1. The archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of
When the government expropriates private property
land and waters by defining an archipelago either as
a group of islands surrounded by waters or a body of
waters studded with islands.
2. EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, which shall not extend beyond 200 NM from the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
Territorial sea is 12 NM from the baseline.
Contiguous zone is 24 NM from baseline.
Continental shelf is 150 NM from the baseline.
3. Maritime disputes are subject to compulsory
arbitration because under UNCLOS a party state has
given its advance consent to compulsory arbitration,
unless a state has opted out of compulsory
arbitration involving certain specified disputes. In
contrast, territorial disputes can be subject to
arbitration only with the consent of each disputant
state to every arbitration, unless such consent has
been given in advance in a treaty. The PH arbitration
case against China is solely a maritime dispute and
does not involve any territorial dispute.
4. Low Tide Elevations are rocks above water at low
tide but below water, or submerged, at high tide.
LTEs beyond the 12 NM territorial sea are not
capable of appropriation by any state. As part of the
submerged continental shelf, LTEs beyond the
territorial sea but within the EEZ of a coastal state
are subject to the sovereign rights of such coastal
state.
5. Artificial islands do not generate maritime
entitlements. According to UNCLOS, an island is a
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide. Reclamation is
obviously not a mode of acquiring territory under
international law because reclaimed land cannot be
considered a naturally formed are of land.
6. The premises occupied by the Chinese Embassy do
not constitute territory of China but of the PH.
Crimes committed within the Chinese Embassy in
Cebu City are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of
the PH.
7. Doctrine of State Immunity is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state of acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated
by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against a State.
8.
without paying compensation, it is deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit.
9. Where a private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring
title thereto either though expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
10. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases
where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot
be achieved. In effect the precautionary principle
shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from
those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to
change the status quo.
11. Treaties and conventions are not deemed
automatically part of the Philippine law. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in treaties and
conventions which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the source of international law. Indeed, so
much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature.
12. While the Constitution mandates that the President
of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority”, who could thereby elect the minority
leader.
13. Void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is
vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its common meaning and differ as to its
application.
14. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
15. Overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest
in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally protected conduct.
16. Constitutionality of Curfew Ordinances
a. Void for Vagueness not applicable. Petitioner’s
invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is
improper, considering that they do not properly
identify the provision in any of the Curfew
ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology,
fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public
of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly. Petitioners only bewail the lack of
enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected
curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion
as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit
or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances’ lack
of enforcement guidelines. There is no due process
consideration.
b. Overbreadth not applicable. The Court rejects
petitioners’ invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed any
transgression of their rights to free speech or any
inhibition of speech-related conduct. The application
of overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial find of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
That being said, this Court finds it improper to
undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there
being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the
contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under strict
scrutiny test.
c. Right of Parents to rear their children. As our
Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to
support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of,
but rather, complementary to parental supervision.
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right
and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role
for parents to fulfil their parental obligations. The
Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children’s well-being.
d. Equal Protection. The restrictions set by the
Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation,
this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights, the exercise of these
rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are
always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s or guardian/s, and
the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and,
to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the
right to vote, the right to execute contracts, and the
right to engage in gainful employment.
e. Right to Travel. Under the strict scrutiny test, the
government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling
State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
Although treated differently from adults, the
foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors
as they are still accorded the freedom to participate
in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, civic
or religious. In the present case, each of the
ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure
minimal constraint not only on the minors’ right to
travel but also on their other constitutional rights. In
sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test- that is, that the State has sufficiently
shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned
localities, only the QC has passed the second prong
of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance
out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest.
17. A public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot
be charged with disbarment during the incumbency
of such public officer.
18. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature,
while in action for qua warranto is judicial or a
proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
19. From the 1987 Constitution and Administrative
Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not
among the class of Constitutional Commissions. Nor
there is any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy in essence. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from
outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law,
and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs
may require from time to time. Only the Judiciary,
CSC, COA, COMELEC, and Office of the Ombudsman
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
20. Congress cannot exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the SC. Since the payment of legal fees is
a vital component of the rules promulgated by the
SC concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
the Congress. As one of the safeguards of the SC’s
institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. The
power is no longer shared by the SC with Congress,
much less with the Executive.
21. Members of the COA, COMELEC, or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from
 reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Corollary, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment. A commissioner
who resigns after serving for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not
covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that
the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term
of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability
or removal by impeachment. (SUMMARY OF RULES,
Funa vs. Villar)
22. A warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for a violation of an
ordinance or an offense penalized by a fine only. It
may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense
because no warrant of arrest can even be issued.
23. The SC may issue a TRO to stop Congress from
conducting impeachment proceedings. The
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
“judicially discoverable standards” for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion.
24. The President, thru an EO, cannot include the CSC
Chairperson as Ex-Officio Board Member of several
GOCCs. When the CSC Chairman sits as a member of
the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions,
which are not anymore derived from his position as
CSC Chairman. Also, he will receive per diem, a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the
concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the prescription set by the
Constitution.
25. The Constitution does not prohibit service contracts
or joint explorations of our natural resources with
foreign nationals or companies. (Article XII, Section
2)
26. A person questioned by the police or MMDA
enforcer for traffic violation on the roadside is not
considered to be under custodial investigation.
Detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. In this respect,
the questioning as an incident to an ordinary traffic
stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that questioning
will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. Treatment of this sort cannot be
characterized as the functional equivalent of a
formal arrest.
27. The President cannot choose to award the status of
National Artist to persons not nominated by the
NCCA and CCP. Under the law, the discretion of the
President in the matter in the matter of the Order of
National artist is confined to the names submitted to
him/her by the NCAA and the CCP Boards. This
means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any
person not considered and recommended by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. The President’s discretion
on the matter does not extend to removing a legal
impediment or overriding a legal restriction.
28. PDAF is not Constitutional. It is unconstitional for
Congress to allocate funds unto themselves and
participate in its implementation and disbursement.
29. The clustering system of the nominees is
unconstitutional as it impinges upon the chances for
appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1)
the President’s option for every vacancy is limited to
the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2)
once the President has appointed from one cluster,
then he is proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without
legal basis and in contravention of the President’s
appointing power. The power to recommend of the
JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s
power to appoint as the latte’s prerogative to
choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount.
30. A congressman convicted of rape may not be
allowed to attend session in Congress pending his
appeal. To allow accused-appellant to attend
legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified
broadening of the privilege from arrest bestowed by
the Constitution upon members of Congress.
31. While the law creating the CA can be amended or
repealed by Congress, it cannot remove or shorten
the tenure of incumbent Justices of the CA or
transfer its workload and duties to the SC or any
other court without the advice and concurrence of
the SC. The jurisdiction of the SC may not be reduced
by the Congress. Neither may it be increased without
the advice and concurrence of the SC.
32. It is extremely difficult to conceptualize how an
office conceived and created by the Constitution to
 be independent- as the CHR- and vested with the
delicate and vital functions of investigating violations
of human rights pinpointing responsibility and
recommending sanctions as well as remedial
measures therefore, can truly function with
independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in
office of its Chairman and Members is made
dependent on the pleasure of the President.
33. It is not okay for a senator to criticize the SC in a
privilege speech. The Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language definitely tended to denigrate
the institution. It is imperative on the Court’s part to
re-instil in the Senator her duty to respect courts of
justice, especially the SC , and remind her anew that
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the people’s representatives, to perform
the functions of their office without fear of being
made responsible before courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.
34. In Question Hour, Congress’ oversight function is
limited to information gathering- attendance of
executive officials is subject to the president’s
consent. The heads of the departments may upon
their own initiative with consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of
each house shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. In Legislative Investigation, it is
plenary and the objective is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation. The president cannot
prohibit the attendance of witnesses.
35. The President exercises only one kind of appointing
power. There is no need to differentiate the exercise
of the President’s appointing power outside, just
before, or during the appointment ban. The
Constitution allows the President to exercise the
power of appointment during the period not
covered by the appointment ban, and disallows the
President from exercising the power of appointment
during the period covered by the appointment ban.
So even if the appointment was accepted after the
ban, it is still void.
36. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to
convene in joint session except to vote jointly to
revoke the President’s declaration or suspension. By
the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote
jointly to revoke the President’s proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. It is worthy to stress that the
provision does not actually refer to a joint session.
The requirement of voting jointly explicitly applies
only to the situation when the Congress revokes the
President’s proclamation of martial law.
37. The 5-year service policy for First Level judges does
not violate the equal protection clause.
Consideration of experience by the JBC as one factor
in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause.
The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The
number of years of service provides a relevant basis
to determine proven competence which may be
measured by experience, among other factors. The
difference in treatment between lower court judges
who have served at least five years and those who
have served less than five years, is based on
substantial distinction.
38. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which
the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or administrative investigation.
39. The Philippine National Red Cross, although not a
GOCC, is sui generis in character, thus requiring the
SC to approach controversies involving the PNRC on
a case-to-case basis. The CSC has jurisdiction over
the PNRC because the issue at hand is the
enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, thus,
the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC and as such, it is
within the ambit of RA 6713.
40. Congress cannot issue a subpoena to compel
attendance of Justices of the CA in its investigation in
aid of legislation and cite them in contempt should
they refuse to appear. Congressional powers cannot
be used to deprive the SC of its Constitutional duty
to supervise judges of lower courts in the
performance of their official duties. The fact remains
that the CA Justices are non-impeachable officers. As
such, authority over them primarily belongs to the
SC and to no other.
41. A precautionary hold departure is an order in writing
issued by a court commanding the Bureau of
Immigration to prevent any attempt by a person
suspected of a crime to depart from the Philippines,
 which shall be issued ex-parte in cases involving
crimes where the minimum of the penalty
prescribed by law is at least 6 years and one day or
when the offender is a foreigner regardless of the
imposable penalty.
42. Custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is under
investigation in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed. Rights during
custodial investigation apply only against testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined which is purely a
mechanical act.
43. Miranda rights are not available during: police line-
up, unless admissions or confessions are being
elicited from the suspect; During administrative
investigations; Confessions made by an accused at
the time he voluntarily surrendered to the police or
outside the context of a formal investigation; and
Statements made to a private person.
44. Live TV coverage may be prohibited since the right of
the accused must prevail over the right of the public
to information and freedom of the press. Public trial
is not synonymous with publicized trial.
45. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments,
and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting”
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
46. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary to
accommodate institutional needs and objectives of
prison facilities, primarily internal security. But if the
letters are marked confidential communication
between detainee and lawyer, the officer must not
read them but only inspect them in the presence of
detainees.
47. Pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting
adults who have no impediment to marry each
other, and, consequently conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular
view or morality, does not amount to a disgraceful
or immoral conduct. There is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual
conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons; that neither does
such situation contravene any fundamental state
policy enshrined in the Constitution.
48. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party
and a corporation would have no such ground for
relief.
49. In order to give life to the constitutional right of
freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a reorganization
of the reality that some governmental measures may
not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair
the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.
50. In the case of Montano vs. Ocampo, the accused is
charged with multiple murder and frustrated
murders but was granted bail because the possibility
of escape in this case, bearing in mind the
defendant’s official and social standing and his other
personal circumstances, seems remote if not nil.
Besides, to deny bail is not enough that the evidence
is strong; it must also appeal that in case of
conviction the defendant’s criminal liability would
probably call for a capital punishment.
51. The right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection
of human right. The presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the PH should see to it that the
right of liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or he from filing a motion
for bail , a right to due process under the
Constitution.
52. The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of one individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
53. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to
life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly rendered a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.
54. Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security has been
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
55. If the accused is a minor with imposable penalty for
the crime charged is reclusion perpetua, bail would
be a matter of right. Under Article 68 of the RPC,
when the offender is a minor under r18 years of age,
he is entitled to a penalty depending on his age,
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the crime committed. The Constitution
withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is
accused of a capital offense where the evidence of
guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who
faces a probable death sentence has a particularly
strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold
where the accused has been established without
objection to be a minor who by law cannot be
sentenced to death.
56. Assuming that evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall
be denied as the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority is not available for violation of special
laws penalized by life imprisonment.
57. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances has been defined by the Court as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate
or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such person outside the protection of law.
58. The privilege of writ of Amparo is a remedy available
ONLY to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual.