CHARLES L. ONG, G.R. No.

175746 having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia
Petitioner, Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
- versus - Austria-Martinez, peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than
Chico-Nazario, thirty (30) years.
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated: the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
March 12, 2008 opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June
DECISION 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to
adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration
appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely shows
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the public
and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision[2] of the Municipal Trial Court domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution[3] which denied petitioners motion for On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of
reconsideration. petitioner and his brothers, viz:

The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and
as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and
Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title [4] over Lot 15911 (subject
lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five
hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they
are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic)
for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by
spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the
same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin
Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later,
they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and
Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein
applicants.

The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of
the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has
(sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession
and ownership of the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-
interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been continuous and
peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of
the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the registration of a
parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved by the
Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four
(574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of
title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of
CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his
brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and
CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor
General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the
Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as
the applicant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered
the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo granting the
application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the
subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the
subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. However, petitioner
failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse
possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or
earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax
declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner
could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner
able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject
lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS
BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO
L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-
023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT
REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
CORRECT.[7]

The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as amended,
provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of
title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These
requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this
Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the
trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. [9] After a
careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The Report[10] dated January 17, 2000 of
the Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is within the alienable and
disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released
and classified as such on November 21, 1927.[11] This finding is, likewise,
embodied in the Report[12] dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy[13] of the plan
covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,[14] who in
turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen
on January 16, 1997.[15] The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin
Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.[16] The
earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration
No. 25606[17] issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and
Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
and a claim of title over the subject property.[18] Even if we were to tack
petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in
1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:[19]
 The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.[20]
Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in
denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
April 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085
which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023,
and the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot SO ORDERED.
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his
brothers actually occupied the subject lot.[21] No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
occasions.[22] Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he Associate Justice
and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought
WE CONCUR:
the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. [23] Aside
from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the
character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other alleged
predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish specific MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration
required by law.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who Associate Justice Associate Justice
must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession
and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by
law.[24] Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not constitute the well-nigh RUBEN T. REYES
incontrovertible evidence necessary in cases of this nature.[25] Accordingly, the Associate Justice
 G.R. No. 154080 January 22, 2008

NELSIE B. CAÑETE, RONA ANAS, MILAGROSA APUAN, ERLINDA AQUINO,

GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO, JESUS BATRINA,
ATTESTATION ALBERTO BUENAVENTURA, BONIFACIO BUENAVENTURA, EUSEBIO CAPIRAL,
MARIO CAPIRAL, LOLITA CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL, LETICIA CAPIRAL, RENATO
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
CAPIRAL, ELY CABANGON, ERWIN CATALUNA, JESSIE CONRADO, JOEL
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONRADO, NARCISIO CONRADO, RICARDO CALAMPIANO, ALUMNIO
CORSANES, NILO COLATOY, MARJETO DAYAN, HENRY DIAZ, SALVACION
ESMANDE, REYNALDO FUENTEBELLA, GERRY GEQUILLANA, DELSIE GARCIA,
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION JUNSAY, ESTELA JOVEN, JOSE LANZUELA,
Associate Justice MARLON MALANGAYON, RENATO MARCELO, ANITA MARZONIA, MARCELINO
Chairperson, Third Division MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR., LEONITA MULI, EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO
PACON, ASUNCION PACON, SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER PANTALEON,
SHERLITA RABE, ANITA REYES, MEDELYN RIOS, BERTITO RIVAS, ENGRACIA
CERTIFICATION RIVERA, GERALYN RIVERA, ARMANDO RIVERA, MA. MERCY SHERVA,
ALEXANDER SANGALAN, ERNESTO SANTIAGO, JOY SANTIAGO, ELENA TALION,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division JOE RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS VALENZUELA, GERRY VALENZUELA, LILIBETH
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE VICTORINO, JOJO VICTORINO, MAXIMINO
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer VICTORINO, NOEL VICTORINO, REYNANTE VICTORINO, ROBERTO VICTORINO
of the opinion of the Courts Division. and JOVITO VILLAREAL, represented by NELSIE B. CAÑETE, petitioners,
vs.
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC., respondent.

REYNATO S. PUNO DECISION

Chief Justice
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Republic of the Philippines This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the
SUPREME COURT Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled
Manila "Genuino Ice Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Cañete,
et al.," and its Resolution2 dated June 26, 2002, dismissing petitioners’ "Second
THIRD DIVISION
Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. N-140441;3 14399;4 RT-94384 (292245);5 RT-94794 (292246);6 and
292247.7 Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were
issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders thereof
– including their predecessors-in-interest – were never in actual, adverse and
physical possession of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title
to the said property under the Friar Lands Act.8 Petitioners also sought to
nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the foregoing titles
sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss9 on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-
in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied by the
trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a "Second Amended Complaint"10
which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original
complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and 274096;11 274097 and 274098;12 and
274099.13
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as well
as the remedy sought to be obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among
those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in
concept of owners of unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog,
Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which parcels of land are more
particularly described as follows:
(1) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668, situated at Barangay Culiat,
Quezon City x x x."
(2) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669, situated at Barangay Culiat,
Quezon City x x x."
5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land known as
"Piedad Estate," which property is intended for distribution among the bona
fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or derived from
Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious,
spurious and null and void, for the following reasons: (a) that no record of any
agency of the government shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614
issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or
administrative, can support defendants’ claim that the above-described
property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of title
over the above-described property were issued under mysterious
circumstances for the above-named defendants and their so-called
predecessors-in-interest never had any actual, adverse, physical possession of
the said property, thus, not allowed to acquire title over the property in
litigation pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the above-
described property, which transfer certificates of title are null and void, for
reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof x x x;
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer certificates of title in
violation of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial to
plaintiffs’ rights over the above-described property.
9. That equity demands that defendants’ transfer certificates of title as
specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious, spurious and null and
void ab initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer certificates of
title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants’ transfer certificates of title over the
property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel defendants’
transfer certificates of title and all transfer certificates of title derived
therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation
pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.14
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the following
grounds:
a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the allegations alone,
plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in interest who may bring suit to
cancel defendants’ (including respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations
and prayer of the complaint, no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;
b) Prescription has set in;
c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834 and Q-95-
23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against a different set of defendants
but which involve the same subject matter, cause of action and allegations of
the plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles
derived from it. Said complaints have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.15
On January 3, 2001,16 the trial court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and dismissed
petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT
FILED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS
ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
"EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND DENIED PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR
COMPLAINT.17
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of
the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act)
enacted on April 26, 1904.18
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was
subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed
in the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition
of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands
Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the Second World War,
all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of.19 The Piedad Estate has
long been segregated from the mass of the public domain and has become
private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the procedure
for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands
inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public domain.20
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-
interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation
from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands
were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act
of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual
persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the
Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or
acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons
before the government acquired the lands. 21
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading
shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts.22 And in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.23
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the
action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the
complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is
better established than that which requires the complaint to contain a
statement of all the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
must be stated with particularity. In the case at bar, while there are allegations
of fraud in the above quoted complaints, the same are not particular enough
to bring the controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction. The said allegations are
not statements of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or
conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just,
fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy,
without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.24
"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action, or such facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.25 "Cause of action"
has been defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other;26 and its essential elements are: 1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.27 In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to
state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its
annexes must be considered.28 The test in such case is whether a court can
render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and
pursuant to the prayer therein.29
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action
against a defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial court can
consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence
on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or
falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in the
hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based
on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of
such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the
law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents.
Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions
of law, and not questions of fact.
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action.
While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a
motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The
said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of
any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a
dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action
against an inferior court magistrate.30
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity and
incipient substantiation in the petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 – of which all the other subject titles are
derivatives – is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac
and other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name
of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources,
which was specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the
Piedad Estate, found that as early as the period prior to the Second World War,
all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land
registration, which means that all lots therein are titled.
Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar
Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which
means that petitioners’ claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of the subject property is really of no moment unless it is shown
that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the
time said lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were not
disregarded even though they were in occupation of the same before the
government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse
possession is alleged.
Petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete
narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the
allegations therein partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular
averment of circumstances that will show why or how such inferences or
conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping generalizations and
inferences derived from facts that are not found therein. While there are
allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious,
spurious and obtained under "mysterious circumstances," the same are not
specific to bring the controversy within the trial court’s jurisdiction. There is no
explanation or narration of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to
be fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity; otherwise,
the allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the
absence of specific averments, the complaint is defective, for it presents no
basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an
intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide
occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands
Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long and since
when. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment –
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation
pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property – despite their
alleged adverse possession – but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide
occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the State’s ownership
of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the
purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court
of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor
General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled
and the issue need not be belabored. Thus –
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to
initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of
the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were
derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said
title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will
have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the
Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled
to this relief. The Court in that case held:
"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16
of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he
has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendant’s title,
because, even if the said title were canceled or amended, the ownership of the
land embraced therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the amendment,
would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff
makes no pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the defendant’s
title was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it
is admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public
domain until December 18, 1964, when the government issued a title thereon
in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to relief, it can only
be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s own averments negate the existence of such
right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might have been
violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is captioned as one for
cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of action
based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the
improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the
land, and on the damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in
relation to the improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central
issue of whether or not defendant-appellee’s title should be canceled or
amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause
of action in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed
for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-
appellee’s title."31
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest.32
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest
in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned
upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is
reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given preferential
treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar Lands
Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law that grants them
license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the
privilege belong.
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that
since petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case
for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue
administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they
qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown by their complaint that
they have previously taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands
Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles be nullified, is to be
declared bona fide occupants of the property covered by the questioned titles.
Neither is there any indication that they possess the qualifications necessary to
enable them to avail of the preference granted under the Act.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ contention that respondent belatedly
filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate
court gravely abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the same.
The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondent’s motion
to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was received by the respondent on
January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on January 18,
2001 which was denied on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order
denying its motion for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it
filed a Notice to File Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for
certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed
hence, the appellate court correctly entertained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners’ "Second
Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated
June 26, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Corona * , Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And
it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not
been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in
Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the
same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their
own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for
their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and
an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know
how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal
settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide
cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that
have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us
from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay
City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf
of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had
become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons
from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property
that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and
I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11 which
was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that
the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum
since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration
of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice
of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural
lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June
of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the
preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For
its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not
matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been "converted" into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our
2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not
the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable
and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified
according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject
to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when
the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed
to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits that
this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.23
This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural
lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
a larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the
bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then
in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by
P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually
the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree
codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands
of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of
such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature
of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January
1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been
"in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title
by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim
and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of
the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47
of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right
to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail
of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where
the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further,
That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945
or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under
a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible
to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which
was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of
virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide
claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than
what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void
ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession…" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before
12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after
Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared
alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25,
1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the
public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation
of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far
as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for
they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show
that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared
alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section
14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It
did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who
have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and
where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far
back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of
the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition
of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be
acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code
as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing
law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass
original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which
a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year"
period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at
least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year
rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as
it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113
in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under
the Civil Code–ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted
adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not
refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as
to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present
language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same
time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under
the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation
of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce
of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only
when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State
to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability
even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the
bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion
Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly
known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain
military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including
Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands
to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President is authorized
to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the
BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable
and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public
service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at
that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article
420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their
sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such
lands become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as
such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period
of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of
public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object
of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was
still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration
on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree
and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based
on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should
not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the
Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil
Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear
intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil
Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription,
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years.
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisites–good faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr.
Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and
which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is
the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other
mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the
purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person
in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration
of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did
not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property
under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of
imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership
over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive
periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service
or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the
ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means
of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free
patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52 Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means
to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many
more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands.
They have been regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the
virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as
property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a
new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement
of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the
problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples,
by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being
not only of that individual, but also to the person’s family. Once that sense of
security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political
branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR

Associate Justice . Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTO Republic of the Philippines

Associate Justice Associate Justice SUPREME COURT
Manila
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice FIRST DIVISION

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976

Associate Justice
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
CERTIFICATION plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
REYNATO S. PUNO Ramirez and Atty. Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.
Chief Justice
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
ESGUERRA, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final
consideration and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the
following:
3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant
Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension, Quezon
City and Davao City, respectively. "(are included in this complaint, the first
being the public Official charged under the law with the approval )." subdivision
surveys of private lands while the second is the Official vested with the
authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area
of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE
METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos.
379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which
was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967;
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1
contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an
area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which
is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order
from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing
the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct
the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and
issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot
379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No.
18887 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance
with law for lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496,
as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of
the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion
of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said
Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887
which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322,
wherein the excess area of land belong to the public domain (not private land)
is null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in
good faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot
No. 379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No.
18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No.
T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they
admit the increase in area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase
in area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-
18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T- 1439 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio
Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase
of area was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that
Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as
riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or
excess in area of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a
judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge
of the subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved
therein was approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio
Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land
Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the
Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the
registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded areas and to
withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have already
been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate
steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene
in the case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by
the trial court in its order of August 16,1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on
their case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts"
of the parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the
Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts
and allege:
1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under
Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the
name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was
issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322
by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of
Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and
made integral part hereof;
 (g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently
cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 (h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and
for value; (i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;

5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court (j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967,
copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof; (k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;

6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd-
of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land 71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy
Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex of which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and
"C" and made integral part hereof; made integral part hereof;

7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by 8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Registration Commissioner and the court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the
following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the following named 9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
persons, to wit: prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered
owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin; and abuts the Davao River;

(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang; 11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang; predecessor-in-interest;

(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang; 12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as
the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion
of the increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713;
and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title
issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in
area;
15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was
without notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which
reads as follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against
the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the
Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao.
Because the residue of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been
divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang
and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to substitute for the
intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609
of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna
and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of
Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang,
T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang
and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to
607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include
the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-
79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report,
and for issuance of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with
this court, which was assigned to Branch IV.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was
sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was
no notice to the persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the
petition was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even
assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner of the land to which
it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision
plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a registered land under
Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of land or area not
embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the title. And the
approval by the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The
subdivision must be limited to the area stated in the title. Neither amendment
of the title under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy 1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have
acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496
should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by continuous
possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership And even assuming
that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does
not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon final
judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due
publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land
Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry,
for the reason that no initial or original registration proceedings have been
instituted by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land in
question can be issued for the first time is for the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of
Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the
portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been
segregated therefrom in accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-
G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the
approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on
ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation
of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the
contention of the defendant-appellant that since the government agencies
having to do with lands know all the time the increase in area in subdivision
plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if not
abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-
appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong
procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision
plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the
legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan
concerned was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of
Act 496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the
subdivision plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land
Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and
that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper
and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration
Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of
notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of
subdivision plan was not at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive
at a judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court
erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725,
T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question
totalling 82,127 square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are
of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713
and T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square
meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-
69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to
include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the
least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question,
which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give
allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of
land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the
name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this
increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of
the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration
Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed
Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan. 9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant
took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant
case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters,
has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse
still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was
without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to
be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be
satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation
and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding
Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and
the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant
by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant; Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower
court committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together
with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of No special pronouncement as to costs.
Court to the Land Registration Commission;
SO ORDERED.
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette; Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known

to have interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the

notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

 parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling
the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground
that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to
pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in
question was a property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela
Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

Republic of the Philippines After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First
SUPREME COURT Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
Manila possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor
of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued
EN BANC to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of
Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925 holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said
vs. parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register
LANDS, appellant. of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant. Lands.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land
in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the
VILLA-REAL, J.: sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having
been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood
gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price
of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi
and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in
her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi
filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of
the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper
administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon
required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do
so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the
peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then
brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by
the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession
of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally
and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five
years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands,
yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been
in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken
into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when
he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to
possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title
to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore
is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State,
it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more
the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
recover possession thereof and hold it. tribe.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings
in this wise:
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur. 1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Johnson, J., took no part. Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Manila Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes
EN BANC (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was
ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as
vs. such are cultural minorities;
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents. 4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is
applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
NARVASA, J.: discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought
said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from
time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members
of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more
than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered
by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the
townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to
reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which
donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela
(Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this,
he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on
July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter
is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits
private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found
in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration
in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings
of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and
Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29,
1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves
and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land
Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that
Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution
other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title
that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of
the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution
was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then
still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the
other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock
of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to
said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to
apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as
to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding
under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director
of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4
which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by
law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what
is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who
may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that
an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he
had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to
do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected
from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by
a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9
Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914,
by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter,
it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to
be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which
the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which
came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in
their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public
Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land
at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess
of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it
had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the
doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-
78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance
of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain.
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It
cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA,
123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme
in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either
the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed
and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding
or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer
in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should
not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets
when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels
and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to
Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same
result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone,
by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence
suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-
established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test
of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief
Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from
applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco,
in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate
court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8,
of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted
the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit),
the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to
Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP
– 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The
application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition.
Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against
the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945
under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed
a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming),
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5 Subsequently,
the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent
Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present,
there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued
titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection
from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested
that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor
Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear
during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a
decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that
the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the
land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7
However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated
February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to
the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed
in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed
by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it
can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529,
and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of
owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
....

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945
or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under
a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible
to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals
.14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15
In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the
land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for
registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits
that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the
Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was
only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell,
the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the
property was declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case,
where the application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot
ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court
of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the
basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership
going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the
bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then
in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by
P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though
that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It
did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who
have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land
but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent
can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced
since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt
that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right
thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court
in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—shown earlier to be
unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior SO ORDERED.
to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since
1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally
respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since
1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees
at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed
by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to vs.
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1 which affirmed
the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated
21 December 1999,2 granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for
registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in
fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3 Together with
their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of
documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias;
and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject
Lots;6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25
June 1963;8
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994;
and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also
issued in 1994;9 and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000.
Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were
not subject to private appropriation.11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners
of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a
conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the
municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02
August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
Special Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional
facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence
from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No.
8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an
Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to
the Court of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22
November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since
June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code,
respectively provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men
are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object
of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith."
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already
acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since
1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short,
it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had
occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees'
possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the
subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still
the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown
by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription,
thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137,
appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as
provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in
any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of
appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared
the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject
parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35
years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to
the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
court a quo.20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the
following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the
petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot
be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession
required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court
of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the
public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is
implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While
an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the
subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the
subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute
and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly
complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents
failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property
Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by
the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner
Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction
of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were
actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with
the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested
the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because
the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which
is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings
utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants
for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several
parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province.25
The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation
wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are
seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation,
then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of
action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that,
"[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance
with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the
defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the
MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single
or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more
appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots
No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not even
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court,
the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of
the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon
the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance
of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the
severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have
been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner
Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and
more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the
MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and
parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested
with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition
did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding,
this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice
of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot
be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given
Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of
(1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication. –
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom
it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear
in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still
affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals30 that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land
registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated
and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of
the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication
of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative,
and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on
the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation, thus –
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should
be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in
the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the
reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem
nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact
held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed
in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released
on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily
newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu
and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than
three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice
as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject
Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear
before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents'
application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of
such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail
to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default
and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant
thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September
1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate
result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to
constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over
respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422
and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing
the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are
both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the
Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to
hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court
nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required
period of possession for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis
for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained
title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his
testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots
in the concept of an owner since 1950.32
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is
outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are
thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as
of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;34
and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show
that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted
to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may
be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the
Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application
procedure for every mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application
before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which reads –
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only
be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since
12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior
to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land
had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or
legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on
the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject
Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property
Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner
provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the
Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since
25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article
1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under
the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains
to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in
the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious
possession.43 As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the
Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title
thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act,
their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in
accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public
Land Act reads –
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in
right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this
chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First
Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into
and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration
Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other
real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act
specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the
Public Land Act may be considered a special law45 that must take precedence
over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory
construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails – Generalia specialibus non derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case
No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are
declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),
Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the
parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby
we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of
the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20,
1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D,
Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig,
Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described
on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable
land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to
March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s
period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs
elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition
for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the
effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration
as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier,
was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of
the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to
support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription
at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought
to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation
of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient
to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in
good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the
land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification
with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an
applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the
different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being
for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such
character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use
or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities
and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily
rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of
lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public
land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all
other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership
under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be
classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can
be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section
11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the
public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or
national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the
coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The
use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as
set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such
limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945,
or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the
public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the
authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid
down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the
full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of
the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress,
the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no
other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration
should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land
Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine
the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or
incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of
the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed
to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by
the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued
in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number
of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or
the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of
the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no
longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction
with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription
can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of
public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly
under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption SO ORDERED.
that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to Associate Justice
be part of the public domain and has become private property.37
WE CONCUR:
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into Chief Justice
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or Associate Justice . Associate Justice
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition I submitted my vote joining the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Associate Justice
In the Result: See Separate Opinion
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession Associate Justice Associate Justice
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, DIOSDADO M. PERLATA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be Associate Justice Associate Justice
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration Associate Justice Associate Justice
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President Associate Justice Associate Justice
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

See separate concurring and dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987
CERTIFICATION Petitioner,

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the Present:
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court. PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chief Justice CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and

Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And
it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not
been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in
Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the
same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their
own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for
their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and
an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know
how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal
settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide
cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that
have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us
from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay
City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf
of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided
it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and
I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10]
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which
was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that
the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum
since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration
of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice
of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural
lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that
the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd.
For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16]
and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not
matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our
2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial
property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court
has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application
for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should
be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20]
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified
according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when
the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This
is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural
lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
a larger class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the
bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then
in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by
P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually
the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree
codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands
of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of
such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature
of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January
1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and
the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of
the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47
of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right
to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail
of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where
the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further,
That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945
or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since
June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a
bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible
to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which
was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of
virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide
claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than
what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void
ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before
12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after
Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25,
1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the
public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation
of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far
as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for
they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show
that this is one of them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared
alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section
14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It
did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified
as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]]
With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and
such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and
where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far
back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of
the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition
of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be
acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith,[34] as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid
basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that
needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original
registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private
person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year
period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at
least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year
rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as
it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113
in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under
the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not
refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as
to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same
time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under
the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation
of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce
of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only
when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State
to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability
even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the
bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion
Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly
known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain
military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including
Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands
to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is
authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.[42]
Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof
are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such purpose can be tied to either
public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2).
Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is
upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity
that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as
such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period
of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of
public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object
of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was
still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration
on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree
and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based
on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should
not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the
Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil
Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear
intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil
Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription,
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years.
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino
explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and
which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is
the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other
mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the
purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person
in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration
of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did
not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property
under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of
imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2)
thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe
Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service
or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully
evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground.
The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of
acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free
patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means
to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many
more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands.
They have been regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the
virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as
property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a
new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement
of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the
problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples,
by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being
not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of
security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political
branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Chief Justice Associate Justice
 Chief Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice THIRD DIVISION

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010
Associate Justice Associate Justice
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTO vs.
Associate Justice Associate Justice REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA RESOLUTION

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CORONA, J.:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the
June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by
CERTIFICATION petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. registration of a vast tract of land1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City
in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12,
1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
REYNATO S. PUNO
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same
continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was
within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue
of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of
Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcia’s application was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence
of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a
certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent
Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor
was declared null and void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision5 dated July
1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of
Appeals (CA). In its decision6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to
petitioner’s case as it involved the same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question
to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the property was
largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information
title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court
in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation,
the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was
substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz.81avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While
the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of
the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued
a resolution9 upholding petitioner’s right to recall the records of the case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic
withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside
the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of
the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of
the amicable settlement in the CA.10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.11
On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s favor.12
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the
issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court
that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended
resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz;
the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and
effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the
name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999
Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-
appellee Diaz’ registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the
validity of the Mendoza decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to
in the CA’s amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the
assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration
proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when
the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice
against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision
should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It
was denied for raising factual issues.16 She moved for reconsideration.17 This
motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial
argument warranting a modification of the Court’s resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we
ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the
case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that
a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore,
the motion to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not
an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be
appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be
entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed
to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the
nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my
lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for
Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the
case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises
utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the
Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial
justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the
fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very
same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of
Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed
by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my
constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in
which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from
the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action
will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice
Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead
our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the
dark forces that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine
do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not
experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).
The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled
threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to
her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at
the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s letter/third
motion for reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this
case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However,
petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of
identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends
that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two
cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of
Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a
considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141.
When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the
public domain. Quintin’s successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the
same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in
his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our
decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res
judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the
provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete
and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only
against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law
of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be
taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision
in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an
earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as
it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the
findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us – on
the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect
and bind even this Court – is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the
court a quo to respect this Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way
around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which
should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court
still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in
Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and
thus outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision
of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29 Notably, a
judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in
legal contemplation.30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be
reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A
conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the
position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system.
As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."31
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its
effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the
military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as
to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely
mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it
was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest
lands are not registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest
are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and
its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title. (Emphasis supplied).33
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner
(upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable,
timber and mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the claimant as well
as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was
not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and
that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of
the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in
reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling
in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an
official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.37
Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private rights" to the property,
meaning her and her predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As
earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even
before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as
to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely
mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it
was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen
to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-
interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years
after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted
the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription,
pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared
and cultivated under the ‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting
of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course
to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere
occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures,
or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title
thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.38
xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner
also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus
rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her
application for registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that
the same was null and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a
contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic,
through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land
Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG
when it executed the agreement with her.40 The lack of authority on the part
of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and
void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases
involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of
the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for
respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of
Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special authority" for
attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client’s litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.
(Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a
contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including
future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to
law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of
petitioner’s withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that
portion of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was
withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation.
The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter
of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably
be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.
That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this
Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by
stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what
she perceived as this Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in rendering
"impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my
lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for
Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the
case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises
utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the
Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial
justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the
fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no
choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from
the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the
good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that
the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration
that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her
baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in
response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed
against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase,
involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the
tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to
the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became
justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which
he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play
– for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her
piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in
the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors’
sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court
temper its strike with compassion – as her letter to the Chief Justice was never
written with a view of threatening the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of
the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s irresponsible insinuations and
threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever
and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation
of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice
with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a
careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters
pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent
issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the
appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s denial of her petition
through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process
as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable
jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue
decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute
resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a
case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the
Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are
deemed sustained.42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing
three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion
subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further
pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable persistence
constitutes utter defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the rules of
procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the
media to gain public sympathy – although the tone of petitioner’s compliance
with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier
letters – constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a
declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the
parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of
this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right
to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision
late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the
CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied?
It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his
client’s lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a
statement in her petition to this Court that:
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the
proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings
it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992
Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L.
Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and
the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s
successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis
supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s cause at all. If anything,
it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her
counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED
and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is
DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt the opinion of the Court’s Division.
of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be
dealt with more severely. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Treble costs against petitioner. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED. Manila

RENATO C. CORONA SECOND DIVISION

Associate Justice
Chairperson G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

WE CONCUR: SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,

vs.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
. DECISION
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice BRION, J.:

ATTESTATION Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners,
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16,
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the 20052 and the resolution dated June 27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Court’s Division. CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set aside the decision dated May
7, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
RENATO C. CORONA 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.
Associate Justice
Chairperson THE BACKGROUND FACTS

CERTIFICATION In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of
a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora
Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and
Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972,
Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente.
Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo
sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated
May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the
application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since
no private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of
general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the
Republic.6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for
registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the
spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including that of their
predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an
owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years."8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses
Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the
lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also
claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s evidence – Tax Declaration No. 8366 –
showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to
meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the
alienable and disposable nature of the land,10 they failed to show that they
complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June
12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366
only showed that the spouses Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora,
proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its decision
in its resolution dated June 27, 2006.11
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA
rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942.
RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an
agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be
since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in
Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977
and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and
published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et
al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD
should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979,
respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year
requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession
dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does
not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The
failure to present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948
was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessor’s
Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due to the
outbreak of World War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the
spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed
the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a
statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the
back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos.
10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that
there was already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they
rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was
also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the
subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided
in a place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed
by these lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was
owned by Pastora because the latter’s family had constructed a house and
planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of
Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the
RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462,
27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision has
lapsed into finality unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be
considered to prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373
is a separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject
property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest.
Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in
LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of
evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and
competency of Macaria[.]"17
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied mostly on
the CA’s ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the
dismissal of the petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove
their compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable
lands of the public domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or
timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.19 Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural
land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any
applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA
provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically,
Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a public land
has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public
lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through
a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land
to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered
by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.21
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of
title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by
establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C.
Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military
reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record,
neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the
subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the above documents is
evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties’ alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very
least, only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification through
survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that [t]he
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by
the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land
as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not
the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or
the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title
through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the
alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground
to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to
address the other important legal issues raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of
alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the
public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by
Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth,
eighteen hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year
period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended
by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by
requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years – from 1945
up to its enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively impairs the vested
rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required
under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose possession commenced only
after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073
amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30 that
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have
been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the
[PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly
30 years counted backward from January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD
No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was
enacted; based on the certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No.
1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than
its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact materially affects
the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect
upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera,
etc., et al.32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its
effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to
mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977.
This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947.
In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application for
registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that
they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543
both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest,
in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn
statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While
these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves
that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax
declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of
Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession
and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366
shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as
cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as
"cogonal."36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366
by relying on Macaria’s testimony in a separate land registration proceeding,
LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to
school, and she saw Pastora’s family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing
trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria’s
testimony constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in
cases of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of
land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These
parcels of land were covered by three separate applications for registration, to
wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq. m.,
commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area
of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of
2,597 sq. m.
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in
LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastora’s ownership, be taken into
account in resolving the present case.
 Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of the grounds
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna.
previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the
Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed acts of possession and occupation (as SO ORDERED.
testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size of
the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess ARTURO D. BRION
and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of Associate Justice
possession and occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As
mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," WE CONCUR:
thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said
that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's Chairperson
possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses
Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as alienable lands of Associate Justice Associate Justice
the public domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met
the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
rules of evidence or consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our Associate Justice
directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38
CERTIFICATION
Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such the opinion of the Court's Division.
proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim
with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever ANTONIO T. CARPIO
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it Acting Chief Justice
retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the
resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143
are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda