FIRE

To be followed in case of fire. To be placed in the Bridge and Engine Control Room.

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SQE-MARINE-Fire-2018_06.pdf

This checklist should be placed in the Bridge and Engine Control Room and followed in case
of fire. Page 1 of 1 Explore more: www.sqemarine.com/shipmanuals &
www.sqemarine.com/systems

EMERGENCY CHECKLIST Fire A. Action Personnel Responsible

Completed
1. Sound general emergency alarm. Muster fire party.
Crew member On the Spot Of Fire / Officer On Duty
2. At sea, alter course & speed to reduce draft & minimize fire spread. Officer On Duty 3.
Advise bridge. Crew member On The Spot 4. Call Master. Officer On Duty 5. Determine
location of fire. Master / Ch. Officer 6. Conduct fire control procedures*. Fire Party 7.
Assess proximity of navigational hazards, including traffic, and maneuver the ship as
appropriate. Master / Ch. Officer
8.
In case of fire in: Master / Ch. Engineer • Engine room – checklist “Main Engine Failure” as
appropriate. Master / Ch. Engineer • Steering gear compartment – checklist “Steering
Failure” as appropriate. Master / Ch. Engineer • Generator compartments – checklist “Total
electrical power Failure (Blackout)” as appropriate. Master / Ch. Engineer 9. Broadcast
URGENCY or DISTRESS message, if appropriate. Master / Ch. Officer 10. Advise engine
room. Officer On Duty 11. Isolate fire. Fire Party 12. Shut down cargo & bunker operations
(if any). Ch. Officer / Ch. Engineer 13. Close down vent system. Ch. Officer / Ch. Engineer
14. Close skylights, doors ports etc. Care Of Ch. Officer / Bosun 15. Isolate electrical
circuits. Ch. Engineer / Electrician 16. Stop engines if necessary. Master / Ch. Engineer
17. Evacuate unnecessary personnel from area. Master / Ch. Officer 18. Check for missing
crew. Ch. Officer 19. Check for injuries. Ch. Officer 20. Operate fire extinguishing system
if necessary. Master / Ch. Officer/ 2nd Engineer. 21. If in or near port alert harbor authority,
shore fire services & agent. Master 22. Shore hose connection ready. Ch. Officer / Bosun
23. Switch on vhf-channel 16. Officer On Duty 24. At sea-fix position. Officer On Duty 25.
Switch on deck lights (at night). Officer On Duty 26. At sea-position to radio room. Master /
Off. On Duty 27. At sea-exhibit lights/shapes. Master / Off. On Duty 28. At sea-prepare
lifeboats. Master / Ch. Officer 29. Determine cause of fire. Master / CO / CE 30. Assess
 damage to vessel. Master / CO / CE 31. Assess damage to cargo. Master / Ch. Officer 32.
Enter all times and facts in log book. Master 33. Notify interested parties. Master 34. Date
& time (using GMT) of the occurrence. Master 35. Weather conditions. Master 36. Actions
taken to control/extinguish & means used (water, foam etc.). Master 37. Inform VTS or port
authority, as appropriate. Master 38. Maintain log/record of events and decisions. Master
39. Report to the office. Master B. Other

GALLEY FRYER FIRE

A member has reported an incident in which a fire occurred during ‘routine’ cleaning and
operation of a twin vat deep fat fryer onboard a vessel. The night shift galley team were given
the task of cleaning a twin vat deep fat fryer. This task was carried out by them, however on
completion only one of the twin vats was refilled with oil. This fact was not communicated to
the day shift galley team. The day shift team were required to use the fryer shortly after
starting work, and it was switched on by one of the stewards without any pre-start checks
being carried out. Shortly after the fryer was switched on a small fire started in the left-hand
(empty) vat, which was quickly extinguished by the cook. There were no injuries and little
damage occurred.

Galley deep fat fryer

The incident was investigated and the following was noted:

 No procedure existed detailing that the fryer should be refilled after cleaning;
 The risk assessment did not identify the risk of fire if the unit was switched on without oil
being at the required level in the vat;
 The galley team shift handover was inadequate;
 The galley team had inadequate knowledge of the fryer operation;
 The unit was ‘routine’ly being switched on at the main isolation point, despite there being
two thermostatic controls to operate the vats independently of one another;
 Not all galley staff had the confidence to tackle the fire, and had not attended recent
emergency drills;
 This was the second deep fat fryer fire on a company vessel in the previous six months, both
having similar causes.

It was noted that a fire risk with deep fat fryers will always exist where personnel are not
adequately trained in the correct operation and maintenance of such equipment. It was also
noted that key errors were made where the unit was left without oil in one vat and then
switched on with no check made that it was functioning correctly, and that there were no
control measures in place for the cleaning of the fryer.

The following actions weere outlined:

 Ensure that the processes and procedures concerning the fryers are suitable and that sufficient
controls are in place for their safe operation and maintenance;
 Ensure that the risk assessment for the fryers and galley equipment is suitable and sufficient,
and understood by all;
 Ensure that all the galley staff have been fully familiarised with all the galley equipment and
fully understand the operation and risks for each;
 Ensure that all members of the galley team are regularly trained in emergency requirements.
Alert Information
Alert ID: 570
Published: 19 July 2011
Download: IMCA SF 07/11 (386.3kB)
Rating: Please rate this alert to help us select and prioritise future alert
material
5 (100%) 1 vote

These flashes summarise key safety matters and incidents, allowing wider dissemination of
lessons learnt from them. The information below has been provided in good faith by
members and should be reviewed individually by recipients, who will determine its relevance
to their own operations.

The effectiveness of the IMCA safety flash system depends on receiving reports from
members in order to pass on information and avoid repeat incidents. Please consider adding
the IMCA secretariat (incidentreports@imca-int.com) to your internal distribution list for
safety alerts and/or manually submitting information on specific incidents you consider may
be relevant. All information will be anonymised or sanitised, as appropriate.

A number of other organisations issue safety flashes and similar documents which may be of
interest to IMCA members. Where these are particularly relevant, these may be summarised
or highlighted here. Links to known relevant websites are provided at www.imca-
int.com/links. Additional links should be submitted to incidentreports@imca-int.com.

Any actions, lessons learnt, recommendations and suggestions in IMCA safety flashes are
generated by the submitting organisation. IMCA safety flashes provide, in good faith, safety
information for the benefit of members and do not necessarily constitute IMCA guidance, nor
represent the official view of the Association or its members.

Fighting Fire In Ship’s Cargo Hold

At Port
By Shilavadra Bhattacharjee | In: Marine Safety | Last Updated on April 19, 2019

FacebookTweetPinLinkedIn
Fire is the most widely discussed hazard onboard ships. Fire in a cargo hold is in all
probability referred to for dry cargo ships.

In port, it is far easier to get assistance as opposed to that at sea but that doesn’t
discount the urgency and severity of the same. In fact, with more people
concentrated onboard, proximity to flammable object, and dissimilar fire fighting
practices, render it even more necessary to adhere to the strictest dictum.

Actions To Take In Case Of Fire –

Assuming that the fire has occurred in ship’s hold with general cargo, following are
the actions that are suggested to be taken:

 Scream ‘FIRE’ loud to alert everyone around many times

 Sound the fire alarm from the call point which will be somewhere near to you.
This will alert everybody to proceed to stations and for the authorities to be
informed of the incident
 Use the PA system to announce the location of the fire so that the whole crew
knows where to go and what to do with regard to the kind of fire in question
 Constant contact must be maintained with the Master as well as the Chief
Engineer (who is most likely the Safety Officer as well) by the handheld VHF
  Cease all operations in this hold and evacuate any person that might be
inside or in the periphery of the hold. Send all stevedores ashore and cease
operation in every other hold as well.
 Inform the fire brigade
 Follow the Master’s orders as the case may be. In his absence (if he is on
shore leave), try and get in touch with him immediately. In the interim, the
Chief Officer will be in charge
 If the Chief Officer is also on shore leave, the Second Officer must assume
duties. It is highly unlikely that both Master and Chief Officer will be ashore
considering that most companies require one such senior officer to be
present onboard
 Inform the agents as soon as possible
 Switch off the blowers in the hold in case there are any
 Fight fire immediately to the best of the ability, trying to extinguish it before it
spreads
 Care must also be taken to avoid damage to cargo by water in the hold
 The Port Control might ask the vessel to move out to an anchorage to not
jeopardise the surrounding vessels in which case stations need to be called
and engine on standby

Read: 16 Fire Fighting Appliances and Preventive Measure On Board Ships

Image for representation purpose only

If the above actions do not extinguish the fire, then

–
 Ensure that there is nobody inside the hold and shut the hatch
 Shut the fire dampers in the ventilator coamings of the hold
  Start infusing CO2 in the hold

Read: 12 Things To Do Before Operating Ship’s CO2 Fire Extinguishing System

 Carry out boundary cooling

 Do not open the hatch immediately seeing as it is full of CO2 and must be
given time and the discretion of the Master
 It must be noted that the OOW must ensure that the duties are executed by
the crew as assigned. This is essential to avoid confusion at the time of crisis
 In case that the fire brigade shows up on time, be ready to render all
information and provide assistance to them as required. They are far better
trained and equipped to fight fire. At the crux of it all remains one fact
though– the Master will always be the ultimate in charge irrespective of
whoever shows up!

Read: Basics Of Fire Prevention On Board Ships

The Fire Brigade
 As mentioned above, the ultimate authority is the Master of the ship
 As soon as the Fire Brigade arrives, their chief must be introduced to the
Master for further operational discussions
 The chief on behalf of the Fire Brigade will request for information which will
necessarily include:
 Location of the fire
  Nature of the fire
 Any special or specific dangers that the firefighters might be exposed
to such as asphyxiation, lack of oxygen, toxic gases, etc
 The fire fighting carried out by the firefighters so far
 Any structural problems that might exist on the ship resulting in
instability
 The Master’s opinion and command on the best possible course of
action
 The Master and the chief of the brigade will then liaise for the best
possible action for this mishap
 The Master and the chief of the brigade will then oversee the whole
operation with the OOWs deputed on ground to get the decided
methods executed

Read : Types of Fire Extinguishers Used On Ships

Opening the Ship’s Hatch
 It is known by now that there is ample CO2 in the hold and caution must be
taking while opening the hatch. Clear out all unnecessary/extra members
from the vicinity of the hold. All the remaining personnel must don breathing
apparatus to be unaffected by a sudden gush of CO2 as well as to be ready
to enter the hold if need be
 Keep everybody well clear and open the hatch
 The use of exhaust blower may be made at this point to get rid of the smoke
as much as possible

Image Credits: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Daniel Viramontes/Released
  The ‘masked’ personnel may then enter the hold to check if the fire has been
extinguished entirely
 The time spent inside inspecting and/or extinguishing any residual pockets of
fire must be kept to the practicable minimum as the BA sets eventually run
out
 The hatch must be left open after the personnel have exited the hold to
ensure maximum ventilation in hold to rid it of the CO2 and other toxic gases
 After a stipulated time and as decided by the Master after checking for toxic
gases, man entry may be allowed in the hold under supervision
 All these events must be logged for reference

Read: Fire Control Plan On Ship

Although these theoretical methods hardly make any sense when there is absolute
chaos onboard, following a certain procedure streamlines the action that needs to be
taken. In all this it must always be remembered that safety of life is of utmost
importance and that should always be given priority.

Action in case of Galley Fire At Sea

1. Raise alarm & Inform master.
2. Muster all crew- head count & Fire party briefed.
3. Proceed to scene off fire and investigate.
4. Shut down all ventilation.
5. Start emergency fire p/pump & try to fight the fire by conventional means.
6. Maintain boundary cooling at all times
7. Due regards to be given to the type of extinguishing agent being used-
 Foam- oil stoves.
 DCP- electrical fires.
 CO2 can be used as smothering agent.

Dos and Don’ts to Avoid Fire in the

Ship’s Accommodation Area
By Anish | In: Marine Safety | Last Updated on January 4, 2017

FacebookTweetPinLinkedIn

Out of all the causes for accidents and casualties onboard a ship, fire remains at the
top of the lists. In the past, even a simple accident of fire has resulted into sinking or
grounding of the ship. In this article we bring you the dos and don’ts to avoid fire in
the ship’s accommodation area.
It is noted that the maximum number fires on ships initiates in the ship’s
accommodation area due to negligence of the ship’s staff. The accommodation area
of the ship is vulnerable to fire as it comprises substance such as wood, cardboard,
and other personal fire-sensitive things used by the ship’s crew onboard.

Superstructure – Credits: Hervé Cozanet/wikipedia.org

A ship accommodation is an area where the crew member’s cabin is located along
with galley, recreational room, meeting room etc. The best way to avoid incidents of
fire on ship is to take preventive measures than to suffer later.

 Do not smoke cigarette sitting or lying on the bed and also, do not keep or
throw live smoking buds in the dust bins.

 Try not to use essence stick or candles inside the cabins. If they are used,
make sure they are lit up during your own presence and while your going out
of the cabin, are blown off

 Never use hot plate or heater for cooking purpose inside the cabin.

 Never use loose or open wire (without plug or naked wire).

 Always make sure electrical circuit is never overloaded i.e. too many
connection in one socket.

 Never put your clothes near or on room heater or lamps.

  Do not bring oily rags inside your boiler suit pocket into the cabin.

 Never leave iron unattended when ironing clothes in laundry room.

 Always make sure all the electrical circuits in accommodation are in sound
condition to avoid short circuit fire.

 Chief cook should make sure that galley is always attended when hot plate is
on.

 Never leave oil pan unattended in galley.

 Toaster and kettle must never be over heated.

 If any welding or gas cutting operation is carried out inside accommodation,

all the precaution that are necessary, must be taken.

 In tanker ship, accommodation ventilation suction should be away from cargo

holds as their vapour can enter inside the accommodation and create a
flammable atmosphere.

 All the visitors coming on board when the ship is at port must be briefed about
the fire hazard

Fire protection & control system for Ships machinery spaces

Fire is a constant hazard at sea. It results in more total losses of ships

than any other form of casualty. Almost all fires are the result of
negligence or carelessness.

Carelessly carried out maintenance in machinery spaces may cause

serious fire hazard such as below :

1. Sheaving on high pressure fuel pipes that are not correctly replaced
after work
2. fuel filter covers that are not correctly torqued
3. lagging on exhaust manifolds that is not replaced or properly
replaced after maintenance.

Two basically different types of equipment are available on board ship for
the control of fires. These are small portable extinguishers and large fixed
installations. The small portable extinguishers are for small fires which, by
prompt on-the-spot action, can be rapidly extinguished. The fixed
installation is used when the fire cannot be fought or restrained by
portable equipment or there is perhaps a greater danger if associated
areas were to be set on fire.

The use of fixed installations require evacuation of the area containing the
fire which, if it is the machinery space, means the loss of effective control
of the ship. Various types of both portable and fixed fire fighting
equipment are available.

Fire protection on ships is provided by detection and fire-fighting

equipment together with structural features which are intended to contain
an outbreak of fire and the employment when required of non-
combustible materials to prevent its spread.

Combustion occurs when the gases or vapours given off by a substance

are ignited: it is the gas given off that burns, not the substance. The
temperature of the substance at which it gives off enough gas to continue
burning is known as the 'flash point'.

Fire is the result of a combination of three factors:

 A substance that will burn.

 An ignition source.
 A supply of oxygen, usually from the air.

These three factors are often considered as the sides of the fire triangle.
Removing any one or more of these sides will break the triangle and
result in the fire being put out. The complete absence of one of the three
will ensure that a fire never starts.

Fires are classified according to the types of material which are acting as
fuel. These classifications are also used for extinguishers and it is
essential to use the correct classification of extinguisher for a fire, to
avoid spreading the fire or creating additional hazards. The classifications
use the letters A, B, C, D and E.

1. Class A : Fires burning wood, glass fibre, upholstery and

furnishings.
2. Class B : Fires burning liquids such as lubricating oil and fuels.
3. Class C : Fires burning gas fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas.
4. Class D : Fires burning combustible metals such as magnesium and
aluminium.
5. Class E : Fires burning any of the above materials together with
high voltage electricity.

Many fire extinguishers will have multiple classifications such as A, B and

C. Fire fighting at sea may be considered in three distinct stages,
detection—locating the fire; alarm—informing the rest of the ship; and
control—bringing to bear the means of extinguishing the fire.
Machinery space systems

Machinery spaces are protected by fixed fire extinguishing installations,

the fire main and extinguishers. Any statutory fixed installation must be
operable from a position outside of the space. Any emergency stops for
machinery and vent fans, means of securing openings and fuel tank valve
shut-off devices, must also be located external to the space.

Machinery space fires

Engine room fires have been started by neglected oil leaks with the
combustible material, in the form of fuel or lubricating oil dripping on to
and being ignited by hot exhaust manifolds. There are a number of
examples of combustible materials and potential ignition sources in
machinery spaces.

A fire when it starts is usually small enough to be dealt with by a vigilant

watchkeeper using a portable fire extinguisher. A fire which develops
undetected in an unmanned machinery space (or one where the
watchkeeper is in a control room) could require complete shutdown,
evacuation and employment of the inert gas system. With unmanned
spaces, an efficient alarm system for early detection is vital .

Fire protection on ships is provided by detection and fire-fighting

equipment together with structural features which are intended to contain
an outbreak of fire and the employment when required of non-
combustible materials to prevent its spread.

Two basically different types of equipment are available on board ship for
the control of fires. These are small portable extinguishers and large fixed
installations. The small portable extinguishers are for small fires which, by
prompt on-the-spot action, can be rapidly extinguished. The fixed
installation is used when the fire cannot be fought or restrained by
portable equipment or there is perhaps a greater danger if associated
areas were to be set on fire.

The use of fixed installations require evacuation of the area containing the
fire which, if it is the machinery space, means the loss of effective control
of the ship. Various types of both portable and fixed fire fighting
equipment are available.
Types of portable fire extinguisher

There are four principal types of portable extinguisher usually found on

board ship. These are the soda-acid, foam, dry powder and carbon
dioxide extinguishers. Details as below :

1. Soda acid portable fire extinguisher

The container of this extinguisher holds a sodium bicarbonate

solution. The screw-on cap contains a plunger mechanism covered
by a safety guard.

2. Foam type portable fire extinguisher

The main container is filled with sodium bicarbonate solution and a

long inner polythene container is filled with aluminium sulphate

3. Dry powder fire extinguishers

The outer container contains sodium bicarbonate powder. A capsule

of carbon dioxide gas is located beneath a plunger mechanism in
the central cap

4. CO2 portable fire extinguisher

A very strong container is used to store liquid carbon dioxide under

pressure

Which fire fighting equipment to use on certain fires ?

Small oil fire in the machinery space: You could use a foam or dry powder
fire extinguisher as this is a class B fire. These extinguishers would have a
smothering type effect on the fire.

Bedding fire in the accommodation: You could use a water extinguisher

on this type of fire as it is a class A fire. The water would have a cooling
effect on the heat source.

Galley fryer where it has been left on and the thermostat has failed,
causing oil to burst into flames: As you don't know that the electrical
supply has been isolated, you would use a CO2 fire extinguisher on this
type of fire. This would have a smothering effect on the fire.

Fixed fire extinguishing installations

A variety of different fixed fire fighting installations exist, some of which
are specifically designed for certain types of ship. A selection of the more
general installations will now be outlined.

1. Fire main system for cargo ships

An outbreak of fire requires a source of ignition, the presence of

combustible material and ample oxygen. Of the three factors,
oxygen is provided in large quantities in machinery spaces,
accommodation, dry cargo holds and tanker pumprooms by
ventilation fans. Air supply trunkings are not only a source for a
supply of oxygen to feed the fire but also have potential for carrying
smoke from one area to another....

2. Automatic water spray & water mist system for machinery protected
area

The automatic spray or sprinker system provides a network of

sprinkler heads throughout the protected spaces. This system may
be used in accommodation areas, and in machinery spaces with
certain variations in the equipment used and the method of
operation. ....

3. Automatic foam induction system for machinery space fire

Foam spreading systems are designed to suit the particular ship's

requirements with regard to quantity of foam, areas to be
protected, etc. Mechanical foam is the usual substance used, being
produced by mixing foam making liquid with large quantities of
water. Violent agitation of the mixture in air creates air bubbles in
the foam. ...

4. CO2 fire extinguishing installations for machinery spaces

Fire extinguishing installations employing CO 2 stored under

pressure at ambient temperature are extensively used to protect
ships' cargo compartments, boiler rooms and machinery spaces.
When released the CO 2 is distributed throughout the compartment,
so diminishing the relative oxygen content and rendering the
atmosphere inert....

5. Inert gas systems, inert gas generator

 Inert gases are those which do not support combustion and are
largely nitrogen and carbon dioxide. Large quantities suitable for
fire extinguishing can be obtained by burning fuel in carefully
measured amounts or by cleaning the exhaust gases from a boiler.
....

6. Fire fighting Halon system

A Halon storage system would be very similar to one using carbon

dioxide except that fewer cylinders would be required. The liquefied
Halon is usually pressurised in the cylinders with nitrogen in order
to increase the speed of discharge. ....

7. Accommodation sprinkler system

Advantages of accommodation sprinkler system are its automatic

and quick operation. The fire fighting medium is cheap and plentiful
and the system can also be easily tested. ....

8. Bulk CO2 fire fighting system

The advantages of a bulk CO2 system over a multi- bottle system

are that it gives a 50% less weight saving, the volume it occupies is
less and it is a lot cheaper to supply CO2 in bulk. . ....

Other important fire & safety equipments

 Use of Breathing apparatus

Compressed air cylinders are of various sizes, usually of either 9 or

6 litre water capacity. The fully charged pressure of cylinders also
varies. Some types are charged to as high as 300 bar (4500 p.s.i.).
The maximum charging pressure is always stamped on either the
neck or the shoulder of a cylinder.

 Emergency Fire pump cargo ships machinery spaces

Two independently powered pumps must be provided in all cargo

ships of 1000 tons gross and over and in passenger ships of less
 than 4000 tons gross. Larger passenger vessels and passenger
ferries must have three such pumps.

 Foam adapter for machinery space fire

Foam branch pipes which operate in a similar manner to those used

in deck installations for tankers, are fitted for use with the hydrants
in some machinery spaces and in particular for passenger ferry car
decks.

 Various fire detectors working principle

The main function of a fire detector is to detect a fire as quickly as

possible; it must also be reliable and require a minimum of
attention.

 Fire detection system

The fire detection system is to be classed as Critical Equipment and

must be maintained in good working order.

 Fire fighting strategy for cargo ships

A basic strategy should be followed in all fire fighting situations.

This will involve four distinct aspects, which are locating, informing,
containing and finally extinguishing a fire.

