Specific disputes[edit]

Summary of disputes

Area of
dispute Brunei China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Vietnam

The nine-dash
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
line

Vietnamese
✔ ✔ ✔
coast

Sea area north of

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Borneo

South China Sea

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
islands

Sea area north of

the Natuna ✔ ✔ ✔
Islands

Sea area west of

Palawan and ✔ ✔ ✔
Luzon

Sabah area ✔ ✔ ✔

Luzon Strait ✔ ✔ ✔

The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands.[8] There are several disputes, each of
which involves a different collection of countries:

1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China, later the People's Republic of
China (PRC), which covers most of the South China Sea and overlaps the exclusive
economic zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
 2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
3. Maritime boundary north of Borneo between the PRC, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and
Taiwan.
4. Islands, reefs, banks and shoals in the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands,
the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between
the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts of the area also contested by Malaysia and the
Philippines.
5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between the PRC, Indonesia
and Taiwan[9]
6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between the PRC, the Philippines,
and Taiwan.
7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the PRC, the Philippines, and
Taiwan.

Background[edit]
Further information: Timeline of the South China Sea dispute
The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly
varied. The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People's Republic of
China estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil[10], whereas the
oil rich country of Kuwait has 13 billion tons. In the years following the announcement by the PRC
ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources claim
that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about
1.1 billion tons.[11] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South
China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered
oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a PRC figure of 125 billion barrels.[12] The same EIA
report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion
cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".[12]
The South China Sea is dubbed by the PRC as the "second Persian Sea."[13] The state-owned China
Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to
exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and
natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.[14]
The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area
began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.[15] In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a
well.[16] However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration.
On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an
island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.[17] These oil fields supply 15% of
annual oil consumption in the Philippines.[citation needed]
South-east facing aerial view of PRC-settled Woody Island. The island is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.

The nine-dash line was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," first indicated by the

then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China
Sea. After, the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's
Republic of China in 1949. The line was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots as endorsed
by Zhou Enlai.[18]
The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by some PRC government officials, and by the PRC
military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.[19]
In the 1970s, however, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries began referring to the Spratly
Islands as included in their own territory.[citation needed] On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of
the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the Spratly
Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.[20]
The once abundant fishing opportunities within the region are another motivation for claims. In 2012,
the South China Sea was believed to have accounted for 12% of world fishing catches worth $21.8
billion.[21] There have been many clashes in the Philippines with foreign fishing vessels (including
those of the PRC) in disputed areas. According to some commentators, the PRC believes that the
value in fishing and oil from the sea has risen to a trillion dollars.[22]
The area is also one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. In the 1980s, at least 270 merchant
ships used the route[clarification needed]each day. Currently[timeframe?], more than half the tonnage of the world's
crude oil transported by sea passes through the South China Sea,[citation needed] a figure rising steadily
with the growth of the PRC consumption of oil.[citation needed] This traffic is three times greater than that
passing through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama Canal.[citation needed]

Fiery Cross Reef being transformed by the PRC in May 2015

Since 1996, Vietnam and the Philippines, and to a lesser degree Malaysia and Brunei, have
asserted claims within the area covered by the Chinese (PRC & ROC) nine-dotted line.[23]
Since 1974, when PRC troops confronted and expelled Vietnamese troops, most of the Paracel
Islands have been occupied by the PRC, and all have been under PRC control.
Similarly, although there have been a small number of notable changes in influence or occupation,
the occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly Islands has not changed significantly since
the mid 1990s - see List of maritime features in the Spratly Islandsfor details. Vietnamese troops
control the greatest number of islands, reefs, etc. (approx 29.) Eight islands are controlled by the
Philippines, five by Malaysia, one by Taiwan, and all of those mentioned have various degrees of
"control" over other features. Although the Paracels are completely under PRC control, the PRC has
control of only five "rocks" naturally above water at high tide.[25][24] The significance of this situation
has changed dramatically since 2014 whence the PRC embarked on a program of land reclamation -
see Great wall of sand and List of maritime features in the Spratly Islands for details.
In 2012 the Indian Ambassador to Vietnam, while expressing concern over rising tension in the area,
said that 50 per cent of its trade passes through the area and called for peaceful resolution of the
disputes in accordance with international law.[26]
On 17 March 2016, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 94 s. 2016, President
Aquino created the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, to secure the State's
sovereignty and national territory and preserve marine wealth in its waters and exclusive economic
zone, reserving use and enjoyment of the West Philippine Sea exclusively for Filipino citizens.[27]

2011 agreement[edit]
On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to a set of
preliminary guidelines which would help resolve the dispute.[which?][28] The agreement was described by
the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for
cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".[28] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects
such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and
communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and
natural gas drilling remains unresolved.

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration[edit]

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam,
was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China
Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was entering PRC
waters.[29][30] A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the
INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that
"[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in
international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with
accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."[29]
In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a
dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year
agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had
accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea.[31] In
response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated:
"China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is
based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in
the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis
of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully
solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to
peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect
China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We
hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through
bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are
opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters
under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea
dispute."[32][33]

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by
what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and [we] have conveyed this to the Chinese."[32] The
Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.[31][33]

Chinese policy on the South China Sea[edit]

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was
"an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national
agenda. However, Beijing appears to have backed away from that assertion in 2011.[34][35][36]
In October 2011, the PRC's Global Times newspaper, published by the Communist Party People's
Daily group, editorialised on South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take
peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced recent[when?] incidents involving the Philippines
and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to change
their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for
that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved."[37] Responding to questions
about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the
country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."[38]
In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying
that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a
matter of policy.[39]

Oil development[edit]
Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South
China Sea.[citation needed] By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and
production contracts with various foreign companies.[40] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the
South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by
"The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.[41] Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's
proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region.[42] However, the country is a net
importer of oil products.[43] In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese government
income, down from 24 percent in 2004.[44]
China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is
the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates
(6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).[45] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320
kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.[46] On
2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands,[47] a move Vietnam stated violated
their territorial claims.[48] Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding
the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.[49]

Incidents involving fishermen[edit]

Prior to the dispute around the sea areas involved, fishermen from involved countries tended to
enter each other's controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with
the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to
the depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas they were forced to fish in the
neighbouring countries' areas.[50][51][52]
A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in May
2013.[53][54]
In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in
Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen Vietnamese injured and damaged both China's and
Vietnam's ships.[55]
Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo became
President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were
caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed. The president wanted
to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic
policy.[56][57] Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many neighbouring countries
were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China,
Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed.[58] On 19 March 2016, the China Coast
Guardprevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese
fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading to a protest by Indonesian
authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed as China had considered the
areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds".[59][60] Further Indonesian campaigns against foreign
fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April
2016.[61]
Until late 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese fishing
vessels.[62][63] Although Indonesian authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing vessels,
the areas in the South China Sea had already become known for Indonesian pirates, with frequent
attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to hijacking such as
the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign
fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was
killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities.[51][52] Beside that, Filipino pirates of Moro Pirates from
the Sulu Sea also reaching South China Sea when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed by Filipino
pirates in late 2015.[64]

Revisiting the
Philippines’ Permanent Court of
Arbitration victory
Two years ago today, the Philippines scored a decisive victory against China when the
Permanent Court of Arbitration affirmed that China’s “historical maritime rights” over
con-tested areas in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea have no basis in
international law. To recall, the worsening dispute between the Philippines and China
over conflicting maritime entitlements in the region prompted Manila to bring its case to
the PCA.

At the center of the maritime dispute was the “nine-dash line,” Beijing’s claim that
encircles as much as 90 percent of the contested waters. The line runs as far as 2,000
kilometers from Mainland China to within a few hundred kilometers of the Philippines,
Malaysia and Vietnam. Beijing maint
The Philippines contested China’s claim, arguing that the nine-dash line exceeds the
limits of maritime entitlements permitted under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Under the Unclos, a nation has sovereignty over waters extending 12
nautical miles from its land and exclusive control over economic activities within 200
nautical miles.

Manila won a near unanimous victory, scoring all but one of its 15 claims against Beijing
in its PCA submissions. The court also ruled that China’s construction projects in the
Spratly Islands, harassment and prevention of Filipinos from conducting fishing activities
in Scarborough Shoal, and interference with oil and gas exploration at the Reed Bank
blatantly violated Philippine sovereign rights.

Although China has said it does not recognize the ruling, the role of the PCA as an
impartial legal institution in maritime dispute resolution in the West Philippine Sea/South
China Sea cannot be questioned. As such, the PCA ruling invalidated China’s so-called
“historic rights” over the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, clarified our maritime
entitlements and set a precedent for peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.

Before the PCA ruling, countries with overlapping claims in disputed areas either acted
in accordance with their own interpretations of the Unclos or adopted neutral position
on certain maritime issues. This prevented joint cooperation among claimant nations to
thwart what was perceived as China’s expansionism.

To mark the second year of the country’s victory at the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
independent think tank Stratbase ADR Institute (ADRi) is holding a forum today—“The
South China Sea Arbitration Award 12 July 2016: Promoting a Rules-Based International
System?”—from 8:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. at the Manila Polo Club in Makati City.

Stratbase ADRi President Victor Adres “Dindo” Manhit said the forum will highlight the
need for a rules-based international system to resolve the regional conflict over the area.
“Two years have passed since the Philippines scored a decisive victory against its
northern neighbor. Yet, while the ruling should have transformed the strategic milieu in
terms of maritime security and should have reshaped the state actors’ strategies and
actions, there remains uncertainty on the future of maritime commons,” he said.
Invited key speakers include Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” G. Robredo, acting
Supreme Court Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Foreign Secretary Alan Peter S.
Cayetano. Also invited to provide key insights are Dr. Jay Batongbacal, Director of the
University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea; journalist
Marites Vitug, the author of the book Rock Solid: How the Philippines Won its Maritime Case
vs China; Prof. Brahma Chellaney of Strategic Studies Centre for Policy Research in New
Delhi; Prof. Makoto Seta of Yokohama City University; Prof. Go Ito of Meiji University;
and Natalie Sambhi of Australian National University. Gregory Poling, director of Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
will provide a video presentation.

Former Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, who is the chairman of Stratbase ADRi,
said, “The fact that the issue of the Hague tribunal decision has been set aside, to be
brought up on another day,” is disappointing. He explained: “At the end of the day,
everyone, even a superpower like China, has to understand that if they have to be
respected, they must follow the rule of law. And until they do that, they will not get the
entire respect of the world.”

Philippines wins arbitration case vs. China over South China Sea