Basic Principles of Social Comparison: Does Gender Matter?: January 2014

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Basic principles of social comparison: Does

gender matter?
Serge Guimond & Armand Chatard
Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by the following grant: ANR-06-CONF-07

awarded to the first author. Please address correspondence concerning this chapter to
Serge Guimond, Clermont Universite, Université Blaise Pascal, Laboratoire de Psychologie
Sociale et Cognitive CNRS, 34 av. Carnot, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France, e-mail: Serge.
Guimond@univ-bpclermont.fr
To the extent that self evaluation can only be accomplished by means of comparison
with other persons, the drive for self evaluation is a force acting on persons to belong
to groups, to associate with others (. . .) to making human beings “gregarious.”
—Festinger (1954, pp. 135–136)
introduction
We are social animals, and as Festinger (1954) suggests, part of what makes us so
is our need to compare and contrast our appraisal of social reality with others
around us. As such, research on social comparison processes has played an
important role in the development of a social psychology (Buunk & Gibbons,
2007; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Guimond, 2006a; Suls & Wheeler,
2000). In this chapter, we consider the extent to which gender needs to be
considered in the analysis of basic processes of social comparison. Do men and
women have the same need to compare themselves with others? Are there
important psychological differences between women and men that would
justify giving attention to gender issues in social comparison dynamics? This
chapter attempts to shed more light on these important issues.
Currently, most social psychologists appear to assume, following Festinger
(1954), that the process of social comparison arises from a universal drive to
evaluate the self and that it applies in essentially the same manner to women
and men. However, this chapter reviews existing research and presents new
data showing (a) that gender is related to the motivation to engage in social
205
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206 Gender in social comparison
comparison, (b) that the psychological effects of social comparison among

men often differ from those among women, and (c) that the emergence of
psychological similarities and differences between women and men can be
explained by social comparison processes. As such, we point out that our
understanding of basic principles of social comparison has been impaired by
the tendency not to consider what Banaji (1993, p. 252) called “the most
fundamental dichotomy of life” that is, “sex and gender.”
male power and domination

To set the stage for the analysis that follows, it is necessary first to introduce
some preliminary ideas about male power and social dominance and to define
what is meant by sex and gender. Sex refers to biological differences between
women and men that may or may not have any psychological consequences.
Gender refers to a social category and the meaning that is culturally assigned
to this category. Categorization by sex/gender guides much of our social
interactions. Moreover, using gender as a social category implies issues of
power and domination. As Sidanius and Pratto (1999, p. 36) state, “gender
systems of social stratification appear to be completely universal . . . there are
no known examples of matriarchal societies (i.e. where women, as a group,
control the political and military authority within the society)”. Psychological
differences between men and women, as a group, often turned out, on closer
inspection, to be differences between dominant and subordinate groups
respectively (Bègue, 2005; Chatard, Guimond, Lorenzi-Cioldi, & Désert,
2005; Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2009; Lorenzi-
Cioldi & Chatard, 2006).
When it comes to social comparison processes, this connection between
gender and social dominance is extremely important. In fact, the extent to
which a system is hierarchically organized into dominant and subordinate
groups has a large bearing on the forms that social comparison will take, and
on whether it will affect the behavior of women and men at all (Guimond,
Chatard, Branscombe, et al., 2006). For example, recent evidence suggests
that intergroup social comparisons between women and men can and do have
strong psychological effects in societies that are relatively low in inequality
and hierarchy (Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006).
Thus, in the United States, in France, or in the Netherlands, when women
and men are led to compare themselves with members of the opposite sex,
their self-concept becomes more consistent with current gender stereotypes.
However, among members of a cultural system that is highly stratified
and hierarchical (i.e., Malaysia), where intergroup social comparisons are
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Guimond & Chatard 207
generally perceived as inappropriate, between-gender social comparisons

have no noticeable impact of the self-concept of women and men (see
Guimond et al., 2007). This means that perhaps, gender becomes important
to the extent that male power and domination is questioned. It certainly
seems to be what occurred in the field of scientific psychology as a whole.
We now have in psychology and related fields not only textbooks, research
programs, and scientific journals but also, indeed, university programs
devoted to gender issues. For example, in the 1990s, Carol Gilligan played a
key role in setting up a program of gender studies at Harvard University in
the department of human development and psychology (for more details
about the development of gender studies programs and controversies sur-
rounding such programs, see Gilligan, 2011). Yet, these are extremely recent
events. In fact, before the 1970s, the terms psychology of gender or psychology
of sex differences were largely unheard of (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).
Psychologists were studying human behaviors and gender did not seem to
matter much in their scientific analysis. Thus, it would seem that it was not
until the power and domination of male psychologists began to be ques-
tioned that the issue of gender became a legitimate topic of research and
experimentation. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1998) has written
about male domination in a way that helps us understand why differences
between men and women can sometimes go entirely unnoticed. He points
out that “the defining feature of dominants is their ability to have others
believe that their own particular way of doing things is in fact the universal
way of doing things” (p. 69). Thus, certain peculiarities in the behavior of
men (or women) can be entirely overlooked to the extent that it is taken as
evidence of human social behaviors. Bourdieu (1998) goes on to explain that
in every domain, what we define as excellent is in fact highly ingrained with
masculine features that do not appear as masculine. In other words, what
may be especially telling about masculine behaviors is the fact that it does not
appear as masculine behaviors.
One can readily relate this analysis to the state of psychology as a science,
and its attempt to develop universal laws of human behavior. Although
specialists such as Sternberg (2004) are now arguing that it is impossible to
understand intelligence without taking into account the cultural context,
Western psychologists have been doing exactly this for decades, asserting
that their particular studies of intelligence among Westerners are in fact
giving us universal truth about intelligence.
This tendency to present as universal what is in fact culturally defined, and
largely male, seems to fit with the defining feature of social dominance
advocated by Bourdieu (1998). Bourdieu’s analysis is informed by the work
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of various feminist writers such as Virginia Woolf or Adrienne Rich (1980),

who wrote that “cultural values become the embodiment of male subjectivity”
(p. 208). All of this is pure speculation of course but it does lead one to predict
that gender may be more intimately related than anticipated to various topics
that are studied by social psychologists, including the topic of social
comparison.
gender in social comparison research

Looking at reviews of research related to social comparison theory unmis-
takably reveals that gender is rarely considered in any explicit manner (see
Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Darley, 2003; Muller &
Fayant, 2010; Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2006; Suls,
Martin, & Wheeler, 2002; Suls & Miller, 1977; Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wood,
1996). For example, in the Handbook of Social Comparison edited by Suls
and Wheeler (2000), there are no chapters targeting the role of gender in
social comparison theory and research. Festinger (1954) himself did not
write anything about potential sex differences in social comparison, and
researchers after him seemed to have followed that lead. This does not mean
that no studies have raised the question of potential gender differences in
social comparison behavior (see Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Kemmelmeier &
Oyserman, 2001; Monteil, 1998; Suls, Gastorf, & Lawhon, 1978). To the
contrary, there were several early signs that, as Major and Forsey (1985)
put it, “sex may be a fundamental attribute for social comparison purposes”
(p. 402). Nevertheless, it is still the case that major reviews of social compar-
ison research typically do not refer to any important role of sex/gender. The
present chapter is probably the first one to focus on the topic. This is
probably not unique to this area of research (for the area of moral reasoning,
see Gilligan, 1982; for personality, see Stewart, Cortina & Curtin, 2008; for
the area of implicit prejudice, see Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003).
Indeed, the more critical question is, Why should it be otherwise? Unless
there are reasons to believe that social comparison is inherently related to
gender or that there are important gender differences that impinge directly
and importantly on social comparative activities, it would seem entirely
appropriate not to categorize a given theory or a given set of findings by
gender. However, another possibility is that there are findings that clearly
point to the importance of gender in social comparison research but that
most researchers were simply not prepared to perceive them. Looking at
both classic and recent findings suggests that this latter option may be closer
to the truth.
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the psychology of affiliation

A major reason for the thriving interest in social comparison theory following
the publication of Festinger (1954) lies in the work of Schachter (1959) on
affiliation. Schachter succeeded in extending social comparison theory to
emotional states by showing that the link between fear and affiliation was at
least partly mediated by comparison processes. There is little doubt that this
research played a tremendous role in the development of Festinger’s theory
(see Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Who were the participants in these early studies
and in many other ones that confirmed Schachter’s basic analysis (e.g.,
Gineste, 1973) and that attracted attention to the concept of social compar-
ison? Only women, no men. Indeed, it appears that Schachter’s results are
very difficult to replicate among male participants. Is this simply anecdotal?
Shelley Taylor and colleagues (2000) certainly do not think so. They reviewed
an impressive body of evidence suggesting that “the desire to affiliate with
others is substantially more marked among females than among males” and
that, indeed, this is “one of the most robust gender differences in adult human
behavior” (p. 418).
This is a first important piece of evidence suggesting that over the last
several decades, researchers interested in social comparison processes may
have overlooked an important fact by dismissing the role of gender. It is
argued here that this oversight is not dealing with peripheral issues but touch
on some theoretically central ideas in social comparison processes.
Furthermore, it appears that Schachter (1959) is not alone in drawing general
conclusions based on single-sex investigations. Many other studies that have
had a huge influence in this area concerned only one gender, leaving open the
possibility that the findings may differ among the other gender. We will
return to some of these later on. For the moment, it is important not to forget
the critical issue that relates to Schachter’s work: the motivation for social
comparison. Why would somebody engage in social comparisons? The
answer that comes out of Schachter’s theory revolves around fear and uncer-
tainty. People want to compare with others especially when they are in doubt,
when they lack confidence, when they are uncertain about the appropriate
thing to do. There are various types of evidence in support of this view
(see Buunk & Oldersma, 2003). Moreover, uncertainty reduction is now
considered as a main motive involved in a broad range of social behaviors
and attitudes such as political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003), the explanation of why people join groups (Hogg,
Hohman, & Rivera, 2008), or the role of intergroup contact in reducing
prejudice (Pettigrew, 2008). Thus, if women are more likely than men to
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feel insecure and if this tendency to be uncertain drives the need to compare
with others, then women may have a greater need for social comparison than
men. Direct evidence for this view comes from Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999)
research on the development of a scale to measure the extent to which people
want to compare with others.
social comparison orientation

Gibbons and Buunk (1999) argued that although social comparison is
assumed to be universal, there may be variations in the interest that people
have in social comparison information with some people being much more
interested than others. They decided to develop a scale to measure this
tendency, the scale of Social Comparison Orientation (SCO). This is an
11-item scale with statements such as “I always pay a lot of attention to how
I do things compared with how others do things” or “I am not the type of
person who compares often with others” (reverse-scored item). Using a
5-point scale, people simply rate the extent to which they agree or disagree
with each item. This seems a very straightforward way to find out the extent to
which people are motivated to compare themselves with others. Gibbons and
Buunk (1999) report extensive evidence on the reliability and validity of this
scale (see also Buunk & Gibbons, 2006).
To assess the construct validity of the scale, Gibbons and Buunk (1999)
reported the results of a comparison of U. S. and Dutch college students in
which they predicted and found that U.S. students scored significantly higher
on the scale of SCO relative to Dutch participants. They argued that this
difference probably reflects the fact that the U.S. culture is more competitive
and achievement oriented than is the Dutch. Thus, being concerned with
social comparison involves some forms of competitiveness. As Turner (1975)
suggested, social comparison often triggers a form of “social competition”
that can be distinguished from the realistic competition that Sherif (1966)
dealt with. However, there is more to the SCO scale than a competitive
orientation. This emerged from the fact that Gibbons and Buunk (1999)
also included gender as a factor in their analysis. Although no predictions
were made, a modest but significant gender effect was observed, with women
being more interested than were men in social comparison, in both the U.S.
and the Netherlands. This gender effect is striking for two reasons. First, the
scale of the SCO was not developed to study gender differences, and the items
do not refer to sex or gender. Second, because men are expected to be more
competitive than women, men should have scored higher than women on the
SCO scale if the scale were measuring essentially a competitive orientation.
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These findings of Gibbons and Buunk (1999) were replicated and extended
in a cross-cultural study of social comparison processes. With participants
from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, and Malaysia,
Guimond et al. (2007) also found a significant gender effect on the SCO
scale and no interaction involving culture, suggesting some level of generality
to this difference between women and men (see also Guimond, Chatard,
Branscombe, et al., 2006, for additional evidence). Why would women be
more likely than men to engage in social comparison? The extensive analysis
of the psychological correlates of the SCO scale presented by Gibbons and
Buunk (1999) gives several clues. Overall, the findings suggest that those who
are high in SCO have a genuine communal orientation. “The prototypical
image of a high comparer,” wrote Gibbons and Buunk (1999), is that of an
individual “who (a) is interpersonal more than introspectively oriented, being
sensitive to the behavior of others, and (b) has a degree of uncertainty about the
self ” (p. 138). Indeed, scores on the scale of SCO correlate positively with
scales measuring a communal orientation and an interpersonal orientation.
Furthermore, in terms of the five-factor model of personality (see John,
Naumann, & Soto, 2008, for review), SCO relates positively and most strongly
with neuroticism. Given extensive research suggesting that women are
higher than men on neuroticism (e.g., Costa, Terraciano, & MaCrae, 2001)
and that women have a stronger interpersonal/communal orientation than
men (Cross & Madson, 1997), it is no surprise that women score higher than
men did on the SCO scale.
Self-Construal and SCO

The preceding pattern of results suggests that construing the self in a partic-
ular manner may account for the fact that women score higher than men on
the SCO scale. As noted by Buunk and Gibbons (2006), those who display a
motivation to compare with others, as measured by the SCO scale, appear to
have an interdependent self-construal as oppose to an independent one. This
distinction between two primary types of self-construal was proposed origi-
nally by Markus and Kitayama (1991) in their cultural theory of the self and
later used by Cross and Madson (1997) as a basis to develop a model of gender
differences.
Indeed, a large body of research has emerged over the last decade suggest-
ing that a major difference between women and men reside in how the self is
construed. The main dimensions underlying gender differences in the self
have been labeled in various distinctive ways (e.g., Kashima et al., 1995).
However, the common theme emerging from this work revolves around a
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distinction between a concern for others referred to as interdependent,

communal, collectivistic or relational self-construal, assumed to be typical
of women, and a concern for the self and lack of concern for others labeled as
independent, individualistic, separate, or agentic self-construal more typical
of men (Bakan, 1966; Conway et al., 1996; Eagly, 1987; Glick & Fiske, 2001;
Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992; Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001;
Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1994; Wood,
Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). Theoretically, the critical importance
of this distinction rests in the fact that gender differences in self-construals are
seen as so basic that they can explain all other gender differences in emotion,
cognition, motivation, and social behavior (Cross & Madson, 1997; Gardner,
Gabriel, & Hochschild, 2002; Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001). Thus, one
may hypothesize that gender differences in SCO would be explained by
differences in self-construal. More specifically, one would expect scores on
the SCO scale to be related to an interdependent or relational self-construal
and given that women typically score higher than men on measures of this
type of self-construal, controlling for this gender difference in self-construal
should suppress the effect of gender on the SCO scale.
This analysis seems sound. However, there are reasons to believe that
another type of self-construal may be even more important. Guimond et al.
(2007) found that rating the self as “fearful” and “anxious,” something they
labeled as a measure of the insecure self, loaded on a factor separate from items
measuring interdependent and independent self-construals. Furthermore,
whereas gender differences in interdependent and in independent self-
construals were found, as predicted, to vary significantly across cultures,
this was not the case for the insecure self-construal. Rather, Guimond et al.
(2007) found that women scored higher than men on this tendency to define
the self as fearful and anxious and that this was the only gender difference
in the self to be invariant across cultures. Given that gender differences in
SCO were also found to be invariant across cultures, this suggests that the
insecure self-construal, rather than the interdependent self-construal, may lie
at the basis of the divergent motivation of men and women regarding social
comparison.
Data from the cross-cultural project of Guimond, Chatard, Branscombe,
et al., (2006) can shed light on these issues as it contains measures of three
types of self-construal (interdependent, independent, and insecure) in addi-
tion to the full 11-item scale of the SCO among men and women from eight
nations/culture: Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Tunisia, and Malaysia. This project involved
different experimental conditions in which participants were requested to
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compare themselves with in-group or out-group members, and a control

