Ledesma vs.

Court of Appeals
465 SCRA 437
G.R. No. 161629
July 29, 2005
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of
the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a
letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau
(FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign
nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted
with similar irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against
herein petitioner. The complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative charge
for nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for
falsification of public documents, and for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
In a Joint Resolution dated January 22, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer
Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases, Where it recommended that Respondent
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, which included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin public respondents from
implementing the order of suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO on April 19,
2000.
MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed any misconduct, nonfeasance,
misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance of his duties
RULING:
YES. In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, we stated that all heads of offices
have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency
in the conduct of government business dictate that the gritty details be sifted and
reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority. In the case at bar, it
is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and recommendation of
the BSI as it cannot be expected to review every detail of each application
transmitted for its approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First Division of
the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance
or good faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension applications are so
patently clear on its face. He is principally accountable for certifying the
regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were defective.
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 437, G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005
SIDE ISSUE:
Whether or not in finding petitioner administratively liable,
ombudsman has encroached into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over
immigration matters.
RULING:

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed NO. The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or
petitioner's suspension but reduced the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its
one (1) day without pay. investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. The
creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees.
RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly
on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of
government officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people. The proper interpretation of the Court’s
statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the
head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction
Bagong Kapisanan sa Punta Tenement, Inc. vs. Dolot
680 SCRA 164
G.R. No. 179054
September 5, 2012
Petitioner Punta Tenement is an association formed by the residents
of said tenement in Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila. The controversy stemmed from the
February 6, 1999 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by Barangay 901 and
Barangay 902, represented by their respective chairmen, Azer E. Dolot (Dolot) and
Silverio S. Tañada (Tañada); and Inpart Engineering (Inpart), represented by
respondent Antonio Benzon (Benzon). Both barangays adopted and approved the
said undertaking as reflected in Resolution No. 99-006. The MOA was formulated
to address the repair and rehabilitation of the water system of Punta Tenement and
to manage the water distribution in the tenement as well as to handle the payment
of the back accounts of its tenants to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS).
Punta Tenement filed a complaint for dishonesty and corruption
before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against their barangay
chairmen, Dolot and Tañada; and Benzon and other barangay kagawads.
Punta Tenement alleged that the respondents conspired to defraud the tenants by not
remitting to MWSS the agreed barangay share of P0.125 or 50% of P0.25 per 20
liter-container from the cost of water collection paid by the tenement residents
which was intended to pay the back account with MWSS as instructed by the
MOA.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding all the respondents
guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal from the
service. The Ombudsman found that Inpart was already reneging on its MOA
obligation as early as 1999, but the respondents failed to act on the problem.
Aggrieved, the respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In its
October 21, 2005 Order, the Ombudsman denied the said motions.
Undaunted, the respondents appealed the case to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On October 20, 2006, the CA reversed the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman.
Punta Tenement he Ombudsmanmoved for the reconsideration of the said
decision the CA, in its Amended Decision, partly granted Punta Tenement's motion for
reconsideration. The CA ruled that the respondents were indeed remiss in their duties but the
penalty of dismissal from service would be too harsh. It noted that "the collections intended
for Barangays 901 and 902 were spent for noble Barangay projects.
Punta Tenement insists that the CA was not correct in imposing a penalty of
suspension despite its finding that Dolot and Tañada were guilty of dishonesty. It also faults
the CA for absolving the other respondents despite their direct participation in the
questionable patubig project.
MAIN ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondents misfeasance and dishonesty warrants
their dismissal from public office.
RULING:
YES. Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable with
dismissal from the service even for the first offense. In the case at bench, the
supposed acts of dishonesty by Dolot and Tañada were convincingly established.
Based on the contract, both barangays were to receive P0.25/20 liter as their share in
the water distribution arrangement. From the said amount, 50% was allocated for the
payment of back account with MWSS, while the remaining 50% was earmarked to
their other barangay-related projects. The provision was very clear and categorical.
Inpart was never tasked to pay the barangays’ back account as the money allocated for
payment was agreed to be deducted from the barangays’ share. Apart from the self-
serving declaration of Dolot and Tañada that it was Inpart’s obligation to remit
payments to MWSS, nothing in the records would show that they had an
arrangement to such effect.
When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the
corresponding penalty is dismissal from employment or service. The
underlying reason for this is because when a public official or government
employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such
officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government. A finding
of dishonesty necessarily carries with it the penalty of dismissal from the
office he is holding or serving.
Furthermore, The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees lays down the state policy to promote a high
standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and
employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity and
competence.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in exonerating the rest
of the respondents despite the fact that these respondents have direct and
continuous participation in the anomalous transaction to date.
RULING:
As to the other respondents, the Court affirms the dismissal of
the complaint against them for lack of evidence proving, even in the slightest
degree, that they had a direct hand in the mishandling of the tenement’s
patubig project. They merely signed the resolution approving the MOA in
their capacities as barangay kagawads, a laudable remedy to alleviate the
plight of the members of the Punta Tenement.
SIDE ISSUE/S:
Dishonesty Defined:
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Substantial Evidence Defined:
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion
Conclusive Finding/s
The Court agrees with the findings of the Ombudsman and the CA that Dolot
and Tañada were guilty of dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due
respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. It is not the task of this
Court to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious
ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Although there
are exceptions to this rule, the Court finds none in this case.
Quantum of Proof
In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required to support any
findings. Evidently, the circumstances of the case all point to the inexcusable misfeasance of
Dolot and Tañada. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability
to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee.
Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines
676 SCRA 563
G.R. No. 200242
July 17, 2012
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C.
Corona, assailing the... impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of
the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent
Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of
the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was
submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation,
on the same day, the complaint was voted in... session and 188 Members signed and
endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint
charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust
and graft and corruption,... THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY
PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO
ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A
MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THEPRESENT FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO
THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner argued at length that the acts,... misdeeds or offenses
imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper.
He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the
requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of
acquittal... for all the articles of impeachment.
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution
and defense submitted their respective memoranda on the question of whether the
prosecution may present evidence to prove the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report
some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in
SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort
in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner's alleged failure to disclose to the
public his SALN as required... by the Constitution).
Impeachment Court granted the prosecution's request for subpoena directed to
the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and
dollar currencies.
ISSUE:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail
matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings.
RULING:
YES. In the case of Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol
ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. The Supreme Court ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly
a violation of the due process clause and of the one year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine
whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack
or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy,” was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that “the decision will be
regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” Given their concededly political character,
the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of
judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
SIDE ISSUE:
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-
Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of
screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected
to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among
those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which
the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.
 Montallana vs. Office of the Ombudsman
678 SCRA 488
G.R. No. 179677
August 15, 2012
In the early hours of August 18, 2001, fire struck and engulfed the Manor
Hotel in Kamias Road, Quezon City, claiming the lives of seventy-four people and seriously
injuring several others. To determine the officials and persons responsible for this tragedy, an
investigation was conducted by the Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman (OMB). The FFIB found that the fire that consumed the Manor Hotel
was attributable to the hotel’s faulty electrical wiring systems. It concluded that, had it not
been for the gross negligence of the public officials of the local government of Quezon City,
who were in charge in the licensing operations of the Manor Hotel, the incident would not
have happened.
On June 17, 2003, the Investigating Panel of the OMB rendered a Decision7
finding petitioner liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Gross
Neglect of Duty and meted upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties.
On July 26, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the OMB issued a
Memorandum9 which modified the Joint Decision insofar as petitioner and the other
respondents are concerned. In the said Memorandum, petitioner was also found guilty of
gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was also stated
therein that since petitioner was already separated from the service due to his retirement, the
benefits he received by virtue thereof must be returned to the government as declared in the
Affidavit of Undertaking which he executed before his retirement. The said Memorandum
was approved by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on November 26, 2004.
_______________
Not satisfied, petitioner sought recourse before the CA. On May 28, 2007, the CA
rendered a Decision denying the petition.
In ruling against petitioner, the CA ratiocinated that between
petitioner’s unsubstantiated denials of the irregularities made in the electrical
inspection of the Manor Hotel and the categorical findings of the investigators,
there is no room for a contrary conclusion that petitioner is indeed administratively
liable for his negligence. The CA held that petitioner cannot attribute the fault to his
subordinates. As head of office and the final approving authority of the Electrical
Division, it behooves petitioner to see to it that his subordinate engineers and
inspectors are performing their respective duties effectively. Petitioner should have
made appropriate measures that can verify the veracity of their reports.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner could be held administratively liable based
on the principle of command responsibility.
RULING:
YES. This Court has held in several cases that in the absence of
substantial evidence of gross negligence of the petitioner, administrative liability
could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. However, in the
case at bar, the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA,
clearly establish the negligence of petitioner in the performance of his duties as
head of the Electrical Division. Thus, it was incumbent on petitioner as head of the
Electrical Division to see to it that proper annual inspections are conducted on the
existing electrical installations in Quezon City. Records would disclose that the
charges against petitioner were supported by the evidence on record.
 This Court has time and again refrained from interfering with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory
powers. This is in recognition of the Office of the Ombudsman’s independence and initiative
in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.30 More so, in the case at bar, where
the CA affirmed the factual findings and conclusion of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Although there are exceptions to this rule, none of which exists in the present case.
Public Office is a Public Trust
The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. From the
foregoing, petitioner’s negligence in the performance of his duties as a public servant was
well established. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
It is worth to reiterate that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.31 As a public servant, petitioner is tasked to provide efficient, competent, and
proper service to the public. Public officials and employees are under obligation to perform
the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. In the case at
bar, petitioner miserably failed to perform his duties as a public servant.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE DEFINED:
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.
Republic Vs. Lacap
The District Engineer of Pampanga, issued and duly published an
“invitation to bid”, where Lacap was awarded as the lowest bidder. Accordingly, the
latter undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of materials and
payment for labor costs.
On October 29, 1992 the office of the DE issued Certification of
Final Inspection and Acceptance for100% completion of project in accordance with
specifications. The respondent sought to collect payment but Department of Public
Works and Highways withheld payment after the District Auditor of Commission
on Audit disapproved final release of funds on the ground that contractor’s license
had expired.
Opinion of the DPWH Legal Department was sought by the District
Engineer. The former then responded that RA No. 4566 does not provide that a
contract entered into after the license has expired is void and that there is no law
which expressly prohibits such a contract void. Furthermore, Cesar D. Mejia,
Director III of the Legal Department in a First Indorsement, recommended the
payment should be made to Carwin Construction. However, no payment was made.
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint through Office of the Solicitor
General for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on September 14, 1995 on the
grounds that complaint states no cause of action and RTC had no jurisdiction since
respondent did not appeal to COA. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was likewise
denied by RTC, in its order on May 23, 1996. On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its
Answer invoking defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and
doctrine of non-suability of the State.
Following the trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its
decision ordering the DPWH to pay the contract price plus interest at 12% from
demand until fully paid and the costs of the suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license at the time of execution of
its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects?

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the
completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof. To allow petitioner to acquire the
finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner
to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law