Conflict Analysis Paper:

The Caucasus Conflict and its Implications for

European Security

Crisia Miroiu

1
 The 2008 “Five-Day” War shook the fragile equilibrium in Caucasus and
provoked an international crisis. It started from a local crisis in South Ossetia and,
prompted by Russia’s decision to intervene with massive military forces and punish
Georgia for its internal politics, it quickly escalated into an international conflict.
Georgia declared its independence short time before the collapse of the USSR, on
April 9, 1991. During the ‘90s, Georgia endured severe political instability, economic
crisis and civil unrest, particularly within the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Elected as President in 1995, Eduard Shevardnadze, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, dictated a strong pro-Russian foreign policy. After the 2003 Rose
Revolution, he was displaced by the Westward looking Mikheil Saakashvili. Under
Saakashvili, Georgia reoriented its foreign policy and initiated limited democratic
reforms and development.
Economically and military impuissant after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a
weakened Russia lost its hegemonic role and its power status in the ‘90s. However,
increased demand for and development of its oil and natural gas reserves contributed to
rapid economic growth in the aftermath of the 1999 financial crisis, leading Russia to
become more confident and assertive in international politics.
Concerned about imposing its leadership and supremacy in the post-Soviet space,
Russian government remained deeply suspicious of Georgia’s intention of developing
closer ties with the NATO or the EU. Once it had the chance, Russia aggressively
intervened in Georgia’s internal affairs.
The recent events in the Caucasus proved that existing international structures –
the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) – were unable to prevent such conflicts and suggest a need for new security
architecture. Also, the events of Caucasus hide frozen conflicts and old tensions between
the West and Georgia, on one side, and Russia, on the other side, deeply rooted in geo-
political, ethnic and economic interests.

2
 Russia’s intervention in the Georgian conflict and its later recognition of the two
breakaway regions may set a dangerous precedent for “successful aggressions” and
proves that post-Soviet space is still restless and disposed to force abuses.
The Five-Day War suggests that the EU must begin to accelerate the development
of an efficient security policy, as well as to change its energy policy, in order to prevent
Russia’s use of energy as a political weapon. Direct confrontation with the Moscow
government is not a way for solving such conflicts, but open dialogue. Isolating and
alienating Russia internationally is not a good policy, either, but strengthening relations
with it and persuading it into cooperation would grant peace in the Caucasus.

The Caucasus Situation before the 2008 Conflict

The tensions between Georgia and Russia are as old as Georgia’s internal ethno-
political conflicts. Russia never welcomed Georgia’s declaration of independence, and
unofficially offered military and economic support to the breakaway Georgian regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which, at the same time, were looking for their own
independence.
Provoked by the secessionist movements from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, these
local conflicts evolved initially as ethno-political tensions and, few years later, developed
into bloody wars (the 1991–1992 South Ossetia War, the 1991-1992 Abkhazian War and
the 1998 Abkhazian War), leading to unimaginable atrocities, cruelties and massacres,
forced mass expulsion of thousands of Georgians and ethnic cleansing 1. Mediated by
Russia itself or by Russia and the OSCE, the cease-fire negotiations reached with
difficulty some peaceful resolutions. However, as a consequence of the negotiations,
Georgian authorities had to renounce to their control over the break-away regions.
1
As various and different sources reported, as international organizations (International Crisis Group in
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia. Europe Report N° 159, Tbilisi/Brussels, November, 26, 2004) or
in Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly, Europe Report N° 183, 7 June 2007; or Human
Rights Watch, Helsinki, reported in Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the laws of war and Russia's role in
the Conflict, Human Wrights Watch Arms Project, Vol. 7, N° 7, March 1995; Budapest Declaration and
Geneva Declaration on Ethnic Cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia between 1992-1993 adopted by the
OSCE and recognized as ethnic cleansing in 1994 and 1999), analysts, journalists and writers as Svetlana
Mikhailovna Chervonnaia in Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow.
Gothic Image Publications, 1994; Georgiy Mirsky in On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the
Former Soviet Union, United States: Greenwood Press, 1997; Goltz Thomas and Georgia Diary in A
Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in the Post-Soviet, United States: M.E. Sharpe 2006;

3
Georgian-Russian relations were further strained by the fact that Russia repeatedly
accused Georgia of supporting Chechen separatists with military reinforcements and
supplies and allowing Chechen refugees in Pankisi Gorge, in eastern Georgia2.
However, tensions between Russia and Georgia increased after the Rose
Revolution. Funded by a George Soros-related organization,3 the 2003 Georgian
Revolution displaced President-in-Office Eduard Shevardnadze and lead to the 2004
election of Columbia-educated and Washington government-supported Mikheil
Saakashvili as President.
Saakashvili expressed Georgia’s intention of acquiring EU membership as a long-
term priority, as well as seeking close relations and membership within NATO. Intending
to keep Georgia as a client-state, Russia always opposed Georgian membership in both
the EU and NATO, particularly during the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the
last held before the crisis.
Concerning Georgia’s internal politics, Saakashvili election rapidly produced a
new crisis, as the pro-Moscow leadership of the province of Adjara refused to recognize
the authority of the new Georgian government. Even though the Georgian-Adjarian
conflict threatened to develop into an armed confrontation, the strong position of
Saakashvili’s government and local mass protests against local leaders’ policies, imposed
obedience to the direct presidential rule. The successful resolution of the Adjara conflict
encouraged the Saakashvili government to intensify its efforts to reassert Georgian
authority in the autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchel suggest that citing the Adjarian conflict
as a model of dealing with breakaway regions was a grievous error, as the example of
Adjarian province was “largely irrelevant”4 to the situation in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. As later events proved, Saakashvili’s political miscalculation had unpleasant
and enduring consequences.

2
According to official press-releases, as then President Shevardnadze’s statements (for instance, President
Shevardnadze declaration for The Wall Street Journal Europe, from Tuesday, September 17, 2002);
3
As Foundation for the Defense of Democracies reported. Soros downplayed his role in the Rose
Revolution, though;
4
Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchel, No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S. –
Georgian Relations, in The Washington Quarterly, January 2009, 32:1, pp. 27-41;

4
 Speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January
2005, Saakashvili stated that his priority was to bring breakaway regions under central
government control, promising to South Ossetia "a constitutional guarantee of this
autonomy, a status that includes the right for a local government elected freely and
directly that would include an executive branch and a parliament"5. Saakashvili also
suggested a 3-year transitional period until South Ossetia would reach its autonomy, and
declared his willingness to extend this offer to the other breakaway region, Abkhazia.
Portentously, Saakashvili denounced Russia’s “interventionist policy" in Georgian
internal affairs6.
Provoking some first incidents7, Georgia worsened rapidly its relation with South
Ossetia8, but these were ephemeral in comparison with the increasing tension between
Russia and Georgia.9
In the following years, relations between Georgia and South Ossetia continued to
worsen, and by September 2006 South Ossetian forces attacked a Georgian Helicopter.
The following October, four Chechen gunmen were killed by the South Ossetian police,
with South Ossetian authorities accusing Georgia of hiring them in order to carry out
sabotage acts in the South Ossetian region.10 In November, South Ossetia was the scene
of two rival and simultaneous elections and referendums: one election and one
referendum were held in the separatist controlled part of the region (the voters reelected
Eduard Kokoity as President and voted for independence from Georgia), while the other
election and referendum were held in the Georgian controlled part of the region (the
voters elected Dmitry Sanakoyev as President and voted for negotiations with Georgia
concerning a future common agreement). Both South Ossetia and Russia denounced the
election of Sanakoyev as a Georgian manoeuvre.
In May 2007, Saakashvili appointed Sanakoyev as Head of the South Ossetian
Provisional Administrative Entity. In his new capacity, Sanakoyev, in the Georgian
5
According to international press (BBC News related on 26 January, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4209243.stm).
6
Idem;
7
For instance, the Georgian government provoked one first incident when the Georgian police closed one
of the major trading points for tax-free goods from Russia, the Ergneti Market;
8
South Ossetian forces replied by closing the highway between Russia and Georgia;
9
Georgian military patrols intercepted a Russian convoy, the Russian Duma passed a resolution supporting
the South Ossetian secessionists and hundred of Russian volunteers joined the separatist movement;
10
According to international press agencies as ReliefWeb, EuroNews and to Russian press (Kommersant );

5
Parliament, presented new suggestions concerning the resolution of the South Ossetian
conflict. The United States State Department strongly supported Sanakoyev’s initiative,
which suggested that negotiation between Georgia and South Ossetia should peacefully
begin and ultimately result in granting autonomy to South Ossetia, as well as
“guaranteeing political representation and cultural identity to the Ossetian people within a
unified state. This must be preceded and followed by joint social and economic
projects”11.
In the following months, tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia were
increased by “the missile incident” - a missile landed without exploding in August 2007,
in the Ossetian region controlled by Georgian government (the village of Tsitelubani).
Georgian authorities blamed Russian forces for firing the missile, but Russian and South
Ossetian authorities claimed that the incident was actually a covert operation conducted
by Georgian government in order to increase tension in the region. A NATO
investigation reported that the missile was fired by a jet that entered Georgian airspace
from Russia, but Russia’s investigators denied this conclusion12.
Unlike the way it tried to settle the Adjarian and Ossetian conflicts, in Abkhaz
conflict case, the new Saakashvili government renounced using military force and put a
strong emphasis on diplomatic tactics.13 Also, it denounced Russia for supporting the
Abkhaz separatist movement in economic matters. Russia denied it, claiming it was only
a business matter, but it still offered various monetary benefits (as retirement pensions) to
Abkhazians.
For the first time since 2001, the Coordinating Council of Georgia’s Government
and Abkhaz separatists was convened in 2006, and a UN report suggested that it resulted
in positive dialogue.14 However, a few months later, a new crisis erupted, when, in the
upper part of Kodory Gorge (the only part in Abkhazia not controlled by the Abkhaz
authorities), a local militia leader rose against the government of Georgia. The Georgian

11
The speech of the Head of Provisional Administration of South Ossetia Dimitri Sanakoev in the
Parliament of Georgia,
English translation provided by Sanakoev’s press office (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15101see);
12
According to Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty;
13
As International Crisis Group reported in Report N°176 , on mid-September 2006;
14
According to Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special representative
in Georgia, official press declaration;

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government sent forces to disarm the rebels and restore control in the region, while
Russian and Abkhazian authorities denounced the Georgian operation as a violation of
the ceasefire and an effort to extend their authority into secessionist-controlled regions.
Georgian officials denied these accusations, emphasizing that their only concern was to
offer police and security services in the region. The Georgian government was vocally
supported by NATO, as Georgian officials accused Russian security services of being
behind the incident15.
CIS peacekeeping forces kept their military presence on Georgian territories
under the pretext of maintaining the ceasefire in Abkhazia. Even though the Russian
Federation formally agreed to withdraw the troops, the retreat was never completed, their
military presence concretizing certain Russian interest in and influence over Georgia.
Situated at the dividing line between Europe and Asia, Georgia has a great
significance for Russian geopolitical connections. This is the reason Russia intended to
keep its military and political influence in Georgian space. However, Russia repeatedly
tried to involve Georgia in different projects and treatises developed and sustained by the
CIS16. But, even though Georgia joined later some of the military treatises signed within
the CSI, it renewed them officially shortly.
However, Russia tried to maintain its influence in Georgia by controlling the
Georgian energy and gas sectors. Thus, RAO UES17 controlled in Georgia 25% of electric
power generation and 35% of electric power distribution18. Concerning the gas sector, the
Russian state monopoly Gazprom manifested its interest in the Georgian distribution
system. Beginning in 2003, Gazprom refused to allow the Georgian branch of Itera (in
charge of Georgian gas transport) to use its pipelines, thus becoming the main supplier of
gas to Georgia. Rapidly, Georgia was in debt to Gazprom for its transportation services
and started negotiations for selling Georgian state-owned companies and their main
pipelines to Gazprom. Another contributing reason for Georgia to begin these negations
was also provided by the fact that its pipelines needed significant and expensive repairs.
15
According to the Jamestown Foundation’s reports;
16
The CIS was created on the December 8, 1991, by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine as a successor political,
economical and military bloc to the USSR, according to the AGREEMENT on the Establishment of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (unofficial English translation by John Fowler for theRussiaSite.org);
17
Electric power holding company in Russia;
18
According to Anatoly Trynkov report, RAO UES of Russia: Regional Power Markets Activities, for
Emerging Europe Energy Summit, Vienna, 3-4 November 2005;

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Georgia’s analysts and EU and US strategic partners were definitely against the
pipelines’ selling to Gazprom for its geopolitical implications of strengthening Russia’s
influence in the Caucasus19. Thus, American Millennium Challenge Corporation allocated
to Georgia the necessary sum for pipelines repair works. Once the pipelines were no
longer offered for sale, Gazprom stepped back from the negotiations, being uninterested
in acquiring only the Georgian gas state owned companies. Resumed negotiations only
concerned the gas supply20.
However, they were suspended, too, after an explosion in the incoming pipelines
from Russia. Georgian officials declared that the explosions represented a deliberately act
of Russian sabotage due to the refusal to sell the main Georgian pipelines to Gazprom:
the explosions "happened at the same time, and basically they didn't affect supplies to
Russia proper, so we can conclude that it was a very well-organized and very well co-
coordinated act (…) We've received numerous threats by Russian politicians and officials
at different levels to punish us for basically for not giving them pipelines", declared
President Saakashvili for BBC21. No evidence could be procured, however, while Russia
dismissed the accusations, blaming Chechens terrorists. One year later, Gazprom doubled
natural gas prices for Georgia22, prompting Georgia to denounce its contract with
Gazprom and successfully conclude new deals with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Georgia’s officials (as well as international journalists and analysts)23 suspected
political reasons behind this price increase24, as it came in a period when Georgian-
Russian relations were already worsened by other conflicts. A few months earlier Russia

19
For example, Mamuka Tsereteli suggested that Gazprom sees the potential for competition and tries to
attract all the regional gas in its system. If successful, Gazprom could make all those producing countries
depend on its transportation system and would dictate commercial considerations. It could also maintain
greater leverage on European consumer countries. (Mamuka Tsereteli, Russian Economic Expansion in the
Caucasus: A Challenge for Georgia, in Central Asia-Caucasus Analysts, Bi-Weekly Briefing Vol. 6, No
59, March, 2005);
20
According to Georgia Today, in Georgia’s state energy policy in the natural gas sector, Issue 403, April
11-17, 2008;
21
According to BBC, in Desperate Georgia gets some gas, 23 January 2006;
22
According to International Herald Tribune, in Gazprom of Russia to double natural gas prices for
Georgia, by Andrew E. Kramer, December 22, 2006;
23
According to International Herald Tribune, in Wine blockade by Kremlin drawing fire, by C.J. Chivers,
April 6, 2006;
24
See note 22;

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had imposed other sanctions on Georgia, including bans on Georgian wines, mineral
water, fresh fruits and vegetables25 and a suspension of air, rail and roadway links26.
In turn, these sanctions were interpreted as a Russian retaliatory step after an
espionage controversy, in which the Georgian government had arrested four Russian
officers on charges of espionage in late fall 2006. Another Russian retaliation was the
deportation of Georgian citizens from Russian territory, with several international
organizations (such as Freedom House or Human Rights Watch) denouncing the Russian
deportations as illegal, denying basic rights to the deportees and charging them arbitrarily
of improvable visa violations.
A primary factor contributing to the deterioration of Russo-Georgian relations
was the strong pro-Western stance of the Saakashvili government, and its close ties with
Washington. Saakashvili was looking forward acquiring membership within EU and
NATO and his regime was strongly supported by the US government from the very
beginning. Also, Saakashvili gradually developed increasingly good personalized
relationship with the US administration. Although the political support and propaganda
for the US policy that Georgia was able to do was a poor one, Saakashvili government
supported the US policy towards the Iraq war by any mean it was able to. Even though
Georgia couldn’t provide a significant financial help, it manifested its willingness for
helping US-led forces to stabilize the situation in Iraq. In a moment when other states
announced their intention of reduce their troops number in Iraq, as Britain, Denmark or
Lithuania, Saakashvili announced, in March 2007, its government intention of more than
double the number of troops serving in Iraq, from 850 to 200027.
Also, the US government strongly supported future Georgia membership within
NATO. President Bush advocated Georgia’s case alongside that of Ukraine’s, urging that
the two former Soviet republics join the Membership Action Plan, first step towards

25
According to the New York Times, Russian Double the Price Neighbor Pays for Natural Gas, by
Andrew E. Kramer, December 23, 2006;
According to BBC News, Russian wine move draws protests, March 30, 2008;
26
According to New York Times, Russia Severs Transport Link with Georgia, by Steven Lee Myers,
October 3, 2006;
According to Washington Post, Russia Cuts Travel Links with Georgia, by Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili,
October 3, 2006;
27
According to BBC News, Georgia to double troops in Iraq, by Matthew Collin, March 9, 2007;

9
membership. Anyway, due to the strong opposition from Britain, France and Germany,
neither Georgia nor Ukraine was asked to join the alliance.28
However, Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated throughout 2008, once internal
frozen tensions revealed themselves and Russia officially sided with the break-away
Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The 2008 Caucasus Conflict

A crisis in the Caucasus was precipitated with the Kosovar declaration of

independence. As a response to international recognition of Kosovo’s independence,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia renewed their own requests for recognized independence. It
was the moment when Russia announced that it would withdraw the economic sanction
concerning Abkhazia29 and President Putin officially announced that his government
would start to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist’s documents and trade
with the breakaway regions as sovereign states on different issues30, as energetic ones or
transport links.
Also, in the spring of 2008, Russian officials renewed their position against closer
ties between Georgia and NATO and declared that the Georgian membership in NATO
would force Russia to recognize South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence31.
A few days later, a new incident underlined tensions between Russia and Georgia,
when a UN investigation reported that a Russian jet had shot down an unarmed Georgian
drone over the Abkhazian conflict zone.32 Russia denied the accusation, implying the jet
belonged to a NATO member. As a reply, Russia increased the number of peacekeepers
in Abkhazia. In turn, Abkhaz separatist officials asked Russia to take military control

28
According to Times, NATO summit: George Bush abandoned over Ukraine and Georgia, by Michael
Evans and Francis Elliott, in Bucharest, April 3, 2008;
29
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release: Russian Federation Withdraws
from Regime of Restrictions Established in 1996 for Abkhazia, March 6, 2008;
30
According to Reuters, Russia tightens ties with Georgian rebels areas, by Christian Lowe, April 16 2008;
31
According to International Herald Tribune, Russia’s NATO envoy says offering Georgia membership
track would bolster separatists, March 11, 2008;
32
Report of UNOMIG on the incident of 20 April involving the downing of a Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over the zone of conflict
(http://www.unomig.org/data/other/080526_unomig_report.pdf)

10
over Abkhazia for security guarantees33 and South Ossetian officials declared that their
main goal was no longer independence but unification with the Russian Federation.34
Hostilities escalated on July 31, when a Georgian police patrol was hit by
roadside bombs. The conflict launched intense fighting between Georgian and South
Ossetian forces, which were blamed for the bombing incident. Shortly thereafter, South
Ossetian civilians started evacuating the region. Russian ambassador Yuri Popov, who
headed the Russian delegation to joint commission in South Ossetia, warned that, “if
events develop according to the worst-case violence scenario, Russia will not allow itself
to remain indifferent”.35
Apparently, Georgian officials announced a temporary ceasefire in order to hold
talks with South Ossetian officials, with Russia as a mediator. Nonetheless, fighting
intensified the same day,36 and Georgians launched a ground and air military attack on
South Ossetia's capital Tskhinvali, on the evening of 7 August 2008. The war began.
The Georgian attack on Tskhinvali remained for a while a matter of controversy
and debate. President Saakashvili declared that South Ossetian forces were attacking
Georgian villages and announced an operation to restore order. South Ossetian officials
denied any such bombardment on Georgian villages. Also, any such bombardment was
not recorded either by OSCE monitoring group in Tskhinvali 37, either by NATO
officials38. Ryan Grist, senior OSCE official in Georgia on the night war broke out
declared that “the [Georgian] attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate
to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation”39. However, OSCE monitors reported
that, since the afternoon, large numbers of Georgian artillery and rocket launchers were
massing on roads north of Gori, very close to South Ossetia40.

33
According to Reuters and ITAR-TASS;
34
According to the Jamestown Foundation. (http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373078 );
35
According to BBC News, Russia vows to defend S Ossetia, August 5, 2008;
36
According to Russia Today, Georgia and South Ossetia announce ceasefire, August 7, 2008;
37
According to Washington Post Foreign Service, A Two-Sided Descent into Full-Scale War, by Peter Finn,
August 17, 2008;
According to New York Times, Georgia Claims on Russia War Called into Question, by C.J. Chivers and
Ellen Barry, November 6, 2008;
38
According to Spiegel International, The West Begins to Doubt Georgian Leader, September 15, 2008;
39
According to Times, Georgia fired first shot, say UK monitors, by Jon Swain, November 9, 2008;
40
According to New York Times, Georgia Claims on Russia War Called into Question, by C.J. Chivers
and Ellen Barry, November 6, 2008;

11
 Thus, half an hour after the Shakasvili’s announcement, at 11.30 p.m., three
Georgian artillery brigades assaulted Tskhinvali. Shells falled on Tskhinvali every 15-20
seconds, according to OSCE monitors. As Russian peacekeeping forces reported to
OSCE monitors,41 the Georgian attack left parts of Tskhinvali in ruin, killed more than
2000 civilians and several Russian peacekeepers. The international organization HRR
later investigated civilian casualties and reported only 44 had been killed.42
Breaking the ceasefire agreement of 1992, a new Georgian military offensive was
launched in the early morning of 8 August, in order to surround and capture Tskhinvali.
Russian military forces and South Ossetian militias joined South Ossetian military forces
in order to stop Georgian troops from advancing.43 According to the Washington Post’s
Foreign Service,44 Russian artillery and air force succeeded in pushing back Georgian
military ground troops that had occupied Tskhinvali center. The fighting went on until the
late afternoon of August 9, when Russian officials declared that Georgian forces had been
driven from the capital45 and Tskhinvali was liberated.
With armored reinforcements arriving from Gori, Georgian military units
regrouped and re-attacked Tskhinvali46, using heavy tube and rocket artillery. After
several onslaughts, the joint Russian and South Ossetian forces succeeded repulsing the
Georgian attack, with Georgian infantry forcers either destroyed or forced to withdraw.
By August 10, Russian and South Ossetian forces gained complete control over
Tskhinvali. South Ossetian officials complained that Georgian forces didn’t provide a
peace corridor to evacuate civilians caught up in crossfire47.
Georgian officials denounced Russia for violating Georgian airspace and
attacking Georgian civilian population all over the country48. "All day today they've been
bombing Georgia from numerous warplanes and specifically targeting (the) civilian
population, and we have scores of wounded and dead among (the) civilian population all

41
Idem;
42
According to Human Wrights Watch, in Russia/Georgia: Investigate Civilian Deaths, August 12, 2008;
43
According to Spiegel International, The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy, August 25, 2008;
44
See note 37;
45
According to Russian News & Information Agency RIA Novosti, Russia says Georgian forces expelled
from S. Ossetian capital, August 9, 2008;
46
According to Novinite Sofia News Agency, Georgia Army Launches New Offensive on South Ossetia
Capital Tskhinvali, August 9, 2008;
47
See 42;
48
According to Bay News 9, Russian tanks’ rolling into Georgian breakaway, August 8, 2008;

12
around the country," declared President Saakashvili for the CNN. During the fights for
Tskhinvali, the Russian Air Force bombed Gori, a Georgian town near the border with
breakaway South Ossetia. According to BBC, several buildings were destroyed and more
than 60 civilians were killed on August 949. By the next day, more than 56.000 civilians
had fled the region50. Defeated at Tskhinvali, Georgian troops left the town. However,
Russian bomb attacks went on, killing and severely injuring Georgian civilians and
foreign journalists. Russian air force attacked also the Gori Hospital51. Human Rights
Watch accused Russian air forces of attacking civilian regions, too. On August 12,
Russian air force launched RBK-250 cluster bombs, each containing 30 PTAB 2.5M
submunitions or "bomblets" in the centre of Gori52.
The following day, Russian ground forces entered Gori53. Though Russian official
Vyacheslav Borisov from the Ministry of Defence, declared that Gori was controlled by
the joint Georgian Police and Russian forces, columns of Georgian police and army
vehicles prepared to enter Gori were pushed back by Russian tanks. Russians also denied
access in the town to many humanitarian missions. Human Rights Report and the UN
denounced the Russian occupation and the blockade of the town. The Russian military
didn’t ensure any safe passage for civilians wishing to leave the region or for
humanitarian aid agencies to enter and injured civilians needing assistance and food
supplies did not get them. Also, South Ossetian militia committed human rights abuses
and atrocities such as assaulting, kidnapping and killing civilians and looting their homes
and properties.54
Nonetheless, UN Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin denied that Russian troops
were occupying Gori: Russian soldiers "are not in Gori, have never been in Gori and do
not occupy Gori", he officially declared for press. Finally, Russian troops left Gori late on
August 22 and Georgian police entered the town shortly. However, a Russian checkpoint

49
According to BBC News, Russian jets attack Georgian town, August 9, 2008;
50
According to BBC News, Eyewitness: Mood shifts in Gori, August 10, 2008;
51
According to The Independent, The new Cold War: Crisis in the Caucasus, August 17, 2008;
52
According to Times, Russia accused of dropping cluster bombs on Georgian civilians, by Nico Hines,
August 15, 2008;
53
According to The Spectator, Russian forces occupy Gori, so much for the ceasefire, by James Forsyth,
August 13, 2008;
54
See note 41;

13
remained in the vicinity of Gori, specifically in the village of Karaleti, just five
kilometers from the town.
During the battles for Tskhinvali, another controversial incident took place in the
Black Sea off the coast of Abkhazia. According to Russian and Ukrainian sources,
between August 9th-10th the Russian navy sunk a Georgian missile boat. Details on this
encounter are sketchy at best, as Georgia refused to comment on this incident and
independent third party sources didn’t confirm this battle took place.
Also, on 10 August, Abkhazia declared a full military mobilization, calling up the
reservists to drive out the 1000 Georgian troops from the Kodori Valley, the only region
of Abkhazia that was, before the war began, still under Georgian authority55. In addition,
4000 Russian troops arrived in Abkhazia. However, Russian army spokesman Anatoly
Nogovitsyn declared for Interfax that Russia was interested only in maintaining
stabilization in Abkhazia: "We do not intend to take the initiative in escalating the
conflict in this region. We are primarily interested in stabilization there [in Abkhazia]".56
Also, ships of Russian navy arrived on the eastern part of the sea, near the
Georgian border. According to a spokesman for the Abkhaz President, the Russian
reinforcements were asked by the Abkhaz side "The local administration and
peacekeepers had asked Russia to reinforce its naval presence near the Abkhazian coast,
after Georgian warships attempted to approach the coastline"57. More Russian troops
entered Abkhazia, finally having more than 9,000 paratroopers and 350 armor in the
region58. Georgian officials received two ultimatums for removing its troops from Upper
Kodori Gorge and to disarm, from Abkhaz and Russia side, but rejected them both59.
On August 12, Abkhaz military forces launched an operation against the Georgian
troops in order to force them to withdraw. According to the Abkhaz President’s
declaration, Sergei Bagapsh, Georgian positions were attacked first by Abkhaz artillery
forces, following the the Abkhaz infantry and armor60.

55
According to BBC News, Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia crisis, August 13, 2008;
56
According to The Guardian, Abkhazia: Moscow sends troops into second enclave. by Luke Harding,
August 11, 2008;
57
According Global Security Military Report on Abkhazia;
58
According to Reuters, Russia boosts forces in Abkhazia to 9,000-lfax, August 11, 2008;
59
According Reuters, Russia demands Georgian troops near Abkhazia disarm, August 11, 2008;
60
According to international press recorded declarations by International Herald Tribune, The Guardian or
The Earth Times;

14
 The Abkhaz President declared that Abkaz forces succeeded in taking the villages
of Azhara and Chkhalta and were advancing to the Georgian border, controlling most of
the region. Thus, an Abkhaz unit of 250 servicemen surrounded the Georgian troops in
the Kodori Gorge, meeting some resistance from the Georgians who fired on them with
small arms. A second unit jointed the Abkhaz side while Abkhazian Air Force and
artillery attacked the region.61 This operation involved not only Abkhaz regular troops but
also reservists.62 Furthermore, Georgian officials declared that "Russian troops were not
involved in any of these operations and a humanitarian corridor would be created for
civilians and humanitarian missions63. However, more than 2000 civilians were forced to
flee and left their homes with no food or water supplies64.
The same day, Georgian troops ceased fire and withdrew from their positions as
“a gesture of good will”, as Georgian officials stated. On the same day, international
press agencies reported Russian troops violating Georgian territory, entering Georgia
from Abkhazia. Thus, in an apparent broadening of the conflict over South Ossetia,
Russian forces launched a raid on the town of Senaki and took control of a Georgian
military base that was abandoned by Georgian forces65. Also, Russian Air Force officials
claimed shooting down two Georgian helicopters at the Senaki airbase.
According to Associated Press, Georgia's Foreign Ministry declared that the
Abkhaz side moved its border in direction of the Inguri river, and its troops occupied two
villages near Zugdidi, 13 villages in the region of Tsalenjikha and the surrounding area of
the water power station near the Inguri river. Georgian government was not able to
estimate how far the military actions had gone66.
Russia violated Georgian territory one more time, attacking the town of Poti, the
main Georgian port at the black Sea and the passing point for a major pipeline delivering
oil to Europe. On August 9, Russian Air Force attacked the port, its facilities and the

61
According to Abkhazia's chief of the General Staff of the armed forces, Anatoly Zaitsev, declaration at
pres conference on August 12, as news agencies recorded (ITAR-TASS, Hurriyet Daily News or Sky
News), August 12, 2008;
62
According to foreign Minister of Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba, declaration for ITAR-TASS;
63
Abkhaz statement at the press conference mentioned above;
64
According to the OSCE Report on the Violations of Human Rights in the Conflict Zones,
HDIM.DEL/433/07, October 4, 2007;
65
According to BBC News, Russian troops advance in Georgia, August 12, 2008;
66
According to ABC News, Georgia Says Abkhazia Separatists Seize Villages, August 16, 2008;

15
nearby Georgian airbase. Georgian officials, as well as American ones, interpreted the
Russian attacks as targeting the Georgian military infrastructure and oil hub67.
On August 11 Russian forces captured Senaki, which sits on the only major road
linking Poti with the rest of Georgia. A day later, Russian troops withdrew68.
Sporadic air attacks went on and international press reported on August 14 that
Russian troops occupied the city and Georgian Naval vessels were sunk. Also, Russian
troops captured few Georgian soldiers, a few days later.

International Reactions to the Conflict and its Implications for European Security

The United Nations Security Council was convened and held an emergency
meeting for discussing the Caucasus conflict on the evening of August 7, 2008, at the
request of Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations69. No consensus was reached at that meeting, or at the open-consultations
with Georgia that followed it that night and over the next few days.70
Most international political actors (states, international organizations and NGOs)
asked for a peaceful conflict resolution by August 10th. The European Union announced
that a joint delegation of EU’s members and US’s representatives would be sent to the
conflict zone in order to try to negotiate a cease-fire deal. 71 Russia refused to participate
in any negotiations until Georgia withdrew its troops from South Ossetia. Two days later,
Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev declared that the Russian military operation in
Georgia, “achieving its goal”, would be ended.72
67
As international press and organization recorded, as Daily Times, Russia makes bombing raids as
conflict escalates, August 10, 2008; or EurasiaNet, Russian “Imperialist Boots” Stomping on Georgia –
President, August 11, 2008;
68
According to Washington Post Foreign Service, Russia Pushes into Georgia, by Peter Finn, August 12,
2008;
69
Letter dated 7 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations, S/2008/533;
70
Security Council Report, Update Report, Report No. 2, 12 August 2008;
71
According to Le Monde, 8 August 2008, La Géorgie et la Russie s'affrontent pour le contrôle de
l'Ossétie du Sud, August 8, 2008;

72
According to Russia News & Information Agency RIA Novosti, Russia’s President says operation in
Georgia over, August 12, 2008;
According to New York Times, Russia, in Accord with Georgians Sets Withdrawal, August 12, 2008;

16
 Two days later, by the efforts of Nicolas Sarkozy, the President-in-Office of the
EU at that time, who lead the negotiations, a six-point peace plan was signed by all the
parts involved in the conflict: Russian President Medvedev, Georgian President
Saakashvili, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity and Abkhazian President Sergei
Bagapsh. The agreement protocol73 stipulated the following six-points:
1. No recourse to the use of force.
2. Definitive cessation of hostilities.
3. Free access to humanitarian aid.
4. The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions.
5. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where
they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment
of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional
security measures.
6. An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
ways to ensure their lasting security will take place.
The EU immediately sent a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
mission to monitor the ceasefire agreement. The EU desired to remain present in the
Caucasus through the structures of the United Nations and the OSCE, too.
Despite the agreement signed and the monitors’ presence, the hostilities didn’t
stop immediately. Firing and sporadic incidents kept going on with casualties for all the
four sides involved. Also, Russian officials ignored Western leaders’ calls for a quick
withdraw of military forces.74 Russian troops occupied Georgian regions for about two
months. Only a small part of the forces were withdrawn at the end of August, while many
others remained in the so-called “buffer-zones” around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
withdrawal of the Russian forces in the Georgian territories was completed only in early
October, when Russia handed control to the EU monitoring mission in Georgia. 75
However, Russia maintained troops in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

73
http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/Six_Point_Peace_Plan.pdf;
74
According to Washington Post, Bush, European Leaders Urge Quick Withdrawal from Georgia, by
Frederick Kunkle, August 18, 2008;
75
According to Russia News & Information Agency RIA Novosti, Russia hands over control of Georgian
buffer zones to EU, September, 9, 2008;

17
 For its involvement in the 2008 Caucasus conflict, its foreign policy and its post-
war attitude, Russia faced strong criticism from many states. The US President George
W. Bush warned Russia that its use of bullying and intimidation was not an acceptable
way to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century.76 Also, Vice President Dick Cheney
expressed U.S. solidarity with Georgia in the conflict with Russia, stating that: "Russian
aggression must not go unanswered".77 In turn, United Kingdom, Denmark, Poland,
Ukraine, Sweden and the Baltic States sharply condemned Russian actions as aggression
alongside Australia and Canada. Thus, the foreign minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, and
Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe commented Russia's
claims of defending Russian citizens in South Ossetia as a recall of “Hitler’s justifications
of Nazi invasions".78
France and Germany focused on helping ending the conflict, refraining from
designated a culprit in the conflict. An intermediate position, trying no to side toward any
party of the conflict but deploring the violence and the casualties resulted, was adopted
also by Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, the Vatican,
Greece, Croatia, Serbia, Israel, Iran, Uruguay, Vietnam, Japan, People’s Republic of
China, Argentina, Brazil, Chile.
The other states from the Black Sea area, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and
Turkey shared the same refusal to name a culprit while urging for the end of hostilities,
while Azerbaijan stated its strong support for Georgia.
The Czech Republic blamed both Georgia and Russia for the conflict, while Italy
appeared to support Russia’s position. Thus, Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, declared: "We
cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin's
position"79.
Russia’s policy was praised by Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba,
Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Syria, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Venezuela. Thus, for

76
According to Los Angeles Times, Bush to Russia: “Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable”,
August 15, 2008;
77
According to Reuters, Cheney: “Russian aggression must not go unanswered”, August 10, 2008;
78
According to The Economist, Russia resurgent, August 14, 2008;
79
According to the International Herald Tribune, Differences emerge in Europe of a response to Georgia
conflict, by Katrin Benhold, August 12, 2008;

18
instance, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko applauded Russia's response to the
crisis in South Ossetia, declaring that: "Russia acted calmly, wisely and beautifully"80.
International organization had different reactions to the conflict, too. The
Collective Security Treaty Organization, from which are members, besides Russia,
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in a collective statement,
affirmed their support for Russia’s position in the Caucasus conflict.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted an intermediate position, not
offering to Russia the vigorous support it was expecting. "The SCO states express grave
concern in connection with the recent tensions around the South Ossetian issue and urge
the sides to solve existing problems peacefully, through dialogue, and to make efforts
facilitating reconciliation and talks", finally declared the security group SCO81. Neither
member of CIS answered promptly in Russia’s support (despite efforts by Moscow to
impose its leadership within the organization) while Ukraine, who took an unequivocal
stand against Russia, responded slowly and cautiously.

As noted above, the European Union and the United Nations played important
parts in peace-negotiations. Even though either these organizations refrained to side on
any party involved in the conflict, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, the President of the UN
General Assembly and former Nicaraguan foreign minister, asked for his personal
opinion by an American reporter whether Russia violated the UN Charter by intruding
into Georgia, he declared that actually it was Georgia the party that committed an act of
aggression against South Ossetia and violated UN Charter. The Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe took also part to the cease-fire negotiations. The chairman of
the organization, the Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb, accompanied the EU
delegation for negotiations to treat for a cease-fire and offered, in the unanimously accord
of all the OSCE members, to immediately deploy military observers and humanitarian
assistance to manage the conflict.

80
According to Russia News & Information Agency RIA Novosti, Belarus leader applauds Russian
response to South Ossetia crisis, August 19, 2008;
81
"The SCO states express grave concern in connection with the recent tensions around the South Ossetian
issue and urge the sides to solve existing problems peacefully, through dialogue, and to make efforts
facilitating reconciliation and talks," the final declaration said.

19
 According to NATO’s press release “the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer, is seriously concerned about the events that are taking place in the Georgian
region of South Ossetia and said that the Alliance is closely following the situation. The
Secretary General calls on all sides for an immediate end of the armed clashes and direct
talks between the parties”82.
International NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Caritas Internationalis,
Human Rights Watch, and Red Cross International deplored the violence and the
casualties, denounced the wartime violation of international law by both Georgia and
Russia, and urged the establishment of humanitarian corridors for civilians while offering
them supplies and health services.
On 26 August 2008, Russian President Medvedev officially recognized Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as independent states, urged by the unanimous vote of the Federal
Assembly of Russia of the previous day.83 Nicaragua followed suit on 5 September,
2008.84
The Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was
supported only by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Even under this circumstance,
the SCO’s member states (except Russia), Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, and China, refrained from recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and ambiguously stated that: “Presidents affirmed their commitment to the
principles of respect for historical and cultural traditions of any country and efforts made
to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of any state”85.
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission,
Foreign Ministers of the Group of Seven (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United
Kingdom, United States of America and Canada), Ukraine’s government, NATO, and the
OSCE strongly condemned the Russian policy of recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. “The unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
by the Russian Federation violates the territorial integrity of a fellow Council of Europe
82
Press release of NATO http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-100e.html;
83
Statement of President of Russia, August 26, 2008,
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml);
84
Decree of President of Nicaragua, No 47, 2008,
(http://www.cancilleria.gob.ni/publicaciones/r_abjasia.pdf);
85
According to Jamestown Foundation, Nazarbayev Plays Double Game on South Ossetia, by Farkhad
Sharip, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 167, September 2, 2008;

20
member state. It jeopardizes prospects for a negotiated settlement of the dispute about the
future status of these two regions,” declared Terry Davis, the secretary-general of the
Council of Europe.
International Herald Tribune’s journalist Andrew Kramer86 and political analyst
Vladimir Socor87 emphasized that NATO increased its naval presence and maintained it
uninterrupted in the Black Sea after the conflict, as it was allowed by the limitations
imposed by the Montreux Convention, in order to prevent any further escalations of the
recent conflict.
Russia maintained more than 3.700 soldiers in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia
and is planning to open military bases in Java, Tskhinvali, and Gudauta in the following
two years. Russia’s military presence in the two regions was reinforced by the treaties
signed by President Dmitri Medveded with South Ossetian and Abkhaz officials on
September 17.
The treaties formalized diplomatic and economic cooperation between Russia and
the two separatist regions. Also, Russia committed to defend South Ossetia and Abkhazia
from any Georgian future attack. "We will show each other all necessary support,
including military support," Declared Medvedev, threatening that "a repeat of the
Georgian aggression" would lead to "a catastrophe on a regional scale, so no one should
be in doubt that we will not allow new military adventures."88 The friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance treaties between Russia and the two break-away
regions - providing for the establishment of regional Russian bases - strengthened
Russia’s position in the Caucasus and its capacity to military intervene in post-Soviet
space.
The 2008 Caucasus Conflict was one the first attempts by the EU to help solve an
international crisis. The EU proved impressively united and produced strong answers to
Russian actions. At the EU Summits held weekly in Brussels from the 1st of September,
all the 27 members of the organization shared the same position concerning the
prevention of war, called on parties to the conflict to implement the six-point plan

86
According to International Herald Tribune, In NATO ships cause alarm in Moscow, August 27, 2008;
87
According to Eurasia, In Naval Imbalance in the Black Sea after the Russian-Georgian War, November
26, 2008;
88
According to International Herald Tribune, Russia signs pacts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
September 17, 2008;

21
immediately. Examining relations with Russia after its invasion of Georgia, the EU
members announced that no further negotiations over the planned European-Russian
partnership and co-operation agreement talks with Russia would be held until Russian
troops were withdrawn to pre-August 7th positions89.
The EU expressed its intention of continuing to support Georgia with
humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance, as well as helping to rebuild damaged
areas in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Also, the EU from the very beginning provided
Georgia with 6 million euros and held an international donor’s conference to further
assist Georgia’s economic recovery, while individual member states contributed another
9 million euros. Visa facilities were also offered to Georgian citizens and a civilian EU
Monitoring Mission in Georgia was deployed on October 1st.90

However, the EU had few punitive options to use against Russia. One group of
states—headed by Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Britain and Sweden—
appealed for confrontation with Moscow, in close collaboration with Washington. They
asked for punitive measures, such as ending negotiations over a European-Russian
partnership agreement, as well as placing visa restrictions on Russian citizens. Another
group—headed by Germany, France and Italy—rejected sanctions and advocated
dialogue with Moscow, in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict91.
Any confrontation with Russia, as a main supplier of natural gas and oil of the
Western Europe could have dire consequences for the states involved. Slovakia, Finland
and Bulgaria depend on Russia for more than 90 percent of the gas consumption and
Germany relies on Russia for 34 percent of its oil imports and 36 percent of its natural
gas consumption. Although most dependent on Russian energy, Poland and other East-
European states pressed for punitive measures, presumably because of their recent
memories of Soviet domination. With its own oil and gas reserves, the United Kingdom

89
According to Deutsche Welle’s analysis - Caucasus Conflict Shows EU Unity, September 9, 2008;
90
According to European Council official statement
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/index_en.htm);

91
Peter Schwarz, European Union summit sides with Georgia, in World Socialist Web Site,
published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), September 2, 2008;

22
joined the idea of confrontation, suggesting that Russia should be excluded from the
Group of Eight (G8).
Not coincidently, after the second EU Council, Russia announced that it would
shut down its Yamal natural-gas pipeline supplying Western Europe for more than a day
for “routine maintenance." In addition, Russian giant energy supplier Gazprom
announced the same day that it would temporarily reduce gas supplies to Germany.
However, at the beginning of November, without Lithuania’s endorsement, the
EU renewed negotiations with Russia for a new partnership treaty.

The 2008 Caucasus Conflict revealed a poor EU policy in the field of conflict
prevention. A renewal of the security architecture should be a European priority. The
security structure currently begs for rapid reconfiguration, in order to assure good
coverage in East-European areas, as well as high monitoring activity in the troubled
regions.
Thus, because of the role the EU assumed in the conflict mediation and its ability
of maintaining dialogue with Russia, the great task post-conflict would be assigned to the
EU as well. The EU should enforce its effort in creating a new European security and
conflict-prevention architecture in order to achieve and maintain stability in the
conflicted regions. Also, simultaneously, EU should pursue its non-confrontation policy,
mediating the Caucasus tensions and pleading for a cooperating Russian position.
Renewing talks with Russia, EU did a strategic move. Conflicts prevention,
stability and security in the Caucasus are issues that cannot be worked out and solved
without Russia’s cooperation. Its participation is needed for the achieving of peace in its
immediate neighbors, a group of nations that are still strongly influenced by Russia. Also,
EU should insist on a strategic partnership with Russia for a “Common Space of External
Security”, as Russia agreed to be involved in, in discussions prior to the conflict. The
goal of a cooperative security policy should be that of maintaining a permanent open
dialogue with Russia and persuading it to participate together with the EU in building
new international security structures to prevent new arms races in Eastern Europe and
jointly tackle global and regional problems.

23
 Internationally isolating Russia would not be a wise step for the EU, nor for the
US and NATO. Initially, Russia answered NATO calls with hostility, President
Medvedev declaring that ultimately NATO depends on cooperation with Russia, while
Russia had nothing to fear from an end of collaboration. Also, concerning the
suspensions of negotiation for Russia’s ascension to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Moscow government manifested its lack of interest, Putin declaring that there
was no special need for Russia to join it. Despite the suspension of the NATO-Russia
Council, at a foreign ministers meeting in December the alliance decided to revive
informal high-level meetings with Moscow.
Alienating itself from the West would not be Russia best future policy, either. For
instance, analyst Philip Hanson92 argues that not joining the WTO would not be in
Russia’s long-term interest, as such a decision could have deleterious effects on Russia’s
national economy. For instance, Moscow’s government recent move of blocking imports
of chicken from the US is considered by Hanson a decision that would push up prices,
destabilizing its market.
In any event, the 2008 war had several unpleasant economic consequences for
Russia. Even though the war-costs were not high for Russia, it suffered losses by the
collapse on the stock exchanges and currency markets. According to Russia’s Finance
Minister Alexei Kudrin, $6 billion left country on August 8 and another $1 billion on
August 1193. It seems that Russia already has a dangerous fragile market that would not
be benefited by further conflict with the EU.

Future Consequences of the Conflict.

In a recent interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty94, Matthew Bryza,

U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, called the war a
defining moment. "It is a watershed because Russia demonstrated that it is willing to be a

92
Philip Hanson, Associate Fellow of Chatham House and Professor of the Political Economy of Russia
and Eastern Europe at the University of Birmingham, in The August 2008 Conflict: Economic
Consequences for Russia, Analysis Paper, September 2008;
93
According to Russia News & Information Agency RIA Novosti;
94
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2008 in Review: War, Peace, and Football Diplomacy in the South
Caucasus, by Brian Whitmore, December 26, 2008;

24
belligerent and use force against smaller neighbors," Bryza said. "In fact, against a
neighbor with a military that is maybe 1/100th of its size. That act has sent some
powerful signals reverberating through the Caucasus."
Thus, the 2008 Caucasus Conflict proved that, from the shadow of its past great
power, Russia has perceived EU and NATO as threats, ignored OSCE’s efforts and was
hostile to Western states. Frustrated by its reduced, peripheral influence, Russia insisted
in reaffirming its power status and kept fighting for a Eurasian hegemonic role, imposing
its leadership in the former Soviet space. Russia has demonstrated that it has the capacity
to enforce its aims within the post-Soviet region by use of force and that neither NATO
nor the EU possesses the desire to interfere.
Beside reinforcing Russian’s position in the Caucasus and strengthening its power
status, an outcome of the conflict was an improvement in Medvedev’s domestic situation.
Supported by the majority of the Russian people, the Russian-Georgian War surprisingly
stabilized President Medvedev position and raised his confidence.
There are also several interpretation that suggest Russia was motivated in its
actions by energy security issues, as its frustration toward the major pipelines constructed
and planned to by-pass its territory and run through Georgia (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and
South Caucasus Pipeline). Thus, its actions would be motivated by the hope that an
increased risk of instability and military conflict within Georgian territory would
discourage future investors and similar initiatives.95
However, the 2008 Caucasus Conflict has also consequences regarding the
European energy policy. Russia’s card for not facing any punitive consequences was its
reserves of natural gas and oil and it was a strong one. Thus, the EU’s relations with
Russia were shaped by the tensions between Central and Eastern European security
interests and Western Europe’s energy needs. This situation particularly emphasized the
necessity for EU to implement and develop a better coordinated energy-policy, as
Germany has insisted upon since its Presidency in the European Council in the first half
of 2007. A common European Energy Policy is needed in order to prevent formation of
various undesired tendencies, such as the increasing energy dependence on Russia.

95
Mikko Palonkorpi, in The role of Energy in the Caucasus Conflict, 29.10. 2008, Researcher, Aleksanteri
Institute;

25
 If, for the moment, Russia needs EU market as much as EU market needs it, the
petrodollars received from exports being the most important factor for economic
development of Russia, future Russian development and investments in new technologies
(as the technologies of liquefied natural gas - LNG), would enforce Russia’s position and
EU unilateral dependency on it. In this scenario, Moscow’s government would accentuate
its policy of using energy as an instrument of political pressure and would strengthen its
importance in the world politics.
However, the conflict revealed Russia’s military shortcomings. Margarete Klein
underlines that “Russia’s victory was built not on material and technological superiority
but good preparation and superiority of numbers”96, estimating that 80 percent of Russian
weaponry was worn out and outdated, lacking high-technology weapons and weapons
systems, radar and modern computerized targeting and modern communication and
navigation systems.
President Medvedev declared on 11 Sept 2008, the lessons of the “five-day war”
would be taken into account, with attention focusing on procuring modern weapons and
equipment, and creating “modern, efficient armed forces” would be one of the “highest
priority” in coming years. Thus, President Medveded announced a 27 percent increase in
the budget for the next year to $50 billion, further accelerating then-President Putin’s
2006 military modernization plan with a volume of almost $190 billion from 2007 to
2015.
Klein doubts Russia’s ambitious plan of modernizing and maintaining its armed
forces for the inflation in military items and the high costs involved. However, Russia’s
plan raises a huge concern: what are Russia’s future intentions, if it is eager for having a
new, modernized army?
The two treaties on U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions will expire during the
President Barack Obama’s term and it is doubtful that Russia would be willing to renew
them, as analyst Stephen Sestanovich97 argues. However, the U.S. missile defense system
planned for deployment in Eastern Europe threatens Russia’s desire of becoming a major
96
Margarete Klein, in Military Implications of the Georgia War: Russian Armed Forces in Need of Reform,
in The Caucasus Crisis. International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe, Ed.
Hans-Henning Schroeder, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2008, p. 12-19;
97
Stephen Sestanovich, What Has Moscow Done?, in Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008, Vol. 87, Issue 6, p.
12-28;

26
power with hegemony in the post-Soviet space, against any Russian effort of
modernizing its military forces.
Despite the momentary enforcement and consolidation of Russia within the post-
Soviet space, Charles King suggests that Russia’s position concerning the 2008 Caucasus
conflict, “in the long run, […] could backfire”. The analyst argues that the Russian
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may set a dangerous precedent for regions
within Russia itself: “If South Ossetia can be independent, why not Russia's own North
Ossetia, whose inhabitants are connected by ties of ethnicity and history to the majority
population in South Ossetia? If the mountaineers of Abkhazia are entitled to their own
country, why not their ethnic cousins, the Circassians, who inhabit the fertile plains just
to the north?”98.
Concerning Georgian post-conflict consequences, some analysts think that
Georgia’s relationship with the Western military alliance has deepened post-conflict. This
contention is arguable. Even though NATO developed closer relations with Georgia post-
conflict (NATO set up a special NATO-Georgia Commission to supervise assistance for
rebuilding Georgia’s security structures and held open meetings with Georgian officials
in Tbilisi), Georgia seems to have a poor chance for receiving a NATO membership in
the near future. Saakasvili government proved that it was not the democratic government
that one would have expected. First, Saakashvili cracked down an antigovernment
demonstration in Tbilisi and temporally closed down independent media outlets, in
November 7, 2007, the press comparing this attitude with the one of Putin 99. Also, few
months later, in January 2008, Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement,
were accused of re-winning the election by intimidation and bullying. International
monitors assessed the election as undemocratic, as well as numerous domestic monitors.
Secondly, Saakashvili government was strongly criticized for its involvement in the 2008
Caucasus Conflict. The use of military forces for solving the conflict with the break-away
regions was not a democratic procedure but a sure way of challenging an international
conflict.

98
Charles King, The Five-Day War, in Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008, Vol. 87, Issue 6, p. 2-11;
99
According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian Opposition Leader says Putin, Saakashvili
“Like Twins”, November 7, 2008.

27
 Thus, Georgia’s chances of joining NATO were diminished by the muscular way
it tried to solve the issue of the breakaway regions, as well as by some measures of the
Saakashvili’s government that were proved to be undemocratic.

References:

1. Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchel, No Way to Treat Our Friends:

Recasting Recent U.S. – Georgian Relations, in The Washington Quarterly,
January 2009, 32:1;
2. Charles King, The Five-Day War, in Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008, Vol. 87,
Issue 6;
3. Margarete Klein, Military Implications of the Georgia War: Russian Armed
Forces in Need of Reform, in The Caucasus Crisis. International Perceptions and
Policy Implications for Germany and Europe, Ed. Hans-Henning Schroeder,
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2008;
4. Svetlana Mikhailovna Chervonnaia in Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia,
Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow. Gothic Image Publications, 1994;
5. Georgiy Mirsky in On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former
Soviet Union, United States: Greenwood Press, 1997;
6. Mikko Palonkorpi, in The role of Energy in the Caucasus Conflict, October 29,
2008, Researcher, Aleksanteri Institute;
7. Peter Schwarz, European Union summit sides with Georgia, in World Socialist
Web Site, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International
(ICFI), September 2, 2008;
8. Stephen Sestanovich, What Has Moscow Done?, in Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec
2008, Vol. 87, Issue 6;

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 9. Goltz Thomas and Georgia Diary in A Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in
the Post-Soviet, United States: M.E. Sharpe 2006;
10. Anatoly Trynkov’s report, RAO UES of Russia: Regional Power Markets
Activities, for Emerging Europe Energy Summit, Vienna, 3-4 November 2005;
11. Mamuka Tsereteli, Russian Economic Expansion in the Caucasus: A Challenge
for Georgia, in Central Asia-Caucasus Analysts, Bi-Weekly Briefing Vol. 6, No
59, March, 2005).

Sources:

• International press (Daily Times, Eurasia Daily Monitor, International Herald

Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Times, The Spectator, The Independent, The Guardian, The Earth Times,
The Economist, Washington Post) and press-agencies (ABC News, Bay News 9,
BBC News, Daily News, Deutsche Welle, EurasiaNet, EuroNews Sky News,
ReliefWeb, Reuters);
• Local and regional press(Georgia Today, Kommersant, Le Monde, Russia Today,
Spiegel International) and press-agencies (Russia News & Information Agencies
ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti, Novinite Sofia News Agency, Hurriyet - Turkey);
• Official press-releases of institutions (presidencies, ministers, governments,
embassies) and international organizations (as EU or NATO);
• Public declarations and officials’ speeches;
• Reports of international NGOs, as Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,
Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, Jamestown Foundation.

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