group assessing self-definition without any explicit social comparison.
Considering only the participants from the control group who were asked
to answer a questionnaire measuring self-construals and SCO in that order,
the sample includes 436 students (243 women and 193 men), aged between
16 and 33 years old (exclusion of missing data account for the reduced N
reported in the following).
Details about the reliability and validity of the measures, which are quite
satisfactory, can be found in Guimond et al. (2007). The measure of rela-
tional or interdependent self-construal reflects self-ratings on four items
(caring, affectionate, family-oriented, and value human relationships) that
loaded together on one factor. The measure of independent or agentic self-
construal also reflects self-ratings on four items (boastful, selfish, dominant,
and often use coarse language) that loaded together on a separate factor. All
self-ratings were made using a 7-point rating scale. The measure of the
insecure self was obtained by adding together the self-ratings on two items,
fearful and anxious. Table 1 presents the zero-order correlations between
SCO and the three types of self-construal across eight countries. Overall, the
results are clear: SCO is mainly related to a tendency to define the self as
fearful and anxious.
Given that rating oneself as fearful and anxious is highly similar to the way
neuroticism is measured within the Big Five model of personality traits (e.g.,
Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), these results are consistent with Gibbons
and Buunk (1999). Given the theoretical perspective developed by Festinger
(1954) and Schachter (1959) and the supportive evidence that people are
t a b l e 1 . Correlations between Social Comparison Orientation (SCO)

and three types of self-construals, across cultures.
Country (n) Interdependent self Independent self Insecure self

France (43) .23 .15 .22
Belgium (110) .07 .05 .32***
Switzerland (36) .29 .29 .48**
Netherlands (46) .20 .21 .44**
United Kingdom (39) .22 –.17 .10
United States (52) –.11 .42** .51***
Malaysia (50) .14 .07 .38**
Tunisia (53) .35* .14 .48***
Total (429) .20*** .12** .31***
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

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t a b l e 2 . Hierarchical multiple regression of predictor variables

on the Social Comparison Orientation scale.
Hierarchical entry of variables β t p<

Dependent variable: Social Comparison Orientation (SCO)
1. Sex –.19 –3.86 .001
2. Sex –.19 –3.88 .001
Independent self .19 3.98 .001
Interdependent self .19 3.96 .001
3. Sex –.13 –2.70 .007
Independent self .16 3.49 .001
Interdependent self .18 3.86 .001
Insecure self .26 5.71 .001
Note: F change (1, 411) = 32.66, p = .001. Women were coded 1, and men were coded 2.
motivated to compare themselves with others when there is uncertainty

(Buunk & Oldersma, 2003), these findings are also consistent with a major
tenet of social comparison theory. Indeed, overall, the relation between SCO
and insecure self-construal is valid among men (r = .26, p < .001) as well as
among women (r = .30, p < .001). Finally, given the diverse cultures and
languages sampled and the consistency of the results, these data provide
support for the cross-cultural validity of the scale of the SCO.
To further examine these results, a multiple regression analysis was per-
formed, considering scores on the scale of the SCO as dependent variable (see
Table 2). For the predictors, sex of participants was entered in a first step,
followed by the measures of independent and interdependent/relational self-
construals together in a second step. In a third and last step, the measure of
insecure self-construal was added to the equation. This analysis addressed
two main questions. First, do all measures of self-construals provide an
independent contribution to explaining variations in SCO? Second, can
these measures of self-construals mediate the effect of gender on SCO (see
Baron & Kenny, 1986)? Table 2 shows the effect of each variable at each of the
three steps. At Step 3, it reveals that all variables entered into the equation
have a statistically significant and independent effect on SCO, providing a
positive answer to the first question. Consistent with past research, this
analysis suggests that construing the self in independent and interdependent
ways is important to understand people’s interest in social comparison, over
and above gender. However, Table 2 also suggests that the measure of the
insecure self adds to the prediction of SCO over and above gender, and the
other two measures of self-construals. Clearly, the tendency to define the self
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as fearful and anxious is a distinct form of self-construal that deserves

attention in its own right in social comparison research. Moreover, Table 2
suggests that construing the self in independent or interdependent ways does
not mediate the effect of gender on SCO. In Step 2, the effect of gender on SCO
remains the same when entering the measures of independent and interde-
pendent self-construals (β = –.19). In contrast, Step 3 reveals that the effect of
gender drops from –.19 to –.13 when entering the measure of insecure self-
construal in the equation.
The Sobel (1982) test indicates that this is a significant reduction in the
variance accounted for by gender (z = 2.154, p = .03). In other words, as
expected, an insecure self-construal does partially mediate the effect of gender
on SCO. Women are more likely to engage in social comparison than are
men, in part, because women are more likely to define themselves as fearful
and anxious than are men.
the effects of in-group and out-group

comparisons
We have considered how gender may be relevant to an understanding of the
motivation leading to engage in social comparison and why this may be the
case. Of course, regardless of one’s individual motivation, the environment
often confronts us with some comparative standards (Wood, 1989). A con-
siderable amount of research has sought to examine the effects that these
comparisons can have.
One basic question concerns the effects of in-group versus out-group
comparisons. Do comparisons with in-group members have a greater impact
on our feelings, emotions, and behavior than do comparison with out-group
members? In accordance with the similarity hypothesis, Festinger (1954)
suggested that people can engage in intergroup comparisons “on a phantasy
level, but very rarely in reality” (p. 136). Following that view, a strong argu-
ment has been that people usually compare themselves with other in-group
members because they are more similar whereas out-group members are too
different to provide a meaningful comparison. In terms of gender, this
suggests that people are usually looking for a comparison with a same-sex
other. Considerable evidence has confirmed this view (Major, 1994; Miller,
1984; Zanna, Goethals, & Hill, 1975). Crocker and Blanton (1999) summarized
the evidence by stating that “the desire for ingroup comparison appears quite
robust . . . women show a strong tendency to prefer comparisons with other
women” (p. 175). In the area of social comparison, this is probably the single
most discussed finding involving sex/gender. It led researchers to assume that
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comparison with members of the opposite sex have probably little psycho-
logical importance.
Surprisingly, the influential study carried out by Major, Schiaccitano, and
Crocker (1993) that served to reinforce this view that only in-group compar-
isons matter psychologically was a single-sex investigation involving males
only. This experiment by Major et al. went beyond assessing the preference
for in-group comparisons. It was designed to systematically test the effect of
in-group versus out-group comparisons on self-esteem. The results were
clear: Comparison with out-group members who do better than oneself has
no major impact on self-esteem whereas a similar comparison with in-group
members reduces self-esteem in a significant way. This is, without any doubt,
an important set of findings leading Major et al. to conclude that “if compar-
ison with advantaged outgroup members cannot be avoided, they may be
dismissed as not self-relevant” (p. 719). The significant problem, however, is
that this general conclusion is drawn from the results of an experiment
involving only men, no women. When the same experiment was carried
out with women, exactly opposite results were predicted and obtained (see
Martinot & Redersdorff, 2006). Among women, and using the same exper-
imental paradigm as Major et al., results show that comparison with out-
group members who do better than oneself has a significant and negative
impact on self-esteem whereas a similar comparison with in-group members
does not reduce self-esteem in any significant way (see Martinot, Redersdorff,
Guimond, & Dif, 2002).
These results, which have been replicated and confirmed in several experi-
ments, establish that the effects of social comparison can be very different as a
function of one’s gender (see also Lorenzi-Cioldi & Chatard, 2006;
Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001). Why would that be the case? As suggested
in the Introduction, this gender difference rests mainly on a difference in
power, status, or dominance between women and men. The strategy of
dismissing as irrelevant some unflattering comparative information is cer-
tainly an important idea that can account for the fact that sometimes, social
comparison can have little psychological impact. However, not everybody is
in a position to use this strategy. Subordinates have to pay attention to the
powerful; they have little choice. Only those having power, usually men, can
totally disregard subordinates, usually women, and use this strategy of dis-
missal (Fiske, 1993). Follow-up studies, experimentally manipulating group
status, confirmed this view by showing that women can also dismiss as
irrelevant social comparison with out-group members but only when their
group is in a dominant or high-status position relative to the out-group (see
Martinot & Redersdorff, 2006).
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Intergroup Comparisons and Gender Differences

The idea that only in-group comparisons matter, so prevalent in classic social
comparison research, can be contrasted with the perspective taken on the
subject by researchers working in the context of social identity and self-
categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). In the develop-
ment of social identity theory, Tajfel (1974) has suggested, very early on, that it
may be useful to consider that social comparison takes place not only between
individuals within interpersonal relationships, as Festinger (1954) empha-
sized, but also between social groups within intergroup relations. This has
led to a tradition of research on social comparison that has been largely
unconnected with the classic work initiated by Festinger (see Guimond,
2006b). This research has made it clear that people do engage in intergroup
comparisons and that this has important implications for understanding
intergroup behaviors. One of the most basic hypotheses of social identity
theory can be expressed in the following manner: Group membership,
through a process of intergroup comparison, has an impact on the self such
that belonging to a group that compares favorably with other groups can
enhance the self. Surprisingly enough, this basic hypothesis has in fact
been rarely tested. This is because most studies dealing with social identity
theory have used measures of intergroup bias as dependent variables and have
only rarely used measures of self-construal or self-esteem (e.g., Lemyre &
Smith, 1985).
The extension of social identity theory into self-categorization theory by
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) led to a greater focus on
the self. Recent research has shown that this theory has considerable impli-
cations for the explanation of gender differences and points to a novel role for
social comparison processes in this explanation (see Guimond, 2008). Many
studies have argued that how men and women construe the self may deter-
mine the extent to which social comparison will lead to assimilation or
contrast effects (see Buunk & Gibbons, 2007, for a review). For example,
because women have a more relational or interdependent self-concept than
do men, they may be more likely to empathize with a worse-off other than
men may be and more likely to feel more strongly the consequences of
downward comparison than men may (Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001).
However, the question that is rarely raised in these studies is why do men and
women differ in their self-construal in the first place?
Contrary to the model of self and gender proposed by Cross and Madson
(1997), Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) argued that men and women
do not always differ in their self-construal. Based on self-categorization theory,
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they suggested that there was a need to include in a model of self and gender the
idea of multiple levels of self-definition. People are not simply men or women.
They are also Americans, Europeans, Catholics, Muslims, young, old, and so
on. In principle, people can define themselves in any number of ways. Simply
looking at scientific research on the self, one could easily list more than 30
different types of self that have been discussed (i.e., the core self, the public self,
the dialogical self, and so on; see Legrand & Ruby, 2009). In practice, self-
categorization theory suggests that it is usually important to distinguish
between two main levels of self-definition, personal identity, and social identity
(Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Personal identity corresponds to
the individual self, the definition of oneself as a unique individual with a
particular personality. Social identity corresponds to the collective self, the
definition of oneself as member of a social group sharing attributes in common
with other members of that group in contrast to other social groups. When it is
argued (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997) that men and women differ in their self-
construals, with women having a more communal, relational, or interdepend-
ent self-construal than men, is this referring to the individual self or the
collective self? This is a key issue that Cross and Madson (1997) unfortunately
do not answer. Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) argued that gender
differences in self-construals are more likely to occur when the context activates
a collective self-definition, a social identity as a man or as a woman. In contexts
where personal identity is salient, little gender differences in self-construal
should be observed. Furthermore, Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006)
proposed that same-sex social comparison versus opposite-sex social compar-
ison may be a critical contextual factor that activates the individual self or
the collective self, respectively. Several studies manipulating comparison with
in-group and out-group members revealed strong support for these proposi-
tions. When participants were asked to define themselves in comparison with
same-sex in-group members, the results revealed gender similarities in self-
construals on both the dimension of interdependence and independence/
agency. Indeed, gender had no significant effect on self-construals in this
condition. That is, men were not more independent than women, who were
not more relational than men were.
However, when participants were asked to define themselves in compar-
ison with out-group members, that is, members of the opposite-sex, the
results revealed strong and statistically significant effects of gender on self-
construals: Women defined themselves as more relational than men did, and
men defined themselves as more independent than women did. The inclusion
of a control group in which self-construal was measured without inducing
any explicit social comparison allowed us to confirm the effects of same-sex
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versus opposite-sex social comparisons. In each study, comparisons with the

opposite sex increased gender differences in self-construals, as compared to
the control condition, whereas same-sex comparisons reduced gender differ-
ences. Thus, women and men do not always differ in their self-construal.
They do, primarily, when they engage in intergroup comparisons. These
studies are consistent with prior experimental research on self-stereotyping
(see Biernat, Crandall, Young, Kobrynowicz & Halpin, 1998; Hogg & Turner,
1987; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002). However, their main
contribution lies in their ability to pinpoint the critical effects of same-sex
versus opposite-sex social comparisons, something that was not directly
examined in past research, and to outline why these effects occur.
Indeed, Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) devoted great attention
to the issue of why social comparisons can change the self-views of women and
men. They argued that within-gender as opposed to between-gender social
comparisons induce a shift in the level of self-definition (personal vs. collec-
tive). According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), the collec-
tive self, the definition of oneself as a group member, emerges in intergroup
contexts when a given social categorization (i.e., women vs. men) is salient. It
entails a depersonalization of the self in the sense that the self changes in level
and content. Through a self-stereotyping process, people come to define
themselves using attributes that are typical of their in-group (see Onorato &
Turner, 2004). If so, then when women compare themselves with men, they
will tend to use the stereotype of their gender to describe themselves. To
examine this, Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) measured not only
how participants rated themselves but also how they rated the typical man and
the typical woman.
The extent to which participants perceived their in-group as relational
versus independent was expected to be used as a basis of self-definition more
so in the between-gender social comparison condition (intergroup) than in
the within-gender social comparison condition (intragroup). The results of
several studies provided support for this prediction. Self-ratings and in-group
ratings on the two relevant dimensions (independence vs. interdependence)
were strongly and positively correlated in intergroup contexts, but much less
so in intragroup contexts. In two studies, negative correlations emerged
between self-ratings and out-group ratings but only in the intergroup com-
parison condition. This is interesting because it suggests that in this condition
but not in intragroup comparison condition, the participants behaved as
group members, in terms of their collective self, which is defined not only
as similar to the in-group but also as different from the out-group. Moreover,
as expected, gender differences in relational self-construals, which were
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magnified in intergroup contexts, completely disappeared when in-group

ratings were controlled for. Such mediation provides evidence in favor of a
self-stereotyping account of gender differences. It seems that when men and
women engage in intergroup comparisons, they rely more on attributes
shared by in-group members to define themselves, than they do when they
engage in intragroup comparisons. This is consistent with the view that the
context of comparison triggers different levels of self-definition, personal or
collective.
changing self-construals matters

The preceding findings suggest that gender differences in self-construals are
not fixed or enduring. Rather, they fluctuate in magnitude as a function of
social comparisons. Of course, the role of the social context has long been
acknowledged by researchers studying gender issues (e.g., Deaux & Major,
1987), although the critical function of same-sex versus opposite-sex social
comparisons did not attract attention. Two further experiments were carried
out by Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) to examine the consequen-
ces that changing gender differences in self-construals can have. Is the change
in self-construal noted earlier, following same-sex versus opposite-sex social
comparisons, a mere perceptual phenomenon having little concrete impact
on subsequent behaviors? Or, is this a genuine change in self-views that
carries important consequences?
To examine this issue, a variable on which sex differences are said to be
extremely robust was considered, namely, the scale of social dominance
orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO is a
relatively new psychological construct proposed within social dominance
theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It refers to a general attitude toward
group-based dominance and hierarchy. People who score high on the scale
are favorable toward a hierarchical system in which one group is dominant
over other groups. People who have a low score favor social equality and
are opposed to inequalitarian or hierarchical intergroup relations. Sidanius
and Pratto (1999) have presented a general theory to explain how and why
hierarchical social systems tend to form and to reproduce themselves. Within
this theory, they argue that the gender stratification system follows somewhat
different principles than those operating within other stratification systems
based on ethnicities, religion, or social class. Thus, in the case of these other
stratification systems, called arbitrary set, the theory predicts that group
status has an impact on SDO such that people who belong to groups of higher
status will tend to score higher on the scale than will those having a lower
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position in the status hierarchy. Furthermore, it is expected that changes in

the status system will be reflected in changes in SDO levels. Empirical
evidence has supported these predictions (see Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin,
2006).
However, in the case of gender, different predictions are advocated.
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) suggest that men support group-based hierarchy
and social inequality to a greater extent than women, and that this basic
gender difference is “transcultural” and “transituational” (see Sidanius,
Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). That is, whatever the circumstances, men would be
higher in SDO than would women. Thus, even if the status of women relative
to that of men was higher in a particular society, the prediction is that this
would not change the size of the gender gap in SDO. Tests of this “invariance
hypothesis” have also revealed supportive evidence (see Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Cross-cultural research for example is generally consistent with this
hypothesis (e.g., Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000). Nevertheless, a number
of studies have appeared over the years that challenged the biosocial explan-
ation proposed by social dominance theorists. These studies advocate a more
cultural explanation for the gender gap in SDO (see Chatard et al., 2005;
Dambrun, Duarte & Guimond, 2004; Foels & Papas, 2004; Wilson & Liu,
2003). In fact, many of these studies show that the tendency to define the self
using masculine versus feminine attributes mediates the effect of gender on
SDO. Thus, these researchers argue that men and women differ on SDO
because of cultural and identity factors, not because of biological differences
between the sexes. Reviewing this research, Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin (2006)
argue that this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the invariance
hypothesis to the extent that sex is still the basic determinant of differences in
self-construals. They state that “on average, men will tend to rate themselves as
higher on the masculine characteristics, while women will tend to rate them-
selves as being higher on the feminine characteristics. The question is why?”
(p. 300). They suggest that until this question is resolved it is not possible to
conclude one way or the other. In other words, Pratto et al. (2006) argue that
to the extent that biological sex is at the basis of the tendency to define the self
using “masculine” or “feminine” traits, then the fact that self-definition
mediates gender differences in SDO may actually support a bio-social explan-
ation for the gender gap in SDO.
By showing that manipulating social comparison can change gender differ-
ences in self-construals, the series of studies described above (Guimond,
Chatard, Martinot, et al., 2006) do move us toward resolving the question
of why there is a gender difference on SDO in favor of a sociocultural rather
than sociobiological resolution. Given that comparison with the opposite sex
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increases gender differences while comparison with same-sex ingroup mem-

bers decreases them, Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) predicted that
the consequence would be a reduction in the gender gap in SDO in the
intragroup comparison condition and an increase in the gender gap in SDO
in the intergroup comparison condition, relative to the control group. Study 3
and Study 4 in Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, et al. (2006) revealed evidence
consistent with these predictions. In Study 3 among British university stu-
dents, the results showed no effect of gender on SDO in the intragroup
comparison condition, women scoring even slightly higher (M = 2.74) than
men (M = 2.53). In contrast, a strong gender effect was found in the intergroup
comparison condition with men (M = 3.42) having higher SDO than women
(M = 2.62). Similarly, in Study 4 among French college students, there were no
reliable sex differences on SDO in the intragoup context. However, in the
intergroup comparison condition, males (M = 2.55) scored significantly
higher on SDO compared to female participants (M = 1.93).
In sum, this research indicates that through a simple change in target of
comparison, involving the substitution of one word, men versus women,
gender differences in self-construals are altered. This change in self-construals
obviously does not have biological origin. Furthermore, when participants are
subsequently asked to complete the SDO scale presented in the same standard
format, their answers reflect the prior experimental conditions to which they
were randomly allocated. Contrary to the invariance hypothesis, gender differ-
ences in SDO were reduced in the intragroup comparison condition and
magnified in the intergroup comparison condition, as noted earlier. This attests
to the flexibility of human social behavior and to the powerful role that social
comparison with in-group and out-group members can play.
conclusion
Previous research has given relatively little attention to the role of gender in
social comparison research. Is gender related to the motivation to engage in
social comparison? Are the psychological effects of social comparison among
men different from those among women? Are psychological similarities and
differences between women and men contingent on social comparison pro-
cesses? The present chapter sought to shed more light on these issues. We find
that indeed gender relates to both the willingness to engage in social compar-
ison and to the psychological effects of these comparisons once they have
taken place. Perhaps more important, we also find that social comparison
with in-group or out-group members has an important role to play in the
explanation of gender similarities and differences on important psychological
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attributes, even in cases where gender differences on these attributes were

thought to be irrepressible. More research is needed on these topics, as we are
only beginning to understand their implications (see Chatard, Guimond, &
Selimbegovic, 2007; Guimond, Chatard, & Kang, 2010). For example, given
the significant role of social comparison in health-related issues, the fact that
women typically express a stronger interest than men in comparing them-
selves with others may have important practical consequences.
One conclusion that we can reinforce, because in principle, it is already
known, is that gender should not be overlooked as a factor in social compar-
ison research. Of course, this applies to the field of psychology as a whole,
and there are reasons to believe that in the years to come, this conclusion
will become even more important. First, most research in psychology is still
carried out within Western, individualistic cultures. As Guimond et al. (2007)
observed, it is precisely in Western Europe and North America that the size of
gender differences in personality, values, emotions, and self-construals tend
to be the largest. Second, undergraduate students in psychology, largely a
male population in the 1970s, is now overwhelmingly female. This means that
experimental research in social psychology is increasingly being conducted
with female participants only.
The take-home message of this chapter is not that single-sex investigations
are inherently misleading. To the contrary, as we have seen, many classic
and important findings related to social comparison theory emerged from
single-sex investigations. However, these investigations do not really tell us
anything about human psychology until it is recognized that there were
only male or only female participants and that further research is needed.
When this is not recognized, we may have an instance of the expression of
male domination (Bourdieu, 1998). Fortunately, this occurs rarely. Researchers
usually do acknowledge potential limitations in their research including limi-
tations concerning the gender composition of their sample. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that when they do not, one usually discover later on that this
was indeed a problem. For example, in her groundbreaking work on automatic
and controlled components of prejudice, Devine (1989) does not report the
proportion of men and women that participated in her studies. One may
assume that this is no problem given that gender is unlikely to be related to
implicit prejudice. It took almost 15 years to find out that gender is in fact related
to implicit prejudice with women showing higher implicit prejudice than men
(see Ekehammar et al., 2003). Thus, even when the topic under consideration
does not seem at first glance to be gender related, it is nevertheless important to
be attentive to the role of gender. To do otherwise can result in an incomplete
picture and a weak science.
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Basic principles of social comparison: Does

Serge Guimond & Armand Chatard

Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by the following grant: ANR-06-CONF-07

206 Gender in social comparison

comparison, (b) that the psychological eﬀects of social comparison among

male power and domination

Guimond & Chatard 207

generally perceived as inappropriate, between-gender social comparisons

208 Gender in social comparison

of various feminist writers such as Virginia Woolf or Adrienne Rich (1980),

gender in social comparison research

Guimond & Chatard 209

the psychology of affiliation

210 Gender in social comparison

social comparison orientation

Guimond & Chatard 211

Self-Construal and SCO

212 Gender in social comparison

distinction between a concern for others referred to as interdependent,

Guimond & Chatard 213

compare themselves with in-group or out-group members, and a control

t a b l e 1 . Correlations between Social Comparison Orientation (SCO)

Country (n) Interdependent self Independent self Insecure self

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

214 Gender in social comparison

t a b l e 2 . Hierarchical multiple regression of predictor variables

Hierarchical entry of variables β t p<

motivated to compare themselves with others when there is uncertainty

Guimond & Chatard 215

as fearful and anxious is a distinct form of self-construal that deserves

the effects of in-group and out-group

216 Gender in social comparison

Guimond & Chatard 217

Intergroup Comparisons and Gender Diﬀerences

218 Gender in social comparison

Guimond & Chatard 219

versus opposite-sex social comparisons. In each study, comparisons with the

220 Gender in social comparison

magniﬁed in intergroup contexts, completely disappeared when in-group

changing self-construals matters

Guimond & Chatard 221

position in the status hierarchy. Furthermore, it is expected that changes in

222 Gender in social comparison

increases gender diﬀerences while comparison with same-sex ingroup mem-

Guimond & Chatard 223

attributes, even in cases where gender diﬀerences on these attributes were

224 Gender in social comparison

Guimond & Chatard 225

226 Gender in social comparison

Guimond, S. (2006b). Introduction: Social comparison processes and levels of analysis.

Guimond & Chatard 227

228 Gender in social comparison

Guimond & Chatard 229

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p < .05. p < .01. p < .001.