Elias Neibart

The Pursuit of Truth: An Internal or External Discovery?

Although writing nearly 700 years apart, both Plato and Saint Augustine of Hippo

addressed the relationship between the intelligible and sensible world. Specifically, both

philosophers sought to uncover how we know what we know: can we trust and derive truth from

what we see and sense, or must we look past the sensible world, and derive truth from the

immaterial, incorporeal world? And, on top of that, by what means and through what processes

can we uncover truth? In Plato’s Republic and Augustine’s Confessions, both philosophers

address and explain their positions on these foundational epistemological questions. The

following will (1) explicate Plato and Augustine’s positions, (2) compare and contrast the two

positions and (3) address which position I find more compelling and tenable.

Plato’s Republic still stands as one of the most foundational works of philosophy and

political theory. Plato addresses topics such as the nature of justice, the character of the polis,

and the relationship between ruler and ruled, yet, for the purposes of this paper, close attention

will be given to Plato’s discussion of the divided line. In essence, Plato’s divided line addresses

the questions of what and how we know things. Plato first divides “things” in the world into the

“visible and intelligible,” the prior being things that can be “seen” and the latter being that which

is “intellected” (Republic 509d). Yet, Plato then divides both groups further. Within the visible

class, Plato asserts that there are two groups: (1) “images” of the visible world, including

shadows and reflections of things, and (2) physical objects or beings, including animals, plants,

and “the whole class of artifacts” (Republic 510a). Here, Plato makes a distinction between the

objects we actually sense and mere reflections or pictures of those objects.

Next, and perhaps more complexly, Plato divides the “intelligible” world into two

groups: (1) thought which uses images and visible forms to argue and reach conclusions, and (2)

thought which does not begin in hypotheses nor rely on “anything sensed”; instead such thought
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uses “Form themselves, [goes] through Form to Form, [and ends] in Forms (Republic 511c). To

better understand the “intelligible” world, it is helpful to consider Plato’s discussion regarding

geometry and the intellectual work of geometers. In essence, geometers begin their work with a

rigid set of presuppositions; they “treat as known [emphasis added] the odd and the even, the

figures, three forms of angles, and other things…” (Republic 510c). Beginning at these givens,

geometers then commence their exposition and end “at the object toward which their

investigation was directed” (Republic 510d). Additionally, geometers, in their attempt to

demonstrate a proof or mathematical argument, use images and appeals to the sensible world.

After outlining mathematical reasoning’s position on his divided line, Plato shifts focus to

second half of the intelligible world—the segment of intellection. For Plato, this method of

understanding and argumentation does not begin with presupposed or widely held hypotheses;

instead, intellection requires that examination begin with a figurative clean slate. Through debate

and discussion, we naturally uncover Truth; in essence, “the argument itself grasps with the

power of the dialectic” (Republic 511b). Equally as important, however, intellection requires that

argumentation and debate use and employ the Forms. In other words, we cannot rely on or utilize

images or artifacts from the sensible world; we must argue using Forms—immaterial, eternal

essences of material beings—and, subsequently, our argumentation will end and result in the

Forms, the highest of which is the Idea of the Good.

After expounding upon his divided line, Plato, towards the end of Book VI, offers an

epistemological hierarchy of the aforementioned segments of the divided line. The following

represents the segments of the divided line, ranging from the most true, real, and clear to the

least: (1) intellection (understanding), (2) mathematical reasoning (thought), (3), artifacts, and

(4) images (Republic 511d). What we can extrapolate from this hierarchy is that, for Plato, the

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attainment of the Good, Truth, or clarity does not require sense perception nor the physical

world. With that being said however, Plato does suggest, through his allegory of the cave, that

attaining the Good is a gradual, plodding process, necessitating one to recognize the differences

in reality and clarity between the segments on the divided line. The following will address that

process.

In the aforementioned allegory, “prisoners” chained to the walls of a cave merely observe

shadows (images) of objects, yet, being that they are unaware and sheltered from the real world

outside the cave, they perceive these images as true, clear, and real (Republic 515a). However, if

one were to drag the prisoners out of the cave and show them the real world, the prisoners would

be so overwhelmed with the truth that they would be unable to comprehend or ascertain the

world around them (Republic 516a). Rather than abruptly removing the prisoners from the cave,

Plato suggests a far more gradual approach. First, allow for the prisoners to “get accustomed” to

the world above; they will soon recognize that what they first believed to be real and true are

merely shadows and reflections of “artifacts.” Then, they will progressively realize that there

also exists more than just the “things themselves,” so they will “turn to beholding the things in

heaven and heaven itself,” first observing the stars and the moon, and then shifting focus to the

sun and sunlight (Republic 516a-b). It should be noted, that for Plato, the sun and sunlight

represent the Idea and Form of goodness (Republic 508d). What we see then, is that the process

to reach Truth and Goodness is a gradual one. Our progression necessitates that we recognize

each sequential segment of truth and reality until we ultimately reach a point of intellection,

dialectic, and understanding. At that point, we are aware of both the sensible world and

mathematical reasoning, but we recognize that the pursuit of Truth does not require presupposed

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hypotheses or appeals to sensible objects, but rather debate and conversation grounded in the

Forms.

Augustine, though similarly interested in outlining how one reaches Truth, approaches

the problem from a different angle: he wishes to understand how he and others can uncover God.

For Augustine, however, Truth and God are ostensibly synonymous; he considers “[his] God, [to

be] Truth Itself…” (Confessions 209). Augustine begins his inquiry by discussing how “various

things” come into one’s memory. Much like the Platonic sensible world, Augustine first

examines the role of sense perception in the memory formation process (Confessions 196). As

humans, we use our taste, smell, touch, and hearing abilities to soak in the sensible world. We

then “store up” these sense experiences and call upon them later “when need arises” (ibid).

Augustine, however, clarifies that the things we sense do not enter our memories, just “images of

the things perceived” (ibid). In other words, our memories of the things we sense are mere

“images” or reflections of what was actually sensed in the past. And, these images stored within

our minds can be called upon or “summoned” without the need for external stimuli. “At our

pleasure” and by “only remembering,” we can taste honey or smell the ocean without physically

eating honey or being near the ocean (ibid). Although not entirely analogous, Augustine’s

conceptualization of the sensible world mirrors the Platonic view. To Plato, we physically

perceive “artifacts,” yet we can also imagine the likenesses of what we have previously

perceived.

Much like the Platonic divide between the sensible and intelligible worlds, Augustine

similarly recognizes that there exist certain aspects of the world, within his memory, that he has

not physically sensed. Augustine realizes that our memories contain “innumerable principles and

laws of numbers and dimensions,” yet none of these concepts or principles have “been impressed

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in [him] by any bodily sense” (Confessions 199). Of course, our understanding and recognition

of these mathematical and numerical concepts prompts the question—how do we know such

things and how are they contained within our memories? Augustine posits that these “truths”

exist within us; if we look within and “recognize them interiorly,” we can notice and

subsequently uncover these innate, eternal, and mathematical truths (ibid).

Similarly, Augustine’s path to finding God—“who is Truth Itself”—required the

philosopher to look inward and uncover the memory of God. Augustine notes that during his

search for God, he did not find it necessary to examine the physical world nor to utilize his sense

perception. Instead, “from the first time he learned of [God],” he remembered God; he did not

“find God outside [his memory]” (Confessions 209). Yet, in which part of Augustine’s mind did

this “memory” of God preside? Augustine never physically views God, tastes God, nor smells

God, so he surely did “not find [God] among the images of corporeal things” (ibid). On that

same note, God is not an affection or emotion—like happiness or sadness—and therefore was

not found among such feelings within Augustine’s mind. He ultimately posits that God is not

stored in our memory like the images of the sensible world or emotions; instead, God “resides

everywhere to answer all who ask counsel of [him]” (Confessions 210). God was always with

Augustine, and, the philosopher suggests, God is with us all. To uncover God, we must refrain

from finding relief, happiness, or answers externally; Augustine’s account calls for introspection

and an openness to God’s call and counsel.

At first glance, it does not appear that Plato and Augustine contradict one another. They

both, in essence, agree that Truth cannot be attained by viewing or analyzing the sensible world.

Of course, Plato’s divided line delineates a clear hierarchy—the intelligible world, namely

intellection, allows for the most real and true understanding of the world, whereas merely

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analyzing the sensible world—things and their reflections—cannot and will not lead to a genuine

understanding or appreciation of Truth. Augustine, although less explicitly, does suggest that

“Truth itself,” that being God, requires that one look inward, and not to the physical world.

Additionally, both agree that there exists certain innate, immutable concepts in the world—for

Plato the Forms and for Augustine both mathematical truths and, of course, God. Yet, Plato and

Augustine differ on how exactly we can attain these truths. The following will address that

important discrepancy.

As stated above, both philosophers agree that certain innate concepts exist and remain

true independent of the sensible world and irrespective of personal experience. For Plato and

Augustine, their respective notions of the Forms and God are a priori—that is they proceed from

deduction rather than observation or experience. Plato suggests, however, through his allegory of

the cave and the allegory of the sun, that reaching the point of intellection does, to some extent,

require an understanding and recognition of the physical world. In other words, Plato outlines an

intellectual process and progression. The “prisoners” inside the cave do not abruptly

understand or comprehend the Forms; they gradually progress through the stages of divided line,

eventually reaching the point of intellection. In fact, recall that intellection consists of

argumentation using the Forms—innate concepts and essences—and, by using Forms to debate,

our argumentation will end in and yield the Forms, the highest of which is the Idea of the Good.

Therefore, the pursuit of both Truth and the Idea of the Good is just that—a pursuit; truly

understanding “fair, just, and good things,” requires thoughtful deliberation, discussion, debate,

and “dialectic” (Republic 520b-d). More notably, this dialectic, described by Plato, appears to be

an external process. While the Forms are a priori—such that they do not require experience or

appeals to the sensible world—Plato suggests that we must actively participate in dialectic with

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others to fully attain and understand the Forms, rendering the pursuit of truth (understanding the

Forms and intellection) a public, shared, and external process.

The Augustinian path towards Truth and God, however, appears more epiphanic and

internal. While Augustine does note that he turned away from sin, particularly some of his lustful

habits, he did not outline any particular process or set of steps taken to “uncover” God. The

philosopher merely asserts that God is within him, and, by looking within himself and by

opening his mind and heart to God, he was then able to find God within his memories. While

some might contend that the preceding chapters of the Confessions outline Augustine’s path to

uncovering God, the section of interest, explicated above, describes rather simple steps to

attaining God and “Truth itself”—look within and discover God’s call and presence. These rather

straightforward steps, though understandably profound and important, differ drastically from the

Platonic dialectical process. The intellection segment on Plato’s divided line calls for argument

and discussion that both use the Forms and reject presuppositions and hypotheses. And, as was

stated above, the ability to partake in intellection required progressing through the divided line

and, later, engaging in external dialogue with others. Augustine, on the other hand, describes a

deeply personal, internal awakening. With that being said, the characterization of Augustine’s

uncovering of God as internal and personal does not render it subjective; Augustine still believes

that God, much like numerical and mathematical concepts, is immutable, eternal, and universal.

Yet, finding God—that is the process of looking within oneself and uncovering God from one’s

memories—is quite plainly described as an individual and internal process.

In my opinion, the pursuit of Truth—whether that be understanding the Idea of the Good

or God—should be an external and dialectical process. I agree with both the Platonic and

Augustinian notions of universality and eternality; there exists certain immutable aspects of the

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world which can be understood a priori—without experience and without consulting the sensible

world. Yet, truly understanding these truths and uncovering them, requires unfettered debate,

discussion, and dialogue. The Platonic dialectic method, later popularized and adopted by Hegel,

forces interlocutors to engage in argumentation bereft of presupposed hypotheses or appeals to

the sensible, physical world. Through honest inquiry and passionate disagreement, we

collectively inch closer to the understanding and grasping those a priori truths—for Plato, the

Idea of the Good, and for Augustine, God and “Truth itself.” While Augustine’s internal

discovery of God is both compelling and sincere, the Platonic process portends a more

widespread and more thorough understanding of Truth. Of course, however, one’s path to

discovering God should not be dictated or directed by an institution—like the State or the

Catholic Church. Yet, if we are to apply and reconcile Plato’s conceptualization of intellection

with Augustine’s method of uncovering God, we can see a path to understanding the Divine that

consists of thoughtful and unencumbered engagement with religious precepts and texts. Ideally,

such discourse will result in a more holistic and earnest appreciation and understanding of God

and Truth.

Although Plato and Augustine agree on the existence of a priori, immutable, and

universal truths, they disagree on the steps and ways to attain knowledge of those truths. While

Augustine’s pursuit and uncovering of God was an internal process, Plato outlines a different

approach for uncovering and attaining truth, an approach that I find more palatable and

constructive. Rather than looking inward to uncover universal truths and principles, Plato

proposes an external method—a method that encourages us to engage in meaningful dialogue

and debate. And, if we debate and argue using Forms and refrain from relying on or appealing to

widely held beliefs or presuppositions, then our dialectic will naturally and organically end in the

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Forms. In other words, the pursuit of truth should be a public and external endeavor, requiring

interlocutors to genuinely question their worldviews and opinions, and through unfettered

dialogue, we can incrementally inch towards Plato’s Idea of the Good.

Works Cited

Augustine, F. J. Sheed, and Michael P. Foley. Confessions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2006.

Bloom, Allan trans. Republic of Plato, The. Basic Books, 1968