The discourse of humanitarian action and localization in the

Philippines

Maria Alexandra Pura

Paper for Master of Applied Sociology and Anthropology Course

Ateneo de Manila University

Philippines

I. Introduction

“Human suffering from the impacts of armed conflicts and disasters has reached

staggering levels. Nearly 60 million people, half of them children, have been forced

from their homes due to conflict and violence. The human and economic cost of

disasters caused by natural hazards is also escalating. In the last 2 decades, 218

million people each year were affected by disasters; at an annual cost to the global

economy that now exceeds $300 billion.”

- from Restoring Humanity: Global Voices calling for action. Synthesis of the

Consultation Process for the World Humanitarian Summit

Alongside this global picture, the Philippines has one of the highest exposures to natural

hazards in the world and widely recognized that global climate change is exacerbating

the natural hazards that threaten the country. The 2015 World Risk Index reports that

1
the Philippines ranks 3rd among the countries most prone to calamities. In 2016 alone,

natural hazards and disaster events affected more than 10 million people.1 The country

is placed under “extreme risk” to impacts of climate change over the next 30 years. 2

The impacts are expected to be more severe, with sea level rise, more intense rainfall

events (thus more floods and landslides), longer dry spells and stronger moonsoon

rainfall variability. This will have important implications for water resources, agriculture,

forestry, coastal areas, public health and human settlement.

The State of the Humanitarian System report in 2015 highlighted that despite the huge

improvements in financing, institutional machinery and coordination, the current set up

is at the “wrong scale and lacks both the capacity and the agility to meet the multiple

demands that have been placed upon it in many crises, while often being hamstrung by

external political forces.” As a result, globally, too many populations in need of

humanitarian assistance remain unreached or under-served.

One of the key actions that came out from the First World Humanitarian Summit in May

2016 was the new paradigm of localizing humanitarian action. This is a shift in

emphasis towards the important role that national actors play in humanitarian response

and linked to a concern that members of the international humanitarian system could do

far more to help national humanitarian action.

1
Philippines: 2016 Highlights of Displacement and Effects Snapshot, OCHA, 2017.
2
Verisk Maplecroft Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), 2014.
2
Two years after the first World Humanitarian Summit, despite formal international

commitments and the good intentions of many, post-disaster evaluations, research

reports and anecdotes consistently highlight the little space that local actors are

afforded by the international community as it carries out humanitarian operations. As

one recent report put it: “The reality is that efforts to work with national and local actors

do not play a central role in the majority of international humanitarian work” (Missed

Opportunities, Ramalingam, Gray and Cerruti, 2013).

This is perhaps most starkly illustrated in the area of humanitarian financing. Cited in a

report by Wall and Hedlund (p9,2016) Els and Carstensen noted in 2015 that “the

available data on humanitarian funding shows that funding directly from the largest

donors does privilege a few large international agencies over other international

agencies – and to an extreme degree over local and national actors.” Local

organizations only receive around 1.6% of overall first level humanitarian funding

available to NGOs and even this percentage is actually decreasing. According to the

Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2015 (p6), local organizations accessed US$49

million of global humanitarian assistance in 2013, a decrease of US$2 million from

2012.

While transnational discussions are happening around humanitarian emergencies at the

global level, in the Philippines there are also discussions happening triggered by year-

on-year disasters. A series of big disasters in the last decade (e.g., Typhoon

Ketsana/Ondoy in 2009, Supertyphoon Bopha/Pablo in 2012 and Supertyphoon

3
Haiyan/Yolanda in 2013, among others, including earthquake and conflict induced

displacements) were wake up calls to civil society organizations (CSOs) or non-

government organizations (NGOs) in the Philippines.

A report, Missed Again: Making Space for Partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan

Response3, cited findings that provide evidence of the enduring imbalance between

international and national humanitarian actors in the Philippines. It mentioned the lack

of communication about how the international humanitarian system is configured and

how it operates and the inequalities in the system that often prioritize the international

over the local.

It is against this backdrop that a project on transforming humanitarian surge capacity

was implemented from 2015-2018. The project has seen collaborative engagement by

eleven UK-based aid agencies with a collective focus on finding ways to ensure

effective civil society surge capacity in order to deliver more efficient, collaborative and

localised emergency responses to today’s crises.4 The experience of implementing this

project in the Philippines, albeit internationally conceptualized, has contributed much to

a movement towards local ownership and leadership of humanitarian surge/action. It is

3
This report was commissioned by a consortium of UK-based INGOs: Action Aid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB
and Tearfund and published in September 2014.

4
The Transforming Surge Capacity Project is led by Action Aid with 10 other INGOs. TSCP is part of the Disasters
and Emergencies Preparedness Programme portfolio of projects by the START Network, funded by DFID. This
project is delivered through collaborative platforms in the Philippines, Pakistan and Asia region. Christian Aid’s
Philippines office led the implementation in the Philippines. National stakeholders were involved as the project
was implemented. The project is financed by the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) Disaster
and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP).

4
important to capture and reflect on the discourse of localizing humanitarian action that

underpinned this movement. My role had been to coordinate this collaborative

endeavor and as such have an intimate knowledge and understanding of the journey of

humanitarian actors that engaged in this project.

II. Purpose of the paper

At this juncture, humanitarian actors and the institutions that influence their actions are

looking inwards, in a campaign to be ‘fit for purpose’ and in response to the growing

challenges to the dominant actors. This is a good time to look back on the meanings

and definitions in order to, on a practical level, reorient actions and operations. But

there is a deeper pre-requisite to this re-orientation and it has to do with the socially

constructed international humanitarian system, how this has resulted to an imbalance in

favor of global or international actors, and how can we shift minds to reconstruct a more

balanced and agile system that is able to fulfill its mandate of saving lives and protecting

affected populations.

Thus, the purpose of this reflection paper is to contribute to knowledge and

understanding of the nature of the changes in humanitarian action to accommodate the

clamor for localization and to explore the evolution of the concept and practice of

humanitarian action in the Philippines.

The paper aims to find answers to the following questions:

5
  How did the concept of humanitarianism and practice of humanitarian action

change as a result of the clamor for localization and locally-led humanitarian

action?

 What are the points of contention that are being communicated by which actors

and institutions?

III. Review of related literature

A deeper understanding of the international humanitarian system is needed in order to

critically engage with it. As I look for theories to explain this inertia to change, I explored

norm diffusion and localization, institutionalist frameworks, localization frameworks, and

post-development theory. The inherent imbalance and power dynamics in the

humanitarian sector beg for an analysis of the discourse of humanitarian concepts and

practices. For exigency, I will refer to humanitarian action, humanitarian aid,

humanitarian assistance interchangeably.

Foucault developed the concept of the ‘discursive field’ as part of his attempt to

understand the relationship between language, social institutions, subjectivity and

power. Discursive fields, such as the law or the family, contain a number of competing

and contradictory discourses with varying degrees of power to give meaning to and

organize social institutions and processes. (Pinkus, 1996) The humanitarian sector will

be considered as a discursive field in this paper. The humanitarian sector is a mesh of

social relations and hierarchies that defined what constitutes humanitarian knowledge.
6
This knowledge, through time, has transformed into the humanitarian discourse. The

power of discourse is to “naturalize” such knowledge – composed of values,

conventions, norms and habits – that shapes decisions and creates institutions which

now governs our social lives.

Discourse is defined as “an interrelated set of story lines that interprets the world around

us and becomes deeply embedded in societal institutions, agendas and knowledge

claims. These story lines have a triple mission: to create meaning and validate action,

to mobilize action and to define alternatives.” (Hannigan, p 72) This is a relevant

approach to the study of the humanitarian sector as discourse brings in a discussion of

power: what are defined as meaningful by dominant actors becomes the dominant

paradigm that influences thoughts and actions.

The discursive field of humanitarian action

Using Focault’s line of questioning to analyze the discourse of humanitarianism and

humanitarian action: Why is this being so widely discussed and what has been said

about it? What are the effects of power generated by what was said? Who does the

speaking? From which positions and viewpoints do they speak? What institutions

prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said?

These questions guide this review of literature on humanitarian action as a field with

systems of meanings that produce knowledge and power.

7
Why is this being widely discussed and what is being said about it?

Armed conflicts, epidemics, famine, natural disasters and other major emergencies

almost always lead to a situation where human beings are left in urgent need of life-

saving assistance such as shelter, food, water and health care. This triggers responses

by organizations with the agency or ability to provide assistance, to save lives and

alleviate suffering. This is the classic “crisis-response” mode and referred to generally

as humanitarian action.

With the advent of 24-hour cable news and internet, humanitarian action has entered

our everyday life in a profound way. More and more universities are offering formal

humanitarian courses that was not the case two or three decades ago. The

international humanitarian system is larger than ever comprised of 4,480 aid

organizations clocking a total expenditure of over $25 billion and about 450,000

professional humanitarian aid workers. (SOHS 2015)

The global humanitarian system as we know it was not deliberately engineered. It

evolved from various altruistic endeavors at the local and international levels (ALNAP

2015 p10). The development of global norms around humanitarian action can be

considered an outcome of the contention between different international, transnational

and state actors who agree at some point on the validity of norms and models for

development policies. (Axelrod 1986, cited in Localization of Aid, page 1)

8
The normative institutionalization of humanitarian action by NGOs, governments and in

particular international governmental organizations (IGOs) associated with the UN (e.g.,

WFP, WHO, IOM, etc.) has been a long process which began with the first Geneva

Convention of 1864 (Eberwein 2011, cited by Sezgin and Dijkzeul. 2016, p 25) The

main organizational institutionalization process started at about the same time and

intensified after the end of the Cold War.

Considered to be the 3 pillars of the international humanitarian system are the national

governments, the UN, and the CSOs or NGOs. The appearance of NGOs with public

aims in Western Europe from the mid-18th century on was related to the emergence of

the middle classes and the growth in education and resources which enabled people to

take part in the activities of such organizations, as well as to advances in

communication (roads, trains, shipping, postal services, the telegraph, the press) (Seary

1996, cited by Sezgin and Dijkzeul. 2016, p 25)

It might come as a surprise but a comprehensive and generally accepted legal definition

of “humanitarian action” has never been formulated. The four Geneva conventions and

the additional protocols, which constitute the core of the International Humanitarian Law

(IHL) do not even provide a full definition of the word “humanitarian” (Sezgin and

Dijkzeul. 2016, p5).

Normative institutionalization of humanitarianism amongst NGOs/CSOs is demonstrated

in the Sphere Project. “Sphere is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of

9
humanitarian agencies together around a common aim - to improve the quality of

humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their

constituents, donors and affected populations. The Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian

Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, is one of the most widely

known and internationally recognized sets of common principles and universal minimum

standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response.”

(http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/what-is-sphere/)

The Humanitarian Charter provides the ethical and legal backdrop to principles and

standards contained in the Handbook. It is both a statement of established legal rights

and obligations and a statement of shared belief. It summarises the core legal

principles that protect the welfare of disaster affected populations and attempts to

capture a consensus among humanitarian agencies as to the principles which should

govern the response to disaster or conflict, including the roles and responsibilities of the

various actors involved. It forms the basis of a commitment by humanitarian agencies

that endorse Sphere and an invitation to all those who engage in humanitarian action to

adopt the same principles.

The Humanitarian Charter in summary:

 all people affected by disaster or conflict have a right to receive protection and assistance

to ensure the basic conditions for life with dignity

 the principles described in the Humanitarian Charter are universal, applying to all those

affected by disaster or conflict wherever they may be, and to all those who seek to assist

them or provide for their security

10
 principles are derived from the fundamental moral principle of humanity: that all human

beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Based on this principle, primacy of

the humanitarian imperative is affirmed: that action should be taken to prevent or

alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster or conflict, and that nothing should

override this principle

 humanitarian action is guided by the four core humanitarian principles: humanity (to

prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found), impartiality (to make no

discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions, and to

give priority to the most urgent cases of distress), neutrality (not to take sides in hostilities

or engage in political, racial, religious or ideological controversies…to provide aid without

favouring any side in a conflict or in a dispute), and independence (to maintain autonomy

from donors and to be free from any economic, political or military interests at stake),

 acknowledgement that it is firstly through their own efforts, and through the support of

community and local institutions, that the basic needs of people affected by disaster or

conflict are met

 recognition of the primary role and responsibility of the affected state to provide timely

assistance to those affected, to ensure people’s protection and security and to provide

support for their recovery

 a combination of official and voluntary action is crucial to effective prevention and

response, and in this regard civil society actors have an essential role to play in

supporting public authorities

 where national capacity is insufficient, the wider international community, including

governmental donors and regional organisations, have a role in assisting states to fulfil

their responsibilities

 recognition of the special roles played by the mandated agencies of the United Nations

and the International Committee of the Red Cross

11
  as humanitarian agencies, role is interpreted in relation to the needs and capacities of

affected populations and the responsibilities of their governments

 affected population at the centre of humanitarian action; their active participation is

essential to providing assistance in ways that best meet their needs, including those of

vulnerable and socially excluded people

 support to local efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to disaster, and to the effects

of conflict, and to reinforce the capacities of local actors at all levels

 minimise any negative effects of humanitarian action on the local community or on the

environment

 with respect to armed conflict, recognition that the way in which humanitarian assistance

is provided may potentially render civilians more vulnerable to attack, or may on occasion

bring unintended advantage to one or more of the parties to the conflict;

 act in accordance with the principles of humanitarian action set out in the Charter and

with the specific guidance in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and

Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster

Relief (1994).

What are the effects of power generated by what was said?

The humanitarian discourse has shaped and created meaning systems that have

gained the status and currency of ‘truth’ and dominate how we define and organize our

individual selves as subjects within this discursive field.

It is also instructive to use the lens of institutionalist schools – rational choice,

sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. These schools of thought

12
explain how and why institutions, in this case humanitarian agencies and institutions,

originate, persist and evolve; the role they play in determination of social and political

outcomes; the environment that determines organizational activities and change;

institutions as relatively durable patterns of behaviour; how they affect actions by

structuring expectations about what others will do; and they persist because they

reduce uncertainty and reduce transaction costs of collective action.

Using lens of rational choice institutionalism, humanitarian actors built and sustained the

international humanitarian system to reduce uncertainty, to help reduce transaction

costs of collective action through compliance with rules and norms, decision-making

using a strategic logic of consequences, maximizing individual interests, and being

highly purposive. Actors employ institutionalized scripts for action because those that

‘incorporate societal legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures

maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capacities. This

helps to explain why the humanitarian sector has experienced an increase in donor-

driven standardization in planning, reporting and accountability in the past two decades.

(Sezgin and Dijkzeul, p10).

Sociological institutionalism explains that the humanitarian actors in the humanitarian

system has core humanitarian principles that constitute the basis for the ethic of

traditional humanitarian action, providing a moral code of appropriate or exemplary

behaviour for humanitarians. This ethic is a form of the “logic of appropriateness” which

thus has overtones of morality. (Sezgin and Dijkzeul, p11) This is reflected in the

codified principles and rules of action in the Sphere Project, particularly the reference to

13
“humanity” as a fundamental moral principle and subsequently, the exhortation to follow

the “humanitarian imperative”.

Historical institutionalism stresses path dependence and critical junctures where

institutions determine choices, worldviews and interpretations. Once an organization

has chosen a path (a way of solving a problem), it tends to stick to this path both

formally (relying on rules) and informally (relying on practice). (Reinalda 2013; 16; TNH

page 11). While international humanitarian institutions and actors have changed quite

significantly over time, there has been a growing concentration process in the

emergency relief sector, with fewer actors providing an increasingly large share of the

service delivery. By 2012, between two-thirds and three quarters of all recorded

humanitarian assistance is provided through the UN system, ICRC and a cartel of 5

consortia of transnational NGOs – World Vision, CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children and

MSF. (Donini, 2012, p187; TNH, p36).

Who does the speaking? From which positions and viewpoints do they speak?

The well-established actors in the humanitarian system consists of the UN agencies

such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World

Food Program, NGOs headquartered in Europe and North America such as OXFAM,

Save the Children and MSF, the Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations, and the

large donors represented in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). ((Sezgin and

14
Dijkzeul, pxix). Together they control the multibillion dollar humanitarian system. Today,

the global norms of humanitarian action are institutionalized: has fundamental values,

has organizing principles, or standardized procedures, that resonate across many

states and global actors, having gained support in multiple forums, including official

policies, laws, treaties or agreement (Wiener, 2009; 183)

But this discursive field of humanitarian action is also dynamic, it is not without

challenges from within by its subjects, especially in a field that is fast paced and whose

core business is to save lives. As the UN announced the first ever World Humanitarian

Summit in 2016, various networks of actors and organizations put forward their

positions ranging from fixing the system to a fundamental reorientation of the system

itself. Consultations with over 23,000 people issued a resounding call to put people

affected by crises at the heart of humanitarian action. The actors were also pushed to

align with global drive for change and push for the global frameworks on disaster risk

reduction, sustainable development, climate change, and urban development. This is a

critique on how humanitarian action has been acting or being treated as stand-alone,

life-saving action, without having to link with work to reduce vulnerabilities and increase

resilience.

15
Those who called for fundamental reorientation are faith-based organizations and

alliances, such as ACT Alliance.5 It invoked the recommendation from the Tsunami

Evaluation Committee towards “fundamental reorientation away from supplying aid to

supporting and facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.” 6

The most talked about change is the localization of international humanitarian action.

What is being said about localization? Who is saying what?

‘Localization’ is used across the humanitarian sector to refer to various things from the

practice of increasing numbers of local staff in international organizations to outsourcing

of aid delivery to local partners, to development of locally specific response models.

The term often also encompasses work that originates with local groups or is in support

of local initiatives. (Wall, 2016)

However, the presence of ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘regional’ actors, both state and civil

society, at the heart of humanitarian response is not new. The idea that states are

entrusted with the core responsibility for their populations in crises is articulated in

General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991; “Strengthening of the coordination of

humanitarian emergency assistance of the UN”.) and numerous international

5
ACT Alliance is a coalition of more than 140 churches and affiliated organizations working together in over 140
countries. Its stated mission is to create positive and sustainable change in the lives of poor and marginalized
people using the extraordinary reach and trust of its network of faith-based and church-based organizations.

6
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Synthesis Report. January 2007, J. Cosgrave

16
frameworks and initiatives, all of which underscore the centrality of national and local

action in humanitarian contexts.

The importance of local actors to humanitarian action has been increasingly recognized

by the humanitarian community, scholars and donors (Ramalingam, Gray and Cerruti,

2013). This cannot simply be explained by their proximity. It is, in part, connected to the

rise of the global risk reduction agenda, which asserts that humanitarian action must be

better linked to building the resilience and preparedness of people, institutions and

places affected by hazards. There is a growing feeling that strengthening the role of

local actors may finally help to redress some of the perennial challenges of

humanitarian aid, such as shrinking access, fragmentation and incoherency in

operations, and the gaps between response, recovery and development.

Despite the increased interest on localization, there is no agreed definition of the term in

the literature (Wall,2016). While repeated recommendations reflect the need for a shift

in humanitarian response, it is unclear what localization actually means (ICVA-ODI)

While a case could be made for common sense understanding and discussion on

localization, the discourse of humanitarian action begs a more thorough questioning and

conceptualization of localization.

In the Oxford dictionary (1976), to localize something is to “invest (it) with the

characteristics of a particular place.”

17
In norm studies, localization is defined as the embedding of global norms in the local

social environment, that brings about a number of challenges, obstacles and conflicts.

“Global norms are often contested, modified, appropriated, rejected or politicized and

discussed by local actors in processes of sense making while being fitted into a specific

local setting” (Appadurai, 1990, 1996; Capie 2008; Chan 2014; McGinty 2011;

Zimmermann 2014).

Amitav Acharya introduced his framework of localization 7 as: “Localizing norms involves

the ‘active construction’ through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection of

foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing congruence with

local beliefs and practices.”

Acharya’s framework for investigating norm diffusion stresses the agency role of

local/domestic actors or agents through a dynamic process called “localization”. Instead

of just assessing fit between international and domestic norms and institutions and

explaining response in simple dichotomy of acceptance and rejection, localization

describes a complex process and outcome by which locals build “congruence” between

transnational norms and local beliefs and practices. In this process, foreign norms

7
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877858 (Page Count: 37)

18
which may not initially cohere with the latter are incorporated into local norms.

(Bonacker, Thorsten, Judith von Heusinger and Kerstin Zimmer. 2017, p240-241)

But going back to the discursive field of humanitarian action, the call for localization

exposed the competing understanding and meanings and the established power

relations within the sector. At the World Humanitarian Summit, calls for “putting people

at the center”, “bottom-up approach”, “shifting power towards locally-led response”,

“greater accountability to disaster affected populations”, “direct funding to local

organizations”, “working with government”, and other calls, reflect the questioning of

what has been thus far a hegemonic control of a few, big actors in humanitarian action –

control over resources, language, what is right, and what is true.

If we go back to the humanitarian charter, most of the calls at the WHS are already

included as principles and commitments. So what is happening has been dissonance

between what is said/stated and what is done. Different interpretations of what

localization means has also led to an ‘appropriation’ of the localization agenda.

IV. Discussion

The inclusion of localization within the humanitarian discourse had a disruptive effect on

the sector. It evoked passion and inspiration but also doubts and trepidation that make

key actors hesitant or even completely avoid jumping into the localization train. The

lack of clarity makes it difficult to understand how localization works, who the key actors
19
are and how local actors engage with international actors. I will now focus on how the

localization agenda has impacted on the discourse of humanitarian action in the

Philippines.

The Transforming Surge Capacity Project (TSCP) responds to this problem: during

times of disaster, even the most well-prepared and resilient communities require

additional resources, beyond what the affected community can cope with alone. Surge

capacity is, and will remain vital, to fulfilling the humanitarian mandate, meeting the

urgent needs of crisis affected people when disasters strike. Eleven international

humanitarian agencies joined the project consortium. 8 Prior to the project, the 11

agencies involved were individually struggling with a number of similar surge-related

challenges. As a result, they decided to combine their efforts into this three-year project,

piloting and building evidence on collaborative and locally-focused approaches to surge.

Included in their collaboration principles is the recognition that each of the agencies are

working individually to try to improve surge capacity, but will aim to work together to

reduce duplication and pool resources to tackle some of the shared challenges in this

area.

The organizations generally agreed with People in Aid’s 2007 definition of surge

capacity – “In the humanitarian context surge capacity can be defined as the “ability of

an organization to rapidly and effectively increase [the sum of] its available resources in

8
Action Aid (lead agency overall and lead in Pakistan), Action Against Hunger, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid (lead in
the Philippines), International Medical Corps, Islamic Relief Worlwide, Muslim Aid, Plan International (lead in Asia
region), Save the Children, and Tearfund.

20
a specific geographic location” in order to meet increased demand to stabilize or

alleviate suffering in any given population”. It is about having the right people,

processes, mechanisms and resources in place to allow the organization to go from one

level of response to another level very quickly.

To address the challenges faced by the humanitarian system in getting the right people

to the right place at the right time, the project envisaged the following outcomes:

 increase in the number of suitably trained, better prepared humanitarian

personnel available at national/regional levels;

 pooled, well prepared human resources are deployed more efficiently and where

needed most at more ‘localized’ levels;

 develop more effective, financially viable models for improved coordination and

collaboration;

 propose different models for surge based on evidence and proof of concept to

scale up across the sector.

And if we can bring about these changes and so develop replicable, evidence-based

surge systems models that are effective at the international, regional and national level,

then this more effective, collaborative, and localized surge capacity will enable the

sector to respond to emergencies more quickly and efficiently.

TSCP was implemented in the Philippines from 2015 to 2018, led by Christian Aid’s

Philippines office. The project team set up and convened a national platform for surge,
21
contributed to the development of a surge training package and implemented training

activities, developed a collaborative roster of local humanitarian responders, piloted

local coordination mechanisms and local humanitarian fundraising.

The most significant aspect of the project is the national platform, which was intended to

be a platform where agencies can collectively discuss problems and issues around

surge and find solutions. Going by observations on dynamics between international and

national NGOs, there are bilateral, contractual relationships, but it was evident that

there has never been an opportunity, or space or platform, where international and

national NGOs come together to discuss. Christian Aid, as lead agency, deliberately

invited national NGO/CSO networks to join the national platform.9

Foucault’s notion of power is that it can be destructive but it can also be productive.

Engagement between international and national actors within the national platform

creates meanings, symbols and forms subjects and identities. All actors want to do

good work but the dominant humanitarian discourse produces unequal relationships -

marginalizes certain actors and stifles their voices, in this case, local and national

NGOs.

TSCP was designed to be responsive to what local actors are saying at the country

level. While a big portion of the funding was already allocated to fixed budget items,

there was a sizeable fund for piloting. This was then used to explore what the national

9
The four national NGO networks referred to are: Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE NGO),
Humanitarian Response Consortium (HRC), CBCP-NASSA-Caritas Philippines (NASSA), National Council of Churches
in the Philippines (NCCP)

22
NGOs said were crucial elements for localized and collaborative surge. The challenge

is to adjust the design of the project based on the country context and analysis and at

the same time remain consistent to the overall frame or goal of localized, collaborative

and better engaged surge. Consortium partners allowed the Project Team to negotiate

targets and explore other strategies based on the country context and analysis shaped

and guided by consultations and dialogues with stakeholders throughout the project

implementation. This openness allowed the Project to experiment on strategies and in

the process debunked initial project assumptions which led to enhanced project results.

The openness of the INGO consortium members to engage the participation of national

NGOs in the national platform played a decisive role and created a significant impact on

the way the Project has defined and implemented its activities and outputs. It allowed

for greater voice for dialogue and discourse. A shared decision-making process

between the Consortium Members and NGO networks was also crucial, strengthening

overall accountability among stakeholders and contributing to improving the Project’s

responsiveness to the needs and priorities of national and local stakeholders.

Fully committed and involved NGO networks was crucial. The initiative of national NGO

networks has played an important role in setting up collaborative platforms. The NGO

networks were willing to commit time to push for the creation and strengthening of the

collaborative mechanisms both at the national and local levels and to participate actively

in them. From the get go, the national NGOs challenged the project’s theory of change

by putting forward their own ideas and reflections, based on their humanitarian

response experiences and their knowledge of the context.

23
What are the points of contention on localization that are being communicated by which

actors and institutions?

The key points of contention are leadership, voice, capacity and resources, specifically

financial resources. These are considered to be the at the root of the call for

localization. For the national NGOs, “localization” is an inadequate agenda. The more

crucial agenda is for locally-led humanitarian action. In the first workshop of the

national NGOs facilitated through the TSCP, they came up with a paper that outlined

their perspective about the role of local/national NGOs in humanitarian action more

broadly.

“Since the ‘70s, the national/local NGOs or the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 10 in

general, have been engaged in humanitarian work in responding to big disaster events

such as the great flooding in Central Luzon, recurring typhoons in Southern Luzon and

the Visayas, north Luzon earthquake, the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, conflict in Mindanao

among others. The CSOs in the forefront of these responses with funding support from

INGOs, are proof of existing national and local capacity. Networks of development

NGOs, religious groups, business, people’s organizations and the Red Cross with

presence in various regions have their respective pool of human resources with serves

as local surge capacity within their networks. Note that up to 2000, support was funding

10Civil Society organizations (CSOs) are non-state actors that include non-government organizations, professional associations,
foundations, independent research institutes, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, people’s
organizations, social movements and labor unions.
24
only with design, management and implementation done by the local NGO. From 2000

onwards, the relationship changed to the current subcontracting mode of working which

forms most of the current partnerships.”11

The statement above builds on history of humanitarianism in the Philippines. In the

1980s a national network of relief and rehabilitation NGOs developed and promoted an

approach called “citizenry-based and development-oriented disaster response” (CBDO-

DR). This was a response to the Marcos government’s neglect of the situation and

needs of the survivors after a string of disasters hit the country: collapse of the Negros

sugar industry affecting about 1 million workers and members of their family 12, six

typhoons in 1983 that displaced 280,000 families and damaged properties and

livelihoods, eruption of Mt Mayon on top of an economic crisis. CBDO-DR linked the

short-term effect of disasters to long-term poverty and development issues that resulted

to vulnerability of the poor, their lack of capacity to cope with disasters. A network of

disaster response agencies was formed based on this – the Citizens’ Disaster

Response Network. Apart from this, church-based groups from different denominations

and religious orders were also actively responding to emergencies. (de Dios, p 12)

11Building on the Strengths of Philippine Civil Society Organizations in Responding to Emergencies; paper drafted by four
CSO/NGO networks for discussion within the Transforming Surge Capacity - National Platform for Surge, January 2016 (CODE
NGO, HRC, NASSA and NCCP)

12
https://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/1985/09/11/ucan-special-report-whats-behind-the-
negros-famine-crisis&post_id=33345

25
The national NGOs articulated their interpretation of localization. First responders are

those closest to affected population, meaning local organizations and institutions. Any

organization not based ‘on the ground’ needs to invest in building relationships before a

disaster. And invoking the principle of complementarity, all outside NGOs – whether

international or national - need to add value to local response.

By 2017, a group of 6 Start Network members met to discuss the future beyond the

project which ends in 2018. The meeting note included this statement: “It is important…

that initiatives going forward are located within a clear vision, as opposed to being

mainly project-driven. If, being true to the Start Network mandate, we consider this

vision one of transformation, then we have to articulate the nature and direction of

transformation. For our national partners, ‘localization’ has been the often-expressed

nature of transformation. This too has to be unpacked in terms of the changes that are

required in identity (who is national/local, who is not?), roles, access to resources, and

behaviors and practices (how do we collaborate in a competitive environment?) – and

these changes are required not just at the level of INGOs, but also for national/local

NGOs. More importantly, the leadership and investment in clarifying the vision for

localization must emanate from national/local NGOs themselves.”

As the project provided a platform for discussions on surge, we recognized differences

in defining surge capacity between the international NGOs and the national NGOs.

INGOs with more resources and with systems in place adhere to the classic surge

definition - scaling up (and down) of existing humanitarian systems (human resources,

26
money, materials). Most of the INGOs also organize their humanitarian systems around

response sectors (e.g., water, sanitation and hygiene, emergency food security and

livelihoods, health, education, shelter, protection, etc.) This banks on years, even

decades, of investment in their institutional capacity as well as membership in UN

organized clusters.

For national actors, surge capacity is integrating humanitarian operations within their

development work. For them, development and humanitarian are linked closely. It is not

only ‘scaling up’ but ‘scaling up and out’, which means reaching out to other groups on

the ground and with other actors. This can be understood in a context where there are

quite a number of organized citizen groups: cooperatives, support NGOs for specific

sectors, sectoral organizations (e.g., farmers, fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, women,

children, persons with disabilities, elderly, migrant workers, labor, etc.), faith-based

organizations, foundations, self-help groups, socio-civic organizations, among others.

This is a strength of civil society in the Philippines and a good foundation for effective

humanitarian response because these groups are spread out and are embedded in

communities.

In a research conducted by the People’s Disaster Risk Reduction Network in 2017,

national and local NGOs capacity for political and power analysis facilitated

humanitarian assistance that avoided compounding the pre-existing power inequalities

in disaster affected communities they were assisting, e.g., local politicians using relief

for political mileage, patronage, disempowered women and men. Having a strong

27
development orientation enabled the implementing NGOs to enhance connectedness of

of response to recovery and long-term development. (De Dios, 2017)

National NGOs’ description of surge is that it “should be people-centered, responsive to

the needs and priorities of disaster-affected population, led by capable responders

closest to the disaster affected population; it should be collaborative or finds

complementarity with other actors, especially local government and national

government.”13

Indeed, by year three of the project (2017), participating agencies felt that the definition

of surge capacity should be adapted to be less organization-centric and to incorporate

localization and collaboration as key enablers for surge, as follows:

“Surge capacity is the ability of organizations, communities and individuals in crisis to

rapidly and effectively respond to the needs of affected populations through improved

local preparedness, collaborative effort and the scaling up and down of responses.” 14

The element of surge that the Transforming Surge Capacity Project focused on, as

designed, was on pooled or shared, suitably trained and well-prepared human resource

for surge at local levels.

13Building on the Strengths of Philippine Civil Society Organizations in Responding to Emergencies; paper drafted by four
CSO/NGO networks for discussion within the Transforming Surge Capacity - National Platform for Surge, January 2016 (CODE
NGO, HRC, NASSA and NCCP)

14
From The Future of Humanitarian Surge: Learning from the Transforming Surge Capacity Project, 2015-2018
28
Dialogues and consultations amongst national and local NGOs, though, surfaced

elements that they consider more crucial, consistent with their advocacy for locally-led

humanitarian surge and humanitarian action more broadly. They went so far as to say

that the national platform should not just be a means to increase the number of skilled

persons readily available for implementation, but must include: clear terms of

coordination and collaboration equalize the power relationship; human rights based

implementation, recognizing the role of government as duty bearer, and implementation

guided by humanitarian principles and standards; clarification of the roles of INGOs -

moving away from direct implementation to resource and capacity mobilization, and

local NGO's as designers, managers and implementers of effective response; direct

access to funds by national/local NGOs for rapid assessment and response; donors to

recognize national/local NGOs leadership role; locus of change - municipal and

community levels as the primary locus of change during recovery.

International NGOs were concerned with capacity. As the dominant subjects within the

humanitarian discursive field, their story lines are around universally accepted

standards of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality and that the humanitarian imperative

banks on who is best placed to provide assistance. As mentioned, the Humanitarian

Charter and Sphere standards are the norms. The national and local NGOs’ story lines

are around the power of context – language, shared values, shared vision with affected

populations - and the ability to work and engage with local governments and institutions.

29
But the latter are not gainsaying the humanitarian standards that INGOs are speaking

about.

“The long years of experience in responding to emergencies by national/local NGOs

has developed local capacities. This experience needs to be consolidated and then

strengthened to be more responsive to disaster affected communities and population.

Local/National NGO's must also step up. The national platform will have to actively

participate in all of the humanitarian response structures, such as clusters. It must also

promote working to accepted standards and advocate amongst themselves and

international partners that Humanitarian Response is led by government, with support

from outside agencies as needed, ie. when they are unable or unwilling to cope with

and meet the needs of affected populations.”15

National NGOs were also aware of the issues and problems that has plagued and

weakened NNGO-INGO collaboration - weak coordination, lack of common voice,

limited human resources and capacities, working in silos and mistrust of INGOs.

International NGOs for their part, recognized the need to get their acts together to

address issues raised by national NGOs, thus providing the space for discussion to

formulate and test viable solutions.

15
Building on the Strengths of Philippine Civil Society Organizations in Responding to Emergencies; paper drafted by four
CSO/NGO networks for discussion within the Transforming Surge Capacity - National Platform for Surge, January 2016 (CODE
NGO, HRC, NASSA and NCCP)

30
The national NGOs were also aware about capacity gaps within their ranks. CODE

NGO, one of the national NGO networks engaged in TSCP, surveyed the surge

capacity of its existing regional disaster risk reduction coordination hubs. This

generated response from 92 CSOs/NGOs coming from eight regions that were affected

by Haiyan. Majority of the respondents are engaged with their respective local

government units (LGUs) in various ways: as members of the local development

councils, disaster risk reduction and management councils, local poverty reduction

action teams, local school boards, and others.

The respondents to the survey understand surge to be ‘capacity to respond to

emergencies’ that involve communication protocols, coordination, staff development,

rapid damage and needs assessment, clear roles and responsibilities of staff during a

response. Majority of the respondents said that they are engaged in emergency

response in the following ways: distribution of food and non-food items, shelter

assistance – distribution of shelter repair kits and construction of temporary or transition

shelters, psychosocial support, water, sanitation and hygiene, communication, camp

coordination and management, medical/health care, cash transfers and search and

rescue. Despite their engagement as mentioned above, two-thirds of the respondents

said that their emergency response is ad hoc while the rest said that emergency

response is part of their program. A big number, 39%, said that their response work

goes beyond relief, but continue through to recovery and rehabilitation. 80% said they

respond to only 1 or 2 municipalities within a province, or to several barangays within a

municipality, where they have presence. Few have responded to emergencies outside

31
of their province. Consistent with NGOs/CSOs engagement with LGUs in development

and good governance, 96% of the respondents said they partner with government and

other agencies - mainly CSO networks, INGOs, church, universities, business sector,

and UN. Some partnerships with local governments are formalized via MOUs.

Based on the survey, CODE NGO’s analysis is that a big challenge, despite the

enactment of the DRRM law in 2010, is that majority of local governments and

communities have very low capacity for disaster preparedness. Local governments

have inadequate DRRM plans, DRRM committees are not functional, lack of trained

people on emergency response, such that instead of gap filling or providing support only

to government as duty bearer, the NGOs/CSOs are actually doing the main response.

The more serious implication of this is going to be lack of immediate assistance to

affected populations after impact. The survey also pointed to the challenge of dealing

with local governments compounded by differences in targeting for distribution and lack

of good quality information about their constituents.

In summary, NGO capacity to respond is challenged by: 1) lack of adequate

transportation to access geographically isolated areas and islands; 2) lack of safety

equipment; 3) inadequate communications equipment; 4) inadequate security plan

related to criminal elements who take advantage of the disaster situation; 5) few CSOs

have earmarked funds for emergency response, even for the conduct of rapid

assessments; and, 6) managing funds - monitoring and reporting of spends.

32
The abovementioned challenges are already being addressed by the national and local

NGOs/CSOs with support from various donors, especially post Haiyan. What is

important to emphasize is that national/local CSOs are aware and cognizant of their

capacity issues, including that of LGUs, and this has become part of their local and

national advocacy for government to invest in disaster risk reduction and climate

change adaptation

Without capable and viable local institutions, there is little that can be done to reduce

disaster risk or to build resilience. Recognizing the need to invest in organizational

capacity building, the TSC Project supplemented the surge training with training on

Core Humanitarian Standard and Humanitarian 101 for local CSOs/NGOs.

The shift to organizational level capacity development stems from the Project’s

acknowledgement of the need to develop organization’s internal capacities so that it can

respond to disasters and provide life-saving assistance. This was also in keeping with

the lessons learned by Consortium Members’ various initiatives such as that of Oxfam’s,

CARE’s, and Christian Aid that emphasized the value and long-term benefits of building

organizational capacity for emergency response.

What do the actors – international and national/local – are saying about the values

being invoked by proponents of localization? i.e., community at the center, solidarity,

partnership, role of government, expertise

33
The national NGO networks conducted humanitarian coordination meetings at the

regional level – one in Western Visayas and another in the Autonomous Region of

Muslim Mindanao - which aimed to ensure that their constituents and networks at the

local level are informed and inspired by the ongoing initiatives at the national level.

These simulations were attended not only by the members of these NGO networks but

also by representatives from the local government units, academe, churches, and other

CSO networks in the area. Interesting points were raised and there were reflections on

the values that drive local humanitarian action.

Building social capital

To localize surge, local organizations present in the local communities should be

engaged. The simulations highlighted the presence and active involvement of the local

civil society organizations in humanitarian response. The NGOs, peoples’ organizations,

churches, and local government staff present in the activity have in one way or another

previously partnered with each other in extending help to the affected communities.

The activity provided venue for these organizations to get to know each other: their

mandates, core values and various programs and expertise. Their biggest strength lies

in their direct connection with communities and this is where collaboration/coordination

with each other would ensure that the people who need help most would be reached.

The power of context

34
Localization also means defining humanitarian work based on the local peoples’ own

language, culture, and analysis of the situation. In one of the activities, the local

organizations defined “surge” and “resilience” in the vernacular and in the process

discovered that these humanitarian terminologies are part of their own local language,

and are not new to them. They also collectively discussed the local situation, the

dynamics among the institutions, and came up with appropriate partnership models

based on their local context/scenarios. They also identified mechanisms that would

work based on history and culture, that non-locals would not be aware of. The way the

local organizations navigate the dynamics in the local level would help maximize the

potential of every actor and lessen friction/misunderstanding that might spring up and

would cause further harm to the community.

Shared vision

The localization of humanitarian coordination activity enabled the members of the four

national networks to come up with their shared vision of resilient community. By

maximizing the existence of local knowledge and capacities, while organizing the

various expertise of different local humanitarian stakeholders towards a common goal,

they saw the huge potential of creating greater impact to the communities on the

ground. Shared vision with disaster-affected people, which means not just surviving

from the crisis but looking at long-term recovery –building resilience.

Bayanihan (communal unity)

35
One characteristic of the local communities that was highlighted during the localizing

humanitarian coordination activities is the strong bayanihan or communal unity. At the

national level, it took a while to build trust among the four NGO networks because they

needed to understand the mandate, programs, how and when to work together. But at

the local level, the organizations had much more appreciation of the need to collaborate

as they are working in the same geographic areas, they share the local language, have

shared history, and know that they would need each other during emergencies.

In Western Visayas, the participants to the coordination meeting talked about

humanitarian assistance in Hiligaynon language. They came up with the concepts of

“tabang” (help from the outside) and “bulig” (mutual help/collective response). In the

context of surge, tabang is rapid response from outside as communities are reeling from

immediate impact of a disaster. Bulig refers to actions that are mutual and collective in

nature. The participants said that humanitarian assistance consists of these two

concepts – rapid response and collective response or mutual assistance. This

illustrates how the locals exercise agency in the face of disasters and emergencies.

Bayanihan is a core value that is embedded into the ways of working of national and

local NGOs and CSOs. ‘Community organizing’ or CO is a key approach that most

development workers use starting from the 1970s during the turbulent phase of martial

law through to rebuilding democratic institutions post martial law. It is an approach that

Philippine NGOs are known for. During the Haiyan response, many NGOs adapted CO

to fit the emergency situation.

36
One such experience worth noting is that of Likhaan Center for Women’s Health.16

“We sent a team of 12 veteran community organizers to Eastern Samar to provide

immediate support in community rebuilding, on health concerns, as well as to find out

what could be done under the circumstances, in terms of practical gender needs and long

term strategic needs…We provided relief from the vantage point of health; health is the

first thing we need to address. We provided medicine for the common cold and cough.

We also provided contraceptives because many of the health units ran out of

contraceptives. We distributed gas lamps and radios which were appreciated by the

women. When they turned the radio on they said it was the first time they were connected

withthe rest of the world since Yolanda. We also sent books. What they loved and still

use up to now is the book “Where Women Have No Doctor.” It is a health book for

grassroots leaders. We sent toys. We sent vegetable seeds. We also provided emotional

and mental health help. The organizers’ first task was to undertake situational needs

analysis. They went around the areas. They talked to the municipal and barangay

leaders, social welfare officers, rural health unit doctors and health service providers,

police officers, municipal agriculturists, and others involved in community development.

After the situational analysis was planning the action. They identified community

education sessions as critical in a disaster context. They discussed disaster and gender -

what are the specific needs of women given the disaster context; what are the capacities

that women can harness; how they can prepare themselves, prevent disaster. The

community sessions also touched on reproductive health, violence against women,

organizing collective action.

We are community health workers. Our community organizers went to Eastern Samar to

respond to the primary health needs, treat infections, deal with injuries, etc. A very

16Likhaan Center for Women’s Health is a non-government organization engaged in providing direct health care services to
women in marginalized communities. It advocates for universal access to high-quality health care, including provision of
contraception, and for programs that reduce maternal mortality and unsafe abortion in the Philippines.

37
important learning for us was that the women and children we were supporting in the

communities were traumatized…Our health workers developed a module on debriefing to

be part of the sessions.

We wanted women to develop partnerships with government. We are not always happy

with government; we have a lot of critique. But wherever we are, in the cities or in the

rural areas, we have to make sure that our governments work for us. If government was

not responsive before, then perhaps women could take action about it.

We focused on four things: to provide physical and psychological relief; to establish

rapport with the communities; to organize the communities for social transformation; to

build and strengthen the linkage between the communities and the local agencies. Our

approach is different, we did not bring a lot of relief goods/items, but what we had was

time for them: time to understand, to help them deal with stress and boost their morale.

We established rapport through our work in addressing the practical safety needs. There

were also reports of violence against women before and after the disaster. It was a good

thing the police were there, listening to the women.

The bulk of our work is organizing towards building women’s inner resources and

capacity for a very ambitious goal, that of ‘social transformation’. The disaster situation is

not just an event that could multiply whatever inequalities that existed before. It could,

hopefully, be a vehicle also for transforming relationships that could lead to the

development process.

The women described their situation as “the great deprivation”. When we arrived there,

we saw the people who lost their lifeblood: the coconut trees. There was no electricity, no

food. They said they only have sardines for food. And because they were so dependent

on the relief, the tendency was to treat them as passive recipients. It is really top-down. In

the situation analysis, we found out that all the agencies there, whether national and
38
international, were employing a top-down, dole-out approach. One of the barangay

captains said, “lista ng lista; tinatanong kung ano’ng problema; wala namang bumabalik

sa amin kung anong solusyon nila sa mga pinapalista nila sa amin.” (They always ask us

to make a list of our problems. We just list them down, but nothing comes back to us in

terms of solutions). I think that it is a big violation. If you are there to help, the biggest

mistake that you can do is reinforce the already top-down political situation there.

Some local government officials had a low regard towards the women. They said, “we

are so surprised that the women are not lazy and they are not useless, after all”. There is

an underlying attitude here; a hidden discrimination of women. I think it is good that when

we started to organize women, we are able to surface that kind of attitude existing before

the disaster.

There were very few organized communities in Eastern Samar. I have always heard that

Eastern Samar is a bastion of people power; that they have been organized for quite

some time. There are organized rebel groups belonging to the New Peoples’ Army. And

yet there is no organizing for the practical needs, for survival.

We also discovered conflicts between and amongst the local government officials. Some

had conflictsthat are personal and political. Even these had to be addressed by the

organizers - to bridge the gap.

We had very little relief goods with us and yet they (communities) warmly welcomed the

non-material and organizing support. They say that the one reason we were welcomed

was that we were coming in ‘horizontally’, from the side. The community organizers lived

in the community, with the people. There was no top down or hierarchical relationship

between the organizers and the community people. The LGUs were also supportive. We

received a lot of support from the Mayors and Barangay Captains. Some lent us their
39
tricycles. Some officials accompanied us to the communities and introduced us to the

barangay officials. They also let us use their barangay hall.

In all, 2,517 education sessions were conducted; which may be considered modest in

number. But we were able to organize women in all seven municipalities, reaching 3,

270. Of this number, about 2000 are already women leaders or have potential to be

women leaders. For the women’s spaces, some of them were old barangay halls, some

were lots that the barangay officials provided. The space could be anywhere: it is a

space where you can gather together, you have privacy there, you can talk, you can do

what you want. That to us is a space. It did not have to be a concrete, formal space. It is

a functional space.

Then there are the women’s vegetable garden in all the 42 barangays we organized. We

provided primary health care to over 2,000 patients. 1,000 of these were reproductive

health cases – those who are pregnant, those who needed contraceptives, those who

consulted for suspected sexually transmitted infection. We linked with development

partners. The local government officials are very important to us. We also linked with the

Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Natural

Resources because we are very interested that the women help out in the mangrove

planting along the coast. And then of course we were happy that there were civil society

organizations.

- Dr. Junice Melgar, Executive Director of Likhaan,

presentation at the Women After the Storm Forum, August 2014

40
There are other stories of CO work done by various local organizations. CO is a key

strategy to ensure that the poor and disaster affected women and men are visible in the

different phases of humanitarian action – targeting, identifying needs, provision of

assistance. CO is a way to ensure locally-led response. It strengthens community

cohesion and community structures so that survivors are able to collectively engage

with government and non-government organizations and are able to articulate their

immediate needs and underlying causes of their vulnerability to disasters. (de Dios,

2017)

How did the discourse of humanitarianism and practice of humanitarian action change

as a result of the clamor for localization and locally-led humanitarian action?

A key report out of the experiences of TSCP is the Future of Surge: Learning from the

Transforming Surge Capacity Project 2015-2018. Much of the learning from the

Philippines experiences on localization is included and this is important as the report

contributes to knowledge and inform the humanitarian discourse.

Localised surge - key learning:

 Localised surge contributes to a better ability to identify needs, enhances

contextual understanding, provides a quicker response and is significantly more

cost-effective than alternatives.

 A move towards surge being locally led through collaboration and partnership,

maximises the social value of local and national actors, based on a shared vision

with the disaster affected people.

41
  In order to ensure its effectiveness, localised surge benefits from a collective

approach with tools such as joint rosters, shared services, coordinating and

preparedness mechanisms.

 Localised surge requires all actors to redefine their current roles, with INGOs

playing a more facilitative role while LNGOs and national NGOs (NNGOs) step

up to lead and sustain links with the authorities.

 A residual barrier to increasing and sustaining localised surge models is the lack

of available direct financing for LNGOS and NNGOs.

The TSC Project placed localisation as a central pillar of its work. It has served as a

platform to link international to national and local actors for an exchange of knowledge

and the establishment of concrete initiatives on localisation.

The Future of Surge report also included a case study on localization based on the

Typhoon Nock-ten/Nina surge response.

Nina entered the Philippines on 23 December 2016 and made its first landfall in the

Catanduanes province on 25 December 2016. Maximum sustained winds of 255 km/h it

left a trail of destruction with 2 million people affected. 11 agencies from the project’s

Philippines platform responded to Nock Ten in different ways ranging from water,

sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities, provision of shelter, coordination and

monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The Start Fund provided a grant of GBP 250,000 to

members, a coalition headed by Action Against Hunger and to Catholic Relief Service

(CRS).

Local organisations were either partners with INGOs or led certain aspects of the

response. For example, a gap identified was the lack of formal coordination mechanism
42
 at the local level, amongst provincial and municipal government, NGO and INGOs. As

part of the Humanitarian Resource Consortium, one local organisation, the People’s

Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN), stepped in to provide de-facto coordination

support, initiating coordination meetings, which made collaboration and information

sharing with other groups possible. Another local organisation, Simon of Cyrene was

instrumental in supporting social mobilisation and identifying vulnerable groups in

partnership with Action Against Hunger. In another partnership, CRS worked closely with

the local church network to identify and prioritise the distribution of supplies to the most

affected households. All platform members reported that their response was 100%

carried out in collaboration with others. The response was led by local staff, with only one

global staff member known to have been mobilised. From the project’s Philippines roster,

On Call, three people were mobilised (one WASH and two M&E specialists) to support

the response. Local organisations felt that their involvement was positive in gaining

experience in working in an emergency response and provided them with a “voice” in the

response. But, given their lack of access to funding, organisations found that the

response still maintained LNGOs largely as “service providers”.

Towards the end of the TSCP, a participatory assessment was conducted. In

attendance were representatives from the members of the project consortium and the

national platform. When the participants were asked what could be a most appropriate

title for the story of TSCP as it was implemented and as it impacted on the

stakeholders, they came up with this: “Breaking the walls, the unfinished/continuing

business”. And these are the highlights of the story they told. From the text, one could

‘hear’ the voices of national/local NGOs.

43
 “We champion creating new linkages and collaborations between local, national and

international actors, creating diversity and blending colors of life. A rainbow on the

horizon, creating space for supporting each other on the same humanitarian objectives,

conducting trainings and building capacity of our human resources, testing those learning

and disseminating them more widely. We explore the duty of care and mindfulness while

serving others; changing the minds of decision makers within our organizations and

beyond. We are exploring and occupying new spaces, breaking walls all around,

including localization and representation at national and international levels.”

Presently, national NGOs have 3 seats in the Humanitarian Country Team, the formal

coordination mechanism where the three pillars of the humanitarian system are

represented. This is a big step in recognizing the role and capacity of national and local

actors.

Perhaps the biggest contribution of the project to the humanitarian discourse is the

connections and relationships built amongst humanitarian responders from international

and national organizations – so called the subjects within the discursive field of

humanitarian action. Beyond building capacities, the training that were conducted and

meetings facilitated provided space for people to get to know each other and build

relationships post training/meeting. Shared experiences during the surge training are

further nurtured through connections via social media. The relationships built among

the roster members, most of whom are front-liners, proved helpful during emergency

response as can be seen during the Marawi response. For instance, upon learning that

HRC needed storage facilities for their relief goods and equipment, NCCP immediately

44
offered their assistance and provided space. The camaraderie built during the surge

trainings facilitated better coordination among colleagues who are not only familiar with

each other’s expertise and affiliation but also have established direct lines of

communication.

V. Conclusion

The practices and processes of humanitarian action, as discussed in the early part of

the paper, have created relationships that are unequal – at the international level and

carried over at the national/local level – and this is justified and legitimized within the

current humanitarian discourse.

But as Foucault also said, power can be productive. Looking at the experiences during

the implementation of the TSCP, national/local actors, particularly NGOs/CSOs, are

creating meanings and symbols, as subjects within this humanitarian discourse. As

subjects, they have the power to create their own narratives around the critical themes

of localization - “community at the center”, “bayanihan”, “partnership”, “engaging local

governments”, “context”. These are their ‘truths’. And that is where their power

emanates. Combining their knowledge from experience and their truths as power, this

can influence the discursive field of humanitarian action.

45
In this paper, the role of government is not emphasized, as the focus was on NGOs.

However, discussions within TSCP about government, and perhaps including the

business sector, points to greater potential for more profound transformation of the

humanitarian discourse. The current imbalance between the international and

national/local could be rendered irrelevant or insignificant in the future as states like the

Philippines fully take control of humanitarian action. There are already moves towards

this as the Philippine government develops its mitigation, preparedness and response

framework plans and the creation of government led clusters, including the Philippine

International Humanitarian Assistance Cluster which will coordinate and regulate

international humanitarian assistance. This will be another interesting field for discourse

analysis.

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