3) BANAT v.

COMELEC, 586 SCRA 210

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

FACTS:

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election,
is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then
with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.

ISSUE

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that
only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also
get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all
party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their
one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from
the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each.
There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for
the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of
the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because
the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that
the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate
the party-list system.
10) Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106

FACTS

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 767,
President Ramos signed it into law.

Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong
were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41%
of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of
these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.

Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule which states
that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects,
namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

SC RULING:

Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that
said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

The provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners’ additional argument that the subject law has resulted in “gerrymandering,”
which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not
worthy of credence.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.

11) Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which
contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUE
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as
allowed by the Constitution

RULING
No. Increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in RA No.
7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.—

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for
in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in
paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the
reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in
full as follows: “Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.” In short,
the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

12) Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS

The 1987 Constitution apportioned two (2) Legislative Districts to the province of Maguindanao
(which is part of the ARMM).

The first legislative district is composed of Cotabato City and 8 Municipalities, however Cotabato
City is not part of ARMM but Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM.

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM regional assembly (ARMM’s legislature) exercised its power
under Section 19 of RA 9504 [Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA 201)] creating the
province of Shari Kabunsuan.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of
the first legislative district into its own separate province of Shari Kabunsuan.

On March 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. (RN) 07-0407 maintaining the status
quo of Cotabato City as part of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

On March 29, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated RN 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first
legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA 201

On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued RN 7902 by renaming the first legislative district as the
province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City.

The petitioner, Sema, was a candidate in the May 14, 2007 elections for representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. The petitioner prayed for the nullification of the RN 7902 and
exclusion of the votes casted by the inhabitants of Cotabato City in that office.

1. Sema contended that Shari Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in the congress under
Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. The petitioner claimed that in issuing RN 7902, the COMELEC usurped
Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

The COMELEC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contended:
The Petitioner wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify RN 7902 because the COMELEC
issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power

The writ of prohibition became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen Dilangalen as
representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan province with Cotabato City.

The respondent (Dilangalen) countered that the petitioner is estopped from questioning RN 7902,
since in the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City. The respondent added
that the RN 7902 is constitutional because it only renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
The respondent further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first
legislative district to solely Cotabato City since the power of reapportion lies exclusively with
congress. Not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the population requirements under
Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution (at least 250,000 inhabitants).

ISSUE
Issues relating to Article VI, Section 5:
If the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan (created under MMA 201) is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives (HOR) without the need of a national law creating
a legislative district for such new province.
If the COMELEC resolution no. 7902 is constitutional, can the COMELEC reapportion
Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City.

RULING

1. As mentioned earlier, Article X, Section 20, the ARMM Regional assembly may not create a
representative district nor may it create a province, because under Article VI, Section 5,
paragraph 3 provinces automatically gets one representative district.

Each city with a population of at least two hundred and fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives. There is no provision in
the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.”
A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also
the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population
reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district.

2. The court ordered the consolidation of GR 177597 and GR 178628 (If the COMELEC act in
Ultra Vires in issuing RN 7902). The petition in the latter echoed Sema’s contention that the
COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing RA 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City a
representative in the HOR.

The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the
power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be
created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA
415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the
power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district
for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

Court Ruling:
The court declared Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power
to create provinces and cities. Thus, the court declared VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 creating the Province of Shari Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

13) Herrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999

FACTS

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to
have the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial
Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal
officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other
interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No.
97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva
Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
ISSUE

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No.
2950?

RULING

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous
and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or
touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras
shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor.
As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and
represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into
2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province
of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be
the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters.
The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population
as certified by the National Statistics Office.

14) Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

FACTS
RA 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.
Petitioner Moises Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535 and sought to enjoin its implementation, the holding a
plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the disbursement of funds for said
plebiscite, on the following grounds:

a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a) of
the Local Government Code, as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its
Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon
City Council of barangay resolution; an

b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not the proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution.

RULING

Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law
passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites
therefor.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, we had occasion to stress that:

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a
liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted.

Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his
allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed to examine whether or
not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded R.A. No.
8535.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of
the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution
merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in
the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17
cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or
appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing
proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he
succeed to convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the
reliefs he seeks.

15) Aldaba v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts:
May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending the Malolos Charter by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos is a contested fact given that the house
bill for this law relied on the undated certification issued by NSO that the population of Malolos will
be 254,030 by year 2010 due its current population growth rate.
Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending that RA
9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for a city to
merit representation in Congress.
OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance
with constitutional requirement.

Issue: Is RA 9591 unconstitutional as the population of Malolos has not met the population
requirements set forth by the Constitution?

Ruling:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative
district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The only issue
here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10
May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is

without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,
intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city
whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the
immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he
certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that
the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared
official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of
the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been
designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region
III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can
be given credence by this Court.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based
on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise
the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

16) Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur
by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law
originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create
an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of
a new legislative district in a province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet
a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province

17) Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of
the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).

On November 10, 2006, herein petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on
technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people
of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA),
and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a
land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.

On May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the
intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of
the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the
instant case.

The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that
the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

Movant-intervenors then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing
several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged
that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They
averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this
case.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in
this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence the above motion. At the
outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the
original parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, which states that the land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands", is valid, for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC

RULING: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-
fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed
flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00
for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s
existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and
capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

Ratio legisest anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according
to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute, although it is not within its
letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal

branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great
departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not to
interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts
ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of
earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.
Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.

18) Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179670, December 8, 2008

FACTS: In 2006, Cagayan de Oro Congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative
districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. COMELEC promulgated Recolution No. 7837 implementing RA 9371. Bagabuyo
assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. Petitioner
argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single
legislative district for Cagayan de Oro. The Court didn’t grant the petitioner’s prayer for TRO thus
the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to RA 9371.

Respondent averred that R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; that the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and that R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Petitioner countered that Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator -
the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected, as well as of the people therein; that a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should
be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because
the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC; and that a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district.

ISSUE: Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de
Oro City or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

RULING: No, Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination
of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on
legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides: xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.xxx

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of,
are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations")
that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. The
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X).

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act
has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and
reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the
standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by
actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their
boundaries through legislation.

Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district
sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of
legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among districts." Hence,
emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be
observed among the representative districts. To ensure continued adherence to the required
standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the
given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10
expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks
of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a
plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and
members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a
representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike
the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in
behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people
who will choose a representative in their national affairs. The role of the congressman that it
elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee
the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal
personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need
for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of
the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. As a political subdivision, a local government
unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government." As a corporate
entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special
functions for the sole benefit of its constituents.

Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not
even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay
under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

Section 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

1) Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipinoparents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the UnitedStates Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippinecitizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the Houseof Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondentCruz was not qualified to become a member of the
House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly electedRepresentative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET
likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino whobecame an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-bornFilipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

RULING
YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized
citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship

2) Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution
that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino,
with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

ISSUE
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in
the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in

RULING
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not
only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was
in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of
the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC
agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR
one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .

Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to
that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously,
choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he
claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.
Decision

3) Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional
requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring
to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.

4) Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999

FACTS
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on
March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a
resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as
required by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,[11] dismissed
the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as
representative for the Third District of Cagayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and
eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan?

RULING:
…the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
(COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
“As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the
First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections
were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May
16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998.
Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of
proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been
proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the
proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner’s action. In the same
vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent
was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private
respondent’s ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal:[14]”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
When does section 6 of R.A. 6646 apply to petitions for disqualifying a candidate and when does
it not apply?

In the case supra, R.A 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was already a decision
made by COMELEC based on substantial evidence, dismissing the petition for disqualification,
finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of
Cagayan.Accordingly he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. It
thereforebarred further consideration of petitioner’s action.
“Petitioner’s remedies should have been:
1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of an
order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing
of the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before the proclamation of private
respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin
the proclamation of private respondent;

2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16,
1998.”

“In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent is that the
COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before
the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delayin g
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”
“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on
the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was
illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar
to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at
the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within
the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a
proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the
assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.”
“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify
that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.”

5) Fernandez v. HRET, 608 SCRA 733

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court stems
from the Decision[1] in HRET CASE No. 07-034 for quo warranto entitled Jesus L. Vicente v.
Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez promulgated by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) on December 16, 2008 as well as Minute Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30,
2009, likewise issued by the HRET, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DECLARES respondent Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez ineligible for
the Office of Representative of [the] First District of Laguna for lack of residence in the district and
[ORDERS] him to vacate his office.

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of
Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his
complete/exact address as “No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago,
Sta. Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).

Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course to
and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification” before the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the ground of
an alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because
during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise
claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside
the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on
June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over
the nearest candidate.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed
as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province
of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.

Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent, this petition was filed before us.

ISSUE: whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a
Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the HRET in HRET CASE No. 07-034 promulgated on December 16, 2008, and its
Minute Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same case, are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

RATIO: Anent the second issue pertaining to petitioner’s compliance with the residency
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, after studying the evidence submitted
by the parties, we find for petitioner, taking into account our ruling in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, which
reads in part:

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
xxx Emphasis supplied)

The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6
of the Constitution, which provides: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Emphasis supplied)

We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be
overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case. The evidence
presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution. Private respondent’s
documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioner’s certificates of
candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence
as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his application for a driver’s
license in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement
in his COCs including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his
place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile of origin
was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other hand,
what petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in
the First District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that
claim. If it is true that petitioner and his family had been living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna as of
February 2006 with the intent to reside therein permanently, that would more than fulfill the
requirement that petitioner be a resident of the district where he was a candidate for at least one
year before election day, which in this case was May 14, 2007.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
beginning at least in February 2006, petitioner’s evidence included, among others: (a) original and
extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of the Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association,
Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of
petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said
subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e)
certificates of attendance of petitioner’s children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since
2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show
that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.

The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in
another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, this Court held that the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost
his residence.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a
candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional
candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where
he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see
the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a
barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional
candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in
that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as
the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed
can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing
a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional.

To summarize, private respondent’s own evidence did not categorically establish where
petitioner’s domicile is nor did said evidence conclusively prove that for the year prior to the May
14, 2007 petitioner had a domicile other than where he actually resided, i.e. Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

6) Tagolino v. HRET, G.R.No. 195540, March 19, 2013

FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the March 22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in
HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie
Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the
Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on
December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a
Verified Petition, 3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East
Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI 4 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said
office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. On
February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution qualification.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date,
Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the
filing of the necessary documents for substitution."

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC 9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s
official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In
response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law
Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued
Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said
department to allow the substitution of private respondent.

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution (May 9, 2010
Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were
conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained
on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and
herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view of the
aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as
a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the
one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that
the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan to the Fourth District of Leyte was
only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void
ab initio; and (3) private respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the
prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her
identity before the notarizing officer. After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March
22, 2012 Decision which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private
respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District).

ISSUE: whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly
substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided
under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012
Decision rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031
(QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO: The petition is meritorious. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a
petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.

The Omnibus Election Code 23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid
for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition
for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to
have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned
election offenses. On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of
the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person
lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same
in the CoC.

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all.
The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections
due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however,
stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the
substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo
warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC
was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly
substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly
decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated
the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should
be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to
comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a
ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s
qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of
natural-born Filipino status.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that
Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled,
paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the
COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in
consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and
serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s
substitution. Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed,
the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona
fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for
office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there
exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own
qualification to office.
7) Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

FACTS

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On
October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s
COC contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan,
Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a
resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;2
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8
July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or
an immigrant4 of the United States of America;
And
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding
marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman
Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements
prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio. Consequently, petitioner argues that as
she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be
attributed to her. As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that
she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by
evidence.

Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s
COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

2. Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
3. Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines.

RULING

1.) Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

Yes. The COMELEC has jurisdiction and not the HRET.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications,
as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action Second, the jurisdiction of the
HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The court has consistently held that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office
of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.”28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction

2.) Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not
meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

NO. COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives

For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA;
and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence however, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012,
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading
to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:
“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year residency
requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July
13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner]
has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.

3.) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines.

NO. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections.
Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner
of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

8) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, supra.

FACTS

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is challenged insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1)
candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government;
(2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The drug testing shall employ, two testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10,
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the
Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x
x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required.

Petitioner Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10,
2004 elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE
Whether or not Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

RULING
No.Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as unconstitutional. The
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve
as senator.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution. It unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards for senators
as written in the Constitution, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be
declared as unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law
to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the
Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws
or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require
a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,

effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper,
be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso
that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate.

The Court declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Section 7: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO v. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of

Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary, House of representatives

FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District
of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.

He took his oath of office and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

According to the speaker, by the very act of filing his certificate of candidacy, Ali Dimaporo
removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner wrote to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of
Congress."

Petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief
was subsequently.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

He did not lose his seat as congressman when he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to
the present members of Congress.

The term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which
the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. On the
other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as
among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a
very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the
contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881.

He cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office
or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to
holding another office or employment.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION:

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the
voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary
renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

The ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as
the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive.

There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress,
among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of
disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from
claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.

ISSUE:

WON SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 IS OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION (AND THEREFORE PETITIONER IS CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO
RESIGNED)

RULING:

YES.
1. Only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective
public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy for another office. The advocates elucidated on the rationale of this
inclusion, thus:

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose
is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the
Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past where
members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that
spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people…
xxxx
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
…officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under
our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers.
…Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only
means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the
people…we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a
Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and
mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he
relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years.
Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to
file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not
(sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he
should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that
the Constitution requires of elective public officials…
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a
Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve,
otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact
therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing
his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position
which he feels he could be of better service.
…primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public
officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition…
XXX

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, the statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
2. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office.
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be
affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than
the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of
office.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term.
The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

3. The ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not
preclude its application to present members of Congress.

Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of
the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.

As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither
does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the
constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall
become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would
it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is
not one of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never
intended such absurdity.

4. Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. The act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate
of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office.
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held.

The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the
forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Section 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

1) Lucero v. COMELEC, 234 SCRA 280

WILMAR P. LUCERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR.

FACTS:

The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of Northern
Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L.
Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204
votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino
Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible;
of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was
held.

The COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution calling for a special
election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino
Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern
Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct.

Both Lucero and Ong filed with SC special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his
chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns
for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10)
months, following the day of the synchronized elections

RULING:

YES.

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:
Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6
and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a
majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur
before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

1. There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure
would affect the results of the election.

The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box
snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of
the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be
based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns.

The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of
Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the
votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is
safe to predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the
votes of the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four
(204) votes against petitioner Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be reduced to either 175
or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected
in the election returns of Precinct No. 7.
Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can
correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held in
Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.
xxxxxxx

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the
affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 is
two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of
registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the
possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority
might be more than the present lead of Ong.

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, the following computation is in
order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of
24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from
Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is
admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13.

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
have indeed been met.

2. In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible
application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no
special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall
be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one
(1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to
fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying
philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain
period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is
obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a
regular election is, after all, less than a year away.

The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are
inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President,
Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election
under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election.

Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only
the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular
constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election
for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a
Representative, district-wide.

Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had
been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately
determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation
until the end of the term. Under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected
officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.

Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding
of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No.
7166.

3. Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's

disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and
the results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the
election in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an
incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of
Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people
of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the
very least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

2) Ocampo v. HRET, 432 SCRA 114

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

1) People v. Jalosjos, 432 SCRA 689

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Trillanes v. Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471

FACTS:On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a
series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event
dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and
won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes
requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

RULING: No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and
coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present
case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of
an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention
of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso
that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.”
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation,
or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest
and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of.
In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected
him to the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to
govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence
of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May
14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending
concessions and blanket authorizations.

3) Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876

FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T.
Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for
the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. At the time of
said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense.

ISSUE: whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; whether the

aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate therein” of
Article VI, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which provides that “[t]he Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place”

RULING: No. The phrase “speech or debate therein” refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It
is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

4) Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2001

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
1) Puyat v. De Guzman, 112 SCRA 31

FACTS

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a
private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be
called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the
Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning
the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in
force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative
body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which
motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing
as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.

RULING

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for
the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the
fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit
had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the
Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the
matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before
an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

2) Baguilat v. Alvraez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017

FACTS

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news
articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment
of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative
minority" in the House of Representatives.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the
Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader.
However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as
such.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where
the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's
election to said Minority Leader position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the
House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of
the govemment.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep.
Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only
legitimate members of the House Minority.

RULING

The petition is without merit.

In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the peremptory writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary
course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear
legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12

The deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority
vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may
decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its sole control.

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government."

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-
pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this
case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of
government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially
interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but
also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.

Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself."

3) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17

(can’t find topic related to Sec. 14 in this case huhu)

FACTS
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate
President Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen.
Tanada’s motions were continuously denied of the common courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad
and Tanada “out of order!”. Senator Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the session
hall. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the
vacancy of the position of Senate President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate
President. These resolutions were voted and unanimously approved.
Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a vote
of 6 out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no
jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote
of seven, granted the motion and took cognizance over the case.

ISSUE
WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted a
quorum?

RULING
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23
Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President. PETITION DISMISSED.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In
other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because
the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the
absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House"
shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is
a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

NOTE:
Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to transact its lawful business, or, in other words, that number
that makes the lawful body and gives it power to pass a valid act. Unless otherwise validly
provided, it ordinarily refers to one-half plus one of the entire membership of the body. (Agpalo,
2005.)
Although the Supreme Court’s initial findings that there was no quorum originally constituted, the
Supreme Court finds light in the dissenting opinions of the Justices that even if a new quorum
were to be established, Sen. Cuenco would still be elected Senate President because of the 12
Senators supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting Sen. Avelino.

4) Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 169271. Oct. 18, 2011
(can’t find also Sec. 14 topic here huhuhu)

FACTS
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A.
6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a
consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said
laws.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well
as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President
of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they
also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court
agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every
three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by
RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30,
1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion.This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in
the Constitutional Commission.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the
perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local
Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.

Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.
Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty
nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term
suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements
and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a
manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under
these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional
discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could
have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of
the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room
for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office."This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be
therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize
elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.

5) Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268

FACTS
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation
is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of
Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions
of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chair, Deputy Speaker Daza, declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day,
the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.

Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI,
Section 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend
that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House

RULING

No. Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial
in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.The matter complained
of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

6) Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863

FACTS
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President Carlos Garcia. Because of
this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate
the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his
charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House.

Osmeña then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A
House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE
Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

RULING
No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in
any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that
“they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the
House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to
hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate.”

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
“is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
7) Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

8) United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

9) Casco Philippines Commercial Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the
production of synthetic resin glues. Petitioner asked for a refund of its payment of margin fee on
foreign exchange transactions under RA 2609. Sec 2 of RA 2609 exempts the payment of margin
fee on the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of Urea formaldehyde.Respondent,
however, refused on the ground that the exemption from margin fee refers to “Urea
formaldehyde” and not “Urea and Formaldehyde”. Petitioner contends that “Urea formaldehyde”
in Sec 2 of RA 2609 should be construed as “Urea and Formaldehyde” based on the intention of
the Senate during the consideration of the bill.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s contention is correct

RULING: No. "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
It is well settled that the enrolled bill, which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea
and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

10) Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131

FACTS: The Petitioner is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and
holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of the chief of police, Petitioner was
designated acting chief of police and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the Mayor of Manila. The respondent Commissioner of Civil Service rejected his
appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements
for the said position”due to lack of a bachelor’s degree based on section 10 of the Police Act of
1966.
Petitioner asserted that he is not required to be a bachelor’s degree holder. He posits that what
was approved by the Senate in the third reading of House Bill 6951 is different in what now
appears in Sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966. It would thus appear that the Bill was change during
the course of its engrossment and such change was not made by Congress but by a mere
employee in rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences. Hence, the petitioner would like the SC to
look into the matter.

ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the
legislative process

RULING: No. under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, the signing of the bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the secretaries of both Houses that it was
passed are conclusive as to its due enactment. The enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal,
the enrolled bill prevails in case of discrepancy.
The court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to
the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to
make can be better done in Congress.

11) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was
passed on third reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate,
substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas
but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The
House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the
amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were
the ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President
affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by
the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President
withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bill has become a law

RULING: No.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to
sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was
considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under the same
circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence.8 But in the case of Field
vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in
the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers,
to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other
cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the
courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as
to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is
present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It
does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does
contain the following provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
on the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof
of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously
this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which
it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that
the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a
law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will
satisfy the constitutional requirement."
12) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered

1) Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134

FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

2) Reyes v. COMELEC, supra.

FACTS
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On
October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s
COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency,
date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and
filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s
COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUE

1 Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative.
2 Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

RULING
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
1 Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
2 In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public
office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate
in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of
residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes
naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.

3) Vera v. Aquino, 77 Phil. 192 (per checking title should be Vera v. Avelino)

FACTS
After The elections, Comelec submitted its report to Congress & the President. The Report state
that there was terrorism and violence in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, which prevented the
expression of the
popular will. That there was coercion and intimidation, that most of the residents left their homes
in order not to be subjected to oppression (many of them voted for Roxas as president and that
there was terrorism to ensure the election of the members of the Nationalista party)

A protest against the election of VERA DIOKNO & ROMERO was filed with the SET. The Senate
convened and THE PENDATUN RESOLUTION was approved. Under the Resolution, pending
the termination of the protest against their election, VERA, DIOKNO, ROMERO (who had been
included among the 16 senators who won, and proclaimed by Comelec), SHALL NOT BE
SWORN IN, NOR SEATED AS SENATORS.’

The 3 filed this case for the annulment of the Pendatun Resolution, and for them to be able to
occupy their seats and exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUE
1. Whether the SC has jurisdiction?
2. Does prohibition lie?
3. Assuming that the SC had jurisdiction, did Senate exceed its powers in adopting the
Pendatun Resolution?

RULING
1. No.

Petitioners further invoke the ANGARA DOCTRINE which they claim grants SC jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission.

The Court provides that previously, under the ALEJANDRINO DOCTRINE, mandamus will not lie
against the legislative body, and its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative
in character. The courts cannot dictate their legislative functions, over which they have exclusive
control. When there is a member who has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have
no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel
his reinstatement.

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in pursuance of a power committed
exclusively to that department by the constitution.

HOWEVER: The Organic Act had some innovations which established additional exceptions to
the well known doctrine of SEPARATION OF POWERS, for instance the CREATION OF
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, wherein the Justices of the SC participate in the decision of
congressional election protests. Under Marbury vs. Madison, the court may annul any legislative
enactment that fails to observe the constitutional limitations. A legislative enactment is the act of
an agency of sovereign authority. If it conflicts with the Constitution, then it must fall. Invalidating it
is a plain exercise of judicial power, that power vested in the courts to enable them to administer
justice according to law. THIS IS NOT THE EXERCISE OF SUBSTANTIVE POWER to review
and nullify the acts of Congress. It is simply a NECESSARY CONCOMITANT OF THE POWER
TO HEAR AND DISPOSE OF A CASE and to determine its validity against the law.

The Angara Doctrine is not applicable. In Angara, the Court took jurisdiction because there was a
conflict of
jurisdiction between 2 constitutional bodies, hence the SC was compelled to determine the
character, scope and
extent of their respective spheres of action. IN THIS CASE, there is actually no antagonism
between the Senate and the SET. Consequently, the SC cannot intervene. Following the
ALEJANDRINO DOCTRINE, the court cannot entertain this petition and order the branch of
legislature to reinstate a member. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance and to
UPSET THE CLASSIC PATTERN OF CHECKS AND BALANCES WISELY WOVEN INTO OUR
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. There are undoubtedly many wrongs that the judiciary may not correct,
for instance, those involving political questions.

2. NO. prohibition refers only to proceedings of tribunals exercising judicial or ministerial

functions, NOT
LEGISLATIVE functions.

