REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No.

L-43105 August 31, 1984

FACTS:
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of a parcel on May 9,
1966, his share from the partitioned estate of his father. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands
and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.

Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses
on the land in question, though paying rentals, they constructed residential houses instead which prompted
private respondent to file an ejectment suit against them in 1966. In the meantime, private oppositors
simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed
Santos del Rios application for registration. The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration.
Applicant (Del Rio) appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of
Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.

ISSUES:
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD:
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered
with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshore
land, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code therefore irregistrable.

As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains
"falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the
land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the
authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or
basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and
therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable
title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable
title to the land.

Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his
title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession of the property. The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his father
before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed
land for more than thirty (30) years, counted from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person
by purchase. The record does not show any circumstance of note sufficient enough to overthrow said findings
of facts which is binding upon us. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with
just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription
to set in. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement and would be entitled to a judicial confirmation
of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended
by RA 1942).

The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have reclaimed the land from the waters
of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve
their position. In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging
to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And even if such reclamation had
been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may
still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper
authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. In the second
place, their alleged possession can never ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription. As correctly found by the appellate
court, the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants
of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent cannot be considered
in their favor. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant
and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into
ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.

The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of land
described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.Tthe judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

FAUSTINO IGNACIO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960
FACTS:
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove). Later, he
amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To
the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez
later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public
domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto,
not having acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title
under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously
and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was
holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and
approved by the President.

It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from
the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land
since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and
public for a period of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano. On the other
hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the
tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application,
holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the land in question, although an accretion to the land of the
applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public domain.

RULE:
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit
by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which
provides that: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.

Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to
accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same.

Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been
gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or
purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Consequently, until a formal
declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that
the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having
possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject
to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for
seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such
land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses
and for the benefit of those who live nearby.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal. In view of the foregoing, the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond
property. On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a
written opposition to the application for registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3
of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. On March 7, 1975, Lot
3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-
131892. On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in
question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. On August, 19, 1982, the respondent
Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually
happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River,
and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect that:
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the
property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry
up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and
soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were
then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention
because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is registrable as an accretion.

RULE:
We agree with the petitioner. Article 457 of the New Civil Code requires the concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the
river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the
said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
There is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current
of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to
be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is
under two meters of water.

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate
him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.

The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property
to the river to which it belongs.

HILARIO vs. CITY OF MANILA GR No. L-19570 April 27, 1967 (sensya taas kayo, libog ni kasoha kay kinatsila ang uban law)
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang,
San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new
certificate of title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiff’s father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western
side by the San Mateo River. To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was
constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For
years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which
inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on
the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a
lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between
the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the
premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the
River. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages
was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario’s estate. The US
Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its
operations.

On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City
Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-
in-charge of the plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed
to join the litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted.
On 14 March 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same
case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between
the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but
subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. On 13 May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded
as additional defendants the City of Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new
Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the
City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of
materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations. On
21 December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision, ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public
Works to pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiff’s
land, plus costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36.80
representing gravel fees illegally collected. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and
they all sought a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to
reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the
case against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario
taking action against proper party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration,
which the lower court denied. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the riverbanks lining of a river that newly opened up through private property be of public
ownership.

RULE:
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public ownership — including those formed when
a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear.
Without any qualifications, it provides:
Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which
defines the phrase "banks of a river" provides:
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the
stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the banks — for
all legal purposes — as part of the riverbed. The lower court also ruled — correctly — that the banks of the River
are paint of its bed. Since undeniably all beds of rivers are of public ownership, it follows that the banks, which form
part of them, are also of public ownership.

Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply because Art. 312 of the old Civil Code mentions
only the new bed but omits the banks, and that said articles only apply to natural — meaning original — bed and banks is
untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:

The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest [ordinary]
floods.

Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —

Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a
private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event
that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose.

Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely
private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature
also.

However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are
public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of
the Law of Waters of 1866.

Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now equates the term "natural"
with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However, the
premise is incorrect. "Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river
should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the
definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary
nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.

The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really confined their operations within the banks of
the River as alleged by them. To resolve this, We have to find out from what precise portion in the disputed area the
defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they did not extract indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of
the parties' briefs were very helpful but the evidence on record discloses that defendants made their extractions only within
specified areas during definite periods.
It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond the receding western extremities of the
west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from within the banks of the river which constitute
part of the public domain — wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that
defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have invaded his private estate.
He cannot, therefore, recover from them.

As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire disputed area as part of the riverbanks would be
tantamount to converting about half of his estate to public ownership without just compensation. He even adds that
defendants have already exhausted the supply in that area and have unjustly profited at his expense. These arguments,
however, do not detract from the above conclusions.

First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the "secondary bank" line and the
"primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are only holding is that at the time the
defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. Secondly, it is not correct
to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code,
the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And
had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in
proportion to the area he has lost

And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were not responsible for the
shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And defendants were extracting from
public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the defendants, may have been enriched by
chance, but not unjustly.

Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and his agents and employees are hereby absolved
from liability to plaintiff since they did not extract materials from plaintiff's property but from the public domain.

(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from the line running parallel to the western waterline
of the river and twenty meters east from the camachile tree is hereby declared as not part of the public domain and
confirmed as part of plaintiff's private property. No costs. So ordered.

MAXIMO JAGUALING vs. CA G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991

FACTS:
The parties to this case dispute the ownership of a certain parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental, forming part of an island in a non-navigable river. Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against petitioners.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of private respondents as plaintiffs therein to establish by
preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation. The court found that the island is
a delta forming part of the river bed which the government may use to reroute, redirect or control the course of
the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held that it was outside the commerce of man and part of the public
domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. The trial court, however, recognized the validity of petitioners'
possession and gave them preferential rights to use and enjoy the property. The trial court added that should
the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership, the petitioners have rights better than that of
private respondents.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court found that the island was formed by the branching off of
the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles
463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private
respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court correctly applied the provisions of Articles 463 and 465 of the new Civil Code
to the facts of the case at bar; and

HELD:
The Court of Appeals also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because
the island is longer than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that
portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established by petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be
recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right
is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the
reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific
act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof,
the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the
Torrens system must itself still be registered.

Petitioners may therefore, acquire said property by adverse possession for the required number of years under
the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot be considered in good faith, however, because
they are presumed to have notice of the status of private respondents as riparian owners who have the
preferential right to the island as recognized and accorded by law. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good
faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of
thirty years. By their own admission, petitioners have been in possession of the property for only about fifteen
years. Thus, by this token and under the theory adopted by petitioners, the island cannot be adjudicated in their
favor.

This case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership over an accession but rather
between a riparian owner and the one in possession of the island. Hence, there is no need to make a final
determination regarding the origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was initially formed by the branching off
or division of the river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there is strictly no accession
because the original owner retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the river under Article 465,
or, as claimed by petitioners, whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and washing away of the stockpile
of the river control, which makes it a case of avulsion under Article 459.

We are also well aware that this petition is an upshot of the action to quiet title brought by the private respondents
against petitioners. As such it is an action quasi in rem. Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this nature is
conclusive only between the parties and does not bind the State or the other riparian owners who may have an
interest over the island involved herein. We find no error committed by respondent court and DENY the petition
for lack of sufficient merit. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.