DEL CASTILLO’S CASES (2009-2018) AND RECENT SC DECISIONS

JUDGE MARLO CAMPANILLA

1. Territoriality - For purpose of venue and territoriality principle in

Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the place of commission of the criminal
act and the place of occurrence of the effect of such act which is an
element of the offense shall be considered. If one pulled the trigger of his
gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in manila who died as a
consequence, Quezon City and manila, which are the places of commission
of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are proper
venues. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity
punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in a foreign land but the
psychological effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife and the
children of the respondent, who suffered mental anguish, are residing in
the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction (see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R.
no. 212448, January 11, 2018). However, if the commission of the criminal
act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is not an element of the
crime, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be considered for
purpose of venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in a foreign
land is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse
is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy to
him/her is not an element thereof.

2. Self-defense - For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there

must be an "actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude" and the accused
must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. For this
reason, Danny’s observation that one of the men was pulling an object
from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression. Threat,
even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be
attacked, is not sufficient. An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no
means enough. In this case, other than the self-serving allegation of
Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the
victim indeed attacked him (People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061 July 4,
2011, J. Del Castillo).

3. Minority - If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is

an exempting circumstance (Section 6 of RA No. 9344). Lack of
discernment is conclusively presumed. If the child is above 15 years of age,
minority is an exempting circumstance if he acted without discernment, or
privilege mitigating circumstance if he acted with discernment. This
privilege mitigating circumstance shall be appreciated even if minority was
not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented on appeal (People vs. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013,
J. Del Castillo) and even if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death
(People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).

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 4. Mitigating circumstance - Mitigating circumstance of praeter
intentionem cane be appreciated when there is a notable disparity between
the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting
crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed, and the injury sustained by the victim (People vs.
Buenamer, G.R. No. 206227, August 31, 2016).

Accused punched the victim twice causing him to fall to the ground,
and lost consciousness. Thereafter, the victim died. The argument of the
accused that that he should be held liable only for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide due to the absence of intent to kill victim is
untenable. When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the
crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with respect to crimes
of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for
all the consequences thereof. Under Article 4 of RPC, a person is liable for
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. However, the mitigating circumstance of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, was appreciated (Seguritan
vs. People, G.R. No. 172896 April 19, 2010, J. Del Castillo).

5. Aggravating circumstances - The aggravating circumstance of

dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance
to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually
entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that
the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may
have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without (People vs.
Tirso, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017).

Covering his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident conceal
his identity constitutes disguise as an aggravating circumstance (People
vs. Tirso, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017).

In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling

is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the crime may be
committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended
party's house. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode
(People vs. Bringcula, G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018).

Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but "a generic

aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property (People vs. Baron, G.R. No. 185209
June 28, 2010, J. Del Castillo). When abuse of superior strength obtains
in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to be regarded
as a generic circumstance, robbery with homicide being a composite crime
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with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code
(People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014, J. Del Castillo).

6. Compound crime - Slapping and pushing a public school

teacher, a person in authority, against a wall divider, while engaged in the
performance of duty is direct assault. Accused initiated her tirades against
the teacher. The fact that the teacher retaliated by similar verbal invectives
against the accused, does not mean that she as a person in authority
already descended to the level of a private person. If the victim suffered
abortion, the offender is liable for complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion since single act of assaulting a person in authority
constitutes two crimes. However, in this case, the prosecution failed to
prove that the proximate cause of the abortion is the commission of direct
assault since no doctor, who examined her, was not presented as witness
to testify on the causal connection between the two (Gelig vs. People, G.R.
No. 173150 July 28, 2010, J. Del Castillo).

7. Complex crime proper - When the offender commits on a public,

official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime proper
(Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013, J. Del Castillo).

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be

a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already
been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to
defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification
of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa (Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013, J.
Del Castillo; People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014, J. Del
Castillo).

Presenting to the complainant a falsified BIR receipt to make it

appears that accused paid the capital gains tax for the real property
bought by the former constitutes complex crime of estafa through
falsification of document (Pascual vs. People, G.R. No. 204873, July 27,
2016, J. Del Castillo).

a. Receiving property with consent of the owner - If the accused

received the property with the consent of the owner but he merely acquired
physical possession in doing so, misappropriation shall be considered as
taking without consent; hence, the crime committed is theft (U.S. v. De
Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921) or qualified theft (People v.
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Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012, J. Del Castillo). If the
accused received the property with the consent of the owner and he
acquired legal possession in doing so by virtue of trust, commission,
administration or obligation involving the duty to make delivery or return
such as lease, deposit, commodatum, or quasi-contract, misappropriation
shall be considered as estafa through conversion or misappropriation
(Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; D’Aigle vs. People,
G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012, J. Del Castillo). If the accused received the
property with the consent of the owner and he acquired ownership in
doing so by virtue of a contract such as sale, mutuum or loan, failure to
perform obligation under such contract is neither theft nor estafa since the
same is purely civil in character (People vs. Montemayor, G.R. No. L-17449,
August 30, 1962).

As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller,

collector or cash custodian is only physical. Hence, misappropriation of
property is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the
property is accessible to the employee (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No.
109595, April 27, 2000; People vs. Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18,
2012, J. Del Castillo). However, if the employee is an officer of the
company with discretion on how to use property or fund of the company to
further its interest, his possession is juridical; hence, misappropriation
thereof is estafa. Thus, the following officers are liable for estafa for
misappropriating company property: a. A bank president who held the
money in trust or administration for the bank in his fiduciary capacity with
discretion on how to administer such fund (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015,
August 6, 2014, J. Del Castillo); b. A corporate treasurer who received the
money for safe-keeping and administration (U.S. vs. Sevilla, G.R. No.
18056, March 16, 1922; c. A corporate officer with discretion option on
how to use bending machine without the participation of the corporation
(D’Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012, J. Del Castillo).
However, in Remo vs. Devanadera, G.R. No. 192925, December 9, 2016,
the Supreme Court ruled that directors of a corporation have no juridical
possession over the corporate funds.

b. Receiving the property through deceit - If the accused received

the property through deceit but he merely acquired physical possession in
doing so, misappropriation shall be considered as taking without consent;
hence, the crime committed is theft (People vs. Maglaya, L-29243,
November 28, 1969, L-29243). If the bank president received bank fund
through deceit by using falsified loan documents with fictitious borrower,
and misappropriated the money, he is liable for complex crime of complex
crime of estafa through misappropriation through falsification of
commercial documents. His possession over the funds is legal. He did not
acquired ownership over the property since he is holding the bank fund
under trust or administration in his fiduciary capacity (People vs. Go, G.R.
No. 191015, August 06, 2014, J. Del Castillo; Soriano v. People, G.R. No.
162336 February 1, 2010, J. Del Castillo). If a bank manager received
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bank fund through deceit by using falsified promissory note with fictitious
borrower and falsified endorsement on the check issued by the bank, he is
liable for complex crime of estafa through false pretense through
falsification of commercial documents (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No.
179448, June 26, 2013, J. Del Castillo). If a bank employee stole blank
cashier check, falsified the authorized signatory of the check, and received
money from the bank through deceit by presenting the falsified check for
encashment, he is liable for complex crime of qualified theft through
falsification of commercial document. Deceit shall be considered as a
continuation and natural development of the theft, which was previously
committed (People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001).

The bank president in addition to the charge of estafa by

misappropriation through falsification of document can be charged with
DOSRI violation. Under Section 83 of RA 337, DOSRI violation can
committed by officer of the bank by borrowing either directly or indirectly,
from the bank. In this case, the president borrowed indirectly from the
bank by making a fictitious loan (Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 162336
February 1, 2010, J. Del Castillo).

8. Penalty - The special aggravating circumstance of syndicated or

organize crime group under Article 62 of RPC cannot be appreciated in
carnapping if the same is not alleged in the information (People vs. Mallari,
G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013, J. Del Castillo). However, even this
circumstance is alleged in the information and proven by evidence, the
same shall not be appreciated in carnaping since RA No. 10883, the new
carnapping law, did not adopt the technical nomenclature of the penalty
under the Revised Penal Code (e.g. the penalty for simple carnapping is not
more than 20 years but not less than 30 years). Since the penalty is not
borrowed from the Code, it cannot be applied in its maximum period by
taking into consideration syndicated or organize crime group.

Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27

of RPC and 30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592
if the convict has undergone preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty
than life imprisonment, which has no duration. Amendatory law, which
prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment, shall be given a
retroactive effect for being favorable to the accused (People vs. Morilla, GR
No. 189833, February 5, 2014; Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229
October 19, 2011, J. Del Castillo).

Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27

of RPC and 30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592
if the convict has undergone preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty
than life imprisonment, which has no duration. Amendatory law, which
prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment, shall be given a
retroactive effect for being favorable to the accused (People vs. Morilla, GR

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No. 189833, February 5, 2014; Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229
October 19, 2011, J. Del Castillo).

Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the penalty of

reclusion perpetua to death. Applying rules for application of indivisible
penalties (Article 63), the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
applied if there are two mitigating circumstance. The penalty cannot be
lowered to reclusion temporal, no matter how many mitigating
circumstances are present. The special mitigating circumstance is found in
rules for application of divisible penalties (Article 64), which is not
applicable because the penalty is not divisible (People vs. Takbobo, G.R.
No. No. 102984, June 30, 1993; People vs. Sales, G.R. No. 177218 October
3, 2011, J. Del Castillo). The Takbobo principle is also applicable if the
penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed is a single indivisible
penalty such as reclusion perpetua.

Under Article 78 of RPC, no penalty shall be executed except by

virtue of a final judgment. Subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty since
under Article 39 of RPC, it is imposed upon the accused and served by him
in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. Where the
judgement finding the accused guilty does not impose subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine by reason of insolvency, the
court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment.
To rule otherwise is to violate RPC and the constitutional provision on due
process (People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018).

9. Failure to render an accounting - In People vs. Lumauig, G.R.

No.166680, July 7, 2014, J. Del Castillo, the accused received cash
advance for payment of the insurance coverage of motorcycles purchased
by the Municipality in 1994. Under COA Circular, accused is required to
liquidate the same within 20 days after the end of the year or on or before
January 20, 1995. To avoid criminal liability under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code, he must liquidate the cash advance within two
months from January 20, 1995 or on or before March 20, 1995. The
accused was liable for failure to render account because it took him over
six years before settling his accounts. Demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime is not required. Article 218
merely provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to
render account.

Same as in malversation, the offender in failure to render accounting

under Article 218 of RPC is also an accountable officer (People vs.
Lumauig, G.R. No.166680, July 7, 2014, J. Del Castillo). If an
accountable officer misappropriated the cash advance that he received, the
crime committed is malversation (People vs. Icdang, G.R. No. 185960,
January 25, 2012; People vs. Devalos, G.R. No. 145229, April 20, 2006).
However, if an accountable officer did not misappropriate the cash
advance since he was able to account the same, but the accounting was
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delayed for more than two months after such accounts should be
rendered, the crime committed is failure to render an accounting (People
vs. Lumauig, supra).

Same as in malversation, return of the money in the amount in

which the accountable officer failed to render an accounting is a mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender (People vs. Lumauig, G.R.
No.166680, July 7, 2014, J. Del Castillo).

10. Murder or homicide - Firing his firearm at the residence of the

victims, killing two and inflicting injuries another murder and attempted
murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery (People vs. Tirso, G.R.
No. 214757, March 29, 2017).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by

the offender and the parts of the victim’s body at which the weapon was
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon,
like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter’s abdomen, the intent to
kill can be presumed (Roque vs. People, G.R. No. 193169 April 6, 2015, J.
Del Castillo).

In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the relationship can

either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, grandparent
or grandchild, the relationship must be legitimate (People vs. Gamez, GR
No. 202847, October 23, 2013; People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218 October
3, 2011, J. Del Castillo). Relationship in parricide is by blood except
where the victim is spouse (Regalado). The qualifying circumstance of
relationship in parricide is personal. Hence, it can be appreciated against
the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is not related to her
husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March 15, 1922).

11. Rape - In rape through sexual intercourse (organ rape or penile

rape), there must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the perpetrator’s penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to
ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. In rape by sexual
assault, the perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called
"instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower
"homosexual rape" (People vs. Gaduyon, G.R. No. 181473 November 11,
2013 J. Del Castillo).

If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is

absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29,
2002). But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through
sexual assault. Inserting lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal
orifice of the victim and raping her constitutes two counts of rape by
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sexual assault and rape through sexual intercourse (People vs.
Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014, J. Del Castillo). Inserting
the penis into the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice
constitutes rape through sexual assault and organ rape (In People vs.
Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).

If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of

lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the
variance rule. Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily
included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is rape through sexual
intercourse, but the crime proven is rape through sexual assault, the
accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not
applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in
the charge of rape through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two
crimes are materially and substantially different. In such case, the
accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, which is necessarily
included in the charge of rape through sexual intercourse (People vs.
Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No.
196051, October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652, February 25,
2015).

The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish that Edwin had

carnal knowledge of AAA (4 years old). Michael's testimony did not show
that Edwin had carnal knowledge with AAA. He only testified that he saw
Edwin holding AAA's vagina. Under the variance doctrine, even though the
crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge,
he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child subjected to sexual abuse under 12 years of age under the
Revised Penal Code in relation to RA No. 7610 without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape
(People vs. Dagsa, G.R. No. 219889, January 29, 2018).

In the information for rape, it was alleged that rape committed thru
force and intimidation. But the evidence shows that the victim was under
the state of unconsciousness. However, the information, which fails to
allege that the offense was committed while the victim was unconscious, is
deemed cured by the failure of the accused to question before the trial
court the sufficiency of the information or by his failure to object to the
presentation of evidence tending to establish that the crime was committed
through such means. Apparently, accused participated in the trial without
raising any objection to the prosecution's evidence. Besides, the victim’s
unconsciousness was the direct result of the force employed by accused
when he boxed the former on her stomach (People vs. Lagangga, G.R. No.
207633 December 9, 2015, J. Del Castillo).

Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under RA No.

8353 is Section 266-D, which provides “Any physical overt act manifesting
resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or
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where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of
giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution rape”
(People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012). The legislators
agreed that Article 266-D is intended to soften the jurisprudence on
tenacious resistance (People vs. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23,
2002). Indeed, failure to offer tenacious resistance does not make the
submission by the victim to the criminal acts of the accused voluntary.
What is necessary is that the force employed against her be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he has in mind (People vs. Olesco, G.R.
No. 174861 April 11, 2011, J. Del Castillo; People vs. Nachor, G.R. No.
177779, December 14, 2010, J. Del Castillo). Failure to shout should not
be taken against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September
04, 2013; People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs.
Penilla, GR No. 189324, March 20, 2013). It is not necessary for the victim
to sustain physical injuries. She need not kick, bite, hit or scratch the
offender with her fingernails to prove that she had been defensive (People
vs. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004). Well-settled is the rule
that where the victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist
is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo,
such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission
to the lustful desires of the rapist (G.R. No. 176740 June 22, 2011, People
v. Dumadag, J. Del Castillo).

Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of

rape (People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an
ingredient of the qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which must
be alleged in the information (People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March
24, 2014; People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012; (People v.
Madeo, G.R. No. 176070 October 2, 2009, J. Del Castillo)

If the female consents to have sexual intercourse with the accused,

but then withdraws her consent before penetration, and the act is
accomplished by force, it is rape (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932,
October 19, 2011). However, if the female tacitly consents to have sexual
intercourse with the accused, but then withdraws her consent in the
course of sexual intercourse because she felt pain, and the act is not rape.
It would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman
who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her
tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed
her mind in the middle and charged him with rape (see: People vs. Tionloc,
G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017, J. Del Castillo).

In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and

special aggravating circumstance in sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, the
guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. He
must be legally appointed was first (People vs. Flores G.R. No.
188315, August 25, 2010).

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 The Pruna guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, are as follows.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an

original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic

documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to

have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if
clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either
by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is

sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is

sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is

sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or

the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s
age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the

age of the victim People vs. Albalate, G.R. No. 174480 December 18, 2009,
J. Del Castillo).

The Maria Clara or women’s honor doctrine is a standard used by

the court in assessing the credibility of a rape victim. Under this principle,
women of decent repute, especially Filipinos, would not publicly admit that
she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural
instinct to protect her honor. However, the factual setting in 1960 when
the "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence is that it is
natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault.
However, the women today have over the years transformed into a strong
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and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her
rights. Thus, in assessing the credibility of a rape victim, the Maria Clara
standard should not be used. The testimony of the victim must be
evaluated without gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to
weed out the Maria Clara notions because an accused may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the victim (People vs. Amarela, G.R. Nos.
225642-43, January 17, 2018, the Supreme Court, Third Division).

12. Piracy - Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is

defined as bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays
around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all
other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including
territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. Thus, a river in
a municipality is considered as part of Philippine waters for purpose of
piracy (People vs. Dela Pena, G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018, J. Del
Castillo).

13. Theft - Theft becomes qualified when it is, among others,

committed with grave abuse of confidence. The grave abuse of confidence
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship,
or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might
create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant
abused (People vs. Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012, J. Del
Castillo).

The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it

capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts or
any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation (P1
million) made by the complainant, the courts may either apply the lowest
penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on
the attendant circumstances of the case. In this case, the court imposed
the lowest penalty (People vs. Mejares, G.R. No. 225735, January 10,
2018).

14. Robbery by using force upon thing - A store used as a house is

not a dwelling for purpose of appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of dwelling. A dwelling must be a shelter exclusively used for rest
and comfort (US vs. Baguio, G.R. No. 5332, October 4, 1909). However, for
purpose of trespass to dwelling and robbery by using force upon thing, a
store used as a house is a dwelling or inhabited house (People vs. Tubog,
G.R. No. L-26284, Nov. 17, 1926; People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. 43530,
August 3, 1935). For purpose of robbery by using for upon thing
committed inside the store located at the first floor while the second floor
is used as a dwelling, a store shall be considered as a dependency of an
inhabited house (U.S. vs. Ventura, G.R. No. L-13715, January 22, 1919).
For purpose of robbery by using for upon thing committed inside the store,
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which is not used as a house, the store shall be considered as a private
building (Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 181138 December 3, 2012, J. Del
Castillo).

The Information did not specify whether the robbery with force upon
things was committed in an inhabited house, or uninhabited house or
private building. It merely stated that accused committed the robbery by
destroying the door lock of the stall. Hence, they can only be convicted of
the lesser crime of robbery in a private building (Marquez vs. People, G.R.
No. 181138 December 3, 2012, J. Del Castillo).

15. Falsification - Commercial documents such as promissory note

and check are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions (Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013, J.
Del Castillo).

16. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a

complaint affidavit for theft based on the execution of affidavit of
desistance. There is no perjury solely on the basis of two contradictory
statements. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence
other than the contradictory statement (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902;
Masangkay vs. People, G.R. No. 164443, June 18, 2010, J. Del Castillo).

17. Estafa through misappropriation - Demand is not an element

of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint
for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be convicted of estafa if the
prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the
money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion (People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015. August 6, 2014, J. Del
Castillo).

Even a verbal query satisfies the requirement on the prima facie

evidence of misappropriation, which is an element of estafa (People v. Go,
G.R. No. 191015. August 6, 2014, J. Del Castillo)

18. Qualified carnapping - To prove the special complex crime of

carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential
elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of
the culprit and the killing of owner, driver or occupant of the vehicle was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping (People vs.
Mallari, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013, J. Del Castillo).

19. Collective responsibility - When a homicide takes place by

reason or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or
Page 12 of 19
not they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that they
had endeavored to prevent the killing (Crisostomo vs. People, G.R. No.
171526 September 1, 2010, J. Del Castillo; People vs. Bongos, G.R. No.
227698, January 31, 2018, Justice Peralta).

Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime

charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does
not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to
the body of the person murdered or the weapons used in the commission
of robbery with homicide (People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September
22, 2014, J. Del Castillo).

20. Libel – The billboards erected by accused simply say "CADIZ

FOREVER", "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER". According to complainant,
Mayor of Cadiz, whose nickname is bading, the statement portrayed him
as tuta of the City of Sagay. According to the Supreme Court, there is
nothing in the subject billboards which state, either directly or indirectly,
that he is a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except for complainant, not a
single prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray him as a
"tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City. The controversial statement embarrassed
the complainant. But embarrassment is not automatically equivalent to
defamation. Words, which are merely insulting or offensive, are not
actionable as libel or slander per se. A public official may be attacked,
rightly or wrongly. He may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation
for an act committed in connection with his public function. But he must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts
(Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011, J. Del Castillo).

In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Domingo, G.R. No.

170341, July 5, 2017, the accused published an article where he stated
that these national employees should be commended for bringing into the
open this garbage that has piled up in their own backyard. To Joe Con's
successor, the chopping board is ready. All you need is a Muslim kris!
Palakulin mo, Pare ko!. This is not libelous. On the first statement, accused
is merely commending the DTI employees who brought into the open their
complaints against the private complainant in this case, a DTI officer. This
is a fair remark. The last three sentences merely meant that heads should
roll at the DTI office, which does not ascribe something deprecating
against complainant. Moreover, the statement does not refer to an
ascertained or ascertainable person.

In Belen vs. People,G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, accused

filed a motion for reconsideration of resolution dismissing a complaint for
estafa with irrelevant and defamatory statement against the investigating
prosecutor was filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to
the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of
Justice. Despite the fact that the motion was contained in sealed
envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than the one
Page 13 of 19
defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements in it. Hence, the
element of publicity in libel is present.

In Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, accused
filed a motion for reconsideration of resolution dismissing a complaint for
estafa. The accused alleged in the said motion the public prosecutor who
dismissed the case is corrupt, stupid, imbecile, mentally dishonest and
bereft of intellectual ability. This is not covered by the absolute privilege
communication rule since the defamatory allegations in the motion are not
relevant to the issue of whether or not the motion for reconsideration
should be granted because there is probable cause to charge the
respondent in the preliminary investigation for estafa.

Before a statement would come within the ambit of a privileged

communication, it must be established that: "1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; 2) the communication
is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought: and 3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice."
In the instant case, accused addressed the memorandum pertaining to the
mental condition of the complainant not only to the Plant Manager but
also to the staff of HPP. Undoubtedly, the staff of HPP were not accused's
superiors vested with the power of supervision over the complainant. They
do not have the power to furnish the protection sought. Though private
respondent is a public officer, certainly, the defamatory remarks are not
related or relevant to the discharge of her official duties but was purely an
attack on her mental condition which adversely reflect on her
reputation and dignity (Lagaya vs. People G.R. No. 176251, July 25, 2012,
J. Del Castillo).

21. RA No. 3019 – Section 3 of RA No. 3019 reads: “In addition to

acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer.” It is clear
then that one may be charged with violation of RA No. 3019 in addition to
a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same act (Ramiscal, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169727-28, August 18, 2006). Thus, the
offender in addition to violation of Section 3 RA No. 3019 can be held liable
for falsification of document by public official (Suero vs. People, G.R. No.
156408, January 31, 2005); or malversation through falsification of
document (Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008) or failure to
render an accounting (Lumauig vs. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014,
J. Del Castillo).

Under Section 3 of RA No. 3019, any incumbent public officer,

against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information for
Page 14 of 19
crime of corruption under RA 3019, crimes committed by public officer
under the RPC or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. The allegation of falsification of the three public documents by
making it appear that the flood control project was 100% complete when in
fact it was not constitutes fraud upon public funds, which is a ground to
preventively suspend a public officer (Abdul vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
184496 December 2, 2013, J. Del Castillo).

It cannot be denied that the transfer of the vehicles to SFWD was

made to ensure the success of the implementation of the waterworks
projects in the province. The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the
subject vehicles shall be used for the said purpose. There is no showing
that the accused acted in bad faith in donating the vehicles. Accused was
acquitted of violation of RA No. 3019 (Bustillo vs. People, G.R. No. 160718
May 12, 2010, J. Del Castillo).

The amount and number of loans (P16 million) obtained from the
government bank by the private company despite being undercapitalized
(P7 million capital stock) and absence of any action by the bank to collect
full payment are showing that the contract, which is manifestly
disadvantageous on the part of the government, violates Section 3 (g) of RA
No. 3019. The private individual, who obtained that loan, and the
responsible bank officers are liable for the crime of corruption. Private
persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019
if they conspired with the public officer in consonance with the avowed
policy of this law, which is to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons (Singian, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-19
September 30, 2013, J. Del Castillo).

Accused, as a school principal, acted with evident bad faith in

refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants as
ordered by the CHED. Her refusal to implement the subject promotion was
based on a personal dislike or ill feelings towards the complainants and
not anchored on any law or civil service rule. Despite of the several
directives of the CHED to implement the promotion, the accused refused to
do so. The complainants suffered undue injury they failed to enjoy the
benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed
positions. Accused was convicted of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019 (Catacutan vs. People, G.R. No. 175991 August 31, 2011, J. Del
Castillo).

22. Inordinate delay doctrine – Inordinate delay in resolving a

criminal complaint is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, which warrants the
dismissal of the criminal case. Delay prejudices the accused or respondent
and the State just the same. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of
the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
Page 15 of 19
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.

In Coscolluela, the fact that it took the Ombudsman eight years to

resolve a case under preliminary investigation was considered violative of
the right to speedy disposition of cases. In Cervantes, it took the OSP six
years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before deciding to file an
information; this was struck down as well. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, a
three-year delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan was considered violative of the right. In Lopez, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four
years from the time all the counter- and reply-affidavits were submitted to
the Ombudsman, and this was similarly struck down. In People v.
Sandiganbayan, the fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation by the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months,
which the Court considered an inordinate delay. The same is true
in Angchangco, Jr., and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the delay
involved a period of six years, more or less. In Licaros, the failure of
the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of more than 10
years after it was submitted for decision was declared to involve "more
than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings. In this case, the
preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more than 11 long
years to resolve. Thus, the case against petitioner should be dismissed
(Almeda vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016, J.
Del Castillo).

23. RA No. 9165 - The chain of custody refers to recorded

authorized movements and custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. It
involves testimony on every link in the chain - from the confiscation of the
illegal drugs to its receipt in the forensic laboratory up to its presentation
in court. It is necessary that every person who touched the seized item
describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession; its condition when
received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
Generally, there are four links in said chain of custody: 1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug confiscated from the accused by
the apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the
investigating officer of said item to the forensic chemist for examination;
and, 4) the turnover and submission thereof from forensic chemist to the
court (People vs. Gajo, G.R. No. 217026, January 22, 2018).

Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the apprehending team shall

conduct physical inventory of the seized dangerous drugs and photograph
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the same in the presence of “at least four persons”, to wit: (1) the accused
or the person from whom such items were confiscated or his representative
or counsel; (2) media representatives (3) DOJ representative and (4) any
elected public official. However, RA No. 10640 amended Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 and relaxed this provision with respect to the persons required to
be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized
items. Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by RA No. 10640, the
inventory and photography of the seized items must be made in the
presence of “at least three persons”, to wit: (1) the accused or the person
from whom such items were confiscated or his representative or counsel;
(2) the media or representatives of National Prosecution Service and (3) any
elected public official. RA No. 9165 as amended uses the disjunctive “or” in
the phrase “the National Prosecution elected public official Service or the
media.” Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from
the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other (People
vs. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018).

The original version of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 did not provide the
place where the inventory and photography of the confiscated item shall be
conducted. However, Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by RA No.
10640 now includes a specification of locations where the physical
inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted. The amended
section uses the mandatory verb "shall" and now includes the following
proviso: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures (People vs. Que,
G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018).

The original version of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 did not provide the
effect of non-compliance of the rule on inventory and photography of the
confiscated item. Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by Republic Act
No. 10640, now includes a proviso that sanctions noncompliance under
"justifiable grounds": Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items (People vs. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31,
2018). The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they
even exist. Moreover, for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution
must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved (People vs. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018).

The police were able to explain the failure to conduct an inventory

and take photographs of the seized items. This is because of the
intervening fact that one Illuminado Acosta was shot at the time of the
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buy-bust operation (People vs. Flor, G.R. No. 216017, January 19, 2018,
J. Del Castillo).

The absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a photograph of

the seized items are not sufficient justifications to acquit the appellant as
the Court in several cases has affirmed convictions despite the failure of
the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as
long as the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti of the crime are
preserved (People vs. Villahermoso, G.R. No. 218208, January 24, 2018, J.
Del Castillo).

Non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not fatal

and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is
that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items was
properly preserved and safeguarded through an unbroken chain of custody
(People vs. Aplat, G.R. No. 191727 March 31, 2014, J. Del Castillo).

It must be noted that whatever relevant information the poseur-

buyer may have was also equally known to the police officers who testified
for the prosecution during trial. Hence, the testimony of the poseur-buyer
was not indispensable or necessary; it would have been cumulative merely,
or corroborative at best (People vs. Perondo, G.R. No. 193855 February 18,
2015, J. Del Castillo).

Section 86 of RA No. 9165, which declares PDEA shall be the "lead

agency" in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases, is
more of an administrative provision. It is silent as to the consequences of
failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA
prior to conducting a buy-bust operation (People vs. Berdadero, G.R. No.
179710 June 29, 2010, J. Del Castillo). Lack of coordination with the
PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not
an indispensable requirement in buy-bust operations (People vs. Mendosa,
G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012).

Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime

involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. However, this
provision was declared as unconstitutional for contrary to the rule making
authority of the Supreme Court (Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No.
226679, August 15, 2017).

24. BP Blg. 22 - In addition to proof of receipt of the notice of

dishonor, the prosecution must also establish beyond reasonable doubt
the date when the accused received the notice of dishonor. Without proof
of the date of receipt, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period
under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end. The MeTC cannot simply
presume that the date of the demand letter (November 30, 1993) was
Page 18 of 19
likewise the date of when the accused received it. There is simply no such
presumption provided in our rules on evidence (Chua vs. People, G.R. No.
196853 July 13, 2015, J. Del Castillo).

The stipulation on the existence of the demand letter and of

accused’s signature thereon is not admission that he received the demand
letter. In fact, the accused is denying the receipt of the demand letter and
claimed that he was required to sign blank papers where the contents of
the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated (Chua
vs. People, G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015, J. Del Castillo).

A demand letter that precedes the issuance of checks cannot

constitute as sufficient notice of dishonor within the contemplation of BP
22 (Chua vs. People, G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015, J. Del Castillo).

Acquittal of the accused for violation of BP Blg. 22 for failure to

establish receipt of notice of dishonor does not entail the extinguishment
of his civil liability for the dishonored checks (Chua vs. People, G.R. No.
196853 July 13, 2015, J. Del Castillo).

25. Trafficking in person - Accompanying a child and offering her

sexual services in exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The
accused who offered the victim to the one who raped her is not liable for
rape as principal indispensable cooperation since bringing the victim to
the rapist is not indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape
(People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused is
regularly offering the sexual service of the child in exchange for money, the
crime committed is not anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring
the child as purpose of prostitution constitutes qualified trafficking in
person because the former took advantage of vulnerability of the latter as a
child and as one who need money. Minority is qualifying circumstance
(People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014; People vs. Hirang,
G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017). Recruiting without license a person,
child or adult, to work as a prostitute abroad constitutes the crime of
trafficking in person and illegal recruitment. Syndicate is qualifying
circumstance in both crimes. Even if the accused is less than three, but
the allegation and evidence shows that there are at least three traffickers
and recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying circumstance
(People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People vs. Hashim,
G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012).

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