QUINTO v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

DOCTRINE:
The 2nd proviso in the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which
provides that “any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of
candidacy” is valid and constitutional. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and
elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made
not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise
to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the
sovereign will.
FACTS:
1. The case was based on the motion of reconsideration filed by respondents against the
earlier decision of the Court which declared Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
and the 2nd proviso in the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 13 of RA 9369 or the Omnibus Election
Code- in so far as they provide that public appointive officials shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy- as unconstitutional
for being overbreadth and violative of the equal protections clause. The Court reversed
this decision on the present case.
2. Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC,
in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, issued Resolution No.
8678 which provides: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. - a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position
shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same
or any other elective office or position.
3. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they
file their COCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto (DENR Secretary) and Gerino A. Tolentino,
Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of
the aforequoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect
to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their
positions upon the filing of their COCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and 2nd proviso in the
3rd paragraph of Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9369 and are violative of the equal protection clause
and, therefore, unconstitutional

RULING: NO.
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
2. SC’s assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected
officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because “whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain.”
3. In the instant case, there is a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term,
it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no
such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
4. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside
the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted.