Ignoratio elenchi, also known as irrelevant conclusion,[1] is the informal fallacy of presenting an argument that may

or may not be logically valid, but fails nonetheless to address the issue in question. More colloquially, it is also known
as missing the point.

Ignoratio elenchi falls into the broad class of relevance fallacies.[2] It is one of the fallacies identified by Aristotle in
his Organon. In a broader sense he asserted that all fallacies are a form of ignoratio elenchi.[3][4]
Ignoratio Elenchi, according to Aristotle, is a fallacy which arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". In order
to refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which
stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ignoratio elenchi. Since Aristotle, the scope of the
fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point… "I am required to prove a certain
conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy… For instance, instead
of proving that ‘this person has committed an atrocious fraud’, you prove that ‘this fraud he is accused of is atrocious;’"
… The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely
related to it, and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do
not really support the substituted issue, it only calls attention to the fact that they do not constitute a proof of the
original one… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms. But whenever it
occurs and whatever form it takes, it is brought about by an assumption that leads the person guilty of it to substitute
for a definite subject of inquiry another which is in close relation with it.[5]

— Arthur Ernest Davies, "Fallacies" in A Text-Book of Logic

The phrase ignoratio elenchi is from Latin, meaning "an ignoring of a refutation". Here elenchi is the genitive singular of
the Latin noun elenchus, which is from Ancient Greek ἔλεγχος (elenchos), meaning "an argument of disproof or
refutation".[6] The translation in English of the Latin expression has varied somewhat. Hamblinproposed "misconception
of refutation" or "ignorance of refutation" as a literal translation, [7] John Arthur Oesterle preferred "ignoring the issue",
and [7] Irving Copi, Christopher Tindale and others used "irrelevant conclusion".[7][8]
● Example 1: A and B are debating as to whether criticizing indirectly has any merit in general.
A: There is no point in people ranting on social media about politics; the president is not going to read it
anyway.
B: But it is their social media. People can agree on making a petition or convey notice from many others that
they will be signing one based on their concerns.
A: Well, I do not keep up with it anyway.
A attempts to support their position with an argument that politics ought not to be criticized because the message is not
directly being heard by the head of state; this would make them guilty of ignoratio elenchi, as people such as B may be
criticizing politics because they have a strong message for their peers, or because they wish to bring attention to
political matters, rather than ever intending that their views would be read by the president. [9]
● Example 2: A and B are debating about the law.
A: Does the law allow me to do that?
B: The law should allow you to do that because this and that.
B missed the point. The question was not if the law should allow, but if it does or not.
Dr Johnson's unique "refutation" of Bishop Berkeley's immaterialism, his claim that matter did not actually exist but
only seemed to exist,[10] has been described as ignoratio elenchi:[11] during a conversation with Boswell, Johnson
powerfully kicked a nearby stone and proclaimed of Berkeley's theory, "I refute it thus!"[12] (See also argumentum ad
lapidem.)
A related concept is that of the red herring, which is a deliberate attempt to divert a process of enquiry by changing the
subject.[2] Ignoratio elenchi is sometimes confused with straw man argument.[2]

Ad hominem (Latin for "to the man" or "to the person"[1]), short for argumentum ad hominem, is an argumentative
strategy whereby an argument is rebutted by attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the person making
the argument, or persons associated with the argument, rather than attacking the substance of the argument itself. [2]
However, its original meaning was an argument "calculated to appeal to the person addressed more than to impartial
reason".[3]
Fallacious ad hominem reasoning is categorized as an informal fallacy,[4][5][6] more precisely as a genetic fallacy, a
subcategory of fallacies of irrelevance.
However, in some cases, ad hominem attacks can be non-fallacious; i.e., if the attack on the character of the person is
directly tackling the argument itself. For example, if the truth of the argument relies on the truthfulness of the person
making the argument—rather than known facts—then pointing out that the person has previously lied is not a
fallacious argument.[citation needed]

Types[edit]
See also: List of fallacies
Tu quoque[edit]
Main article: Tu quoque
Ad hominem tu quoque (literally: "You also") refers to a claim that the source making the argument has spoken or
acted in a way inconsistent with the argument. In particular, if Source A criticizes the actions of Source B, a tu
quoque response is that Source A has acted in the same way. This argument is false because it does not disprove the
premise; if the premise is true then Source A may be a hypocrite, but this does not make the statement less credible
from a logical perspective. Indeed, Source A may be in a position to provide personal testimony to support the
argument.
For example, a father may tell his son not to start smoking as he will regret it when he is older, and the son may point
out that his father is or was a smoker. This does not alter the fact that his son may regret smoking when he is older.
Circumstantial[edit]
Main article: Bulverism
Circumstantial ad hominem points out that someone is in circumstances such that they are disposed to take a
particular position. It constitutes an attack on the bias of a source. This is fallacious because a disposition to make a
certain argument does not make the argument false; this overlaps with the genetic fallacy (an argument that a claim is
incorrect due to its source).[7]
The circumstantial fallacy does not apply where the source is taking a position by using a logical argument based
solely on premises that are generally accepted. Where the source seeks to convince an audience of the truth of a
premise by a claim of authority or by personal observation, observation of their circumstances may reduce the
evidentiary weight of the claims, sometimes to zero.[8]
Examples:
1. Mandy Rice-Davies's famous testimony during the Profumo Affair, "He would [say that], wouldn't he?", is an
example of a valid circumstantial argument. Her point was that a man in a prominent position, accused of an
affair with a callgirl, would deny the claim whether it was true or false. His denial, in itself, provides little
evidence against the claim of an affair.
However, this argument is valid only insofar as it devalues the denial; it does not strengthen the original claim.
To construe invalid evidence of the denial as valid evidence of the original claim is fallacious (on several
different bases, including that of argumentum ad hominem and appeal to emotions); however likely the man in
question would be to deny an affair that did in fact happen, he is even more likely to deny an affair that never
happened. (For example, inferring guilt from a denial – or, less starkly, excessive devaluation of a denial – is a
very common feature in conspiracy theories, witch-hunts, show trials, struggle sessions, and other coercive
circumstances in which the person targeted is presumed guilty.)

2. Glassner suggests that Bennett is somehow unqualified to criticize rap music because of positions Bennett
has taken on other issues. However wrong Bennett may have been on other issues, such as the funding of
public television or illegitimacy, that does not mean that his criticisms of rap were mistaken. [8]
Guilt by association[edit]
Main article: Association fallacy
Guilt by association can sometimes also be a type of ad hominem fallacy if the argument attacks a source because of
the similarity between the views of someone making an argument and other proponents of the argument. [7]
This form of the argument is as follows:

1. Source S makes claim C.

2. Group G, which is currently viewed negatively by the recipient, also makes claim C.
3. Therefore, source S is viewed by the recipient of the claim as associated to the group G and inherits how
negatively viewed it is.
An example of this fallacy could be "My opponent for office just received an endorsement from the Puppy Haters
Association. Is that the sort of person you would want to vote for?"

Non-fallacious reasoning[edit]
When a statement is challenged by making an ad hominem attack on its author, it is important to draw a distinction
between whether the statement in question was an argument or a statement of fact (testimony). In the latter case the
issues of the credibility of the person making the statement may be crucial. [8]

Criticism as a fallacy[edit]
Doug Walton, Canadian academic and author, has argued that ad hominem reasoning is not always fallacious, and
that in some instances, questions of personal conduct, character, motives, etc., are legitimate and relevant to the
issue,[9] as when it directly involves hypocrisy, or actions contradicting the subject's words.
The philosopher Charles Taylor has argued that ad hominem reasoning (discussing facts about the speaker or author
relative to the value of his statements) is essential to understanding certain moral issues due to the connection
between individual persons and morality (or moral claims), and contrasts this sort of reasoning with
the apodictic reasoning (involving facts beyond dispute or clearly established) of philosophical naturalism.[10]

An appeal to pity (also called argumentum ad misericordiam, the sob story, or the Galileo argument)[1][2] is
a fallacy in which someone tries to win support for an argument or idea by exploiting his or her opponent's feelings of
pity or guilt. It is a specific kind of appeal to emotion. The name "Galileo argument" refers to the scientist's suffering as
a result of his house arrest by the Inquisition.

Examples[edit]
An appeal to pity can be seen in many charitable advertisements. Charities appeal to your pity of less fortunate people
in order for you to be more likely to donate to that particular charity.

 "You must have graded my exam incorrectly. I studied very hard for weeks specifically because I knew my career
depended on getting a good grade. If you give me a failing grade I'm ruined!"
 "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, look at this miserable man, in a wheelchair, unable to use his legs. Could such
a man really be guilty of embezzlement?"

An argument from authority, also called an appeal to authority, or the argumentum ad verecundiam[note 1], is a
form of defeasible[4] argument in which a claimed authority's support is used as evidence for an argument's conclusion.
It is well known as a fallacy, though it is used in a cogent form when all sides of a discussion agree on the reliability of
the authority in the given context.[5][6]

History[edit]
Historically, opinion on the appeal to authority has been divided – it has been held to be a valid argument about as
often as it has been considered an outright fallacy.[7]
In the Medieval period, the argument from authority was considered by many the weakest form of argument [8] such as
in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica, he wrote, citing Boethius as well, that "to argue from
authority … is the weakest kind of proof."[9] [10]
John Locke, in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, identified the argumentum ad verecundiam as a
specific category of argument.[11] Although he did not call this type of argument a fallacy, he did note that it can be
misused by taking advantage of the "respect" and "submission" of the reader or listener to persuade them to accept
the conclusion.[12] Over time, logic textbooks started to adopt and change Locke's original terminology to refer more
specifically to fallacious uses of the argument from authority. [13] By the mid-twentieth century, it was common for logic
textbooks to refer to the "Fallacy of appealing to authority," even while noting that "this method of argument is not
always strictly fallacious."[14]
In the Western rationalistic tradition[15] and in early modern philosophy, appealing to authority was generally considered
a logical fallacy.[16]
More recently, logic textbooks have shifted to a less blanket approach to these arguments, now often referring to the
fallacy as the "Argument from Unqualified Authority"[17] or the "Argument from Unreliable Authority".[18]

Forms[edit]
Appeals to authorities[edit]
Historically, opinion on the appeal to authority has been divided as it is listed as a valid argument as often as a
fallacious argument in various sources,[19] with some holding that it is a strong argument[20][21][22] which "has a legitimate
force",[23] and others that it is weak or an outright fallacy. [24][25][26][27] These hold that, as noted in the Medical Press and
Circular, on a conflict of facts, "mere appeal to authority alone had better be avoided".[28]
If all parties agrees on the reliability of an authority in the given context it forms a valid inductive argument.[5][6]
Use in science[edit]
Scientific knowledge is best established and taught by evidence and experiment rather than through
authority[29][30][31] as authority has no place in science.[30][32][33]Carl Sagan wrote of arguments from authority:
One of the great commandments of science is, "Mistrust arguments from authority." ... Too many such arguments have
proved too painfully wrong. Authorities must prove their contentions like everybody else. [34]
An example of the use of the appeal to authority in science can be seen in 1923, when leading American
zoologist Theophilus Painter declared, based on poor data and conflicting observations he had made, [35][36] that
humans had 24 pairs of chromosomes. From the 1920s to the 1950s, this continued to be held based on Painter's
authority,[37][38][36] despite subsequent counts totaling the correct number of 23.[35][39] Even textbooks[35] with photos
showing 23 pairs incorrectly declared the number to be 24[39] based on the authority of the then-consensus of 24
pairs.[40]
This seemingly established number created confirmation bias among researchers, and "most cytologists, expecting to
detect Painter's number, virtually always did so".[40] Painter's "influence was so great that many scientists preferred to
believe his count over the actual evidence",[39] to the point that "textbooks from the time carried photographs
showing twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, and yet the caption would say there were twenty-four".[39] Scientists who
obtained the accurate number modified[41] or discarded[42] their data to agree with Painter's count.
Another example recently involved the "When contact changes minds: An experiment on transmission of support for
gay equality" paper. The paper was a fraud based on forged data, yet concerns about it were ignored in many cases
due to appeals to authority. One analysis of the affair notes that "Over and over again, throughout the scientific
community and the media, LaCour’s impossible-seeming results were treated as truth, in part because of the weight
[the study's co-author] Green’s name carried".[43] One psychologist stated his reaction to the paper was "that’s very
surprising and doesn’t fit with a huge literature of evidence. It doesn’t sound plausible to me... [then I pull it up and] I
see Don Green is an author. I trust him completely, so I’m no longer doubtful". The forger, LaCour, would use appeals
to authority to defend his research: "if his responses sometimes seemed to lack depth when he was pressed for
details, his impressive connections often allayed concerns", with one of his partners stating "when he and I really had a
disagreement, he would often rely on the kind of arguments where he’d basically invoke authority, right? He’s the one
with advanced training, and his adviser is this very high-powered, very experienced person...and they know a lot more
than we do".[43]
Much like the erroneous chromosome number taking decades to refute until microscopy made the error unmistakable,
the one who would go on to debunk this paper "was consistently told by friends and advisers to keep quiet about his
concerns lest he earn a reputation as a troublemaker", up until "the very last moment when multiple 'smoking guns'
finally appeared", and he found that "There was almost no encouragement for him to probe the hints of weirdness he’d
uncovered".[43]
Appeal to non-authorities[edit]
Fallacious arguments from authority are also frequently the result of citing a non-authority as an authority.[44] An
example of the fallacy of appealing to an authority in an unrelated field would be citing Albert Einstein as an authority
for a determination on religion when his primary expertise was in physics.[44] The body of attributed authorities might
not even welcome their citation, such as with the "More Doctors Smoke Camels" ad campaign.[45]
It is also a fallacious ad hominem argument to argue that a person presenting statements lacks authority and thus their
arguments do not need to be considered.[46] As appeals to a perceived lack of authority, these types of argument are
fallacious for much the same reasons as an appeal to authority.
Other related fallacious arguments assume that a person without status or authority is inherently reliable. For instance,
the appeal to poverty is the fallacy of thinking that someone is more likely to be correct because they are
poor.[47] When an argument holds that a conclusion is likely to be true precisely because the one who holds or is
presenting it lacks authority, it is a fallacious appeal to the common man.[48]

Cognitive bias[edit]
The argument from authority is based on the idea that an expert will know better and that the person should conform to
the expert's opinion. This has its roots in psychological cognitive biases[49] such as the Asch effect.[50][51] In repeated
and modified instances of the Asch conformity experiments, it was found that high-status individuals create a stronger
likelihood of a subject agreeing with an obviously false conclusion, despite the subject normally being able to clearly
see that the answer was incorrect.[52]
Further, humans have been shown to feel strong emotional pressure to conform to authorities and majority positions. A
repeat of the experiments by another group of researchers found that "Participants reported
considerable distress under the group pressure", with 59% conforming at least once and agreeing with the clearly
incorrect answer, whereas the incorrect answer was much more rarely given when no such pressures were present.[53]
Another study shining light on the psychological basis of the fallacy as it relates to perceived authorities are
the Milgram experiments, which demonstrated that people are more likely to go along with something when it is
presented by an authority.[54] In a variation of a study where the researchers did not wear a lab coat, thus reducing the
perceived authority of the tasker, the obedience level dropped to 20% from the original rate, which had been higher
than 50%. Obedience is encouraged by reminding the individual of what a perceived authority states and by showing
them that their opinion goes against this authority.[55]
Scholars have noted that certain environments can produce an ideal situation for these processes to take hold, giving
rise to groupthink.[56] In groupthink, individuals in a group feel inclined to minimize conflict and encourage conformity.
Through an appeal to authority, a group member might present that opinion as a consensus and encourage the other
group members to engage in groupthink by not disagreeing with this perceived consensus or authority. [57][58] One paper
about the philosophy of mathematics for example notes that, within academia,
If...a person accepts our discipline, and goes through two or three years of graduate study in mathematics, he absorbs
our way of thinking, and is no longer the critical outsider he once was...If the student is unable to absorb our way of
thinking, we flunk him out, of course. If he gets through our obstacle course and then decides that our arguments are
unclear or incorrect, we dismiss him as a crank, crackpot, or misfit. [59]
Corporate environments are similarly vulnerable to appeals to perceived authorities and experts leading to
groupthink,[60] as are governments and militaries.[61]

Argumentum ad baculum (Latin for "argument to the cudgel" or "appeal to the stick") is the fallacy committed when
one appeals to force or the threat of force to bring about the acceptance of a conclusion. [1][2] One participates in
argumentum ad baculum when one points out the negative consequences of holding the contrary position (ex. believe
what I say, or I will hit you). It is a specific case of the negative form of an argument to the consequences.

Fallacious ad baculum[edit]
A fallacious logical argument based on argumentum ad baculum generally proceeds as follows:
If x accepts P as true, then Q.
x acts to prevent Q and succeeds, so Q is not true.
Therefore, P is not true.
This form of argument is an informal fallacy, because the attack on Q may not necessarily reveal anything
about the truth value of the premise P. This fallacy has been identified since the Middle Ages by
many philosophers. This is a special case of argumentum ad consequentiam, or "appeal to
consequences".
Example[edit]

 General: "If we accept capitulation, the enemy will take the chance to slaughter us all."
 Colonel: "So far they have treated captives adequately."
 General: "This time they won't. And you better believe me if you don't want to find yourself rotting in a
mass grave."
 The colonel (x) wants to avoid death (Q), therefore he abandons capitulation (P), although the
undesirability of death does not prove that death follows from capitulation.

Non-fallacious ad baculum[edit]
This argument is of the form:
If x accepts P, then Q.
x does not want Q and will act to prevent it.
Therefore, x will reject P.
The fallacy in the argument lies in assuming that the truth value of "x accepts P" is related to
the truth value of P itself. Whether x does accept P, and whether P is true can not be
inferred from the available statements. However, the argument can be changed into a
valid modus tollens by changing the conclusion.
Example[edit]
If Peter does not deny knowing Jesus, he will be arrested by the Romans.
Peter does not want to be arrested by Romans.
Therefore, Peter denies knowing Jesus.
Note that this argument does not assert or come to any conclusion on whether Peter knows Jesus (cf. the fallacious
conclusion "Therefore, Peter does not know Jesus").

A non sequitur (Latin for "it does not follow"), in formal logic, is an invalid argument.[1] In a non sequitur, the
conclusion is either true or false, but the argument nonetheless asserts the conclusion to be true and is thus fallacious.
While a logical argument is a non sequitur if, and only if, it is invalid, the term 'non sequitur' typically refers to those
types of invalid arguments which do not constitute logical fallacies covered by particular terms (e.g. affirming the
consequent). In other words, in practice, 'non sequitur' refers to an unnamed logical fallacy. Often, in fact, 'non
sequitur' is used when an irrelevancy is showing up in the conclusion.

Logical constructions[edit]
Affirming the consequent[edit]
Main article: Affirming the consequent
Any argument that takes the following form is a non sequitur

1. If A is true, then B is true.

2. B is true.
3. Therefore, A is true.
Even if the premise and conclusion are all true, the conclusion is not a necessary consequence of the premise. This
sort of non sequitur is also called affirming the consequent.
An example of affirming the consequent would be:

1. If Jackson is a human (A), then Jackson is a mammal. (B)

2. Jackson is a mammal. (B)
3. Therefore, Jackson is a human. (A)
While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise:

1. Humans are mammals

2. Jackson is a mammal
3. Therefore, Jackson is a human
The truth of the conclusion is independent of the truth of its premise – it is a 'non sequitur', since Jackson might be a
mammal without being human. He might be, say, an elephant.
Affirming the consequent is essentially the same as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, but using propositions
rather than set membership.
Denying the antecedent[edit]
Main article: Denying the antecedent
Another common non sequitur is this:

1. If A is true, then B is true.

2. A is false.
3. Therefore, B is false.
While B can indeed be false, this cannot be linked to the premise since the statement is a non sequitur. This is
called denying the antecedent.
An example of denying the antecedent would be:

1. If I am Japanese, then I am Asian.

2. I am not Japanese.
3. Therefore, I am not Asian.
While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the statement's
declarant could be another ethnicity of Asia, e.g. Chinese, in which case the premise would be true but the conclusion
false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.
Affirming a disjunct[edit]
Main article: Affirming a disjunct
Affirming a disjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

1. A is true or B is true.
2. B is true.
3. Therefore, A is not true.*
The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both true. This fallacy stems
from the stated definition of or in propositional logic to be inclusive.
An example of affirming a disjunct would be:

1. I am at home or I am in the city.

2. I am at home.
3. Therefore, I am not in the city.
While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the
statement very well could be in both the city and their home, in which case the premises would be true but the
conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.
*Note that this is only a logical fallacy when the word "or" is in its inclusive form. If the two possibilities in question are
mutually exclusive, this is not a logical fallacy. For example,

1. I am either at home or I am in the city.

2. I am at home.
3. Therefore, I am not in the city.
Denying a conjunct[edit]
Main article: Denying a conjunct
Denying a conjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

1. It is not the case that both A is true and B is true.

2. B is not true.
3. Therefore, A is true.
The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both false.
An example of denying a conjunct would be:

1. I cannot be both at home and in the city.

2. I am not at home.
 3. Therefore, I am in the city.
While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the
statement very well could neither be at home nor in the city, in which case the premise would be true but the
conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.
Fallacy of the undistributed middle[edit]
Main article: Fallacy of the undistributed middle
The fallacy of the undistributed middle is a fallacy that is committed when the middle term in a categorical syllogism is
not distributed. It is thus a syllogistic fallacy. More specifically it is also a form of non sequitur.
The fallacy of the undistributed middle takes the following form:

1. All Zs are Bs.

2. Y is a B.
3. Therefore, Y is a Z.
It may or may not be the case that "all Zs are Bs", but in either case it is irrelevant to the conclusion. What is relevant
to the conclusion is whether it is true that "all Bs are Zs," which is ignored in the argument.
An example can be given as follows, where B=mammals, Y=Mary and Z=humans:

1. All humans are mammals.

2. Mary is a mammal.
3. Therefore, Mary is a human.
Note that if the terms (Z and B) were swapped around in the first co-premise then it would no longer be a fallacy and
would be correct.

In everyday speech[edit]
Main article: Non sequitur (literary device)
See also: Derailment (thought disorder)
In everyday speech, a non sequitur is a statement in which the final part is totally unrelated to the first part, for
example:
Life is life and fun is fun, but it's all so quiet when the goldfish die.

— West with the Night, Beryl Markham[2]

To beg the question is to assume the truth of the conclusion of an argument in the premises in order for the
conclusion to follow. It is a type of circular reasoning and an informal fallacy, in which an arguer makes an argument
that requires the desired conclusion to be true. This often occurs in an indirect way such that the fallacy's presence is
hidden or at least not easily apparent.
The term "begging the question", as it is usually phrased, originated in the 16th century as a mistranslation of
the Latin petitio principii,which actually translates to "assuming the initial point".[1] In modern vernacular usage, "to beg
the question" frequently[2] appears to mean "to raise the question" (as in, "This begs the question, whether...") or
"to dodge a question".[1] In contexts that demand strict adherence to a technical definition of the term, many consider
these usages incorrect.[3]

Definition[edit]
To "beg the question" is to put forward an argument whose validity requires that its own conclusion is true.
Also called petitio principii, the fallacy is an attempt to support a claim with a premise that itself presupposes the
claim.[7] It is an attempt to prove a proposition while simultaneously taking the proposition for granted.
Given the single variable C (claim), "begging the question" is an attempt to assert that C => C. In two variables, C
(claim) and P (premise), it attempts to pass (C => P) => C as the valid claim P => C. This is a form of circular
reasoning, and may involve any number of variables.
When the fallacy involves only a single variable, it is sometimes called a hysteron proteron[8][9][10], as in the statement:

 "Opium induces sleep because it has a soporific quality."[11]

This form of the fallacy may not be immediately obvious. Linguistic variations in syntax, sentence structure and literary
device may conceal it, as may other factors involved in an argument's delivery. It may take the form of an unstated
premise which is essential but not identical to the conclusion, or is "controversial or questionable for the same reasons
that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion":[12]
...[S]eldom is anyone going to simply place the conclusion word-for-word into the premises ... Rather, an arguer might
use phraseology that conceals the fact that the conclusion is masquerading as a premise. The conclusion is rephrased
to look different and is then placed in the premises.

— Paul Herrick[13]
For example, one can obscure the fallacy by first making a statement in concrete terms, then attempting to pass off an
identical statement, delivered in abstract terms, as evidence for the original. [11] One could also "bring forth a
proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words
of Norman origin",[14] as here:

 "To allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State,
for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly
unlimited of expressing his sentiments."[15]
When the fallacy of begging the question is committed in more than one step, some authors dub it circulus in
probando (reasoning in a circle)[8][16] or, more commonly, circular reasoning.
Begging the question is not considered a formal fallacy (an argument that is defective because it uses an
incorrect deductive step). Rather, it is a type of informal fallacythat is logically valid but unpersuasive, in that it fails to
prove anything other than what is already assumed.