Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007 release of the retention money.
release of the retention money. However, PNR denied Kanlaon’s demand
 Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed, with modifications, ruling by the RTC
granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed
by Lacap against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27,
1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified
 Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a
certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works and purchased
materials and labor in connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final
investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed according
to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
 DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved
final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having
expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded
to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not
provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of
license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or
declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First
Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made to
Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did
not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the
Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18
but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23,
1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-
suability of the State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision
ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the project, 12%
interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid
for completed projects
RULING A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for
completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines
thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who
shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or
license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos
but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning rule" or verba
legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not
declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor
is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is
without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner, v. KANLAON
CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC.,Respondent.
FACTS: In July 1990, PNR and Kanlaon entered into contracts for the
repair of three PNR station buildings and passenger shelters.By November
1990, Kanlaon alleged that it had already completed the three projects.
On 30 June 1994, Kanlaon sent a demand letter to PNR requesting for the
because of the Notices of Suspension issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, forcing Kanlaon to file a complaint for collection of sum of
money plus damages against PNR. In its amended complaint, Kanlaon
even impleaded the COA.
In its answer, PNR admitted the existence of the three contracts but alleged
that Kanlaon did not comply with the conditions of the contract. Moreover,
they alleged that Kanlaon did not complete the projects. Thus, they did not
have any unpaid balance. In addition to that, PNR added that it had a valid
ground to refuse the release of the retention money because of the COA
orders suspending the release of payment to Kanlaon.
The TC ruled in favor of Kanlaon and ordered PNR to to pay the retention
money and unpaid contract price with 12% legal interest while COA was
absolved of any liability for actual or moral damages. Thus, prompting
PNR to file a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the TC modified its
decision by lowering the legal interest rate from 12% to 6% per annum
from the date of the first written demand. The CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision and held that the only reason PNR refused to pay Kanlaon
was because of COA’s Notices of Suspension and not Kanlaon’s non-
completion of the projects.
ISSUE:
Were the projects completed?
HELD: One of the reasons the COA issued the Notices of Suspension was
because the contracts did not contain a Certificate of Availability of Funds
as required under Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree No. 1445. The
Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are
satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the
expenditure required in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the
contract a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that
funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available. The
existence of appropriation and the attachment of the certification are
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. Thus,
failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract
void.
The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government
contracts are never signed unless supported by the corresponding
appropriation law and fund availability. In the case at hand, the three
contracts between PNR and Kanlaon do not comply with the requirement
of a certification of appropriation and fund availability. Even if a
certification of appropriation is not applicable to PNR if the funds used are
internally generated, still a certificate of fund availability is required. Thus,
the three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon are void.
Therefore, the CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower court and its
is reversed and set aside.
RAMON R. YAP, Petitioner, v. COMMISION ON AUDIT,
Respondent.
FACTS: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department
Manager of the National Development Company (NDC), a government-
owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was appointed
by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of
NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991while
remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional employment
entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic
salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In the course
of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of
disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the
ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his regular
position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of
the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly
contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8,
Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors
disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all
approved by the MGC Board of Directors.
Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC
Corporate Auditors findings.Unperturbed, petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA arguing that
his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office
and was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on
July 25, 1987. In turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein
assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213.It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that
characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited
by the Constitution.Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and
reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public
purpose requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not
enough that payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of
Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not
contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the
public purpose requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines.A Motion for Reconsiderationwas subsequently filed by
petitioner, but this was likewise denied by respondent COA in COA
Decision No. 2003-087.
ISSUE:
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in
affirming the questioned disallowances?
HELD: Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of
salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be
authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in
relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use directly
available to the general public as a matter of right.Thus, it has also been
defined as an activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body
and which at the same time is directly related function of
government.However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes.Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to
clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.In fact, this Court has
already categorically stated that the term public purpose is not defined,
since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards.It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not
only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as
essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of
basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social
justice.Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use
is now equated with public interest,and that it is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public
funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should
be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and
the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be
commensurate with services rendered.In the same vein, additional
allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the
fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers
and employees.Petitioners theory that the compensation and benefits of
public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers,
or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer
satisfies the public purpose requirement is wrong.That theory would lead to
the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be
paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary
other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government.Public funds are the property of the people and must be used
prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.
DISMISSED
VERCELES, JR. VS COA
Governor Leandro B. Verceles, Jr. (Verceles) OF Catanduanes, engaged
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to
carry out the province's tree seedlings production project (the
project).[4] The province and PENRO entered into several Memoranda of
Agreement (MOA) to implement the project.
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) gave blanket authority to the governor
to enter into contracts on behalf of the province.[ The SP reaffirmed the
authority given to the governor and also resolved to give the governor the
power to realign, revise, or modify items in the provincial budget.
The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the Economic
Development Fund (EDF) allocation in the provincial budget for calendar
years (CY) 2001 and 2002.[9] The EDF is the 20% portion of the province's
internal revenue allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent on
development projects.[10] The province and PENRO subsequently executed
the 5 MOAs.
COA Audit Team Leader issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM), finding that Verceles should have sought prior
authority from the SP pursuant to Sections 22 (c)[14] and 465 (b) (1)
(vi)[15] of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC)
before executing any MOA after the issuance of Resolution No. 104-A-
2001.[16]
Verceles anchors his petition on the following grounds: COA disregarded
Section 465 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC, an exception to Section 22 (c) of the
same code.[36] According to Verceles, while prior authorization to enter into
a contract is the general rule, the LGC identifies an exception, i.e., when
the contract entered into is pursuant to a law or ordinance. He points out
that the funding for the first and third MOAs were approved and included
in the budget of the province for CYs 2001 and 2002.[37]
, the MOAs merely implemented the items already identified in the
appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002.
The Issue
The issue is whether the COA gravely abused its discretion when it
disallowed the payments for the questioned MOAs and held
Verceles[53] liable for the amount disallowed.
In summary and to harmonize the two provisions: Section 22 (c) of the
LGC requires the local chief executive to obtain prior authorization from
the sanggunian before he can enter into contracts in behalf of the LGU.
Section 465 (b) (1) (vi), on the other hand, allows the local chief executive
to implement specific or specified projects with corresponding
appropriations without securing a separate authority from the sanggunian.
In the latter provision, the appropriation ordinance is the authority from
the sanggunian required in the former provision.
While there was an available fund for the economic development projects
of the province, the specific projects had not yet been identified. The
corresponding costs for the projects had also not been set aside. Contrary to
Verceles' assertion, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not
specifically authorize him to enter into the first MOA to implement the tree
seedlings production project.
To stress, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not at all identify the
projects to be funded by the EDF. On this basis, Verceles should have
clearly obtained prior approval from the SP before he entered into
the first MOA.
Second, the power of the purse of the SP requires the governor to obtain
prior authority before he can implement projects funded by lump-sum
appropriations.
the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the third MOA
and insisted that Verceles should have secured a separate and additional
authority from the SP. The COA ignored Section 3 of the CY 2002
appropriation ordinance, which specifically identified the tree seedlings
production project with a P3,000,000.00 allocation.
Article 454[77] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC[78] states that augmentation implies the existence in the budget of an
item, project, activity, or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is
determined to be deficient.
The crucial requisite as far as the fourth and fifth MOAs are concerned is
the first requisite, i.e., the existence of a law (in this case, ordinance)
authorizing the governor to augment items in approved budget. As to
the second MOA, the crucial requisite is the third requisite, i.e., the
existence of an actual item to be augmented.
There was no valid augmentation made in CY 2001 that could have
covered the cost of the second MOA.
As discussed above, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not identify
the specific projects or items[82] to be funded by the EDF. How could
Verceles transfer savings from nonexistent items (in the EDF) to augment
the tree seedlings propagation project? The project that was supposed to be
augmented was also not identified in the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance.
The augmentation was legally impossible as there were no items from
which savings could have been generated from and there was no item to
which such savings could have been transferred.[83] The second MOA was
thus correctly disallowed.
Fourth and Fifth MOAs (2002 EDF)
Section 16 of the LGC, also known as the general welfare clause,
empowers the local government units (LGUs) to act for the benefit of their
constituents. The LGUs exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2)
necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4)
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants.[54]
As the chief executive of the province, the governor exercises powers and
performs duties and functions that the LGC and other pertinent laws
provide.[55] These include the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the
province.
In support of their competing claims, it is notable that both Verceles and
the COA invoke the same provisions of the LGC: Section 22 (c)and Section
465 (b) (1) (vi).
Section 22 (c) of the LGC provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in
this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in
behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by
the sanggunian concerned."
Section 465 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC, on the other hand, states that ". . . the
Chief Executive . . . [shall] [r]epresent the province in all its business
transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations,
and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang
panlalawigan or pursuant to law or ordinance."
the local chief executive must inquire if the provisions in the appropriation
ordinance specifically cover the expense to be incurred or the contract to be
entered into.
If the project or program is identified in the appropriation ordinance in
sufficient detail, then there is no more need to obtain a separate or
additional authority from the sanggunian. In such case, the project and the
cost are already identified and approved by the sanggunianthrough the
appropriation ordinance. To require the local chief executive to secure
another authorization for a project that has been specifically identified and
approved by the sanggunian is antithetical to a responsive local
government envisioned in the Constitution[66]and in the LGC.
The LGC defines appropriation as the authorization made by ordinance,
directing the payment of goods and services from local government funds
under specified conditions or for specific purposes. [70] The power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law (in the case of LGUs, by
ordinance) of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose.[71] Lump-sum, on the other hand, means 'consisting of a single
sum of money.'[72] Lump-sum appropriation is thus a single sum of money
set aside by the legislature for a specified purpose.
The SP, as the legislative organ of the province, exercises the power of the
purse in much the same way as the Congress does at the national level.
The SP decides how the provincial budget will be spent; what projects,
activities and programs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for
each project, activity or program. On the other hand, the governor, as the
local chief executive tasked to enforce ordinances, is expected to faithfully
execute the appropriation ordinance and to spend the budget in accordance
with its provisions.[73]
for augmentations to be valid, the GAA of a given fiscal year must
expressly authorize the transfer of funds in the same year. At the very least,
a law must first be passed authorizing the transfer of savings in the year
that realignments are to be made.
In summary, and except for the incorrectly disallowed third MOA, we find
that the COA's assailed decision was made in faithful compliance with its
mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred
on it by the Constitution. The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in
observing the policy that government funds and property should be fully
protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be
prevented. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.
G.R. No. 154200 July 24, 2007
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION and its BOARD
OF ADMINISTRATORS, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO MORALES, Respondent.
FACTS: Danilo Morales and 105 other employees (Morales, et al.) of the
NEA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, Quezon City, a
class suit against their employer for payment of rice allowance, meal
allowance, medical/dental/optical allowance, children’s allowance and
longevity pay purportedly authorized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
the petition is hereby GRANTED directing the respondent NEA, its Board
of Administrators to forthwith settle the claims of the petitioners and other
employees similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and
allowances to which they are entitled but which until now they have been
deprived of.
Thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment was issued against the funds of NEA
with Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the extent of
₱16,581,429.00.
NEA filed a Motion to Quash Writs of Execution/Garnishment, 13 claiming
that the garnished public funds are exempt from execution under Section
414 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,15 but manifesting that it is
willing to pay the claims of Morales, et al.,16 only that it has no funds to
cover the same, although it already requested the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) for a supplemental budget.
On July 18, 2000, Morales, et al. filed a Motion for an Order to
Implement Writ of Execution, but was denied by the RTC. Upon a
Petition for Certiorari27 filed by Morales, et al., the CA granted the
petition and the respondent judge is directed to implement the Writ of
Execution relative thereto. The CA held that, as such GOCC,
petitioner NEA may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation; specifically, its properties may be proceeded against by
way of garnishment or levy.
NEA and its Board of Directors (petitioners) immediately filed herein
petition for review. It is their contention that the CA erred in directing
implementation of the writ of execution on two grounds: first, execution is
premature as Morales, et al. (respondents) have yet to file their judgment
claim with the COA in accordance with P.D. No. 1445 and SC
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000; and second, execution is not feasible
without DBM as an indispensable party to the petition for certiorari for it
is said department which can certify that funds are available to cover the
judgment claim.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) committed an error of law in ordering
the implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA)
RULING:
In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct
immediate implementation of the writ of execution through garnishment of
the funds of petitioners,
Respondents (Morales) cannot proceed against the funds of petitioners
because the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not
a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of execution by
garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to settle the
claims of respondents in accordance with existing regulations of the COA.
Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC36 -- a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government, with capacity to sue and be
sued.37 As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot evade execution; its funds
may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered
against it.38 However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for
payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. 39
 Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section
26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to
examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from
or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims
arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or
disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of
appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.
NOTES:
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 [1970], this Court explicitly stated:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant's action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and the power of the court
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. "
Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State
liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still
be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in
P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines
All money claims against the Government must "first be filed
with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within
sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in
effect sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50)."
HON. TOMAS R, OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND HONORABLE EUFEMIO C.
DOMINGO, respondents.
The City of Cebu decided to construct a modern abattoir. The City
Treasurer issued a certificate of availability of funds in the amount of
P5,419,180.00 specifically "for the construction of Cebu City Abbatoir.
After a public bidding, H. Franco Construction Company, Inc.
(HFCCI) was awarded to do the construction of the abattoir. Thus, the
City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Ronald R. Duterte, entered into a
contract with HFCCI wherein the contract cost for this project
P8,368,920.00. Sen. John H. Osmeña, then Officer-In-Charge of the
City of Cebu, ordered the suspension of the project and review of the
contract by the COA. HFCCI claimed the amount P2,142,964.29 as the
value of the work accomplished.
Unable to collect the said amount after so many demands, HFCCI
instituted a civil action against the City of Cebu, for recovery of investment
and damages. The City of Cebu, while admitting having entered into a
contract with HFCCI, alleged that the contract it entered into was null and
void as declared by the Commission on Audit in its 2nd Indorsement dated
September 4, 1986. Therefore whatever amount is due to HFCCI is to the
sole liability of the officer or officers who entered into the said contract.
The City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas R. Osmeña, entered into a
compromise agreement, approved by the court, to the effect that as a full
and final settlement to the claim of HFCCI, the City of Cebu shall pay the
amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P1,500,000.00) PESOS. RTC was ordered to serve a writ of execution
against the City of Cebu through its Mayor, Tomas R. Osmeña. Thus, the
amount of P1,500,000.00 and P15,052.00, as lawful fees, were garnished
from the City's funds deposited in the Philippine National
Bank. 5
The trial court's judgment based on the compromise agreement was
referred to the COA who in turn ruled that the compromise agreement
is a circumvention of the constitutional provision that the party
aggrieved by any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may
appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court and thus concurs that the
expenditure involved would be the personal liability of the officer
directly responsible for its incurrence.
In petitioner's request for reconsideration , he argues that the decision
of COA invalidating the contract between the City of Cebu and
HFCCI was void since it was already executed and fulfilled. Petitioner
further stresses that COA has no authority to declare a contract
already executed void.
ISSUE: WON the contract entered into by Mayor Duterte for the
construction of the abattoir is valid
RULING: The contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was
void from the very beginning since the agreed cost for the project
(P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated amount
(P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract
was properly declared void and unenforceable.
The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445
(Government Auditing Code) is explicit and
mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always
been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution
of any government contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by all government
agencies at all levels. Such contracts are not to be
considered as final or binding unless such
certification as to funds availability is issued (Letter
of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent of
advance appropriation is thus essential to
government liability on contracts (Zobel v. City of
Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This contract being violative
of the legal requirements aforequoted, the same
contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and void
by virtue of Sec. 87. 13
Premises considered, the Compromise Agreement entered into between the
City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas Osmeña is void being merely a
derivative of a previously void Abattoir Contract, and thus becomes a
personal liability of the officer who entered into it pursuant to Sec. 87 &
103 of P.D. 1445.
NOTES: The Commission on Audit has the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned of held in trust by,
or pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities.9
The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no
contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into
unless there is an appropriation therefor 10 and the proper accounting
official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering
into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose
and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current
year is available for expenditure on account thereof. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be
VOID.
COMELEC VS Judge Padilla
G. R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
FACTS:
On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify
and bid for the supply and installations of information technology
equipment and ancillary services for its Voter’s Registration and
Identification System Project or VRIS Project for the May 2004 Elections.
Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-
qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the
public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of
P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was
declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the Notice of Award to
PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. The parties
then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K.
Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the
COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760 ]the budget appropriated by
Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only One (1)
Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of
Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the
COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public
statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been “scrapped,
dropped, junked, or set aside.” He further announced his plan to “re-
engineer” the entire modernization program of the COMELEC,
emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own
version, the “Triple E Vision”.
PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for
mandamus, prohibition and damages against the COMELEC and all
its Commissioners alleging three causes of action: first, the deliberate
refusal of the COMELEC and its Commissioners to formalize the contract
rendered nugatory the perfected contract between them; second, in
announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that he has plans to
re-engineer the COMELEC’s entire modernization program, Chairman
Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the COMELEC’s
failure to perform its duty under the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to
incur damages since it has spent substantial time and resources in the
preparation of the bid and the draft contract.
Respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla grantiED
PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction directing all respondent Commissioners to immediately
resume negotiations to formalize the execution of the contract with
Petitioner for the VRIS Project upon petitioner’s posting of a bond,
separate from the above bond for the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction, in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer
for whatever damages that may be sustained by reason of the issuance
of the said writ, if it turns out that Petitioner is not entitled thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not a successful bidder compel a government agency to
formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?
RULING: No. PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel
the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is
beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the
proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered
void.
Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that “No contract
involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there
is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of
other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure” while
Section 47 states “no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by
any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the
proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to
the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for
expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor
concerned” (not complete provision. Just the pertinent parts)
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the
existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable
pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of
government contracts.
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot
compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s
bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project,
the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is
considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of
mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil
Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to
discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion,
especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
NOTES: “The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further
provides that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be
entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the proper
accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the
officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated
for the purpose and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract
for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof.
Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be
VOID.
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175482; July 6, 2011
AMBIL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.
The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste,
President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim for
murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of the
governor. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing
of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section
3(e)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, The new President of the IBP informed the
Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case
against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against petitioners. Nonetheless, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint and the amendment of the Information to include the charge
of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. At the pre-trial,
petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A.
Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor
Adalim was to be held. Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered
testimonial evidence and rested its case after the admission of its
documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of
Denial but the same was denied. Sandiganbayan founds petitioners guilty
of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving
Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access
to television and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It
stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.
ISSUE: Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal
custody of a detention prisoner
RULING: NO. Petitions denied.
RATIONALE: First, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality
and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
virtue of his power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar. Besides, the
only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
1737under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient
to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been
superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the RevisedRules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114.
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads[;]
xxxx

In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of
giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public
officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and
detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil,
Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on
two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because
the last sentence thereof provides that the provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses, permits or other concessions and he is not such
government officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted
benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V.
VINLUAN, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191219; July 31, 2013

However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil,
Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling
in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of
whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions. Following is an excerpt of what
we said in Mejorada,
Acting on the special audit report5 submitted by the Commission on
Audit, the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted an internal
investigation6 on the purported "ghost" purchases of combat, clothing,
and individual equipment (CCIE) worth ₱133,000,000.00 which were
allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System (SSS) and
delivered to the PNP General Services Command (GSC). As a result of
the internal investigation, an Information7 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP officers, including, among others,
Vinluan and Lihaylihay, for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019.

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a
place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more
comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about
the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits
to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayors life
would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish
the existence of any risk on Adalims safety. To be sure, the latter would not
be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat
Akyatans gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of
aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling
reason to warrant Adalims detention outside the provincial jail. For one,
there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have
been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the
isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence
of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order was still
Accused Gen. Nazareno in his capacity as Chief, PNP and concurrently
Board Chairman of the PNP Service Store System, surreptitiously
channeled PNP funds to the PNP SSS through "Funded RIVs" valued at ₱8
[M]illion and Director Domondon released ASA No. 000-200-004-92 (SN-
1353) without proper authority from the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and
caused it to appear that there were purchases and deliveries of combat
clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the General Service
Command (GSC), PNP, by deliberately and maliciously using funds for
personal services and divided the invoices of not more than ₱500,000.00
each.
thereafter, accused members of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee
together with respondents Marcelo Castillo III and Ramon Lihay-Lihay
certified or caused to be certified that the CCIE items covered by the
aforementioned invoices were delivered, properly inspected and accepted,
and subsequently distributed to the end-users, when in truth and in fact, as
accused well knew, no such purchases of CCIE items were made and no
items were delivered, inspected, accepted and distributed to the respective
end-users; that despite the fact that no deliveries were made, respondent
Alejandro claimed payment therefor, and respondent Obillos approved the
disbursement vouchers therefor as well as the checks authorizing payment
which was countersigned by respondent Aquino; and as a result, the
government, having been caused to pay for the inexistent purchases and
deliveries, suffered undue injury in the amount of EIGHT MILLION
PESOS (₱8,000,000.00), more or less.

indispensable for his transfer.

NOTES: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
ISSUE: The essential issue in this case is whether or not petitioners’
conviction for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was
proper.
exercise
Petitioners were charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e)22 of
RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.23 As
observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are extant in this case:
As to the first element, it is undisputed that both petitioners were public
officers discharging administrative functions at the time material to this
case.
As to the second element, records show that Vinluan, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed the 16
certificates of acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles from the PNP
SSS despite its incompleteness or lack of material dates, while Lihaylihay
certified to the correctness of the Inspection Report Forms even if no such
deliveries were made.24 Petitioners’ claim that the subject CCIE items were
received by GSC SAO Mateo25 is belied by the absence of any proof as to
when the said deliveries were made. Moreover, the supposed deliveries to
the Narcotics Command26 were properly rejected by the Sandiganbayan
considering that the said transactions pertained to a different set of end-
users other than the PNP GSC. Hence, having affixed their signatures on
the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein,
petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in
approving the "ghost" purchases in the amount of ₱8,000,000.00. 27 To
note, their concerted actions, when taken together, demonstrate a common
design28 which altogether justifies the finding of conspiracy.1âwphi1
Lastly, as to the third element, petitioners’ participation in facilitating the
payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss on
the part of the government.1âwphi1
Thus, considering the presence of all its elements, the Court sustains the
conviction of petitioners for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
G.R. Nos. 153952-71 August 23, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Div.) and HENRY BARRERA
Mayor Henry E. Barrera (former vice-mayor) as the Municipal Mayor,
Market Collector, District Supervisor in Zambales, in conspiracy with one
another, prevented legitimate lessee-stallholders who were given priority
by the ex-mayor from exercising their proprietary rights to transfer to,
occupy and/or operate assigned stall at the public market, under the
subsisting lease contract without any valid or justifiable reason
whatsoever, by means of the issuance and implementation of the patently
unlawful memorandum thereby causing undue injury to private
complainants.
Mayor Barrera filed his Demurrer to Evidence avowing that there was
no bad faith in his issuance of Memorandum No. 1 Abella, et al., from
occupying the new stalls at the Candelaria Public Market. He
explained that he needed to issue Memorandum No. 1 since the
previous Municipal Mayor, Fidel Elamparo, awarded the Lease
Contracts over the new public market stalls less than a week before the
end of the latter’s term and without regard to the requirement of
pertinent laws. Mayor Barrera also claimed that he did not act with
manifest partiality in issuing Memorandum No. 1 considering that said
issuance applies not only to Abella, et al., but also to all awardees of
the questionable Lease Contracts. the Demurrer to Evidence was granted
and the criminal case was dismissed on the ground that the elements of the
offense under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Henry E. Barrera is liable for violation of Section
3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019.3
RULING: To be liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, four essential elements (as stated in the Information filed in the
present cases) must be present:
1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person
charged in conspiracy with the public officers;
2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during
the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public
position;
3) That he causes undue injury to any party, whether
government or private individuals; and
4) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The first two above-stated elements are clearly present in the instance
cases. However, the third and fourth elements appear to be absent, or at
best remain doubtful.
The undue injury mentioned as the third essential element in the
commission of the crime requires proof of actual injury and damage.
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
prove actual injury and damage suffered by the private complainants,
as one of the elements of the crime herein charged, in that it failed to
specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral certainty the
purported "undue injury". The complainants in their testimonies,
admitted that they have been working and earning, either as market
vendors or in pursuit of their profession from the time of the closure of
their respective market stalls up to now. Also, their claims of business
losses, at the time material to the cases at bar, leave much to be
desired vis-à-vis the moral certitude exacted by law to prove the
alleged undue injury. Pathetically, said evidence, are either
contradictory or incredible.
Likewise, the prosecution’s evidence failed to prove manifest partiality
and/or evident bad faith on the part of the accused, as the fourth of the
above-stated requisites for the commission of the crime herein charged.
In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, the provision itself explicitly requires that the accused caused undue
injury for having acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or with
gross inexcusable negligence, in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial function. The People’s evidence failed to support the existence
of these two elements.
NOTES: For an act to be considered as exhibiting "manifest partiality,"
there must be a showing of a clear, notorious or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side rather than the other. "Partiality" is
synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Evident bad faith,"
on the other hand, is something which does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design, or
some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purpose. Evident bad
faith connotes a manifest and deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
do wrong or cause damage.
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, LEONARDO B. ROMAN, ROMEO L. MENDIOLA,
PASTOR P. VICHUACO, AURORA J. TIAMBENG, and
NUMERIANO G. MEDINA,
G.R. No. 197567; November 19, 2014
FACTS:
Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered into a
contract8 with V.F. Construction, as represented by Valdecañas, for the
construction of a mini-theater at the Bataan State College - Abucay
Campus, Abucay, Bataan (project) for the contract price of ₱3,660,000.00.
Roman signed and issued a Certificate of Acceptance,10 stating that the
project was "100% completed in accordance with plans and
specification[s]" per the Accomplishment Report 11 and Certification. –
Roman’s successor as Provincial Governor – authorized the inspection of
the project sometimein August 2004 and discovered that while its
construction was indeed commenced, it remained unfinished Roman cited
political enmity between him and Garcia as the reason for the filing of the
complaint. Mendiola denied any participation in the preparation and
execution of any of the documents involved in the project
Valdecañas, for his part, denied35 the allegations against him and claimed
that Medina borrowed his contractor’s accreditation in order to participate
in the bidding for the project. He pointed out that it was Medina who
actually participated in the bidding process and that his signature appearing
on the documents pertaining to the project was falsified. 36 He added that he
was out of the country when payments for the project were made. 37
the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano, Rodriguez,
Jimenez, and Capistrano for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents
by making it appear through the aforesaid Certification and
Accomplishment Report that the project had already been completed when
the same was only partially constructed.
Garcia moved for reconsideration
ISSUE: whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing all the criminal charges against respondents for lack of probable
cause.
RULING: the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded the CoA Memo and patently misapplied
existing jurisprudence – particularly, the Ariascase – in ruling that there
was no probable cause for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), 60 RA
3019. Accordingly, respondents should be indicted for such. However, the
same does not hold true for the other crimes of Technical Malversation and
Malversation of PublicFunds through Falsification of Public Documents
for reasons that will be hereinafter discussed.
The non-existence of valid appropriations rendered the contracts void and
the payments illegal.
The validity of the appropriations and the subsequent transactions were not
considered in audit due tolack of legal basis, to wit:
a. No sources of funds for the ₱14.005M appropriation rendering it invalid
b. Non-release of allotments for the ₱14.005 M appropriation
Hence, unless the CoA’s findings are substantially rebutted, the allotment’s
absence should have roused respondents’ suspicions, as regards the
project’s legality, and, in consequence, prevented them from approving the
disbursements therefor. This is especially true for Roman, who, as the
Local Chief Executive of the Province at that time, was primarily charged
with the issuance of allotments.68 As such, he was in the position to know
if the allotment requirement had, in the first place, been complied with,
given that it was a pre-requisite before the project could have been
contracted.
In addition, the Court observes the same degree of negligence on the part
of respondents in seemingly attesting to the project’s 100% completion
when such was not the case. The erroneous certification rendered the
disbursements made by the Province suspect as V.F. Construction had still
to fulfill its contractual obligations to the Province and yet were able to
receive full payment.
Considering that the illegal diversion of public funds for the mini theafter
project would undermine the execution of other projects legitimately
supported by proper allotments, it is quite obvious that undue injury on the
part of the Province and its residents would be caused. Likewise,
considering that V.F. Construction had already received full payment for a
project that had yet to be completed,it also appears that a private party was
given unwarranted benefits by respondents inthe discharge of their
functions (third element).
Thus, with the elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA
3019 herein ostensibly present, the Court hereby holds that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion whenit dismissed said
charge against respondents.
G.R. No. 188066 October 22, 2014
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY
FACTS:
Respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy, the principal of Ramon Avanceña
National High School, was charged with Oppression and Violation of
Section 3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly
withholding her salary for the month of June 2002 because of her failure to
submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers
(PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same
month. The OMB found her guilty of Oppression and was meted out the
penalty of dismissal from service. 11Caberoy filed a petition for
certiorariwith the CA, seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service
which was granted by the CA.
The CA found that no undue injury was caused to Tuares since she
received her June 2002 salary. The CA also ruled that Caberoy’s "refusal"
to release Tuares’ salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act
x x x for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in
favor of an interestedparty, or [discrimination] against another" under
Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is likewise absent. 14 Finally, the CA found
that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of oppression.
ISSUE: WON CABEROY can be ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
OPPRESSION
RULING:
In this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to
support respondent Ombudsman’s findings and conclusion that petitioner
committed oppressive acts against private respondent and violated Sections
3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed,
respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private respondent was
paid her June salary albeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of
respondent Ombudsman in concluding that petitioner is guilty as charged
despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is totally
unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of discretion. x x x.
Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June
2002 salary only on July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or
Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary
hardly qualifies as an "act of crueltyor severity or excessive use of
authority," especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that
is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on
July 11, 2002.
Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of
the vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll, the records of this
case are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the
release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting
Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares]
who was not included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers
who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end
clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated
against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman.
NOTES: Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office,
wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other
injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.23 To be
held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority,
there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s
allegations.24 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.
It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil
Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith
connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35 There must be evidence,
independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable
conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out Tuares. The Court has
consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against
the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct
knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions
will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on."37
014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T.
GO
G. R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
FACTS:
Nature: petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
1.The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's
Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
2.Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed
a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
3.Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the
Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
4.On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
5.While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary
Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
6.Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged
before the SB.
7.On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which
to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a
private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-
conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when
he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because
he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
8. On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information
filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do
not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent,
citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently
of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was
capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
SB Resolution: Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T.
Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone
accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-
public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in
court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court
grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be
indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior
to the filing of the Information.
HELD: YES. The settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.
RATIO:
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean
that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must
be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an
indictment for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy,
any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation
of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.
This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators
in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been
said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether
the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The
death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor or survivors.
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the
bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.
Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even
filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court
agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting
bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction
over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting
bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court
by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the
question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived
either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so
wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for
the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall
be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard
now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to
question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of
bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued
an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which
has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A.
3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged
before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the
death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons
already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its
jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To
rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would
no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors,
such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, ET AL. (SANDIGANBAYAN, CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 26558 [FOR PLUNDER], 12 SEPTEMB ER 2007)
BASIC FACTS
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (œFPres. Estrada•), together with Jose
œJinggoy• Estrada, Charlie ˜Atong• Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, for the crime
of Plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7659. The Information was subsequently amended, as
follows:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office
of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. œASIONG SALONGA•
AND a.k.a. œJOSE VELARDE•, together with Jose ˜Jinggoy™ Estrada,
Charlie œAtong• Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the
crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended
by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES
AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused
CHARLIE ˜ATONG™ ANG, JOSE ˜Jinggoy™ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie
˜Atong™ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME œJOSE VELARDE•;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME œJOSE VELARDE• AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, FPres. Estrada filed,
with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence. The demurrer, however, was
denied by the court. Accused Serapio opted not to present his own
evidence, and instead adopted the evidence presented by FPres. Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada.
Incidentally, in 2007, the Sandiganbayan approved the Plea Bargaining
Agreement between the prosecution and accused Atong Ang, the latter
pleading guilty to a lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials under
Article 212 in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused
Atong Ang was sentenced to two years and four months of prision
correccional minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional
maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of P25,000,000.00 to the
Government as his civil liability. Accused Atong Ang is now out of jail
under probation.
RULING OF THE COURT
The elements of the crime of plunder, pursuant to RA 7080 and as laid
down by the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001), are as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts described in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
The terms œCombination• and œSeries• were likewise defined in the
above-cited case. œCombination• refers to at least two acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids
on the public treasury in Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government under Sec.1,
par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a œseries•, there must
be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1).
Section 1 (d) reads:
Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversation, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or “controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
promises of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended
to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
plunder as against former President Estrada, thus:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the
commission of the acts charged in the Amended Information was the
President of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis œChavit• Singson,
who was granted immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and
with the participation of other persons named by prosecution witnesses in
the course of the trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and
acquiring ill-gotten wealth as follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from œjueteng•, a
form of illegal gambling, during the period beginning November 1998 to
August 2000 in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00. Out of this
amount, P200,000,000.00 was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving
commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
These two acts – (i) and (ii) – correspond to sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of
the Amended Information. However, there is uncertainty as to the
participation of Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio in the allegations under sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information (both are not included in sub-
paragraph [c] of the Amended Information).
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, there was no evidence that the money he
turned over to Gov. Singson or the latter™s representatives was part of the
jueteng protection money collected from Bulacan or that he received funds
from a certain Viceo. The prosecution did not also rebut the bank
certification presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an
account with the United Overseas Bank, disproving the testimony of Emma
Lim that the deposit slip in the amount said to be part of jueteng money
was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada from his account at the United
Overseas Bank. The gaps in the prosecution™s evidence as to Jinggoy
Estrada create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the participation of
Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of jueteng money.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singson™s testimony nor the
ledger entries proved that Serapio was involved in any way in the
collection or disbursement of jueteng protection money. It is difficult to
presume any criminal intent on the part of Serapio to conceal or launder
jueteng protection money in order to contribute to the amassing and
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the
transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the allegations under sub-paragraph (b) and (d) of the amended
Information:
1. Acts under sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. – With
respect to the act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, the
paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise
taxes began with Gov. Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does
not find the evidence sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
FPres. Estrada or any member of his family had instigated and/or
benefited from the diversion of said funds. The prosecution failed to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, who among the accused benefited from the
misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in what
amounts.
2. Acts under sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information. – While the
prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were numerous
deposits of astoundingly large sums of money into the Jose Velarde
account, it failed to prove the predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d)
of R.A. No. 7080 through which the said deposits could have been acquired
or amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing illegal
commissions from the sales of Belle shares and the money collected from
illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of wealth which is
 proscribed by the Anti-Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less
than P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the commission of overt or criminal
acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the prosecution has
succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is the repository or
receptacle of vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada.
However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above
(particularly, first, the regular and methodical acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth through collections from illegal gambling, and, second, the receipt
of unlawful commissions from the sales of Belle shares twice), whether
taken separately or independently of the other or in combination with each
other, unquestionably constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section
2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng
money collection on a regular bi-monthly basis from the dfferent provinces
nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the connivance and/or
participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita
Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred
to in the Amended Information as œJohn Does• and œJane Does.• As
proven, the collections in œseveral instances• from illegal gambling
money went way beyond the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-
Plunder Law. These repeated collections of jueteng money from November
1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of a œseries• of illegal
acts constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own, would have
been sufficient to convict the principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However,
this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada is criminally liable for plunder for
receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by the GSIS and
by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two separate occasions as
charged in sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the
receipt of these commissions on two occasions likewise meets the
definition of a series of two similar unlawful acts employing the same
scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of
acts falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information,
proven in the course of the trial could have amounted to two (2) counts of
plunder. It would be a purely academic exercise, as the accused cannot be
convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single
Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder, because
that would violate his constitutional rights to due process, given the
severity of the crime charged in this case.
The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended
Information, which formed two separate series of acts of a different nature,
were linked by the fact that they were plainly geared towards a common
goal which was the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada
and that they shared a pattern or a common method of commission which
was the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the Presidency.
In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the commission by the principal accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder but not so in the case of former
Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, 36 SCRA 394 (November
19, 2001)
Facts:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides
the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights
of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
Ruling:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still
remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact
or element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special
law, especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished
the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to
dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and
the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of people it governs over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted
statute in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may be “saved”
by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
– not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and
no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value of
all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
along attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the persons
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terorrem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech
HELD: RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Jinggoy Estrada, G.R.
No. 158754, 10 August 2007.
FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of
herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6,
2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent
Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for brevity). Jinggoy was
among the respondents in the crime of Plunder filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for
early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus
Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its comment and
opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission
by the parties of their respective memoranda. Petitioner suggests that
Jinggoy is harboring a plan to escape, thus a flight risk. But in a
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for
Bail. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground that he
is no longer considered a flight risk?
HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the
probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the
assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not,
as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with
approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general,
been consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not
ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that
would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the
possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost
nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who usually
jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of
the people for as long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On
the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable name to protect
and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot
accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as
Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for
becoming a fugitive from justice.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R.
MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for
plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus
motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish
probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail)
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered
the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the
Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of
arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s
denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following
grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments
he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information; and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during
trial.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and
insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the
denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific
participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits that the
Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that
allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that
led to the charge of plunder.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are
material facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he
may be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to meet
the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are
cited in a context different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue was
interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the same issue in
subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different
proceeding.”
ISSUE (S)
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan exercised its discretionary power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner in denying Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars
Held:
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under
the terms outlined below.
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET
ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of
this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with
copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought
that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars
shall specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Ratio
The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense
has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him
The objective is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully
appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid
possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would
be left speculating on why he has been charged at all. The Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly
prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or
claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by motion before
arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to enable
the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the
Information means.
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function
of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution.
Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove
the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any
item of factual information included in the bill of particulars
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude
towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars
elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting
the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213455
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and
John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts, as follows:
1. by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions
under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES
received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from
ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES,
to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES
to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
2. by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence
to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan.
On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since
he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH).
The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is
vague or indefinite resulting in the serious violation of
Enrile’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him?

HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite,
the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a
bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information,
one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague
terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply
are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if
the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude
towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and withholding
others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the
trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to
avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated
to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present
case where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital
punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal
acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable
period of time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property
language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the
proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of
those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for
bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the
enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition
to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in
his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from
the prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the
position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of
substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in
details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his
defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form. Note that in
the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to
state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the
details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in
the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions
and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless
specifications are made.That every element constituting the offense had
been alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from
requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is
alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function
of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient
for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged,
the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to
properly plead and prepare for trial.
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with
copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought
that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars
shall specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the
Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or
commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the
year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby
denied.
ISSUE: whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against
an accused
Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth
involving at least P50 million by means of a combination or series of overt
acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the
amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the
manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a
combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080–
is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two
(2) acts falling under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d)
of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public treasury under Section
1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more
overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives
LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the
cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly
funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x
x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun
approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly committed by
Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to
the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and
prepare for his defense. These points are explained in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of
overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth
amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This
interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional
deliberations.99redarclaw

Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be

no crime of plunder, the various overt acts that constitute the
“combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts that
should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness
so that the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why
he stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the
charge.

Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy must not be generally stated; they should be stated
with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to
prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt
acts.

It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had

been repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if averred with
sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The Information should reflect with
particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based on
the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.

A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows
that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize the
transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of
overt acts.

In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of

the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing
its general view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that
constituted the crime of plunder.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the
“combination” or “series” of transactions constituting plunder, it stands to
reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures, should be
stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and cannot
simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without
hampering Enrile’s right to respond after receiving the right information.

To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a
very specific sum based on a number of different acts and hence must
have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required
specificity in describing the different overt acts.

Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given
the chance to object to unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the
trial at the same time that the prosecution is given the opportunity to play
fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million
requirement of law.