THE ETHICS OF BEING-WITH: EXPLORING ETHICS IN HEIDEGGER’S BEING

AND TIME

A Thesis Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Science

TRENT UNIVERSITY

Peterborough, Ontario, Canada

(c) Copyright by Adam Rejak 2014

Theory, Culture and Politics M.A. Graduate Program

September 2014
 ABSTRACT

The Ethics of Being-With: Exploring Ethics in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Adam Rejak

Martin Heidegger is perhaps best known for his work Being and Time, in which

he tries to re-discover what he deems to be a forgotten question; the meaning of being.

However, what many have missed in this work is the ethical potential it presents,

particularly through his notion of Mitsein. This thesis will discuss how the history of

philosophy has misunderstood the question of intersubjectivity. Throughout the history of

philosophy, there has been a tendency to focus on detachment of the subject, rather than

an engaged existence. Heidegger overcomes this by introducing the concept of Mitsein

and allowing us to think of being-with one another as something which is integral to our

very being, rather than something which comes to us through detached reflection. The

consequences of this re-interpretation are significant for ethics because our starting point

is always-already with others, rather than isolated and alone.

Keywords: Heidegger, Mitsein, Ethics, Being-with, Intersubjectivity

ii
 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor David Holdsworth, my reader

Kathryn Norlock and my external supervisor Emilia Angelova. This project would not be

possible without their hours of help and guidance. I learned a great deal during this

process and I am very grateful for all the help they provided. Lastly, I would like to thank

both the Theory, Culture and Poltics, and the Philosophy departments at Trent University.

The professors and staff from both departments were very helpful in helping me achieve

my personal goals. This has been a great experience which I will never forget.

iii
 The Ethics of Being-With: Exploring Ethics in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Table of Contents

Abstract Page ii
Acknowledgements Page iii
Introduction Page 1-6
Chapter 1 – The Tradition Page 7-22
A) Ancient/Medieval Page 8-14
B) Modern Philosophy Page 14-21
C) Conclusion Page 21-22
Chapter 2 - Being-there and Being-with Page 23-47
A) Being-There & Being-In Page 24-32
B) Being-With Page 32-46
C) Heidegger’s Ethical Potential Page 46-47
Chapter 3 - Heidegger’s Mitsein: A New Ethics Page 48-72
A) Ethics in the Tradition Page 49-62
B) Being-with Others Ethically Page 62-71
Conclusion Page 72-74
References Page 74-75

iv
 1

Introduction

Martin Heidegger has been one of the most influential philosophers of the past

one hundred years. His ideas revolutionized many fields and his work has influenced

many different disciplines. In the field of philosophy, he is known for his seminal book,

Being and Time. Few works in modern history have been so influential, with the

exception, perhaps, of Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason. Being and Time

continues today to be one of the most important philosophical treatises because of its

revolutionary turn away from the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger’s work is known for

its destruction (itself a Heideggarian term) of modern subjectivity and its move towards

existentialism. Yet, for some, it has an ethical dimension to it as well. The purpose of this

thesis will be to look at how Heidegger’s ideas within Being and Time can be seen as

ethically relevant. This will be done by examining the history of philosophy and how it

has misinterpreted the idea of intersubjectivity.1 We will see that through Heidegger’s

idea of Mitsein we are able to break away from isolated subjectivity and move into an

existential ethics which at its core is fundamentally relational. In other words, our

existence is always-already with others, rather than being constituted autonomously and

coming to know others through detached intuition or reason. Thus, our starting point is

drastically different than those of the past. This will ultimately lead to an ethics which is

based on a fundamental sameness that is dictated by our being-in-the-world.

This work will consist of three chapters. The first will provide a brief history of

epistemology and metaphysics with respect to the concept of being, from ancient and

medieval times, all the way through modern philosophy and up until Heidegger. The

1
My primary focus will be Heidegger’s Being and Time as well as various secondary sources. I will not be
using any other texts written by Heidegger.
 2

chapter will discuss some aspects of ancient and medieval philosophy, but will focus

more on modern philosophers such as René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Edmund

Husserl to show how the question of being has evolved. We shall see that from the time

of Plato up until Husserlian phenomenology, the question of being has been

misunderstood. Despite their best intentions, philosophers have continually looked at

being in terms of entities. This has caused a number of problems within philosophy,

because beings were treated without access to the ultimate questions of the world. We

were left to think that being was something inherently separate from everyday existence

and that it was something which we could never access. This led to beings becoming

isolated not only from their own world, but from each other.

Beginning with ancient philosophy, there were the forms which existed in the

ethereal realm which we could never access. Aristotle countered this idea and said that

the true essence of things was present within the object itself. Nevertheless, it was still

never completely accessible in a singular form. Medieval philosophers imagined that God

was infinite and could never possibly be known in His true form. Descartes’ idea of

subjectivity was meant to change the question of being and knowledge by giving the

ability to know things through rational deductive reason. It meant that we were no longer

dependent upon the world in order to have knowledge. However, with this idea came an

entirely new form of isolation for the subject, one which would cause a regress in

philosophical knowledge.

With ancient and medieval philosophy, we were at least able to participate in the

essence of wordly objects. But, with the turn towards subjectivity, we were left on our

own, trying to escape ourselves and get out into the world. In some ways Kant resolved
 3

these issues by reversing the order of daily experience. Human beings became the focal

point of knowledge rather than the world impressing itself upon us. We were meant to

discover things on our own without being passive agents. However, Kant never truly

resolved the subject/object binary which was created by our inability to know the world

as a whole. We could not escape our own subjectivity and understand the world of

objects or even other subjects. The best we could hope for was coming up with analogies

that made others “just like me.” From this we can see our ethical dilemma. If we cannot

truly know the other, then how can we expect to have an idea of true ethical

relationships? For centuries, philosophers tried to resolve this issue, but it took the ideas

of Martin Heidegger to theorize about the subject/object binary in a completely novel

way.

For many, the question of being has very little to do with ethics, but what I intend

to prove is that this misunderstanding has ultimately led not merely to epistemological

problems, but to ethical ones as well. This is due to the fact that our starting point of

subjectivity has always been from a point of isolation. This is a point about which

Heidegger speaks extensively in regards to the misinterpretation throughout the history of

philosophy. He makes it clear that he does not want to start with an isolated subject and

move outwards. Heidegger states that what we have meant by others has been incorrectly

formulated. For him, others “does not mean everybody else but me – those from whom

the I distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not

distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is.”2

2
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2010), 115.
 4

This will be the topic of the second chapter. Unlike philosophers from the past,

Heidegger did not try to solve the problem through epistemology. For him there was no

need to try and learn the essence of the world through cognition, or escape the confines of

our minds in order to gain knowledge about the world of other beings. Instead, Heidegger

focused all of his attention on being and ontology.

This solved the epistemological issue of knowing others because it framed the

question in a completely new way. For Heidegger, our existence is Dasein (being-there in

the world of objects and other people). Dasein shares in the openness of the world and

participates in being simply by virtue of its existence. Secondly, part of the primordial

constitution of Dasein is being-there in the world with others (Mitsein). This will be a

crucial point upon which my thesis rests. Heidegger uniquely points out that Dasein’s

existence is always-already with others. No matter what the situation may be, we are

together with others in some way or another. He states as an example that the worker who

uses a tool is connected, by use of that tool, to the one who manufactured it.3 This is the

revolutionary turn away from not only enclosed subjectivity, but from isolated subjects

that try to understand the other through cognitive reason. In its place, we see that Dasein

is constituted by Mitsein (being-with), in the world. Therefore, this new idea of

intersubjectivity does not begin with a detached subject, but is based upon an idea of

togetherness in a shared system of meanings, cultures and values that is revealed by our

place in the world. This new starting point is what allows for a superior understanding of

ethics in general. We are no longer burdened by the need to question our own existence

or to try and prove that we can know the other.

3
Heidegger, 114-115.
 5

In some ways my own project will be much like Heidegger’s insofar as it will not

deal with ethics in the same way as past philosophers. For example, I will move away

from Kantian morality, because it reduces human choice and individuality significantly,

since it operates as a guideline on how to act in all situations regardless of circumstance

through the categorical imperative. Even though Kant claims we have a capacity for

autonomous rational choice, our choices are dictated by universal maxims that exist

outside of the world of human choice. Authentic morality involves conflict and

consequences and should never be reduced to a simple binary between right and wrong,

something which is not always possible in Kantian ethics because of its insistence upon

set rules of conduct. There are always other influences that one must consider in any

given situation and reducing all moral choices into a preset system undermines the

importance of being-in-the-world and living with so many contingencies.

This brings us to the final chapter. By exploring a Heideggerian ethics through

Mitsein, I aim to illustrate that ethics is not necessarily defined by a set of normative

rules. It can be thought of as a fundamental aspect of our being that is shared by all

Daseins. I want to establish a sameness that exists within all of humanity, but is not

outside of existence. In fact, it is our existence as Dasein that makes Mitsein possible.

Mitsein is itself not a construction, nor even a societal choice. We are bound to it insofar

as we exist in the world. Thus, to say that Heidegger was not interested in social ethics is

true to a high degree. However, this does not totally obliterate any potential for his

thought to be included in those fields. We must ensure that when we think of Heidegger

in those terms, that we start from a point of sameness rather than difference; always
 6

keeping in mind that that point is only made possible by our existence and not something

that is prior to human interaction.4

Hopefully, with a new starting point we will begin to unravel where we can see an

ethical Mitsein.5 This will be done by explaining the various ways in which Mitsein

manifests itself in our daily lives. In other words, we will see how many of the things we

do are already ethical. This project will illustrate that underneath the various

contingencies, we have basic needs that are understood by all people because our very

being consists of being-with others in-the-world.

4
The theme of sameness versus difference is one that will no doubt spark some debate. Here I want to
make clear that when I use the term “sameness” I do not mean a liberal notion of humanity that is based on
an a priori category. Our sameness is one that comes from existence, as mentioned by Heidegger when he
discusses that Dasein as being-with others existentially.
5
In the future, I hope to explore the political potential of Mitsein as well, but will not be doing so in this
thesis.
 7

Chapter 1 - The Tradition

The purpose of this chapter is not to give an exhaustive look at the entire tradition

of Western metaphysics and ethics. Instead, I want to present a brief outline of a few

major themes and thinkers that influenced Heidegger’s work. Specifically, I would like to

discuss the works of René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, as well as

provide some insight into ancient and medieval ontology. My objective is to show why

Heidegger sees it as “ontotheological.” By looking at these historical precursors I shall

illustrate a few things. First, I want to show that the works of the pre-Socratics had a

different approach to philosophy that Heidegger tried to recover. The Socratic and post-

Socratic traditions changed the approach of ontology and thus affected philosophy over

the course of the next two millennia. This is where Heidegger thinks the tradition went

astray by addressing only entities rather than being as such.

The second section will be devoted to modern philosophy beginning with

Descartes’ turn towards the subject. From the beginning of the seventeenth century with

Descartes, up until the twentieth century with Husserl, the subject became conceptualized

in isolated ways from the world, which had a profound effect, not only on epistemology,

but on ethics as well. I will try to illustrate that the subject/object binary that resulted

from Descartes’ Meditations created a rift that separated not only subjects from objects,

but subjects from each other as well. This problem is a crucial point for this thesis

because it shows a disconnect between people that was prevalent within the tradition for

hundreds of years. My conclusions at the end of this thesis will attempt to show that
 8

Heidegger eventually overcomes the intersubjective6 gap that resulted from the isolated

subject that Descartes created.

A) Ancient/Medieval

Although it seems rather odd to begin a thesis on ethics by looking back upon the

history of Western metaphysics, the main reason why this must be done is that Heidegger

does not talk about ethics as such. This means that he is not interested in providing a set

of meta-ethical principles in the same way as Kant, or Mill (or any other ethical thinker

for that matter) was in the past. Heidegger’s project is centered on the destruction

(destruktion) of the subject and the ontotheological tradition. This means that it intends to

bring us back to the original meaning of being by revealing that which has been forgotten

(i.e. the question of the meaning of being itself). Therefore, the only way to discuss

Heidegger is to provide the background from which he gets his critique.

In ancient Greece, although the pre-Socratics were by no means univocal, there

was for the most part a clear difference between the ideas of the pre-Socratics and those

of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In many ways both Plato and Aristotle continued on with

the tradition, but their ideas were much more developed. But before them, claims such as

the one made by Thales which stated that water is the basis for being showed the desire to

know what the world is like beyond everyday experience. He tried to explain the being of

the world as such without explaining things in terms of the highest being. However, he

6
The term “intersubjectivity” was first used by Edmund Husserl in relation to transcendental
phenomenology. Husserl will be discussed in detail in later chapters. For now, it is important to note that
Heidegger overcomes this gap by moving away from this kind of psychological language that divides
subjects. Being-with for Heidegger does not rely on moving outward to know the other, and instead we
always-already exist amongst others in the world. Heidegger does however note that Husserl contributed
greatly to this conversation, but Heidegger’s contribution lies in the fact that he does not separate ontology
and phenomenology.
Heidegger, 36.
 9

still described being in terms of a substance, which in this case is water. Nevertheless,

this was one of the earliest examples of a philosopher attempting to explain things in

terms of nature, rather than looking at the substance. For Thales, there was a being

beyond the being of the water.

Parmenides also tried to answer the question of being. For him, all that exists is

included in being. He specified that being was not necessarily limited to entities. For

example, water “is” cold, thus whatever “is” would be included in being as well.7 All

thoughts that could answer the question of what “it” is would therefore be considered part

of being. But part of the problem with his theories (as well as others to come) was that the

essential quality of being was static. Although, as we shall see, Heidegger uses the term

“essence” as many ancient and medieval thinkers did, it does not have the same meaning

as it does throughout the tradition. It does not mean a static point that is unchanging, but

rather signifies a process of always becoming. This idea was influenced greatly by the

ancient philosopher Heraclitus.

Heraclitus differed from Parmenides because of his idea of change. The idea of

logos was the form which produced change in the world and was behind natural

phenomena. He famously stated that you can never step in the same river twice. This

meant that there was a constant flux in the world that changed the river over the course of

time. Heraclitus stated that fire best represents the flux of nature and its constant

movement. When fire burns, its look, shape and its essential nature did not remain the

same. Whereas Heraclitus believed in a flux, Parmenides thought all changing properties

belonged only to seeming (appearances) rather than being. So Parmenides’ idea of being

7
Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 160.
 10

was unchanging and eternal, while Heraclitus believed in constant change over time.

With Parmenides we begin to see how the tradition stressed the idleness of thought and

overlooked the flux of life. This signals one of the most important changes in Western

metaphysics because of the emphasis began to be placed on a fixed notion of being rather

than becoming.

The static nature of being would be expanded by Plato through his Socratic

dialogues. Plato took the idea of being to another level by essentially replacing it with the

idea of the good. A hierarchical structure developed in which everything is geared

towards the idea of the good and towards perfection. Plato also started the classification

of higher and lower order thinking. This was the beginning of the primacy of

contemplation over the life-world because of the theoretical nature of contemplation over

practice. These two sets of classifications resulted in the world of humans becoming

disconnected from the world of forms. As well, it started the idea of the “metaphysics of

presence”8 as ideal forms were eternal and unchanging, something with which Heidegger

strongly disagrees. The essential properties of objects in the natural world became

inaccessible to experience; an idea which would be later continued by Kant with his

noumenal/phenomenal distinction. Thus, we were left with the idea that we could never

experience the full reality of any object. With this we do not yet have the isolation of the

subject that we shall see later, but there is already a separation between subjects and how

they experience everyday objects.

8
This idea of the nature of time greatly influenced Jacques Derrida who agreed with Heidegger on the
limitations of ancient/medieval notions of time. Both philosophers sought to overcome this through a more
originary understanding of time through the unity of past, present and future. This idea plays a critical role
in understanding beings and how they are constantly in a process of movement towards an end.
 11

Aristotle’s idea of metaphysics, on the other hand, tried to recover the natural

world in some ways.

Aristotle critiqued Plato’s idea of the good as being outside of the natural human

world. The good for Aristotle manifests itself in many ways and is always within human

life and action. Aristotle disagreed with Plato, not only because he disputed the idea that

objects had an essence, but also because of the way in which forms manifest themselves

for Plato. While Plato believed in an otherworldly form, Aristotle thought that form was

paired with matter. Therefore, the pairing of the two created a substance which was

behind what one could directly experience. As a result, each object and each person had

an essential quality about them which was part of their nature. In contrast to Plato, there

was no perfect form of a cow in a different world, the universal form exists within the

particular cow. The same could be said about human beings, which he called “rational

animals.” It was from a system of classification based on a specific difference. Humans

are the species of animal which are identified by their specific difference (rationality).

These were the attributes that constituted what it essentially meant to be human.

For Mark Blitz, ideas such as “rational” overlook the world because they only

analyze beings in parts and sections rather than looking at being as a whole.9 Therefore,

the problem with categorizing humans as “rational animals” is that those are only ontical

differences. These types of categories do not differentiate man’s being as such. Humans

are not an aggregate of psychical (rational) and physical (animal) parts. Heidegger

introduces the concept of Dasein which is a unity and a whole, whose being is determined

9
Mark Blitz, "Heidegger and the Political." Political Theory. no. 2 (2000), 181.
 12

by its finitude rather than by the parts which are determined ontically.10 Aristotle’s ideas

also leave out Dasein’s living existence as it does not describe how it interacts with the

world on a daily basis. Being a rational animal says nothing about the life-world because

it divides our existence into categories that do not manifest themselves in our daily lives.

Therefore, when one says “rational animal,” that may be part of what it means to be

human, but it is not the whole of human existence and does not adequately provide a

living essence. This is an important part of the Heideggerian problematic.

Yet, for Aristotle, being was not merely uncovered through contemplative and

deductive means. Aristotle had three modes in which we uncover beings. The first was

theoria, which was a form of contemplative knowledge. Heidegger believed this was

where beings appeared as present-at-hand. This is a term Heidegger uses to designate

objects in the world. Whereas humans have an existential existence, objects cannot reflect

upon themselves in any way, thus do not exist in the same way as humans. The second

was póiesis which is an uncovering attitude of manipulation whose aim is to produce.

Traditionally it corresponds with tēchne or what Heidegger calls ready-to-hand, as with

equipment that is available to use. Although equipment can be thought of as an object, in

its usefulness it gains the attribute of an object that is ready for Dasein. This distinction

that Heidegger makes is similar to Aristotle in that it separates objects such as rocks,

from objects like hammers or other tools that we use. We do not contemplate the

objective nature of a hammer, rather we encounter it in the world of equipment and put it

10
Heidegger, 175-176.
 13

to use.11 Lastly, there is práxis which is guided by practical wisdom and is a determining

attitude for Dasein. Heidegger prioritizes this last mode in his philosophy. Because of the

idea of praxis, many see Heidegger’s ethics are about virtue. However, as Volpi explains,

these categories become “modalities of Being” for Heidegger which make various actions

possible.12 Praxis (since it is part of the constitution of Dasein) is not a choice for

Heidegger. In other words, Heidegger’s main criticism of the tradition, beginning with

the ancient Greeks, is that they prioritize the present-at-hand, or the theoretical aspects of

life. In reality, we live much of our everyday existence in a state of readiness that guides

us rather than a contemplative life. As Heidegger rightly states, we often do not even

notice equipment in a theoretical manner until it breaks down. It is only then that we

contemplate the present-at-hand qualities which reveal themselves to us.13

What could be said then is that the Greek tradition thus far has missed much of

the existential structures of daily existence. By prioritizing the theoretical aspects of life

over the practical we lose what it means to exist. This does not mean there is no space for

high theory or contemplation, but instead we should not necessarily prioritize that

dimension, as it is for the most part actually secondary in our daily lives. Secondly, by

essentializing form, Greek philosophers like Aristotle, made objects and subjects partially

inaccessible. This divides the world into those things which we can experience directly

and those which we cannot fully access. Although, as we shall see, being for Heidegger is

never directly accessible, it can still be seen or experienced in various ways. Being

11
There will be more on the topic of equipment as well as the ready-to-hand, present-at-hand distinction in
a later chapter. I simply wanted to give a brief explanation of these terms in order to show some of the
similarities Heidegger had with Aristotle.
12
Franco Volpi, "In Whose Name: Heidegger and 'Practical Philosoph'y." European Journal of Political
Theory. no. 1 (2007), 37.
13
Heidegger, 68-70.
 14

unconceals itself through entities. While this may seem similar to what Aristotle was

saying, being for Heidegger is never an entity. This interpretation of being by many

Greek philosophers greatly influenced medieval philosophers, causing them to also miss

the ontological difference. This resulted in a re-problematization of the question into a

new form, namely the idea of a Christian God.

Philosophers from the Middle Ages were influenced greatly by the Greeks,

particularly by the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. One of the most influential ideas of

Aristotle was that of the unmoved mover and the idea of causality. In his physics,

Aristotle believed that all matter was in motion, but there had to be an unmoved mover to

set matter into motion. In other words, there had to be a primal cause in order for motion

to occur. This idea was adopted by Thomas Aquinas who essentially replaced the

unmoved mover with the idea of the Christian God. What this illustrates is the

ontotheological character of being during these times. Rather than discussing being as

such, being was thought of in terms of the highest being.14 There was a causal course of

events that set things in motion and was made possible by a single entity. This set the

groundwork for Descartes’ critique of the medieval tradition.

B) Modern Philosophy

The beginning of modern philosophy was a turn towards subjectivity brought on

by a rejection of religious authority. By no means did this spell the end of Christian

14
Once again, Heidegger’s re-framing of the question of being is important here. Rather than discussing
being in terms of entities, Heidegger moves towards the ontic-ontological language of being. It is not a
matter of having things set into motion by the highest entity, but rather being unconcealing itself into the
world of beings. The ontological is made evident through the ontic. This is made evident by what I will
later discuss in terms of being-with others. We are made aware of being-with others, not by a causal series
of events, but by being unconcealing itself into our daily existence.
 15

thought, but it took some of the authority away from the Church and gave it to the

individual. The church could no longer dictate every aspect of social life as the individual

was the source of knowledge rather than Church doctrine. This shift was brought on

partly by Descartes’ search for pure rational knowledge. He determined that the only

thing that could be certain was his own existence. Nothing outside of him in the world

was certain. “I think, therefore I am” was the phrase that he used in order to illustrate the

certainty of his own existence. This famous phrase changed the course of philosophical

and ethical thinking. First, it isolated the individual subject from the world as it

eliminated the world outside the subject in order to get to pure rational thought. Second, it

posited the subject in terms of a present-at-hand entity, meaning that the subject’s place

in the world was no different than the objects that surround us.15

Descartes claimed that the subject was a non-extended thinking thing (res-

cogitans). Descartes united res cogitans and res extensa (subject and object) through God

as one. Thus, we are a measurable quantity and not merely a bundle of different qualities

(i.e. rational and animal). The object, on the other hand is extended, but has no thought.

Heidegger’s criticism is of the scientification of these ideas as it essentially kills the life

world. The world becomes explainable through “mechanical laws, abstract properties,

and causal relations.”16

The most important aspect of Descartes’ philosophy for our discussion is the

isolation of the individual away from other subjects. Descartes created not only a

subject/object division, but also a legacy of individualism that isolates subjects from the

15
This is what Foucault called the “transcendental-empirico doublet”. It is the constant tension that exists in
the subject as being both a physical specimen and having mental activity.
16
Lawrence J. Hatab, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy. (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000): 10.
 16

world and from each other. We cannot be sure of each other’s existence, only our own.

Certainty for Descartes came through abstract ideas and since that time, the idea of others

in the philosophical tradition has often been framed in terms of “other minds” with a clear

focus on consciousness. Skeptics were thus able to claim that we can never truly know

the other as we cannot access their mind as we can our own. Even if we were to

experience the same thing as the other, the question became whether or not my

experience is the same as that of the other. So, rather than overcoming doubt with self-

evident knowledge, Descartes created an artificial philosophical problem that would

plague the tradition for centuries. It isolated subjects by relegating them to the confines of

their own minds. Thus, human relations could only be side-by-side and external rather

than be based on any primordial co-existence.17

Another reason why there has always been an epistemological problem within the

tradition is from the inner/outer distinction, or in other words, the mind/body gap.

Heidegger knew that there is obviously a distinction between the two, but says there is

also a unity. They are not separate, as Descartes makes them seem. The idea of the Cogito

split the two and thus created a bifurcation that continues to be a problem in philosophy

today. This echoed the Platonic idea of hierarchical structures which relegated the body

to the lowest form of pursuit towards the good. Instead, if we think of them as united,

then it is not only our minds that are in-the-world, but our bodies as well. For the time

being this topic will not be pursued further; however, it is important to signal this

17
We will later see a parallel development in political philosophy that is rooted in the Cartesian subject.
Modern liberal politics became about abstract individual rights. Liberalism overlooks the fundamental
sameness that can be developed out of Heideggerian ethics, through his notion of Mitsein and being-in-the-
world. The point here is that we are not as isolated as liberalism has made us seem.
 17

dichotomy for future reference since it will be discussed in later chapters. For now, it is

worth noting because it is one of many dualities that were created by Descartes.

While Descartes pursued pure rational thought, empiricists believed in objects

impressing themselves upon our minds. Yet, neither of these two schools of thought was

satisfactory for Kant as he sought to explain knowledge and ethics in a totally new form.

He proposed the theory that subjects are not passive agents in an objective world. We do

not merely receive data in its complete form. We actually bring something to the world

because of an a priori schema that organizes the world into an intelligible form.

Heidegger would later add to this theory by claiming that we also bring our own personal

history and cultural influences. It is not merely a cognitive act that is based solely on an

individual within a closed system. Our actions depend on the past and other people as

well. This would be one of the major breakthroughs that caused the tradition to shift

completely.

So in a sense, Kant’s theories looked to be much more in line with modern

phenomenology.18 However, despite the fact that Kant moved past the ideas of

empiricists such as those of John Locke who proposed that experiences were bundles of

ideas, his own theories still caused the inner/outer dualism between the subject and

objects outside of the self. As Olafson states, Kant came close to a phenomenological

discussion of experience, but fell short since “he does not finally conceive the

phenomenal world in terms of presence, but rather as a manifold of representations, on

18
In this instance, Kant still fell short of Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology, as he believed there
was still a “thing-in-itself” separate from the phenomenal world, in what he called the “noumenal” world.
Husserl would later develop phenomenology as we know it by studying only what appears in
consciousness. Thus, Kant’s theory was a major step towards 20 th century philosophy.
 18

which various logical operations have been performed.”19 Therefore, Kant split the I from

its being-in-the-world. The processes that make knowledge possible are always away

from the world as if they are somehow independent of it. In reality, what he calls “logical

acts” are always-already in the world.20

In a clear critique of Kant, Heidegger explains as an example of the subject being

separated from the world that the phenomenon of space is not to be understood as being

in the subject prior to the world. He states “Space is neither in the subject nor is the

world in space.”21 We do not come up with the idea of space prior to our being-in-the-

world; it comes from the encounter with the world itself. It is not that Dasein discovers

space as an a priori category prior to being-in-the-world. What makes Dasein unique is

that Dasein always-already understands space by virtue of its existence. We discover

space through our everyday interactions with objects and interacting with the world, not

through a detached reasoning outside of it.

The reader may once again ask why this thesis devotes so much time to

epistemological questions (theoretical judgment) when thinkers like Kant have a totally

separate ethics. But we must remember the objective of this thesis is to illustrate that the

binaries that were created within the tradition (subject/object, inner/outer, etc.) are all

ethically relevant. If our position in the world in relation to others begins from the

standpoint of total opposition to the other, then how can we come up with an ethics that

goes beyond mere objective presence? We only see the other as a separate consciousness

which we must try and access rather than seeing them as other beings which co-exist.
19
Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being: A Heideggerian View. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 147.
20
Olafson, WIAHB, 7.
21
Heidegger, 108.
 19

The philosopher that came closest to establishing a modern intersubjective

philosophy before Heidegger was Husserl.22 For Husserl, the other is given through

analogy and never directly.23 He called this “appresentation.”24 The relation of my body

to the ego was the same for the other and thus, we can come to know them because of

their similarity. It is a kind of “cognitive doubling” that posits the other as being similar

by means of reflection rather than existential positing. For Husserl, only bodies are

immediately present, while cognition or understanding of the other comes through

empathy.25 The humanity of the other is appresented, meaning that it is not clear

initially.26 It is a cognitive understanding of the other, much like the tradition before him.

As we shall see later, Heidegger replaces this egological view with Dasein and bodily

existence, and in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger does not believe we need to double

ourselves in order to know the other. For Heidegger, cognitive doubling is an artificial

construct as the idea behind it relies on the premise that others are “just like me.”

Although Husserl uses empathy as a way to bridge the Ego and the other, it still ignores

the ontological structure of Dasein insofar as it focuses on subjectivity and the other,

rather than exploring the pre-given qualities of being-with the other, namely, what it

22
Apel and Habermas were also major figures in the German tradition who tried to present intersubjectivity
and ethics through discourse. They deserve mention because of their unwillingness to accept Kantian or
Cartesian individualistic approaches to philosophy.
23
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. 12. (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1999), 112.
In this case, Husserl explains that we must look at ourselves first in order to understand the other.
24
Husserl, 108-109
25
Although he never used the term “empathy”, Wilhelm Dilthey was a major influence in this particular
case. Dilthey acknowledged that the way to understand the world came through introspection and
understanding the other.
Husserl would also be greatly influenced by the works of David Hume and Franz Brentano. Both of which
shaped his idea of “intentionality”; the idea that all conscious activity has a directedness towards objects.
26
Heidegger discusses empathy briefly and makes it clear that empathy is only possible on the basis of
being-with. In other words, empathy is not sufficient in explaining ontological being-with.
Heidegger, 120-121.
 20

means to be in the world with others.27 Mitsein (as we shall see) is not meant to be about

separate entities in relation, but a genuine engagement in “the there” of the world.

Although empathy is a step towards existential ethics and interpersonal

relationships, it still has its limits. It cannot account for the entirety of interpersonal

relationships. Its biggest limitation is that it still perpetuates the subject/other division, as

we must come upon the other from the standpoint of a self-contained self. Thus, the

starting point of empathy is a closure towards the other from which we must emerge.

Dasein is in a world of shared meaning structures and empathy is only made possible by

being-with others. To put it another way, empathy is something we experience on an

ontical level and being-with is the ontological pre-condition which makes empathy

possible.

Most of the intersubjective problems that confounded Husserl are to do with his

continuation of modern epistemology. Husserl largely ignored the difference between

perception and reality and instead chose to focus on consciousness alone and how things

appear to the mind. The epoché is used to try and bracket the natural world or to suspend

judgement of it in order to explore the phenomena and how it appears in consciousness.

Bracketing under the Husserlian tradition was meant to give access to the “I” coming

from outside the world; a proposition which is theoretically significant, but limited in our

daily existence with others. This type of formal philosophical exercise takes the world out

of being-in-the-world. It becomes existentially irrelevant since from Heidegger’s

perspective we cannot examine the subject without the world. As we shall see, being-in-

27
The idea of empathy comes from the Fifth Meditation of Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Phenomenology. That is where Husserl claims we are a community of monads bound by a certain social,
cultural framework.
 21

the-world is part of Dasein’s fundamental constitution.28 The world cannot be bracketed

for Heidegger as we are always-already affected by things around us. By virtue of the fact

that we are beings, we are moral beings. We cannot slip in and out of a worldly context

which means we cannot bracket the world and make our decisions from outside of it. We

must deal with the present context (whatever it may be) and make decisions that impact

the lives of others. This can be as simple as whether or not to physically hurt someone or

it may mean building a multi-national corporation based upon greed which can have

harmful effects on people, animals or the earth.

Therefore, bracketing is a valid form of philosophical reasoning, but does not tell

us anything about how we experience things outside of consciousness. Therefore,

reducing things to things in the mind takes the context out of the item and eliminates its

existential character. This does not mean an object exists in the same way as Dasein, but

it can relate people to others by its history and place in the world. Therefore, Husserl’s

idea of a transcendental subject as a cognitive act could not address the issue of practical

philosophy.

C) Conclusion

As we can see, the tradition has stressed a number of binaries that have caused

epistemological and ethical problems. Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, there was a

clear divide between what humans experienced and the world of essences. Whether the

essence of a given object was in the world as it was for Aristotle or in a world of Ideas for

Plato, in each instance objects in the world were only ever partially accessible to humans.

28
Heidegger, 54.
 22

These ideas continued well into the modern age when Descartes and Kant began

exploring consciousness and explaining how we truly experience the world. By doing

this, however, they further separated not only humans from objects by isolating them

within their own minds, but also humans from each other. We became stuck in our own

minds and then became obsessed with trying to figure out how we can possibly

understand each other. Husserl tried to solve this problem with his ideas of empathy and

appresentation; however, he still never fully withdrew from the subject-oriented tradition.

Heidegger offers a solution to this problem which changes the entire view, not only of

metaphysics, but of ethics as well. As we shall see in the following chapter, Heidegger’s

view of being-in-the-world releases us from isolation and brings forth an idea of

ontological existence that is always-already with others.

 23

Chapter 2 - Being-there and Being-with

There are two fundamental concepts that distinguish Heidegger from the rest of

the tradition. The first is Dasein, which translated basically means “being-there”. The

second term is Mitsein or “being-with.” At first glance both of these terms seem rather

self-explanatory, but they are central to understanding Heidegger’s entire project in Being

and Time. This chapter will focus upon these two terms and explain why they are so

significant not only to Heidegger’s project, but to the history of philosophy. The first part

of the chapter will explain the significance of Dasein and how it is a break from the idea

of the Cartesian ego. This will be important in establishing the existential analytic for

which Heidegger strives. The second section will be an in-depth analysis of Mitsein and

how it is a revolutionary turn away from traditional intersubjective relationships. This

will help us understand how we encounter others in the world and why this has potential

to be an ethical philosophy.

Despite these divisions, the reader will notice that many of the themes and

concepts will overlap. This is due to Heidegger’s hermeneutical system which constantly

defines and then expands various terms. We cannot discuss Dasein without discussing

Mitsein and we cannot discuss being without discussing being-with others. These

concepts are completely intertwined and will thus be explained only partially on their

own certain points will have to be repeated in order to be fully comprehended in a

contextual totality.

By the end of the chapter it is my hope that the reader will understand the

concepts that are essential to Heidegger’s break away from the tradition. By doing this, I
 24

want to establish the idea of being-in-the-world as a fundamental aspect of being Dasein.

As well, I would like to illustrate how being-with others is a major aspect of our existence

and not merely a relationship with others that is achieved through cognitive reflection.

Thus, the entire idea of what it means to be and what it means to be with others will be

transformed from an isolated subject to a being whose essence is existence with others.

My goal is that this chapter will work as a prelude to the final chapter which will discuss

the ethical aspects of Heidegger’s early work.

A) Being-There & Being-In

Being-there may seem like a simple concept, yet, according to Heidegger, it has

been misunderstood. Literally translated, Dasein means “being-there,” immersed in the

world of people and things. Put simply, Dasein is not the ego that Descartes or Husserl

placed at the center of daily life.29 In Heidegger and the Subject, François Raffoul notes

that Heidegger only deepens the question of subjectivity rather than eliminating it.

Raffoul states that Heidegger is interested in understanding selfhood in its fullest.

However, the reason why subjectivity is an obstacle for being is that it has always been

approached in the wrong way. He notes that Heidegger abandons the metaphysics of

subjectivity which has made the subject into a present-at-hand object. The question then

becomes, what is meant to replace subjectivity?

For Heidegger, this question can only be answered by looking into the meaning of

being. However, the tradition, as we have seen, has always been ontotheological by

29
The reader should also note that being-there should not necessarily be used as a synonym for human
being. The latter term brings with it a set of terms that has socio-political connotations categorizes it under
a traditional liberal category. Although in many ways Dasein is similar to human being, the two terms are
not synonymous.
 25

claiming that the highest being is equivalent to being as such. We must then somehow

find a way to access this question in a completely novel way. But, for Heidegger, there

are two things that stall our understanding of being. The first is that we have forgotten the

question of the meaning of being. In order to understand being we must find a way to

access being because being as such does not manifest itself fully. Therefore, Heidegger

posits that the best way to understand being is through a being or entity. Dasein is that

access point into the question of being, as it is the entity for which being is a question.

But, this does not adequately or completely describe Dasein. It may give us insight into

the question of being, but why does it do this and how?

Unlike Descartes’ cogitans, Heidegger’s Dasein is not a subject that is outside of

the world through reflection. It is always-already a part of the world by virtue of its being

thrown into it. Dasein’s being-there in the world is part of its mode of being. Dasein is in

“the there” and is not bracketed from the world like Husserl’s subject. For Husserl, there

are cases in which we must suspend our natural attitude and enter into the epoché. This

allows the subject to focus more on mental experience outside of the world. However,

Heidegger’s Dasein is always engaged and its being-in-the-world precedes reflection.30 It

is not a center like a subject, it is precisely the opposite. As Fred Dallmayr states “Dasein

is pre-egological in the sense that it precedes and bypasses customary dichotomies.”31

Dallmayr notes that Heidegger’s intent is to shift the actor away from the pursuit of

objectives and that it is no longer about the will or desire of the ego. It is about the

importance of the pre-conditions of action and what it means to exist in the world.

30
Later Heidegger states Dasein is being of the there (Das Sein des Da). (Dallmayr, 55) It is the happening
of clearing which manifests ontological truth.
31
Fred R. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 65.
 26

Dasein has a predisposition to being and to the question of being because it finds

itself in a privileged position. Dasein has a concern for the question of being; this is what

distinguishes it from other beings. It understands its being, without necessarily knowing

what it is.32 This means that being is disclosed to Dasein without being transparent and

obvious. Dasein always-already has an understanding of its being in the world by means

of relevance in the totality of things it encounters. For Heidegger, the tradition has

always been about objective presence or what he calls Vorhandenheit. It has always

treated beings as something we must consider and process philosophically. He believes

that our initial encounters are in fact best described a ready-to-hand or Zuhandenheit. As

opposed to the former term, zuhanden means a taking care of worldly things in the world,

or a concern for things. However, this concern is towards an end of Dasein’s personal

average everyday dealings and not a conscious deliberation about how things work or

where they are situated in a greater scheme. To put it more simply, we first encounter

things because of their use and not because they are philosophically meaningful.

As we can see, Dasein’s first involvement with the world is being in it, rather than

knowing it. With that point, we immediately move away from the tradition that placed

cognition and knowledge above all else. Dasein’s existence is an involved familiarity and

not a reflective disengagement. For Heidegger, reason should not be the defining factor of

humanity, but rather it is our existence that separates Dasein from other beings. We do

not need to question existence because existence precedes any cognition and this is why

for Heidegger the existential structure of Dasein is its being-in-the-world. But, the term

“in” does not have the same meaning as a corporeal being in, such as being in a pool or

32
Heidegger, 11.
 27

being in a field. That type of being-in is not existential in the same way, since it reduces

Dasein’s being-in to the traditional subject/object binary, by placing Dasein on the same

ontological level as the objects which surround it. Being-in-the-world is much more than

simple spatiality, the “in” of being-in is about involvement.33

This underscores one of Lawrence J. Hatab’s major points, which is that Dasein’s

being-in-the-world is performative. Dasein’s essence is the fact that it is constantly

creating itself and not bound by a fixed essence. To put it another way, the essence of

Dasein lies in its existence and its existence is towards an end. Despite its similarities,

Heidegger does not want Dasein to be confused with Aristotelian potentiality. That said,

for Heidegger, possibility stands higher than actuality, as Dasein is always “not-yet” what

it can be. Dasein is never completely whole and never stable. Dasein is characterized by

its nothingness or an abyss. It is always towards its nothingness or its death. This destroys

the idea of a fixed self-identity.34 This is Dasein’s essential quality, because by virtue of

its being, it is therefore not yet what it will be. If there is nothing outstanding for Dasein

it would cease to exist. Dasein understands its being as finite and is always moving

towards an end which is the essence of its existence.

This brings us to the second reason that our idea of being has been stalled.

According to Heidegger, we are stuck in a binary logic between essence and existence.35

Essence has always been fixed, or been thought of as potential, as in the case of Aristotle.

The question of man and his essence has been around philosophy since its inception;

33
Heidegger, 54.
34
Dallmayr, 63-64.
35
This reasoning is central to Gavin Rae’s "Re-Thinking the Human: Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology,
and Humanism."
 28

however, it has overlooked being as such. For Heidegger, humans are open-ended and are

defined by their existence or ek-static nature.36 Only humans can ek-sist and are thus a

special kind of being.37 For Heidegger, being ekstatically there means being immersed in

the world and being open to the question of being. Existence is an ek-stasis (standing

out). This is not to be confused with an empirical presence or Sartrean consciousness, but

a pre-reflective “immersion in the there.”38 What Gavin Rae explains here is the special

position which humans occupy in the world. While the traditional conception of a human

through the Middle Ages has been derivative and about a specific difference (i.e. rational-

animal), Rae states that humans must be judged on their own and not in opposition to

other non-human beings, meaning that they are not defined by being a species of animal

and hold a unique position in the world.39

Dasein’s place in the world is not like that of objects either. Dasein is in the world

existentially, meaning that it “is “in” the world in the sense of a familiar and heedful

dealing with the beings encountered within the world. Thus, when spatiality is attributed

to it in some way, this is possible only on the basis of this being-in.”40 Heidegger states

that its spatiality is characterized by a “de-distancing.”41 In other words it makes distance

disappear and brings other beings closer existentially. Heidegger gives the example of a

radio, or better yet, in today’s terms it could be the internet that eliminates the distance

between people around the world while the physical distance between them stays the

36
Gavin Rae, "Re-Thinking the Human: Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology, and Humanism." Human
Studies. no. 1 (2010), 24.
37
Heidegger, 114.
38
Hatab, 11.
39
Rae, 30.
40
Heidegger, 102.
41
Heidegger, 102.
 29

same. Our measurements in everyday life are dictated by these types of estimations and

variable ranges.

What is important here is that our lives are not dictated by precise calculative

measurements. On many occasions we say that our friend lives around the block, or is

just a five minute walk away. We do not say he or she is seven hundred metres away

from our doorstep and that if we walk at 10 kilometers per hour we will arrive in 12

minutes. The latter example has validity, say for a precise calculation in an experiment,

but does not have any in day-to-day existence among other Daseins. Heidegger’s point

here is that we do not live in a world of constant systematic calculation, but in a world of

shared meaning in which two or more parties understand what “around the block” may

mean even if the term is not exact.

This point will be expanded upon later when we deal with interpersonal

relationships. For now, let us turn back to being-in-the-world and how Dasein

differentiates itself from the tradition. As we have seen, Dasein is not a rational animal,

or the ego and it is also not a subject. Dasein is defined by its existence in a referential

totality as it stands out from other beings and from present-at-hand entities like tools.

There are two modes for Dasein, the first of which (the ontological existential), has

already been explained. The second mode is the ontic existentiell the level on which

Dasein operates on a daily basis. This is not a normative statement about how we should

live, but a factical quality of Dasein’s existence. Neither mode takes precedence over the

other and both of these modes are essential to Dasein’s existence. Dasein cannot operate

solely in one mode or the other.

 30

The split between two modes of existence for Dasein is one of the biggest

challenges when trying to reconcile Heidegger’s ideas with ethics. The reason for this is

that we usually live in the ontic existentiell realm and we tend to become immersed in

that world. This is a world of facts and inauthentic existence which is dictated by our

forgetting of the question of being. Facts for Heidegger are constructed because our

position in the world affects our very experience of them. Therefore, facts are not outside

of experience and are not universally true, they are true contingent upon human

experience. As we shall see, there is no authentic being-with others; however, I will later

explain that this does not mean that being-with others is any less important. Heidegger

does not want to attribute any normative values to words such as authentic and

inauthentic. They are both necessary to each other and to the existence of Dasein. They

can never be totally separated from each other, but they are distinct in their own ways.

What then makes existence authentic or inauthentic and why is it important for Dasein’s

existence?

First, we must discuss the inauthentic realm and what Dasein encounters in that

mode. It is important to note that Dasein’s inauthentic existence is contingent upon the

various horizons by which Dasein defines itself. For example, we can be lawyers,

doctors, husbands, wives, children, and so on. However, none of these qualities of Dasein

are authentic because none of them are proper to Dasein, meaning they are contingent

upon our circumstances. What makes Dasein unique and authentic is its being towards its

own end. We are authentic when we realize that we are finite beings and that we are

always-already being-towards-death. One may say that all beings are being-towards-

death, which is true, but only Dasein understands this unique circumstance.
 31

Understanding has a specific ontological meaning for Heidegger. For him, as for many of

his predecessors, it is an existential understanding of one’s own death and not only

knowing something ontically. This is an important concept for Heidegger, because it

distinguishes Dasein from other beings. Dasein is the only being for Heidegger that can

anticipate death.42 For Heidegger, this relates to Dasein’s temporality and its structural

whole. We see death as outstanding and to come to an end means to relate to our futural

projection.

Being-in-the-world can thus be characterized as a finite dwelling as we are always

being-towards death and are aware of this fact. Dasein is always moving towards its

own-most possibility. As Heidegger believes, humans are in a privileged position because

they understand their situation as finite. For Werner Marx and Heidegger, death is a kind

of awakening that summons us out of indifference. As Marx says “Horror, forlornness,

and helplessness are the attunements that have now replaced indifference and that

unmask my naïve security as mere illusion, and only a veneer.”43

It may seem by this description of being-in-the-world that we are somehow

isolated individuals like subjects or an ego. But this is far from the case as we will soon

see. However, one of the challenges as stated above is reconciling how we can be

authentic and how we can be with others. The challenge arises because in order to be

authentic and to be towards death we must face that end ourselves. No one other than

ourselves can die our own death. This problematizes the intersubjective relationship, but

42
Heidegger , 227.
43
Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics: Ethos and the Life-World. (Albany: State University
of New York, 1992), 50.
 32

does not completely de-value it. This will be a problem that will be discussed in the next

section.

The foregoing discussion was a brief description of what it means to be there. But

of course that is not the main question of this thesis. What we want to know is why

Heidegger’s idea of being-there is so unique to the tradition and why it changes

intersubjective and ethical history. This is the question for the next section, which will

look at how part of Dasein’s fundamental constitution is being-with others.

B) Being-With

When we look at the tradition, whether it is Descartes, Kant, or Husserl, we see a

common theme: our philosophical foundation is from a position of individuation

separated from others. This results in the subject trying to understand his or her own

existence by looking out into the world. When the conclusion is reached that one truly

exists, the problem then becomes, how can we know the other? Because we can never

step into the skin of the other, we make the analogy that the other is just like me. This is

how the classical problem of intersubjectivity has always been framed. Heidegger

believes that our being-with one another does not consist of a rational scientific model

from which we deduce the existence of the other. The presence of others is not simply

“added on” to our own experience.44 We do not have experience without others and then

somehow cognitively add the other afterwards. Dasein does not theoretically distinguish

itself from others, it is always-already there with others in the world of action.

44
Heidegger, 115.
 33

Similar to Heidegger, Wittgenstein had a similar approach when it came to our

relationship with others. For him there was no need for “epistemic bridges” in order to

get to the other, as we have an attitude towards others that is not based on knowledge or

belief.45 Most importantly, we are a community of language users. But it is not just a

matter of hearing the other or seeing the other’s mind or body, what we see or hear is a

human being. We experience human beings as the whole that they are, rather than in

fragments. Now it may be true that there is an asymmetry or discrepancy between what

we feel or experience, and the experiences of the other; however, that does not mean that

our existence must be thought of in individualistic terms.46

Here we see what is so revolutionary about Heidegger’s model; it is that our

existence does not involve questioning whether or not we are truly present, nor does it

involve questioning the existence of the other. Existence should be defined as an “I-We”

relationship in which the “I” and the “We” are equiprimordial.47 Neither one precedes the

other, nor is one of greater importance. Each constitutes an important aspect of being

which is essential to the other.48 Therefore, the idea that we may never know whether the

other exists is never an issue. Our first question for this section is: how are others

encountered in the world?

45
Soren Overgaard, “The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological Perspective.”
Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences. no. 5 (2006), 55-56.
46
Overgaard, 66.
47
Although Heidegger uses it in a different context, I wanted to emphasize that neither I or We comes prior
to the other temporally. Unlike the tradition, Heidegger does not want to begin with the I and move outward
to the other. Instead, we are always-already with others. The term equipromordial is first used in Heidegger,
12.
48
The idea of the “I-We” relationship can never be expressed properly in language because even when we
write something we must put one term before the other. That is why the terms are hyphenated, so that we
can come as close as possible to describing the simultaneity of this relationship.
 34

As discussed earlier, Dasein operates in two different modes. We will begin here

by discussing the inauthentic mode which is where Dasein exists on a daily basis. Our

initial interaction with others and the world for Heidegger is through equipment. We

come to know the other by using various tools. For example, the hammer that we use to

build something has a history of previous interaction with other people. Even though one

may purchase the hammer brand new, there has to be someone that sold you the hammer,

as well as the people who manufactured it. Thus, our initial encounter with objects does

not make the subject/object division noticeable. Our pre-reflective practices are what take

precedence in the life-world rather than scientific objectivity which so many philosophers

have claimed. We actually lose ourselves in the world of handiness because we do not

consciously act and reflect upon those actions. It is existence at its most bare. “Handiness

is the ontological categorical definition of beings as they are ‘in themselves’.”49 Our

ready-to-handedness is ontologically primary as we become familiar with the world by

using things and through action. Our relationship with others is not initially as present-to-

hand subjects. That only comes later through theoretical reflection. This also illustrates

that we are always connected to others even if they are not physically present. Almost all

of our actions somehow involve others in a direct or indirect manner.

Heidegger makes it clear that the physical presence of others is not the deciding

factor of whether or not we are “with” someone. He states “Being-alone is a deficient

mode of being-with.”50 This means that part of the existential constitution of Dasein is

that it is always with others and that being alone physically does not negate being-with.

He goes on to say that someone can be in the physical presence of others and still feel

49
Heidegger, 71.
50
Heidegger, 117.
 35

lonely. Thus, the physicality of others is only a small part of what it means to be with

others. For example, those we love the most are always with us in some way, it could be

in our thoughts or dreams, whatever it may be, their presence is often felt in our lives. In

fact, it can often be said that we experience the presence of others most when they are not

physically with us. We see this often times with married couples or couples in long-term

relationships, as the physicality of the other is taken for granted because they are with

each other almost every day. However, when they are apart, they begin to miss each other

and reflect on the qualities that they miss most about the other. Those reflections often

are coupled with feelings of longing because they are accustomed to being with each

other. Therefore, proximity to the other is often not a determinative factor of being-with.

Although it is understandable and even in some ways natural to think that because we are

physically present that we are with the other, it is not what Mitsein ultimately entails.

As we can see from the previous example, equipment is also not the only way we

encounter others. From the very beginning of our lives we are immersed in a world that

has been previously formed. Olafson states that initially we depend on others to provide

for us and then we depend upon their guidance to help us see and understand the world.

The “with” of being-with is essentially a standing out in “the there” with others which

requires a response and disclosure. We stand out in the openness in the world with others

and rely on their response to live properly. “The disclosedness of the Dasein-with of

others which belongs to being-with means that the understanding of others already lies in

the understanding of being Dasein because its being is being-with.”51 This quote

illustrates that insofar as we exist, we understand that we are with others on a basic level.

51
Heidegger, 120.
 36

It does not come after cognitive reasoning, because it is always-already a part of our basic

existential constitution.

The other becomes known to us through action and helps frame our understanding

of the world. From this we see that our being-in-the-world is based upon our being-with

others. We depend greatly on others, as knowledge is a very public notion and not solely

a private concept as some philosophers have claimed. Of course, we are still the ones that

must filter the information; however, knowledge is not only up to the individual,

especially from a very young age. Dasein has a history which we share with others. We

inherit ideas of morality, judgement, intuition, etc. from past generations. But we also do

not passively accept those ideas. We still must choose to accept those ideas and practice

them or not. Lawrence J. Hatab alludes to the point that adults bring with them an entire

world when raising a child. Their lives were shaped by others and they bring with them

an entire history of beliefs and values that they pass on to their children. For Heidegger,

we are not separated, but rather unified by experiences.52 We live in a shared system of

meanings, which is obviously against the monological view that states the world is full of

brute facts that are dependent upon our own personal understanding.53 Therefore, we can

say that we live in a Mitwelt, as we exist with others in the world rather than as

fragmented individuals within a self-contained system.

Husserl sought to counter the popular positivistic account of the world and came

up with the idea that we have a plurality of meanings in everyday activity. This means

that we never experience the world as a whole. This plurality of meanings is met with a

52
Heidegger, 118.
53
Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 18.
 37

mood which discloses the world differently based on the situation. So where does that

leave us within these worlds? According to Werner Marx, the self is relatively stable

despite these changing surroundings; however, it would be wrong to say it is the same

stable ego or self that we find in the tradition.54 The reason for this is that what the

tradition has overlooked is being-with others that is always present in varying contexts.

This is where Heidegger distinguishes himself from much of the tradition. He posits that

we are with others in the world of meaning, rather than individuated and separated from

the world. As Marx states, “There is no solipsistic world; world always bears in its

essence the character of our fellow man.”55 We are not closed off from others and thus do

not need to “cross over” to connect with others.56 Our identity is only formed by our

relationships within various communities and histories. They are not shaped

independently of experience or by properties that exist outside of our being-in-the-

world.57 This should not imply that ontological relatedness eliminates all doubt between

individual minds. Rather, Heidegger’s idea of Mitsein allows for a superior foundation to

interpersonal relationships by moving beyond the idea of other minds.

Therefore, we cannot discuss disclosure merely in terms of human minds.

Disclosure comes in three ways, firstly, through attunement, secondly, through

understanding; and lastly through language. Each of these three concepts plays a role in

revealing the world. Mood is an affective attunement rather than a subjective feeling, as

evidenced by the fact that there can be a cultural or social mood. Affective reactions can

dictate many moral situations. For example, when we see a child being beaten senselessly

54
Marx, 132.
55
Marx, 135.
56
Marx, 135.
57
Freeman, 375.
 38

it impacts our world on a visceral level. We can feel the pain of someone not by analogy,

but by affective attunement. Affect is world disclosive and reveals people and the world

through mood. This disclosure can often be historical and cultural as well, thus it

illustrates how impactful it can be on a larger scale according to Heidegger.

Therefore, Dasein is not merely about subjective consciousness. The entire idea of

a self-conscious subject is predicated upon the idea that we must rationally reflect upon

ourselves in order to disclose our subjectivity. However, there is little need for the

language self-consciousness, because we see ourselves, or become disclosed through our

use of equipment. Beings are discovered only when they are referred to something which

in turn gives them an ontological relevance. When we hammer, fasten, and build things it

is always for a purpose, or for-the-sake-of-which. It is always in order to preserve Dasein

and to create a space for it to pursue possibilities. This revelation has a twofold

consequence. The first is that it shatters the self-referential consciousness that has always

been prevalent in philosophical history. Self-reflection is presupposed and not a way of

learning something new about ourselves. The second is that for Heidegger, even in the

inauthentic mode, Dasein learns something about itself.58

We must think of disclosure as a common world of truth. Husserl rightly critiqued

psychologism for this very reason, as it only relativizes cultures and ethnicities and

eliminates the possibility of a common world. It splits the human condition rather than

uniting it. But then we are left with the question of individual discrepancy. How is it that

one person may experience something differently than the other? Heidegger does not

58
Steven Crowell, “What Gives? Getting over the Subject.” Continental Philosophy Review. 33 (2000),
100.
 39

wish to eliminate this epistemological question altogether, but does not want there to be

the subject/object isolation that we have seen. On a phenomenological level we may

experience things differently, but truth should be thought of as an opening which is open

to all people and not just some. This means that because of our being-in-the-world we are

all capable of similar experiences, even if they are not always identical. This relates back

to the idea of sameness which I explained earlier. Our experiences are based on a shared

system of meanings and not a closed one. Our circumstances may be different than those

of the other, but those contingencies are not the defining factor of our existence. It is the

openness to those experiences that helps define that sameness.

This is one of the grounds for all ethical relationships. The importance of trust

cannot be overstated here as once again we must rely on others to provide us with some

sense of direction as well as truth. Thus, others must use truth responsibly because they

are accountable for what they do and say to others. Heidegger uses the term Rede

(discourse) to describe the passing of truth from one person to another or the

unconcealment of being or beings that are talked about. Discourse is the existential basis

for language.59 Language takes priority within the three categories of disclosure

previously mentioned, as it is a communicative practice. For Heidegger its importance

lies in the fact that language is in the world and not trapped in the mind of the individual.

It is a shared practice rather than an individualistic endeavour that requires scientific

analysis. It is an opening that allows for interpretation and creates the possibility of a co-

understanding. It means that we all pass a disclosure of ourselves and the world whenever

we speak.

59
Heidegger, 31-32.
 40

Here is where Heidegger signals the importance of listening because it is an

existential being-open for the other. However, like most Heideggerian concepts, listening

has a specific meaning. We can only listen when we understand what is being said.

Heidegger states “being-with-one-another takes place in talking with one another and in

heeding what is spoken about.”60 In other words, we are already together with the other

so that their discourse makes sense to us within this worldly context. Conversely,

speaking a lot has no value to Heidegger as it often makes things less intelligible and

conceals meaning. A good example arises when politicians speak with jargon. They often

say many words, but those words have no meaning or value; they mask any truth rather

than disclosing it. Therefore, we must be able to listen in order to accept difference, so

there must be a silence that allows for the other to speak.

What we can then say is that disclosure occurs primarily in the way which things

are done with others. In other words, we disclose ourselves towards the other when we

act. In some sense this is very similar to what Heidegger says about being-with.

Disclosure should be thought of in functional and instrumental terms as we constantly

have dealings with others in our day-to-day lives. Our worlds are not separate enclosed

systems that exclude others. Our initial experience is always-already with others in a

world of functional equipment. Once again, we must emphasize the importance of each

other towards our potential development.

While there may be a wide variety of actions that may be deemed to be “proper”

or “right” in any given situation, the consequences of those actions are often shared by

many. For example, if two people have two totally opposing views on how they should

60
Heidegger, 162.
 41

act in a given situation then there are usually no ultimate consequences for holding those

views. However, if those views are acted upon, then the consequences can go far beyond

those individuals. Thus, Mitsein “commits us” in a field of action that is always towards

the other. We must also remember that a thing is only useful because of its place in a

totality in reference to other things. Things or deeds are not good in and of themselves,

they need a context. Therefore, we cannot have categorical rules as they exclude context.

Much like the hammer needs a person to put it to use, a good deed is defined by how one

acts and not by following a set of pre-established rules. Here, we begin to see some of the

ways in which Heidegger’s idea of being-with can have ethical consequences.

Much like Heidegger, Frederick Olafson states that the ground of ethics is a

relation between humans and not a “supreme moral truth from which rules of conduct

could be deduced.”61 This point is essential to understanding Heidegger’s project as a

whole. He is not interested in constructing a new ethical code or telling people how they

ought to live; instead his project describes how it is that we already live and what it

means to be and to exist together in the world. More specifically, Heidegger wants to

describe how we disclose ourselves to one another. Heidegger uses the term entdecken

(ent-decken), which means to discover (dis-cover literally). This prefix shows that there is

an opening towards the other as we literally un-close ourselves in a way that is

reciprocal.62 According to Heidegger, humans have a special relationship to each other

that only we share with other humans and not with animals and certainly not with

objects.63 One can then make the claim that there is a partnership that comes from this

61
Olafson, HGE, 7.
62
Olafson, HGE, 8.
63
Heidegger, 114-115.
 42

relationship and “this partnership carries with it a binding character of a specifically

ethical kind.”64

But for Heidegger there is a negative aspect to being-with, which he calls Das-

Man.65 Translated, the term can be seen as “the they” or, “the one.” (as in “Man spricht”

– “one speaks.”) For the purpose of this thesis I shall use the term “the one” as it

represents anonymity and a voice with no particular speaker. Das-Man is a closure as it

makes things appear a certain way only because “one says so.” Individuality is lost, as

things are said anonymously. Dasein becomes dispersed in the one and must find itself. It

is effectively what Olafson calls a “self-disqualification” of the individual as there is no

longer any responsibility for what is said. We lose our individual voice and we are no

longer able to ek-sist in an authentic manner. The one is concerned with averageness. It is

concerned with levelling down of all possibilities by making them public. That said, it is

not a universal subject or a genus.

Being immersed in the one can be called an against-one-another because it pins

people against each other through gossip and idle talk. The world of Das-Man is ruled by

gossip and idle talk. Unfortunately, many people get to know things this way. Especially

in our modern age where we have constant twenty four hour news channels and the

internet, our exposure to gossip is more prevalent than ever. What is supposed to be

informative is often merely idle talk and therefore, it becomes difficult for many to tell

the difference between substantial information and information that has been said

anonymously without sources. Then, like a plague, it spreads to others and is repeated.

64
Olafson, HGE, 11.
65
Heidegger, 114.
 43

This is how the one thrives as millions throw false information around and eventually

myths are created which replace truth. Our world becomes flooded and no responsibility

is ever taken because the source or the original speaker is long gone or never existed.

The reader can easily see that this can be translated into the difference between

what we deem to be genuine relationships, and public or corporate ones. We have true

friendships that are based on trust, responsibility, concern, and others that are public and

have none of those qualities. On the surface many large companies may appear to care for

their workers, but those are all just by-products of their goals to maintain a bottom line.

In other words, if they provide health care to their workers, it is not because they show

genuine concern, but because they want to maintain healthy workers to achieve their own

goals. Ultimately, the company will not help you in the same way as a friend. The one is

the same since it takes no responsibility for what is said or done. But it is also important

to remember that the one is still part of the constancy of Dasein’s existence. Dasein

cannot live without the one anymore than it can live without genuine relationships.

At this point one should recall that Das-Man is on the ontic and inauthentic level.

But this does not mean Dasein is permanently trapped in such a state. For Heidegger,

authenticity means to escape from the one and take responsibility. Conscience calls

Dasein back from Das-Man which causes Dasein to feel guilty.66 Gewissen is a

conscience or a voice of the individual. The call of Dasein back to itself does not have

any real content. In other words, it does not give Dasein guidance on how it should live as

66
Heidegger, 224.
 44

we have seen in the past with ethical codes.67 We are summoned into existence and

brought back into taking action. It is a counter to Das-Man’s totalizing voice. It is a silent

call that calls Dasein out of Das-Man and makes it recall its individuality. It is a reminder

that even though we may be under Das-Man, we are still responsible as individuals for

our actions. Ortega claims that this understanding is the condition for living morally. Our

guilt is not a debt, but an understanding of responsibility.

We are initially under the spell of Das-Man and enjoy it because it relieves us of

authentic choice. However, we owe ourselves a choice and must free ourselves from Das-

Man. Unlike previous times where our choices were either determined by God or

universal maxims, we are now forced into a position to choose. It is a choice to have a

conscience and this is what it means to be resolute. As Philipse states, it is not a moral

law that guides you and there are no definite answers. By choosing to be resolute, Dasein

is not bound by normative moral rules. It seems, however, that Philipse overstates

Dasein’s resoluteness as somehow outside of moral norms.68 We must still deal with the

world even if we escape inauthenticity. Our choices may be free, but they are always

constrained by norms and pre-existing values that were established long before we

existed. If we are only going to follow a moral archetype or narrative then we are not

really choosing as those decisions are made for us already. The circumstances in which

we live will vary and determine in a sense how we should act, but never dictate our

actions totally. Therefore, our actions will always have consequences not only to

67
Philipse, 453-454.
Here we should note the contrast that is made by Philipse in regards to the traditional notion of guilt in
Kantian philosophy. The guilt that is brought on by conscience is not a call to adhere to moral norms, but
rather the call of silence.
68
Philipse, 456.
 45

ourselves but to others as well, because the decisions we make always stand in relation to

the other.

What is evident here is that in Heidegger’s work there is a constant tension

between the individual and the group. The idea of authentic selfhood and being-toward-

death seem to allow no possibility of Mitsein. Despite claims from the past, Hatab rejects

the notion that individual authenticity is a total break from the social.69 Dasein is never a

rational self that separates itself from the world; it is never what we have come to know

as the liberal autonomous self. Authentic selfhood is always a mode of Mitsein because of

its constant involvement in the world of others.

Olafson had a similar argument and wondered whether it is possible to be

authentic together. He stated that our public mode of selfhood (Das-Man) occludes

individuality and ontology.70 We become lost amongst the crowd. In the same vein, one

of Sartre’s major critiques of Heidegger was that he was never able to account for the

particularity of the other.71 For Sartre, Mitsein is merely an a priori category that misses

the presence of the other. We encounter others by means of mediation (through

equipment), or in anonymity (das-Man). Irene Mcmullin answers these critiques made by

Sartre by saying Dasein is constituted by existential categories which are indeed a priori,

but can change based on our worldly existence.72 Therefore, they are not static as we may

have seen traditionally. We are grounded by our existence and not a set of laws that are

69
Hatab, 173.
70
Olafson, HGE, 3.
71
Irene McMullin, “Sharing the ‘now’: Heidegger and the Temporal Co-Constitution of the World.”
Continental Philosophy Review. 42 (2009), 201.
72
McMullin, 203.
 46

outside of human experience and interaction. Mitsein is thus dependent on particular

others because we respond to the particular temporal being that is the other.73

Ultimately, this leaves Dasein in a certain grey area because it is difficult to

explain things in terms of ethics if we are living anonymously and must try to escape

inauthenticity. Olafson claims that das-Man is merely a “deformation” of Mitsein and

that it does not represent true being-with.

It is most certain that no one other than yourself can die your death, but should

this be a defining factor of our relationships with the other? The answer is surely no.

Authenticity should not imply something of greater importance than inauthenticity. To be

authentic and to remember that we are being-towards-death only means that we should

not be defined by contingent circumstances of which we sometimes have no control. We

do not choose our birth and often times cannot choose our social circumstances. These

then should not be defining factors of our existence. Das-Man may cloud our

individuality and that is why we must escape from it. However, in a strange sense, for

Heidegger to be an individual always-already implies being an individual with others.

What is evident is that we cannot exist without others being in our lives. This is the

fundamental point of Heidegger’s theory on being-with. We are always-already with

others and our lives should be lived with that in mind. We are not solely individuated

beings that need to question our existence or the existence of others. We live in a world

of shared meanings which binds us together on a primordial level.

C) Heidegger’s Ethical Potential

73
McMullin, 216.
 47

Over the course of this chapter we have seen why Dasein is such an important

concept to the history of philosophy. We are no longer stuck in ourselves as isolated

subjects. We are defined by our existence as being-in-the-world. Secondly, Dasein is no

longer isolated from other individuals, since part of its fundamental constitution is being-

with others. Again, the fact that we are with others existentially means there is no need to

question the existence of the other because without the other we ourselves could not exist.

Therefore, what Heidegger has established is a new starting point for existence. This

creates new possibilities for discussing ethics because we no longer need to start from a

point of isolation and instead we start from togetherness. But what does an ethical

Mitsein look like? That is the task for the final chapter.
 48

Chapter 3 - Heidegger’s Mitsein: A New Ethics

Now that we have established the technical aspects of being-with, we must ask

ourselves what an ethical Mitsein looks likes. In other words, how does it manifest itself

in our daily lives? In this chapter we will re-visit some of the important concepts

discussed in the previous chapters and see how they can be seen through an ethical lens.

The purpose of this chapter will be to use the information we have already gathered to see

how Heidegger’s idea of Mitsein is a better groundwork for establishing an ethical

philosophy. The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first will discuss

Heidegger’s break with the ethical tradition and see why he has critiqued ethics as a

whole. We will look at some of the history of ethics and its ties to the subject/object

binary that was established by Descartes and continued up until Heidegger’s time. In this

section I hope to show how the subject/object binary has impacted ethics and what effect

it had on the tradition at large. We will see that what has happened is the starting point of

all ethics has been one of isolation. Then, in order to come out of isolation the subject

needs to reason his way out and into the world and only then come to know the other. The

result of this has been a false conception of intersubjective relationships predicated upon

individual reason and the adherence to universal maxims and norms. The goal here is to

show not only the limits of the tradition in ethics, but how Heidegger was influenced by

those ideas.

The second section will use the ideas that were discussed and show that

Heidegger’s work is ethical because of his concept of Mitsein. This will be made clear by

the fact that Heidegger does not have the same starting point. Rather, we begin by

always-already being-with others in the world. The impact of this is extremely important
 49

to this thesis because it eliminates the need to work from inside the subject out into the

world. The starting point becomes one of cohesion and self-other understanding and it

does not rely on principles which the individual must follow in order to be moral. As we

shall see, I am not the only one who thinks that Heidegger’s work can be seen in this way

and the reader will hopefully see that there are many different views on this matter, both

for and against. It is my hope that at the end of the chapter, the reader will see

Heidegger’s work as a new form of ethical thought.

A) Ethics in the Tradition

Prior to this chapter, several major aspects of the history of philosophy have been

explained. First, we have seen that philosophers prior to Heidegger had consistently

isolated the subject from the world and from other people. Heidegger counters this with

Dasein; the entity for whom being is a question and a being whose essence is existence.

But, Dasein alone cannot fully destroy the intersubjective gap that was created because of

the isolated ego. This was only solved by looking at how Dasein is able to exist and we

have seen that its existence is predicated upon the existence of other beings. Therefore,

unlike previous intersubjective theories which relied upon conscious acts of reflection,

Dasein’s existence with others does not need to be questioned because by virtue of its

existence, it must exist alongside of others. This has led us to this point where it is

imperative that we see how that dualism has shaped the history of ethics in general. In

this section of the chapter I will show the development of modern ethics and explain what

is lacking for a more complete existential ethics, or to be more precise, a Heideggerian

ethics. This will be done by discussing the idea of subjects in isolation from each other as

well as seeing how the tradition has framed ethics in general. Thus, we will look back to
 50

some of the issues discussed earlier in the work, as well as provide more detail of the

ethical tradition as a whole. By the end of this chapter we will see how the tradition has

interpreted our ethical relations to one another which will lead us into a discussion on the

existential nature of a new form of ethics.

In order to understand some of the critiques Heidegger makes of ancient and

medieval ethics, one has to understand the distinction he makes between morality and

ethics. While morality is involved in norms, ethics is about the free behaviour of the

individual and his or her conduct. For Heidegger, beginning with Plato, there has been a

decay into morality.74 This caused us to forget the question of being in favour of “an

object proper to particular knowledge.”75 In other words, being has been divided into

subjects such as physics, logic, ethics, etc. The consequence of this is that being is split

into categories and takes away the ontological difference.

The point to which we must refer from the outset is once again the problem of

other minds. The dualism of the inner/outer and subject/object left philosophy with an

artificial quandary about how we are to understand each other. For Heidegger, the scandal

of philosophy is that we have been forced to prove the existence of the outside world. It

should never be a matter of proving reality or even about having faith in one’s existence,

when part of the fundamental constitution of our being is being-in-the-world. The

creation of the inner/outer reality is also due in large part to the reflective nature of

philosophy. It comes from the belief that we must analyze our very existence before we

74
Benso, 160.
75
Benso, 160.
 51

can even begin to exist. In other words, if we are not sure that we exist then how can we

even act?

Heidegger states that the modern turn towards the subject occurred because the

self is immediately given and accessible. At least in principle this is true, as we are more

accessible to ourselves than the objects that stand in opposition to us. However, where

modern philosophy failed is by radicalizing the opposition between subject and object

without maintaining the ontological difference. What occurred then is an ontical

difference of two present-at-hand beings. This is where Heidegger is most misunderstood

as he does not wish to bridge the gap between subject and object. He is rather interested

in establishing the ontological difference between Dasein and its world. The modern

tradition started with an isolated subject and a worldless object. They can then both be

considered worldless substances, which overlooks the importance of the inner-worldly

existence of Dasein. Therefore, Descartes’ famous Cogito Sum can turn into Sum Cogito,

as I am in a world and therefore, can think within it.76 What Descartes misses most is that

Being is prior to the divide between consciousness and reality and does not come through

reflection.

In contrast, for Heidegger, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is characterized by

dwelling. This means we are not initially concerned with knowing things in the world,

but by interacting with them and with the world. Heidegger’s critique is that Descartes is

too mechanistic and misses the existential quality of Being and dwelling. Thus, being-in-

the-world precedes the “I think” quality which Descartes proclaims is indisputable.

76
Francois Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject. (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1998), 54.
 52

These differences are much more in tune with real world situations than it may

seem. As Christopher Pawling states, in “Rethinking Heideggerian Marxism,” Marx was

similar to Heidegger in that they both believed that the subject/object binary had to be

overcome. It is not that the world is “out there,” we must interact and engage with the

world, and for Marx this meant that it was our responsibility to change it.77 This in turn,

impacts Dasein’s being-in-the-world because a revolution can change many

environmental factors of our existence. It can bring about a new attitude and alter how we

approach ethics as a whole. It is an altering of our situatedness and impacts future

generations as well as our own development.

In much in the same vain Lawrence J. Hatab states that “traditional moral

philosophy has concealed the finitude of ethics.”78 In other words, our situated contingent

finitude has been ignored, while detached reflection has been at the forefront. In reality,

our ethical decisions are always in the world and never detached as some have made them

seem. According to Hatab, we need to look at our pre-reflective life as much as the

reflective one if we are to understand how we live ethically. This does not mean we

cannot reflect upon our moral decisions; however those decisions should not come from

moral guidelines or universal maxims that are supposed to tell the individual how they

ought to act in every situation no matter what the circumstances entail. The tradition has

often dealt with objective guiding principles and thus left out individuality and context.

Olafson claims that Heidegger’s idea of Mitsein is meant to show that our relation to one

77
Christopher Pawling, "Rethinking Heideggerian Marxism."Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of
Economics, Culture & Society. no. 4 (2010). 593.
78
Hatab, 55.
 53

another precedes these guiding principles and is the ground of ethical authority. We are at

once both bound to each other and free from guiding regulations and principles.

Herman Philipse discusses Hubert Dreyfus’ interpretation of being-with. As

Dreyfus says we are defined by our social roles. Our lives are lived mostly in the

inauthentic realm and we are thus anonymous, rather than individualized. We follow

rules and norms like everyone else. Although it is easy to discount moral maxims as too

universal and outside of experience, Dreyfus claims that we consistently apply different

maxims in our daily lives. The difference between his ideas and traditional moral claims

is that Dreyfus believes our expertise plays a role in those ethical decisions. We learn

things by applying various maxims and seeing how they turn out and then adjusting them

accordingly based upon the situation in which we find ourselves. What often occurs is

that we must think about a situation before we act, but for Heidegger cognizing is a

deficiency due to the fact that it takes us out of the world. Dreyfus refutes these claims by

saying we can only cognize within the world.

There is thus a false dichotomy within the tradition between principle-based

deliberation and intuition. Therefore, this is potentially a new way of understanding the

ethical tradition as a whole because it eliminates the dichotomies that always seemed to

suppress individuality and openness. Perhaps that is why Heidegger never fully

developed an ethics, as he could not see past the dichotomies. However, I disagree in part

with Dreyfus’ interpretation because Heidegger’s project is not intended to overcome

these dichotomies, but rather move around them through ontology and the discussion of

being. We can derive ethical principles from Heidegger without attributing any normative

rules associated with them.

 54

Hatab expresses Heidegger’s skepticism with these points of the tradition by

stating ethics has always been “the rule of normalization that suppresses heroic creativity,

individual eccentricity, and the openness of life.”79 Unlike many before him, Heidegger

was never interested in developing an ethical code or guideline. In The Letter on

Humanism, Heidegger takes ethics to be an ontical discipline that is concerned with a

value system that dictates how one should live. Those values are confined to a subject,

while facts are objectively in the world outside the subject. Thus, to say Heidegger has an

ethical base would make no sense to discuss. Hatab states that “ethics should be thought

in an ontological register as the finite dwelling of being-in-the-world.”80

This point is a perfect illustration of how Heidegger’s project prioritizes ontology

over ethics and being over beings. According to Silvia Benso, Heidegger’s main criticism

of the ethical tradition is that it has never been involved with revealing the ontological

dimension. It has always left “being unthought, and thereby leaves unthought the true

essence of human being, which is that of ek-sisting in the light of Being.”81 For

Heidegger, ethics needs to recall ethos and the behaviour of humans towards being.

Ethics must be about our dwelling and how we comport ourselves towards being rather

than telling people how to live. It is more about description and less about prescription.82

Ethics should be an “engaged responsive openness.”83 There will always be disruption

and contingencies.

79
Hatab, XI
80
Hatab, 90.
81
Silvia Benso, “On the Way to an Ontological Ethics: Ethical Suggestions in Reading Heidegger.”
Research in Phenomneology. 24, no, 1 (1994): 160.
82
Benso, 162.
83
Hatab, 63.
 55

Hatab adds that “We can detect in Kant’s disengaged, abstract route to universal

consistency something akin to the segregation of moral right from existential interests

and the contingencies of experience produces a kind of imperial formalism that can be

blind to actual life outcomes.”84 There is no guidance in concrete cases, but rather a code

which one is expected to follow that is meant to apply to all situations regardless of

context. But, in reality our history matters because in many ways we are always-already

shaped by ethics upon entering the world. The problem with how the tradition has seen

the “I” has always been related to how it has seen time. If there are eternal forms or

universal substances, then something underlying the human being must be eternal and

consistent. This has left the “I” in an eternal position which does not change. The “I”

became an abstraction from which you must begin and then try and emanate outwards.

Heidegger’s critique of value not only targeted Kant, but ideas taken up by

scientifically grounded theories of value such as those by Rickert and Windelband.85

These ideas were constructed to be absolute systems of value, but ended up being de-

worlding as they took out the living aspects of morality.86 As the authors of Ethics and

Danger state, value theory was “an expression of the inauthenticity of everyday life.”87 It

makes things simple and the subject becomes self-satisfied by following a rule. Instead of

viewing ethics and morals in terms of universal laws and regulations, we should define

them by situations where the exception to the rule may be necessary. Rather than

exploring ethics in terms of universal laws and regulations. Our character and how we

84
Hatab, 62.
85
These men were two turn-of-the-century Neo-Kantians who believed in a systematic approach to
philosophy. Heidegger would highly dispute their approaches because of the adherence they each had to
traditional forms of epistemology.
86
Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott, and P. Holley Roberts, Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and
Continental Thought. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 174.
87
Dallery, Scott, Roberts, E&D, 175
 56

become who we are only arises when we have to make choices and are free to do so

instead of calling upon a pre-conceived notion of the good or the true. If morality was

that simple then our decisions would not matter on an existential basis as we would only

need to act in such a way as to conform to laws. However, our world and our decisions

change the course of history and if our judgement dictates that we need to make

exceptions to universal laws then so be it. We should not dwell on whether or not

breaking a conventional law is bad for humanity as such and instead focus on the

contingencies that are presented to us at a given moment. This makes the idea of morality

one that is much more engaging and dependent on circumstances. We not only make the

decisions that affect us, but those decisions are made relative to the exceptional situation,

rather than based upon the rule of law.

We should note here that Heidegger’s ethics (if we can call any of his philosophy

ethics) were influenced by Aristotle as it deals with the human world. Aristotle’s self is

an activity of virtue and not a static essence. Virtue comes from action rather than a

theoretical model. A key feature that has always been overlooked is the performance of

ethics in the history of philosophy. Action should not be subordinate to cognition. This is

in some ways similar to the points that Dreyfus makes; however this is more of a living

ethical philosophy that does not rely on maxims.88 Instead, we see that one can only

become virtuous by doing virtuous things. Through action we must find a means to be

virtuous. However, it is not an exact science, but more like tuning a guitar; it will never

be exactly the same and a formula will not be helpful in every situation. This is a perfect

88
When I say “living ethical philosophy”, I want to free ethics from moral constraints that were previously
the norm. Although judgements and rules will always exist, it is our judgement of the situation which I
want to emphasize and not the judgement of a particular moral rule which may constrain us in a given
situation.
 57

analogy for all ethical behaviour. We must learn the basics, but we can never know

without trying things within the world first.

Of course when we begin to deal with “living philosophies,” we must begin to

discuss other people and not just individuals. This means that we should recall the history

of political theory and philosophy (particularly in modern times) which has always

promulgated the idea of a nature in which individuals were pinned against each other in a

fight for survival. This would later evolve further into the quasi-Darwinian idea that only

the strongest survive. However, none of these philosophies took into account packs or

group collectivities. Instead, social contracts focused on individual rights and their

theories were meant to protect those rights.89 It was a way of protecting the subject from

the state of nature which was harsh and dangerous. The contract limited agency, but was

entered by the individual freely for his or her own benefit.

Hobbes believed that we have a natural desire to keep moving. Thus, by nature

humans are natural enemies because they only stand in the way of our goals and desires.

With this comes a fear of the other and the basis of human interaction is to avoid threat.

We are left with an idea of humanity based on the presupposition that we are all here only

in order to achieve our goals and desires and that anyone who stands in the way of those

goals is a threat. Similarly for Sartre, intersubjective relationships are often dictated by

sadism and masochism and so from the very beginning we see a different relationship

89
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all spent time discussing individual rights. The primary goal was always to
escape the natural world through abstract principles of human rights. Their theories were focused primarily
on the individual and how we are all entitled to rights based upon these abstract principles. This created the
liberal notion that humans are all entitled to these rights outside of circumstance and prior to existence.
 58

between others.90 Although Sartre’s ideas obviously differ from those of social

contractarians, the fundamental starting point of the relation to one another is one of

distrust and fear.

Heidegger’s theory stands in total opposition to Sartre’s and Hobbes’ since our

anticipation of death is marked by respect for the other and we must allow the other to

come to his or her own end. This idea actually stems from Kantian deontology for which

Heidegger had a great deal of respect. Kantian deontology was meant to be a response to

ethical theories of his time and stated morality is always independent of the

consequences. We come to know right and wrong through reason and then we act upon

those ideas.

Kant came closer to overcoming the presence-at-hand of the subject. However, he

split the “I” into different parts between the theoretical and the practical. Heidegger saw

this as an important step for establishing the ontological difference. The practical or

moral self can be differentiated from objects in the world because we can only make

moral decisions within the world and with others. For Heidegger, the practical self

reveals itself through the feeling of respect for the self and for others. Ontologically, the

self is revealed to itself as an end in itself. It shows that the self has respect for itself,

which is fundamental to the moral act. Heidegger agrees with Kant’s idea of respect as it

is a matter of self-determination and a responsibility to and for itself. To put this in more

Heideggerian terminology, by respecting the for-itself, you anticipate the future self. You

become responsible for your actions and of your own future. Most importantly, in

90
Peter Lucas, Ethics and Self-Knowledge: Respect for Self-Interpreting Agents. (London:Springer, 2011),
160.
 59

Heidegger’s terms, moral self-consciousness or respect for the self, is a feeling and not a

theoretical act.91 Where Kant falls short in his analysis is that the feeling is an intellectual

and a priori feeling which still involves the mind’s ability to gauge right from wrong

based on universal maxims.

As we can see, modern moral theory (particularly Kantian moral theory) was

originally intended to allow for the autonomy of the individual over the institution or

group collectivity. Ethics has been distinct from life in terms of Plato’s ideas, God or

values. Kant rejected these traditional forms of ethics because they were grounded

outside of human involvement and focused too little attention on the acting agent. For

him, there is no ground in external authority, and should rather be grounded in autonomy.

Traditional notions of autonomy centered around ideas of self-governance. Even the

family “comprised of autonomous individuals.”92 Those individuals rely on self-

sufficiency and attempt to realize their own potential. For Kant, the will of the rational

agent is a crucial idea in his moral system of values in which we must act in conjunction

with our moral duty while not letting desires or interpersonal affections distract us.93 The

subject thus becomes the focal point of moral decisions because of his or her ability to

apprehend what is the right or wrong action. In Kantian terms this meant that practical

reason took precedence over theoretical reason when it came to moral decisions.

None of these moral theories really take into account the complexities of real life

moral decisions. Lauren Freeman notes that autonomy of the individual should not be

91
Raffoul, 116.
92
Lauren Freeman, "Reconsidering Relational Autonomy: A Feminist Approach to Selfhood and the Other
in the Thinking of Martin Heidegger." Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. no. 4 (2011),
364.
93
Freeman, 364.
 60

discounted totally, but must be seen in conjunction with relationality. As Freeman states

Dasein is ontologically relational because Mitsein is “neither added on to Dasein as an

afterthought nor derivative of it.”94Unlike Husserl before him, Heidegger is not interested

in bracketing and stepping back to view the situation from a detached perspective. Contra

Husserl, Freeman notes that relations cannot be bracketed since we cannot think of

Dasein without being-with. The self then can only be constituted as a self in relation to

others. This is the beginning of what can be considered an ethical philosophy in

Heidegger. If our existence is defined by our being with others, then we must live in such

a way that we always have that relationship in mind. With that relationship comes various

circumstances that are constantly shifting and never defined by a universal truth. One

cannot merely say that no one should lie. Of course, in principle that is perfectly fine as a

universal maxim, because then keeping a promise would have no meaning if everyone

began to lie. However, there are many circumstances in which lying can be considered

for some to be the proper course of action.

What many of these theories underscore is the priority of reason and deliberation

over all other types of existence. As we have seen in previous chapters, this has led to a

poor understanding of what it means to be in the world alongside of other. As Werner

Marx observes, reason has been determinative of reality as it has assured its existence and

its objectivity.95 The epoch prior to phenomenology was always determined by substance.

Unlike past attempts which tried to explain the world, Marx believes that phenomenology

has a way of bringing things into the open. It is therefore a superior way of explaining the

world because it is concerned with the whole of experience, or in Heideggerian terms, the

94
Freeman, 368.
95
Marx, 31.
 61

being of entities.96 We can then develop a better way of understanding our existence as a

whole.

Secondly, in ethical history, rationality has always been prioritized over emotions.

Thinkers like Aristotle and Spinoza have given priority to rationality, while Hume and

Husserl have noted the importance of emotions.97 Marx is interested in exploring this

dimension further as he wants to know how we form our ethical beliefs through

experiences which cause emotions. Marx points out that rationality was already proven

limited and thus cannot explain the totality of experience. Only by examining both

rationality and emotionality can we come to understand ethics as a whole. In conjunction

with each other, we become open to the other and can feel compassion and a sense of

responsibility towards others. Most importantly, Marx frames his argument in a way that

seems to anticipate Heidegger by explaining that through mortality we can come to a

point of compassion for the other. It becomes more than just a present-at-hand

relationship in which we try to cognize the suffering of the other. Instead, compassion is a

love for the other that is a sharing of the other’s suffering. This is a part of our existence

and not a psychological examination of the self or of the other. We are attuned to the

feelings of the other and thus our mood compels us to feel compassion towards them.

That is why the counter play of rationality and emotionality is so crucial, since they both

play an equal role in determining the self-other relationship. We “share in the fate of

others.”98

96
Marx, 33.
97
Marx, 34.
98
Marx, 40.
 62

Through the works of Marx and various other philosophers, we will begin to see

how Mitsein is defined by certain characteristics that give it an ethical quality. Once

again, we will not see a definitive way of living, as an alternative we will find that

Mitsein is the pre-condition that defines our potential ethical relationships.

B) Being-with Others Ethically

Before discussing this topic, we should note that Mitsein is an ontological-

existential pre-condition. It is not something that we “see” in our daily activities on a

regular basis. This means that what we experience is the manifestations of Mitsein,

including notions of trust, responsibility and care. All of these are qualities of Mitsein and

our being-with others. They are not necessarily reasoned qualities on which we reflect.

Therefore, Mitsein is neither a guide, nor a moral maxim, but something which is already

present in our lives. This is an example of how Heidegger’s Mitsein should be considered

on the ontological level.

There are several qualities that are integral to being-with others that make it a

potentially ethical philosophy. The first of these is care. Empathy or other traditional

value judgements are not sufficient in explaining Mitsein. Instead, Heidegger uses “care”

as the central mode which explains being-with one another.99 Something we must

remember is that in its being, Dasein is being for the sake of others. This means that we

live for the sake of the well-being of others and not just for ourselves. A great example

would be taking care of a child. Child rearing creates moral good habits that can only be

possible with a certain level of concern for the other. From the very beginning children

99
Heidegger, 118.
 63

are moral thinkers; however, their growth relies on the concern of others. That said,

children cannot be systematically instructed in the moral law. In other words, simply

telling them the categorical imperative will not make them moral. Thus, there is a great

deal of moral action pre-reflectively and is only learned through interaction. Caring for a

child is not reasoned inferentially and there is no guidance from a moral theory needed,

instead we need to understand our responsibility towards the other in that situation.

This is one of the examples that refutes any claims that some have made for the

notion that somehow Heidegger is totally an individualistic philosopher by prioritizing

the individuality of being-towards-death. As Mariana Ortega states “Care is before the

distinction between theory and practice.”100 This once again means that part of Dasein’s

constitution is taking care (besorgen) of things and people. Fürsorge means a care-for the

other that anticipates a response to someone else’s needs. It is essentially one of the

fundamental points to establishing an ethical Heideggerian philosophy, as it implies a

responsibility to the other. Because we are never alone, authentic care thus means helping

others understand their own responsibility.

One of the basic aspects of care is that it lets the other be. It is a letting-be of the

other towards its own-most potential of death, or of being and non-being. Despite what

many people claim to be Heidegger’s ultimate downfall towards an intersubjective

philosophy, a letting-be of the other does not mean complete indifference. It means rather

we are to let the other pursue their own-most possibility, which is death. Death is always

100
Mariana Ortega, "When Conscience Calls, Will Dasein Answer? Heideggerian Authenticity and the
Possibility of Ethical Life." International Journal of Philosophical Studies. no. 1 (2005), 21.
 64

going to be final and individualistic; however, there is still an engagement of the other.101

It is in some sense respecting the other’s projects and possibilities without disturbing that

process. A great example of what it means to let someone be would be in a marriage or

any long term relationship. There are times when you must let your partner be themselves

and that is a way to show you care and support them. Despite the fact that they may not

wish to be with you physically at every moment they still know that you care for them.

Of course, this is not quite the same as being towards death, but the principle is the same

since you let someone be alone and pursue their own goals. For Heidegger, authentic care

“pertains to existence of the other.”102 A part of care is anxiety as we worry about

burdens. Of course, in this case the burden that we all must carry is the possibility of

death. In other words, when we face our own-most possibilities we are living

authentically and become liberated from social patterns caused by the one. It also helps us

see the commonality of the human species as we all face our own personal being-towards

death.

Our only commonality is our finitude and there are no essential qualities outside

of this. As Hatab states “the Enlightenment promotion of universal humanity was in some

ways a ruse, since it was a concealed Eurocentrism that cashed out in practice as

colonialist paternalism and cultural genocide.”103 Thus, we should let others be in their

own unique way and not try to create an aggregate “humanity.” That said, it is important

to remember that being is always being-with others and if we let others be, that will mean

101
Heidegger, 285.
102
Heidegger, 119.
103
Hatab, 181.
 65

to let them dwell in a world with others. We share the world and yet we must let each

other dwell in the openness of the shared world.

One of the major critiques of this argument would be that for Heidegger there are

also deficient modes of concern, such as passing each other by. Dasein lives in this mode

as we often ignore the other and it leads us to believe that others are merely objectively

present. This should not completely negate the other aspects of care, such as the care we

have for others. Perhaps it is true that we spend most of our daily lives in a state of apathy

in terms of caring for strangers, but that should not imply that we are somehow immoral

or have no empathy towards others. It would be difficult to always care for others without

attending to our own personal needs or to the needs to those who are closest to us. Dasein

will always act towards self-preservation by virtue of its existence. However, that does

not imply that we somehow prioritize ourselves over others. Dasein’s self-preservation is

part of its constitution, as are care and being-with others.

What does this say then about how we interact with others when they are not

considered close to us? For example, we often feel affected more by problems that are

close to home, whether that is within our community or our family. However, as stated

earlier, Heidegger says that we should not let proximity be a determinative factor in terms

of our idea of being-with. We are with others whether they are close by or far away and it

seems to me that this can apply greatly to ethical situations.

Taking this point further, we often see people complain when a government or a

wealthy individual donates a sizeable amount of money towards a cause outside his or her

own country. There is often a sense of entitlement from those who are near, often because
 66

of proximity. They ask “why would he or she donate to that cause when there are so

many problems at home?” It is as if the problems abroad somehow are secondary to the

problems of others near home, even if those abroad may not have the means to help

themselves. We often fall into trusting only those who are near to us (i.e. family, friends,

and communities). Not only does this limit our view, but creates a split that Heidegger

wishes to avoid. We create groups that are our own and those that are other. This means

there is a lack of trust between certain people or groups. On a political level this can lead

to social struggle and turmoil as various ethnic or religious groups clash over arbitrary

issues. We learn to trust only those people to whom we feel close and often ignore those

that seem foreign to our inner circle. This is where Mitsein falls apart and only creates

division rather than unity. This is a general example, but illustrates the priority we often

give to causes that are close to us.

This brings us to the second important quality of Mitsein, which is trust. Mitsein

centers around the idea of truthful relationships. A great example comes from Kantian

philosophy when we make a promise to someone. Promising is another vital part of

Mitsein, because it changes the ethical relationship between two or more parties. People

understand that they have a role to play when they make a promise. Despite any

contingencies they are bound to honour that promise. However, this is another sense in

which Heidegger moves beyond the Categorical Imperative. Whereas Kant would make

this into a universal maxim which cannot be broken, for Heidegger, the importance lies in

the living world of ethical relationships. It is not about breaking a rule, but breaking the

bond that was formed between you and the other. The relationship we have to others is
 67

what is important and not a moral rule. This subtle distinction between the two

philosophies is what stands out as a Heideggerian ethic.

One of Herman Philipse’s major critiques of Frederick Olafson’s argument is that

he says we cannot easily transfer the concept of trustful relationships to human kind as a

whole.104 In other words, although trust may be an important part of ethical relations

between individuals, it is difficult to translate trust into human kind as a whole. This

relates back to the issue of proximity as we often find it difficult to trust those who are

not near to us. This is one of the best arguments against trust because it is difficult to trust

people outside of our own circle. But that should not deter us from trusting individuals;

rather, it illustrates that trust is not something that can be easily translated into the whole

of the human condition.

Nevertheless, trust still remains one of the foundations of ethical relationships.

Without it we could not function together as a society. It is even important on a socio-

political level. One of the best examples of mistrust is in the United States. The emphasis

on personal liberty and the right to bear arms has gotten out of control to the point where

there is no more Mitsein. What I mean by this is that individuals are so isolated that there

is no more trust amongst the population. Instead, people buy deadly weapons because

they are so afraid of each other and what the other could do to them. This is the complete

antithesis of an ethical Mitsein where we revert back to the idea of isolated subjects.105

104
Philipse, 467.
105
This is not to say that all American citizens have the same mentality, but it is a common enough theme
that has been perpetuated by various pro-gun groups through the media. They have atomized the population
by creating a clear division between good people and bad people and the only way to ensure your own
safety from the bad people is to own a gun for self-protection.
 68

The only way to overcome such isolation is to change the culture of guns and violence

and renew a sense of trust within the population.

This example shows that some people today still seem to approach subjectivity

the same way we once did, which is firstly through the individual. Our society is geared

towards the individual mindset with technologies such as the iPhone or iPod. These types

of devices illustrate that we are truly self-centered, not necessarily by nature, but by

convention. We have lost what it means to co-exist and instead have become increasingly

egotistical. Now, I do not want to imply that Apple is solely responsible for creating a

generation of egomaniacs; they are only a part of a larger problem that is ever present in

our politics today. It does not seem that there is any cohesion amongst individuals on a

political level. It can be said that of course there are many who share similar interests,

goals, values and then go on to form movements or political parties. However, the

starting point always seems to be from the subject and emanates outward, precisely what

Heidegger says is wrong with philosophical thinking. Although it was clear that

Heidegger did not deal with ontical political questions, but perhaps his idea of Mitsein

can provide a better means to understanding how we should live, or at least how we

should think of our own existence. Rather than thinking about how each problem is our

own, we should think of them as problems that affect the whole of humanity.

Yet, once again, we arrive at the major duality present in Heidegger’s work

between individuality and the group dynamic. Dallmayr’s ultimate point is that

Heidegger’s ethics lies in authenticity, resoluteness and the call of conscience.106 In other

words, the individual is prioritized over the social. This does not mean that we should

106
Dallmayr, 109.
 69

discount the collective aspects of Heidegger’s work, but that decisions and actions rest

upon the individual.

Olafson, on the other hand, goes so far as to say that we become so ingrained with

one another, that we cannot possibly know what we put in or take out from the world.

That is to say, our individuality becomes somewhat blurred because of how much we are

bound together. This point has interesting politico-social implications since we can never

fully claim that we earn everything we receive. In each case there are multiple factors that

determine someone’s social standing or success and thus we cannot always make the

claim that people always get what they deserve. That being said, Olafson nor I wish to

make the claim that Dasein has no choice and is totally lost in the world of others. We are

far from total cultural determinacy in the sense that our ability to make choices is gone. It

simply means that our lives are not as clear cut as some people claim.

That is why child development is so integral to our being-with others; it is a

sharing of historical and cultural values. However, as we mature, our relationship with

the other changes as we begin to see the importance of what Olafson calls identity and

difference.107 We begin to see how others are important to our own personal projects and

fulfilling our potential needs and desires. With time, our relationships become more

fragmented as others are no longer there to only help provide our basic needs, but also to

fulfill their own with your help. Thus, the ethical relationship changes as we age and the

fundamental Mitsein relationship begins to take on a different meaning.

107
Olafson, HGE, 25
 70

This is the case near the end of people’s lives and in our realization of our being-

towards-death. Werner Marx emphasizes the point that we change individually through

the death of others. Where Marx seems to overstate his thesis is when he claims that we

come to the idea of compassion through horror and tragedy. Marx claims that horror is in

many ways synonymous with death. Perhaps this is a flawed sense of how we should

understand death, at least in Heidegger’s terms. Although Marx is correct when he claims

that death or tragedy displaces the individual by revealing our limits, it should not

necessarily be equated with the idea of horror. Alternatively it can be thought of as a

simple part of our existence. Although this may not seem as dramatic as horror, it is

nevertheless a coming to know of our own finitude, which can lead to compassion

knowing that we and others all come to an end. This may sound exactly what I was

countering earlier in terms of the idea of rationality over emotionality; however, when we

come to understand our limits it is not merely a matter of thinking about those limits.

What comes with it are feelings and emotions that often overwhelm our entire bodies,

which is a perfect example of why pure rationality and consciousness are inadequate

explanations of existence. To his credit, Marx states brilliantly that horror cannot be

rejected, unlike rational reflections. Again, death or tragedy can do the same, without

thinking of them in terms of horror.

Another weak point in Marx’s argument is when he describes how we and others

transform through the process of coming to know mortality. We see the other differently

because of this process. Marx states that this is when we see the other as equal because

they are “like me.”108 However, this appears to be very similar to many of the arguments

108
Marx, 55.
 71

made by Husserl and Descartes in which the other comes to be known through the

experience of consciousness or deductive logic. Heidegger’s Mitsein refutes this very

claim that others are just like me, as this is a given. Therefore, Marx’s eventual

conclusion does not go far enough in terms of intersubjective relations and falls back into

the old sense of what it means to be-with.

Mortality is not the only form in which we come out of indifference for Marx.

Natural disasters often bring communities together and people begin to work together in

times of need. Another more poignant example may be economic downturn which

ultimately affects entire nations and often times many parts of the world. This type of

disaster is felt more widely and is perhaps a better example of our arbitrary and

contingent position in the world.

Ultimately, for Marx the idea of compassion results in the idea of social justice

and peace, and the idea of a welfare state. Marx states that a welfare state is the form of

government that can satisfy “the essence of man” insofar as it creates conditions which

make a true co-existence possible.109 Heidegger agrees that welfare work is a great

example of concern for the other.110 This shows that despite Heidegger’s lack of interest

in ontical political matters, Marx still thinks there are possibilities for a political Mitsein.

109
Marx, 81.
110
Heidegger, 118.
 72

Conclusion

One of the difficulties of writing this thesis is the fact that Heidegger’s intention

was never to develop a formal ethical philosophy like many of his predecessors. Despite

his own works, it cannot be denied that Heidegger still had a major influence upon ethics

and politics, as many of his students wrote on those topics. However, if we begin to look

closely at some of his concepts, there appears to be some room for ethical and political

interpretation. Stephen K. White has a quote that sums up Heidegger’s ethical points

perfectly, he says Heidegger’s comments on ethics are like “small, stunted plants

overshadowed by huge ones of a very different sort.”111 This means that his project on

being was so big, that it is often difficult to see much else in his work. Upon closer

examination, one of the things that is most evident is that ethical ideas reveal themselves

in a totally unique way in Heidegger’s work. We do not see a moral guideline on how to

live, or even a critique of the history of normative ethics. Instead, we come to see ethical

points by looking at what it means to be-in-the-world with others.

One of the more surprising aspects of Being and Time is the fact that despite its

insistence that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of Dasein’s being, it nevertheless receives

very little attention. Yet, in many ways it can be seen as one of the essential aspects of

Dasein’s being. Perhaps this oversight is due to the fact that often times Mitsein is not

enough to overcome individuality or ego. There will always be clashes between the

individual, and the group and authentic being-towards-death. Nevertheless, Dasein could

111
Stephen K. White, "Heidegger and the Difficulties of a Postmodern Ethics and Politics." Political
Theory. no. 1 (1990), 96.
 73

never arrive at authentic being-towards-death without others. Therefore, individuality is

predicated upon others being there when we need them. Dasein’s ultimate end is not

about overcoming others, but having others there who will let Dasein be towards that end.

Thus, what we see is that Heidegger’s work is a unique way to view

intersubjective relationships. Even the term “intersubjective” does not adequately portray

Heidegger’s views, because subjects are socially constructed entities which only come

into being through society’s construction. Thus, these relationships are products of the

ontic and not ontological dimension. People tend to forget the ontic-ontological

difference and that is why our social circumstances are in such disarray. That is not to

imply that at some point we understood this difference and that we have fallen into some

form of dystopia. Rather, we have always let social contingencies dictate our ethics,

rather than remembering the basis of being, which is being-with others.

One of the criticisms that will surely arise is that I did not make any specific

claims as to how Heidegger’s work can change ethical relationships as we know it. What

we have here is a commonplace critique against many intellectual works. Although the

work may be enlightening, it will doubtfully change the way most people would think

about the world or themselves in most part due to the language that Heidegger and I use.

Nevertheless, I do not believe it is the role of the intellectual to change the language or

manipulate the work in such a way as to conform to the average citizen. I believe that

Heidegger’s work is a superior way of discussing intersubjectivity and that we can

potentially move forward with a new ethical philosophy.

 74

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