G.R. No.

187728 September 12, 2011

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
and PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order 1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal
case for rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the Resolution 2 dated
March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.

The records reveal the following antecedent facts.

On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement before an
Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated that she was raped by herein private respondent on
October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary investigation of the
case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against private respondent, so he voluntarily
surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004 and was then incarcerated at the
Sogod Municipal Jail.

On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced
on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent presented evidence. Thus,
on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post bail set at
₱200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was released from confinement.

Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the
subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte. 3 The Prosecutor's
Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private respondent and,
accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of arrest was immediately
issued against private respondent.

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention 4 and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order5 stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and
arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a
Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the RTC
cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on said
motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody
appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the Order 6 dated August 20, 2008 resetting the
arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:

x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant prosecutor x x x to appear
and prosecute this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up to the termination of the
trial of this case otherwise this Court will order the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or nolle
prosequi.7

On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing,8 manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the
authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled arraignment on
October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The
hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order 9issued on the same day, that
unless restrained by a higher court, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not
sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's right
to a speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for the purpose of arraignment.
Pre-trial was set for November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-trial was cancelled (per
Order10 dated November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a PHILJA Seminar, and
pre-trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of the pre-trial itself, the
private prosecutor again filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, again using as justification the
pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order on even date, reading as follows:

During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the public prosecutors of Leyte, the private
prosecutor and the private complainant failed to appear despite proper notices sent [to] them. A motion
for cancellation of hearing was filed by the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr. for reasons
stated therein to which this Court finds to be not meritorious, hence, the same is denied. x x x the public
prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were directed to make their oral comments on the first
endorsement of the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator, regarding the motion to transfer venue of this
case to any of the RTC, at Tacloban City, x x x.

x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters concerning the amicable settlement, plea
bargaining agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking of documentary exhibits, number of witnesses,
trial dates and nature of the defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial in order to
expedite the early disposition of this case, the pre-trial proper is now deemed terminated. 11

The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for December 12, 2008. On
December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for accused private
respondent to move for dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private respondent's
motion to dismiss was denied per Order 12dated December 12, 2008, and hearing was reset to January
16, 2009.

Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the
notice of the January 16, 2009 hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for another
case he was handling, set for the very same date. Thus, in the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC
disposed, thus:

x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two public prosecutors designated by the
Department of Justice to prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.

A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private prosecutor, but the same is denied being in
violation of the three (3) day rule in filing written postponements. After hearing the arguments coming
from both the public prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the defense, the Court deems it
proper to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said counsel. Considering that the accused
has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the present and to allow him to stay in jail for a single
minute, it is quite unreasonable and would violate his right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to be based on grounds that are
meritorious, this Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be "8493"] hereby
orders this case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.13

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per Resolution dated March
16, 2009.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape case
against private respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed by the trial
court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in double jeopardy.

The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,14 the Court,
quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,15 ruled thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers
must strictly observe.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court found
compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal,17 the Court
opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be
one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence, the Court also finds sufficient
reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of double jeopardy, necessitating a look
into the merits of the petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too hurriedly,
despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now
incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not
limited to the following:

xxxx
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;

x x x x18

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the time
limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning the accused.
The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said
time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during which the
petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the
time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact,
already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order 19 dated November 24, 2008
on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008. 20 This
means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday
or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the
December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was
constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit.
Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the
RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper
courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing
and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion. As set forth in the
narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court
processes.

Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of
venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,21 the Court held that "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."22 The
trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners'
motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer of venue.

The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case. The
Court's ruling in Tan v. People23 is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having
his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in
criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period
to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the
Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay.1âwphi1 Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the
State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining
whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.24

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from
November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an
Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months.
Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive.
Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him
great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal
case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where
there is no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against
herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing
the case against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

July 25, 2016

G.R. No. 199151-56

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, LT. GEN. LEOPOLDO S. ACOT, B/GEN. ILDEFONSO N.
DULINAYAN, LT. COL. SANTIAGO B. RAMIREZ, LT. COL. CESAR M. CARINO, MAJ. PROCESO T. SABADO,
MAJ. PACQUITO L. CUENCA, lLT. MARCELINO M. MORALES, M/SGT. ATULFO D. TAMPOLINO, REMEDIOS
"REMY" DIAZ, JOSE GADIN, JR., GLENN ORQUIOLA, HERMINIGILDA LLAVE, GLORIA BAYONA and
RAMON BAYONA JR., Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolutions dated September 16, 2011 and October 15, 2010 by public respondent
Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and to reinstate the six (6) Informations for
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" filed against all private respondents.

The assailed Resolution dated October 15, 2010 granted the motions to quash or dismiss filed by private
respondents Lt. Gen. Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), B/Gen. Ildefonso N. Dulinayan (Dulinayan ), Lt. Col.
Santiago B. Ramirez (Ramirez), Lt. Col. Cesar M. Carifio (Carino), Maj. Proceso T. Sabado (Sabado), Maj.
Pacquito L. Cuenca (Cuenca), 1Lt. Marcelino M. Morales (Morales), M/Sgt. Atulfo D.
Tampolino (Tampolino) and Remedios Diaz (Diaz). The assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2011
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the October 15, 2010 Resolution and granted the
motions to quash filed by respondents Jose Gadin, Jr. (Gadin), Glenn Orquiola (Orquiola), I-Ierminigilda
Llave (Llave), Gloria Bayona and Ramon Bayona, Jr. 2
The motions to quash or dismiss filed by private respondents were premised on the ground of inordinate
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their constitutional
rights to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of the cases.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Sometime on December 28, 1994, a letter-complaint was filed by one Carmelita U. Ramirez before the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO) alleging,
among others, that private respondents conspired and defrauded the government in the amount of
Eighty-Nine Million Pesos (P89M) through ghost deliveries.3 The complaint prompted the MOLEO to
immediately conduct a fact-finding investigation. It discovered that a similar fact-finding body within the
Philippine Air Force, more particularly the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG), found that based on
the audit of the AFP's Program and Evaluation and Management Analysis Division (PEMRAD), Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership OJ6, there were ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and
materials at the 5th Fighter Wing Basa Air Base amounting to P24,430,029.00 and unaccounted supplies
and materials worth P42,592,257.61.4

On February 22, 1995, the records and report of the OTIG were subsequently forwarded to the MOLEO,
after which, MOLEO commenced conducting the preliminary investigation against private
respondents.5The last counter-affidavit was filed on March 11, 1996. 6

On April 12, 1996, MOLEO Investigator Rudiger G. Falcis prepared a Resolution recommending that all
private respondents be indicted for six counts of Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and six counts of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents (Article 217, in
relation to Articles 171 and 172, of the Revised Penal Code). 7 Then Director Orlando C. Casimiro of the
Criminal and Administrative Investigation Bureau concurred in the findings, and the same was
recommended for approval by B/Gen Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret), Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. 8

On July 10, 1996, Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo Mendoza issued a Memorandum
recommending the filing of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and the dismissal of the charges for
Malversation of Public Funds.9This Memorandum was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Orlando
Casimiro.10

On January 12, 1998, Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo issued a Memorandum recommending the
dropping of charges against private respondents Acot and Dulinayan on the ground that the supplies
involved were among those that had undergone the regular and proper procedure. This
recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on March 2, 1998. 11 On even date,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto also approved the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 with the following note
- "with the modifications as to the respondents as recommended by SP Tamayo and as to the scope as
recommended by the OSP."12

On January 12, 1999, the case was subjected to another re-evaluation by the MOLEO. 13

In 2003, upon the assumption of then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, the case underwent another
thorough review upon the recommendation of the MOLEO. 14

On April 27, 2005, MOLEO, received the records of the case for the preparation of the Informations to be
filed with the court.15

On July 7, 2005, MOLEO, through its investigation team, issued a Memorandum recommending for
another thorough review of the case arguing against the dismissal of the charges against private
respondents Acot and Dulinayan.16 The Memorandum was recommended for approval by then Deputy
Ombudsman Orlando Casirniro.17

On September 19, 2005, then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo referred the case to the Office of the
Legal Affairs (OLA) for a thorough review of the case.18

On June 25, 2007, a Review Memorandum was prepared by Assistant Special Prosecutor Terence S.
Fernando and was recommended for approval by Assistant Ombudsman Dina Joy Tenala containing the
opinion of the OLA that "the April 12, 1996 Resolution did not become final and executory and that the
doctrine relied upon for the dismissal of the case against Acot and Dulinayan is not applicable and that
probable cause exists based on evidence."19

On October 23, 2008, then Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro approved the said Review
Mernorandum.20

On October 6, 2009, six Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan docketed as SB-09-CRM-0184
to 189 charging private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

The arraignment was set on November 20, 2009. On November 9, 2009, respondent Dulinayan filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion to Defer Arraignment. On December 1, 2009, respondent Acot
filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment. On February 8, 2010, a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss and for Deferment of Arraignment was filed by respondents Ramirez, Carifio, Sabado,
Cuenca and Morales wherein they adopted the motions of respondents Dulinayan and Acot. 21 On
February 19, 2010, a Motion to Quash was filed by respondent TampoliNo. 22

In their separate motions to quash, respondents Dulinayan, Acot, Ramirez, Carifio, Sabado, Cuenca and
Morales argued, among others, that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated when it took
the Office of the Ombudsman almost fifteen (15) years to file their case before the court.

In the Comment or Opposition filed by the petitioner, it stated that the respondents failed to invoke their
right which must also be weighed with the right of the State to prosecute citing the case of Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan.23 It further stated that the State should not be bound by the negligent act of its officers,
and the laxity in the filing of the case is prejudicial to the State because it stands to lose Eighty-Nine
Million Pesos (P89M).

In his Reply, respondent Dulinayan countered that the cited cases of Corpuz and Valencia24have different
factual antecedents. In the said cases, the delay was only one year and there was contributory
negligence on the part of the accused. He reiterated that it took more than seven (7) years before the
MOLEO requested a review of the Resolution of the Ombudsman and another four (4) years before the
Informations were filed. He did not have the opportunity to invoke his right before the Ombudsman
because he was not informed of the existence of the cases considering that he was able to secure
clearance therefrom. His constitutional rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights take precedence over the
rights of the State.

In his Reply, respondent Acot asserted that there was a power play within the Office of the Ombudsman
considering that despite prior dismissal of the case against him, it was still subjected to review seven
years later and a contrary recommendation was issued after four (4) more years. He claimed that the
internal politics in the instant case was akin to the case of People v. Tatad.25

In its Supplemental Comment/Opposition, the petitioner averred that considering the huge amount
involved in the case, it had to be reviewed meticulously and scrupulously such that the resolution
underwent a hierarchy of review which called for a painstaking and fastidious study of the records of the
case.

On October 15, 2010, public respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motions to
quash on the ground that the aforesaid private respondents' right to speedy disposition of their cases
was unduly violated, thus:

A careful reading of the April 12, 1996 Resolution of the Ombudsman and the Memoranda issued reveals
that this initial Resolution was the one which resulted from [the] painstaking study of the documents
gathered vis-a-vis the counter-affidavits of the respondents. Noteworthy is the fact that the prosecution
did not offer any other explanation as to the delay of the review of the Resolution except that the case
had to be reviewed meticulously and scrupulously, that the Resolution underwent a hierarchy of review
and calls for painstaking and fastidious study of the records of the case. Upon review by OLA, no new
documents were studied but there was merely a revisit of the cited case. Such would not require a
"painstaking study or grueling review" as claimed by the Prosecution. Thus, the length of time it took to
conduct its review is undoubtedly more than what was called for.

Though the Prosecution points out that accused failed to seasonably assert their right, it must be
emphasized that the prosecution has not espoused a justifiable reason for the delay in the review of the
April 12, 1996 Resolution. We reiterate that the review of the said Resolution did not involve any new
computations nor any other ocular inspections. It was merely a revisit and an evaluation of records
already at hand and of the cited Arias case and the reasons espoused for the dismissal of the cases
against Dulinayan and Acot. Neither new findings nor major changes were reflected in the said
Resolution.

Thus, the length of seven (7) years of review is obviously vexatious and oppressive. Likewise, the length
of fifteen (15) years to hold the Preliminary Investigation is too long a time to conduct it, considering the
circumstances of the case. As to the claim of the Prosecution that the accused failed to assert its rights,
we quote the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cervantes:

The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan (220 SCRA 55, 64) alleging that as in Alvizo the
petitioner herein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step
whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter."

We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily
resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not
object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes
directly attributable to him.

We must highlight the fact that there is no contributory act on the part of the accused that resulted in
the delay of the Preliminary Investigation.

Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, and after considering that the right of the
accused-movants to the speedy disposition of their cases and the right of the State to punish people
who violated its penal laws should be balanced, this Court resolves to grant the Motions of accused. The
prosecution has utterly failed to justify the inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation of these
cases.26

On October 15, 2010, respondent Gadin filed a Motion to Quash Information and Defer
Arraignment.27 On October 28, 2010, respondents Orquiola and Llave filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
same grounds raised by the other respondents. 28 On November 7, 2010, respondents Gloria Bayona and
Ramon Bayona, Jr. jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss. 29

Respondents Gadin, Orquiola, Llave, Gloria Bayona and Ramon Bayona, Jr. contended, among others,
that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated due to the inordinate delay in the preliminary
investigation of the case. Respondent Gadin argued that the delay deprived him from adequately
defending himself since the witnesses who could testify in the processes and procedures in the Finance
Department of the Philippine Air Force are no longer available and some of the documents he could
have used for his defense could not anymore be found.

On November 2, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution
dated October 15, 2010. On September 9, 2011, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the motions to quash filed by respondents Gadin, Orquiola, Llave, Bayona
and Bayona, Jr.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioners impute to public respondent Sandiganbayan grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted all of private respondents' motion
to quash and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On January 12, 2012, the Court resolved to require private respondents to comment on the instant
petition.30

We first tackle the propriety of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the
Comment filed by respondents Tampolino, Ramirez, Carifio, Sabado, Cuenca, Morales, Orquiola and
Llave, they stated that the remedy of the petitioner should have been appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
because the issue is allegedly purely legal citing the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, et al.31 According
to the aforesaid respondents, the Resolution of the public respondent Sandiganbayan which quashed the
Informations was a final order that finally disposed of the case such that the proper remedy is a petition
for review under Rule 45. And that, the petition was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period
within which to file an appeal.

We do not agree.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for
review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an
allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of
appeal:32

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court, or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will
thereby be placed in double jeopardy." Therefore, the judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved
party envisaged in Rule 45 is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The
State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review. 33
Instead, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People
is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. 34

In the case of People v. Asis,35 it was held that:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-
acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not
without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.x x x

Thus, the instant petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in seeking to annul the Resolutions of public
respondent Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which granted the motions to quash
or dismiss filed by private respondents which were premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their rights to speedy disposition of
their cases.

We go now to the issue of whether there was a violation of the right of the private respondents to
speedy disposition of their cases. This right is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, which declares:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial.36 In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.37This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 38

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.39 Hence, the doctrinal i·ule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay.40

In the case at bar, the investigatory process was set in motion on December 28, 1994 when the
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, and the last Counter-Affidavit was filed on March
11, 1996. The Graft Investigation Officer came up with a Resolution on April 12, 1996, or after one (1)
year, three (3) months and fifteen (15) days from the start of the investigation proceedings.

The Resolution dated April 12, 1996 recommended the filing of charges against the private respondents
of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 and Article 217, in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.

According to the petitioner, the Resolution was not immediately approved by the higher authorities of
the Office of the Ombudsman because it was allegedly subjected to "painstaking scrutiny and
review."41 And that, as a result of this "painstaking scrutiny and review," two Memoranda were issued
dated July 10, 1996 and January 12, 1998.

The Memorandum dated July 10, 1996 of Special Prosecution Officer Reynaldo Mendoza, which was
approved by Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, contained a recommendation that only cases for Violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 should be filed. The Memorandum dated January 12, 1998, which was issued by
Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo, recommended the dismissal of the cases against Acot and
Dulinayan. The recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on March 2, 1998. On
the same date, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 with the
following note - "with the modifications as to the respondents as recommended by SP Tamayo and as to
the scope as recommended by the OSP " Otherwise stated, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 was
finally approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on March 2, 1998, but with modification so as to
incorporate the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo that the charges against
respondents Acot and Dulinayan be dropped.

The aforesaid approval of the Ombudsman should have resulted in the filing of information with the
court, but no action was taken thereon.

Instead, on January 12, 1999, the case was subjected to another "re-evaluation" by the MOLEO.
According to the petitioner, the "thorough re-evaluation" by the MOLEO was conducted since allegedly
the senior officials of the office could not agree with the recommendation to drop respondents Acot and
Dulinayan believing that both appear to have instigated the crime charged. 42

In 2003, or after four (4) years of "thoroughly" evaluating the case, and upon the assumption of
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, the case underwent another "thorough review," again, upon the
recommendation of the MOLEO as alleged by the petitioner. 43 By that time, nine (9) years had already
passed since the filing of the complaint.

After two (2) more years, the MOLEO recommended another "thorough review" as stated in its
Memorandum dated July 7, 2005 arguing against the dismissal of the case against Acot and Dulinayan.
Thus, the case was referred to the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA).

On June 25, 2007, a Memorandum was issued containing the opinion of the OLA that probable cause
exists in the commission of the crime as against respondents Acot and Dulinayan. The OLA opinion was
concurred in by Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro when he approved the Review Memorandum
dated October 23, 2008. Then, it took one more year for the Office of the Ombudsman to file the
Informations.

From the foregoing, it is clear that from the time the first Resolution was issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 12, 1996, it took more than thirteen (13) years to review and file the Informations
on October 6, 2009. Otherwise stated, from the time the complaint was filed on December 28, 1994, it
took petitioner almost fifteen (15) years to file the Informations.

According to Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,44 inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint, being
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases,
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

The question therefore is - was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive? We answer in the affirmative.
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,45 there was a delay of almost three (3) years in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan. In ruling that such delay constituted a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases, this Court took into account
the following circumstances: (1) the complaint was resurrected only after Tatad had a falling out with the
former President Marcos, and hence, political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling
the prosecutorial process; (2) the Tanodbayan blatantly departed from the established procedure
prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (3) the simple factual and legal issues
involved did not justify the delay.

Likewise, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman46and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,47 this Court held
that the delay of almost or more than six (6) years in resolving the criminal charges against the
petitioners therein amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against them, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act
promptly on complaints filed before him.

In the present case, it took more than a decade for the Office of the Ombudsman to "re-evaluate" and
"thoroughly review" the proper charges to file with the court and whether or not respondents Acot and
Dulinayan should be charged. It must be stressed that the petitioner explicitly admitted in its reply to the
comments of the private respondents that "the matter of the complexity of the legal issues involved was
never raised by the prosecution as a reason for the delay." Instead, it tried to explain that the
determination of probable cause in the instant case entails both factual and legal summations where
allegedly more time was devoted to the "gathering, authentication, and validation of factual and
verifiable assertions."48

Specifically, the petition alleges that the belated filing of the case was caused by the following events: (a)
the initial resolution issued by the MOLEO, dated April 12, 1996, took time because of the need to
conduct clarificatory hearing and on account of the various motions filed by private respondents; (b) the
MOLEO Resolution dated April 12, 1996 was subjected to numerous conflicting reviews by the senior
officials/higher authority in the Office of the Ombudsman; (c) considering the conflict between the
findings of the MO LEO investigators and the recommendation of the senior officials vis-a-vis the amount
of money involved and the positions held by respondents Acot and Dulinayan, the case was re-opened in
2003 for another review; (d) the Office of the Ombudsman was in the midst of transferring to its new
building in Agham Road, Quezon City in 2001; and (e) from 1998 to 2009, there were three (3)
Ombudsmen who handled the case which affected the immediate resolution thereof in terms of the
added layer of review and study before these cases were filed in court.

We are not persuaded by the reasons for the delay advanced by the petitioner. Anent the first reason,
the unnecessary delay was not in the issuance of the initial Resolution on April 12, 1996 because the
motions were filed before the Resolution was issued on April 12, 1996. 49 The delay came after April 12,
1996, that is, in the evaluation, re-evaluation and "thorough review" of the initial Resolution.

As to the second and third reasons, the Court cannot agree with the petitioner that the delay in the
proceedings could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision
through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in addition to
the steady stream of cases which it had to resolve. 50 Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created
under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and, as such,
required to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of
the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient
service."51 Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through
the particulars of the case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful
performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment, but also by the reasonable
promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of
difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its
normal work activity - any of which have not been adequately proven by the petitioner in the case at bar
- there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier
resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the private respondents. 52

Neither are the last alleged causes of delay tolerable. Reasoning that the Office of the Ombudsman was
in the midst of transferring to a new building is a lame excuse not to have resolved the matter at the
earliest opportunity. In addition, the prolonged investigation of the case from 1998 to 2009 by three
Ombudsmen with divergent views as to what charges should be filed and the persons to be indicted
cannot be sufficient justification for the unreasonable length of time it took to resolve the controversy.

We need to emphasize, however, that the initial Resolution dated April 12, 1996 which was allegedly
subjected to "painstaking scrutiny and review" (such that two conflicting findings were embodied in two
Memoranda issued on July 10, 1996 and January 12, 1998) was finally approved by then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto on March 2, 1998. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal
case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance, or he may
proceed with the investigation, if in his view, the complaint is due in proper form or substance. 53 But this
Resolution dated April 12, 1996 despite its final approval was again subjected to a reevaluation and
"thorough review" by the MOLEO which is but a unit of the Ombudsman such that it could not reverse
the findings of the Ombudsman.54 This was the cause of the delay which dragged on for seven (7) years,
from 1998 to 2005, and another two (2) years when the case was referred to the Office of Legal Affairs of
the Ombudsman.

In view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman's resolution of the case, as
well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that
respondent's constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As
the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should
create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable
dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this
case.55

As to the reason advanced by the petitioner that in the year 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman was in
the midst of transferring to its new building in Agham Road, Quezon City, it must be noted that the first
Resolution was approved by then Ombudsman Desierto in 1998, while transfer of office occurred in
2001. A period of three (3) years, from 1998 to 2001, is ample time to review the case which started way
back in 1994.

Petitioner also avers in its petition that there was the "inexplicable loss of the main folder" which
deterred the prosecution of the cases as mentioned in the MOLEO Memorandum dated July 7, 2005
recommending "thorough review and re-evaluation of the case." 56 It must be noted that as early as
January 12, 1999, the records were subjected to a re-evaluation by the MOLEO. 57 Yet, there was no
showing or any statement that efforts were exerted to locate the alleged lost folder. 58

Petitioner likewise partly puts the blame on the respondents that they did not take any steps whatsoever
to accelerate the disposition of the matter. In the case of Celllantes v. Sandiganbayan,59 wherein it was
held that there was a delay of six (6) years, this Comi stated that it is the duty of the prosecutor to
expedite the prosecution of the case regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or
that the delay was with his acquiescence provided it was not due to causes attributable to him. This was
explained in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,60 to wit:

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the March
27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a
plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point
is the Court's observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this
case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-
affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume
that the charges against them had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel
reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay
- the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail -
has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident
before us does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that
the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before
the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to
follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to
promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo.

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring
that the trial is consistent with due process. 61

Furthermore, the Court recognizes the prejudice caused to the private respondents caused by the
lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. We do not agree with the petitioner that respondents did
not suffer any damage because respondents Acot and Dulinayan were able to get their clearances. The
right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in
the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. 62 Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary
objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. 63 This looming
unrest, as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time, should be weighed against
the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan64stated:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.1âwphi1
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews
the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence
or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate ihat such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay;
and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different
weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted
heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case
load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x x

As pointed out by respondent Gadin in his Comment, the delay of fifteen (15) years in the filing of the
Informations impair his ability to adequately defend himself for the reason that the witnesses who could
testify on the processes and procedures in the PAF Finance Service Units at the time the alleged offenses
were committed may no longer be found or available.

Lastly, the contention is that the State cannot be bound by the mistakes committed by the public officers
involved in the review of the case and that the right of the State to prosecute erring officers involved in
this P89 Million-Peso Fiasco cam1ot be prejudiced. We should take note that equally true is the
constitutional right of the respondents to the speedy disposition of cases and the constitutional mandate
for the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints. 65The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in
the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. 66 The adjudication of cases must
not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must
also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. 67

All told, the criminal complaints were correctly dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay of fifteen
(15) years amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy disposition of cases and therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173319 December 4, 2009

FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. DANILO A. BUEMIO, in his capacity as pairing presiding judge of Branch 22 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SAMIR MUHSEN and ROWENA
MUHSEN, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave
Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information 1 dated June 28, 2002
which was raffled to Branch 22 thereof. On October 28, 2002, petitioner posted bail and was released.

Denying petitioner’s motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in light of his pending petition for
review before the Department of Justice from the City Fiscal’s Resolution finding probable cause to hale
him into court, Judge Hipolito dela Vega proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment on February 12,
2003 in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge. 2 Pre-trial was thereupon set to May 28, 2003 which
was, however, declared a non-working day due to the occurrence of typhoon "Chedeng." The pre-trial
was thus reset to October 23, 2003.3

At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither
petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset to January 21, 2004.4

Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21, 2004 or on November 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss5the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under Republic Act No.
84936 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. 7 He argued that
"considering that [he] was not - without any fault on his part - brought to trial within 80 days from the
date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 8 in relation to Rule
119, Section 6 of the Rules."9

The trial court, through pairing Judge Danilo A. Buemio (respondent judge), denied petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss by Order10 of December 5, 2003, holding that petitioner played a big part in the delay of the
case, and that technical rules of procedure were meant to secure, not override, substantial justice.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the December 5, 2003 Order was denied by Order 11 of March
3, 2004 after respondent judge noted that during petitioner’s arraignment on February 12, 2003, he
interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003. Besides, respondent judge held,
strict compliance with the Speedy Trial Act was improbable, given the volume of cases being filed with
the MeTC. Additionally respondent judge held that the term "speedy trial" as applied in criminal cases is
a relative term such that the trial and disposition of cases depended on several factors including the
availability of counsel, witnesses and prosecutor, and weather conditions.

Petitioner challenged respondent judge’s orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, alleging that not only was he (petitioner) not brought to trial within 80 days from
the date of his arraignment as required under Section 6, Rule 119, but the prosecution had failed to
establish the existence of any of the "time exclusions" provided under Section 3 12 of the same Rule to
excuse its failure to bring him to trial within the 80-day period.

By Decision13 of January 31, 2006, the RTC denied the petition, holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case just because trial has not commenced
within 80 days from arraignment; that the proceedings before the MeTC were not attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays; and that the concept of a speedy trial is not a mere question of
numbers that could be computed in terms of years, months or days but is understood according to the
peculiar circumstances of each case, citing SPO1 Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court Martial PRO-Region 6. 14

The RTC further held that in "determining whether petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated," 15 the
circumstances that respondent judge was the pairing judge of Br. 22 of the MeTC who "may be assumed
also [to] preside over his own regular court and devotes limited time to his pairing court" and that first
level courts in Manila have an excessive load of cases should also be taken into consideration.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, 16 petitioner lodged the present petition
for review which, in the main, faults the RTC

. . . IN AFFIRMING THE MTC-MANILA JUDGE’S RULING THAT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 119, SECTION 9 OF
THE RULES IS NOT MANDATORY. THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS A SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT THAT CANNOT BE DISREGARDED.

II

. . . IN AFFIRMING THE MTC-MANILA JUDGE’S RULING THAT THE ENUMERATION OF ALLOWABLE TIME
EXCLUSIONS UNDER RULE 119, SECTION 3 IS NOT EXCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE FAILURE TO BRING
PETITIONER TO TRIAL WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED UNDER RULE 119, SECTION 6 WAS JUSTIFIED.

x x x x,17

errors which raise a question of law.

Petitioner argues that his right to speedy trial is a substantive right and that, contrary to the RTC ruling,
Section 9 of Rule 119 is mandatory in character, having been taken from SCC No. 38-98, strict compliance
with which is urged to remove any attempt on the part of judges to exercise discretion with respect to
the time frame for conducting the trial of an accused; that the last paragraph of said Section 9 clearly
indicates that it is the right of an accused to move for dismissal of the Information should the
prosecution fail to prove the existence of the time exclusions under Section 3 of Rule 119; and that the
enumeration of the allowable time exclusions under Section 3 is exclusive, hence, the RTC erred in
considering the excessive caseload of respondent judge, as a mere pairing judge, to be an allowable time
exclusion under the Rules.

In its Comment,18 the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that "speed
alone is not the chief objective of a trial" such that mere assertion of a violation of the right to speedy
trial does not necessarily result in the automatic dismissal of an Information; that the time exclusions
referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) of Section 3, Rule 119 are not exclusive and admit of other exceptions;
that petitioner himself contributed to the delay in the proceedings when he filed a frivolous motion to
suspend proceedings and failed to appear during the scheduled pre-trial; and that the RTC statement
about respondent judge being a mere pairing judge was not an apology for the court’s congested
dockets but a mere statement of fact as to the impossibility of setting the case for pre-trial at an earlier
date.

Furthermore, the OSG asserts that respondent judge’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss was in
order as he correctly applied the principles of relativity and flexibility in determining whether
petitioner’s right to speedy trial had been violated. 19

Respondents-private complainants, on the other hand, maintain in their Comment 20 that several
Supreme Court decisions21 dealing with the issue of the constitutional guaranty of a speedy trial, the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and SCC No. 38-98 have held that the right is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, which did not obtain in the
present case, petitioner himself having been instrumental in the delay in the prosecution of the case.

The petition does not impress.

Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to
the first pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the
second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days - a clear contravention, according
to petitioner, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial.

It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no
objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a
non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the
control of the trial court.1avvphi1

Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23, 2003) was not
justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time exclusions 22 specified under Section 3 of
Rule 119. The argument is unavailing.

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 23 the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the
time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. This was reiterated in
People v. Hernandez,24 viz:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of
1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
On August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules Implementing R.A. No.
8493. The provisions of said circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As
to the time limit within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the
preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15,
1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80)
days.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain
reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that
"no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to
any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987
Constitution." Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that
the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. In Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan, we held:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. x x x

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. (citations omitted)
(underscoring supplied)

The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and
delays when so warranted by the situation.25 To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and
delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the records indicate
that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003,
the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone,
does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the
MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that
petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting. 26

Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. 27 that "speedy trial" is a
relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. 28 summons the courts to maintain a delicate balance
between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of
the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.

Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the
length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to
the accused resulting from the delay,29 the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and
excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required, 1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing
question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious
interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism
to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the
accused’s presence at trial.3

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time
immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An accused not released on bail is
incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. 5 Even if
the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes
freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to
warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential
danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain
bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.9

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave
caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.10

The Facts

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. 12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. 13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled
that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. It found that petitioner

… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial
will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of
[petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. 14

For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be allowed pending appeal,
the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation
of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough
to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering
that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

The Issue

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary
nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.

Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the
said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16

Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to
justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted
with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that
the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.

We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this
where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an
error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion.20

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be
inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its
discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was
the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal
of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal
was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its
discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued
to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. 21 In this connection, Lee v.
People22 is apropos:

… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded
its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.23 (emphasis supplied)

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s Interpretation

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape
from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired
Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
xxx xxx xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance
is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter
of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule
114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court
has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the
bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words,
the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not,
by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed
from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage
where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; 27 on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent
discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of
the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because
the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are
governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant
is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal
is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such
circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority
is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed
by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s
interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue — whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker." 29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely clipping the
appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for
bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that
"upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the
court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its
appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In view of the grave
caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused
will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. 32 It should also give due regard to
any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and
reputation of the applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine
allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial
determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must
be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a
showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even
more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower court’s
exercise of discretionary power was sound,36 specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that
no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error. 37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 38 rule in statutory
construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the
idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly
relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none
of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible
to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?

Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal

Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the provisions
on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules
of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After judgment by a
municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to
bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After conviction by the
Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which,
under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to
bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall
be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense which,
under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to
bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20,
1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the
trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of
the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on
his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant
to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on
bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on
bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and
the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his
Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the
court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which,
the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his
appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall
be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall
also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have
jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which
brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the
accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail
bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another
crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to
the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to
bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending
appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the
Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments
made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final
conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a
matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the
charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua. 39

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on
the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has
authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. 40 Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail
pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of
bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial
court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is
more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors
the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant
circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the
approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on
bail emanated.41 While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our
treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail — should
be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. 42 In fact, it has even been
pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a
convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule
114, Section 5."43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of
view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap
v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of
bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support
in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the
accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or
other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit
a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile
insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). 4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16,
2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion 5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among
others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition. 7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. 8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , 11 and his Motion to Fix
Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In support of
the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight
risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail, disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with
plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the
allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may
be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should
the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and
his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the
Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused
Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed
to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is
strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it
is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has
not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should
not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical
condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged
with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 18 The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.
[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the Rules of Court , as follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of
its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right
to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when
evidence of guilt is not strong.28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty
of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph
3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of
the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. 31The indispensability of
the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. : 32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc.,
et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital
offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and
the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the
issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither
present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a
summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to
Fix Bail has only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only
reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed
worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the
maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor. 36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the
two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings
but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk
or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes,
and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1,
1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4,
4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes
1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound). 42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant
risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances
(like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients
with asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, 44 was not
even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility
because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP
Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have
any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient
worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela
Rama v. The People’s Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ; 47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner
"is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance
stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the
petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner
was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court
in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual
condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the
said People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted
resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno
Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they
were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail. 48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration
of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as
well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack
of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner
Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the
Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless
he is being detained for some other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 172792

RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 22, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de
Asis Delfin."

The Facts

This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go) accusing
petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having
committed the crime of bigamy. 3

On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. 4 Later, Sally Go
learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on January
5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." 5 Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally.
Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.

The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin,
Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally
married to Sally Go.6 The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
66783.7

After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence. 8 On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. 9 This was granted by
the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003. 10

On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for
bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his
guilt.11 His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because
of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he
and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same person. 12

In its December 3, 2003 Order,13 the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
insufficiency of evidence.14 It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with
Resally.15Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish
that Resally married Benjamin, Jr. 16

Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision17 granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to
Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the
admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s
admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. 18 The CA further stated that Benjamin,
Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was
null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity
was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy
charge.19

Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22,
2006.20

Hence, these petitions.

The Issues

Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into the
factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right of
herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in the Petition for
Certiorari filed by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].

3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court allegedly ignored
the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. 21

On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due course
to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein respondent
(petitioner therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity and/or imprimatur of the
Office of the Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan City

2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering the
further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 22

Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:

1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite the lack
of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Caloocan.

2. Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the
December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petitions.

Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the
demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.

Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA
because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so, only the OSG
or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case against them. 23 Respondent’s
intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is only limited to the
enforcement of the civil liability. 24

Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals25 to support her position: "The
right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has
always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so
would place the accused in double jeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and the OCP had impliedly consented
to the filing of the petition before the CA because they did not interpose any objection. 26

This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of
the State.27 The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. 28 As explained in the case of People v.
Santiago:291awphil

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may
be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite
the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In
such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]

A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the
criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is
apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners.
Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus,
Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.

Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG joined the
cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. 30 Second, the acquittal of the accused was done without
due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance on the part of the public
prosecutor and the trial court.31 There being no valid acquittal, the accused therein could not invoke the
protection of double jeopardy.

In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined the
cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the records show that the trial
court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally offered the
evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus, the petitioners’ acquittal was valid,
entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Double jeopardy had already set-in

Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the
RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right against double
jeopardy.32 They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for further
proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the prosecution of the accused for
the same offense.33

On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering
the same null and void.34

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to
evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient
and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent
to the acquittal of the accused.35 Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy. 36

The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article III)
contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant
was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.37 However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered
final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:

(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution
has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. 38

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its
case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. 39 For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1)
where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and
forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; 40and (2) where the case was dismissed
at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication. 41

In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime
of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them
before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case
was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial
court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy.

As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. 42

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility."43 The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice.44

The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the evidence
presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. 45 An examination of the
decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only
committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition
for certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in. 46

As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of the
case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a
decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a
party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. 47 Sally Go cannot deny that she was given ample
opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was
denied due process is unavailing.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin and dismissing the case
against them is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 223099

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 1 7, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05256, which affirmed the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20-6096 & 20-6097, finding accused-
appellant Lino Alejandro yPimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 8369 3 , of a 12-year old minor,
AAA.4 Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued.

During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back
of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her vagina.5

Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one night, undressed
himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both occasions, accused-appellant
threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened. 6

AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office
where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep, healed, old
and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual
intercourse.7

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present any
evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision. 8

On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the same day,
however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating:

Upon manifestation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz that there were Orders that were
inadvertently placed in the record of Criminal Case No. Br. 20-4979 involving the same accused but
different private complainant-victim, XXX, which if considered will result in a different verdict. The Order
dated September 24, 2007, showed that private complainant-victim, AAA, in the above[-]quoted cases,
Crim. Case No. Br-20-6096 & 6097, has actually testified in Court.

WHEREFORE, to rectify the error committed and in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice, the
Decision promulgated today acquitting the accused is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. 9

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 arguing that a judgment of acquittal is

immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would
place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.

The RTC denied the motion in an Order 11 dated July 26, 2011, explaining its denial, thus:

Admittedly, the Court erroneously declared in its Decision that private complainant AAA did not testify in
Court. When in truth and in fact said private complainant took the witness stand on September 3, 2008
as evidenced by the Order dated September 3, 2008 which was mistakenly captioned as Crim. Case No.
4979 instead of Crim. Cases Nos. Br. 20- 6096 & 6097 and as a result thereof, the Order dated September
3, 2008 was erroneously attached by the Court employee to the records of another criminal case entitled
People of the Philippines versus Lino Alejandro, wherein the private complainant is a certain xxx.

Section 14, Article 8 of the 1997 Constitution requires that the Decision should be based on facts and the
law. The Court believes and so holds that the Decision contravenes the highest law of the land because it
is not in accordance with the law and the facts, and therefore, the judgment of acquittal is invalid. As
dispenser of truth and justice, the Court should be candid enough to admit its error and rectify itself
with dispatch to avoid grave miscarriage of justice. 12

A Joint Decision13 dated July 26, 2011 was rendered by the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of two
counts of rape and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of Simple Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A paragraph (D) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, he is hereby sentenced to suffer, in each count, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indentify the victim, minor AAA in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱50,000.00) and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages for each count.

Costs to be paid by the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

Accused-appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the R TC gravely erred in recalling its previously
promulgated decision acquitting the accused-appellant; and for convicting the accused-appellant despite
the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 15
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that there was no error in the recall of the acquittal.
It ratiocinated that the public prosecutor's manifestation was filed on the same day of the promulgation
of the recalled decision, pointing out that AAA actually testified during the trial and her testimony, if
considered, would result in a different verdict. The OSG stressed that what was proscribed under the
double jeopardy clause was the filing of an appeal to allow the prosecutor to seek a second trier of facts
of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first. 16

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order of recalling and setting aside the judgment of
acquittal was justified. It found that:

The initial decision of the RTC acquitting the accused failed to express clearly and distinctly the facts of
the case, as the records on which the acquittal was based was incomplete and inaccurate. Judges are
expected to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of
the case in the light of the evidence presented. Obviously, with the unintentional exclusion of the
testimony of the private complainant from the records of the two criminal cases, the RTC could not have
made complete findings of facts in the initial decision. The verdict of acquittal had no factual basis. It was
null and void, and should have necessarily been recalled and set aside. 17

The CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant and modified the award of damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20- 6096 and 20-
6097, finding Lino Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that Alejandro is ordered to pay legal interest on the moral
damages awarded to the victim at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
decision until fully paid.

so ORDERED.18

Hence, this petition for review.

Accused-appellant argues that despite the RTC's error and misapprehension of facts, it still had no power
to rectify such mistake as said acquittal had attained finality after valid promulgation. The error
committed by the RTC cannot be validly recalled without transgressing the accused-appellant's right
against double jeopardy. He insists that not only was the decision of acquittal final and executory, the
manifestation of the public prosecutor, which was the catalyst in having the decision recalled, was
equivalent to a motion for reconsideration of the decision. He also points out that the CA erred in
sustaining the conviction for rape despite AAA's incredible testimony. 19

The OSG did not submit a supplemental brief and adopted its Appellee's Brief before the CA where it
stated that the recall of the earlier decision of the trial court, by reason of the manifestation filed by the
public prosecutor, does not actually result in double jeopardy. The OSG maintained that what is
proscribed under the double jeopardy clause is the filing of an appeal that would allow the prosecutor to
seek a second trier of fact of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first. It stressed that here, the
OSG only manifested that the court overlooked a fact, which if not considered, will result to a great
injustice to the private complainant. It pressed that there was no double jeopardy because there was no
presentation of additional evidence to prove or strengthen the State's case.

The appeal has merit.

In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final
and unappealable.20

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double
jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. 21

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the
RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a
judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this
case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private
complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the
same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had
already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the
appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. 22

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this
case.23 Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the
prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. 24

In People v. Laguio, Jr., 25 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may
be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it
of its very power to dispense justice.26

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only
through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that
the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

A similar instance had been ruled upon by this Court in Argel v. Judge Pascua, 27 where the Judge was
sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal, thus:
As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was
no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's
attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and
confirmed by respondent upon re-reading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating
her intention to "revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and
"not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision." The reason given was that the
judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her
attention.

Respondent Judge explained that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness
Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19
August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to
pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱60,000.00 for actual damages.

Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration
except to correct errors which are clerical in· nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or
mock trial.1âwphi1 A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of
any claim of error or incorrectness.

In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be
recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another
order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or
decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13

August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day.
As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial
developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer
"revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Emphasis Ours) 28

Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during the
trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The R TC then
realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different
outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of
rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts
of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-
appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 17, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05256, which affirmed the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20-6096 & 20-
6097, finding accused-appellant Lino. Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation, who is then also directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

January 27, 2016

G.R. No.190798

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285
which affirmed with modifications the July 17, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
255 of Las Piñas City, convicting Ronald Ibañez (Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez
(Bobot) (collectively, petitioners) of the crime of frustrated homicide.

The Facts

For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners together with
their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez (David), who have remained at large, were
charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information 3 dated October 11, 2001. The
accusatory portion thereof reads:

"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable
cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade
and stab with bladed weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries,
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, which
prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio were released on
bail.4 Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on
December 10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 5 After
termination of pre-trial on April 23, 2003,6 trial on the merits immediately followed. In the course of trial,
two versions of what transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001 surfaced. These conflicting
versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David were his
neighbors in CAA, Las Piñas City. Rodolfo recalled that he had visitors on the day of the incident. When
his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001, Rodolfo accompanied them outside his house. After
about thirty minutes and as he was about to go inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of his
house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the vernacular "bakit dito tinambak ang
basura sa harap ng aking bahay na malawak naman ang pagtataponan ng basura?" 7 Emilio and Boyet,
who was then present and angered by what they heard, threw stones at the private complainant hitting
him twice on the forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to
cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x 2" (dos por dos) piece of
wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he was hit on the head with a shovel by another accused,
David.8 Then, Ronald held Rodolfo, rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed
him in the abdomen.9 At this point, Rodolfo fell to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost
consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las Piñas District Hospital
(LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed
surgical procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital
expenses amounting to P30,000.00.10

PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the statements of Rodolfo’s
daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo’s wife, Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the
police station to complain about the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that when he asked Ruth and Salvacion
why Rodolfo was not with them, he was informed that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and
treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also testified that he endorsed the
complaint against the petitioners to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas for proper disposition. 11

To corroborate Rodolfo’s testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and Salvacion as witnesses.

Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted was preceded by the
utterance made by his father. 12 Her testimony on how Ronald, Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up
on her father and who among them stoned, hit, held and stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the latter’s
sworn declarations.13

Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating and stabbing her husband
endured in the hands of the petitioners and their co-accused. Salvacion also submitted receipts in the
total amount of P2,174.80, representing the medical expenses incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo’s
injuries resulting from the incident. 14
The prosecution presented the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Records Division of the PGH
showing that Rodolfo suffered multiple stab wounds in the abdomen and underwent an exploratory
laparotomy,15 the standard surgery in abdominal trauma cases involving life-threatening injuries. 16

Version of the Defense

To refute the accusations against them, the petitioners offered an entirely different scenario.

Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even claimed that he was the one who was
stabbed by Rodolfo. Ronald averred that the incident happened within the vicinity of his home, which
was about four meters away from the house of Rodolfo. 17 When Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at
around 2:00 a.m., he tried pacifying Rodolfo by telling him that they would just talk later in the day.
Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the bicycle belonging to Ronald’s son-in-law. Rodolfo then
attacked Ronald by stabbing him on his right arm. It was during this time that Ronald’s son, Bobot, came
to his rescue but was prevented from doing so as Bobot was also struck with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald
and his son instituted a criminal complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came out
of it. In support of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the day after the incident showing a
slipper purportedly belonging to Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald further insisted that all the other
accused were not around as they were residing elsewhere at that crucial time.

Bobot testified that he immediately rushed outside his house, which is located beside his father’s, upon
hearing Ronald shout, "Tulungan mo ako, ako'y sinaksak."18 However, he was not able to save his father
as he himself was stabbed twice with a knife by Rodolfo. A struggle for the possession of the knife
between Bobot and Rodolfo ensued and in the process, the latter accidentally sustained a stab wound in
the abdomen. Still, Bobot asserted that it was Rodolfo who ran away from the scene of the crime.
Meanwhile, Ronald had already left for the nearby police detachment to seek help.

Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He emphatically denied that he
threw a stone at Rodolfo. On the date and time of the incident, Emilio claimed that he was working
overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, which is one kilometer away from the crime scene. He
argued that he was just unfortunately dragged into this case which had nothing to do with him at all. 19

The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the petitioners’ claims. The July 15,
2001 medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Cecilia Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the Ospital ng Maynila, declared
that Ronald’s body bore lacerations and hematoma at the time she attended to him. Nevertheless, Dr.
Leyson acknowledged that she had no idea how the injuries were sustained by Ronald. The other
medical certificate dated March 20, 2006 was issued by Dr. Renato Borja (Dr. Borja), a physician affiliated
with the Parañaque Community Hospital where Bobot was taken after getting injured. Based on the
hospital records, Dr. Borja testified that Bobot had sustained wounds on the head and chest, possibly
caused by a sharp instrument.20

Petitioners’ Representation in the Trial Court Proceedings

In view of the petitioners’ allegation that they were denied of right to counsel, a narration of petitioners’
representation in the trial court proceedings is imperative.

During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who
was selected as their counsel de oficio only for that occasion. At his arraignment on December 10, 2002,
Emilio appeared with the assistance of Atty. Antonio Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then appointed
by the trial court as counsel de oficio for all the accused. In the pre-trial conference that followed, Atty.
Manzano appeared for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was informed that the trial for the presentation of
prosecution evidence was set on June 18, 2003.

Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing.
However, Atty. Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one
of the petitioners, absented himself from the same hearing. As a result, the RTC issued the June 18, 2003
Order,21 the pertinent portion of which reads:

Due to the failure of Atty. Manzano to appear in today’s proceeding despite due notice and so as not to
delay the proceedings herein, his right to cross-examine the said two (2) witnesses is deemed waived. At
the same time, Atty. Manzano is hereby fined the amount of P2,000.00 for his absence in today’s
proceedings despite the fact that the same has been previously set and known to him, without even
filing any motion or pleading regarding his inability to appear herein which clearly indicates a show of
disrespect to the authority of this Court.

Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Ronald Ibañez for failing to appear in today’s hearing
despite notice and the bond posted by him for his provisional liberty confiscated in favor of the
government. As such, the bondsman BF General Insurance Company, Inc., is hereby directed to produce
the body of the said accused within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and to show cause why no
judgment should be rendered against the bond.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Criminal Investigation
Service Command, PNP, Camp Crame, are hereby directed to explain within five (5) days from receipt of
this Order why the warrants of arrest issued against Boyet Ibañez and David Ibañez remain
unimplemented and/or no return submitted to this Court.

Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners’ counsel de oficio. In its Order22 dated September 3,
2003, the trial court appointed Atty. Gregorio Cañeda, Jr. (Atty. Cañeda) as the new counsel de oficio of
the petitioners. On the same date, Atty. Cañeda conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and even
expressed his desire to continue with the cross-examination of said witness on the next scheduled
hearing. In the hearing of September 17, 2003, Atty. Cañeda appeared for the petitioners but Bobot and
Emilio did not show up. This prompted the trial court to issue the corresponding warrants for their arrest
and the bonds posted by them for their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Despite the continued absence of his clients, Atty. Cañeda religiously attended the
succeeding hearings. On November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved Atty. Cañeda of his
designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners.

Per the trial court’s Order23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the
Public Attorney’s Office, was designated as the petitioners’ counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua’s
designation was recalled upon her manifestation that she had previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the
present case. In her stead, the trial court appointed the petitioners’ current counsel de oficio, Atty. Juan
Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).

Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his help, all three petitioners
finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of
another prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.

After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their respective memoranda in
thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum
was ever filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the
declarations of the defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel
"Bobot" Ibañez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and hereby
sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law.

Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez are ordered to pay to private
complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.

With costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.24

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this was denied in an
Order25 dated October 11, 2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to the CA. They faulted
the trial court for totally disregarding their claim that Rodolfo was the aggressor and for not recognizing
that Bobot was merely acting in self-defense when Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted
that they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA agreed with the trial court’s judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed. The
appellate court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also
found it proper to award P15,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to
Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA’s decision. Still, their motion was denied in
the Resolution26 of December 28, 2009.

The Issue

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of whether the petitioners
were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.

No Deprivation of Right to Counsel

The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which
states that:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.

Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its rule-making
authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted the following
provisions:
Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. x x x

xxxx

Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for the
accused in the absence of private representation. It provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a
counsel de officio to defend him.

SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal

prosecution.27 As such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused. 28 A
deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a
level playing field.29 Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which
is tantamount to a grave denial of due process. 30

On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the petitioners insisted that
they were denied of their right to counsel when their counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18,
2003 trial court hearing during which Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave their testimonies. As a consequence,
the petitioners argued that they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said two
prosecution witnesses.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners’ claim that they were
deprived of their constitutional right to counsel. In their May 5, 2010 Comment 31 on the instant petition,
the OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the proceedings in the trial court until the filing of the
present petition before this Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were appointed and represented the
petitioners32 and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest. 33 The OSG opined that the trial
court judge made sure that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio when they
failed to engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the dismissal
of the petition.

The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.

There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not only assisted
by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court including the direct and cross-examination of the
witnesses.34 As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de oficio all
throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was absent and
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies. 35 As previously stated, it was during said hearing
when the trial court declared that the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was
deemed waived.

Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine. 36 The
case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the
meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral component of due process with
a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. 37

Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not subjected
to cross-examination was not because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably,
the petitioners’ counsel de oficio omitted to mention that in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of
the accused, did not show up despite prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty
was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the
very right he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without
justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of
testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de
oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.

Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely exercising a judicial
prerogative. No proof was presented by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was
either despotic or arbitrary.

Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio had been negligent in
protecting the petitioners’ interests. As a matter of fact, the counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial
court hearings in representation of the petitioners despite the latter’s unjustified absences.

In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the hearings of
this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the
entire trial court proceedings and the eventual invalidation of its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court
held that the fact that a particular counsel de oficio did not or could not consistently appear in all the
hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant
case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio in any way neglected to perform
their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial
sense therefrom.38

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are backed up by substantial
evidence on record, led this Court to no other conclusion than that the petitioners are guilty of
frustrated homicide.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. 39 There being no prior determination by
both the trial and appellate courts of any qualifying circumstance that would elevate the homicide to
murder, the Court will simply limit its discussion to the first two elements.

In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following factors: (1)
the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. 40

Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by the concerted actions
of the accused, the weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by Rodolfo.

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes unity of
purpose and unity of action towards the realization of an unlawful objective among the accused. 41 Its
existence can be inferred from the individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact
related, and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. 42 In this case, conspiracy was manifested in the
spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of them delivered the initial attack on
Rodolfo by stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and the third held him so that the other two
can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had lost
consciousness that the accused hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission
of the crime adequately established a conspiracy among them.

Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the vital parts of Rodolfo’s body
at which he was undeniably stabbed demonstrated petitioners’ intent to kill. The medico-legal certificate
revealed that Rodolfo sustained multiple stab wounds in the epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the
abdomen resulting to internal injuries in the transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left
kidney.43 Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if not for the emergency surgical
intervention.

With respect to the petitioners’ defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs with the lower courts’
rejection of these defenses. An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates looking into
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in determining who
between the prosecution and defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is
accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies. 44 As such, the findings of the trial court is
accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if properly considered, could alter the
result of the case.45

In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this rule considering the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.

The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to petitioners’ denial. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive
identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses. 46 Between an affirmative
assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the former generally prevails. 47 The
prosecution witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner,
without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could not have done unless they
genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly
identified the petitioners as Rodolfo’s perpetrators considering there is so much familiarity among them.
The records are also bereft of any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives
when they testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

In contrast, the petitioners’ testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and experience.

The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves, who had actually seen
the incident and could validate their story. Additionally, aside from the medical certificates of Ronald and
that of Bobot which was issued almost five (5) years since the incident occurred, the defense have not
submitted any credible proof that could efficiently rebut the prosecution’s evidence.

Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that Ronald, would just leave his son
Bobot, while the latter was being stabbed and struggling for the possession of the knife with Rodolfo, to
go to a police station for assistance. Logic dictates that a father would not abandon a son in the presence
of actual harm.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 48 Emilio himself admitted that he was just one
kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m.
of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on
the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail
over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. 49 In
the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants.
Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as
they are expected to make declarations in his favor, 50 as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother
insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio’s
defense of alibi will not hold.

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious consideration or credence. Basic is
the rule that the person asserting self-defense must admit that he inflicted an injury on another person
in order to defend himself.51 Here, there is nothing on record that will show that Bobot categorically
admitted that he wounded Rodolfo.

Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts' conviction of the petitioners for
frustrated homicide.1âwphi1

Penalty and Civil Liability

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states that the imposable penalty upon principals of a frustrated
crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.
Hence, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be
meted on the petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium period
of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by
the CA of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the award of moral and temperate
damages with modification as to the latter's amount.

Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but the amount of which cannot be proven with certainty. In People v.
Villanueva52 and Serrano v. People,53 the Court ruled that in case the amount of actual damages, as
proven by receipts during trial is less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In the instant case, only the amount of
P2,174.80 was supported by receipts. Following the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it necessary
to increase the temperate damages from P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.

The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil Code as Rodolfo sustained
physical injuries which were the proximate effect of the petitioners' criminal offense. As the amount is
left to the discretion of the court, moral damages should be reasonably proportional and approximate to
the degree of the injury caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 54 In light of the attendant
circumstances in the case, the Court affirms that P30,000.00 is a fair and reasonable grant of moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT"
IBAÑEZ are found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They are also
ordered to pay RODOLFO LEBRIA Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169431 April 3, 2007

[Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JERRY RAPEZA y FRANCISCO, Appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In the complex but exquisite scheme laid down by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights occupies a position
of primacy, way above the articles on governmental power. 1 Once again, the Court extends fresh vitality
to the rights of a person under custodial investigation, which, beginning with the 1987 Constitution, has
been accorded equal but segregate weight as the traditional right against self-incrimination, to tip the
scales of justice in favor of the presumption of innocence and the lot of an unlettered confessant.

This treats of the appeal from the Decision 2 dated 1 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Consolidated Judgment3 dated 24 July 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto Princesa
City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 where Jerry Rapeza (appellant) was found guilty of two (2)
counts of murder and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus a total of
₱100,000.00 as indemnity for the heirs of the two (2) victims.

In two (2) separate Informations, appellant, together with Mike Regino, was charged with the murder of
the Spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas,4 with the following accusatory allegations:

Criminal Case No. 13064

That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon at Cawa-
Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and
while armed with bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with their bladed weapons, to wit: knives, PRI[S]CILLA LIBAS, hitting her in the different
vital parts of her body and inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds which causes (sic) hypovolemic
shock which were (sic) the direct and immediate cause of her instantaneous death. 5

Criminal Case No. 13202

That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon at Cawa-
Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and
while armed with bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully, [sic] unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with their bladed weapons, to wit: knives, CESAR GANZON, hitting him in the different
vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which causes hypovolemic shock
which were the direct and immediate cause of his instantaneous death. 6

As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, joint
trial ensued which resulted in the judgment of guilt against appellant as co-principal for two (2) counts of
murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending the commission of the felonies. Both cases
were thereafter elevated to this Court on automatic review, but later referred to the Court of Appeals
per People v. Mateo.7 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of guilt. 8

The prosecution had sought to establish the facts and events recited below.

In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal Station and
reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay Osmeña, Culion, Palawan. 9 The
officer-in-charge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the victims’ house which was the scene of the crime an
investigating team led by SPO2 Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and PO2 Isidro Macatangay. There they saw two
bloodied bodies, that of a woman lying on the floor of the sala and that of a man inside the bedroom.
The investigating team wrapped the bodies in blankets and loaded them in a banca to be brought to the
morgue.10 The victims were later identified as Priscilla Libas and Cesar Ganzon.

The Autopsy Reports11 show that the common cause of death of both victims was hypovolemic shock
secondary to massive bleeding secondary to multiple stab wounds and that both bodies were in the
early stages of decomposition. The medico-legal officer testified that Ganzon sustained six (6) wounds on
different parts of his body while Libas bore sixteen (16) wounds. 12 All the wounds of the victims were
fatal and possibly caused by a sharp instrument.
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the
crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for appellant. 13 He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and
invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make a confession in the
presence of a lawyer. 14 Appellant was then brought to the police station after which SPO2 Gapas
requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was
brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available lawyer in the municipality. 15 The
typewriter at the police station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police
station as he was suffering from rheumatism. 16 At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-
Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an
interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant who was assisted by
Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated for the death of Libas and
Ganzon.

Per the Sinumpaang Salaysay17 that appellant executed, he was informed of his constitutional rights in
the following manner:

xxxx

Tanong: Bago kita kunan ng isang salaysay, ikaw ay mayroong karapatan sa ating Saligang Batas na
sumusunod:

a) Na, ikaw ay maaaring hindi sumagot sa tanong na sa iyong akala ay makaka-apekto sa iyong pagkatao;

b) Na, ikaw ay may karapatang pumili ng isang manananggol o abogado na iyong sariling pili;

c) Na, kung ikaw ay walang kakayahan kumuha ng isang ab[u]gado ang Pulisya ang siyang magbibigay sa
iyo.

d) Na, ang lahat na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gawing ebidensya pabor o laban sa iyo.

Sagot: Opo, sir.

Tanong: Nakahanda ka na bang ipag-patuloy ang pagsisiyasat na ito, na ang ating gagamiting salita ay
salitang Tagalog, na siyang ginagamit nating [sic]?

Sagot: Opo, sir.

x x x18

Thereupon, when asked about the subsequent events, appellant made the following narration:

xxx

Tanong: Maari mo bang isalaysay ang pang-yayari [sic]?

Sagot: Opo, [n]oong Sabado ng umaga alas 8:00[,] petsa 21 ng Oktobre, 1995, kami ni Mike ay nagkaroon
ng pag-iinuman sa kanilang bahay sa Cawa-Cawa at sinabi sa akin [sic] puntahan naming iyong matanda,
dahil may galit daw si Mike sa dalawang matanda [Pris]cilla Libas at Cesar Ganzon) na nakatira din sa
Cawa-Cawa at ang layo ay humigit-kumulang isang daang metro sa aming pinag-iinuman at kami ay
nakaubos ng labing dalawang bote ng beer, mula umaga hanggang alas kuatro ng hapon at habang kami
ay nag-iinom aming pinag-uusapan [sic] ang pagpatay sa dalawang matanda. Noong sinasabi sa akin ni
Mike, ako umayaw ngunit ako ay pinilit at sinabihan ko rin siya (Mike) at pinag-tatapon [sic] pa niya ang
bote ng beer at may sinabi pa si Mike "hindi ka pala marunong tumulong sa akin, pamangkin mo pa
naman ako." At ang sagot ko sa kanya, ay maghintay ka, mamayang hapon natin[g] puntahan. At noong
humigit-kumulang [sa alas] [sic] kuatro ng hapon, amin ng pinuntahan ang bahay ng mag-asawa, at
pagdating namin sa bahay na dala naming [sic] ang patalim, tuloy-tuloy na kaming umakyat, at
hinawakan ni Mike ang babae (Presing) at nilaslas na ang leeg at sinaksak ng sinaksak niya sa iba’t ibang
parte ng katawan at ako ay umakyat din sa bahay at nakita kong nakataob ang lalaki (Cesar)[,] aking
hinawakan [sic] ko sa kanyang balikat, at siya ay nakaalam [sic] na mayroong tao sa kanyang likuran, akin
nang sinaksak sa kaliwang tagiliran [sic] ng kanyang katawan, at hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na pang-
yayari [sic] dahil ako[’]y tuliro. At kami ay umalis at tumalon sa likod ng kusina, nang alam na naming [sic]
na patay [na] iyong dalawang matanda.

x x x x19

An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar. As
he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his thumbmark on the statement above his printed name. Bonifacio
Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also signed the statement. Atty. Reyes
signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement.

Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was filed against appellant, and Regino was likewise
arrested. Judge Jacinto Manalo of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Culion conducted a preliminary
investigation. Finding probable cause only as against appellant, Regino was ordered released. 20 The
Provincial Prosecutor, however, reversed the finding of the MTC by including Regino in the Informations,
but by then the latter had already left Culion. 21

Testifying in his defense, appellant presented a different story during the trial. The defense presented no
other witness.

Appellant testified that he did not know the victims and that he had nothing to do with their deaths. He
was a native of Samar and he did not know how to read or write as he never attended school. 22 He
arrived in Culion as a fisherman for the Parabal Fishing Boat. 23 As his contract had already expired, he
stayed in Culion to look for work. He lived with Regino as the latter was his only friend in Cawa-
Cawa.24 Regino’s house was about 40 meters away from the victims’ house.

Several days after appellant’s arrival, the killings took place. Appellant, along with Regino and another
man named Benny Macabili, was asked by a police officer to help load the bodies of the victims in a
banca. Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and brought to the municipal hall where he was
mauled by PO2 Macatangay and placed in a small cell. 25 Regino, too, was arrested with him. While under
detention, appellant told the police that it was Regino who was responsible for the killing of the victims
but the police did not believe appellant. But appellant later testified that he implicated Regino only in
retaliation upon learning that the latter pointed to him as the perpetrator. 26Appellant was then asked by
SPO2 Gapas to sign a document so that he will be released. When appellant replied that he did not know
how to sign his name, SPO2 Gapas took appellant’s thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the
document. 27 Appellant claimed he did not resist because he was afraid of being mauled again.

Appellant further denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting Abad, the alleged interpreter. He
never left the jail from the time he was arrested except to attend the hearing before the MTC. 28 When
appellant was brought to the MTC, nobody talked to him during the hearing nor did counsel assist
him.29 He was thereafter brought by a police officer to a hut in a mountain where he was told to go a
little bit farther. He refused for fear of being shot. The police officer then got angry and punched him in
the stomach.30

On the basis of appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court.
Appellant submits for our resolution two issues, namely: (1) whether his guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was likewise
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession upon which the trial court placed heavy
emphasis to find him guilty suffers from constitutional infirmity as it was extracted in violation of the due
process guidelines. Specifically, he claims that he affixed his thumbmark through violence and
intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of his rights during the time of his detention when he
was already considered a suspect as the police had already received information of his alleged
involvement in the crimes. Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from the time
he was detained until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed designated as counsel to assist
appellant for purposes of the custodial investigation, said lawyer, however, was not appellant’s personal
choice.

Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay states that his rights were read to
him, there was no showing that his rights were explained to him in a way that an uneducated person like
him could understand. On the assumption that the confession is admissible, appellant asserts that the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not amply proven as the trial court merely relied
on his alleged confession without presenting any other proof that the determination to commit the
crime was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the constitutional guidelines on custodial
investigation were observed. Hence, appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible. Even if appellant
was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his alleged detention, that would not be
relevant, the government counsel argues, since custodial investigation began only when the investigators
started to elicit information from him which took place at the time he was brought to the house of Atty.
Reyes. Moreover, appellant did not interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel. As to the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the Solicitor General submits that the same was
sufficiently proven when accused proceeded to the victims’ house together with Regino, armed with
bladed weapons, in order to consummate their criminal design. He further argues that appellant’s
defense of denial and his lame excuse of being illiterate must be rejected in the face of a valid voluntary
extrajudicial confession.

The fundamental issue in this case is whether appellant’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in
evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt.

There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti.
Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the
alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.

A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits
imposed by the 1987 Constitution. 31 Sec. 12, Art. III thereof states in part, to wit:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

xxxx

Republic Act No. 7438,32 approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting
the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions read:

SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.—

a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to
and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel,
he must be provided by with a competent and independent counsel.

xxxx

f. As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it must further be tested for
voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by the confessant without any form of coercion or
inducement,33 since, to repeat, Sec. 12(2), Art. III of the Constitution explicitly provides:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to
the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the
confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. 34

If all the foregoing requisites are met, the confession constitutes evidence of a high order because it is
presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience.35 Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity
of the exclusionary rule.36 The latter situation obtains in the instant case for several reasons.

Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights in custodial investigation.

A person under custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the Constitution requires that he be informed
of such rights. The raison d' etre for this requirement was amply explained in People v. Ayson37 where
this Court held, to wit:

xxxx
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding
against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation
of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation contemplated has also
been more precisely described by this Court.

x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins[,] a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to
break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he
meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the
law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to
remedy this imbalance.

x x x x38

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to
the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the
morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture,
appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect,
contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when
the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty.
Reyes.39 In People v. Dueñas, Jr.,40 we ruled, to wit:

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to
PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his
participation in the killing. As he testified on cross-examination:

Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told [sic] you?
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has [sic] to reveal something
about the death of Elvira Jacob.

Q So you already know [sic] that on December 18, 1996 that whatever Catalino Duenas will reveal to you
will give you lead in solving the investigation in connection with the death of Elvira Jacob, isn’t it?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isn’t it?

A Yes, sir. That’s all, your honor. 41

In the case at bar, SPO2 Gapas testified:

Q By the way, when you conducted the investigation in the house of Atty. Reyes in Culion, why was Jerry
Rapeza there?

A I invited Jerry Rapeza and upon my invitation he voluntarily came to me.

Q In the first place, why did you invite him?

A To ask [a] question about the crime committed in the Island of Cawa-Cawa.

xxx

Q That was the only reason why you invited him, being a transient in that place you made him a suspect?

A In the first place[,] Your Honor, he was not a suspect but 2 days after the commission of the crime a
certain person came to me and said that Jerry Rapeza requested that he will give his confession but in
front of a lawyer, so he said: "Puntahan nating [sic] ang isang taong nagngangalang Jerry Rapeza."

xxx

Q And based on your experienced [sic], would it not be quite strange that a person who committed a
crime would voluntarily give confession because ordinarily a criminals [sic] will find a way to escape?

A Yes, sir. [B]ut at that time the person who assisted me strongly believed that Jerry Rapeza would
confess so I did not make any "tanong-tanong" in order to solve that crime so I proceeded to that place
and talked to the suspect.

Q So you already considered Jerry Rapeza as a suspect?

A When that person informed me that Jerry Rapeza would like to confess.

x x x x [Emphasis ours.]42

Already being held as a suspect as early as 21 October 1995, accused should have been informed of his
constitutional rights. SPO2 Gapas admitted that appellant was not so informed, thus:

Q What was he doing?

A He was fishing, sir.

Q And you told him that you’re going to arrest him?

A He did not refuse to go with me, sir.

xxxx
Q From the Island you brought him to the station?

A Yes, sir.

Q And there you arrived at the station at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning?

A Yes, sir.

Q And then you started to conduct the investigation as Investigator of the Police Station?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q And what was the[,] result of your investigation?

A According to him he would confess and he would give his confession in the presence of a lawyer so I
talked to Kgd. Arnel Alcantara.

x x x x43

Q On October 22, 1995[,] when you brought him to the Police Station, did you start the investigation at
that time?

A Not yet sir, I only talked to him.

Q When did you start the investigation?

A I started the investigation when Jerry Rapeza was in front of his lawyer.

Q When was that?

A October 23, 1995[,] noon time, sir.

Q From the Island you just talked to him?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not consider that as part of the investigation?

A Yes sir, my purpose at that time was to certain (sic) the suspect of the said crime.

xxxx

Q Please answer my question[,] Mr. Witness, on October 22, 1995, did you inform him of his
constitutional rights?

A No sir, I did not.

x x x x(Emphasis ours.)44

Even supposing that the custodial investigation started only on 23 October 1995, a review of the records
reveals that the taking of appellant’s confession was flawed nonetheless.

It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had informed appellant in
Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used in evidence for or against
him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the
police shall provide one for him.45However, there is no showing that appellant had actually understood
his rights. He was not even informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful
communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital thereof. 46Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. 47

In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not
well versed in Tagalog.48 This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he
understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged
confession.

The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its claim
that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an
interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the
signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the
alleged confession.

For one thing, SPO2 Cuizon did not mention Abad as one of the persons present during the
interrogation. He testified:

Q Who were present during that investigation?

A Vice Mayor Marasigan and the two other SB members.

Q Can you identify who are these two SB members?

A SB Mabiran and SB Alcantara.

Q Who else?

A No more, sir.

Q So, there were two SB members, Vice Mayor Atty. Reyes, Gapas and you?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x49

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best
position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand
what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellant’s claim that he had never
met Abad.

According to the appellate court, appellant admitted in his Brief that the confession was made in the
presence of an interpreter. The passage in appellant’s Brief on which the admission imputed to him was
based reads, thus:

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not
well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is
no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted
to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were
translated in a language understood by accused-appellant. 50

Clearly, the imputation is erroneous. Throughout his Brief, appellant disputes the allegation that he ever
met the interpreter much less made the confession with the latter’s assistance. The evident import of
the passage is that on the assumption that there was an interpreter present still there was no indication
that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively imparted to appellant, as the interpreter
could not translate that which was not even said in the course of the proceeding.

Moreover, SPO2 Gapas testified on direct examination:

Q As a way of refreshing your mind[,] Mr. Witness, can you take a look at this statement [referring to
appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay] those appearing on page 1 of the same up to the word "Opo sir,"
kindly take a look at this, do you remember that you were the one who profounded (sic) this (sic)
questions?

A Yes, sir, I was the one who profounded [sic] that [sic] questions.

Q And you are very definite that the answer is in [the] affirmative, in your question and answer?

A I am not very sure, sir.

Q You are not very sure because he has a lawyer?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x51

SPO2 Gapas could not say for certain if appellant had indeed understood his rights precisely because he
did not explain them to appellant. In any event, SPO2 Gapas would be incompetent to testify thereon
because appellant’s alleged confession was made through an interpreter as he did not understand
Tagalog. SPO2 Gapas’ testimony as regards the contents of appellant’s confession would in fact be
hearsay. In U.S. v. Chu Chio,52 this Court rendered inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of the accused
therein because it was not made immediately to the officer who testified, but through an interpreter.
Thus, the officer as witness on the stand did not swear of his own knowledge as to what the accused had
said. Similarly in this case, SPO2 Gapas’s testimony as to what was translated to appellant and the latter’s
responses thereto were not of his personal knowledge. Therefore, without the testimony of Abad, it
cannot be said with certainty that appellant was informed of his rights and that he understood them.

Not having been properly informed of his rights prior to questioning and not having waived them either,
the alleged confession of appellant is inadmissible.

Confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of appellant’s
choice.

Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was arrested until before he
was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that appellant was provided with counsel only
when he was questioned at the house of Atty. Reyes to which appellant was allegedly taken from the
police station.

SPO2 Gapas testified that he "talked" to appellant when they got to the police station at 11 o’clock in the
morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their "talk" was that appellant would give his confession in
the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held in the police station overnight before he was allegedly
taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.

The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a
police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter
should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence
of counsel.53 Appellant did not make any such waiver.

Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his competence
and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. The meaning of
"competent counsel" and the standards therefor were explained in People v. Deniega 54 as follows:

The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the
choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s
behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely be
giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People v.
Basay, this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not
afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized
by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized
by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as
proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end,
i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that
he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)55

The standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence
for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellant’s counsel and he himself
notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he assisted appellant. The confession itself and the
testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to
appellant his constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon
whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears that his participation in the proceeding was
confined to the notarization of appellant’s confession. Such participation is not the kind of legal
assistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.

Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers
allegedly through the barangay officials. Appellant’s failure to interpose any objection to having Atty.
Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailing circumstances. As discussed earlier,
appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own
choice. SPO2 Gapas testified thus:

xxxx
Q Now Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the accused[,] when he allegedly gave his voluntary
confession[,] he [sic] did not read the document when he made his thumbmark?

A He did not because according to him he is illiterate.

Q Illiterate because he only placed his thumbmark and you have all the freedom to manipulate him and
in fact he doesn’t know that he is entitled to have a lawyer of his own choice?

A He doesn’t know.

x x x x56

Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant was informed of his right
to a counsel of his own choice and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall provide
him with one, it was overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear in the same statement that
appellant was advised that he had the option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police
authorities.57

Set against the clear provisions of the Constitution and the elucidations thereof in jurisprudence, the
foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities preclude the admissibility of appellant’s alleged
confession.

Confession is not voluntary.

It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears
the burden of proving the contrary. 58 The trial court found that appellant’s bare denials failed to
overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not
given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.

First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators
themselves.

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the
confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details—which could only be supplied by the accused–reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may
be considered voluntary.59 The trial court applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of
the evidence, the key details in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police
officers themselves.

The prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. This is disturbing, to say the least.

The trial court found that the killings were reported to the police at four o’clock in the afternoon of 21
October 1995. That when the investigating team arrived at the scene of the crime, the bodies of the
victims were already rank and decomposing, 60 and that two days after the crimes were committed, SPO2
Gapas had set out to look for appellant following information from a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant
would like to confess to the crimes.

Indeed, SPO2 Gapas testified that he received a report of the killings on 21 October 1995 and sent a
team to investigate the incident. On direct examination, he declared that two days after the commission
of the crime, he received information that appellant would give his confession in front of a
lawyer.61 However, on cross-examination, he stated that it was on the following day or on 22 October
1995 when he found appellant and invited him to the police station and that appellant’s custodial
investigation had taken place on 23 October 1995.
Likewise, SPO2 Cuizon’s testimony is far from enlightening. He testified, thus:

xxxx

Q Now, on October 24, 1995, where were you?

A I was in Culion Police Station.

Q While you were there in the Police Station, what happened?

A A woman reported to us regarding this incident. 62

xxxx

Q When was the investigation conducted?

A October 24, 1995.

Q On the same day that you discover [sic] the cadavers?

A The investigation was conducted on October 25, 1995.

x x x x63

The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.

While the prosecution insists through the recitals of the Informations and the testimony of its witnesses
that the killings took place on 21 October 1995, the totality of its evidence shows otherwise, i.e. the
killings took place earlier. When the bodies were discovered on 21 October 1995, they were already
decomposing, a factor that indicates that the victims had been dead long before then. How then could
appellant have killed the victims at 4 o’clock in the afternoon of 21 October 1995 as expressly stated in
the confession, when that was the same date and time when the bodies were discovered? Had appellant
voluntarily confessed and had he really been the killer, he would have given the correct date and time
when he committed the horrid acts. The only sensible way to sort out the puzzle is to conclude that the
police officers themselves supplied 21 October 1995 and four o’clock in the afternoon as the date and
time of the killings in appellant’s statement, a barefaced lie on which the prosecution based its
allegations in the Informations and which SPO2 Gapas repeated on the witness stand.

Moreover, the police officers went to the house of the victims on 21 October 1995 where they found the
bodies. The autopsy on the victims’s bodies was done the following day or on 22 October 1995 while
appellant’s statement was allegedly taken on 23 October 1995. By then, the investigators knew how and
where the victims were killed, circumstances that could have enabled them to fill up the details of the
crime in the extrajudicial confession.64

Curiously, the autopsy report on Ganzon’s body shows that he sustained six (6) stab wounds, four (4) on
the right side of his body and two (2) on the left side. Yet, it is stated in appellant’s extrajudicial
confession that he stabbed Ganzon on his left side. Quite oddly, SPO2 Cuizon testified that Ganzon was
wounded on the left arm only. His full account on this aspect runs, thus:

Q Where did you go?

A I immediately proceeded to the house of the victim.

Q What did you find out when you went to the house of the victim?
A I have seen blood on the ground floor of the house.

xxxx

Q When you opened the house[,] you are [sic] with Macatangay?

A Yes, sir[.] I was with POII Macatangay but he was a little bit far from the victim and I was the one who
opened the door and went upstairs.

Q What did you find out inside the house?

A I have seen a woman lying down with her hands "nakadipa" on the ground and blooded (sic).

xxxx

Q Where else did you go when you were already inside the house?

A I went to the other bedroom.

Q And what did you find out?

A An old man with his face facing downward.

Q The woman already dead was in the sala?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x65

Q Do you know in what bedroom (sic) of her body she was wounded?

A The neck was slashed and both arms and both foot (sic) were wounded.

Q How about the man?

A Left arm, sir.

Q Where else?

A No more, sir.

x x x x66 (Emphasis ours.)

The prosecution’s evidence likewise fails to establish when the custodial investigation had taken place
and for how long appellant had been in detention. Strangely, the confession is undated and it cannot be
ascertained from it when appellant made the confession or affixed his thumbmark thereon. What
emerges only is the bare fact that it was notarized by Atty. Reyes on 23 October 1995. One can only
speculate as to the reason behind what seems to be a lack of forthrightness on the part of the police
officers.

These unexplained inconsistencies cast doubt on the integrity and voluntariness of appellant’s alleged
confession.

Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.

To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the
police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating
statements.67 And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is the duty of his counsel to
ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and that it is a product of his own free
choice.

It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to
the house of Atty. Reyes. He was not informed of his rights and there is no evidence that he was assisted
by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having been subjected to trickery and intimidation at the
hands of the police authorities, as he claims, cannot be entirely discounted.

Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are
corroborated.68 There must be such corroboration so that when considered in connection with the
confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 69

As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified
thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made 70 or by any other evidence.71

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the
credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of
Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not
presented in court.

Abad’s testimony was likewise crucial in proving that appellant had understood every part of his alleged
confession. Confessions made in a language or dialect not known to the confessant must also be
corroborated by independent evidence.72 As appellant is unschooled and was not familiar with the
Tagalog dialect, his confession which was in Tagalog necessarily had to be read and translated to Waray
allegedly by Abad. This Court has held that "such a multiple process of reading and translating the
questions and translating and typing the answers and reading and translating again the said answers is
naturally pregnant with possibilities of human, if unintentional, inadequacies and incompleteness which
render the said confession unsafe as basis of conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently
corroborated."73 A confession may be admissible if it is shown to have been read and translated to the
accused by the person taking down the statement and that the accused fully understood every part of
it.74 To repeat, we cannot accept SPO2 Gapas’ testimony as regards the contents of appellant’s alleged
confession for being hearsay evidence thereon. Since appellant allegedly made the confession to SPO2
Gapas through Abad, Abad’s testimony is thus indispensable in order to make the confession
admissible.1a\^/phi1.net

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be resolved in
favor of appellant75 and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. 76 Verily, we are left with the
unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects
the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we
find the same insufficient bases to hold appellant’s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.

The only other prosecution evidence under consideration are the autopsy reports with which the alleged
confession supposedly dovetails, as the trial court concluded. However, a perusal of the alleged
confession would reveal that does not fit the details in the autopsy report. As discussed earlier, Ganzon
was found to have sustained six (6) stab wounds on different parts of his body while appellant allegedly
admitted stabbing him on his left side only. The confession does not even state how many times
appellant stabbed the old man. SPO2 Cuizon testified that he saw only one stab wound on Ganzon’s
body and it was on the latter’s left arm. Thus, it is not with the autopsy reports that the alleged
confession dovetails but rather with what the police authorities would like us to believe as the truth.
Nevertheless, since the confession is inadmissible, it becomes irrelevant whether it dovetails with the
autopsy reports. The corroboration that medico-legal findings lend to an extrajudicial confession
becomes relevant only when the latter is considered admissible. In People v. De la Cruz,77 we held, to wit:

It is significant that, with the exception of appellant’s putative extrajudicial confession, no other evidence
of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe with
the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal error of
figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed
extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety,
hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which
has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.78

No motive could be ascribed to appellant.

For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for
conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator. 79 In view of the inadmissibility of the
confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to appellant as the culprit. However, the
prosecution failed to show any motive on appellant’s part to commit the felonies. Appellant consistently
denied having known the victims. Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought
appellant’s help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew, the fact of their relationship was denied
by appellant and was never established by the prosecution. In People v. Aguilar, 80 we held that "the
absence of apparent motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a
presumption of the innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a motive would
be an effect without a cause."81

Furthermore, appellant’s conduct after the killings was not that of a guilty person. He never attempted
to flee even if he knew that the police authorities were already investigating the incident as he was
summoned to help load the bodies in a banca. Being a transient in the place, he could have easily
disappeared and left the island but he remained there to continue looking for work.

Taken together, these circumstances generate serious doubts that must be resolved in appellant’s favor,
congruently with the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In view of the inadmissibility of appellant’s confession, which is the sole evidence of the prosecution
against him, the resolution of the issue of whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
had attended the commission of the crimes has become academic. Indeed, there exists no other
prosecution evidence on which appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt may be based.

In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is not whether appellant is completely
innocent, but rather whether the quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met.
With the exclusion of appellant’s alleged confession, we are left with no other recourse but to acquit him
of the offenses charged for the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be
overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in
his behalf.82

WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan, Puerto Princesa City in
Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00642 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza y Francisco is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence leading to reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellant from confinement, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause,
and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court.
During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to
be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during
arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel
is absolute, the accused's option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to
sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important
rights of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

This will be amplified in this appeal seeking the reversal of the August 23, 1994 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, 1 in Criminal Case No. 90-5997 convicting Appellant Mario Serzo,
Jr. of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata, worded as follows: 2

That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Alfredo Alcantara y Casabal at the back, thereby inflicting upon him stab
wounds which directly caused his death.

Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and
trial, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced thus: 3

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of having committed the crime of MURDER and as prescribed under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the
victim's wife in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as actual damages and TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as moral damages and costs.

The Antecedents

Summarizing the testimonies of Adelaida Alcantara (the victim's widow), Medico-Legal Officer Dario L.
Gajardo and Epifania Andrade, the trial court found the following facts: 4

Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just around the corner inevitably meeting his
way. That fateful night of August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were (sic)
staying inside their house comfortably watching television when at around 11:30 in the evening, Susana
Serzo, mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorsteps and
pleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son, the
accused in this case. Unhesitatingly, the couple heeded their call and went with them at (sic) their house,
located just across the private complainant's residence. The spouses were able to rescue the
grandchildren and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who
was walking just armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind.
Accused stabbed Alfredo at his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life. However, accused was
able to overpower him thereby causing his fall in the canal where he was repeatedly stabbed by the
accused. Adelaida Alcantara shouted for help but was likewise attacked by the accused as she was only
half-meter away from her husband. However, Adelaida fortunately was able to hold the hand of the
knifewielder and persistently fought the accused. (p. 05 TSN June 3, 1991) At that moment, the
commotion had already caught the attention of the residents within the vicinity who responded to help
her thereby causing the accused to flee. The victim Alfredo Alcantara, who remained lying and
motionless in the canal, was rushed to the hospital where he was confirmed dead. (p. 06 TSN June 3,
1991) The Medico-legal Officer, Dr. Dario Gajardo, testified in Court that the victim sustained three (3)
stab wounds, two at the back and one in his chest, which instantaneously caused the victim's death. (p.
04 TSN May 13, 1991)

In view of appellant's allegation that he was denied his right to counsel, a narration of the proceedings
before the trial court is now in order. Arraignment was set by the trial court on January 8, 1991, during
which appellant appeared without counsel. Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-
ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that the arraignment be
reset and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his own choice, which the trial court granted. 5

On February 11, 1991, appellant appeared without a counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned
with the assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo Lina-ac. 6 He pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial was waived
and trial was set on April 22, May 6 and 13, 1991 for the reception of the prosecution evidence and June
3 and 17, 1991 for the defense.

The hearings scheduled on April 22, 1991 and May 6, 1991 were cancelled on motion of Public
Prosecutor Robert H. Tobia. 7 On both dates, appellant appeared with Atty. Lina-ac. On May 13 and June
3, 1991, trial proceeded with the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. On behalf of appellant, Atty.
Lina-ac cross-examined the said witnesses.

On June 17, 1991, trial was again cancelled as appellant appeared without counsel. 8 On August 13,
1991, the prosecution rested its case. 9

On November 4 and 11, 1991, presentation of evidence for the defense was reset as appellant was not
ready to testify 10 and he manifested his intention to secure the services of a counsel de parte. 11 On
March 3, 1992, Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of appellant's manifestation and
refusal to cooperate with said counsel. 12 On April 6, 1992 appellant appeared without counsel, forcing
the trial court to appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano. Counsels for both parties agreed to
reset the trial, but appellant refused to sign the minutes of the proceedings. 13

On April 27, 1992, 14 over vehement objection from the prosecution, hearing was reset for the last time
as appellant was still looking for a counsel de parte. 15 On August 25, 1992, appellant appeared without
counsel; thus, the trial court appointed Atty. Bonifacia Garcia of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as
appellant's counsel de oficio. Again, trial was postponed. 16 On September 1 and October 19, 1992, trial
was postponed on motion of Atty. Garcia. 17Appellant again refused to sign the minutes of the
proceedings for both trial dates. On November 5, 1992, appellant refused to cooperate with Atty. Garcia
by declining to take the witness stand, forcing the defense to rest its case. 18Both parties were ordered to
submit their respective memoranda in ten days, after which the case would be submitted for decision.
Atty. Garcia was further ordered to manifest within the same period whether appellant would change his
mind and cooperate with her. No memorandum or manifestation was ever filed by appellant.

Appellant wrote Judge Angeles three times within the period beginning December 16, 1992 until April 2,
1993, seeking legal advice and the early resolution of the case. Branch Clerk of Court Melchisedek A.
Guan replied to him twice, informing him that Judge Angeles was prohibited by law from giving legal
advice to litigants in cases pending in his court and that a decision was forthcoming. On July 13, 1994,
appellant wrote Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, asking for the early resolution of his
case. 19 The latter referred said letter to Judge Angeles for appropriate action.

Thereafter, the assailed Decision convicting appellant of murder was promulgated on August 23, 1994.

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply refused to secure the services of a counsel de
parte and to present evidence in his defense despite ample opportunity accorded to him. Said the trial
court:

The defense particularly the accused assisted by counsel however refused to present any evidence
despite several opportunities afforded by the Court. As early as the arraignment stage, accused refused
to be assisted by a counsel de oficio from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) insisting that he be assisted
by a counsel of his own choice. For several settings, accused and her (sic) mother were allowed to secure
the services of a counsel de parte. However, they failed to present one. Hence, the Court, to avoid
further delay in the proceedings of the case, was constrained to assign a counsel de oficio from the PAO.

During the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused and counsel could not present any witness
as accused refused to cooperate and to testify in Court. Hence, the defense waived its right to present
any evidence.

Considering that this case has been dragging for several years already . . . the court . . . afforded the
defense another opportunity to present its case by submitting its memorandum simultaneously with the
Prosecution. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. 20

Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. Appellant was positively identified as the assailant by the widow, Adelaida Alcantara, who
survived his attack. In her distinct and vivid narration of the sequence of events leading to the murder,
she showed that the attack was treacherous as the victim was stabbed at the back and without warning.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Decision, appellant through Counsel Carmelo L. Arcilla 21 appealed to
this Court.

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief filed by Atty. Arcilla, appellant questions his conviction for murder based on the following
alleged errors on the part of the trial court: 22

The lower court erred in not giving the defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own choice.
II

The lower court erred in not affording the defendant-appellant the chance to present evidence for his
defense.

III

The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant-appellant.

Mainly, appellant alleges that he had been denied effective legal representation. His thesis is that the
trial court did not give him enough time to engage a counsel de parte, effectively depriving him of the
chance to present evidence in his defense. In fact, the scant five-page Appellant's Brief was dedicated
entirely to this argument without contesting the facts found by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This
right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the state. In the words of Justice Black, 23 this is a "recognition . .
. that an average (accused) does not have the professional skill to protect himself . . . before a tribunal
with power to take his life or liberty, wherein
the (prosecutor) is . . . an experienced and learned counsel." In Powell vs. Alabama, 24 Mr. Justice
Sutherland wrote at greater length on why an accused needs a competent counsel:

Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of
judgment, 25 and even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an accused not
only during trial but even before an information is filed. It provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Sec. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, . . .

With these precepts as springboard, the Rules of Court grants an accused the right to counsel under the
following provisions, viz.:

RULE 112

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — . . .

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 113

ARREST

Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any member of the bar shall, at the
request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer
privately with such person, in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night. This right shall also be exercised by any relative of the person arrested subject to
reasonable regulation.

Rule 115

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at the trial.— In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 116 of the Rules of Court makes it compulsory that the trial court inform the accused of his right to
counsel prior to arraignment, thus:

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and shall ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused
is allowed to defend himself in person, or he has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio to defend him.

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar
in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

Even on appeal, the accused is still afforded the right to counsel under Rule 122: 26

Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. — It shall be the duty of the clerk of the
trial court upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain from the appellant,
if he be confined in prison, whether he desires the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to appoint a
counsel to defend him de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk
of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to
his inquiry.

The foregoing is buttressed by another provision in Rule 124:

Sec. 2. Appointment of counsel de oficio for the accused. — If it appears from the record of the case as
transmitted: (a) that the accused is confined in prison, (b) without counsel de parte on appeal, and (c)
signed the notice of appeal himself, then the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall designate a member of
the bar to defend him, such designation to be made by rotation, unless otherwise directed by order of
the court.

An accused-appellant not confined in prison shall not be entitled to a counsel de oficio, unless the
appointment of such counsel is requested in the appellate court within ten (10) days from receipt of the
notice to file brief and the right thereto is established by affidavit.

Recently, Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted providing, inter alia, that any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

A deprivation of the right to counsel divests the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a
level playing field, so to speak. In a previous case, this Court held that an accused was deprived of his
right to counsel when he retained the services of a person who misrepresented himself as a
lawyer. 27 In People vs. Malunsing, 28retrial was ordered on the ground that petitioner was denied his
constitutional right to counsel. Very old and unlettered, he was shown not to have understood what was
going on during the trial. In said case, although the lawyer of his co-accused was appointed as his
counsel, petitioner was not properly apprised by said court of his right to be assisted by counsel. No
evidence was presented for and on his behalf and the trial court did not even bother to inquire why he
did not take the witness stand when all the other defendants were presented as witnesses.

This is the legal backdrop against which appellant's allegation of deprivation of his right to counsel shall
be measured.

Right to Counsel De Parte Is Not Absolute

Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-
appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable,
his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to
balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states's and the offended party's equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is
not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g.
conflict of interest and the like. 29

Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights,
waivable 30 so long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law 31 and (2) the waiver is
unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made. 32

In Sayson vs. People, 33 this Court held that the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not
mandatory where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his
choice but, when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense was due, he appears by
himself alone because of the inexcusable absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held that
the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so
would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of
justice. 34

In the present case, appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time to engage a counsel de parte,
thereby preventing him from presenting evidence in his defense. In his Brief he adds, but without giving
particulars or proof, that allegedly his counsels de oficio did not exert their "utmost efforts" in
representing him, thus: 35

. . . (T)he lower court afforded the accused the assistance of counsel de oficio as early as the arraignment
stage but failed to show that utmost efforts were exerted by said counsel to defend the life and liberty of
the accused. The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, however, as it should also see to
it that the counsel does his duty by the defendant. Counsel de oficio should not merely make the
motions of defending the accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.

The Solicitor General, in his eleven-page Brief, 36 rebuts this, arguing that appellant's actions during the
trial showed instead a "lackadaisical stance on his own defense."

Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent
appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely
delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial
court and the orderly administration of justice.

Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not effectively
represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his own
neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two
years 37 since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not
find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers.

The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel
because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano
and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the
accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor
should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the
trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who
were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.

Crime and Punishment

In spite of appellant's failure, either through negligence or unreasonable refusal, to impute errors to the
assailed Decision — other than the alleged violation of his right to counsel — this Court nonetheless
scoured the records of the trial, perused the transcripts of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution, evaluated the evidence and examined the applicable laws and jurisprudence to determine
the correctness of the trial court's Decision. We, however, find no cogent reason to reverse the
conviction of appellant. In a case of murder or homicide, it is enough that the death of the victim and the
responsibility of the person who caused such death are proven 38 beyond reasonable doubt. Both
elements were duly established by the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Gajardo testified to the fact of death
while Widow Adelaida Alcantara positively identified the appellant as the assailant.
Based on the facts established by the prosecution which remain uncontested, the Court affirms the trial
court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To constitute treachery, two conditions
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of
execution. 39 The manner of the attack itself is proof enough of alevosia. Widow Adelaida vividly
described the stabbing as
follows: 40

Q: And you said a certain Suzana Serzo together with one Epifania Bentilacion came to your house and
asked for help from you, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that you responded for help Mrs. witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you are together with your husband in helping Suzana Serzo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the help she was asking Mrs. witness?

xxx xxx xxx

A: She was asking to help her children being held by Mario Serzo by not letting them go out of the house.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Were you able to help the grandchildren of Suzana Serzo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after you help (sic) them what happened next?

A: We brought them to where they could hide and then we went home.

Q: You said you heard somebody approaching you at the back through the sound of his footsteps is that
right?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened next after you hear (sic) those footsteps at your back?

A: My husband was just beside me.

Q: And immediately your husband was stabbed by the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

From this testimony, it appears that appellant waited for the victim and his wife and pounced on them
swiftly and without warning. The victim and his wife were already on their way home after transferring
appellant's children to a safe place. They were unarmed as they had absolutely no idea that appellant
would attack them right then and from behind. The manner of the attack tended directly and especially
to insure the execution of the crime without risk to appellant and virtually no chance for the victim to
defend himself. 41 Even Adelaida's life would have been mortally threatened were it not for the timely
intervention of her neighbors.

Damages and Indemnity

Actual and moral damages require the presentation of proof before they can be awarded by the trial
court. 42According to Adelaida, burial expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 were incurred. 43 This is
separate and distinct from civil indemnity awarded under prevailing jurisprudence, which is granted
without further proof beyond the fact of death and the accused's responsibility therefor. Moral damages
were not discussed at all in Adelaida's testimony. Hence, without any factual basis, the award of moral
damages is not justified.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is DELETED.
Instead, appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and actual damages
of P2,000.00 as burial expenses.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

Francisco, J., is on leave.