TAÑADA VS TUVERA

Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws.

La bugal B’Laan v. Ramos(421 SCRA 148)

Facts:
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited
by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973Constitution, were subsequently denounced for
being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
Issue:
Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
Ruling:
Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-
scale activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided
that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and
actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of
directors of a private corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and
other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board
retains full residual control of the business.
Issue:
The effectivity Of Executive Order No. 279
Ruling:
Sec. 8 of EO 279 provides that it shall take effect immediately after publication. Ptrs maintain that the 15
day period under EO 200 is required. There is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking
effect on a date other than even before the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for
its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the
very essence of the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200,
therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity. What is
mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v.
Tuvera,217is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

PESIGAN VS ANGELES
FACTS:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April
1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial
commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of
Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station
Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on
Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another.
Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for
recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in
Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.
HELD:
EO 626-A should not be enforced against petitioner on April 2, 1982, because it is a penal regulation
published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective
only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, and Sec. 11 of the Administrative Code.
PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY
FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money
orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under
Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951
after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment,
pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the
Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and
specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.

GARCIA VS RECIO