MARIANO DEL CASTILLO CASE DIGEST (FROM THE NET)

In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]

FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition
filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio
Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised,
among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized
three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to
support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens
by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b.
Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations
by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least

inexcusable negligence. Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above,
stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the
assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme
Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the
rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or
ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take
(ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of
the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing

presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of
the assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made
by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There
is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of
Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not
material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves
no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there
are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately.
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely
used as background facts in establishing the state on international law at various
stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign
authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that
since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There
was no malice, fraud or corruption.

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence.
The researcher is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees
here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third
in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that
the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain
important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part
cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del
Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning
cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting
decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has
already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in
control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also
explained, most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are
found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books
and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment,
she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of
materials that she thought she might need.

She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw
website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the
issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft
Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would
take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing
the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del
Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that
computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their work.
HIPOS V. BAY CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur
Villaruel and two others before RTC presided by Judge Bay. Private complainants AAA
and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against
petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases. Hipos and other filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss
the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed
against them. However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that
there was lack of probable cause. City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion hence the petition.

Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ
of mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC
finding no probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to
withdraw information.

Decision: Petition bereft of merit.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer

or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to

perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty
to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion
are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel
action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of
an action already taken in the exercise of either. While a judge refusing to act on a
Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same,
he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In
the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw
Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus
is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for
Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
ALLIEDBANK V. CA CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Allied Bank Corporation (ABC) hired Galanida as accountant book-keeper with

conditions that the Bank has right to transfer employees whenever public necessity
requires. Galanida every now and then got transferred and promoted. One day, ABC
sought his transfer to Bacolod. Galanida refused through a letter arguing that the
transfer would impede his family relationships in Cebu. Thereafter, Galanida filed a
complaint in the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal. ABC transferred Galanida to
Tagbiliran citing its Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure which provides that
refusal to transfer is insubordination and insubordination is punishable by suspension
to dismissal. Galanida retaliated in a letter asserting discrimination and favoritism
practices by the management. Bank Memo fired him.

Labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of Galanida citing Dosch v. NLRC which
supposedly pens that “refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being
away from the family.” National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed Labor
Arbiter decision via same Dosch case. CA affirmed the same.

Issue. Was Galanida illegally dismissed? –No

Ratio. No because the dismissal was within ABC’s power and there appears to be no
discrimination in the action as transfers in the bank are routine

Doctrine. Relevant discussion in line with Legal Research pertains to the citation of
Dosch. The present court asserts that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA misquoted the
decision in Dosch. The above cited phrase, the court says, was lifted from the syllabus
of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA). The Court in Dosch did not rule
anything of the kind as proposed by the SCRA. SCRA does not reflect the opinion of
the Court as they are mere works of reporters and lawyers beyond the Judiciary’s
ambit. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that
a lawyer should not misquote or misrepresent court decision texts. Having cited these
portions of the report, the lawyers in Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA violated said
provision
COMELEC V. NOYNAY CASE DIGEST

Topic. Other unethical conducts

Case. Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing RTC judge’s decision

Facts:

COMELEC charged some public teachers with violations of Omnibus Election in their
engagement in partisan political activities. COMELEC then filed these criminal cases in
RTC. RTC, through Judge Noynay directed COMELEC to file the cases in MTC as
RTC supposedly had no jurisdiction. COMELEC filed an MR arguing that RTC has
jurisdiction following Alberto v. Lavilles where the court supposedly ruled that RTC has
jurisdiction over election cases. Noynay dismissed MR. COMELEC appeals in present
court.

Issue. Did RTC Judge Noynay err in remanding the case to MTC? –Yes

Ratio. He did because the present case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC, not
MTC. In this issue, two laws should be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the Omnibus
Election Code states that RTC has jurisdiction for violations of the code, except on
cases of failure to register or vote. One the other, a BP states that MTC has jurisdiction
for cases with penalties of one year to six years. In this case, the RTC implemented
the BP. However, the present court finds his ruling mistaken in that in the same BP
providing MTC jurisdiction, it is stated that MTC has jurisdiction only in cases that does
not fall within RTC jurisdiction. Omnibus Election Code gives jurisdiction to RTC on
violates of the code. The violation presented in this case is a violation of the code. This
provided, RTC has jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is less than six years. Thus,
Judge Noynay erred in ruling that RTC has no jurisdiction. Doctrine. In relation to Legal
Research, this case is relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s misreading of the law
and on the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be
studious in the principles of law and office administration in due regard of legal system
integrity, respectively. As well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates them to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. The
above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts these provisions.

Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates

that lawyers should not misquote or represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC
through its counsel Atty. Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In this citation,
however, the present court finds that errors persist. One, that the plaintiff in the case is
Alberto Naldoza not Alberto Naldeza or Alberto as used by the COMELEC lawyer.
Two, that that case is 254 of SCRA not 245. And third, in its ascription of a Court
Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s ruling. Atty. Balbuena is admonished.
VILLATUYA V. ATTY. TABALINGOS CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06,

2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required
the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for
resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.

In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that
he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in
a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by
the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees
paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as
a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases
that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He
also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two
financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross
immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for
having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.

In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the
complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged
that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that
there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that
the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any
unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture
Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the
Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no
probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two
other women

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage

Contracts of respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.

On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed
by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He
disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission
that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts.
In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with
Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.

The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent

moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him,
pending outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.

On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation
addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for
the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the
second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the
solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited
cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third
charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was premature.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration
and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s
disbarment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

nonpayment of fees to complainant;

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING: First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.

Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but
did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is
based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of
Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and
a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.

In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out
the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.

Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in
those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the
client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of
this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to
reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.

The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its
focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar
and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this
case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent
entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to
vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro, 56 we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty
of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of
them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for
their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of
justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a

member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.58

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and
ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
IN RE: APPLICATION OF MAX XHOOP, 41 PHIL 213

+IN RE SHOOP MALCOLM; November 29, 1920 Points to consider:

1. Difference between Civil Law and Common Law

2. Distinguish strains of common law: What are the bases?

3. How did the Court arrive at the conclusion that there is Anglo- American tradition?

4. What system is in place?

5. References to American jurisprudence

6. Laws superseded or modified

7. Identify what is that important question the Court needed to resolve and how it
helped solve the Shoop case.

FACTS

- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of
the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It
was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the
highest court of the State of New York. - The said rule requires that: New York State by
comity confers the privilege of admission without examination under similar
circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from
comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least
5 years in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But
admission is still in the discretion of the court.)

- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without
examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases:

1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the
highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District
of Columbia

2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on

the principles of the English Common Law (ECL).

ISSUE WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established

HELD

The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't.

established by the Congress. - In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws
of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of
the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American
cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the
Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where
such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. - The
jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form of
Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
-New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to

- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils.
similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.

- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesn’t

establish a precedent with respect to future applications.

Reasoning On TERRITORY:

a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US

b. We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the United States but

c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either

d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are a territory since the US
Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a form of territorial government,
so to that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen.

e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word "territory" to be limited
to the technical meaning of organized territory or it would have used the more accurate
expression.

f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement since the full
phraseology indicates a SWEEPING INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the
US. On COMMON LAW jurisdiction: (On what principle/s is the present day
jurisprudence based?)

g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to
be a very large proportion of the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being
a system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the old
English cases.

h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law" it would seem

proper to say that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the
principles of that Common Law if its statute law and its case law to a very large extent
includes the science and application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as
perpetuated and modified by the American cases.

i. Common Law adopted by decision: i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American
codification and remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal
metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction
today.

ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a general sense

iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence of the
courts where practical considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives round for
such a decision.
iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo-American jurisprudence
are used and applied by the courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT
in conflict with the LOCAL WRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the
change of sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER FOREIGN
case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense
of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL

CIVIL CODE AER 7: ANGARA V.ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Topic. Art. VI, Sec. 17 – Jurisdiction of Electoral Commission – Nature and Power

Case. Petition for prohibition restraining Electoral Commission from taking cognizance
of Ynsua’s protest.

Facts.

Angara and Ynsua were rival in an electoral post in Tayabas 1st District. After the
election, on Dec. 3 1935, the National Assembly proclaimed Angara as the winner.
Ynsua filed a Motion of Protest. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission issued a
resolution stating that the last day of filing electoral protests is Dec. 9, 1935.

With Ynsua’s protest within the prescribed date, the Electoral Commission recognized
Ynsua’ protest. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest on account that the
National Assembly has already proclaimed him the winner last Dec. 3. This
proclamation, he claims, should nullify the Electoral Commission’s due date for filing.
The Electoral Commission denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss.

Angara appealed in present court.

Issue. Does the Electoral Commissions’ act constitute grave abuse of discretion? –No

Ratio. It as within the Electoral Commission’s power to decide on the Angara-Ynsua

issue. The Constitution provides that the Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge
of contests pertaining to elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. That
said, even if the National Assembly has already proclaimed Angara as the
representative of Tayabas 1st District, Electoral Commissions’ later resolution setting
the due date for filing of protests shall prevail. The Electoral Commission’s recognition
of Ynsua’s electoral protest is valid. Therefore, Angara’s writ for prohibition is denied.