of the House bill.
Later the President certified to the urgency of private subdivision and over property owned by respondent
Sec. 22 Appearance of Heads of Departments in Congress
281. Senate v. Ermita- 488 SCRA 1 [2006]\
(Specified who may and who may not be summoned to Section
21 hearings. Under this rule, even a Department Head who is an
alter ego of the President may be summoned. Thus, too, the
Chairman and members of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) are not exempt from summons in
spite of the exemption given to them by President Cory Aquino
during her executive rule. The Court ruled that anyone, except
the President and Justices of the Supreme Court, may be
summoned. Nor may a court prevent a witness from appearing
in such hearing.)
Sec. 23. Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers
Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers
282. SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656 [2004]
286. Alvarez v. Guingona- 292 SCRA 695 [1998]
283. Ampatuan v. Hon. DILG Sec. Puno, GR 190259, June 7, 2011
Sec. 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives
287. Southern Cross Cement v. Phil. Cement, GR 158540, July 8,
284. Guingona v. Carague- 196 SCRA 221 [1991]
(Re automatic appropriation for foreign debt servicing:
Contention of the petitioners: 1) appropriation bill under Section
24 must originate in the HOR and 2) there must be definiteness,
certainty, and exactness in an appropriation
The court said that existing presidential decrees were laws and
not bills still to be enacted into laws. The decrees are complete
by themselves and the exact amount due can be arrived at by
arithmetical computation on the basis of existing records.)
Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose
285. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance- 235 SCRA 630 [1994]
288. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works- 110 PHIL. 331 [1960-
(The meaning of origination from the House and the scope of
the Senate's power to introduce amendments were thoroughly
discussed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance involving R.A.
No. 7716, the Value Added Tax (VAT) law. After the House
version of the bill was sent to the Senate, the Senate introduced
a substitute bill which apparently it had prepared in anticipation
passing the Senate version of the bill. After the two versions had
gone through a Conference Committee, the House approved the
Conference Committee report which for all practical purposes
was the Senate bill. Was there a violation of the rule on
origination?
The constitutional rule is that revenue bills must "originate
exclusively" from the House of Representatives. The Court said
that the exclusivity of the prerogative of the House of
Representatives means simply that the House alone can initiate
the passage of a revenue bill, such that, if the House does not
initiate one, no revenue law will be passed. But once the House
has approved a revenue bill and passed it on to the Senate, the
Senate can completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by
amendment by substitution, and come out with one completely
different from what the House approved. It does not matter
whether the Senate already anticipated a bill from the House
and formulated one to take the place of whatever the House
might send. The Court rejected the idea that the Senate is
bound to retain the essence of what the other House approved.
Textually, it is the "bill" which must exclusively originate from the
House; but the "law" itself which is the product of the total
bicameral legislative process originates not just from the House
but from both Senate and House.)
(A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion
of a municipality into a city, is deemed to have originated from
the house provided that the bill in the Senate even if, iin tgghe
end, the senate approved its own version. Reiterates the VAT
case.)
2004
1961]
(The case is interesting because it may have overtaxed the
requirement of public purpose. At issue was the appropriation of
85,000 pesos for a projected feeder road which ran through a
operator Zulueta. The Court invalidated the appropriation saying
that inasmuch "as the land on which the projected feeder roads
were to be constructed belonged to respondent Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose." The
fact that some five months after the approval of appropriation
the property was donated to the government was found quite
irrelevant to the validity of the appropriation. "The validity of a
statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts
performed, subsequently thereto.")
Sec. 25. Rules on Appropriation
289. DPWH v. Quirino, GR No. 183444, October 12, 2011
290. (par. 5) Goh v. COMELEC GR No. 212584, November 25, 2014
Limits on Power to Appropriate
291. Brillantes v. Comelec, GR 163193, June 15, 2004
Prohibition of Increase
Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills
292. Garcia v. Mata- 65 SCRA [1975]
Provisions unrelated to the appropriation bill are considered
prohibited "riders." Thus, a provision on the reversion of
reserved officers into active duty which was inserted in the
Appropriation Act of 1956- 1957 was found to be unrelated to
any provision in the appropriation act and therefore
unconstitutional. 3 1 9 Even if this specific prohibition did not
exist, however, riders in appropriation bills would still be
prohibited under the general prohibition of riders in Section
26(1) to be discussed below. The rule on riders combined with
the President's power of "itemveto" and the with the doctrine on
"inappropriate provisions" has given to the President
tremendous control over money legislation. This will be treated
below under Section 27.
293. Atitiw v. Zamora, GR 143374, Sept. 30, 2005
294. Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387, Dec. 10, 2003

Transfer of Funds
295. Demetria v. Alba- 148 SCRA 208 [1987]
(Commenting on the constitutional text, the Court said that the
provision is intended "to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources" but that the leeway granted was limited. "The
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made
only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation
of the government branch or constitutional body." Pointing out
that P.D. No . 1177 empowered the President "to
indiscriminately transfer funds ... without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item
from which the same are to be taken," the Court declared the
law unconstitutional.)
296. Liga v. COMELEC- 232 SCRA 219 [1994]
297. Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, 29 January 2013, 689
SCRA 385
298. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
196425, 24 July 2012, 677 SCRA 408
299. Philconsa v. Enriquez- 235 SCRA 506
300. Sanchez v. COA- 552 SCRA 471
Sec. 26.Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings
General Prohibition of “Riders”
301. Cordero v. Cabatuando- 6 SCRA 418 [1962]
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon legislators."
Thus, the title "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act Numbered One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines" was sufficient to include a provision authorizing the
Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy mediation
division, to carry out a national enforcement program, including
the mediation of tenancy disputes.
302. Philconsa v. Gimenez- 15 SCRA 479 [1965]
The title "An Act Amending Subsection (c), Section Twelve of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty-Six, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred Ninety-
Six," was not deemed to include a provision allowing retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to members
of Congress because the acts mentioned in the title referred to
members of the Government Service Insurance System
whereas Senators and members of the House were not
members of the System.
303. Alalayan v. NPC- 24 SCRA 172 [1968]
Similarly, the title "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and FortyOne " was found
sufficiently expressive of the provision limiting the allowable
margin of profit for corporations receiving at least fifty percent of
its power from the National Power Corporation.
304. Insular Lumber Company v. CTA- 104 SCRA 710 [1981]
(The purpose of Constitutional provision requiring unity of
content and expression of the content in the title is to prevent
duplicity of subject and surprise upon the legislators and the
public. Clearly, the provision for exemption comes under the
general subject expressed in the title.)
305. Tio v. Vediogram Regulatory Board- 151 SCRA 208 [1987]
The Court has also ruled that the title "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" was sufficiently broad to cover a
regulatory tax provision included in the act.
The requirement that every bill must only have one subject
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve. Taxation is sufficiently related to
the regulation of the video industry.
306. Phil. Judges Assn. v. Prado- 227 SCRA 703 [1993]
Similarly, the title "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining Its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for the Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith" was found to be
sufficiently broad to cover the removal of the franking privileges
of the judiciary.
307. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance- 235 SCRA 630 [1994]
(In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, there was no dispute that
the VAT law bill had gone through second and third readings on
the same day. The petitioners contended that the Constitution
had been violated since certification by the President dispensed
only from the requirement of final printing and distribution three
days before third reading but not from the requirement of having
the three readings on separate days. The Court replied that "the
'unless' clause must be read in relation to the 'except' clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same
sentence." 3 4 8 Hence , what the provision means is that the
President's certification effects a dispensation from all the
requirements.)
308. Tobias v. Abalos- 239 SCRA 106 [1994]
Similarly, the title "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" was
deemed to include the resulting conversion of such city into a
congressional district in compliance with Article VI, Section 5(3)
of the Constitution.
309. Tatad v. Sec. of DOE- 281 SCRA 330 [1997]
310. De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 146319, October 26, 2001
311. Abakada v. Ermita- 469 SCRA 1 and MR [Sept. 1, 2005 & Oct.
18, 2005]
312. BANAT v. COMELEC- 595 SCR 477 [2009]
“An act amending RA 8436 entitled “An act authorizing the
COMELEC to use an Automated Election System in the May 11,
1998 National or Local Eections and in the Subsequent
Elections”
Wide-covering enough.
Practical rather than technical construction of one-subject one-
title rule.
313. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR
196271, 18 October 2011
314. Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011

Sec. 27. Procedure in Passage of Bills; Item Veto
Passage of Bills
315. Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 [1997]
Two steps are required before a bill finally becomes a law. First,
it must be approved by both Houses of Congress. The
legislative action required of Congress is a positive act; there is
no enactment of law by legislative inaction. The votes of the
members of Congress may be obtained viva voce. However,
there are instances when a roll call vote is required and
individual members must vote with a yea or a nay. Such roll call
vote is required (1) upon the last and third readings of a bill [Art.
VI, §26(2)]; (2) at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present [Art. VI, §16(4)]; and (3) in re-passing a bill over the veto
of the President [Art. VI, §27(1)], 277 SCRA 268. Second, it
must be approved by the President. Approval by the President
may be by positive act or by inaction. If the President does not
act on the bill within thirty days after the receipt of the bill, the bill
automatically becomes law.
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there was no
mechanism which allowed verification of whether the President
had acted on the bill or not. Hence, if challenged, it was possible
for the President to say that he did act on the bill within the
specified period even if in fact he had sat on it. Under the new
provision verification is now possible because he is required to
communicate his veto to the House where the bill originated.
"The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it." From the discussions of this provision it is clear that
"otherwise" means "if the President fails to make such
communication within the specified period."
316. Abakada v. Ermita- 469 SCRA 1
Presidential Veto
317. CIR vs. CTA- 185 SCRA 329 [1990]
Thus, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax
Appeals,166 where the President vetoed the portion of Section
42 of R.A. 6110 referring to 20% caterers tax on restaurants
operated by hotels, motels and rest houses but leaving the rest
of the section intact, the Court upheld the veto saying:
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire
section imposing a particular kind of tax , but rather to the
subject of the tax and the tax rate. To construe the word
"item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's
hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the
expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of
foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil
which was sought to be prevented in giving the president the
power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be
perpetrated rendering that power inutile.
318. Gonzales v. Macaraig- 191 SCRA 452 [1990]
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.,313 marks the Court's acceptance of
what eventually would be referred to as the "doctrine of
inappropriate provisions." What the doctrine says is that a
provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an
appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it is not an
appropriation or revenue "item. " It means that the President
may veto riders in an appropriation bill.
319. Bengzon v. Drilon- 208 SCRA 133 [1992]
In Bengzon v. Drilon,161 however, the veto was declared
invalid. The case involved the General Appropriations Act of
1992. The law appropriated 500,000,000 pesos "For general
fund adjustment for operational and special requirements as
indicated hereunder." Among the several authorized uses of the
fund was the adjustment of pension of justices as authorized by
an earlier law. The President vetoed the use of the fund for the
adjustment of the pension of justices. In declaring the veto
invalid, the Court said that it was not the veto of an item. The
item was the entire 500,000,000 peso allocation out of which
unavoidable obligations not adequately funded in separate items
could be met. What the President had vetoed, according to the
Court, was the method of meeting unavoidable obligations or
the manner of using the 500,000,000 pesos.
320. Philconsa v. Enriquez- 235 SCRA 506 [1994]
Another way of exercising veto:
Executive impoundment means refusal of the President to
spend funds already allocated by the Congress for a specific
purpose.
321. Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 (1964)
Effect of invalid veto: It is without effect as if the President
did not act on the bill at all.
Thus, in Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, a veto of a condition in
an appropriation bill which did not include a veto of the items to
which the condition related was deemed invalid and without
effect whatsoever. It is submitted nonetheless that the rule is
also applicable under the present Constitution because all that
the sentence does is to emphasize that an item which can be
subject of a separate veto must be a "distinct and severable
part" of a bill.
This view was applied in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez where the Court invalidated the veto of a restriction on
the use of funds for road maintenance and a restriction on the
use of funds for the purchase of medicines since the veto did
not include a veto of the appropriated funds themselves.
322. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
Publication is indispensable. Toral omission of publication would
be a denial of due process of law in that the people do not know
what laws to obey.
Sec. 28. Taxation
Scope and Purpose
323. Planters v. Fertiphil- 548 SCRA 485
In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v. Fertiphil Corp.,™ the Court
had occasion to review the validity of LOI1465 , a martial rule
product, which imposed a ten peso capital contribution for the
sale of each bag of fertilizer "until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable." PPI was a private corporation. Clearly,
therefore, the imposition was for private benefit and not for a
public purpose and therefore invalid. The Court also found that,
even if seen as an exercise of police power, the imposition
would still be invalid for not being for a public purpose.
Moreover, although the power to tax is legislative in nature,
Section 28(2) itself authorizes Congress to delegate it to the
President. But the President is bound by the conditions set by
Congress. This is one exception to the rule of non-delegability of
legislative power.
Limitations on the Power: Uniform and Equitable
 324. CIR v. CA- 261 SCRA 236 [1996]
325. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric
Power Co., Inc, 164 SCRA 27
326. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance- 235 SCRA 506
327. Tan v. Del Rosario- 237 SCRA 324 [1994]
Tan v. del Rosario put it, uniformity of taxation simply means
that 1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and
not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification
applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
Progressive System
Delegated Tax Legislation
328. Southern Cross Cement v. Phil. Cement, GR 158540, July 8,
2004
Although the power to tax is legislative in nature, Section 28(2)
itself authorizes Congress to delegate it to the President. But the
President is bound by the conditions set by Congress. 3 9 7 This
is one exception to the rule of non-delegability of legislative
power.
329. Abakada v. Ermita- 469 SCRA 1 [2005]
330. Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, Oct. 13. 2005
Exemptions
331. Abra Valley College v. Aquino- 162 SCRA 106 [1988]
332. Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10,2000
333. Republic v. City of Kidapawan- 477 SCRA 324 [2005]
334. John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR 119775, Oct.
24, 2003
Exemptions granted, however whether by the Constitution or by
statute, should not be extended beyond what is covered. Thus,
although the former Camp John Hay was declared a special
economic zone, that fact did not by itself also give to John Hay
the tax exemption given specifically to the Subic Special
Economic Zone under R.A. No. 7227.
335. Lung Center v. QC, GR 144104, June 29, 2004
Illustrative of constitutional tax exemption is the case of the
Lung Center of the Philippines because a minimum of 60% of its
hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and the
major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients,
the Center was deemed to be an exempt charitable institution.
To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable
institution/entity or not, the elements which should be
considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its
corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the
character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties."
336. Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR 101273, July 3, 1992
337. Lladoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292
It must be pointed out, however, that the exemption created by
the constitutional provision is only for taxes assessed ... as
property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes.
338. Central Mindanao University v. DAR, GR 100091, October 22,
1992
339. Commissioner v. CA, GR 124043, October 14, 1998
340. Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City, GR No.
146382, August 7, 2003
Tax exemptions are granted for those properties “actually,
directly and exclusively used either for charitable, religious or
educational purposes
Sec. 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds
Fiscal Powers of Congress
341. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works- 110 PHIL. 331 [1960-
1961]
The subsequent dpnation of the road did not violate the law
because the validity of a statute depends upon the powers of
the congress at the time of its approval , and not upon events
occurring or acts performed subsequently.
342. MIAA v. Mabunay- GR 126151, January 20, 2000
343. Guingona v. Carague- 169 SCRA 221 [1991]
344. COMELEC v. Hon. Quijano- GR 151992, September 18, 2002
Special Funds
345. Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank- 158 SCRA 626 [1988]
346. Osmena v. Orbos- 220 SCRA 703 [1993]
In Osmena v. Orbos, part of the controversy was whether the
money that went into the Oil Price Stabilization Fund [OPSF]
was tax money levied for a special purpose. As set up by law, it
was a "trust fund" which derived funding from four sources: (1)
from increase in the tax collection from ad valorem taxes on oil
products; (2) from any increase in the tax collection as a result
of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations; (3)
from additional amounts imposed by the Board of Energy on
petroleum products; (4) from peso savings resulting from the
fluctuation of the peso against currencies used for the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products.
347. Philippine Coconut v. Republic- 663 SCRA 514 [2012]
Impoundment
348. Araullo v. Aquino III, GR No. 209287 (2014)
Sec. 30. Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
349. First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA- 237 SCRA 519 [1994]
350. Diaz v. CA- 238 SCRA 785 [1994]
351. Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742, September 16, 1998
Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 2 of Article
VIII gives to Congress the power to apportion the jurisdiction of
 courts. Thus, Congress is free to add to or subtract from the
powers of the courts except insofar as these have been fixed by
the Constitution. Section 30 is a response to the concern that
the Supreme Court might be swamped with jurisdictional
concerns which might inhibit it from an expeditious disposition of
important cases. Section 30 does not prohibit Congress from
increasing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but simply
prescribes that any such increase should be with the advice and
concurrence of the Court.
Thus, Art. 82 of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 granting
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court was invalidated
because it was passed without the advice and concurrence of
the Supreme Court.
352. Villavert v. Desierto, 326 SCRA 355 [2000]
353. Tirol v. COA, GR 133954, August 3, 2000
354. Cabrera v. Lapid- 510 SCRA 55 [2006]
Sec. 31. Titles of Royalty and Nobility
Sec. 32. Initiative and Referendum
355. Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279 (1994)
The holders of legislative power: Congress; people through
initiative and referendum; President in emergency. In republican
constitutional theory, the original legislative power belongs to
the people who, through the Constitution, confer derivative
legislative power on the legislature. But the grant of national
legislative power to Congress under the 1987 Constitution is not
exclusive.
The first case to come under this implementing law involved
local "initiative and referendum" was Garcia v. Commission on
Elections, upheld the validity of the procedure prescribed by the
Local Government Code for local initiative and referendum.
The implementing legislation is Republic Act No. 6735 entitled
"An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefore.
356. SBMA v. COMELEC- 262 SCRA 492 [1996]
357. Defensor- Santiago v. COMELEC- 270 SCRA 106 [1997]
358. Lambino v. COMELEC, GR 174153, GR 174299, October 25,
2006
Article VII: Executive Department
Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities
Scope of Power
359. Marcos v. Manglapus- 177 SCRA 668 [1989]
360. Villena v Secretary of Interior 67 Phil 451, 456 (1939)
Example of exercise
Valid Exercise
361. Philconsa v. Enriquez- 235 SCRA 506 [1994]
362. Webb v. de Leon- 247 SCRA 652
363. Djumantan v. Domingo- 240 SCRA 746 [1995]
364. Chavez v. PCGG- GR 130716, December 9, 1998
365. Pontejos v. Ombudsman- 483 SCRA 83 [2006]
366. Banda v. Ermita- 618 SCRA 499 [2010]
Invalid Exercise
367. Laurel v. Garcia- 187 SCRA 797 [1990]
368. Review Center v. Ermita- 583 SCRA 42 [2009]
369. Biraogo v. Truth Commission- 637 SCRA 78 [2010]
Executive Privilege
370. US v. Nixon- 418 US 683 [1974]
371. Almonte v .Vasquez- 244 SCRA 286 [1995]
372. Senate v. Ermita- GR 169659, April 20, 2006 [E.O. 464]
373. Neri v. Senate- GR 180643, March 25, 2008
374. Akbayan v. Aquino- GR 170516, July 16, 2008
Immunity from Suit
375. Soliven v. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393 [1988]
376. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 US 800 [1982]
377. Clinton v. Jones 520 US 681 [1997]
378. Gloria v. CA- GR 119903, August 15, 2000
379. Estrada v. Desierto- GR 146740-15 and GR 146738, March 2,
2001 and MR- April 3, 2001
380. David v. Arroyo- 289 SCRA 162 [2006]
The Cabinet
381. Constantino v. Cuisia- 472 SCRA 505 [2005]
Section 2. Qualifications of the President
382. Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
383. Poe-Llamanzares v.COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8,
2016
Section 3. Vice President
Section 4. Election, Term Limits and Canvass
384. Anson-Roa v. Arroyo, GR 162384, March 24, 2004
Congress as National Board of Canvassers
385. Macalintal v. COMELEC GR NO 157013, July 10, 2003
386. Brillantes v. COMELEC- 432 SCRA [2005]
387. Pimentel v. Joint Committee- GR 163783, June 22, 2004
388. Lopez v. Senate- GR 163556, June 8, 2004
389. BANAT v. COMELEC, GR 177508, August 7, 2009
Breaking President or Vice-President Tie
390. Presidential or Vice- Presidential Controversies
391. Defensor- Santiago v. Ramos- 253 SCRA 559 [1996]
392. Tecson v. Lim- 424 SCRA 277 [2005]
393. Poe v. GMA, Pet Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
394. Macalintal v. PET- 635 SCRA 783 [2010]
Term Limit on the President
395. Pormento v. Estrada, GR 191988, August 31, 2010
396. Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
397. Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004
398. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29,
2005
399. Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005
Section 5. Oath
Section 6. Official Residence; Salary
Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the Presidency
Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the Presidency
400. Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108,
2001
401. Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001
Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice Presidency
Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice
Presidency
Section 11. Incapacity of the President
402. Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108,
2001
Section 12. Serious Illness of the President
Section 13. Prohibitions
403. Rafael v. Embroidery & Apparel Control Board- 21 SCRA 336
[1967]
404. CLU v. Exec. Secretary- 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
405. Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
406. Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004
407. Public Interest Group v. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
408. De la Cruz v. COA, GR 138489, November 27, 2001
409. Funa v. Ermita- 612 SCRA 308 [2010]
410. Enrique U. Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power
Corporation, GR 15655657, 04 October 2011
Other Prohibitions
411. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan- 177 SCRA 354 [1989]
412. Espiritu v. Del Rosario, GR. No. 204964, 738 SCRA 464, 2014
Section 14. Appointments of Acting President
Section 15. Prohibited Appointments
413. In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-
01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
414. De la Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
415. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20,
2010 and May 1, 2010
416. Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 20337,
June 16, 2015
Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments
Nature of the Appointing Power
417. Government v. Springer- 50 PHIL 259 [1927]
418. Roxas v. Lopez 17 SCRA 756
419. Bermudez v. Exec, Secretary- GR 131429 [August 4, 1999]
 420. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,
reconsideration, GR 196271, February 2012
Kinds of Presidential Appointments
421. Pimentel v. Ermita- 471 SCRA 587 [2005]
Scope of the Power of the Commission on Appointments
422. Sarmiento III v. Mison- 156 SCRA 549 [1987]
423. Bautista v. Salonga- 172 SCRA 1260 [1989]
424. Quintos- Deles v. CA- 177 SCRA 259 [1989]
425. Pobre v. Mendieta- 224 738 [1993]
426. Flores v. Drilon- GR 104732, June 22, 1993
427. Rufino v. Endriga- 496 SCRA 13 [2006]
Congress Requiring Confirmation by the Commission
Appointments on Other Appointments
428. Calderon v. Carale- 208 SCRA 254 [1992]
429. U-sing v. NLRC- 221 SCRA 680 [1993]
430. Tarrosa v. Singson- 232 SCRA 553 [1994]
431. Manolo v. Sistoza- 312 SCRA 239 [1999]
432. Soriano v. Lista, GR 153881, March 24, 2004
Recess or Ad- Intern Appointments and Temporary Appointments
433. Pimentel v. Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005
434. Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259,
1989
435. Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
436. Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271,
October 18, 2011
Section 17. Power of Control
437. Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967
438. Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr 197 SCRA 771
439. Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976
440. Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619, 1963
441. NAMARCO v. Arca 29 SCRA 648, 1969
442. Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135, 1994
443. Joson v. Torres 290 SCRA 279, 1998
444. PASEI v. Torres-225 SCRA 417 [1993]
445. De Leon v. Carpio- 178 SCRA 457 [1989]
446. Hutchison v. SBMA- GR 131367, August 31, 2000
on 447. Dadole v. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002
448. Domingo v. Zamora, GR 142283, Feb. 6, 2003
449. DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003
450. Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
451. Chavez v. Romulo- 431 SCRA 534 [2004]
452. KMU v. Dir.-Gen. of NEDA- 487 SCRA 623 [2006]
453. Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July
17, 2007
454. Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 160093,
July 31, 2007
455. Orosa v. Roa, GR No. 14047, July 14, 2006
456. Phillips Seafood v. BOI, GR No. 175787, February 4, 2009
457. Biraogo v. Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7,
2010
458. Angeles v. Gaite- 605 SCRA 409 [2009]
459. Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, GR
177131, 07 June 2011
Power of Supervision
460. Drilon v. Lim- 235 SCRA 135 [1994]
Faithful Execution Clause
461. PRA v. Bunag, GR 143784, Feb. 5, 2003
462. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152259, July 29, 2004
463. Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April
20, 2010
464. Prospero Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
465. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293,
2015
466. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v, Hon. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June
7, 20122
467. Province v. COA, G.R. 182573, September 28, 2010.
Section 18. President’s Powers as Commander in Chief
468. Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
469. Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590
470. IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000
471. Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10,
2001
 472. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 3, 488. Sabello v. Department of Education, GR No. 87687, December
2004 26, 1989

473. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 2006 489. People v. Salle, Jr GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995

474. David v. Ermita, GR No. 171409, May 3, 2006 490. Garcia v. COA, 226 SCRA 356, 1993

475. Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, April 15, 2006 491. Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan 19, 1999

476. Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228

477. Fortun v. Arroyo, GR 190293, March 20,2012 Section 20. Foreign Loans

478. Guamaua v. Espino 96 SCRA 403, 403-7 (Martial Law 492. Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, October 13, 2005
Summary)

Section 21. Foreign Relations: Senate Concurrence in International

Section 19. Executive Clemency Agreements

493. USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 PHIL 1030,

1959
Purpose of Executive Clemency
494. Gonzales v. Hechanova- 9 SCRA 230 [1963]
479. Cristobal v. Labrador 71 PHIL 34 [1940-1941]
495. World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242

496. Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora, 343 SCRA 449, 2000

Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency
497. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 2005
480. Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844 [1991]
498. Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002
481. People v. Salle- 250 SCRA 581 [1995]
499. Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, GR No. 139465, Oct. 17,
482. People v. Bacang 260 SCRA 44 [1996] 2000

483. Drilon v. CA 202 SCRA 378 [1991] 500. Abaya v. Ebdane- 315 SCRA 720 (2007)

484. Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 [1987] 501. Pharmaceutical v. DOH- GR 173034, October 9, 2007

485. People v. Casido 269 SCRA 360 [1997] 502. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010

503. Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244

Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects

486. Monsanto v. Factoran 170 SCRA 190 [1989] Other Foreign Affairs Power

487. Garcia v. COA 226 SCRA 356 [1993] 504. Vinuya v. Romulo- 619 SCRA 533 [2010]