G.R. No.

L-45435 June 17, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
REMIGIO B. CHAN, defendant-appelle.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellant.
Jose Ma. Tuason for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The legal question involved in this appeal is whether a municipal ordinance which prohibits the sale by
first run cinematographs of tickets in excess of their seating capacity, is discriminatory and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
The accused Remigio B. Chan, as manager of the Capitol Theatre, a first class cinematograph located
on the Escolta, Manila, was charged and sentenced in the municipal court to pay a fine for having sold
to the public tickets in excess of seating capacity of said cinematograph. From this judgment, he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila and by virtue of a demurrer therein interposed, the
information was dismissed on the ground that said ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
discriminatory. The fiscal appealed.
In the demurrer interposed by counsel for the accused, it is alleged that the discrimination in the
ordinance is very obvious inasmuch as there is no reasonable or natural basis for the imposition of a
burden on first run theatres and the exemption therefrom of those which are not thus classified.
It seems that this reasoning of the defense refutes itself. If it is admitted that the restriction on the sale
of tickets is imposed on first run cinematographs only and that those cinematographs which are not so
classified are exempted therefrom, then there can be no discrimination.
In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of Manila exercises police
power by delegation and that in the exercise of that power, it is authorized to enact ordinances for the
regulation of the operation of theatres and cinematographs (sec. 2444 [m] and [ee] of the Revised
Administrative Code; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218; U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil., 245).
On April 17, 1935 Ordinance No. 2347 was approved. In section 1 it provides that all first run theatres
or cinematographs should register their seating capacity with the City Treasurer, and in section 2 it
prohibits the sale of tickets in said theatres or cinematographs in excess of their registered seating
capacity.
Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, approved on July 22, 1933, was in
force, section 1 of which divides cinematographs into three different classes; first, second and third.
The first class includes those located on certain and specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which
exhibit films for the first time; those belonging to the second class are those which, not being located
on said streets, also exhibit films for the first time, and those which, being located on said streets,
regularly show films for the second time or which have the exclusive right to show second-hand films;
and the third class comprehends all those which are not included in the first and second classes.
To the foregoing must be added, and this is of common knowledge, that the films which are shown for
the first time attract a large attendance, and the theatre or cinematograph, whether it is first or second
class, presenting shows for the first time, would be suffocatingly overcrowded if the number of tickets
were not limited. This is the reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in excess of the seating
capacity. The prohibition applies with equal force wherever the same reason exists, that is, to first and
second class theatres which show films for the first time.
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and to made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The
 trues governing classification are briefly as follows: The classification must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional law, 2d ed., page 343.) (Emphasis ours.)
A case similar to that now before us is that of People vs. Gabriel (43 Phil., 641), in which this court
said:
Section 749 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended by Ordinances of the
City of Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 938, which is intended to prohibit a crier or the
use of a bell or other means of attracting bidders by noise or show within certain hours and on
certain streets in the city, is a valid excercise of the police power, is not discriminatory or class
legislation, and is not unconstitutional.
We have the other case of Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil., 660) in which the
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. This court
held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things:
. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists
a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. (Id., page 718.)
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed order is hereby reversed and it is ordered that this case be
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Manila for further proceedings. Without costs. So ordered.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7
MAR 1919]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-
Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section
2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes
in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the
Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary

measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on thereservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison
at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person
of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with
said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is
further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.
The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.

Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229,
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early
warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In
compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued
Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue
delegation of police power.

Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not
unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to
promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional
provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations -
that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or
parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and
all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without
due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens
of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2)
an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15,
1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the
heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.

Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been said
that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep.
As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to
attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent
of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important
of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by
the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of
the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it,
for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance
and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the
law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot
be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that
the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.