Republic of the Philippines "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
SUPREME COURT that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
Manila
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask
the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.
This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted
that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is
the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from
its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not
true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely
to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that
six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10
and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2
of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law,
and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least
as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested
by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not
need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.
This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic,
with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain
the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts
of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined

shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,

Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,
petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,
respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,
respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention
and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy
of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred
to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then
Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.
But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played
in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates
on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson
roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson
promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the
what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap,
and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech
was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously
filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the
possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of
the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate
from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the
main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded
with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12
1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes
filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the
ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner
in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants
the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their
pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or
locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because
of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1)
he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a
non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current
policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to
wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to
initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the
"Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of
electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the
petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their
standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the
country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds
that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They
are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual
rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the
execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and
Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous
conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be
noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to
the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the
bar and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated
by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent
case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle
that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By
actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes
moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the
respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and
from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays
that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House
proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already
played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello
Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite
of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when
they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be
in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure"
requires the Senate of every Congress to publish
its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid
of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3)
years for one-half of the Senate’s membership,
the composition of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.
Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted
by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no
longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate
has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected
every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving
less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute
a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in
Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress.
The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48
(On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this
Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as
it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election
or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the
session shall be taken up at the next session in
the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall
terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a different composition
as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by
the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had
no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with
respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an
institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate
(i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE
RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which
the Senators elected in the preceding elections
shall begin their term of office, the President
may endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a
motion which should be presented at least one
day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session
shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the
date of their adoption and shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an
election and the possibility of the amendment or revision
of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly
elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that
its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules
simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended
or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of
the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily
adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make
the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next
Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of
the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
 newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52
It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules
in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October
31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the
infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken
by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to

discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the

petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or
any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal
ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province.
By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit
having committed the acts charged but would claim that the
ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality,
that they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:
This defendant is charged of the crime of
Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an
information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated
October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965
and 1966, in the Municipality
of Pagbilao, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then
the owner and operator of a
fishpond situated in the
barrio of Pinagbayanan, of
said municipality, did then
and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
refuse and fail to pay the
municipal taxes in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY
TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62),
required of him as fishpond
operator as provided for
under Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended,
inspite of repeated demands
made upon him by the
Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the
same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following witnesses
testified in substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married,
farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I
worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The
fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao,
Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond,
the construction of the dikes and the catching of
fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married,
copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon —
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon
since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused
since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at
Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still
operates the fishpond up to the present and I
know this fact as I am the barrio captain of
Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I came to know the accused when he first
operated his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967
and the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the
accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal
treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married —
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax
collection. I know the accused even before I was
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written
the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes
(Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the
accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-
1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00,
more or less, by way of taxes which he did not
pay up to the present. The former Treasurer,
Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand
to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I
sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit
D), requesting information if accused paid taxes
with that office. The Commission sent me a
certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused
had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes
unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee
on fishpond operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their
evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-
2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by
the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3
which were not admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO,
48 years of age, married, owner and general
manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises
and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila, declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I
buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at
San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in
Manila and my business is in Manila and my
family lives at Manila. I never resided at
Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at
Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement
to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965
and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was
still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances
Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966,
were translated into English by the Institute of
National Language to better understand the
ordinances. There were exchange of letters
between me and the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on
my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There
was a letter of demand for the payment of the
taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I
received by mail at my residence at Manila. I
answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with
Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my
fishpond to determine its condition as it was not
then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer
Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found
that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there
were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-
B and 4C. I received another letter of demand,
Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A).
I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from
Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received
another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo,
Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated
February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the
same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A,
dated February 26, 1966. I received another
letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of
Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same
(Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer
Caparros to ask for an application for license tax
and he said none and he told me just to pay my
taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not
know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or
not. The letters of demand asked me to pay
different amounts for taxes for the fishpond.
Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not
paid and they are collecting on a lapsed
ordinance. Because under the Tax Code,
fishermen are exempted from percentage tax
and privilege tax. There is no law empowering
the municipality to pass ordinance taxing
fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-
A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were
admitted by the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want
to show to the court that the accused, as lessee
or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of
Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the
municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and
1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended by Municipal
Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally
amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series
of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence,
tends to show to the court that the taxes sought
to be collected have already lapsed and that
there is no law empowering municipalities to
pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The
defense, by their evidence, tried to show further
that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted
into a fishpond, he is not covered by said
municipal ordinances; and finally that the
accused should not be taxed as fishpond
operator because there is no fishpond yet being
operated by him, considering that the supposed
fishpond was under construction during the
period covered by the taxes sought to be
collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance
in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the
power of the municipal council of Pagbilao,
Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims
that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and
uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences
presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel
of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares,
for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease
 Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the
accused and the government, through the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences
presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land
leased by the defendant from the government
for fishpond purposes was actually converted
into fishpond and used as such, and therefore
defendant is an operator of a fishpond within
the purview of the ordinance in question. 1
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by
Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance
No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon;
and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to
pay the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED. 3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES
OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12,
SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS
NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE
IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX
POST FACTO.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE
IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED
ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. 4
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955,
Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of
1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to
this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in
places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao,
Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount
of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof
per annum. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have
or owners or managers of fishponds within the
territorial limits of this municipality, the date of
payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall
begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the
Bureau of Fisheries. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in
places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao
shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00
per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum
beginning and taking effect from the year 1964,
if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964. 7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly
"ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that being a
mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said
ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that
they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas
Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment
"after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No.
12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking
effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964." 10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot
be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to
assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in
advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " 14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague"
15 act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished,
however, from legislation couched in imprecise language — but
which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased
— in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that
event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed
against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally
under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting,
specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the
defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to
Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves
and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness
doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and
practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair
notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a
divided Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880
penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the
election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political
activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the
ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts
deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan
political activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus
limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been
minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however,
Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be
prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880,
prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression
relating to candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed
with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple
expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and
expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave
the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection
offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions
of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current
political problems or issues')." 23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-
interests" test, 24 insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination of
candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the
prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest
scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the
embracing public interest which Congress has found in the
moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion
that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend the
Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the balance
achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual
liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate
opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less
restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court searches
for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory
limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would
render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28
legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American)
Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the
right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was
available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify
dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the
balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is
usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is
usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic
rights, 30 or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less
precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the
legislature is presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the
vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that
the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the
fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny
the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds,
introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers
to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National
Government which owns them, 32 the Government never shared in
the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he
shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the
character of revenue measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of
the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner,
the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing,
upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from
taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been
making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in
question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the
business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in
question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a
liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There
is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend
upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the
'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an
uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also
to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by
the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the date of
payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning
liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964
if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not
give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have
been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been
allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability
for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere
problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague.
In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of
legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a
vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for
fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new
fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries
(Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance
No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond
operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15).
With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards
that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not
apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of
the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post
facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment
No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the
payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from
the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its
passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37

The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General

notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38
Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No.
12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the
reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially,
Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures
intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the
originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act
(of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made
punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a
retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty
to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It
does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of

Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co.,
Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that local governments' taxing
power does not extend to forest products or concessions under
Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force.
(Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from
imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the
rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare"
42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held
them to the agricultural lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large
tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush;
a large wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were
directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest
products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of

fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales, which
would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon
Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under
Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as
fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances
themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,

Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said
executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country,
inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay
Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few
exceptions.

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G.
Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled "Providing for a comprehensive
industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development
EN BANC
program and its implementing guidelines." The challenged provision
states:
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles is
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS prohibited, except for the following:
(DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the
SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE
personal use of a returning resident or
PORT ZONE, Petitioners,
immigrant and covered by an authority to import
vs.
issued under the No-dollar Importation Program.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its
Such vehicles cannot be resold for at least three
President JOSE T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC., represented
(3) years;
by its President DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN, INC., represented
by its President MARIANO C. SONON, Respondents.
3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the
Diplomatic Corps and authorized to be imported
x---------------x
by the Department of Foreign Affairs;

G.R. No. 164172 February 20, 2006

3.1.3 Trucks excluding pickup trucks;

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC),
an authority to import issued by the
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
DTI.
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC
BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT
ZONE, Petitioners, 2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.
vs.
SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO VENTURES CORP., represented by its 3.1.4 Buses:
President YOLANDA AMBAR, Respondent.
1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by
x---------------x an authority to import issued by DTI;

G.R. No. 168741 February 20, 2006 2. with GVW above 12 tons.

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE 3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:
CHIEF OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, 1. fire trucks
SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, Petitioners,
vs.
MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY 2. ambulances
FREEPORT, INC., represented by its President ALFREDO S. GALANG,
Respondent. 3. funeral hearse/coaches

DECISION 4. crane lorries

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 5. tractor heads and truck tractors

The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the 6. boom trucks
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, in
Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 7. tanker trucks
24, 2004; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284, which declared Article 2, Section
 8. tank lorries with high pressure spray
gun
9. reefers or refrigerated trucks
10. mobile drilling derricks
11. transit/concrete mixers
12. mobile radiological units
13. wreckers or tow trucks
14. concrete pump trucks
15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks
16. street sweepers
17. vacuum trucks
18. garbage compactors
19. self loader trucks
20. man lift trucks
21. lighting trucks
22. trucks mounted with special
purpose equipment
23. all other types of vehicle designed
for a specific use.
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for
declaratory relief before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed
by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are
classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the
business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor
vehicles.
G.R. No. 164171:
On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
(Southwing) United Auctioneers, Inc. (United Auctioneers), and
Microvan, Inc. (Microvan), instituted a declaratory relief case
docketed as Civil Case No. 20-0-04,1 against the Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of
Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation
Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of
Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of
the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
Southwing, United Auctioneers and Microvan prayed that judgment
be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance,
Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman
of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2)
ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside
the Subic Special Economic Zone to process the registration of the
imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the
unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject
only to the payment of the required customs duties.
Upon filing of petitioners’ answer/comment, respondents Southwing
and Microvan filed a motion for summary judgment which was
granted by the trial court. On May 24, 2004, a summary judgment
was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by
the Constitution with Congress. The trial court further held that the
proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA
7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner
declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being
unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents Collector of
Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used
motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing
respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its
subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to
process the registration of imported used motor vehicle; and in
general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor
vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the
required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.2
From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
164171.
G.R. No. 164172:
On January 20, 2004, respondent Subic Integrated Macro Ventures
Corporation (Macro Ventures) filed with the same trial court, a
similar action for declaratory relief docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-
04,3 with the same prayer and against the same parties4 as those in
Civil Case No. 20-0-04.
In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment
on May 24, 2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is
repugnant to the constitution.5 Elevated to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari, Civil Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed as G.R.
No. 164172.
G.R. No. 168741
On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers
Association of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (Association), filed another
action for declaratory relief with essentially the same prayer as
those in Civil Case No. 22-0-04 and Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against
the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Chief of the Land
Transportation Office, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of
Customs at SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,6 before the same trial court.
In a decision dated March 10, 2004, the court a quo granted the
Association’s prayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to
the Constitution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner
declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being
unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents Collector of
Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used
motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing
respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its
subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to
process the registration of imported used motor vehicles; directing
the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to allow the entry into the
Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA imported used motor vehicle;
and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used
motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the
required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a
petition for certiorari8 with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No.
83284) which denied the petition on February 14, 2005 and
sustained the finding of the trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of
EO 156, is void for being repugnant to the constitution. The
dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 72, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,
accordingly, STANDS.
SO ORDERED.9
The aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to
this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 168741. In a Resolution dated
October 4, 2005,10 said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 164171
and G.R. No. 164172.
Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2,
Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country,
including the Freeeport. In support of their arguments, they raise
procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of
the assailed proviso. The procedural issues are: the lack of
respondents’ locus standi to question the validity of EO 156, the
propriety of challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding
and the applicability of a judgment on the pleadings in this case.
Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the
importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and
tax exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation
and/or trading of used cars. They also aver that the actions filed by
respondents do not qualify as declaratory relief cases. Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory
relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation of rights.
Petitioners claim that there was already a breach of respondents’
supposed right because the cases were filed more than a year after
the issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,
numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against
imported used motor vehicles belonging to respondent Association’s
members.
Petitioners’ arguments lack merit.
The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or
administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement11 has been satisfied in the
instant case. The broad subject of the prohibited importation is "all
types of used motor vehicles." Respondents would definitely suffer
a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their
certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade
and/or import new and used motor vehicles and spare parts, except
"used cars."12 Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded
by respondents and not falling within the category of used cars
would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their
business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail
the validity of EO 156.
As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the
executive issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of
respondents will not affect the case. In Commission on Audit of the
Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu,13 the Court entertained a suit
for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper
interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a
violation of the right of the party affected. We find no reason to
deviate from said ruling mindful of the significance of the present
case to the national economy.
So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial
court because the issues involved in the instant case were pure
questions of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on
the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either
because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by
the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action in
which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to
any material fact.14
At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by
petitioners truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing
aside these technicalities and taking cognizance of the action filed by
respondents considering its importance to the public and in keeping
with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution.15
We now come to the substantive issues, which are: (1) whether
there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the
answer is in the affirmative, whether the application of Article 2,
Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within the scope provided by
law.
The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional
because it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment
Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended
to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow
of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs
duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open
floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2,
Section 3.1 of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis
for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on
the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police
power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the
exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is
void.
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals,
and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the
legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well
as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay.16 Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-
legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated
by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and
implement legislative policy.17 To be valid, an administrative
issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the
following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by
the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.18
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually
satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has
both constitutional and statutory bases.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.19 (Emphasis
supplied)
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in
the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national
security, to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity.
Section 401 thereof, reads:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed,
the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic
and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is
hereby empowered: x x x (2) to establish import quota or to ban
imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; x x x Provided,
That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual
reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and
four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to
this section. (Emphasis supplied)
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the
Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power under the
Provisional Freedom Constitution,20 empowers the President to
approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any
equipment or raw materials or finished products. Pertinent
provisions thereof, read:
ART. 4. Composition of the board. The Board of Investments shall be
composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade and
Industry, three (3) Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to be
chosen by the President; and three (3) representatives from the
government agencies and the private sector x x x.
ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.
xxxx
(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs for certain
industries whose operation may result in dislocation, overcrowding
or inefficient use of resources, thus impeding economic growth. For
this purpose, the Board may formulate guidelines for progressive
manufacturing programs, local content programs, mandatory
sourcing requirements and dispersal of industries. In appropriate
cases and upon approval of the President, the Board may restrict,
either totally or partially, the importation of any equipment or raw
materials or finished products involved in the rationalization
program; (Emphasis supplied)
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard
Measures Act" (SMA), and entitled "An Act Protecting Local
Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In
Response To Increased Imports And Providing Penalties For Violation
Thereof,"21 designated the Secretaries22 of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, in their
capacity as alter egos of the President, as the implementing
authorities of the safeguard measures, which include, inter alia,
modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the
importation of a product into the Philippines. The purpose of the
SMA is stated in the declaration of policy, thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall promote
competitiveness of domestic industries and producers based on
sound industrial and agricultural development policies, and efficient
use of human, natural and technical resources. In pursuit of this goal
and in the public interest, the State shall provide safeguard
measures to protect domestic industries and producers from
increased imports which cause or threaten to cause serious injury to
those domestic industries and producers.
There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission
authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles
and commodities into the country.
Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is
necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly
determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that,
the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous
notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature
itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on
certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.23 This
exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as
distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed;24
and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.25 A legislative rule,
on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted
to implement a primary legislation.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,26 and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc.,27 the Court enunciated the doctrine that when an
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the
law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to
implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to
protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation
of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. The
due process requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in
Section 40128 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of
the SMA29 which essentially mandate the conduct of investigation
and public hearings before the regulatory measure or importation
ban may be issued.
In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this
Court nor with the courts below the procedure that paved the way
for the issuance of EO 156. What they challenged in their petitions
before the trial court was the absence of "substantive due process"
in the issuance of the EO.30 Their main contention before the court a
quo is that the importation ban is illogical and unfair because it
unreasonably drives them out of business to the prejudice of the
national economy.
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the
government are presumed to be valid,31 and there being no
objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the
promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive
issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed
by law.
To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and
fourth requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it
was issued within the scope of authority given by the legislature and
that it is reasonable, an examination of the nature of a Freeport
under RA 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban
under the questioned EO is necessary.
RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound
and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations
and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of
Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in
order to promote the economic and social development of Central
Luzon in particular and the country in general.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically
defines the territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to
as the Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227
as "a separate customs territory consisting of the City of Olongapo
and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as
embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military
Base Agreement as amended and within the territorial jurisdiction of
Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, the metes and bounds of
which shall be delineated by the President of the Philippines;
provided further that pending establishment of secure perimeters
around the entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area demarcated by
the SBMA pursuant to Section 1332 hereof."
Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. —
xxxx
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
xxxx
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and
limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions
of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center to generate
employment opportunities in and around the zone and to
attract and promote productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and
managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free
flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and
exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well
as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and
other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of
goods and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order
to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate with
the least governmental intervention. The concept of this zone was
explained by Senator Guingona in this wise:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is
successful in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free
port. The difference between a special economic zone and an
industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense that the
commercial activities, including the establishment of banks, services,
financial institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe agriculture to
a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of
government intervention, and the running of the affairs of the
special economic zone would be run principally by the investors
themselves, similar to a housing subdivision, where the subdivision
owners elect their representatives to run the affairs of the
subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong,
Mr. President, where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free
duties and activities to a maximum spur generation of investment
and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule,
because of red tape and perceived delays, we envision this special
economic zone to be an area where there will be minimum
government interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the
Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because
they would be encouraged to invest not only for the land but also
for the buildings and factories. As long as they are convinced that in
such an area they can do business and reap reasonable profits, then
many from other parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr.
President.33 (Emphasis, added)
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in
general, engage in any kind of business as well as import and export
any article into and out of the Freeport. These are among the rights
accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227, thus –
SEC. 39. Rights and Obligations.- SBF Enterprises shall have the
following rights and obligations:
a. To freely engage in any business, trade, manufacturing, financial
or service activity, and to import and export freely all types of goods
into and out of the SBF, subject to the provisions of the Act, these
Rules and other regulations that may be promulgated by the SBMA;
Citing, inter alia, the interpellations of Senator Enrile, petitioners
claim that the "free flow or movement of goods and capital" only
means that goods and material brought within the Freeport shall not
be subject to customs duties and other taxes and should not be
construed as an open floodgate for entry of all kinds of goods. They
thus surmise that the importation ban on motor vehicles is
applicable within the Freeport. Pertinent interpellations of Senator
Enrile on the concept of Freeport is as follows:
Senator Enrile: Mr. President, I think we are talking here of
sovereign concepts, not territorial concepts. The concept that we
are supposed to craft here is to carve out a portion of our terrestrial
domain as well as our adjacent waters and say to the world: "Well,
you can set up your factories in this area that we are circumscribing,
and bringing your equipment and bringing your goods, you are not
subject to any taxes and duties because you are not within the
customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, whether you
store the goods or only for purposes of transshipment or whether
you make them into finished products again to be reexported to
other lands."
xxxx
My understanding of a "free port" is, we are in effect carving out a
part of our territory and make it as if it were foreign territory for
purposes of our customs laws, and that people can come, bring
their goods, store them there and bring them out again, as long as
they do not come into the domestic commerce of the Republic.
We do not really care whether these goods are stored here. The only
thing that we care is for our people to have an employment because
of the entry of these goods that are being discharged, warehoused
and reloaded into the ships so that they can be exported. That will
generate employment for us. For as long as that is done, we are
saying, in effect, that we have the least contact with our tariff and
customs laws and our tax laws. Therefore, we consider these goods
as outside of the customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines as yet, until we draw them from this territory and bring
them inside our domestic commerce. In which case, they have to
pass through our customs gate. I thought we are carving out this
entire area and convert it into this kind of concept.34
However, contrary to the claim of petitioners, there is nothing in the
foregoing excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport
investors only to exemption from customs duties and taxes. Mindful
of the legislative intent to attract investors, enhance investment and
boost the economy, the legislature could not have limited the
enticement only to exemption from taxes. The minimum
interference policy of the government on the Freeport extends to
the kind of business that investors may embark on and the articles
which they may import or export into and out of the zone. A
contrary interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the
Freeport and drive away investors.
It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport enterprises to
import all types of goods and article is absolute. Such right is of
course subject to the limitation that articles absolutely prohibited by
law cannot be imported into the Freeport.35 Nevertheless, in
determining whether the prohibition would apply to the Freeport,
resort to the purpose of the prohibition is necessary.
In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under
Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the
importation of used motor vehicles and to enhance the capabilities
of the Philippine motor manufacturing firms to be globally
competitive producers of completely build-up units and their parts
and components for the local and export markets.36 In justifying the
issuance of EO 156, petitioners alleged that there has been a decline
in the sales of new vehicles and a remarkable growth of the sales of
imported used motor vehicles. To address the same, the President
issued the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the already
depressed market base of the local motor vehicle industry and to
curtail the harmful effects of the increase in the importation of used
motor vehicles.37
Taking our bearings from the foregoing discussions, we hold that the
importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid
administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must
not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It
must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute
and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the
legislature which the other branches of the government cannot
usurp. As held in United BF Homeowner’s Association v. BF Homes,
Inc.:38
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a
delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge
the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge
its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated
by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to
regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is
the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used x x x It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can
protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227, as follows: Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
"the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The
where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not
national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."39 lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."
It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in
operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone
the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night
within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA
clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to
7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance
be earned by those therein employed.
modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the
instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra
vires, but also for being unreasonable. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,44 is a case involving a resolution
issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited
examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative
materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of
law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,
licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable
such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was
secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to
found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:
the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid.40
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the
will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees
domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The
suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or
deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the
preparation on those last three precious days — when they should
influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national concern
be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the
that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the exercise
review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-
of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly
up for the examination day itself — would be like uprooting the tree
proscribe the importation of these vehicles. Thus, in Taxicab
to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of Transportation,41 the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it
Court held that a regulation phasing out taxi cabs more than six
right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated
years old is a valid exercise of police power. The regulation was
from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed
sustained as reasonable holding that the purpose thereof was to
out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up
promote the convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the
and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended
passengers.
or revoked. x x x

The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,45 the Court
importation ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the all
likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city
encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport
ordinance granting an exclusive franchise for 25 years, renewable
which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor
for another 25 years, to one entity for the construction and
vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm
operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in
sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The application of
Lucena City. While professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic
the law should be consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various
law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. When the reason for the law
bus and jeepney terminals within the city, the ordinance was held to
ceases, the law ceases. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the
be beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem
law also that gives it life.42 To apply the proscription to the Freeport
in the city.
would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the
general economy of the country, the application of the importation
ban in the Freeport would subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227 By parity of reasoning, the importation ban in this case should also
which is to create a market that would draw investors and ultimately be declared void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to
boost the national economy. the Freeport which has no bearing on the objective of the
prohibition. If the aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used
motor vehicles from the Freeport to the customs territory, the
In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative issuance or
solution is not to forbid entry of these vehicles into the Freeport, but
ordinances concerned for being unreasonable. To illustrate, in De la
to intensify governmental campaign and measures to thwart illegal
Cruz v. Paras,43 the Court held as unreasonable and unconstitutional
ingress of used motor vehicles into the customs territory.
an ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the
Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, prohibited the operation of all
night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the At this juncture, it must be mentioned that on June 19, 1993,
protection of public morals. As explained by the Court: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, "Further
Clarifying The Tax And Duty-Free Privilege Within The Subic Special
Economic And Free Port Zone," Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax and duty-
free privilege within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic
and Free Port Zone:

1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former

Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area
in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and
foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw
materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and
dutry-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within
the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods,
equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to
non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes
and duties, except as may be provided herein.

In Tiu v. Court of Appeals46 as reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners

Association, Inc. v. Torres,47 this provision limiting the special
privileges on tax and duty-free importation in the presently fenced-
in former Subic Naval Base has been declared valid and
constitutional and in accordance with RA 7227. Consistent with
these rulings and for easier management and monitoring of
activities and to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise and
smuggling, the free flow and importation of used motor vehicles
shall be operative only within the "secured area."

In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void
insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A.
Pursuant to the separability clause48 of EO 156, Section 3.1 is
declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the
Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence,
used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the
secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used
or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but
they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the
secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24,
2004 Decisions of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the
February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63284, are MODIFIED insofar as they declared Article 2, Section 3.1
of Executive Order No. 156, void in its entirety.

Said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine

territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-
in former Subic Naval Base area.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice