EN BANC

[ G.R. No. L-42791, January 30, 1982 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,VS.
PORFERIO SOSING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:

A review of the death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of

Leyte upon Porferio Sosing for the crime of robbery with homicide.
Between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of August 28, 1974,
Emilia Tinaya, a 64-year old widow, was slain in her house at the poblacion
of Julita, Leyte, a victim of multiple stab wounds, to wit: five [5] stab
wounds on the neck, one on the right shoulder, and another at the deltoid
region, left arm. According to Dr. Severo Cunanan, medico-legal officer of
the NBI, the injuries sustained by the victim on the neck were fatal.[1]
The motive for the killing has been ascribed by the prosecution to robbery,
the deceased having been allegedly robbed of the amount of P5,000.00.
On December 18, 1974, an information was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, charging Porferio Sosing, Alfredo Sosing, Alberto
Tenebro and Cresencio Culaban with the crime of robbery with homicide;
and after due trial, Porferio Sosing was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to death; Alfredo Sosing and Alberto Tenebro were acquitted;
while Cresencio Culaban was found guilty of robbery. The latter did not
appeal his conviction.
The court a quo found Porferio Sosing guilty of the crime charged on the
basis of the testimonies of Filomena Maurillo and Romeo Javier, as well as
the extrajudicial statement allegedly executed by accused Cresencio
Culaban, Exhibit "L", implicating Porferio Sosing.
Filomena Maurillo, a 14-year old ward of the victim and her lone companion
in the house at the time of the incident, testified that at about 8:00 o'clock
of the preceding night, she slept at the sala under the table near the door
of the room of her Lola Emilia. At about 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning, she
was awakened by a noise coming from her Lola's room. She was lying
motionless on her right side facing the door of the room when a man, with
a hat on, whom she identified as the accused Porferio Sosing, suddenly
burst forth from the room of her Lola and ran towards the kitchen, holding
in his left hand a 'pisao' [small bolo] dripping with blood, and a pouch
hanging from his right hand. Soon after, her Lola staggered out of the room
and slumped on the floor. Upon noticing that her Lola was bathed in blood,
she shouted for help.
According to this witness, she recognized Porferio Sosing by the light of a
lamp on the table, the brightness of which she likened to that of a 5-centavo
candle.[2]
Romeo Javier, the son-in-law of the deceased, declared that about 1:30 in
the morning of August 28, 1974, he was awakened by Pompeyo Gregorio,
the victim's neighbor, who informed him of the incident. He went to his
Mama's house and upon reaching the gate, he heard a woman's voice
calling for help.[3] However, instead of proceeding directly to his mother-
in-law's house, he went to Sansonella St., located at the back thereof, and
there he saw Porferio Sosing jump from inside the victim's yard over the
steel-matting fence, holding a bolo in his left hand and a bag in his right
hand. The accused sped across Sansonella St. towards the bushes where
he vanished from sight. This witness claimed that he recognized Porferio
Sosing by the beam of his flashlight, as the latter was only ten [10] meters
away from him when he jumped over the fence.[4]
The court a quo found the above testimonies of said witnesses deserving
of full weight and credence. Our own review of the record, however, reveals
certain significant circumstances that seriously impair their credibility.
It appears that the tragic incident was immediately reported to Ramon
Advincula, son-in-law of the victim who was then a resident of Tacloban
City. That same morning of August 28, 1974, the chief of the NBI office in
Tacloban City, upon request of Ramon Advincula, sent one of his men,
Vicente Colas, to the scene of the crime "to lift latent fingerprints and
conduct searches at the scene of the robbery with homicide x x x."[5] Colas
was accompanied by Ramon Advincula and his brother-in-law, PC Sgt.
Superable. Later that morning, NBI Agent Arnaldo Bacabac together with
the NBI medico-legal team also proceeded to the town of Julita.
Vicente Colas testified that upon arriving in the house of the deceased at
about 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning of August 28, 1974, he asked Filomena
Maurillo if she recognized the assailant, and the latter answered that she
saw only the feet of the man who ran out of her Lola's room.[6]
NBI Agent Bacabac also investigated Filomena Maurillo and Romeo Javier,
among others, and his account of these interviews is reflected on the record
as follows:
"Q Do you recall the name of this girl companion of Emilia Tinaya?
A I cannot exactly remember the name, but she is a teenager.
Q You said you interviewed the girl companion of Emilia Tinaya. What were
the questions you asked her?
A I asked her whether she was in the house when the incident occurred and
she admitted that she was. I also asked her what she was doing at the time
when the alleged robbery took place and she said she was asleep. And then
I followed up the question as to whether she was awakened when there
was a commotion and she said she was. I asked her if she can identify the
person who got inside. That she could not answer anymore.
xxxx
"COURT:
What happened after you asked those questions?
A I also asked her if she had seen anyone aside from the old woman and
she answered that she recalled only having seen the lower portion of the
man.
"COURT:
Please proceed, Atty. Cuares.
"ATTY. CUARES:
Q Did you ask her specifically what part of the lower portion of the man she
saw?
A That part like his pants down to his feet.
Q Did you ask her if she recognized the person she saw?
xxxx
Q You also said that you investigated one Romeo Javier, the son-in-law of
Emilia Tinaya de Opiniano. What statement did he give you, if any?
A Well, we were not able to get any substantial information from him. In
fact, we started by asking him if he can do us the favor of employing anyone
of their trusted men to conduct a background surveillance on suspects and
on their families and to give us all the information on whatever
development there may be on this matter.
"Q The said Romeo Javier testified before this Honorable Court that that
evening of the incident, August 28, 1974, at between 1 and 2 o'clock in the
morning, he saw Porferio Sosing, one of the accused herein, jumping from
the concrete fence from Emilia's house towards the street.
A He did not give us that information. Otherwise, we would have taken his
statement on that date if he had given us that information." [pp. 89, 92,
TSN, April 22, 1975]
The foregoing testimonies of the NBI officers, which were admitted without
objection on the part of the prosecution, doubtless deserve more weight
and credit than those of the witnesses for the prosecution. They were
officers of the law whose assistance was solicited by Ramon Advincula, the
son-in-law of the deceased, and their only interest in the case was to
pinpoint the identity of the malefactors.
The unexplained failure of prosecution witnesses Filomena Maurillo and
Romeo Javier to point to the accused Sosing when they were investigated
by the NBI officers a few hours after the incident casts grave doubts as to
the veracity of their statements in open court. And this doubt is heightened
by a number of inherent improbabilities attending their testimonies. If,
according to Filomena Maurillo, she was lying motionless on her right side
facing the door of her Lola's room when the accused, with a hat on, sallied
forth from the door and ran towards the kitchen, she certainly could have
caught only a brief, fleeting glimpse of the man's features. The fact that
the sala was faintly lighted by a lamp, whose illumination approximated
that of a mere 5-centavo candle, further enhances the likelihood of mistake
in her identification of the accused. The witness further stated that she was
under the table when that man passed by. Such assertion lends plausibility
to the statement she gave to the NBI officers that she had seen only the
lower portion of the man's body. Given these circumstances, it is difficult
to believe that she saw the man's face or, if she really did, that she was
able to recognize him with absolute certainty.
The declarations of Romeo Javier should also be scrutinized. He stated that
upon being informed by Pompeyo Gregorio, the victim's neighbor, that his
Mama had been wounded and robbed, he immediately ran to the victim's
house, and upon reaching the gate he heard a woman's cry for help coming
from the house. However, despite the cry for help, he did not proceed to
the victim's house to ascertain the condition of his mother-in-law, as any
person under the circumstances would have done. Instead, he went directly
to Sansonella St., located at the back of the victim's house, where he
allegedly saw the accused jump over the wall. Indeed, this actuation clearly
runs counter to the ordinary pattern of human reactions; and his failure to
reveal the motive for his unnatural demeanor renders his testimony highly
suspect.
The evidence shows that NBI Colas searched the victim's room for
fingerprints and, when he found none inside the room, he proceeded to the
yard to look for tell-tale clues that might lead to the discovery of the
assailant. In the course of his search, he came upon a bamboo pole
smeared with blood, leaning against the wall along Sansonella Street.
Examining this bamboo pole, he found bloodstained fingerprints thereon.
Colas lifted these impressions and sent them to the Manila NBI office,
together with the fingerprints of the suspect Porferio Sosing. The
Didactyloscopic Report issued by NBI[7] shows no similarity whatsoever
between the fingerprints lifted from the bamboo pole and those of the
accused.
The accused denied any participation in the commission of the crime
charged. According to him, he was in the house of one Josefa Caharop from
8:00 to 10:00 o'clock of the preceding night, drinking liquor with his friends,
Braulio Magallanes, Doring Arozado, Alfredo Sosing, Domingo Bueno and
Cresencio Culaban; that he proceeded home after their drinking spree [8] ;
that at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1974, he was awakened
by a policeman, Doring Timonera, who brought him to the police station[9]
, where he was interrogated by the Chief of Police, Toting Tinaya, a nephew
of the deceased; and that his body, finger nails, as well as his clothes and
shoes were closely examined by the police officers for the presence of
human blood.[10]
It further appears that the police officers divested the accused of the polo
shirt he had been wearing since the previous day, and the same was sent
to the NBI laboratory in Cebu for determination of the presence of human
blood. The Biology Report on the test conducted by Manuel Emesilla, senior
forensic chemist of the NBI office in Cebu, indicates that the shirt was
"negative for the presence of blood."[11]
In convicting Porferio Sosing, the court a quo accorded full weight to
Cresencio Culaban's alleged extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "L", despite
objection interposed by the defense to its admissibility. This statement was
allegedly given by Culaban to PC Sgt. Gaudencio Superable on March 10,
1975, i.e., seven [7] months after the incident in question. According to Sgt.
Superable, Culaban who was then detained in the provincial jail, was taken
to the PC headquarters in Tacloban City, where the said statement was
voluntarily given by said accused. It is undisputed, however, that Exhibit
"L" does not bear the signature of Culaban, for when he was brought to the
office of Asst. Fiscal Oledan, he refused to sign it when asked to do so or
to swear to the truth thereof. In fact, in open court Culaban vigorously
denied having given the statements contained in Exhibit "L" either to Sgt.
Superable or to Fiscal Oledan. Under these circumstances, Exhibit "L" has
no probative value.
Even assuming that Exhibit "L" were the true and voluntary declaration of
Culaban, as held by the trial court, it is nevertheless inadmissible against
Porferio Sosing under the principle of "res inter alios nocere non debet."
Well established is the rule that a confession made by an accused is
admissible only against him, and not against his co-accused who did not in
any manner take part in the said confession, except where there is
conspiracy, established by evidence other than the confession itself.[12]
We have painstakingly scrutinized the record, and save for the inculpatory
statements embodied in Exhibit "L", there is not a shred of evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy between Cresencio Culaban and
Porferio Sosing. While it is true that they were admittedly drinking liquor in
the house of one Josefa Caharop in the company of other persons from
8:00 to 10:00 of the preceding night, this circumstance alone does not
suffice to prove the existence of a common criminal design. Mere suspicion,
speculation, relationship or association and companionship does not
establish conspiracy[13] , for proof thereof must be positive and
convincing.[14]
Furthermore, this Court had consistently ruled[15] that an extrajudicial
declaration of an accused cannot be utilized and considered against his co-
accused unless the same is confirmed in open court by the declarant. The
evident purpose for this requirement is to afford the accused against whom
such evidence is offered the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
declarant. In the case at bar, it seems redundant to repeat that since
accused Culaban had repudiated Exhibit "L" at the trial, the statements set
forth therein implicating accused Porferio Sosing are inadmissible in
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby set aside, and the
accused Porferio Sosing acquitted of the crime charged. His immediate
release from custody is hereby ordered, unless he is otherwise detained for
some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, and Plana, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., no part.
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-38859, July 30, 1982 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO
VIZCARRA, LEOBINO SALAMATIN, JOSE DELOS REYES AND
LIBERATO FERNANDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Review of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,

imposing the death sentence upon Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin,
Jose delos Reyes and Liberato Fernando for the crime of rape with
homicide, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven the guilt of
the accused DANILO VIZCARRA, LEOBINO SALAMATIN, JOSE DELOS REYES
and LIBERATO FERNANDO of the crime charged in the information beyond
reasonable doubt and, in accordance with the provision of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111, the
Court is constrained to impose to each of them the supreme penalty of
death by electrocution as their penal sentence and to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the late Erlinda Manzano in the amount of P12,000
and to pay the costs. x x x x" The
victim Erlinda Manzano was at the time of the incident a fourteen-year old
maiden, employed as a waitress at the Lily's Restaurant in Novaliches,
Quezon City. When she failed to come home in the night of June 25, 1969,
her parents set out to look for her at her place of work and the houses
nearby. Having failed to find her, they reported her disappearance to the
Quezon City Police Department. Two days later, the lifeless and almost
naked body of Erlinda[1] was found in a grassy spot of a vacant lot behind
an ice plant at Dumalay Street, Novaliches, Quezon City. The deceased was
lying on her back with a piece of clothing material tied around her neck. Dr.
Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal officer of the Quezon City Police Department,
who first examined the body of the victim, testified that the protrusion of
the deceased's tongue was the result of excessive pressure exerted upon
her neck and that the probable cause of death was strangulation.[2] Dr.
Ernesto Gimenez, medico-legal officer of the NBI, to whom the victim's
body was referred for autopsy, attributed the cause of death to "asphyxia
by ligature strangulation." He testified that the ligature used was a "piece
of cloth or what appears as a portion of a 'sando' shirt"; that the ligature
was still tied around the victim's neck when he performed the autopsy; that
his findings on the genitals "are compatible with sexual intercourse with
men and that the intercourse was done in a forceful manner or not with the
cooperation of the victim"; that the left breast of the victim was bitten, as
evidenced by the presence of deep teeth marks; and that the abrasion on
the forearm, posterior lateral aspect, was produced by fingernails.[3] Dr.
Ernesto Brion, assistant director of the NBI medico-legal division, confirmed
said findings. Dr. Brion added that "the laceration at the 7:00 o'clock
position of the victim's genitals was the result of sexual intercourse
committed before death or within five to ten minutes immediately after
death."[4]
Elements of the Quezon City Police and the PC Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) launched a massive manhunt for the malefactors. Acting on
confidential reports received by said law officers, they took into custody
Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes, Liberato Fernando, Patricio Verdote,
Rogelio Vizmanos and Rodolfo Bagtasos; and in the course of their
investigation, these suspects gave written statements to CIS agents
Fernando Perucho, Arthur Sison, Modesto Garcia and Francisco Novero,
wherein they admitted having taken turns in raping the victim. They
pointed to appellant Danilo Vizcarra, then at large, as the one who strangled
Erlinda to death. Their respective statements were signed and sworn to by
each of them before Assistant Fiscal Arsenio Santos of Quezon City. On
August 2, 1969, a verified complaint jointly signed by the victim's father,
Patricio R. Manzano, and Assistant Fiscal Miguel F. Halili, Jr. was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) charging Danilo Vizcarra,
Rogelio Vizmanos, Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes, Liberato Fernando,
Patricio Verdote and Rodolfo Bagtasos with the crime of rape with homicide.
The complaint alleged that the accused conspired and confederated
together and mutually helped one another in having carnal knowledge one
after the other of Erlinda Manzano against her will, as well as in killing her,
and that in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating
circumstances concurred:
"(1) nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense;
"(2) a
dvantage was taken of superior strength and means were employed to
weaken the defense; and
"(3) the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
aggravated by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission."
Rodolfo Bagtasos was discharged and utilized as state witness. At the
commencement of the trial, Danilo Vizcarra was still at large; but after he
was arrested, the prosecution presented its evidence anew against him.
After due trial, the lower court acquitted Patricio Verdote and Rogelio
Vizmanos, but found Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes
and Liberato Fernando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and, as aforestated, imposed on each of them the supreme penalty
of death.
Hence, this mandatory review.
At the trial, state witness Rodolfo Bagtasos substantially testified that at
about 9:00 in the evening of June 25, 1969, he, Patricio Verdote, Leobino
Salamatin, Rogelio Vizmanos and Liberato Fernando went to a vacant lot
located behind an ice plant at Dumalay Street, Nova-liches, Quezon City,
where they awaited the arrival of Danilo Vizcarra and Jose delos Reyes,
who, in accordance with their prior agreement, were to bring Erlinda to that
appointed place; that when Vizcarra and Delos Reyes arrived with the girl,
they brought her to an unlighted, grassy place and pushed her to the
ground; that Vizcarra removed her panty and then took off his clothes; that
whereupon he ravished the girl while the witness (Bagtasos) and Liberato
Fernando pinned down her legs, and Patricio Verdote and Rogelio
Vizmanos, her arms; that after Vizcarra had satisfied his lust, Jose delos
Reyes took his turn, followed by witness Bagtasos; that while Bagtasos was
on top of her, he noticed that one of the victim's nipples was bleeding,
leading him to surmise that Jose delos Reyes had bitten it; that after he
was through, Patricio Verdote, Leobino Salamatin, Rogelio Vizmanos and
Liberato Fernando took turns in that order in ravishing the victim, as the
others alternated in holding her arms, legs and hair and in covering her
mouth to prevent her from shouting; and that afterwards Danilo Vizcarra
tied around the girl's neck a string that looked like a plastic rope, which he
pulled backward (binigti) so that the tongue of the girl pro-truded out; and
that upon seeing this, he (witness Bagtasos) and his companions ran away,
leaving Vizcarra at the scene of the crime.
Appellants disclaimed having participated in the perpetration of the crime
charged and invoked the defense of alibi, which the trial court summarized
as follows: [5]
"According to accused Danilo Vizcarra, he drove a certain Mr. Sergio Peña
to the doctor at about nine o'clock in the evening of June 25, 1969 and
from the house of the doctor at San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, they
proceeded to Manila to buy medi-cine and they stayed there up to twelve
midnight; Jose delos Reyes claimed that from five o'clock in the afternoon
to twelve midnight of said date, he was with his friend-driver, 'Manny', who
was plying the Blumentritt-Novaliches route; Liberato Fernando alleged
that he was watching T.V. from eight o'clock in the evening of said date in
Sta. Cruz, Novaliches, Quezon City after which he went home after eating
in the place of Salamatin; while the accused Leobino Salamatin claimed
that at about four o'clock in the afternoon of same date, he was with
Leonardo Recuenco in buying palanca forms and clothing materials in
Manila after which they returned to Novaliches at about seven o'clock in
the evening and stayed in the place of Rosita del Rosario for about three
hours before finally going home."
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' alibi, and it explained why:
"x x x the defense of alibi inter-posed by the aforenamed accused cannot
serve to overcome the clear, explicit and positive identification made of the
said accused by state witness Rodolfo Bagtasos (U.S. vs. Hudieres, 27 Phil.
45; Peo. vs. Tatlonghari, L-22094, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 726; Peo. vs.
Tapitan, L-21492, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 959). It is well settled that alibi
is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused (Peo.
vs. Dela Cruz, 76 Phil. 601; Peo. vs. Bondoc, 47 O.G. 4128; Peo. vs. Zapata,
L-11074, Feb. 1960) for the reason that 'oral evidence of alibi is so easily
manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence'
(Peo. vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718; People vs. De Asis, 61 Phil. 384; Peo vs.
Estacio, L-11430, Jan. 30, 1960). Moreover, it has been sufficiently
established by the evidence that at the time and date in question, the
accused Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose Delos Reyes and Liberato
Fernando were residing in or within the vicinity of Sta. Cruz, Novaliches,
Quezon City where the crime was committed and that on the parti-cular
time and date charged in the information, the said accused were not so far
a distance as to preclude the possibility of the said accused's presence at
the locus criminis (People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603) especially
considering the available means of travel (Peo. vs. Aparato, 80 Phil. 199)
open to them or particularly to accused Jose delos Reyes, who was
supposed to be on board a passenger vehicle plying the Blumentritt-
Novaliches route, and accused Danilo Vizcarra, who claimed that he was
then driving a Lambreta motorcycle.
"Moreover, it has been held that to establish an alibi, a defendant must not
only show that he was present at some other place about the time of the
alleged crime, but also that it was impossible for him to have been at the
place where the crime was committed, either before or after the time he
was at such other place (U.S. vs. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587; Peo. vs. De Guzman
L-13340, April 30, 1960)."
Appellants Salamatin, Delos Reyes and Fernando further assail the
admissibility of their respective extrajudicial statements[6] on the ground
that they were extracted by the CIS agents through force and intimidation.
The circumstances revealed by the records fail to support appellants'
posture.
As heretofore pointed out, appellants admitted in their respective
statements that they took turns in ravishing Erlinda. Their responses to the
questions of the investigators were so candid and informative as to indicate
the lack of any extraneous pressure on their mind. In Exhibit D, Liberato
Fernando stated the order in which he and his co-appellants took turns in
debauching the victim:
"27. T - Sino sa inyo and unang gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S - Una po si Danilo Vizcarra.
"28. T - Sino ang pangalawang gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S - Si Jose delos Reyes po and nata-tandaan kong pangalawa nguni't hindi
ko po sigurado.
"29. T - Ikaw pang-ilan ka sa mga kasamahan mong gumahasa kay Erlinda
Manzano?
S - Pang-apat po.
"30. T - Sino ang sinundan mong gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S - Ang natatandaan ko po ay si Rodolfo Bagtasos."
Appellant Delos Reyes, in Exhibit G, related his participation as follows:
"16. T - Noong mga sandaling iyon, ano ang hitsura ni Erlinda kung iyong
natatandaan?
S - Nakapanty na lamang si Erlinda at nakapangitaas na damit na lamang.
"17. T - Ano pagkatapos ang iyong ginawa?
S - Naghubad ho ako ng pantalon at salawal at si Erlinda ay aking ginamit.
"18. T - Noong kasalukuyang ginagamit mo si Erlinda, ano naman ang
kanyang kilos?
S - Wala ho, basta umiiyak lamang siya."
Previous sexual activity indulged in by Vizcarra and Delos Reyes was also
disclosed by the latter:
"59. T - Sinong babae ang inyong niyari o ginamit noon kung natatandaan
mo?
S - Ang alam ko lamang ay Cely ang kanyang pangalan at doon ko ho siya
nakuha sa may Balintawak, Quezon City.
"60. T - Saan lugar ninyo niyari o ginamit si Cely?
S - Doon ho sa Villaverde, Novaliches, Quezon City sa isang lugar na walang
bahay at kagubatan.
"61. T - Sino-sino ang yumari o gumamit doon kay Cely na sinasabi mo?
S - Kaming dalawa lamang ho ni Danny Vizcarra."[7]
And appellant Salamatin gave his version thus:
"28. T - Sino ang nakita mo na may hawak kay Erlinda?
S - Ang natatandaan ko po ay sila Delos Reyes at Fernando.
xxx xxx xxx
"40. T - Ng ikaw ay gumamit, naghubad ka ba?
S - Pantalong at carsuncillo ay aking hinubad, inililis ko na lamang and
aking Orlon T-shirt na ngayon ay suot. ko.
"41. T - May nakahawak bang ibang kasamahan mo kay Erlinda nang
gumamit ka?
S - Wala na po, nagiisa na lamang ako.
"42. T - Ano ang ginawa ni Erlinda ng gumagamit ka na?
S - Hindi na siya kumikibo, libreng libre na ako sa paggamit sa kanya.
"43. T - Iyo bang natatandaan kung may sugat o may parte ng katawan ni
Erlinda na may bahid dugo ng ginagamit mo ito?
S - Meroon po, ang kanyang ari ay dumudugo, basa at nang ako ay tapus
na at makauwi, nakita ko na may dugo ang aking karsuncillo at yong kamay
ko."[8]
In Exhibit H, Salamatin further attested to the fact that, immediately after
he and his companions were taken into custody, i.e., before they had given
their statements to the CIS officers, a televised interview was held in the
office of Lt. Col. Pelagio Perez, then chief of the CIS, and that in the
presence of the latter and of several press reporters, he and his co-
appellants spontaneously admitted that they were the ones who raped
Erlinda Manzano. Thus, the written confessions they gave on July 18, 1969
merely reaffirmed their prior public admissions of culpability.
It further appears that appellants, at the request of the city mayor of
Quezon City, were physically examined by Dr. Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal
officer of the Quezon City Police Department. The latter's findings that he
"did not find any visible and palpable sign of injury" on the persons of the
appellants[9] belie their claim of maltreatment and torture.
But even disregarding the appellants' extrajudicial confessions, the
testimony given in open court by state witness Rodolfo Bagtasos, which the
lower court found to be "credible, clear and straightforward," affords
adequate basis for their conviction.
Appellants would assail the credibility of Bagtasos by pointing out what they
characterized as "apparent discrepancy" between the latter's extrajudicial
statement[10] and his testimony on the stand as to who held the arms and
legs of the victim while his companions took turns in abusing her. The point
raised undoubtedly refers to a very minor inconsistency which tends to
indicate that the witness was not rehearsed. In the absence of proof that
the trial court failed to appreciate significant facts and circumstances that
would have altered the result of the case, We are not disposed to disturb
the findings of the court below.
Appellant Vizcarra claims that insofar as he is concerned, the trial court
erred in considering against him the testimony of state witness Bagtasos.
He contends that before Bagtasos' testimony could be admitted against
him, proof of the alleged conspiracy must first be shown by evidence other
than such testimony. He cites in support thereof the provision of Section
27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act."
The argument fails to consider that Section 27 of Rule 130 applies only to
an extrajudicial act or declaration of a co-conspirator, but not to the
testimony given by a witness at the trial where the accused had the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[11] Besides, it is a familiar rule
that a co-accused in a criminal case is a competent witness for or against
any of his co-accused.[12]
From the evidence on record, there is not a shred of doubt as to the guilt
of Danilo Vizcarra for the crime of rape with homicide. But We cannot agree
with the view of the trial court that his co-appellants Delos Reyes, Fernando
and Salamatin were equally responsible for the death of the victim. It is
undisputed that it was Vizcarra alone who strangled the victim to death.
While it is indubitable that all of them conspired and acted together in the
execution of successive rapes, We find the record bereft of any evidence
that it was part of their plan to do away with the victim. The mere passive
presence of Delos Reyes and Fernando and Salamatin at the scene of the
crime at the moment Vizcarra suddenly strangled Erlinda does not make
them liable for the act of their co-accused.
Be that as it may, We see no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the
trial court on said three appel-lants. The crime of successive rapes is
punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under para-graph
3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4111,
which took effect on June 20, 1964:
"xxx xxx xxx.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"xxx xxx xxx."
(Underscoring supplied).
The greater penalty - death - should be imposed, as the commission of the
offense was attended by the following aggravating circumstances: (1)
nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to
facilitate the execution thereof; and (2) abuse of superior strength, the
crime having been perpetrated by four appellants in conspiracy with one
another. None of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any
extenuating circumstance.
Since four successive offenses were charged and proved, each of them
should be imposed four (4) death sentences for four distinct and separate
crimes of rape. The existence of conspiracy among the appellants, the
overwhelming evidence as to the nature and the number of the crimes
committed, as well as the attendance of the aforementioned aggravating
circumstances, fully justify the imposition of four death penalties. As this
Court said in People vs. Peralta:[13]
"The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless
formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several
capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity,
which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death
sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable.
Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably
reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of
pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter deliquency of such a convict,
the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
"Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his
constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which
is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death
penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the
convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life
sentences. If one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years
corresponding to a single life sentence."
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in the sense
that each and everyone of the appellants, namely: Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino
Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes and Liberato Fernando, is hereby sentenced to
four (4) death penalties. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects,
with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,

De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, and Relova,
JJ., concur. Abad Santos, J., in the result. Fernando, C.J., did not
take part. Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO
CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores
for plaintiff-appellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia
and Dueñas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P.
Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio
S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA,
JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO
CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO
GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of
the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned
complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their
common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four
(4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION
y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by
forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by
an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and
permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one
of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying
material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating
circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make
its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the
above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the
court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded
presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the
complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their
respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision
on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo
Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be
executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that
the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices
Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the
Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by
pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted
and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony
admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which
requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime,
the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr.,
Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio
Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as
appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident,
25 years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll
College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie
actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her
work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid
P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional
shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva,
homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her
bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front
seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was
already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men
aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to
bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas
and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her
house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This
prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith,
Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards
her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her
car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and
grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel
and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no
match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her
mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la
Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was
able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all
the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac
car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the
neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss
De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped
unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid
was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the
back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated
beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in
response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and threats
that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if
she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss
De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the
complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her
thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her
captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family
and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her
father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father,
Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one
could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize
the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The
appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand
up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing
glances with Cañal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed
towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa
Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car
reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of
Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would
be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the
rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was
removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal
sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant:
"Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and
ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of
the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be
ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be
more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her
stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting.
Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned
task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and
the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the
zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress
to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together
with her brassiere, fell on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling
in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for
about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked
twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room
with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to
cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva,
who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him
to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward
and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each
other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her
and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The
complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open.
Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the
room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued
between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the
body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in
a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her
face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room,
leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her,
the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the
complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went
into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several
times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would
know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now
appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like
the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the
body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four
appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the
room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to
give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la
Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her
face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her.
They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a
hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was
released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she
did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up
and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva
again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to
be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his
lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by
others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss
De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far
from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to
them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to
alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known
company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a
UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what
had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was
a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone
with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the
driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the
negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la
Riva reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC
officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the
complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four
of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's
instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older
woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a
strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was
afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The
doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo
Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the
De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the
snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat.
Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the
interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were
still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what
steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was
reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29,
1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her
lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the
Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a
statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the
four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant
submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief
Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967,
Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the
police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended.
That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters
where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of
persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four
men he abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1")
wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement
(Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose
admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named
the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that
upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to
come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that
it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally
assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture
of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who
declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of
her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another
sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the
authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5,
1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva
pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and raped
her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of
Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn
statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants
from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau,
adding that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification,
one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and he
saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day
of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information
previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come
down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her.
Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the
crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the
complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda
executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept
to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made
plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car
and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear,
however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with
him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions
and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries.
On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant
taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and
the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or
bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index
finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining
her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the
abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on
pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the
subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows
administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been
inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that
they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the
genital examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's
genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June
26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that
spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from
the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have
douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the
witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative
to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail
Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the
evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of
the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying
some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much
so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had
been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come
time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao.
The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After
dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the
Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver
was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted,
"Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way.
Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she
swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly
got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out.
Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car,
who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle
lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the
red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they
also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to
scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and
return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could
net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you
not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a
mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly
snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he
said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the
performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were
limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted
first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover
her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair
enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as
they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows
before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing.
Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal
stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw
Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would
pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10
minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5
times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused
(Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for
Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of
payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda
joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is
testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near
the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia
Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did
not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he
was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted
Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help
raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they
invited Cañal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the
one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his
compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the
meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to
Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later
moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and
arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the
newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste,
wife of the governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies
one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report
and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this
point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition
that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the
complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance
to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The
Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind
of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would
consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not
even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these
wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a
woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for
money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the
rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of
time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity
about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a
weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something
beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused
had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her
satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is
simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a
striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid
God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment
basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their
attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand
full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not
even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted
with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is
anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that,
could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe
Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this
circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police
interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or
even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a
last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for
this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's
positive identification of Cañal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock,
the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their
underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of
men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought
nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them,
but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to
argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and
disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick
passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the
version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of
evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense
unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination conducted
on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings
of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that
Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual
assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the
following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left
behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place
then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after
three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda
to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested
by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon
herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining physician rules
out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the
imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was
P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about
all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did)
expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of
these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in
the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the
redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y
Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it
could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on
Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into
the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the
location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the
inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those
of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated
testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted
declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's
declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing less than the
written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie
stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum
notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence
has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight
of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible,
the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted.
(Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should
be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his
worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to
prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in
certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial
courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such
uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable
(Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the
abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as
the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was
purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform
a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the
existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to
stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in
her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car
against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car,
Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former
forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that
meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among
the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel.
This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the
defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended
complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated
by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below,
likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence
of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is
untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is
not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if
the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the
examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant
had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important
consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs
Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were
caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to
strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to
imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva
did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-
pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not
pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified
that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the
kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the
commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's
arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her
mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This
utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,
considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this
nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth.
Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the
press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and
her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her.
This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of
the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with
disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different
parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as
suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when
the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the
hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what
they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly
suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume
her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public
disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay
her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as
a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass
of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and
intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police
investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or
that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements
were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated
the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which
could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the authorities
could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was
presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose
and Canal admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for
Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements
to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally
abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the
complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the
statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained
matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant,
too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or
relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario
of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter
made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body
in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms
was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further,
that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the
witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the
statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves,
We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the
statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody
statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution
on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose
on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said
provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction
the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham,
23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of
Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before
the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said
constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that
is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are
during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding
effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered.
And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the
absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme
Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial
resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge
against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint
cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it
was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The
contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the
admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29,
1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-
15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of
guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to
require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested
the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the
better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People
vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil.,
91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it
found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit
that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the
information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of
the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota
prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the
contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get,
and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for
three times — and his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had
always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the
circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the
aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the
fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the
Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs.
Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that
attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said
publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a
fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted.
For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been
influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of
the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit
the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of
this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant
from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable
means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape
upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was
being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so
that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be
considered as still connected with the abduction — in other words, they should be
detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as
follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of
the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the
provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the
extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of
the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of
simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect
that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating
circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance
to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime
having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf.
People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants
in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten
minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has
been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which
does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the
reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a
result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in
each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the
trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant
shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe
of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years."
The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong,
the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated
just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only
be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in
the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that
only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial
court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs.
Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him
two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not
applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different
from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have
committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex.
As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and
proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar
as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of
Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the
accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in
which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three
distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that
once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then
each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a
result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate
penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the
decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at
length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality,
an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like
all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and
biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death
penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the
execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four
basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties;
(2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and
(4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though
related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by
the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of
sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not
concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go
into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding
penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only
two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or
successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple
capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has
practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an
indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of
the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper
penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency
or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute)
deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum
forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and
then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of
only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among
them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed,
as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should
be imposed in the premises.
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Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below
ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the
complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No.
WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171,
alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the
Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores
Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose,
bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a
chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which
was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4,
1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land
Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The
mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967,
for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation
assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the
intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor
filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court
of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The
sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in
Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G.
Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la
Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in
the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the
ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the
intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was
not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment
in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime.
Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a
motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on
October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case
in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a
petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs.
Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could
be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to
execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ
of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present
petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a
brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo
having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is
correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores
Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered
as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that
the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of
the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended
to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother,
but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by
the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car
and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before
the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the
possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final
judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of
the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool
used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for
confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should
be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
————
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal
manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal,
one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this
development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants
Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of
the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is
likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each
of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four
crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the
court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof
is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment &
Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.