3. No.

The discussions of the Con-Con showed that instead of transferring to the Electoral Tribunal all
the powers of the
House or Senate as the “sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications” of its members, it
was GIVEN ONLY JURISDICTION OVER “ALL CONTESTS” relation to election, etc.
According to the deliberations, a compromise plan / amendment was submitted limiting the power
of the ET to judging all cases contesting the election, returns and qualifications of members. In
rejecting the Labrador Amendment (which seemed to give to the ET the power to determine also
the election of members who have not been protested), the Con-Con thus did NOT INTEND TO
GIVE IT ALL THE FUNCTION OF THE ASSEMBLY on the subject of election and qualification of
members.
An ELECTION CONTEST relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not
only to out the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office.
Thus, since the power to defer-oath taking, until the contest is adjudged, does not belong to the
ET, then it must be held that the Senate or the House still retains such authority, for it has not
been transferred to, nor assumed by the ET. This can be interpreted in 2 ways:
•that such power to delay oath taking stemmed from the former privilege of either House to be
the judge of election returns and qualifications of members, OR
•that it is an inherent power to every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
3 points:
1. the authority of the ET is only over all contests relating to E,R,Q of its members, it does not
extend to all matters and functions of legislative on the subject.
2. Congress still retains the authority to defer oath taking of members, pending an election
contest
3. Congress, under parliamentary practice, has the power to inquire into the credentials of any of
its
members. But the power of the ET is a limited power.

4) Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 434

FACTS
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival
Olivia Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong
before the COMELEC. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because
when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her
citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects. Hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. During the pendency of the case, election day came, and
votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing,
declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification,
Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with
Resolution no. 8062 adopting the disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec

ISSUE

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case

2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification
based on citizenship

RULING
1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance
with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil
Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said
naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his
permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more
than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any
other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his
permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools]
of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the
naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior
[now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation
of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the
exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to
be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government
institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law.
Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of
fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be
deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious
rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified
by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention
to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
office, and she was allowed to officially assume the. Accordingly, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications
is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of
their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a
member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive
period notwithstanding.

5) ChaveZ v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315

FACTS
Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate.

May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case “Francisco Chavez v. Comelec , et al.,”
disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. The
petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its
agents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the
name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns
and “to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . .
. .”

May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez
from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes
in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified
candidates. On Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified
candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all
“Chavez” votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the precincts.

Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166
which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to
instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.

Confusion arose as the “Chavez” votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of
Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, “Chavez” votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.

May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election
registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to
credit all the “Chavez” votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor
of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the various
BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of voting did not
indicate the number of “Chavez” votes which were declared stray or invalidated.

May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter
to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes
to scan for the “Chavez” votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the
appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the
proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this
urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the
Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing
Comelec’s resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner �s letter/complaint dated May
14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec
acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.

June 8, 1992, Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground
that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the
Senate.

ISSUE

Whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING

Jurisdiction - The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor

Chavez’s name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court’s
function of judicial review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in
cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers
and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions.

Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. Comelec
has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez’s name not only on the official list of candidates, but
also on the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner �s allegation
that respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.

Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre-
proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator,
and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases
shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However,
this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.

xxx xxx xxx

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.

What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns.” To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before
the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

The petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns” before the Comelec but for the reopening of the ballot boxes and
appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has not even pointed to any “manifest error” in
the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the
proper recourse is to file a regular

- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: “… (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of
inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of ballots.
(2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The
function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level.
(3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243
OEC. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie
considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning
candidates.

“The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be
raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended
for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed.
Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the
power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their
authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).”

Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvas s or election
returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.

Note:

Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as “any question pertaining to or affecting the

proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.” [Sec. 241,
Omnibus Election Code).

6) Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

FACTS

Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file
a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the election, Farinas
filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3,
1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not
the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas
took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR
on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal.

ISSUE
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the
validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

RULING
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as
Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to
declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the
proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution,
the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision
to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own
jurisdiction and functions.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressmanis raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.

7) Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569

FACTS

Robert Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates in the 2004 Senatorial elections. After a
partial canvass of the votes, the first eleven senators were duly proclaimed by the Comelec.
Barbers and Biazaon battled for the 12th and final spot.

After canvassing the remaining Certificates of Canvass (COCs), Comelec proclaimed Biazon as
the 12th Senator. Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. While there were certain
precincts where there was failure of elections, the COMELEC stated that this difference will not
materially be affected by the votes in said precincts.

Barbers assailed the proclamation of Biazon arguing that it was illegal and premature being
based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and
votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections.

Comelec denied Barbers’ petition and declared Biazon to be the winner for the 12th and final slot
in the Senate. Barbers sought the review of the Comelec’s Resolution before the SC by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

ISSUE

Can the Supreme Court take cognizance over Barbers’ petition?

RULING

NO.

The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within
the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against
Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Xxx”

Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides: The Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the Senate.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. The word sole in Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election contests relating to
members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
therefore clear that the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain Barbers’ petition. Since Barbers
contests Biazons proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET, which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint.

EXISTENCE OF OTHER REMEDY PRECLUDES DIRECT RESORT TO THE SUPREME

COURT VIA CERTIORARI. Where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral
Tribunal. In like manner, where as in the present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as
the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers’ proper recourse is to file a regular election protest with
the SET.

Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELECs assailed proceedings.

8) Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

FACTS

G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who
was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were
internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group
that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca
and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House
of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question
must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan

RULING

YES.

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

9) Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651

FACTS

On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against
22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator
Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and
resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the
tribunal?

RULING

NO.

Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the
Supreme Court.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the
Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial”
and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly
stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear expression of
an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the
Senators’) peers in that Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the
constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision
of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.—

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

10) Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002

FACTS

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the
Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election
through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13
organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to
send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative
each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives
to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the
political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it
does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the
present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the
House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to the Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the
CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved
to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General
Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the
HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of
Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both
cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an
additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the
CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed
the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution
and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

ISSUES
Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the
HRET.

Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULING
NO.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits,
who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose
its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation
of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers
calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28]
Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the
election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET
or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that
time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did
not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the
CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to
the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

11) Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

FACTS

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur
to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET
received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from
the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

12) Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

1) Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496

FACTS:
Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative
of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to
LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the
seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza,
in accordance to proportional representation.
Issues

1. Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party

2. Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the CA

RULING and Ratio

Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25
Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3
Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who
joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA.
Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The
Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still
part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on
proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the
organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability.
However, the LDP has already been in existence for a year. They command the biggest following.
They not only survived but prevailed.
Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party
by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.

2) Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377

Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under
KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the
CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced
Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the
revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal
Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the
election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the
theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and
elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the
support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence
outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation”
clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since
KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question
but because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House,
comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA
and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of
the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party,
its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does
not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members
of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and
elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by
the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the
Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other
government branches.

3) Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 316

FACTS: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the
Senate for the Commission on Appointments (COA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5;
NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the COA to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. Respondents filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging, among others, that decision ignored the reality of the multi-party
system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; It is
mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments; The Senate did not act
with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Tañada to the Commission on
Appointments; and that the election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-
party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional
membership of any party in the Commission.

The court denied the MR, stating that the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission
on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in
accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the
same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected
on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of Article VI, Sec. 18

RULING: The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada in the Commission on
Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision
however refers to the former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as
Senator in 1953-1954. In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments
showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the
various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks.

His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member
of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was
constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Tañada's membership in the
Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Tañada as a
precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the
Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party. The Senate recognized the rule on proportional
representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve
and avoid fractional membership in the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada to the Commission on Appointments does not
reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial
acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the
absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the
repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on
the legislature.

This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-
party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments
requires a minimum membership in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to
a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on
Appointments.

We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators
be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its
functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding
directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political
parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12
members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement
allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard
the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional
membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.

Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions
even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full
complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and
transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent
Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on
proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in
the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce
Enrile.

4) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

FACTS: In 2005, the anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project(NRP) as well as the
Graci tapes surfaced, which prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing and investigate the
said scandals, particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before them as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend due to
pressing matters. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the Senate
President, excepted the letters.

Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. It prohibited the Department
Heads, Senior Officials of Exec. Dept, flag officers of AFP, PNP with rank of chief superintendent
and others as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted
by Congress without first securing the President’s approval.
Those department heads and military officers invited by the Senate invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it allegedly infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in
the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional

RULING: EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of the subject
EO, SC distinguished Sec. 21 and 22 of Art 6 of the Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry
is expressed in Sec. 21. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. Stated differently, the power of inquiry is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information; and where the body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Sec. 22 provides for the Question Hour which is closely related to legislative power and it is
precisely a complement to or a supplement of the legislative inquiry. The appearance of the
members of the Cabinet is essential not only to the application of check and balance but also in
aid of legislation.

A distinction was thus made between Sec. 21 and 22. One specifically relates to conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation – the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation; while the other aims to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
While attendance is discretionary in Question Hour, it is mandatory in Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation. The power of Congress to compel appearance under Sec. 21 but the lack of it under
Sec. 22 is based in the principle of Separation of Powers. While Exec. Branch is a co-equal
branch, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power to inquiry, the only way to be
exempted is by a valid claim of privilege. Only one Exec. Official may be excused – the President.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent as per EO 464, limited as it is only to
appearances in the Question Hour, is valid on its face. However, this shall not be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department heads to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim is subsequently made by either the President of the Exec. Secretary.

5) Gudani v. Senga, 498 SCRA 671

FACTS
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On
the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing
in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate,
prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office
of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day,
Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service.
After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of
War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the
Senate.

ISSUE
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?

RULING
1. Yes. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces of the Philippines. Outside the limitations of provisions such as Sec. 5, Art.
XVI, the President has absolute authority over members of the armed forces, and can restrict
their mobility and speech. Both restrictions are necessary to insulate the military from partisan
politics and to ensure that they are ready to be called in times of emergency. The military must
follow the President’s authority pursuant to the principles of discipline and obedience to the chain
of command, with violation of the latter punishable under Art. 65 of the Articles of War.

The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that
the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash
may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes
this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a
particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to
its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be
outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him
occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.

6) NOEC II v. Sangguniang Panlungsod, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987

FACTS
Assailed is the validity of a subpoena sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio
Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager,
respectively, of petitioner NegrosOriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II), requiring their
attendance and testimony at the Committee's investigation.
The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities" in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner
NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically, the inquiry
was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power
lines in that city. Respondent Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on
Public Utilities and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed
both the subpoena and the Order complained of.
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:
a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and
b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants (the
Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of
NORECO II.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey the subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel
the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in
the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to
NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the SangguniangPanlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation
and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. It is
also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is
necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Furthermore, the
respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its
effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumagueteresidents is well-within the
jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.

ISSUE
Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and
order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena?

RULING:
NO
1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative
power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government units, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of
law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest
Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and
dignity, in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve
their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.
The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine
Congress in a subsequent decision arising from the same factual antecedents:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of
separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it
must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the
other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every
act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must
resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . .
Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied
mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee
of a city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.
3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the
same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative
bodies which are creations of law.
4. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a
judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as
mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any
government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of
testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have
impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all
government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the
legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must
therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the
Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitionersTorres and
Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to
claim that it can exercise these powers.
5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc
Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances
would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body. As admitted by the respondents in their Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the
Ad-Hoc Committee was to look into the use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of pre-war
vintage" which the latter had acquired from the Visayan Electric Company, and "to hear the side
of the petitioners". It becomes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the
electric service of NORECO II and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is
beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
committee.
There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines or wires within its territorial jurisdiction. The
power subsists notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification Administration (NEA),
to which body the franchise powers of local government units were transferred by Presidential
Decree No. 269.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines,
in order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this ordinance-
making power, said body or any of its committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not
the same as, the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already
discussed, the difference lies in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for
contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who
are willing to supply information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of
investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its
ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of its
electric franchise.
In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas
and invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54,
P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any
suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law
and in its franchise. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if
there be sufficient basis therefor. The legislative contempt for their disobedience of said
subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultravires. The respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non--members
for contempt.

7) Standard v. Senate, 541 SCRA 456

FACTS

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile,
in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation,
to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then
set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were
cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge
to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion
of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees
of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or
remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive,
but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the
offender.

8) Dela Paz v. Senate, 579 SCRA 521

FACTS
Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended at the Moscow airport departure area for his failure to declare in
written form the 150, 000 euros found in his possession. As a result, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations conducted an inquiry and issued warrants of arrest in connection with the
“Euro-General’s” detention in Moscow. However, Dela Paz contended that the said Senate
Committee chaired by Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, was devoid of any jurisdiction to
investigate the Moscow incident as it does not involve state to state relations as provided in par.
12, sec. 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure. He added that the arrest warrants issued
by the Senate against him were invalid as these lacked the required signatures of the majority of
the members of respondent committee. Are the contentions of the Dela Paz tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. In a nine-page unanimous resolution penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, the
Court enumerated six reasons why the petition of the spouses Dela Paz “must inevitably fail.”

The Court cited sec. 16(3), Art. VI of the Constitution, which states that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings. “The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee…in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full
discretion of the Senate….[I]t is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of
policy, an issue depended upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action,” the Court
said.

Second, the Court said that even if it is within the Court’s power to inquire into the validity of the
exercise of assailed jurisdiction, it is convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the
proper sphere of its authority. Citing the same provision raised by dela Paz, the Court said that
the Senate provision “unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident is well
within its committee’s jurisdiction.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court cautioned that the
Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia, noting
that country is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United
Nations Convetion Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain
provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders. The
Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s compliance with the obligations required of state-
parties under these conventions, noted the Court.

Third, the Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the
respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee). Pursuant to par. 36, sec. 13, Rule 10 of the Senate
Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the
government.
Fourth, the Philippine Senate has issued a formal written order of arrest signed by 10 senators,
with the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.

Fifth, the Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general Circulation.

Lastly, the arrest order issued against the Dela Paz coupled has been rendered ineffectual when
Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily submitted himself during the Senate inquiry held on November 15,
2008. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations initially scheduled the hearing on the Moscow
incident on October 23, 2008. (GR No. 184849, Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, February 13, 2009

OR

FACTS
Petitioner Gen. dela Paz was detained by the local authorities at the Moscow departure area for
the failure of declaration and the discovery of 105, 000 Euros in his luggage. Waiting upon his
arrival in Manila is a subpoena from the Senate Committee for an investigation with regards to the
incident in Moscow.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committee has jurisdiction over a matter involving state to state relations?
HELD
YES. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that is to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. The Senate has the capacity to set its own
rules of proceedings as the provision of the Philippine Constitution. The exercise of its power is
exempted from any interference and supervision from the Judiciary.
The Senate Rules provide that the Senate Committee shall cover in its jurisdiction all matters
relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular
services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its
agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and
overseas Filipinos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.

9) Romero v. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other
compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human
Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. On
August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the
Committee an invitation, 1 signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads
as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:

Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF
THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF
OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF
P550.86 MILLION".

The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a
much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned
Resolutions.

On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking
to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to
appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.

Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the
September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.

Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the senate committee hearing was constitutional. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The Court petition. resolves to dismiss the instant petition. A legislative investigation in
aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other
hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative
body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; 17 and to determine whether
there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, 18 albeit the inquiry
need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this
recourse. Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to
petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned
investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is
clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and
testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. 21 Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those
subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are
expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked
by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being
asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be
asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying
respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of
every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. 22
(Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of
constitutionality except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota 23 of the controversy. So it
must be here. Indeed, the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and
subpoenas issued vis - à-vis the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and
543 has ceased to be a justiciable controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by
supervening events heretofore indicated. In short, there is no more investigation to be continued
by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation the constitutionality of which is subject
to a challenge.

10) Garcillano v. House, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

11) Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

FACTS
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING

YES. The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-
chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

12) Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 25

FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was
the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that
only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The
Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of
the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.

ISSUES

Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00
Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session.
Whether or not the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination

RULING

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness
gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject
of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already
indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded
to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with
the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation.
To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the
very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress .
. . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find
no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate
him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the
court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him
to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the
same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.

13) Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704

SABIO v. GORDON (related to Art. VI, Section 21 not Section 18)

FACTS:

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her
regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's
unhampered performance of its task.

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples
upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors." According to said Resolution, the Philippine Star, in its 12
February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately
released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee
member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated
interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel

Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti,
Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006
and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar
subpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006,
he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they
previously filed, which raised issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners
Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate.

They submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation, which partly reads:

Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it
explicitly provides:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to
ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section
4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.

XxxxxxX

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order
directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate.

The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees'
members.

Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA,
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President
Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.

Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry.

It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry
by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted
provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987
Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.

Chairman Sabio also argues that respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him
and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution

This issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their
refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified

2. Whether respondent Senate Committees have power to punish petitioner Sabio and his
Commissioners for contempt of the Senate

RULING:

1. YES.

The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached
our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty, cited in Arnault v. Nazareno. In those earlier days,
American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864
case of Briggs v. MacKellar explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:

Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies
composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable
them to legislate….It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may
institute any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of
its members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon
which it may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would
be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain
information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and
intelligent exercise of the legislative function….In American legislatures the investigation of public
matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house
appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and
the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to
punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced….The right of inquiry, I think, extends to
other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for
legislative aid.

XXXXXXX

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that
the power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:

Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
possess it."

XXXXXXXXX

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power
made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. Then came the
1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit
under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but
also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and
that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

CONSIDERING THESE JURISPRUDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS, WE FIND SECTION 4(B)

DIRECTLY REPUGNANT WITH ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21.

Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This
cannot be countenanced. NOWHERE IN THE CONSTITUTION IS ANY PROVISION GRANTING
SUCH EXEMPTION. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.

CERTAINLY, A MERE PROVISION OF LAW CANNOT POSE A LIMITATION TO THE BROAD

POWER OF CONGRESS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating
that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and
other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.

2. YES

Article VI, Section 21 provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the
Philippine Senate" was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators.
From this, it can be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent
Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees.

Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not
just of Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant because it constitutes a
direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to
the Committees.

XXXX

This is a reasonable conclusion.

The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with
it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will
be meaningless.
The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is
underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.

In Arnault v. Balagtas, the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is
founded upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every
contumacious act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information
on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When
the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's
authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could
the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every
act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity.43

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, the

Court characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis x x x.

14) Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

ARVIN R. BALAGv.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin
the implementation of Senate P.S. Resolution (SR) No. 504 and the Order (Contempt Order)of
the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs citing Arvin Balag (petitioner) in
contempt.

FACTS:
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill), a first year law student of the
University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.
SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri condemning the death of Horacio III and
directing the appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to
hold those responsible accountable.
· The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator
PanfiloLacson together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional
Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint
Public Hearing.
· Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled.
· On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order
and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, issued a
Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to appear before the committee
and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry. Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was
issued on October 17, 2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to
attend the legislative hearing on October 18, 2017.
· On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing.
· In the course of the proceedings, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he
was the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and invoked his right
against self-incrimination.
· Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson then
reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple question, otherwise, he could
be cited in contempt.
· Senator Poe retorted that petitioner might still be clinging to the supposed "Code of
Silence" in his alleged text messages to his fraternity. She manifested that petitioner's signature
appeared on the application for recognition of the AJ Fraternity and on the organizational sheet,
indicating that he was the president.
· Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.
· Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel
Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the motion was properly
seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to place petitioner in detention after
the committee hearing.
· Thus, petitioner was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms by virtue of
a Contempt Order.
· Hence, this petition.
PETITIONER:

· The legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not in aid of legislation;
rather, it was in aid of prosecution.
· He properly invoked his right against self-incrimination as the questions propounded by
Senator Poe regarding the officers, particularly the presidency of the AJ Fraternity, were
incriminating because the answer thereto involves an element of the crime of hazing.
· The Senate illegally enforced and executed SR No. 504 and the Contempt Order, which
caused him grave and irreparable injury as he was deprived of his liberty without due process of
law. Respondents did not exercise their power of contempt judiciously and with restraint.

SUPREME COURT:

· Petition is moot and academic. Respondent committees have terminated their legislative
inquiry. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of petitioner likewise
ends.Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of
their constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and
the validity of petitioner's detention.

· Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues
although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. In this case, the
petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be addressed by Court: what is the
duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?This issue must be threshed out
as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition.
Moreover, the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to
liberty. Thus, paramount public interest requires the Court to determine such issue to ensure that
the constitutional rights of the persons appearing before a legislative inquiry of the Senate are
protected.
ISSUE:
WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY THE
SENATE?(To know the answer right away, skip the discussion below and go directly to
“SUPREME COURT RULING”)

JURISPRUDENCE RE: CONTEMPT POWER

In Arnault v. Nazareno (Arnault), where the Senate's power of contempt was discussed, the Court
held that the Senate "is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time [with] the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
xxx" It was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of Representatives, the
contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the said Congress.

Notably, Arnault gave a distinction between the Senate and the House of Representatives' power
of contempt. In the former, since it is a continuing body, there is no time limit in the exercise of its
power to punish for contempt; on the other hand, the House of Representatives, as it is not a
continuing body, has a limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt, which is on the
final adjournment of its last session.

Later, in Neri v. Senate (Neri), the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing'', as it is not dissolved
as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon
the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the
first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate
of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the
previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which
they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its
business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Based on the above-pronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the

conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of
the Senate during the expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such
as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated
upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the
first time.

WHY IS THERE A NEED TO LIMIT THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT?

SC:There is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be
imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of
legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries
in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.

Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be
detained indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be
detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the
perpetual Senate.Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons appearing before or affected by the
legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys
certainly cannot be respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due
process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-
preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end
and not the end itself. 48 Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of
contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to secure
information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the
liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary and
purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the
restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears
excessive in relation to that purpose. An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount
to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.

It is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A

legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed
through the power of contempt during legislative inquiry.

While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of
contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of
witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated
and envisioned by the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY THE

SENATE?

1. The Court finds that THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE INHERENT
POWER OF CONTEMPT BY THE SENATE DURING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
SHOULD ONLY LAST UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY UNDER
WHICH THE SAID POWER IS INVOKED.

In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee
if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate
legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

2. The Court further rules that THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY OF THE SENATE
TERMINATES ON TWO INSTANCES:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report.

Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report…

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred
to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the
conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the
Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within
fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall then be
approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall
be the subject matter of the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate.
Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or
disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether or
not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point, the
power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the
legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress.

As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the
Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon
that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

3. In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of imprisonment
pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an essential and appropriate means
for its performance." Also, in view of the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have
to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed xxx."

The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an unspecified
period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If Congress believes that
there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment
beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session,
then it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify
or produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall
be tried before the courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it
shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or imprisonment, and
the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of
contempt, which is different from the inherent power of contempt.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to wit:

Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. -
The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned
to attend as a witness before the National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing
committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees,
subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee chairman or member
authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being
present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed
under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or
records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The
same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall restrain another from attending as a
witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body
or official. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of
contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of
the legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing
law to augment its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the
sole discretion of Congress.

Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault - that the Senate will be prevented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly
provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative
hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling
even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.

Sec. 22

Senate v. Ermita,supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 23: 1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

1) SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was issued declaring a state of national emergency and aimed
to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No.
5 (GO 5). The said law was issued declaring a state of national emergency and aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not
stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their
faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom
of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has
been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power
is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3) Ampatuan v. DILG Secretary Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO
273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this
petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders
encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to
take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed
that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the
Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred
and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well
as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out
the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

RULING:1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor
of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐
Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of
the ARMM.
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized
her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from
the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and
suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court
said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces
may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security
of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must
be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the
“calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the
ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM
by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was
too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both
high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s
fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the
armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions

4) Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 -See MR Feb. 6, 2018

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
1) Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

FACTS

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

RULING

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with
is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

3) Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331

FACTS

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads,
however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but
projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision,
belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the
subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also
gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to
the government.

ISSUE

Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying
an expenditure of the government?

RULING

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage
of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
Section 25: 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President
for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure
for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.

6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

1) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517

FACTS
Petitioner Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
When RA 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10
years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of
RA 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such,
he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he
ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
Garcia brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to
compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from
the time of his reversion to inactive status.
He contended that his reversion was contrary to Par. 11 of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion
to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty w/ at least 10 years of accumulated active
commissioned service.
However, the respondents contend that the paragraph 11 “Special Provisions for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines” has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or
to any appropriation item contained law since RA 1600 is about appropriation of money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, while the said paragraph 11 refers to
the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par.
2 4 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to such appropriation.

ISSUE
WON paragraph 11 RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

RULING
YES.
The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the
relevance to any appropriation item.
RA 1600 is , is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government while Section
11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of
inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

… That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who
are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status
except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request;…

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE,

in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It
was a completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed
in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the
subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without
effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

2) Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS
The petition seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no. 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) unconstitutional
as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code )which
provides:

Sec. 67 Candidates holding elective office-Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

Reason for the petition: The unconstitutionality rose upon the violation of Section 26 of article 6 of
the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject, which should be expressed in its
title.

RA No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while section 67 of the Omnibus
election code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office rather than the one
they are holding in a permanent capacity

Petitioners also asserted that Sec 14 violates equal protection clause because it repeals Section
67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving Section 66 intact which imposes similar limitation
to appointive individuals.

Sec. 66 Candidates holding appointive office or position- Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including members of the AFP, and officers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing his certificate
of candidacy.

Respondents’ defense:

Section 14 of RA No. 9006 as it repeals Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code is not a

proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title “An Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices” is broad and could encompass entire election exercise including the filing of
candidacy of elective officials.
 The effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the
Constituion as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 be rendered unconstitutional because it as it expressly
repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and violated the “one-subject-one title” rule?

Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider?

*rider- additional provision added to a bill or other measure under the consideration by a
legislature having little connection with the subject matter of the bill.

RULING
NO and NO

Sec 26(1), Article IV provides:

“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.”
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object.
The title of RA no. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible elections through Fair Election Practices.”
Section 2 provides the principles and objectives thereof: The State shall, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for
public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for
public information campaigns and for among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and objectives of RA no. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Sec. 67 within its contemplation.
RA no. 9006 does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. An act having a single general
subject , indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not
inconsistent or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
3) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – Social Justice Society President Alcantara filed a Petition for Prohibition
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be
issued permanently.

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue
a TRO against respondents.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries
of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public
Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also
authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is
within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment
released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with
the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any
realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any
realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard
programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case
of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU
concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been
deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on accountability.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds,
and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and
hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood
control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing
the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget
or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

Article VI, Section 25 (2) provides that “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.”
Moreover, Article VI, Section 25 (5) provides that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

2. YES.

Regarding the Malampaya Fund:

The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to –
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied
by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated
as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other
purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”

Regarding the Presidential Fund:

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may
be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” The second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine
as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of
PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.

Article VI, Section 25 (4) provides “A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which
it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.”

4) Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208

FACTS
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977) as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of
PD No. 1177 provides:
“The president shall have authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment”.

In particular, petitioners claim that the provision violates the following constitutional provision:
Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution — No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The petition additionally argues that:
The provision infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public funds
It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to specify objectives and purposes for which proposed
transfer of funds are to be made
It allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution
in approving appropriations
It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive
The threatened, continuing transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by
the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of the Philippines are without or in excess of their authority
and jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in
its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has
become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in
pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”

ISSUE
Whether Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 constitutional?

RULING
No. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one cannot transfer an appropriation for one
item to another. However, it allowed enactment of a law which authorized transfer of funds in
order to augment an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the govt. branch or
constitutional body concerned. This leeway is limited, and was only granted to allow heads of
govt. branches some flexibility in the use of public funds and resources. This limitation stems from
the fact that the PURPOSE and CONDITION for fund transferring was required. Paragraph 1 of
The Budget Reform Decree of 1977 unduly overextends the privilege granted in sec. 16(5)
because the President can indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive Dept.’s branches to
any branch in the General Appropriations Act without regard as to whether or not 1) the funds are
actually savings in the item from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting
the item to which the said transfer is made. Although there is no complete disregard of the
standards in the fundamental law, it goes beyond the tenor thereof. It puts the bypasses the
safeguards in Sec. 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution on the release of money from
the Treasury.

5) Liga v. COMELEC 232 SCRA 219

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

6) Sanchez v. COA, 552 SCRA 471

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

7) Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014. -See MR, Feb. 3, 2015

FACTS: On September 25, 2013, Sen. JinggoyEjercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech to
reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona.The revelation of Sen.
Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present
controversy inevitable.The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending.
The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP
violated the mandate of Section 29(1) and Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether DAP violated the Constitution

RULING: Yes. The adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as the
Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed. Although no law was necessary for
the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending, anytransfer of
appropriated fundsshould conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be
transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and(3) The
purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices.
Section 25(5), not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the General Appropriations Acts
(GAA) of a given fiscal year. To comply with the requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize
the transfer of funds. However, the 2011 and 2012 GAA contravened with the Constitution. It did
not contain the phrase “for their respective offices” allowing transfer of funds from one branch to
another branch of the government which is not allowed under Sec. 25 of Art. 6 of the Constitution.
The transfer should only be within their respective offices.To be sure, the phrase "respective
offices" used in Section 25(5), refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the
Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the
Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with
respect to their respective Chairpersons.
There was also no savings from appropriation. The fact alone that the appropriations are
unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or
unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be
generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an
allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority.The Executive could not
circumvent the law by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year. Further, no funds from savings could be transferred under the
DAP to augment deficient items which are not provided in the GAA. An appropriation for any
program, activity or project (PAP) must first be determined to be deficient before it could be
augmented from savings. However, there were certain PAP that was supported by DAP that had
not been covered with appropriations in the respective GAAs. The Executive was authorized to
spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws, but such authority did not translate to
unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He
was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend
pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress.

Section 26: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418

FACTS: Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission
of the Department of Justice, thru its Trial Attorney the herein petitioner Manuel A. Cordero as
counsel for indigent petitioner tenant Vicente Salazar, filed with the Second Regional District of
the Court of Agrarian Relationsagainst private respondent landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana. Upon
a motion by the private respondent, the respondent Judge issued an order disqualifying petitioner
from appearing as counsel for the tenant on the ground that a tenant who cannot afford to pay
should be represented by the public defendant of the Department of Labor and the circular issued
by the Agricultural Tenancy Commission creating the Tenancy Unit Counsel is ultra vires and has
no legal force. Subsequently, RA 2263 "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINE” was enacted which
provides that in case a tenant cannot afford to be represented by counsel, it shall be the duty of
the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to represent him. Petitioner manifested
that the issue is now moot and academic since petitioner, on the basis of RA 2263 section 19 and
20,is now allowed to represent the tenant. Respondent, in his comment, contends that before the
enactment of RA 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division in existence nor was there any
law creating the same and defining its functions, and that its only basis for existence, therefore,
are sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which are null and void because the Constitution
under Article VI Section 1 provides that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." He contended further that
nowhere in the titles of Republic Act No. 1199 and Republic Act No. 2263 is the creation of the
Tenancy Mediation Division ever mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19, Republic Act No.
2263 falls under the first class of prohibited bills.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the respondent is correct

RULING: No. The constitutional requirement under Article VI section 1, is complied with as long
the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act
and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. The provisions of
sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the one general subject, agricultural tenancy.

2) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172

FACTS
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company, both re-suppliers of power
produced by NAPOCOR, assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that "in any contract for the
supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and
energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of
more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Also it
could “renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and
energy,". This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. This
statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the
constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more
than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title and is only meant to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR. The lower court sustained its validity.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

RULING

Yes. No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many American State
Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation
as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a
particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of
proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders
in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan
asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or
impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical,
it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and
means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The
legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made
to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the
amendment. "Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators."

4) Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710

FACTS
These two (2) cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the decision dated July 31, 1969 of the
Court of Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the Insular
Lumber Company the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37, representing 25% of the
specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by said company in the operation of
its forest concession in the year 1963.

Insular Lumber Company (Company for short). a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines is a licensed
forest concessionaire. The Company purchase manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in
the operation of its forest concession on which specific tax was paid.
The commissioner denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of
partial tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those using oil in the operation
of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June 14, 1956, the
date effectivity of said Act.
Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because
the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the
period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was
credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Tax Appeals err in its previous decisions (denying the tax exemption to Insular
Lumber Company)?

RULING
The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 is
unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the Commissioner
anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill
The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund."
The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase Highway Special
Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of
miners and loggers.
Partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the
title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an
increase of the Highway Special Fund.
The Court finds NO MERIT in the arguments.
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the necessity
for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the
imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is nor, a
deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted
constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail
to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation.
Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every
presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true republic in cases presenting other
constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible.
Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation should
be sustained.

5) Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

FACTS Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential

Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on
the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10).

ISSUE

The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

RULING
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if
all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the
title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an
activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which
the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and
8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need
for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board
(Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies
and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative
power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion
as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance
is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the
direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

6) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 27: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.

2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

1) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452

FACTS
Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill 1989. It eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget as submitted by the president.
When presented to the President for her signature, it was signed but 7 SPECIAL PROVISIONS
and Sec 55 (General Provision) were VETOED.
The senate then passed a resolution saying that the President’s Veto was unconstitutional.
Sec 55 provided:
 “Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations / Disapproved
or Reduced by Congress” – No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the
Budget which has been disapproved or reduced shall be restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item for appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the President shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress
if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in the GAB”
The reason why the President vetoed the provision was that it violates Section 25(5) – nullifying
the power of the President to augment any item from savings in other items.
Gonzales et al claim that the President’s Line-Veto in appropriation bills is limited to items and
does not cover provisions.
They claim that Cory exceeded her authority when she vetoed Sec 55 which are PROVISIONS,
such that when the President objects to a PROVISION of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the ITEMVETO POWER but should veto the entire bill.
They further claim that the Item-Veto Power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation.
Lastly they claim that Sec 25(5) of the Constitution (which provides for the President’s
Augmentation Powers) – has to be provided for by law thus Congress has the prerogative to limit
the exercise of the same.
On the other hand the Solgen claims that Sec 55 is actually a rider because it is extraneous to an
appropriation act, therefore the President validly vetoed it. Solgen further claims that the
constitution empowers the President to veto PROVISIONS or other distinct and severable parts of
an Appropriations Bill

ISSUE
Did the President exceeded the item-veto power?

RULING
No. In Article VI Sec 27 of the Constitution:
Paragraph 1 = refers to the general veto power of the President. If exercised, it would
result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL.
Paragraph 2 = refers to the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows the exercise of veto over
particular items in an APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The power given to the
President to disapprove any item in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different. An ITEM refers to the particulars, details, the
distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose. It obviously means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION of money,
not some general provision of law, which just happens to be put in an appropriation bill.
The claim of the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill not
only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a
separate veto,
but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any PROVISION in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that any such provision shall
be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation, and DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL. (The President may veto
provisions.)
Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers,
Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS.

As to the claim that Congress should be allowed to impose restrictions or conditions in an

appropriations bill (which they claim is beyond veto-powers), it cannot be denied that Legislature
has the power to provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills as to limit how the
money shall be spend, etc. Also, it cannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to veto a
condition or qualification but allowing the appropriation
itself to stand. HOWEVER, for these to apply, THE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE
REAL SENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate
legislation. Restrictions or Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEY ITEMS IN A
BUDGETARY SENSE IN THE SCHEDULE
OF EXPENDITURES. Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS. Sec 55 appears to be a
condition but actually they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE FOR a
substantive, separate legislation.

4) Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.

FACTS

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly
done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign
or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31
of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of
the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of
the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization
Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer
planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension
and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress.

ISSUE

Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S)
and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional

RULING

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held
by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege
before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund
policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
“appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President
without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is
not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other
grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment
of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP,
is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of
contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of
said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund
for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President
the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for
such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will
issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or
inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
“necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.

5) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS
(same as previously discussed)

ISSUE
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on.. checks and balances.

RULING

YES. It is unconstitutional for violation of the Consitutional provision on checks and balances.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s item–veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Petitioners claim that “[i]n the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump–sum appropriation,
the legislator’s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the
chance to veto that item later on.”212 Accordingly, they submit that the “item veto power of the
President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line–item budgeting” and that “Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting [which] effectively renders the constitutionally–given power of
the President useless.The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

The Court agrees.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump–sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily
means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump–sum/post–
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above– described system forces
the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.

Moreover, even without its post–enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of
lump–sum appropriation as above–characterized. In particular, the lump–sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does
not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

Section 28: 1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.

2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,

non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.

1) Commissioner of Internal Reveue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power, 164 SCRA 27

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

3) John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, Oct. 24, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing

(1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and

(2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement previously
entered into between public respondent BCDA and private respondents.

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of
no legal force and effect.

Intervener Camp John Hay Development Corp. (CJHDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
alleging that it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease Agreement with
respondent BCDA for the development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it “stands to be most
affected” by this Court’s Decision “invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial
incentives” in the John Hay Special Economic Zone (SEZ) since “[i]ts financial obligations and
development and investment commitments under the Lease Agreement were entered into upon
the premise that these incentives are valid and subsisting.”

CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be granted
leave to intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention be
admitted; and (3) this Court’s Decision of October 24, 2003 be reconsidered and petitioners’
petition dismissed.

CJHDC’s Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration in
Intervention.

ISSUE:
Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), are applicable to
the John Hay SEZ.

RULING:
CJHDC’s argument that the President’s “power to create Special Economic Zones carries with it
the power to provide for tax and financial incentives,” does not lie. It is the legislative branch
which has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions.

Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: “[n]o law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.”

Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full
power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution
itself may provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances
providing for exemption from local taxes, but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch which has
the power to grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.

There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax exemption in
favor of public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and other
incentives in Section 12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which expressly grants tax
exemptions) are clearly the business enterprises located within the Subic SEZ.

Contrary to public respondents’ interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not “tie the
hands” of executive or administrative agencies from implementing any present or future
legislation which affords tax or other financial incentives to qualified persons doing business in the
John Hay SEZ or elsewhere. The second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was
declared null and void only insofar as it purported to grant tax exemptions and other financial
incentives to business enterprises located in John Hay SEZ. However, where there is statutory
basis for exemptions or incentives, there is nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for
and availing thereof.

4) Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

5) CIR v. De La Salle University, G.R. No. 196596, November 9, 2016

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

Section 29: 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or

indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.

1) Guingona v. Carague, supra.

FACTS
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended
(Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For
The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.
HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated
to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

2) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Philippine Coconut v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

1) First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA

MANUFACTURING, INC.

CASE: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board
of Investments (BOI) should be filed.
A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.

FACTS:

· BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
"ceramic tiles."
· Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
which was denied. So,Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals
pursuant to SC Circular 1-91.
· Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of E.O. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

PETITIONER:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to
Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be
filed directly with this Court.

Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a
substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by
this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.

(NOTE: During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the
lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department.According to SC in its decision in the
herein case, the obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to
promote. In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision.)

PRIVATE RESPONDENT:

Whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS (BOI)?

RULING:

COURT OF APPEALS

1. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects
which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and
those arising from procedural law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60
C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their
invasion.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be
brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal
granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the
venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a
different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOI, WHICH BY STATUTE WAS PREVIOUSLY

ALLOWED TO BE FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT, SHOULD NOW BE
BROUGHT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
2) Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 32: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

1) Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492

FACTS: · On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created
SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.

· On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left
by the American navy.

· On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang

Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by
said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the
Office of the President.

· On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.

· The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions
are met.
· The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.

· Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

· On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

· On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

· On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting
a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum

· On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative
that proposes an amendment of a national law

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

RULING:1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum"
is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee";
the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once
was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a
law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content
of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved,
or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission
on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court
which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its
review powers.

2) Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174299, October 25, 2006

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING