Buenaventura, [who did not throw garbage on November 4, 1965 (TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 82)]
while disposing of some human waste into the river, saw the accused near the bank with a flashlight focused at the
bank. Bothered perhaps by his conscience and to be sure that the witness did not see him, the accused asked the
witness [Loida Buenaventura] whether she noticed something at about 3:00 a.m. ..." 150 After having read the above
should we not at this juncture take stock that while circumstances cannot lie, they can be feigned, invented,
distorted, half-stated, misapplied, mistaken or lied about with most infernal skill?

The times and occasions when the various prosecution witnesses entered the chain of events also surprisingly fitted
one another. Loida Buenaventura admitted that she did not have a clock or even a wrist watch in her house 151; that
she could not exactly calculate one hour 152; yet her guess as to the time when the quarrel of the spouse began, even
her guess regarding the length of time she slept, her guess of the time Dolores went out to the street followed by the
appellant, her guess of the time she heard the "kalabog" or loud sound, her guess as to the time that she allegedly
saw the accused coming out of the house with the victim on his shoulder, so perfectly dovetailed with the witness
Crisanto D. Gonzales' leaving the gambling den and reaching the appellant's house, and, with Damaso Cruz's
leaving the gambling den and moving his bowels when he allegedly saw two men carrying the victim. The time
pieces used by Crisanto and Damaso must have been perfectly synchronized with Loida's guesses. In this
connection, it is enlightening to recall that "where a witness undertakes to swear positively from mere memory to the
fraction of hours or to minutes, we may well distrust his testimony and doubt his sincerity." 153

We also note that the prosecution witnesses had tenacious memories not only as to time, but also as to vital
incidents constituting the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court, but were extraordinarily
forgetful of, or inattentive to, incidental matters. This besets suspicion of veracity. 154 Thus the record shows that
even if Loida Buenaventura claimed to have seen the appellant at least six times from 9:00 o'clock p.m. of
November 4 to dawn of November 5, she could not remember what the appellant was wearing 155; she did not notice
the color of his pants and dress 156; she did not notice whether he was wearing pajamas or undershirt 157 or whether
he had any footwear or not 158. Loida likewise saw the deceased that night four times, but she was completely
unobservant and/or forgetful of what Dolores was wearing. She testified that she did not notice what Dolores was
wearing 159; that she did not know the color of her dress 160; and that she did not notice whether she had any
footwear. 161 Loida did not even relate what she saw to her husband who arrived at 4:00 o'clock a.m. of November 5,
1965.

The timing of Crisanto B. Gonzales' role perfectly fitted with that of Loida Buenaventura. Crisanto B. Gonzales left
the gambling place at 1:00 a.m. 162 of November 5, 1965; he walked for two minutes to cover a distance of only six or
seven meters 163 to the place where he urinated 164; then he started walking home reaching the neighborhood of
appellant's house exactly in time to see Dolores running towards the house of her mother and followed by appellant.
His timing was thus perfectly synchronized with that of Loida Buenaventura. He was very sure of the time he left the
gambling house 165 even if he did not have a timepiece at that time. 166 He was cocksure not only of the time but also
of the incident he saw; but he did not notice whether the appellant was wearing footwear; he did not notice the color
of his pants 167 and did not even remember the name of the street where the gambling house which he said he
frequented everyday from its establishment was located 168. He did not even know the name of the street where the
appellant lived. 169

Prosecution witness Damaso Cruz likewise fortunately left the gambling place between 1:00 o'clock and 1:15 o'clock
a.m. of November 5, 1965 170 and he already had stomach ache when he left 171; he passed by the house of appellant
just in time to hear the "kalabugan" testified to by Loida Buenaventura, and after hearing the loud noise,
providentially desired, only at that time, to move his bowels, so he entered the premises of Peping Garcia, went near
the river to move his bowels 172 and while doing so, what a coincidence again! he saw three persons, a woman in the
middle of two men 173, and recognized the appellant as one of them 174 and after that he went home.

Again Damaso Cruz was very positive as to his testimony about the time, although he himself testified that he did
not have a watch at that time. 175 He was also very positive as to the material incidents he testified to but very
evasive, unobservant and forgetful of the incidental matters. He could not tell what the appellant and the other man
he allegedly saw were wearing 176; he did not notice whether they were wearing footwear 177; he could not remember
whether he narrated what he saw to his wife and children or to the police 178; he could not even remember if that was
the first time he entered Peping Garcia's premises 179; and neither could he remember at what time he arrived at the
gambling place. 180

The other vital prosecution witness, Ernesto Manalo, at about 1:35 o'clock a.m. of November 5, 1965 181 also
answered the call of nature at the Pateros River just in time to see two men and Dolores Alviar 182. Such a close and
minute agreement of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution induces suspicion of confederacy and
fraud. 183

Apropos of the prosecution witnesses having testified only to material facts and having been forgetful or non-
committal with particulars and details having relation with the principal facts, it has been said that "it often happens
with fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of" 184 and "it is observed in courts of justice that
witnesses who come to tell a concerted story are always reluctant to enter into particulars, an a perpetually resort to
shifts and evasions". 185 It has also been said that "an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state but one
fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the
case incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be honest, but
his testimony is not reliable. 186

2. Second, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are suspicious not only because of their absolute
concurrence and dovetailing as to principal points and paucity of particulars and details, but also because there was
evidence that said witnesses were paid and were taught what they should testify. Prosecution witness Ernesto
Manalo testified that he was brought to the house of Mr. Young, together with Atty. Lasal and a Fiscal, that he was
told that even if he did not know anything about the incident, he should make a statement or testify, and that he
should tell what he was taught to tell. 187 He also testified, upon the court's questioning, that he declared only that
which he was taught to testify. 188 He furthermore testified in open court that Mr. Young paid all of the witnesses,
Crisanto Gonzales, Damaso Cruz and Loida Buenaventura 189; that Loida Buenaventura was given money weekly by
Mr. Young; that Crisanto Gonzales was paid P700.00; and that Damaso Cruz was paid P2,000.00, and that he was
present when the money was given to the witnesses. 190 Were these big amounts paid to the prosecution witnesses
to make them testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? That the witnesses were paid was
corroborated by Perpetuo Garcia who testified that Loida Buenaventura told him in December 1965 that she would
testify against the appellant and that for doing so she would be paid by a Chinaman who was the husband of a
cousin of the deceased Dolores Alviar 191 Even Loida Buenaventura herself corroborated it when she admitted that
on several occasions she rode in the car of Mrs. Young. 192 Prosecution witness Ernesto Manalo also testified that he
was taught what to testify. Were not those big sums of money given also for that purpose, that said witnesses
should testify what they were taught to? If not, how can the incredible dovetailing of the prosecution witnesses
testimonies be explained? Noteworthy is the fact that the prosecution did not even make an attempt to rebut such
payments to the witnesses.

3. Third, there is another fatal infirmity in the prosecution's evidence. The facts considered by the trial court as
having proved appellant's guilt do not show that it was impossible that the deceased might have died because of
accident or because she committed suicide.

From the results of the autopsy as testified to by Dr. Ibarrola, the deceased died from asphyxia caused by drowning.
The results of the autopsy would not vary, according to Dr. Ibarrola, whether the deceased committed suicide, or
she was drowned by another, and it may be added even if her death was due to an accident. Anent this matter it has
been said that in case of grown-ups, medical evidence will not be able to tell whether a death which occurred by
drowning was due to accident, suicide, or homicide. 193

There is likewise no proof of the motive that might have impelled the appellant to commit the alleged parricide.
Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been
proven and the evidence of identification is convincing; however, where the proof of identification is not convincing,
the proof of motive is necessary. 194

4. Fourth, appellant's theory and defense that the deceased committed suicide cannot be brushed aside, as the trial
court did, as flimsy and improbable, for first, according to the results of the autopsy, there were no indications of foul
play in the deceased's body there being no wounds and no injuries in the whole skeletal framework, and no ante
mortem contusions or abrasions; and second, there are important facts and circumstances that tend to prove that
the deceased's death might have been suicidal, namely: the presence of motivational factors, the suicidal notes, and
the suicidal
attempts. 195

Disappointment in love as well as loss of money, mental depression and psychopatic tendencies, among others,
may be sufficient motives for suicide. 196 It is undisputed, as testified to not only by the appellant but also by
prosecution witness Loida Buenaventura 197, that the deceased Dolores was a very jealous wife. In fact the quarrel
on that fateful night of November 4 was caused by jealousy, about an umbrella and notebook which Dolores claimed
she left in their house 198, and not being able to locate them, Dolores said that the umbrella and notebook might be
with Jose's girl 199 and Dolores accused Jose of living with another girl. 200

There are also suicidal notes and suicidal attempts. It should be noted at the outset that the methods of
communicating suicidal ideas vary. There may be direct statement of an intent to commit suicide or a wish to die, or
mere vague statements showing preoccupation with death, suicide, and methods of suicide. Any expression of
defeat, despair, hopelessness, or a wish to disappear should serve as a warning of a suicidal risk. 201 Generally, a
suicide note does not contain specific details of the suicidal act. The suicide seems more intent on other things such
as provisions for the family and loves ones, instructions, requests and the like. 202

Now to the suicidal notes and attempts. The first suicidal note on the record is Exhibit "10", a letter written on May
22, 1964 by the deceased to her husband, Jose, which reads in part as follows:

Dear Peping,

As a wife it is my duty to give you happiness although it calls for life taking. I never deem that ... you have another
woman whom you can never part with. You valued her at the expense of my love for you. I know before hand that
I'm really worthless to you, but I tried to gamble my love for you with the hope that I can make you love me for the
sake of the children. But that I have experienced only false forced love. So my hope is in vain.
Peping, from this time you are free ... I know that you are tired seeing me, but only wait until I have enrolled Boy and
see them go to school for a week. After this you will not see me in town.

I'll just part giving you complete happiness. ... Please don't forget only to give your care for Baby & Boy. ...

Loleng

The letter shows clearly the deceased's disappointment in her love for her husband, her defeat, hopelessness, a
wish or threat to disappear, and a request that Jose love their children. These are various nuances of
communicating suicidal ideas. What Dolores meant by "life-taking", "not seeing her in town" in that letter of May 22,
1964 became clear in July 1964 203, when she attempted to commit suicide by going down the river beside the
apartment where they were residing but was unable to consummate the suicide for her husband caught up with her.
This attempt was testified to by the accused 204 and corroborated by Dolores' mother. 205

The second suicidal note was another letter dated August 27, 1964 (Exhibit "11") which reads in part thus:

Dear Peping,

With my departure, I have come to know that you are ashame of me in public, ... I'd like to help you give an ease to
your situation. I don't like to he a hindrance to your happiness. In case you are really with another woman, who will
really make you happy, just tell me the truth and you will not hear anything from me. I have sacrifice twelve years
away from you and I think I can manage to carry and risk it yet. For if we shall stay together and your feeling is with
another woman or your heart belongs to another, our life will only be in grief ...

P.S.

Although it is painful to part with you ... I'll try once to close my eyes just to make you happy ... Remember that I
have tried to regain my love to you. I'll always love and care for you although I know that there is some one more
precious to you.

Same
Loleng

This letter shows the woman's defeat, disappointment and despair because her love has been unrequited, and
shows her intention to ease the situation of the husband she loves. What did Dolores intend to do to ease the
situation of the husband? The record gives the answer. In November, 1964, Dolores went away from their house,
and went to Bambang Bridge, in the northeast of Pateros, Rizal, and when the husband found her, she informed him
that she did not succeed in committing suicide because she was afraid of a policeman who saw her. 206

Again on February 21,1965, Dolores wrote another letter (Exhibit "12") which in part reads thus:

Dearest Peping,

I hope you will forgive me if my going to see you in Pampanga is a disturbance to you. I never thought that you will
be embarrassed.

From this time on, you will never bear anything from me ... Just remember that I love you and it is my happiness to
see you happy with any body.

Here is only my pleadings. If time does not warrant my life, please don't forget to educate Baby and Boy. Please
love them in spite that you don't love me. I'm sorry that I lack the virtue that you like to see and love another ladies.

My good luck for you & may God bless you. Cheer up with your happiness.

Love & regards to you,

Loleng
Another suicidal note showing a desire to die, hopelessness, and making instructions and requests!

A few days later, that is on March 6, 1965, she gave the meaning by her overt acts to what she meant by "if time
does not warrant her life" and "he would never hear anything from her again." How tragic jealousy can be! She
drank iodine, but was saved by the timely intervention of the accused. 207 This incident was corroborated by the
deceased's
mother. 208

If Dolores tried to commit suicide in those three instances because of jealousy, was it not then probable that she
also could have tried to commit, and succeeded in committing it also because of jealousy, on November 5, 1965?
Anent this matter it has been said that a decedent had made one or more previous suicidal attempts is often relied
by courts to sustain a verdict of suicide. 209

5. Fifth, We do not agree with the trial court's reason in disbelieving appellant's testimony and defense. One of those
reasons was that appellant's acts after his wife was gone were unnatural and indicative of a bothered conscience.
The trial court's conclusion would be plausible if it is assumed that appellant was guilty. But that was the factum
probandum, and it could not and should not be assumed. Appellant's acts in fact could very well be consistent with
his innocence. Assuming that he was innocent, and assuming that it was true that at dawn of November 5, 1965 he
was at the river bank with a flashlight focused at the river, it cannot be said unnatural for a husband to look for his
wife who slipped away at 3:00 o'clock a.m. and who might have again gone to the river to commit suicide as she
had done before. The trial court also considered strange the appellant's asking Loida if the latter noticed something
at about 3:00 a.m. Assuming that to be true, was it not compatible with accused's innocence to look for his wife, to
ask others, especially the neighbors, if the latter had seen her, she having slipped away at 3:00 o'clock? Is it strange
for a husband to ask a neighbor such question? That the accused was seen sneaking into the house of his mother-
in-law two days later could again be compatible with the accused innocence. His wife was missing. He did not know
where she was and he was looking for her. Was it strange then that appellant might have thought that she went
home to her mother and might be hiding there? If this was not strange, why should it be strange that the appellant
looked for her in that house?

Furthermore, the trial court could not believe that Dolores committed suicide because Dolores, according to the
appellant, woke up appellant at 2:00 o'clock a.m. The trial court said that "if it is true as claimed by the accused and
as the defense would have this Court to believe that the deceased committed suicide, the deceased would not have
warned him, much more wake him up and ask for his permission to go downstairs for a while if her purpose then
was really to give end to her life. " It is to be noted that according to the record, at about 2:00 o'clock a.m. of .
November 5, 1965, Dolores told appellant that she would go down for personal reasons. 210 Dolores did not warn the
accused that she would commit suicide - she said that she was as going down for personal reasons. And even if the
"personal reasons" meant "to commit suicide," still We find no improbability in a would-be suicide to tell another her
intention, perhaps in order to arouse the husband's sympathy. 211

The trial court believed that the deceased was a victim of foul play. This opinion is not in accordance with the
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation's medico-legal officer Dr. Ibarrola who found no injury in the whole
skeletal framework including the skull, and no signs of ante mortem contusions and abrasions.

Another reason advanced by the trial court for not believing that the deceased committed suicide was that she knew
how to swim. But Dr. Ibarrola, when asked whether a person who knows how to swim may drown, categorically
answered that such a person can also kill himself by drowning, that even if a person knows how to swim, the
tendency of the body is to go down the water.

WHEREFORE, We conclude that the prosecution's evidence has not proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant's
guilt of the crime charged. The decision, therefore, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated October 8, 1969, in
its Criminal Case No. 15358 is set aside, and the appellant is hereby acquitted of the crime charged. The bond filed
for the provisional liberty of appellant is ordered cancelled. Costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 TSN, December 14, 1955, p. 5.

2 Ibid., p. 8.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

5 Ibid., p. 28.

6 TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 4.

7 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

8 Ibid., p. 12.

9 Ibid., p, 14.

10 Ibid., p. 15.

11 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

12 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

13 Ibid., p. 20.

14 Ibid., p. 22.

15 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

16 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

17 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

18 Ibid., p. 30.

19 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

20 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

21 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

22 Ibid., pp. 51-53.

23 Ibid., pp. 53-55.

24 Ibid., pp. 56-57.

25 Ibid., pp. 60-61.

26 Ibid., p. 101.
27 Ibid., p. 101.

28 Ibid., p. 112.

29 Ibid., p. 119.

30 Ibid., pp. 122-123.

31 Ibid., pp. 143-144.

32 TSN, February 8, 1967, p, 11.

33 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

34 Ibid., p. 15.

35 Ibid., p. 25.

36 Ibid., p. 26.

37 Ibid., p. 30.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

40 Ibid., p. 46.

41 Ibid., p. 49.

42 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

43 Ibid., p. 62.

44 Ibid., p. 64.

45 Ibid., p. 65.

46 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

47 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

48 Ibid., p. 86.

49 Ibid., p. 89.

50 TSN, March 7, 1967, pp. 8-9.

51 TSN, March 7,1967, p. 33.

52 TSN, March 7,1967, p. 42.

53 Ibid., p. 45.

54 Ibid., p. 46.
55 Ibid., p. 47.

56 Ibid., p. 49.

57 Ibid., p. 50.

58 Ibid., p. 51.

59 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

60 Ibid., p. 52.

61 Ibid., p. 54.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p. 57.

64 Ibid., p. 68.

65 Ibid., pp. 69-70, 95.

66 Ibid., p. 72.

67 TSN, March 7, 1967, pp. 102-103.

68 Ibid., p. 105.

69 Ibid., p. 113.

70 Ibid., pp. 116-117.

71 Ibid., p. 118.

72 Ibid., p. 122.

73 Ibid., pp. 124-126.

74 Ibid., p. 127.

75 Ibid., p. 129.

76 Ibid., p. 132.

77 TSN, April 18, 1967, p, 44.

78 TSN, May 24, 1967, p. 7.

79 Ibid., p. 14.

80 Ibid., p. 15.

81 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

82 Ibid., p. 26.
83 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

84 Ibid., p. 38.

85 TSN, April 18, 1967.

86 Ernesto Manalo for having given false testimony was adjudged to have committed direct contempt by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer 30 days of confinement in the provincial jail (TSN, October 16, 1967, p. 14). Of his
testimony, only that which refers to the prosecution with having been given various amounts of Mr. Young was
considered by the trial court.

87 TSN, Sept. 12, 1967, p. 4.

88 Ibid., pp. 8, 20.

89 Ibid., p. 20.

90 Ibid., p. 20.

91 Ibid., p. 24.

92 Ibid., p. 26.

93 Ibid., p. 10.

94 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

95 Ibid., p. 33.

96 TSN, October 16, 1967, pp. 3-4.

97 Ibid., p. 4.

98 Ibid., p. 4.

99 Ibid., p. 5.

100 Ibid., p. 6.

101 Ibid., p. 8.

102 Ibid., p. 8.

103 Ibid., p. 9.

104 Ibid., p. 9.

105 Ibid., p. 9.

106 Ibid., p. 10.

107 Ibid., p, 10.

108 Ibid., p. 10.

109 Ibid., p. 9.

110 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

111 TSN, November 22, 1967, pp. 17-18. The trial court having observed the manner Ernesto Manalo testified
noted his apparent mendacity, hence his testimony was entirely disregarded for being incredible and unbelievable.
Exhibit "J" was rejected by the Court insofar as to the truth of what is stated therein, but admitted it as a part of the
testimonies of Ernesto Manalo and NBI agent Emiterio Manalo.

112 Ibid., p. 10.

113 Ibid., p. 15.

114 TSN, September 2, 1968, p. 8.

115 Ibid., p. 12.

116 TSN, November 12, 1968, pp. 24.

117 Ibid., p. 5-6.

118 Ibid., pp. 7-9.

119 Ibid., p. 11.

120 Ibid., pp. 12-141.

121 Ibid., p. 15.

122 Ibid., pp. 17-21.

123 Ibid., p. 38.

124 TSN, December 18, 1968, p. 2.

125 Ibid., pp. 6-11.

126 Ibid., p. 15.

127 Ibid., pp. 16-18.

128 Ibid., pp. 21-26.

129 Ibid., p. 28.

130 Ibid., p. 32.

131 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

132 Ibid., pp. 37- 44.

133 Ibid., pp, 45-46.

134 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

135 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

136 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

137 Ibid., p. 56.

138 Ibid.

139 TSN, February 19, 1969, p. 32.

140 Exhibits K & K-1 were rejected by the Court for being immaterial in the case in issue. TSN, Nov. 22,1967, p. 57.

141 TSN, February 19, 1969, pp. 42-43.

142 Ibid., pp. 49-56, 61-63, 78-82.

143 Ibid., p. 60.

144 Ibid., p. 63.

145 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

146 Ibid., pp. 68-69.

147 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

148 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

149 Brief for the Appellant, pp. 7-12.

150 Record, pp. 36-37,

151 TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 60.

152 Ibid., p. 60.

153 Moore, A Treatise on Facts, Vol. III, p. 988.

154 Moore, A Treatise on Facts, Vol. II, p. 1196.

155 TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 56.

156 Ibid., p. 56.

157 Ibid., p. 105.

158 Ibid., p. 57.

159 TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 74.

160 Ibid., pp. 101, 123.

161 Ibid., p. 100.

162 The records says 11:00 o'clock a.m., but the trial court puts it at 1:00 a.m., TSN, December 14, 1966, pp. 4, 8,
10, 16.

163 TSN, December 14, 1966, p. 17.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid., p. 12.

166 Ibid., p. 11.

167 Ibid., p. 50.

168 Ibid., p. 18.

169 Ibid., p. 5.

170 TSN, March 7, 1967, p. 41.

171 Ibid., p. 81.

172 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

173 Ibid., p. 47.

174 Ibid., p. 48.

175 Ibid., p. 72.

176 Ibid., pp. 69, 95.

177 Ibid., p. 70.

178 Ibid., p. 54.

179 Ibid., p. 98.

180 Ibid., p. 92.

181 TSN, Sept. 12, 1967, pp. 6, 7.

182 Ibid., p. 8. Ernesto Manalo's having seen the two men and Dolores was not considered by the trial court in its
decision.

183 Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 7th ed., p. 441.

184 Ibid., p. 441.

185 Ibid., pp. 438-439.

186 Francisco, Trial Technique and Practice Court, 3rd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 302-303.

187 TSN, September 12, 1967, p. 14; TSN, October 16, 1967, pp. 3, 4.

188 TSN, October 16, 1967, pp. 7, 8.

189 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

190 TSN, October 16,1967, pp. 9-10.

191 TSN, November 12, 1968, p. 21.

192 TSN, January 16,1967, pp. 143-144.

193 Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 227.

194 SCRA Quick Index-Digest, Vol. I, p. 862 and cases cited therein.

195 American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts, Vol. 12, pp. 234-235.

196 Gonzales, et al., Legal Medicine, Pathology and Toxicology, 2nd ed., pp. 13, 490.

197 TSN, January 16, 1967, p. 12.

198 Ibid., p. 10.

199 Ibid., p. 12.

200 TSN, December 18, 1968, p. 40.

201 American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts Vol. 12, p. 168.

202 Ibid., p. 170.

203 In a majority of cases, according to Proof of Facts, Vol. 12, p. 168, suicidal ideas are express during a period
that does not exceed one year preceding the suicide, and in many the period does not exceed three months.

204 TSN, December 18, 1968, pp. 6-11.

205 TSN, May 24, 1967, pp. 32-33.

206 TSN, December 18, 1968, pp. 17-18.

207 TSN, December 18, 1968, pp. 25-28.

208 TSN, May 24,1967, pp. 23-26.

209 American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts, Vol. 12, p. 193.

210 TSN, December 18, 1968, p. 41.

211 In this connection it has been said that one of the most important facts to emerge from the statistical data
concerning suicide has been the disproof of the popular belief that persons who talk about committing suicide rarely
do so. That the opposite is true is shown by the fact that more than half of those who commit or attempt suicide in
some manner communicate their suicidal ideas before they do so. American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts. Vol. 12,
p. 168.

G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Attorney
Concepcion F. Torrijos for plaintiff-appellee.

Accused-appellant in her own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p

Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero seeks a reversal of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City finding her
guilty of PARRICIDE and sentencing her "to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium
period, as the minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum; to
indemnify the heirs of Francisco Caballero in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs", and prays for an acquittal based on her plea of self-defense.1

The Solicitor General however asks for the affirmance of the appealed decision predicated on the following
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution before the trial court:

Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956, at a
ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Ormoc City.2 The marriage was not a
happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple separated. Late in the evening of January 2, 1958,
Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong Sacay, drank "tuba" in a certain
house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home. On
the way, they saw Francisco's wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad Cunigunda
called Francisco and when the latter approached her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife marked
by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco called for help to his two companions who upon seeing that Francisco
was wounded, brought him to the St. Jude Hospital.3 Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital, personally attended
to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring 1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First
aid was given, but because there was a need for blood transfusion and the facilities of the hospital were inadequate
to provide the necessary treatment, Dr. Samson suggested that the patient be transported to Cebu City.4 In the
meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the Police Department of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant
Restituto Mariveles and informed the latter that she stabbed her husband.5 While Francisco Caballero was confined
at the hospital, he was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero concerning the identity of his assailant and he
pointed to his wife Cunigunda. The questions propounded by Pat. Covero and the answers given by the victim were
written down in a piece of paper on which the victim affixed his thumbmark (Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother,
Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman, Francisco Tomada.6 On January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was
brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc" but the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of the
same day from the stab wound sustained by him.7

Appellant, on the other hand, pleads that We discard the proof adduced by the prosecution and believe instead what
she declared before the trial judge briefly summarized as follows:

After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956, appellant lived with her husband in the house of her
parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City, and their marriage, although not a harmonious one, was blessed with a daughter;
her married life was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, and serenading",
and there were times when he maltreated and beat her; after more than a year she and her husband transferred to a
house of their own, but a month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to
live with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; in the month of November, 1957, her
daughter became sick and she went to her husband and asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her
away and said "I don't care if you all would die"; in the evening of January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her
friend, Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical instruments; at about 12:00 o'clock midnight they
divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of Crispina Barabad after which she went home, but before she
could leave the vicinity of the house of Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by
the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied:
"What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these
words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you
all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground,
to keep herself from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside
the belt line on the left side of his body; because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to
the ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do
whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the
knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh;
when she finally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; in
the morning of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained
dress worn by her on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the
weapon but because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any knife, and she did, and she gave a
knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution.8

The sole question thus presented in this appeal is: did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her
person?

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural
instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of
self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being. Thus, in the words of the Romans of ancient
history: Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur.9 To the Classicists in penal law, lawful
defense is grounded on the impossibility on the part of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a
person unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the innocent succumb to an
unlawful aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful defense is an exercise of a right, an act of
social justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor.10

Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

xxx xxx xxx

As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of the aforecited circumstances, the rationale being that having admitted the
wounding or killing of his adversary which is a felony, he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. 11

In this case of Cunigunda Caballero, the trial court did not find her evidence clear and convincing, and gave these
reasons for its conclusion: a) appellant's testimony is inherently improbable as brought out by her demonstration of
the incident in question during the trial of the case; b) there was no wound or injury on appellant's body treated by
any physician: c) appellant's insistence that the weapon used by her was Moro hunting knife and not Exh. C is
incredible; d) she gave contradictory statements concerning the report made by her to the police authorities that she
was choked by her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and her child afforded the motive behind
appellant's
attack. 12

We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the rule that appellate court will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified to by the witnesses.
An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due importance to one piece
of evidence which more than the testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant on how she
happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate night. We refer to the location of the wound inflicted on the victim.

Appellant's account of that fatal occurrence as given in her direct testimony follows:

Q At that precise time when you were going home to the place of your parents, did any unusual incident occur?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A At the time when I went down from the house of Crispina Barabad, when I reached near the banana hill, my
husband held me.

Q What happened when your husband, Francisco Caballero, held you?

A He asked me from where did I prostitute myself.

Q What did you answer?

A I answered that I did not go (on) prostituting. I told him that I was only forced to accompany with the carolling in
order to earn money for our child.

Q What part of your body did your husband, Francisco Caballero, hold you?

A He held me at the collar of my dress. (Witness holding the right portion of the collar of her dress.)

Q After you answered Francisco, what did he do?

A He said "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." Then I told him "What is your business.
Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us."

Q When Francisco heard these words, what did he do?

A Francisco said "What do you mean by saying l have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all. I will kill you all."

Q And then, what happened?

A He held my hair and slapped my face twice. Then I staggered and my nose was bleeding.

Q Do you mean to say that blood flowed out of your nose?

A Yes, sir.

Q After you were slapped twice and your nose begun to bleed, what happened next?

A He held the front part of my dress just below the collar and pushed me towards the ground. .

Q While your husband was holding your dress below the neck and tried to push you down, what did you do?

A I held a part of his body in order that I would not fall to the ground.

Q And then what happened?

A Because I struggled hard in order that I would not fall to the ground I held his belt and that was the time I got hold
of a weapon along his belt line.

Q After that what happened?

A He shoved my hands upward and pushed me to the ground and that was the time my hands were released. He
was choking me.

Q When you said your hands were released, was that before or after you were choked by Francisco Caballero?

A At that time when I was about to fall to the ground that was the time I released my hands.

Q When you were almost fallen to the ground, where were the hands of Francisco Caballero?

A On my hair.

Q You mean to say the two hands of Francisco Caballero?

A One of his hands was holding my hair. The other hand pushed me.

COURT:

Q What hand was holding your hair?

A His right hand was holding my hair while his left hand pushed me.

ATTORNEY GARCIA:

Q When you were fallen to the ground what happened?

A While I lay prostrate on the ground and believing that I have no other recourse, while his left hand was holding my
neck, I was able to take hold of the weapon from his belt line and I thrust it to him.

Q What was this weapon which you were able to get from his belt line?

A It was a hunting knife." (tsn. pp. 53-55, witness Cunigunda Caballero)

On cross-examination, appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show her position when she stabbed her
husband and she did, and although the stenographic notes on that demonstration are very sketchy which We quote:

Q Please demonstrate to this Court when you made the thrust to your husband?

A When I took hold of the hunting knife I made the thrust in this manner. (Witness held the ruler with her right hand
kneeled on the floor)" (tsn. p. 67, ibid)

still We can get a clear picture of what appellant must have done, from the questions and answers immediately
following the above-quoted portion of the transcript, viz:

Q You want to make us understand that when you thrust the weapon to the body of your husband you were lying
down flat to the ground?

A I was lying flat on the ground face upward. I was a little bit inclined because tried to struggle trying to get away
from the hold of my husband.
Q You want to make us understand that your back was touching the ground when you made the thrust to your
husband?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Where were you kneeled by your, husband?

A On my right thigh. (ibid; emphasis supplied)

Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck,
appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's belt
and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just below the waist, described by the attending physician, Dr.
Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was
drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent
over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man's belt and
thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.

We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the accused it was physically impossible
for her to get hold of the weapon because the two knees of her husband were on her right thigh "which would have
forced her to put her right elbow towards the ground"(see p. 9 of Decision), for even if it were true that the two knees
of Francisco were on his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the record to show that the right arm of the
accused was held, pinned down or rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to the ground, as conjectured
by the trial judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for the knife. On the contrary, as indicated earlier,
accused testified and so demonstrated that she was lying flat on her back, her husband kneeling over her and her
right arm free to pull out the knife and strike with it.

The trial judge also referred the a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of her testimony when she was
held by the hair and pushed down to the ground, and His Honor commented that "(S)he could not be falling to the
ground, as shown to the Court by her, considering the fact that the pushing was to and fro as shown in her
demonstration." (p. 8, Decision) The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly impossible to have an
exact and accurate reproduction or reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the participation of persons
other than the very protagonists of the incident being re-enacted. In this particular instance appellant was asked by
the private prosecutor to show how she was pushed down by her husband, and her demonstration is described in
the stenographic transcript as follows:

Q Please demonstrate to this Court the position of your husband and you while your husband held your hair.

A He did this way. (Witness held the hair of the Court Interpreter with his left hand and his right hand held the right
shoulder of the Interpreter and pulled the Interpreter to and fro. The Interpreter represented as the accused and the
accused as the deceased.)

Q Where were your two hands?

A My two hands held his waist line. (tsn. 66, witness Cunigunda Caballero; emphasis supplied)

In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was impersonated by the court interpreter,
and so it was difficult if not impossible for the two to give an accurate reenactment considering that the accused
assumed a role not hers during the actual incident and the court interpreter played a part which was not truly his. At
any rate, the accused showed how one hand of her husband held her hair while the other pushed her down by the
shoulder, and to portray how she in turn struggled and tried to push back her husband to keep herself from falling,
she "pulled the interpreter (representing the accused) to and fro." The fact is that Francisco succeeded in forcing
appellant down to the ground as portrayed by the latter when, following the foregoing demonstration, she was asked
by the private prosecutor to show how she stabbed her husband — a matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9 of
this Decision.
It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly militates against the credibility of the
lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad. This witness declared that on that night when husband and wife met on
the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter was near, she immediately stabbed him. If that were true,
that is, husband and wife were standing face to face at a distance of one-half meter when the stabbing occurred
(tsn. p. 11, witness Ignacio Barabad), it would have been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been
directed towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest, rather than at his back, left
side, just above the left thigh.

In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the
accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which can be
used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of
probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence13, so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-
finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal
knowledge but as the result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be proved.

Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, December 28, 1973, a decision of the First Division of this Court penned by
Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, the plea of self-defense of the accused-appellant was sustained on the basis
of certain "physical and objective circumstances" which proved to be of "decisive importance" in ascertaining the
veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location of the wound on the right side of the throat and right arm of
the deceased, the direction of the trajectories of the bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of bloodstains at the
driver's seat, the finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on. 14

In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-defense.

Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that particular night of January 2.
Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a
conviction especially where the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not
disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between
two antagonistic theories or versions of the killings. 15

We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her husband was his
abandonment of her and his failure to support her and her child. While appellant admitted in the course of her
testimony that her marriage was not a happy one, that she and her husband separated in the month of October,
1957, and since then she and her child lived with her parents who supported them, nevertheless she declared that
notwithstanding their separation she still loved her husband (tsn. p. 59, cross-examination of appellant). As a matter
of fact, appellant had been living with her parents for several months prior to the incident in question and appeared
resigned to her fate. Furthermore, there is no record of any event which occurred immediately prior to January 2
which could have aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and carry out the killing of her
husband.

On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his wife
unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad
purpose he held her by the collar of her dress and said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a
bitch." This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling of her hair, pushing her
down to the ground, and strangling her — all of which constituted the unlawful aggression against which appellant
had to defend herself.

Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after the occurrence. As soon as the
sun was up that morning of January 3 (the stabbing occurred past midnight of January 2), Cunigunda went to the
city and presented herself at the police headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband and
surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial judge stated that appellant made
contradictory statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to the police authorities, for while at the
start she declared that she did not report the "choking by her husband", she later changed her testimony and stated
that she did relate that fact. (p. 10, Decision)

We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct examination and nowhere is
there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report that she was choked by her husband. What the
trial judge asked of appellant was whether or not she told the police about the fist mark on her face and her answer
was "No, sir, I forgot." (tsn. p. 55, supra) And on appellant's cross-examination, there was no question propounded
and therefore there was no answer given on the subject-matter of appellant's report to the police concerning the
incident except for the following:

COURT:

Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following day?

A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn out.

Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?

A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it, not to touch it. (Tsn. p. 65, ibid)

We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was singled out by His Honor as
one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-defense.

That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he attacked her is confirmed by no
less than the prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on duty at the desk when appellant
arrived at the police headquarters. This witness on cross-examination declared:

Q And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident her husband Francisco Caballero beat her up, is
that right?

A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband immediately after carolling and she was manhandled by
her husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her husband she happened to take hold of a knife that
was placed under the belt of her husband and because she was already half conscious she did not know that she
was able to thrust said knife to the stomach of her husband. (tsn. p. 23, witness R. Mariveles)

It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her surrender were not taken down
in writing to serve as a faithful and reliable account of her report, nevertheless, We are satisfied by the fact, which is
not disputed, that of her own accord appellant went to the police authorities early in the morning of January 3,
informed Policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband because he manhandled her which rendered her "half-
conscious", and brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which was torn by the collar and with
blood stains due to the bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the time was property
custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant's testimony concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for
the defense. (tsn. p. 70 witness J. de Leon) If there was no clear and positive statement in appellant's testimony
either on direct or cross examination that she informed the police that she was choked by her husband, it was
because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that point.

While We are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the knife marked as Exhibit C for the
prosecution. In her testimony, appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the knife actually used by her in stabbing her
husband because the true weapon was her husband's Moro hunting knife with a blade of around six inches which
she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she was asked by Pat. Mariveles to look for the weapon
and she could not find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the search to get any knife and
surrender it to the desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat. Mariveles. (tsn. appellant
pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was taken against her by the court a quo which held that her declaration
could not have been true. We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the accused on this point. Appellant
does not deny that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed her husband but
she claims that she did so upon advise of another policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter
was not called upon by the prosecution to refute such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify
a misstatement made by her to Pat. Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact We do believe that the fatal
weapon must have had indeed a blade of around six inches as stated by appellant for it to penetrate through the left
lumbar region to the victim's large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p. 6)

All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.

The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present. Here we have a
woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong
pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself from
impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that the reasonable necessity of the
means employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury. (U.S. vs. Paras, 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that there was no visible
injury caused on the body of the appellant which necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the trial
court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril to appellant's life
caused by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt afforded appellant the
only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being strangled and choked to death. What
this Court expressed in the case of People vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil. 153, 160, is very true and applicable to the
situation now before Us, and We quote:

It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature does not act upon processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a person
has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor
irresponsible in law for the consequences. 16

Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no law.

The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to
attack the person claiming self-
defense. 17 Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on
her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding
her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent
to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the
mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by
her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling with some friends to
earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas season during which by tradition people
carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore
should have given some consideration to his wife's excuse before jumping to conclusions and taking the extreme
measure of attempting to kill his wife.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of
her person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.

So Ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Castro, J, is on leave.

Footnotes

1 This appeal was originally elevated to the Court of Appeals; however, in a Resolution promulgated on May 7,
1964, it forwarded the case to this Court on the ground that the penalty for the crime committed by the accused
is reclusion perpetua.

2 Marriage contract marked Exhibit G.

3 T.s.n. March 19, 1958, pp. 3-7, witness Ignacio Barabad.

4 T.s.n. April 18, 1958, pp. 2-7, witness Dr. Cesar Samson.

5 T.s.n. June 24, 1958, pp. 16-17, witness Restituto Mariveles.

6 T.s.n. June 24, 1958, pp. 28-32, witness Covero; t.s.n. June 24, 1958. pp. 54-62, 67, witness Tomada; t.s.n. pp.
72-73 witness Cresencio Caballero.

7 see death certificate marked Exhibit H.

8 T.s.n. August 12, 1958, pp. 58-68, witness Cunigunda Caballero.

9 see 1 Viada, 172, 5th edition. "That which anyone should do for the safety of his own person is to be adjudged as
having been done justly in his own favor." (Writer's translation).

10 Guillermo B. Guevara's Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, 1974 ed. p. 82, citing: Pessina par. 73,
Carrara par. 291; and Calon Derecho Penal, 292.

11 U.S. vs. Coronet, 30 Phil. 112, People vs. Cruz, 53 Phil. 635; People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772; People vs.
Davis, L-13337, Feb. 16, 1961, 1 SCRA 473; People vs. Solana, L-13967, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 60; People vs.
Mendoza, L-16392, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 11; People vs. Talaboc, L-25004, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 87;
People vs. Ordiales, November 23, 1971, 42 SCRA 238; People vs. Tingson, L-31228, October 24, 1972, 47 SCRA
243; People vs. Llamera, L-21604-5-6", May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 48.

12 pp. 7-9, Decision found in pp. 267-269, original record.

13 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 5th edition, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3, cited in Francisco's Evidence, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 68.

14 see also People vs. Maliwanag, et al., L-30302, August 14, 1974 (1st Division)

15 People vs. Zamora, 59 Phil. 568; People vs. Ramponit 62 Phil. 284; People vs. Divinagracia, 105 Phil. 281;
People vs. Ester Murray, 105 Phil. 591; People vs. Macabenta, 106 Phil. 77.

16 see also People vs. Encomienda, No. L-26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA p. 522.

17 Guevara's supra p. 89, citing Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, February 20, 1893, 50 Jur. Crim. 166-168;
Padilla's Criminal Law, Book I, 1971 ed., p. 197.

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.

Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to
indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B.
Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay
Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the
following facts:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were
forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However,
Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three
children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To
have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to
go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.

On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to
Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an
Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven
o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.

At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano
Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the
address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an
employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos.
Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his
pants. It was then noontime.

Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch
at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th,
for their homeward trip.

After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train
left at six o'clock that evening.

The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-
passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated
the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the
back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy
was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more
than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the
brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who
was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month
old baby. They were in front of Reganet.

Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some
chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the
evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed
the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.

For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not
able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The
blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the
passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered
inside the coach.2

Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that
occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car
to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from.
He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the
floor near the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8
and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He
shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay
down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.

Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the
blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and
was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors
(Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.

Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.

Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he received the
information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach,
he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a
woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims
were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.

Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about
to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him.
Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and
turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).

Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The
dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer
took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).

Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:

(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.

(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.

(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.

(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.

(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.

(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and

(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2,
N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)

Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid
being killed. They were:

(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.

(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and

(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-
1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).

Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma,
Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn
January 14, 1966).

Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first
brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National
Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she
was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one
hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred
pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.

The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements
of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date,
the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a
statement.

Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who
wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might
have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. He
stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".

He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as
he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).

Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines"
who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two
persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.

When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was
trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).

According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the
scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him
to avenge himself with the scissors.

On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao,
Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple
murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after
jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).

At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio
Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the
appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.

According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the
Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his
pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected
that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.

When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a
low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of
Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions
towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women
were near them. When the train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached
Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would not
hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not
hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.

When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor
with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he
had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another
person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the
floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.

Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother.
Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in
the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.

However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He
fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the
scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of
the train.

The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:

Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and

Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity
(chest wound (Exh. 11).

and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the
midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which resulted in the
macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:

What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused travelled
long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing
their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter
and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he
could not locate in Manila.

It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite some people to
stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when
stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as
having evil intention towards them (accused).

To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their unfounded
suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control
and actuated them to run amuck.

We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the
limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through
some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking
about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial
minds, they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their
ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.

A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses
confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a
Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and
Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was
Jose. They confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3,
1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).

In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn statements
(Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and
11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who
was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was
armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was
armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which
he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the
person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing
himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11,
wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after
the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact
is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).

The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their
credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several
passengers.

Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's decision. He
argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the
supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw
one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he
knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings.

It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea.
Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render
Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is
not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt
that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their
powers of perception and recollection are not the same.

Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that
one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins.
The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who
admitted that they stabbed some persons.

On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab
wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own
admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the
CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.

Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in
order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal
knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.

On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was
lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by
the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The
injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop
their murderous rampage.

Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B.
Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs.
Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant
behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into contact with the
mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are
convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.

To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died due
to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her
name in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely,
Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple
traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities
(Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).

The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their
untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As
to three of them, the information charges that the accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that
charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by
testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins,
then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).

The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).

Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the
instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus,
U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).

The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already named precludes
the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.

The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder
based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-
3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did
not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.

The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder
qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated
by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who
were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of
execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.

The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be
regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where
"a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other".

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo
hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de las penas", is
that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el
agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 403).

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where
the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate
murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan
massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil.
607, where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham,
15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs.
Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People
vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan,
94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682;
People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex
on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.

A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted
murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of
the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.
Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the
penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ.,
concur.

Makasiar, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 That initial stabbing was described by Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio in her statement dated January 9, 1965 in this
manner (page 16 of the Record):

"4. T: May nasaksihan ba kayong hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari na naganap nang gabing iyon at kung mayroon
maaari ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita?

"S: Mayroon po. Nakaupo ako nuon sa bandang hulihan nang tren. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak nang
biglang nagkagulo. Iyong katabi kong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap kong babae sa
upuan. Nabuwal iyong kanyang sinaksak, at ako naman ay nagtatakbo na dala ko iyong dalawa kong anak.
Sumiksik kami doon sa may kubeta nang tren na nang mangyari iyon ay lumalakad. Hindi ko alam na iyong aking
kanan sintido ay nagdurugo. Nang tahimik na ay dinala kami sa ospital sa Calamba at doon ay ginamot ako roon.

"5. T: Sinabi ninyo na nang biglang magkagulo samantalang lumalakad ang tren ay iyong katabi ninyong lalaki na
may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap ninyong babae sa upuan, nakita ba ninyo kung ano ang
ipinanaksak nang lalaking ito?

"S: Hindi ko na po napansin dahil sa aking takot."

2 Mrs. Mapa's statement (Exh. E) reads:

"4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo?

S: Iyon pong lalaking mataas na payat na bisaya. Hindi ko po kilala pero kung makikita ko ay makikilala ko. Ito pong
sumaksak sa akin na ito ay dinala rin sa ospital sa Calamba, Laguna. Nauna po lamang ako at nakita kong siya ang
isinunod na may saksak din.

5. T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak sa inyong ito?

S: Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.

6. T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang buong pangyayaring inyong
nasaksihan?

S: Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak, nang walang ano-ano ay nakita ko na lamang iyong nakasaksak
sa akin na biglang tumayo sa kanyang kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap niyang sa upuan na babae na
natutulog. Itong katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay tumayo rin at nanaksak din nang nanaksak at ang lahat nang
makitang tao ay hinahabol at sinasaksak. Bata, matanda ay sinasaksak nang dalawang ito at madaanan. Nang
bigla kong tayo ay natamaan iyong aking kanang kamay nang kabig niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy ako sa kubeta sa
tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa na ang lahat ay dinala ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at ako'y ginamot
nang pangunang lunas.

7. T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong nanaksak din ay kung makita ninyong muli ay makikilala pa ninyo?

S: Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang nakasaksak sa akin."

The statement of Cipriano Reganet who was wounded (Exh. D-4), in a way corroborates Mrs. Mapa's statement.
Reganet's statement reads in part as follows (Exh. F);

"3. T: Maaari po ba ninyong masabi kung bakit kayo naririto ngayon sa PNR Hospital dito sa Caloocan City?

S: Dahil po sa mga saksak na tinamo ko nang magkaroon nang gulo sa loob nang tren kagabing humigit kumulang
sa mga alas nueve (9:00 P.M.) petcha 8 nitong Enero 1965.

4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo kung inyong nakikilala?

S: Hindi ko po alam ang pangalan pero mamumukhaan ko kung ihaharap sa akin. Ang sumaksak po sa akin ay
iyong kasama ko sa ambulancia na nagdala saamin dito sa ospital na ito.

5. T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa inyo ay iyong kasama ninyo sa ambulancia na nagdala sa inyo
sa ospital na ito?

S: Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa aking inuupuan sa loob nang tren kaya namukhaan ko siya.

6. T: Ilan beses kayong sinaksak nang taong ito?

S: Dalawang beses po.

7. T: Saan-saan panig nang katawan kayo nagtamo nang saksak?

S: Sa aking noo at sa kanang kamay nang sangahin ko ang kanyang pangalawang saksak.

8. T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?

S: Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa kanyang kaharap sa upuan at saksak nang saksak sa mga taong
kanyang makita.

9. T: Ilan ang nakita ninyong nananaksak?

S: Dalawa pong magkatabi na magkahawig ang mukha.

10. T: Nang mangyari po ba ito ay tumatakbo ang tren?

S: Tumatakbo po.
11. T: Papaano kayo nakaligtas?

S: Tumakbo po ako at kumabit sa rampa at nang medyo tahimik na balak kong magbalik sa loob nang tren. Nakita
ko na maraming sugatan at sa wari ko ay patay na. Sa mga nakita ko sa loob nang tren ay iyong sumaksak sa akin,
na nakasandal at nang makita ako ay tinanganan iyong kanyang panaksak at tinangka akong habulin. Tumakbo ako
at tumalon sa lupa. Sa pagtalon kong iyon ay napinsala ang aking kaliwang balikat.

12. T: Ano po ang ipinanaksak sa inyo?

S: Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang humigit sa isang dangkal".

Mrs. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, who was also wounded (Exh. D-3) executed a statement which reads in part as
follows (page 20, Record):

"4. T: Maaari po ba ninyong ysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang buong pangyayari?

S: Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang Bicol. Walang ano-ano ay bigla na lamang nakita ko na may
sinaksak at pagkatapos nakita ko na lahat nang makita babae o lalaki at sinaksak. Nang ako'y tumayo para
tumakbo ay nilapitan ako at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at humingi nang saklolo at nakiusap sa isang
tao na tagpan nang tualya iyong tinamo kong saksak sa kaliwang puson na tumama sa buto. Makalipas ang ilang
sandali ay dinala na ako sa ospital.

5. T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?

S: Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon nang dalhin ako sa ospital na ito.

6. T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?

S: Dalawa po sila na magkahawig ang mukha.

G.R. No. 181052 November 14, 2012

RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and
Alberto Brucales that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 17,
2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, at1irrning with modification the Decision3 dated December 23, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tabaco City, AI bay, Branch 17, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime off Homicide.

The factual antecedents follow.

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m.
of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area assigned to him. Later on, around 10:00 p.m.,
Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose
was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner
Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was taken to St. Claire Medical Clinic
at Tiwi, Albay, about four kilometers from Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo Corral
(Dr. Corral). Jose was later referred to Ziga Memorial District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was referred
to Albay Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m. He was confined therein for six (6) days. Dr.
Sancho Reduta (Dr. Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which stated the following
wounds found on Jose's body: (1) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, right; (2) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, left;
(3) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, medial aspect; and (4) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, lateral aspect. He was
also found positive for alcoholic breath, his blood level was monitored and was given I.V. (intravenous) fluids and
antibiotics. He was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr. Reduta issued Jose prescriptions and instructed
the latter to go back to the hospital after the medicines prescribed are consumed. Jose remained bedridden and
should have returned to the hospital on December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due to financial constraints. During
that time, the wounds of Jose were not yet fully healed.

Veronica brought Jose back to St. Claire Medical Clinic on January 1, 1998, because the latter was complaining of
urinary retention and pains in his left and right lumbar regions. Dr. Corral suspected that Jose had septicemia; thus,
he was given I.V. fluids, antibiotics and diuretics, and a catheter was used to relieve Jose of urinary retention. Upon
Jose's request, he was discharged on January 3, 1998. He was brought back to the same hospital on January 7,
1998 and was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as having advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus
formation and scarring. Around 10:30 a.m. on January 8, 1998, SPO1 Lerma Bataller of the Philippine National
Police-Tiwi went to the hospital to secure Jose's ante-mortem statement. Later, in the afternoon of the same day,
Jose was brought to the clinic of Dr. Marilou Compuesto upon the advice of Dr. Corral where he underwent
ultrasound scanning. It was found that Jose's kidney had acute inflammation due to infection. He was returned to St.
Claire Medical Clinic and was advised to go to Manila. However, Jose died at 10:00 p.m. of the same day.

Dr. Corral issued a Death Certificate which shows the following:

a) Immediate cause – Uremia, secondary to renal shutdown

b) Antecedent cause – Septicemia, renal inflammatory disease.

Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region V,
conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver on January 14, 1998 and issued Autopsy Report No. BRO No. 98-02,
which indicated multiple organ failure as the cause of the victim's death. Thus, petitioners were charged with the
crime of homicide. The Information reads:

That on or about the 9th day of December 1997, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, and stab JOSE BAHILLO, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds which caused his death on January 8, 1998, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 17, 1999, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well as the testimonies of Dr. Marilou Compuesto, Dr. Sancho
Reduta, Dr. Bernardo Corral, Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, SPO1 Lerma Bataller and Calixto Dacullo.

Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Through the testimonies of
petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their version of the incident is as follows:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home, they
heard Jose's whistle go off as the latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and
the latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able to
evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally with both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's
forehead. Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick which was in reality, a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Jose pulled the
bolo inside and the wooden scabbard was detached from it, thus, the blade thereof injured his left hand. Petitioner
Rodolfo kept holding the wooden scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Rodolfo, the latter parried it
with the wooden scabbard he was holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from Jose and,
thereafter, the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner Rodolfo held the bolo
with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Thereafter, Jose pushed petitioner Rodolfo causing the bolo to slip
from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it first, thus, Jose
stepped back. During that commotion, petitioner Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to
stop fighting.

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to the latter's house because he suffered a hand
injury. Petitioner Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital before he was referred to Albay Provincial
Hospital. Dr. Reduta sutured the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went back to Tabaco General
Hospital where he was operated on his left hand injury by Dr. Romano.

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with him in his house and reported the matter to the police
station of Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities.

The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense. The dispositive portion of the decision follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense in their favor, and applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of Jose Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.4

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA. However, the latter
denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification that there was no mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellants Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr.
and Alberto Brucales are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
VICTIM TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH. CONSTITUTES A DYING
DECLARATION WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 37, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT?

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE?

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB WOUNDS WERE THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH?

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR?6

The petition lacks merit.

In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.7 This rule, however, is not without
exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court which necessitates a review of such factual findings.8

Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the RTC and the CA. According to them, the RTC never
mentioned about a dying declaration which the CA discussed in its decision. They then argue that the CA erred in
ruling that the statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses Veronica Dacir right after being stabbed,
and SPO1 Lerma Bataller before he died, are dying declarations within the contemplation of the law as the victim
still lived for one month after the said dying declaration was made.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the
cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is
certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all
hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under
a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.9

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by
the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; and (4) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry.10

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not prove that the
victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order
to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the
dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of
the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.11 As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.

The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was stabbed as part
of the res gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of the res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and
make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence
in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. In sum, there
are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.12

It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors are then considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz.,
(1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the
place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the
nature and circumstances of the statement itself.13

Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made immediately after a startling
occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie. As shown in the testimony of
Veronica:

Q What time did you sleep that night?

xxxx

A I was not able to sleep that night because I already heard my husband.

Q What did you hear?

A He was shouting.

Q What was he shouting?

A He was calling my name, "Bonic."

Q How did you come to know that it was the voice of your live-in partner?

A Because upon hearing his call "Bonic," I went to the side of the road and I saw him on the road walking towards
our house.

Q More or less what time was that?

A 10:00 p.m.

Q What did you do?

A I approached him.

Q What particular place did you approach him?

A Near the store of Susan Galica.

Q What happened when you approached him?

A I asked him what happened.

Q What was the answer?

A He said that he was stabbed by Paul.

Q What else?

A: He was held by Boboy.

xxxx

Q What did you observe from Jose Bahillo your live-in partner before you brought him to the hospital?

A He was bloody and he was weak.

Q Could you tell us where did you see the blood?

A At his back and on his shorts.14

Be that as it may, the CA need have discussed in its decision the presence of a dying declaration or a statement as
part of the res gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed
to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.15 Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by
itself.16 Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.17

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.18 Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.19

Petitioners argue that the unlawful aggression that was started by the victim continued even if petitioner Rodolfo
was already in possession of the bladed weapon used in the victim's stabbing. Petitioner Alberto narrated the event
as follows:

Q: What happened?

A: Rodolfo Belbis Jr. was able to fend off or parry the blow.

Q: Then what happened again?

A: The next action of Jose Bahillo was to hold the wood horizontally and push it towards Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and
Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was able to get hold of it.

Q: Then what happened after Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was able to get hold of this stick?

A: The piece of wood was detached. The one Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was holding was the scabbard, while the one with
the sharp instrument was held by Jose Bahillo.

Q: Then what happened after this?

A: Jose Bahillo embraced Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.

Q: Then?

A: Wanting to get hold of that sharp instrument.

Q: Then what did Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. do when Jose Bahillo embraced him and tried to wrest the sharp instrument
from him?

A: While this Jose Bahillo was embracing this Rodolfo Belbis, Jr., Rodolfo Belbis. Jr. was moving his hands while
holding the sharp instrument, holding it away and thrusting it towards the back of Jose Bahillo, near the waistline at
the back.

Q: Then what happened when you saw this?

A: When Jose Bahillo was not able to get hold of that sharp instrument, this Jose Bahillo pushed the body of Rodolfo
Belbis, Jr. away from him and Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. fell down.

Q: Then what happened to the sharp instrument which Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was holding when Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. fell
down?

A: That sharp instrument got loose from his hand but it was situated just near him.

Q: Who are you referring as "him?"

A: Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.

Q: Then after this sharp instrument was loosened from the hand of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. after he fell down, would you
kindly inform this Court what happened next?

A: At that point, this Jose Bahillo again tried to get the sharp instrument but Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was faster and he got
hold of that instrument and thrust it towards Jose Bahillo.20

From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when
petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some struggle involved
between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in possession of the same
weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.21 Such an aggression can also
be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location
of the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial
aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect), that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if
the wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body. The CA is, therefore, correct in agreeing
with the observation of the RTC when it found that:

x x x The Court is not convinced on how Bahillo sustained the four stab wounds as narrated by Belbis. If it is true
1âwphi1

that Bahillo embraced him when he was able to wrest possession of the bolo, trying to get it back; that he held it
away from his reach and swung it at Bahillo's back; that he felt the blade touch the body, the nature of the wounds
inflicted would be different. It would be a laceration, slash or abrasion since it was the sharp blade that hit the back
and not the pointed end of the bolo. The location and nature of the injuries which were stab wounds clearly showed
that they were not caused by swinging thrust. They were caused by direct thrust. It was the pointed end of the bolo
that caused the injuries which hit the same spot – the lumbar area and the buttock.22

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the
attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.23 In the
present case, four stab wounds that are the product of direct thrusting of the bladed weapon are not necessary to
prevent what the petitioners claim to be the continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already
without any weapon. In connection therewith, having established that there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim when he was stabbed, petitioners cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense.

Anent the contention of petitioners that the CA failed to consider the testimony of the doctor who performed the
autopsy in its entirety, the same is without any merit. What really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies
is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."24 The autopsy report indicated that the cause of the victim's death is multiple organ failure.
According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the most serious
damage. Although he admitted that autopsy alone cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by having a long
standing infection caused by an open wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure was secondary to a long
standing infection secondary to stab wound which the victim allegedly sustained.25 What is important is that the other
doctors who attended to the wounds sustained by the victim, specially those on the left and right lumbar area,
opined that they affected the kidneys and that the wounds were deep enough to have caused trauma on both
kidneys. On that point, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment,26 is correct in stating the following:

9.3.1 Petitioners-appellants contend that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Lee for the
defense. Dr. Lee opines on cross-examination that the stab wounds sustained by Bahillo are not the cause of his
death because he lived for quite sometime and that there was no direct injury on his vital organs. There was,
however, a qualification to Dr. Lee's statement on cross-examination. He opines that he could only connect the stab
wounds with the infection and death of Bahillo if he has knowledge of the past medical records of the patient.
Petitioners-appellants' reliance of the said statement of Dr. Lee is misplaced because the doctor only examined the
cadaver of Bahillo. This explains why he has no direct knowledge of Bahillo's medical records. The opinions of the
other doctors who testified for the prosecution and who examined Bahillo while he was still alive are more
conclusive than those of Dr. Lee. They had direct knowledge of the causal relation between the stab wounds, the
kidney failure and the death of Bahillo.27

Thus, it can be concluded that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection
which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of
the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.28

As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same
does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.29 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent
of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.30Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need
to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary
surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.31 In the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident
and allegedly surrendered the bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary
surrender within the contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered
after a warrant of their arrest had already been issued.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
and Alberto Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 17,
2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the Decision dated December 23, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the: conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1299 dated August 28, 2012.

1
Rollo, pp. 10-86.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente
S.E. Veloso concurring.

3
Penned by Judge Virginia G. Almonte; records, pp. 392-414.

4
Records, p. 414.

5
Rollo, p. 81.

6
Id. at 11-12.

7
People v. Narca, 341 Phil. 696, 713-714 (1997).

8
Co v. Court of Appeals, August 11, 1995, 247 SCRA 195, 200.

9
People v. Cerilla, G.R. No. 177147, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 251, 261-262, citing R.J. Francisco, Evidence
Rules 128-134, 3rd ed., 1996, p. 257.

People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 67690-91, January 21, 1992, 205 SCRA 213, 220-221; People v. Israel, G.R. No.
10

97027, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 155, 161-162; People v. Apa-ap, Jr., G.R. No. 110993, August 17, 1994, 235
SCRA 468, 473; People v. Pama, G.R. Nos. 90297-98, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 385, 403.
 People v. Cerilla, supra note 6, at 263, citing People v. Almeda, 209 Phil. 393, 398 (1983); See also People v.
11

Devaras, 147 Phil. 664, 673 (1971).

People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70, 79; See also People v. Taneo, G.R. No.
12

87236, February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 494, 506; Anciro v. People, G.R. No. 107819, December 17, 1993, 228 SCRA
629, 642.

13
Francisco 315-317.

14
TSN, April 25, 2001, pp. 6-10.

15
People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 634; 468 Phil. 784, 800 (2004).

16
Marzonia v. People, G.R No. 153794, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 627, 634.

17
People v. Tagana, supra note 15.

People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 650, 657; 403 Phil. 598, 606 (2001); People v.
18

Plazo, G.R. No. 120547, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 433, 442-443; Roca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114917,
January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 414, 422.

19
People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 126145, April 30, 2001, 357 SCRA 447, 457; 409 Phil. 515, 528 (2001).

20
TSN, February 19, 2004, pp. 9-12.

21
People v. Vicente, 452 Phil. 986, 998 (2003).

22
Rollo, p. 74. (Emphasis supplied)

23
See People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580, 598 (2003).

People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 270, 279, citing Calimutan v. People, 517
24

Phil. 272, 284 (2006).

25
Rollo, p. 78.

26
Id. at 94-111.

27
Id. at 106. (Italics supplied)

28
People v. Cutura, G.R. No. L-12702, March 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 663.

De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 6, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 515, citing People v. Oco, 458 Phil. 815, 851
29

(2003).

Id., citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 616, 637; Mendoza v. People, G.R. No.
30

173551, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 668, 697-698.

31
Id. at 515-516, citing People v. Garcia, supra, at 637-638.

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver,
Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman
named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning,
while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to
zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to
the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who
said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a
wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on
the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and
that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified
that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim
in the complaint.

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For
purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial
court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence
to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point
where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of
about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to
leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious,
was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance,
and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as
the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We
also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs'
attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited
by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old,
and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow
his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones,
as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not
have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of
their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the
complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several
witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was
negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed
is from hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 117954 April 27, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.

On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of murder.

On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with the crime of murder,
allegedly committed as follows:

On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador; Misamis Oriental, which is within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one Orlando1Manabat who
was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus, hitting and wounding the latter on the right
leg or thigh, which caused his death the following day.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.2

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.3 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by the prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO
ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and is
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the
jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.4

The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar
Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to head for home instead. They
went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and
waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved
dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis
man kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back "Noano man
diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by
sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did
not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando
was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando
needed blood transfusion and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Hospital in the same city.

Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the victim's blood
pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on
the victim when the latter's blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent
surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's
death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or
briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal circumstances, the wound would
not necessarily cause death but in this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was
fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front portion of the right
knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds.5

The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant Orlando Acuram, a
policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among
the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one
among its passengers who was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective
July 1, 1991, upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.6 Appellant was later surrendered
by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge
Evelyn Nery.7 On motion by the prosecution and without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended
appellant from the service and ordered his detention at the provincial jail.8

During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that time but
denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting at the
front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the
rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver. 9

The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant
readily filed his notice of appeal. 10 In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
 I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR
ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED,
AND THE ALLEGED WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. 11

We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence for
the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.

To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find that his behavior
proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting happened.
Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and
he should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way. 12 That a policeman could
display such indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he reported
for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding officer restricted within the
camp pending investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had
received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer will hold
back from any of his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the
police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.

Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view,
is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself
up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 13 In this case, it was appellant's
commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay
within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary
surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in appellant's favor.

On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
1âwphi 1

concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate
the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. 14 In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment.
As observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of the
jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed. 15 Treachery
cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than
from a deliberate act of the will. 16

Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he
was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses
did not positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 17It
is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must
concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 18Circumstantial evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct
evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of
reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred. 19 No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is
required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed the crime. 20

As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete with details, duly
proven by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain the guilt of
appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and, during the
incident, was a member of the Philippine National Police. He was skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was
issued a firearm (armalite rifle) by his command, which he was then carrying with him before, during and after the
incident; (3) At the particular date, time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly issued armalite rifle
inside the jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of
the jeepney where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. (5) There were no other
persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered
at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7) The appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present
himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest. 21

The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable conclusion that
appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on appellant's part
to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and
completely unexpected shooting of the victim. 22 Here, circumstantial evidence suffices.

Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from
convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person
did not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if
he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter. 23

Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack of prompt and proper
medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim constitutes an
efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the
least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were
negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the
Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying bandage on the injured leg to
prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao
Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's
blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was
cut, thereby causing massive loss of blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died
hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving
medical treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant
and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of
the death of the deceased is the shooting by the appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible
for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact
that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The
rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just
consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their
acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death. 24

To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime committed is only homicide,
not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion
temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown after a review
of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges from a
minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Further applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor as a minimum
to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to
12 years. The span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.

WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal
Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years and
10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided
by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Corrected by witness as "Rolando" Manabat, TSN, January 13, 1992, p. 14.

2
Rollo, p. 9.

3
Records, pp. 29-30.

4
Rollo, p. 56.

5
TSN, March 4, 1992, pp. 4-15.

6
Records, p. 13.

7
TSN, December 29, 1992, p. 30; Records, p. 15.

8
Records, p. 52.

9
TSN, December 29, 1992, pp. 5-24.

10
Rollo, p. 57.

11
Rollo, p. 87.

12
TSN, December 29, 1992, pp. 13-14.

13
People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 572-573 (1998).

14
People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360, 382 (1998).

15
Rollo, p. 95.

16
People vs. Navarro, 295 SCRA 139, 146 (1998).

17
People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, p. 21.

18
Sec. 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
19
R.J. Francisco. Basic Evidence, p. 190 (1991).

20
People vs. Mangat, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999, pp. 7-8.

21
Rollo, pp. 43-44.

22
People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289, 300 (1994).

23
People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158, 177 (1998).

24
R. and C. Aquino. I The Revised Penal Code 74, 76-77, 84 (1997).

G.R. No. L-5070 December 29, 1952

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO PETILLA, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellant.
Arsenio A. Andaya for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon dated August 8, 1951, sustaining the motion
to quash interposed by the accused in criminal case No. 10758 and dismissing the case with costs de oficio and the
cancellation of the bond filed by him for his provisional release.

On August 31, 1949, an information charging Pedro Petilla with the crime of slight physical injuries was filed in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon province. Upon petition of both parties, this case was heard by the
Justice of the Peace jointly with another for frustrated homicide filed against the same accused. During the hearing,
the Justice of the Peace found that the injuries suffered by the offended party would require more than thirty (30)
days to heal and so, believing that the case was beyond his jurisdiction, he forwarded said case, together with that
of frustrated homicide, to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings. On December 17, 1949, the provincial
fiscal amended the information charging the accused with serious physical injuries and praying that the justice of the
peace be ordered to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation (criminal case No. 10620). This petition
was favorably acted upon. The accused having waived his right to preliminary investigation, the case was returned
to the Court of First Instance where on February 22, 1950, the accused filed a motion to quash alleging, among
other grounds, that if the case be continued he would be placed in jeopardy. On February 28, 1950, the court
granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case with costs de oficio.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the provincial fiscal, on March 22, 1950, moved that the case be
returned to the Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca for trial on the merits on the original information contending
that said Justice of the Peace committed a mistake in failing to act upon the erroneous belief that he had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. This motion was favorably acted upon and the record of the case was sent
back to the Justice of the Peace. On June 17, 1950, however, the provincial fiscal asked for the provisional
dismissal of the case alleging that on that same date he was filing in the Court of First Instance an information for
serious physical injuries, and accordingly the Justice of the Peace dismissed the case provisionally and forwarded
the record to the Court of First Instance.

On June 17, 1950, as above stated, a new case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Quezon with the filing
of a new information for serious physical injuries (criminal case No. 10758). On July 7, 1950, the case was sent to
the Justice of the Peace for preliminary investigation. After this was held the record was forwarded to the Court of
First Instance, and on July 6, 1951, the accused again filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
1. That the above-entitled case has already been quashed by this Honorable Court in its order dated February 28,
1950 (Annex A);

2. That if the prosecution has not been satisfied with the order of the Court of 28 February 1950, he should have
appealed from said order within the time allowed by law;

3. That the prosecution has exceeded and gravely abused its discretion in reviving once again a case that has
already been quashed by the Court thereby initiating and encouraging what the court abhors, that of multiplicity of
suits and endless litigations; and

4. That it is submitted that "rulings and orders of this Honorable Court must at least be binding upon itself, (Page 36,
criminal case record No. 10758.) lawphil.net

On August 8, 1951, the court sustained the motion and dismissed the case holding in part as follows:

It is the opinion of the court that the order of February 28,1950, has become final and executory. If the prosecution
in criminal case No. 10620 believed that this court had committed an error in ordering that the information in said
case be quashed, with costs de oficio, it should have appealed from said order within the period prescribed by the
Rules of Court. Not having done so, this court now is absolutely powerless to disregard said final order and proceed
with this criminal case No. 10758 for the same crime which is charged in criminal case No. 10620. There is res
adjudicata. (Page 48, criminal case record No. 10758.)

The case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General.

This case is unfortunate in view of a series of mistakes committed by the officials who intervened in its prosecution.
The first error committed refers to the order of dismissal entered by the lower court on February 28, 1950, wherein
the court quashed the case on the ground that the filing of the amended information charging the accused with
serious physical injuries constituted double jeopardy which barred the Government from prosecuting it. This is a
mistake. The charge contained in the original information was for the slight physical injuries because at that time the
fiscal believed that the wound suffered by the offended party would require medical attendance only for a period of
eight days, but when the preliminary investigation was conducted the Justice of the Peace found that the wound
would not heal until a period of thirty days, and so he forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance for further
action. It, therefore, appears that the act which converted the crime into a more serious one had supervened after
the filing of the original information. And this supervening event can still be the subject of amendment or of a new
charge without necessarily placing the accused in double jeopardy, as held by this court in the recent case
of People vs. Manolong * G.R. No. L-2288. Said the court:

The Constitution enjoins that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy or punished for the same offense." (Art. III,
section 120.) In an attempt to implement this constitutional mandate, the Rules of Court (Rule 113, section 9) make
conviction or acquittal of the accused a bar to his subsequent prosecution, not only for the same offense, but also
"for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information." In the present case there is no question that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the
last information necessarily includes the lesser offense charged in the first complaint and of which the accused was
convicted in the justice of the peace court, and there should likewise be no question that, were we to follow the
doctrine laid down by this court in People vs. Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488, and reiterated in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off.
Gaz., 268 we would have no alternative but to dismiss the present appeal. However, this court in its recent decision
in the case of Melo vs. People, et al., 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, has already repealed the doctrine laid down in the Tarok
case as contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy as intended by the Constitution and the Rules of Court and
"obnoxious to the administration of justice," and has reverted to the rule that "where after the first prosecution a new
fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together
with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur. 66), the accused cannot be
said in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." That rule applies to the present case where, after the first
prosecution for a lesser crime, new facts have supervened which together with those already in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, have made the offense graver and the penalty first imposed legally inadequate.

But the mistake which in the opinion of the court has thwarted the chance of the prosecution is the failure of the
provincial fiscal to appeal from the order of the lower court of February 28, 1950. Had he done so the error
committed would have been remedied. Instead, he asked for the return of the case to the Justice of the Peace Court
for trial on the merits under the original information. Such a step was of no useful purpose, a fact which he later
realized when he filed a motion for provisional dismissal. Another mistake he committed was to file a new
information for the same offense (criminal case No. 10758) which was properly dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. It is true that the order of February 28, 1950, was erroneously entered for reasons which perhaps might be
ascribed to the conflicting decisions that had been rendered regarding the application of the principle of double
jeopardy, but the failure of the fiscal was unfortunate as it rendered said order final and executory. Whether rightly or
wrongly said order stands and cannot now be set aside or rendered ineffective. That order is binding upon the
parties. That order has the effect of res judicata upon the Government.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* 85 Phil., 829.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill
you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and
to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had
it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as
these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention
to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he
thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court
convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt
to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in
the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was
lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way;
and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit
the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as
to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous
acts not within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted
Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires
the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community
suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite
apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim
was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the
Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code.
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases
generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was
indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the
warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and
the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not
contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it
said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such
time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability.
He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not
as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be
held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction
between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of
the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will
be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted
Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 People vs. Intod, C.A-G.R. No. 09205, August 14, 1991; Justice Fidel P. Purisima, Ponente: Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya, concurring.

2 TSN, p. 4, July 24, 1986.

3 Records, p. 65.

4 Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 15 (4th ed., 1946).

5 Albert, Ibid.

6 Albert, Ibid.

7 Albert, Ibid.

8 Albert, Ibid.

9 Grogorio and Feria, Comments on the Revised Penal Code 76 (Vol. I, 1st ed. 1958).
10 Reyes, The revised Penal Code, 90 (Vol. I, 11th ed., 1977).

11 Reyes, Ibid.

12 Reyes, Ibid.

13 U.S. vs. Berrigan, 482 F. 2nd. 171 (1973).

14 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.

15 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, (Vol. I, 1987).

16 U.S. vs. Berrigan, supra, p. 13.

17 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.

18 21 L.R.A. 626 (1898).

19 21 L.R.A. N.S. 898 (1908).

20 17 S.W. 145 (1888).

21 71 S.W. 175 (1902).

22 U.S. vs. HENG AWKAK ROMAN, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 874 (1974).

23 565 F. Supp. 1416 (1983).

24 Supra, n. 13.

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being
then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO,
and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No.
0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to
the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro
(BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for
Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of
July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable
to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account
had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to
inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained
that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they
could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally
into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner
a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino
further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account,
but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the
first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without
even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the
check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted
with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that
she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's
place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again
on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.
Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go
with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia
who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep
and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the
cash she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the
palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked
money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as
Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that
she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the
company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she
was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner
was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the
former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why
Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very
surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was
never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997,
Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of
Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did
not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they
arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?"
Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita
Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20)
DAYS, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of
which reads, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.

(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale
Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution
of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified
theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal
property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check
payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check
belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to
the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact
that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company;
(5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things – the
check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company;
and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of
payments from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property
subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen.This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently
without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft
was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to
kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no
harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court,
he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation
to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent
portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims
sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the
execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was
by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to
500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the
intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this
wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed
is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

xxxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is
empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case,
petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check
was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. 1avv phi 1

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the
definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the
language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the
latter’s consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony
in its consummated stage. x x x 13

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the
check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not
been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as
supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched
only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most,
the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the
due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December
16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of
an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Jose C.
Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 70-77.

2 Id. at 86.

3 Records, p. 107.

4 TSN, February 11, 1998, p. 8.

5 Id. at 14.

6 TSN, February 11, 1998, pp. 9-10.

7 Rollo, p. 51.

8 Id. at 128.

9 G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52.

10 Supra.

11 Id. at 57-58.

12 G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 306, 324 .

13 Id. at 327, 343-345.

G.R. No. L-45966 November 10, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MARIANO y ALEJANDRO alias Negro, defendant-appellant.

Cesar C. Cruz for appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. and Solicitor Celia Lipana-
Reyes for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, 6th Judicial District, Manila in Criminal Case
No. CCC-VI-2466 entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Mario Mariano y Alejandro" convicting the accused of
the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of the latter and the sum of P8,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs. 1
The accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in the following:

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses MARIO MARIANO Y ALEJANDRO alias Negro of the crime of Rape with Homicide,
committed as follows:

That on or about November 11, 1976, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there pinning down
one LUNINGNING MAPOLA Y DIWATA, a minor, six years of age, putting his left hand on her mouth and holding
her left arm with his right hand and her lower extremities with his body, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
her and as a result thereof she suffered traumatic laceration of the vagina as well as traumatic injuries on the head
causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her
death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

(SGD) ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO Assistant Fiscal 2

Upon being arraigned on November 19, 1976, and after the information was translated to Tagalog, the accused,
assisted by his counsel de oficio, manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty to the offense charged. Despite the
warning of the trial judge that the imposable penalty is death, the accused spontaneously entered a plea of guilty.

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and in order to determine the nature of the crime and precise
culpability of the accused, the trial court set the case for hearing on November 25, 1976 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. On said date the accused was assisted by his counsel de parte, Atty. Narciso Santiago. The prosecution
presented as witnesses Juanita Mapola, adopting mother of the victim, Rebecca Molina, Santiago Vargas, a
patrolman, WPD, MPF and Luis Larion medico-legal officer, WPD, MPF.

Juanita Mapola declared that the victim, Luningning Mapola who was her 6-year old adopted child in fact, was
missing on Thursday, November 11, 1976; and that she looked for Luningning and through the information of a
small boy, Juanita found Luningning on the following day at 3:00 o' clock in the afternoon in an uninhabited house in
Fernandez Street, Tondo, Manila, already dead with the dress rolled up to her abdomen, without panty, and her
eyes swollen with blood having oozed from the left eye.

Rebecca Molina, a 13-year old student, testified that on November 11, 1976 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while she was walking at the corner of Fernandez and Laong Nasa Streets, the accused, Mario Mariano, whistled at
her, and she ran away.

Santiago Vargas, a patrolman, testified on his investigation of the case in the process of which, the accused gave
his written confession voluntarily (Exhibit "B") and re-enacted the commission of the crime (Exhibits "E ","E-1" and
"E-2").

Luis Larion medico legal officer, declared on his autopsy of the victim (Exhibits "G" to "J").

The accused, Mario Mariano, declared that he was born on May 29, 1956 as shown by his birth certificate (Exhibit
"1") and that he did not intend to kill the victim.

On December 13, 1976, the trial court, entertaining doubt on the application of Article 189 in relation to Article 192 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, at its own instance, re-opened the case and set it for trial on December 17, 1976 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning for the reception of additional evidence to determine whether the accused is legally
married or not, this fact being material in the application of Presidential Decree No. 603.

The trial on December 17, 1976 was reset to December 29, 1976 and then to January 18, 1977 and finally to
January 25, 1977. On this last date, the prosecution presented the marriage contract of the accused showing that he
was married on March 11, 1975 (Exhibits "L" and "L-1"). The accused also presented as additional witnesses
Angelo Singian, Medico Legal Section, WPD, MPF who declared that the death of the victim, luningning, was due to
the laceration of the vagina caused by a stiffened male organ or by the insertion of a hard blunt object t out of
proportion to the size of the vagina and that the traumatic head injury was only contributory to the cause of death.

Cesar Villanueva declared that on November 11, 197 6 at. 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he saw the accused
walking unsteadily and when the witness asked the accused why, the latter answered that he took something but
without saying what it was.

The trial court concluded from the evidence that the accused really committed the offense charged.

The contention of the counsel de oficio of the accused-appellant that the trial court erred in improvidently accepting
the plea of guilty of defendant-appellant without inquiring into the causes which brought about the same, or whether
the defendant-appellant fully understood the serious charge and the necessary implications of his plea to a capital
offense, in not taking the proper precautions directed in the decisions of the Supreme Court and dictated by
prudence under the circumstances, and, thereafter, convicting the defendant-appellant to suffer the penalty of death
has no merit.

That the defendant-appellant was fully apprised of the charge against him and the consequences of his plea of guilt
is clearly shown by the following dialogue between the accused and the lower court:

COURT:

Your lawyer here has manifested your desire to enter a plea not guilty to the crime charged, rape with homicide, do
you agree to that manifestation of your lawyer?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you know that by agreeing to that manifestation you are admitting the commission of the crime charged, rape
with homicide?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And for which reason this court will sentence you to imprisonment probably up to life or death, the maximum
penalty provided by law?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And notwithstanding what is explained to you, you still insist in your desire to enter a plea of guilty to the offense
charged?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Notwithstanding again the warning of the court that the maximum penalty imposable is death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Arraign the accused.

(T.S.N., pp. 2 and 3, Nov. 19, 1976).

and, again, the dialogue between him and the court after he entered a plea of guilty:

COURT:

Do you understand the information read to you in the vernacular?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Where did this happen?

A In Laong-Nasa, Your Honor.

Q Where is that?

A 2206 Mr. Dizon St., Tondo, Manila, Your Honor.

Q In whose house did this happen?

A I do not know who is the owner of the house, sir.

Q Do you know this child?

A I do not know her, Your Honor.

Q How did you happen to be in that house?

A I was there to fly my kite, sir.

Q What time did this incident happen?

A Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., sir.

Q In the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q In what part of the house?

A Inside a room, your Honor.

Q Did you really have access with the child?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And why did you have to kill yet the child?

A It was by accident, Your Honor.

Q How?

A She was struggling, Your Honor.

Q And in the course of the struggle why will she die as she was

A Her head hit the pavement, Your Honor.

Q What prompted you to rape the child?

A I was not in my right sense. Your Honor, I am an addict.

(T.S.N., pp. 3 and 4, Nov. 19, 1976). 3

The lower court took pains in explaining to the accused the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as
shown by the following dialogue between the accused and the lower court at the trial on November 25, 1976:

COURT:

The last time you were called for arraignment on November 19, 1976 you entered a plea of guilty to the offense
charged, rape with homicide, but no decision was rendered against you in order to give you a chance to maturely
reflect on the consequence of your plea. Now, have you maturely reflected on the consequence of your plea of
guilty?

ACCUSED:

I am still pleading guilty, your Honor.

ATTY. SORIANO:

Your Honor, please, Atty. Narciso Santiago, I understand is going to appear as de parte counsel of the accused.

ATTY. SORIANO:

May I respectfully enter my appearance as counsel de parte for the accused, Your Honor.

COURT:

ORDER

It appearing that accused has already a counsel de parte in person of Atty. Narciso Santiago, Atty. Manuel Soriano,
Jr., is hereby discharged as counsel de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Open Court, Manila, November 15, 1976.

Q What do you say Atty. Santiago about the statement of the court to the accused, were you aware?

ATTY. SORIANO:

Yes, Your Honor, I was aware that he pleaded guilty in the arraignment and he is still insisting with his plea of guilty.

COURT:

As a matter of fact, did you interview him?

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

What did he tell you?

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

He is still pleading guilty, Your Honor.

COURT:

Is it true that Atty. Santiago manifested here that you insist in your plea of guilty?

ACCUSED:

Yes, Your Honor.

(T.S.N., pp. 2-3, Nov. 25, 1976). 4

It will be noted from the above-quoted portions of the transcript that the trial court used simple words which could
have been easily understood by the accused who said that he finished Grade 6 at Princess Urduja School at Solis,
Tondo, Manila (Exhibit "B"). Moreover, the record shows that the information was read to him in Tagalog. In spite of
the efforts of the trial judge to explain the nature of the charges against the accused and the effect of his plea of
guilty, the accused then assisted by his counsel of choice, Atty. Narciso Santiago, reiterated his plea of guilty to the
crime charged. It cannot be said, therefore, that the accused-appellant was sentenced to death on an improvident
plea.

When the accused-appellant was represented by his counsel of choice, he could have withdrawn his plea of guilty
entered by him when he was first arraigned then assisted by counsel de oficio.

The accused was given all the time and opportunity to withdraw his plea. The contention that when the case was
called on November 25, 1976 his fate was already sealed has no merit.

The testimony of the accused that he was prompted to rape the victim because he was not in his right senses
inasmuch as he was an addict is no defense at all. Drug addiction is punishable by law. Nobody should profit
therefrom.

It is to be noted that independent of the plea of guilty of the accused, there is sufficient evidence to convict the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "B") the regularity of
which was never assailed. The extra-judicial confession shows that he gave coherent answer to the questions
propounded to him. Moreover, the accused re-enacted the commission of the crime. He could not have recalled the
events that transpired if he was not in his right senses when he committed the crime.

There is no question that the death of the victim was brought about by the rape committed by the accused-appellant.
That he did not intend to kin her was of no moment. A person who performs a criminal act is responsible for all the
consequences of said act regardless of his intention. 5 The testimonies of Dr. Luis Larion a prosecution witness, and
Dr. Angelo Singian, a defense witness, established beyond doubt that the death of the victim was due to profused
hemorrhage brought about by the laceration of the vagina caused by a stiffened male organ or by the insertion of a
hard blunt object. (p. 19, tsn, Nov. 25, 1976; p. 6, tsn, Jan. 25, 1977). The extrajudicial confession of the accused is
fully corroborated by proof of corpus delicti. Hence, said extra-judicial confession is sufficient to support conviction.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and the accused-appellant is sentenced to death and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) for the death of the
latter, and the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J., concurs in the result.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Teehankee, J, concurs in the separate opinion of Justice Makasiar.

 Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

Appellant's case (the case of a pedophiliac) is covered by the last paragraph of article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code which imposes the death penalty when by reason of the rape, a homicide is committed. Death, as a single
indivisible penalty, is applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances which may have attended
the commission of the deed (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).

Presidential Decree No. 1179, which took effect on August 15, 1977 and which amended article 189 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code by providing that the youthful offender should be below eighteen years of age (instead of
twenty-one years, as originally prescribed) may be applied retroactively to the appellant who is now over twenty-one
years old (he was twenty years and 163 days old when the crime was committed on November 11, 1976).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Two mitigating circumstances should at least be considered to warrant a commutation of the sentence by the Chief
Executive. Lack of intent to commit as grave a wrong as that committed and illness of the offender which diminishes
the exercise of will power without depriving him of consciousness of his act or at least a circumstance of similar or
analogous nature (Pars. 3, 9 and 10, Art. 13, RPC).

The accused, when the crime was committed, was about 20 years, 5 months and 13 days old. His statement, after
pleading guilty, in answer to the question of the trial Court, that the 6 year old victim died by accident as she hit her
head on the pavement while struggling and that he was not in his right senses because he is an addict, is not
disputed nor contradicted by any evidence. It is therefore apparent that he did not intend to kill the girl but merely
wanted to ravish her and that he was under the influence of drugs which impaired his will power. This is further
corroborated by the fact that he was newly married and therefore to a wife presumably as young as, if not younger
than, himself. In his normal state, uninfluenced by any drug, his sexual desires could have been easily satisfied by
his own wife. But the drug that he imbibed that early afternoon must have so excited his sex impulses now rendered
so uncontrollable, that he had to gratify the same with any female that crossed his path. As a matter of fact, one
witness Enrica Molina, a 13-year old student, testified that at two o'clock that afternoon, the accused whistled at her
causing her to run away. It was most unfortunate that the 6-year old victim happened to pass his way about three
o'clock that same afternoon near an uninhabited house where he sexually assaulted her.

Our own criminal law jurisprudence recognizes that a drug, like opium, is "pernicious and dangerous to a degree in
its effect, mental moral and physical, upon the individual addicted thereto ... Its usual concomitants are
imbecility,pauperism and crime (U.S. vs. Tan Tayco, 12 Phil. 739; underscoring supplied). Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the Court, reaffirmed that opium or any other drug is dangerous, because "the weak and unwary,
unless prevented, may use it to their physical and mental ruin. ... Indulgence in this unwholesome, disgusting and
degrading habit generates diseases, pauperism and crime. The usual concomitants are (generation neglect of
appearance, of family and of duty, abject poverty and criminal propensities" (US vs. Delgado, 41 372, 376, citing US
vs. Lim Sing, 23 Phil. 42-4 and American cases; US vs. Tan Tayco, supra, emphasis supplied).

American jurisprudence regards criminal responsibility where an act is committed under the influence of drugs the
same as when it is committed under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In some cases, it may lead to acquittal, akin
to the exempting circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under paragraph 5 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code.

What little authority has been found indicates that the rules as to criminal responsibility where an act is committed
under the influence of drugs are the same as when it is committed under the influence of intoxicating liquor (People
vs. Samaniego, 118 Cal. App. 165, 4 P2d 809, reh den 118 Cal App 174, 5 P2d 653 [statute dealing with effect of
voluntary intoxication includes all forms of voluntary intoxication, not just those caused by alcohol]; De Berry v.
Commonwealth [K] 289 SW2d 495, cert den 352 US 881, 1L ed 2d 81, 77 S Ct. 105; State vs. White, 27 NJ 158,
142 A2d 65; Couch v. State [Okla Crim.] 375 ]P2d 978). Thus, the voluntary non-medicinal use of narcotics is no
defense to a crime committed under their influence (State vs. White, Couch vs. State; State vs. Blassingame, 221
SC 169; 69 SE2d 601). although it may lead to acquittal where it excludes the required specific intent (State vs.
White 27 NJ 158, 142 A2d 65). [emphasis supplied].

Involuntary narcosis, however, like involuntary alcoholic intoxication, may negative criminal responsibility (State vs.
Rippy, 104 NC 752, 10 SE 259, holding to be, a complete defense that a crime was committed in a frenzy produced
by an overdose of morphine administered as medicine). Intoxication resulting from drugs medically administered is
considered as involuntary (Saidiveri vs. State, 217 Md 412, 143 A2d 70; State vs. Rippy, 104 NC 752, 10 SE 259).
Apparently it may be so considered even where the drug was self-administered (where a defendant took intoxicating
pills to ward off an attack of epilepsy, it was a question for the jury whether this was sufficient to render his
intoxication involuntary. People vs. Baker, 42 Cal 2d 550, 268, P2d 705). And although the rule seems to be the
other way in the case of chronic alcoholism, it has been held that a person who has become addicted to a narcotic
and is unable to resist the craving for it cannot be said to act voluntarily in its continued use (Prather vs.
Commonwealth, 215 Ky 714, 287 SW 559). [21 Am Jur 2d 188-189; emphasis supplied].

This young man can still be rehabilitated and ultimately rescued from his present addiction. While it is true that
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty for rape with homicide is mandatory,
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances, the unusual or abnormal predicament of the accused herein
justifies the interposition of the executive benign prerogative of mercy to commute the sentence from death to life
imprisonment, which I strongly recommend. The fault does not lie entirely with the accused as he is a victim of his
own poverty as well as the failure of the government to completely eliminate all drug pushers and peddlers and to
effectively control the smuggling and marketing of narcotics or prohibited drugs.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

Appellant's case (the case of a pedophiliac) is covered by the last paragraph of article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code which imposes the death penalty when by reason of the rape, a homicide is committed. Death, as a single
indivisible penalty, is applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances which may have attended
the commission of the deed (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).

Presidential Decree No. 1179, which took effect on August 15, 1977 and which amended article 189 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code by providing that the youthful offender should be below eighteen years of age (instead of
twenty-one years, as originally prescribed) may be applied retroactively to the appellant who is now over twenty-one
years old (he was twenty years and 163 days old when the crime was committed on November 11, 1976).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Two mitigating circumstances should at least be considered to warrant a commutation of the sentence by the Chief
Executive. Lack of intent to commit as grave a wrong as that committed and illness of the offender which diminishes
the exercise of will power without depriving him of consciousness of his act or at least a circumstance of similar or
analogous nature (Pars. 3, 9 and 10, Art. 13, RPC).

The accused, when the crime was committed, was about 20 years, 5 months and 13 days old. His statement, after
pleading guilty, in answer to the question of the trial Court, that the 6 year old victim died by accident as she hit her
head on the pavement while struggling and that he was not in his right senses because he is an addict, is not
disputed nor contradicted by any evidence. It is therefore apparent that he did not intend to kill the girl but merely
wanted to ravish her and that he was under the influence of drugs which impaired his will power. This is further
corroborated by the fact that he was newly married and therefore to a wife presumably as young as, if not younger
than, himself. In his normal state, uninfluenced by any drug, his sexual desires could have been easily satisfied by
his own wife. But the drug that he imbibed that early afternoon must have so excited his sex impulses now rendered
so uncontrollable, that he had to gratify the same with any female that crossed his path. As a matter of fact, one
witness Enrica Molina, a 13-year old student, testified that at two o'clock that afternoon, the accused whistled at her
causing her to run away. It was most unfortunate that the 6-year old victim happened to pass his way about three
o'clock that same afternoon near an uninhabited house where he sexually assaulted her.

Our own criminal law jurisprudence recognizes that a drug, like opium, is "pernicious and dangerous to a degree in
its effect, mental moral and physical, upon the individual addicted thereto ... Its usual concomitants are
imbecility,pauperism and crime (U.S. vs. Tan Tayco, 12 Phil. 739; underscoring supplied). Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the Court, reaffirmed that opium or any other drug is dangerous, because "the weak and unwary,
unless prevented, may use it to their physical and mental ruin. ... Indulgence in this unwholesome, disgusting and
degrading habit generates diseases, pauperism and crime. The usual concomitants are (generation neglect of
appearance, of family and of duty, abject poverty and criminal propensities" (US vs. Delgado, 41 372, 376, citing US
vs. Lim Sing, 23 Phil. 42-4 and American cases; US vs. Tan Tayco, supra, emphasis supplied).

American jurisprudence regards criminal responsibility where an act is committed under the influence of drugs the
same as when it is committed under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In some cases, it may lead to acquittal, akin
to the exempting circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under paragraph 5 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code.

What little authority has been found indicates that the rules as to criminal responsibility where an act is committed
under the influence of drugs are the same as when it is committed under the influence of intoxicating liquor (People
vs. Samaniego, 118 Cal. App. 165, 4 P2d 809, reh den 118 Cal App 174, 5 P2d 653 [statute dealing with effect of
voluntary intoxication includes all forms of voluntary intoxication, not just those caused by alcohol]; De Berry v.
Commonwealth [K] 289 SW2d 495, cert den 352 US 881, 1L ed 2d 81, 77 S Ct. 105; State vs. White, 27 NJ 158,
142 A2d 65; Couch v. State [Okla Crim.] 375 ]P2d 978). Thus, the voluntary non-medicinal use of narcotics is no
defense to a crime committed under their influence (State vs. White, Couch vs. State; State vs. Blassingame, 221
SC 169; 69 SE2d 601). although it may lead to acquittal where it excludes the required specific intent (State vs.
White 27 NJ 158, 142 A2d 65). [emphasis supplied].

Involuntary narcosis, however, like involuntary alcoholic intoxication, may negative criminal responsibility (State vs.
Rippy, 104 NC 752, 10 SE 259, holding to be, a complete defense that a crime was committed in a frenzy produced
by an overdose of morphine administered as medicine). Intoxication resulting from drugs medically administered is
considered as involuntary (Saidiveri vs. State, 217 Md 412, 143 A2d 70; State vs. Rippy, 104 NC 752, 10 SE 259).
Apparently it may be so considered even where the drug was self-administered (where a defendant took intoxicating
pills to ward off an attack of epilepsy, it was a question for the jury whether this was sufficient to render his
intoxication involuntary. People vs. Baker, 42 Cal 2d 550, 268, P2d 705). And although the rule seems to be the
other way in the case of chronic alcoholism, it has been held that a person who has become addicted to a narcotic
and is unable to resist the craving for it cannot be said to act voluntarily in its continued use (Prather vs.
Commonwealth, 215 Ky 714, 287 SW 559). [21 Am Jur 2d 188-189; emphasis supplied].

This young man can still be rehabilitated and ultimately rescued from his present addiction. While it is true that
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty for rape with homicide is mandatory,
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances, the unusual or abnormal predicament of the accused herein
justifies the interposition of the executive benign prerogative of mercy to commute the sentence from death to life
imprisonment, which I strongly recommend. The fault does not lie entirely with the accused as he is a victim of his
own poverty as well as the failure of the government to completely eliminate all drug pushers and peddlers and to
effectively control the smuggling and marketing of narcotics or prohibited drugs.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 4-13.

2 Rollo, p. 2.

3 Brief for the Appellee, pp. 6-8, Rollo, p. 73.

4 Brief for the Appellee, pp. 8-10, Rollo, p. 73.

5 People vs. Renegade, 57 SCRA 275.

G.R. No. 124670 June 21, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.

Before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, Patrolman Domingo Belbes stood charge of Murder.
The information against him reads:

The on or about the 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, inside the campus of Pili
National High School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery, taking advantage of nighttime,
employing means to insure or afford impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, feloniously, suddenly unexpectedly and without any warning, attack, fire and shoot successively
with an armalite rifle (M-16) FERNANDO B. BATALLER while the latter was intoxicated, thereby hitting and inflicting
upon him multiple serious and mortal wounds on his head, at the right lower face, the chest (front) at the left antero
lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, at the left lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver,
hitting the stomach portions of the large and small intestines and lower vertebrae, and the chest (back) at the middle
back and another at the left back, lateral level of the lower rib, which caused Fernando B. Bataller's direct and
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. 1âwphi1.nêt

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.1

When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.

The facts established during trial by the prosecution is summarized by the appellee in its brief, thus:

In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the
Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High
School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.

Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes were watching the
dance, two students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that
there is somebody making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber
revolver, respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire — "Rat-tat-
tat-tat-tat" filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on different
parts of his body and died.

Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the company of Carlito Bataller and
Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the school's temporary building,
the bamboo splits broke. At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his
gun. Fernando slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the crime
scene.

Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report, Fernando suffered the
following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face, skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn
away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another
gunshot wound on the same location with tattooing locates at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the
middle back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away, another gunshot wound located at
the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with tattooing. (Citations omitted)2

In his defense, the accused-appellant presented his version, of the fatal incident, summed up by the trial court as
follows:
The accused, Domingo Belbes in his defense testified that he was at Pili Barangay High School with P/Cpl. Jose
Pabon because they were detailed by their Station Commander. . . . At 9:00 p.m. two female students reported to
them and Mrs. Ulanca that somebody was making trouble at the back of the temporary building. They were
requested by Mrs. Ulanca to see what happened and they went to the place. There they came upon somebody who
was making trouble and destroying the wall of the temporary building. He came to know that it was Fernando
Bataller. Fernando Bataller had some companions, Carlito Bataller and certain Belista. Fernando Bataller was more
than 20 years old at that time and Carlito was about Fernando's age. He saw Fernando destroying the wall of the
temporary building which was made of bamboo splits. Pabon was in front of him. The two companions were
prevailing upon Fernando. Fernando was drunk or a little bit tipsy. He was not vomiting but he smelled of wine. They
approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen. Fernando did not mind them. Fernando stabbed
Pabon with a knife. Belbes knew because he saw the glint of the blade when the thrust was made on Pabon. Pabon
and Bataller were about one (1) meter away from each other. Pabon was not hit, for he was able to move backward.
Fernando made two thrusts on Pabon. After Pabon retreated because of the knife thrust, he (Belbes) was also
stabbed by Fernando. He was hit on his lower left shoulder. He was able to hold Fernando's hand because he
wanted to get the knife from him. His firearm was slung on his shoulder. Fernando was able to free himself.
Fernando made another thrust and Belbes moved to his left. Then he made a warning shot. After the warning shot,
Fernando suddenly grabbed his firearm. Belista was quite aggressive at that moment, while Carlito wanted to kick
him. Fernando was able to hold the barrel of the armalite. They struggled with each other and the gun went off
considering that his armalite was semi-automatic, with one squeeze of the trigger one shot came out. During the
process of grappling for the armalite he could not recall how many shots came out. When his service armalite went
off he was Fernando fall to the ground. When Fernando fell, he took the knife from his hand. The people gathered
around them. They asked that Fernando be brought to the hospital. After one hour, the police mobile car arrived.
They proceeded to the Police Station. There they turned over the knife to the Desk Officer. The knife is now with the
Provincial Command.3

Defense witness Jose Pabon, also a policeman, who was present when the incident happened, corroborated the
testimony of the appellant. However, on cross-examination, Pabon belied the fact that the appellant fired a warning
shot. Pabon likewise failed to mentioned anything about aggression on the part of the companions of the deceased,
namely Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. He only recalled that said companions ganged up on Belbes after he
shot the deceased.

Finding the defense weak, while the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently strong, the trial court convicted the
appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In this appeal, counsel de oficio raised one issue:

WAS THE TRIAL [Court] CORRECT IN HOLDING ACCUSED- APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER?4

We shall now consider this matter as well as the more basic issues of self-defense claimed by appellant and the
credibility of the witness for the prosecution. Appellant policeman admits firing the fatal gunshots that hit the
deceased student. But he claims that did so in self-defense. He contends that he was only performing his official
functions when he responded in the course of police duties to the information that somebody was making trouble
and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of maintaining peace and order within the vicinity, he ascertained the
veracity of the information given by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of intent and
voluntariness, he cannot be faulted for the death of the deceased.

At the outset, we note that appellant questions the credibility of the sole eye-witness for the prosecution, Carlito
Bataller. He states that Carlito is the cousin and friend of the deceased. In his view, Carlito had strong motive to
falsely testify against him. Moreover, appellant says that Carlito kindled some moral guilt because he contributed to
the sudden death of his cousin. Appellant alleges that if only Carlito had prevailed over Fernando (instead of
tolerating the hostility of the deceased), he could have prevented the shooting incident.

Regrettably, appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on the face of
mortal danger while on police duty. The cross-examination of Carlito Bataller did not bear out his averments of
fraternal bias and psychological guilt or moral taint in Carlito's testimony. The testimony of the single witness, if
positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder.5 Moreover, when the
issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court deserve great respect since it is in a
better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in court, and to discern its dimensions, both
verbal and non-verbal.6 The relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily diminish the former's
credibility.7

It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve respect
because it is in a better position to determine whether the witness was telling the truth or not, having observed the
demeanor of the witness while testifying on the witness stand.8 In the case at bar, there appears to be no cogent
reason why we should not adhere to this rule.

Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must show
by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.9 To
prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not the unlawful
aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to
prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well settled
in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it was
incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength
of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing." 10

Appellant testified that upon responding to the report of two students, he and Patrolman Pabon, saw Fernando
Bataller destroying the bamboo wall of the school's temporary building. Fernando appeared to be drunk and a little
bit tipsy. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen but the former ignored them. Instead,
Fernando lunged with a knife at Patrolman Pabon but the latter avoided the thrust. Afterwards, Fernando also
stabbed the appellant and hit his left shoulder. As another thrust was coming, appellant claims he fired a warning
shot. Fernando grabbed the armalite and they struggled until the gun went off hitting Fernando, according to
appellant.

We have serious questions on accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, on his part, against the alleged
aggressiveness of the deceased student. First, why was the knife allegedly used by the deceased mishandled? It
was not even subjected to fingerprinting. Second, why was the wound on appellant's shoulder medically examined
only after the lapse of more than twenty-one hours? Was it possibly self-inflicted? According to the doctor who
examined him, Dr. Evelyn Amador, it was a possibility. 11 Lastly, as observed by the trial court, if it was true that they
grappled face to face with each other, why was the victim hit sideways, as testified to by Amador?

The time factor here appears significant. Mrs. Mila Ulanca testified that it only took about six seconds from the time
Patrolman Belbes left his seat until she heard the burst of gunshots. 12 This testimony is not contradicted or rebutted.

Thus, appellant's claim of self-defense could not prosper. The evidence on record, however, reveals an incomplete
justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 A person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. But we must
stress there are two requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed
be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. 14 In the instant case, only the first
requisite is present; admittedly appellant acted in the performance of his duty. However, the second requisite is
lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty. His duty is to maintain
peace and order during the Junior and Senior Prom. But he exceeded such duty, in our view, when he fired his
armalite without warning. No doubt, the concept of mitigating circumstance is founded on leniency in favor of an
accused who has shown less perversity in the commission of an offense. 15 Though his protestation of innocence is
unavailing, his offense could only be characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.

On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out murder. Treachery cannot be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be
considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method or
manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of
the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or
manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. 16 There is no showing that the
shooting was premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere
suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery. 17

On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was
intentional. 18 Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a
friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling; 19 or (2) discharging a firearm
from the window of one's house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; 20 or (3)
where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he
fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. 21 In this
case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.

We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken
fromprision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of the crime of murder is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the costs. 1âwphi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 33.

2
Id. at 130-133.

3
Id. at 41-42.

4
Id. at 78.

5
People v. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331, 348-349 (1998) citing People v. Hayahay et. al., 279 SCRA 567 (1997); People
v. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA 1 (1996); People v. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91 (1995).

6
People v. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769, 779 (1995).

7
Ibid.

8
People v. Manalo, 229 SCRA 479, 485 (1994).

9
People v. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37, 45 (1996).

10
People v. Pay-an, 84 SCRA 353, 362 (1978).

11
TSN, July 24, 1995, p. 11.

12
TSN, May 6, 1992, p. 8.
13
Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code states: Justifying circumstances. — . . .

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

14
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257, 262-263 (1943).

15
People v. Santos, 255 SCRA 309, 311 (1996).

16
People v. De Leon, 262 SCRA 446, 450 (1996).

17
Ibid.

18
Art. 365, Revised Penal Code.

19
Aquino; Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, p. 633.

20
Ibid., citing People v. Readique, 32 Phil. 458 (1915).

21
Id. at 635, citing People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); Lampa v. People, 73 Phil. 82 (1941).

[G.R. No. L-3002. May 23, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANICETO MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.

E. L. Peralta for Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF ONE’S ACTS; ILLNESS OF VICTIM DOES NOT RELIEVE ACCUSED
FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. — A person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal act, and even if the deceased had
been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart (which was not shown), appellant’s assault being the proximate cause of
the death, he would be responsible. (U. S. v. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96; U. S. v. Lugo and Lugo, 8 Phil. 80; U. S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil.
310; U. S. v. Rodriquez, 23 Phil. 22.)

2. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — When there is unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without sufficient
provocation by the defendant, but the latter uses means not reasonably necessary, there is incomplete self-defense on the
part of the defendant, which may be considered a mitigating circumstance.

DECISION

JUGO, J.:

Aniceto Martin was accused of the complex crime of parricide with abortion before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
After trial he was acquitted of abortion, but found guilty of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs. He appealed.

We shall not consider the charge of abortion as he was acquitted of it, confining our review to that of parricide.

The defendant, twenty-eight years old, a farmer, was living in the barrio No. 12 of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He
courted the girl Laura Luiz of the same barrio for several months and was accepted. They had sexual intercourse before
marriage and she became pregnant. In an advanced stage of pregnancy, she came to live with the family of the defendant
and demanded marriage, which was duly solemnized on June 7, 1948, and they continued to live as husband and wife.

Between four and five o’clock in the morning of August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found inside the family toilet, which
was at a certain distance from their home, with a maguey rope, six meters long and one centimeter in diameter, around her
neck, leaving a circular mark around it with the exception of the nape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and
thick hair covering it. The corpse was first seen by Anselma Martin, sister of the accused, who was living in the same house,
and Saturnino Tumaneng, brother-in-law of Laura, who happened to be passing by. The defendant was absent from home.

The barrio lieutenant immediately reported the matter to the chief of police who, accompanied by a policeman, came to the
barrio that same morning to make an investigation. When the chief of police arrived, the defendant had not yet returned
home. A relative looked for him, finding him in a farm which was at a considerable distance from the defendant’s house, and
brought him to the latter. Upon being interrogated by the police officer, the defendant at first denied any knowledge of the
event, but later promised to make a statement in the municipal building.

The police took possession of the rope and put the defendant in a jeep bound for the municipal building. There the defendant
made a confession in the Ilocano language, which he signed and swore to at about noon before the provincial fiscal at the
latter’s house. Said confession, as translated into English, reads as follows: jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph

"I, Aniceto Martin, married, 27 years old, resident of Bo. No. 12, Laoag, Ilocos Norte, after having been sworn to in
accordance with law, do hereby declare the following: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"Policeman: — Why are you here in the office of the Chief of Police of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, this 1st day of August, 1948?

"Aniceto: — I am here, sir, in the office of the Chief of Police of Laoag as I came to report what I did to my wife, Laura Luiz,
because I killed her and the killing was perpetrated as follows: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"That at dawn, today August 1, 1948, at about 4 o’clock, I awoke and my wife also awoke and she said to me, ’Why is it that
you seem to have no interest in me?’, and I answered her I do not have interest in you and I did not love you with intent to
marry you because I am not the author of your pregnancy; again she said to me, ’Why is it that you consented to be wedded
with me if you did not love me?’, and in answer, I again told her that I merely consented to be married to you, because
otherwise, you would file an action against me, I then went down to our closet west of our house at barrio No. 12, Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, for major personal necessity, and my wife, Laura Luiz, came after me to the toilet with a rope in her hands and,
as she approached me while I was in the very act of ejecting waste matters inside the toilet she placed around my neck the
rope which she had in her hands, and immediately, I gripped the rope and took it off and I said, ’Why did you do this?’ my
wife also said, ’Yes, because you do not love me.’ I snatched the rope from my wife and in turn I placed same around her
neck, and in that position I tightened the rope with my two hands and when my wife, Laura Luiz, died I laid her then and
there at the foot of the door of our closet with her head towards the east. Soon after my wife expired I left her already and I
proceeded to the country where we use to go, barrio Barit, No. 55, Laoag, west of the barrio school thereat.

"Q. How did you place the rope around the neck of your wife, Laura Luis, for which reason she died? — A. I wound the rope
one turn around the neck of my wife, Laura Luiz, and my two hands tightened the rope and when she expired I laid her at
the foot of the door of the toilet and then I went away.

"Q. The rope which you used in throttling your wife, where is it? — A. It was just laid down at the place where she was, sir.

"Q. Who knows about and who saw what had you done to your wife which caused her death? — A. Nobody knows about it
and saw it, sir, I, alone.

"Q. Is it not true that the reason why you killed your wife was that you made a preconcerted plan with your sister, Anselma
Martin and your mother, Ciriaca Tomas to commit the crime? — A. No, sir, I have no companion, I am alone.

"Q. Why did you treat your wife in that way? — A. I became obfuscated, sir, when she placed the rope around my neck, and
in turn, I tried the same in her person but, in so trying she died.

"Q. Are you, therefore, very positive that the death of your wife. Laura Luiz, was caused by you in having tightened the rope
that was wound around her neck? — A. Yes, sir, that was the cause of her death, I have no doubt that I was the one who
killed my wife, Laura Luiz, today August 1, 1948. I killed her in our toilet at barrio No. 12, Laoag.

"Q. Have you some more to say? — A. I say, no more, sir.

"Q. Were you, in any manner compelled, threatened, maltreated or remunerated by somebody in having made this
declaration of yours? — A. Absolutely, there was none, sir, that compelled me, but I spontaneously made my declaration
above, it being the whole truth that I committed against my wife, Laura Luiz.

"Q. Are you willing to sign your name at the bottom and at the margin of your declaration? — A. Willingly, sir, because said
declaration is what in truth and in fact I did, and in testimony hereof, I sign my name in the presence of attending witnesses
this 1st day of August, 1948, at Laoag, Ilocos Norte." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Dr. Roman de la Cuesta, resident physician of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Hospital, performed an autopsy on the corpse of
Laura and issued a certificate which reads as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"This is to certify that the undersigned performed an autopsy on the person one Laura Luiz Martin, on August 1, 1948, at 9
o’clock a. m. at the request of the Chief of Police of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, with the following findings: jgc: chan roble s.com.p h

"(a) Acute dilatation, heart

"(b) Spleen, enlarged, malarial

"(c) Pregnancy, 8 month, female foetus

"(d) Almost circular contusion around the neck, but absent in the occipital region

"(e) No evidence of strangulation in the lungs.

"In the opinion of the undersigned the cause of death was acute dilatation of the heart. (Heart failure.)"

Dr. De la Cuesta testified that Laura must have died five or six hours before he examined her corpse at about nine o’clock in
the morning of August 1; that the cause of death Was heart failure due to fright or shock; that the deceased was eight
months pregnant at the time of her death; that there was no expulsion of the foetus; and that the foetus must have been
alive at the time of the death of Laura.

At the trial the defendant testified that while he was moving his bowels in the toilet with his back toward the door of the
same, he felt that a rope was being put around his neck from behind. He forthwith snatched the rope and wound it around
the neck of the person who had attempted to strangle him without knowing who that person was. The person fell and upon
looking at the same he found that it was his wife.

This version cannot be believed, for although it was dark, his wife must have shouted or given some sign of who she was
when she felt the rope tightening around her neck. Furthermore, this version is against that freely given by him in his
spontaneous confession made before the chief of police and sworn to before the provincial fiscal. There is no reason for
supposing that either the chief of police or the provincial fiscal had any motive for wringing from him a forced false
confession.

As to the motive of the defendant, it may be found in the fact that the defendant married Laura unwillingly due to fear of
being sued, because he suspected that he was not responsible for her pregnancy.

The appellant contends that the death of Laura was not due to the strangling, but to her heart disease. It should be noted,
however, that the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by the strangling, and consequently, the defendant was
responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the defendant strangled the
deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness, would not have died. In other words, the defendant directly caused her
death.

In the case of People v. Reyes (61 Phil. 341, 343,) the Court held: jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph

". . . A person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown to be
suffering from a diseased heart (which was not shown), appellant’s assault being the proximate cause of the death, he would
be responsible. (U. S. v. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U. S. v. Lugo & Lugo, 8 Phil., 80; U. S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310; U. S. v.
Rodriquez, 23 Phil. 22.)"

In the case of U. S. v. Brobst (14 Phil. 310), the following doctrine was established: jgc:c hanro bles.com. ph

"Where death results as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility."
(Syllabus)

The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendant: (1) that of unlawful aggression on the part
of the deceased without any sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant — which in this case is equivalent to
incomplete self- defense on the part of the defendant, for after having snatched the rope from the deceased, he should not
have wound it around her neck and tightened it — and (2) the lack of instruction, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset them. We agree with this finding of the trial court. There being two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, the penalty next lower in degree should be imposed, which is that of reclusion temporal.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified by imposing upon the appellant the penalty of from twelve
(12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Motemayor, JJ., concur.

PARAS, C.J. :
Mr. Justice Padilla voted with the majority.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO ECHEGARAY y

PILO, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case

affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.

On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the
said motion that can disturb our verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel,

Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines (FLAG).

On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death
sentence:

"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since

the pardon by the offended party and her mother before the
filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission
of the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented
the accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
 [3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-
appellant was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in
affirming the sentence of death against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process
and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the
incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation
of Article III, Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3)

main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial
proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

I.

It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the

pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be
ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court.
Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:1

"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only

for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such
issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court."

It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case

against the accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense attempted to prove that:
 a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere
concoction of the alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly
penetrated the alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in Paraaque during the time of the alleged
rape.

In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic
review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:

a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in

prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which
could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the
victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.

Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of
the accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a
reversal of our judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for
the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
the following matters:

a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as

a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-
appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the
offense in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant
from adequately defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying
circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the
coverage of the Death Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by
the trial court during the trial of the rape case.

Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for

reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to
the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-
appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal.2

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case
against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission
made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an
Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that
she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the
latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women."3 Thus, this
is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded
with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in
court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-
appellant.

We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,4 that:

"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which
is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance
is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused's
defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal.
There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with
the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge."5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses

mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the
positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the
prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim
herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no
bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant,
particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.

II

The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or

mistakes of his counsel.6 One of the recognized exceptions to this rule
is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced
and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend
himself.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-
appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had
amply exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable
decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his client's defense.
As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the
time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the
hearings thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the
Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our
June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his line
of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could
have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness
to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the
preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The main
reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is
the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors
committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel
could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against the
accused-appellant.

III

Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as

punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an
ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge
themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used
to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
punish in the name of the state.

The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing

sensitization throughout the later generations against past barbarity
and the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today
every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human
rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the
duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure

society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.

Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating

on the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal
punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable
and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on
January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the
death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was
originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code,
which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a

constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We
unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
of Harden v. Director of Prison,8 People v. Limaco,9 People v.
Camano,10 People v. Puda11 and People v. Marcos,12 In Harden, we
ruled:

"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.

In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court
said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.'"13 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are
not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and
well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case
of Limaco that:

"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe

that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.15

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of
treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war,
qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons
resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in
death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature
responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the
height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which
carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to
1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among them,
the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-
Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.

In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos

regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a
Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments
thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the
people.

Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom
of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped
themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights
Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.

On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the
proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first
denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or

inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."

Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of
a consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that
the death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the
death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was
to be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution
or by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:

"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether

the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution -- in
 which case it cannot be restored by the legislature -- or left to
the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital
punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are
traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There
is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other
lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another
man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the
death penalty as an institution has been there from time
immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is
more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve
human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons
which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty".16

The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not
survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama
first pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher
incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the
last decade".17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an
unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal
system and leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of
crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de
los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in
the Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future
legislation,"18 and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory
remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro,
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod,
Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo
Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following
exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:

"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear

that the church has never condemned the right of the state to
inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived
of the right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or
prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic
point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
 MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has
the delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death
penalty under certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to
do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the
issue at stake is whether or not under the present circumstances
that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be
denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that
delegation is forever under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to
determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances,
whether the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would
be for the common good. I do not believe this Commission can
a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a month,
determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would
prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for
the most heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by
many qualifying and aggravating circumstances."19

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered

provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death
penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los
Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even
as regards the proposed amendment. He said:

"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this

matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our
legislature. Arguments pro and con have been given x x x. But
my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the
legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because
we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation
and after repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature
that we have repealed the law and that the legislature can go
ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the
death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the
 discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this half-baked
provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code
imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these
pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the
same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so
we, I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to
enact statutes depending on the changing needs of the times. Let
us entrust this completely to the legislature composed of
representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the
fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to
entrust this to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-
hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100
percent."20cräläw virtualibrär y

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-

three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and
twelve (12) voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the
present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
in the following tenor:

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or

inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."

The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the

death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special
criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were
tremendous.

The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what

used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,21 we stated that "in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua"22 thereby eliminating death as the original maximum
period. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed,
limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit,
the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v.
Masangkay,23 People v. Atencio24 and People v. Intino25 divided into
three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the
maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised
Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,26 however, we reconsidered these
aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the
framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article III, Section
19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the
aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one
where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no
total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the
death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the
institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled
in Munoz:

"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the

Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the
penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum
and the medium. These should now be divided into three new
periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the
legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19
(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has
not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly
reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained
intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that
there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it
and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough".27 chanroblesvirtuallawli brary

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19

(1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature
took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution,

to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of:
first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the
bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.

On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments

for and against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted
on the policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:

"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES

Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the

Body suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no
objection, the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted
on the policy issue of death penalty.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate

would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a
vote of Yes would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to
be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as provided in the
Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the
reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ

xxx

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would
first decide the question whether or not death penalty should be
reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be
formed to draft the compromise bill in accordance with the result
of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty,
the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on
which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of
Yes in the nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death
penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on
how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion
of the seven-man committee.

xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA

In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if

a senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still
vote 'no' on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular
crime.

REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the

basic policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be
included in the scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the Body would
discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules,
but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in
the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever course it will
take will depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body later
on.

The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.

REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO

Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as
a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by
the Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body
decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address
two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to
be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if
so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it?
The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the
crime is heinous."28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes
and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-
incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in
the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently
created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The
mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the
main debate in the committee would be the determination of the
crimes to be considered heinous.

On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special

Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech.
He began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-
imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and
other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or
punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the
death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:

x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the

death penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special
Committee the work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that
would be the subject for future deliberations of this Body, the
Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed
originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with
the death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling
reasons reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious
that it was the Revised Penal Code that was affected by that
provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in
the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been
repealed -- all provisions on the death penalty would be
considered as having been repealed by the Constitution, until
Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty
on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but
many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually
affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the
constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to
consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this compromise
bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed draft now
under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either
reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the
Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they
had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And
some of them had to be amended because the Committee
thought that amendments were proper."29 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to

whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a
special law which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for
heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:

"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear
in mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the death
 penalty, it actually was amending the Revised Penal Code to such
an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death
penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. So we thought that it would be best to just
amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the
death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as
heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill... the
whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to
punish in the special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will
have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty
shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in
the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal
Code, we will do the same -- merely reproduce. Why will we do
that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the
definition of the crime as the same and merely adding some
aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in
these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal
Code."30 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for
discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated
on its provisions.

The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept
prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for
each and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was
sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the death
penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming
upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid
statistics showing that in the case of each and every crime in the
death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each
crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino
people, than before such ratification.31 Inasmuch as the re-
impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient
statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of
heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition of
the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no
compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued
that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the
State has done everything in its command so that it can be justified to
use an inhuman punishment called death penalty".32The problem,
Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit
that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system
that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the
enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort,
hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As an
initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino
explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and
refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes.
He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in
incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose
the death penalty is enough compelling reason.33

Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle
lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the
definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill;
and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and every
capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed
his objections to the bill:

"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.

President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are
described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished
by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in
the bill?

Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but
that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the
offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at
the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to
society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these
offenses.

In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by

themselves connected with the effect upon society and the
government have made them fall under the classification of heinous
crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when
the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so
serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a
compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President,
does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which
would call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be
separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will
be very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but
also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the
death penalty therefor?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered

by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid
stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that is
included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble,
general statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And
that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would
be sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by
the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different
offenses.

If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would

suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme
Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble
would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable
in the measure.

So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling

reasons for each and every offense.

Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional

limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation,
especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one
which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.

Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the
compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it
becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished
as crimes?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive

law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process
will more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself
which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the
definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that
the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions
and these are:

1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

2. There are compelling reasons; and

3. These involve heinous crimes.

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section

13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is
bound to state clearly the compelling reasons for the
reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well as the
elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the
bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion
already. I believe that whether we state the compelling reasons
or not, whether we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not
very important. If the question is raised in the Supreme Court, it
is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the
Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to
the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The
accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it
will not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the very
power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So
that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process." 34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death
penalty bill violated our international commitment in support of the
worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a
signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified,
however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to
the different committees which vote on them for consideration in the
plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary
session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory
countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed
irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol considering that
these agreements have reached only the committee level.35 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on

Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative
votes, four (4) negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty
bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.

The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on
August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives.
The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third
reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for
certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the
Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other
bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected
during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was
introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of
Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger
of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586,
2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the
Lower House.

In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal

ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-
impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous
crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the
exercise of such power.

"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I

quote:

'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for

compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
shall thereafter provide for it...'

The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,

the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an
amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment,

the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987
Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision,

Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:

"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at
some future time, the people might want to restore death
penalty through initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:

We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it

is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise
which we should not preclude today.

xxx xxx xxx

I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the
viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming
regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a
mockery of public peace and order.

In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the
Castanoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We
ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of
a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly

violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of
its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the
law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.

Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long
years as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to
civilized society.

The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young

business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral
self of our people.

The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old

high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model
someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal
that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom
Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the
Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still
makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.

xxx xxx xxx

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is

taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to
the overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban
Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:

'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or

unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante
justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands
and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House
Bill No. 62.

As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought

to listen to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty
and pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and
democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped,
raped or butchered.

But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely
on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law
that will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take
their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will
deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.

Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation

of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death
penalty."36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and

in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers
were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House
seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a
special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the
perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress,
if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing
general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details
of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was
clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause:

"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty
not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous
drugs, but also for other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide;
murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal
Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as
defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532;
carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner,
driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and
arson resulting in the death of any occupants.

All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to

the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of
its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or
perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of
decency and morality in a just and civilized society.

For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance

to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it
(U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of
fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government under
which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which
they receive (52 Am Jur 797).

In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against
his or her own will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of
scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of
fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.

In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what

is being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time
of the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he
commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a
homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are
perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other
personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of
the parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the
stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered
the victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to
mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of
police interrogation and court hearings.

Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the

universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are
passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact
that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to
the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker,
the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the
hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an
entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of
subjecting the passengers to terrorism." 37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to
February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House
of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on
second reading.

On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the
House of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it
was up for consideration on third reading. 38 The results were 123
votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions

After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February

23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral
Conference Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.

On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act
to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.39 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the
present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law,
and one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said
law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year
old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and
the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's
affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue
of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the
death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted
in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death
penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against punishment of such
nature.

We reject accused-appellant's proposition.

Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-

appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without
complying with the twin requirements of compelling reasons and
heinous crimes.

At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A.

No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily
provide the context for the following analysis.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in

Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the

death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is
meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by
death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty
bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be
singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we

find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause
provides that
 "x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous
for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society."

Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v.

Alicando, 40 traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the
Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable,
which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so
hatefully or shockingly evil.

We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient

criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is
deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the
accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its
proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on
society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to
exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases
where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but
the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina
and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they
perceived as a mere enumeration of capital crimes without a
specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were
oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death
penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by
mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain
specified qualifying circumstances.

Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death:

(1) Treason (Sec. 2);

(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);

(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);

(4) Murder (Sec. 6);

(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);

(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more
than three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c)
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill
him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);

(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);

(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or

edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or
airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public
utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government
museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials
located in an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the
arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);

(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape
is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two
or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and
committed with homicide (Sec. 11);

(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);

(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);

(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of

prohibited drugs (id.);

(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs

(id.);

(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified

amounts (id.);

(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)

(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);

(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (id.);

(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs

(Sec. 15);

(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec.

16);

(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous

drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);

(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate

vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and

(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the

carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).

All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform
penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature
to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of
foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized
with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial
court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead
actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the
evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in
the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in
any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its
effects on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize
the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or
manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of
death is imposed in the following crimes:

(1) Qualified bribery

"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he

refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed
a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the
penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he

shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)

(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in

the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts

"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or

is raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)

(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized

under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed." (Sec. 10)

(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has

become insane, the penalty shall be death.

xxx xxx xxx

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is

committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any
of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has

suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )

(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of

prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the

contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death]
herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)

(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs

where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the

contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in
every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold
to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a

person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary." (Sec. 13)

(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of
death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)

(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs

where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the

contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered,
delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such
place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person

using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)

(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or

officers including members of police agencies and armed forces

"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1),

5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same
offenses are government officials, employees or officers including
members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with

the mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials,
employees or officers

"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found

guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7,
8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III
(of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall
suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)

(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated
crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more

persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of

heinousness must be squarely applied.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized
as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a
quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to
respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity
of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or
her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and
needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the

significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the
state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor
and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will
to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context,
no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and damage to society.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of

heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified
crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they
are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized
by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to
pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of
the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the
crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating
circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies
circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be
punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor
repeals the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal
Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances
attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision
of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum
penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the
crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided
discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that
characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is
an infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a
crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is
capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in
law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient
thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the
determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the
ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not
heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and
substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the
mandate of R.A. No. 7659.

In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional

requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to
the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the
abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and

compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each
other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing
as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or
its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of
our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these
crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There
can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait
until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and
thrashing it to its demission.

The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be

pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in
case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only
compelling reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing
else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to that
could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by
unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that
the compelling reason required by the constitution is that there
occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural milieu
after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as
an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are,
however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but
not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death
penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it
amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first
proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If
there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the
time that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven
that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before
its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place
did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a
deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that
congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-
impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death
penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and
irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law
to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes."

We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for

attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death
penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.41 To state, however, that the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death
penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty
was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that
is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American
abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against
racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:

"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our
task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled
these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of
justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries
the determination whether defendants committing these crimes
should die x x x.

xxx

In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no

permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised x x x.

xxx

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their

operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is
an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel
and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and
sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether
eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing
juries.

Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-

enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural
checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court
affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the
cases of Gregg v. Georgia,42 Jurek v. Texas,43 and Profitt v. Florida.44

Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,

inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the
ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of
punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the
crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing
capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the
procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence
from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia
capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.

xxx

In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death
penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition
of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to
the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality
of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x

That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before

us.

xxx

x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the

statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been
dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy
 Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital
felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense,
only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in
their revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the
latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found
guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts.
When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions,
again revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death
penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the seven other
legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their
death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in
addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the
death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with
mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for which death
was an authorized punishment.

xxx

It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also

authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the
victim was a child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has
since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x
x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when
the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions
provide capital punishment when the victim is a child

The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not
wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs
very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman.

x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly

confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.

We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly

reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the
'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it
normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to over
come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very
often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict
mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the
community's sense of security, there is public injury as well.

Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms

of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it
does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer;
for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life."

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty
as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful
omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death
penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape,
while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's
spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does
not involve the taking of life.

Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing
on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.

Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that
the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or
not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the
victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have
already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that
the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a
defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal
history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed
in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person
or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry,
and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to
both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would
pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At
any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the
crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46

"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another

person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society
itself."

We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so
essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the
wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without
thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with
the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling
with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of
death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put,
to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of
the living.

"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is

substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which
invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve
the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of
character and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and
civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital
punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance
of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do
otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false
delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival." 47
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for

Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED48 for LACK OF MERIT.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
249 SCRA 303, 307-308.

2 See Amigo v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996]; De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172 [1995].

3
RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.

4 G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.

5 People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469 [1960].

6Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 384, 389 [1995]; Arambulo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 589, 601 [1993]; Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].

7 Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279-280 [1993].

8 81 Phil. 741 [1948].

9 88 Phil. 36 [1951].

10 115 SCRA 688 [1982].

11 133 SCRA 1 [1984].

12
147 SCRA 204 [1987].

13 81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].

14 88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].

15 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].

16 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p.676.

17 Id., p. 678.

18
Id., p. 680.

19 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p.712.

20 Id., p. 744.

21 155 SCRA 327 [1987].

22 Id., p. 335.

23
155 SCRA 113 [1987].

24 156 SCRA 242 [1987].

25 165 SCRA 637 [1988].

26
170 SCRA 107 [1989].

27 Id., p. 121.

28Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.

29 Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.

30 Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.

31 Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106-112.

32 Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p.1223.

33 Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp.1574-1575.

34 Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500-501.

35 Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.

36 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp.417-418.

37
Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp.419-20.

38 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23, 1993, p. 98.

39
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994].

40 251 SCRA 293 [1995].

41
408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct. 2726.

42
428 US 153 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.

43
428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.

44 428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.

45
433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.

46 G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.

47
Donald Atwell Zoll, "A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment," National Review, December 3, 1971, pp.1351-1354.

48 Three members of the Court voted to declare RA. 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it reimposes the death penalty. Two of them wrote
Separate Opinions, which are attached as annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the authors consistent with the Court's policy that,
in death cases, ponentes of opinions whether majority or minority are not to be indicated.