FIRE ACCIDENT REPORT:

SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENT

6. Prior to the ship sailing from Fleet Base West on 5 May 98,
WESTRALIA had undergone an assisted maintenance period for
about 6 weeks. During this period, members of the ship’s company
of WESTRALIA in conjunction with Fleet Intermediate Maintenance
Authority and the ship’s contractor, ADI Limited, carried out
maintenance work. The work included the fitting of new flexible fuel
hoses to the ship’s main engines by a subcontractor under the
direction of ADI Limited.
7. Trials were conducted with the ship alongside the wharf on 22
April 98. The ship sailed on 29 April 98 and conducted a series of
sea trials, both whilst under way and at anchor. On 1 May,
WESTRALIA returned to Fleet Base West. Final preparations for an
overseas deployment were conducted on Monday, 4 May 98.
8. At 0900 on 5 May 98, WESTRALIA sailed from Fleet Base West
for the Western Australia Exercise Area to rendezvous with HMA
Ships SUCCESS, DARWIN and ADELAIDE. WESTRALIA proceeded
north through Cockburn Sound to Gage Roads.
9. At about 1030, when about 2½ miles east of the Fairway Buoy in
the Deepwater Channel, a fuel leak was noticed in the area of the
number 9 cylinder on the inboard side of the port main engine. It
was a significant leak, with fuel was emerging under pressure in a
manner similar to a garden hose.
10. The leak was reported to the machinery control room and on
inspection, it was initially thought that the fuel might be leaking
from a banjo bolt in the vicinity of number 9 or 10 cylinders. The
port main engine was shut down to enable repairs to be carried out
and personnel in the main machinery space set up some fire
fighting equipment. The standing sea fire brigade mustered in the
machinery control room.
11. At about 1035, fire broke out in the main machinery space.
Personnel saw the fire start on the outboard side of the starboard
main engine. A “woofing” sound was heard in the machinery
control room and a flame and black smoke appeared through a
cable duct near an urn on the port side.
12. A fire report was made to the bridge and emergency stations
was sounded. A brief inspection of the main machinery space
through the door of the machinery control room revealed thick black
smoke and flames. Visibility was severely limited. Four people
escaped from the main machinery space into the machinery control
room. Three of the personnel were injured and were initially
treated by the ship’s emergency medical organisation and later
assisted by medical staff from SUCCESS, STIRLING and the Sea
Training Group.
13. The fire was intense, causing rapid smoke build up and extreme
heat. Despite some heroic but unsuccessful firefighting efforts, the
atmosphere in the main machinery space soon became inadequate
to support life. Electrical cabling on the deckhead over the fire was
quickly damaged (Figure 1) with a consequent loss of services,
including some communications.

14. The starboard main engine was shut down and electrical power
to the main machinery space isolated. The emergency generator
started automatically. The machinery control room was evacuated
at 1038. One minute later, the Engineering Officer recommended
to the Commanding Officer that the main machinery space be
drenched with carbon dioxide (CO2). One person was thought to
still be in the machinery space and the recommendation was not
accepted at that time.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

15. After the machinery control room evacuation, the emergency

power circuits were subject to severe voltage fluctuations, probably
as a result of fire damage in the main machinery space. Power to
the gyro compass and the communications centre was lost. After
these initial problems, the power supply to the navigation
equipment, including the radars, was stabilised.
16. The ship's situation was communicated to Fleet Base West via a
mobile telephone at 1045. Maritime Headquarters West notified
RAN ships in the Western Australian exercise area shortly after.
17. At 1050, a hose team entered the main machinery space from
the fridge flat to fight the fire. After making a successful entry
despite intense heat and thick smoke, the team was withdrawn to
allow the CO2 drench to be activated. This occurred at 1101. In the
intervening period, pipes were made for a number of missing
personnel.
18. The drench was remotely initiated but some of the CO2 bottles
failed to discharge and were discharged manually seven minutes
later. The boundary of the main machinery space was monitored
for hot spots and the conclusion reached that the fire had not been
extinguished. At 1126, hose team 2 entered the main machinery
space via the fridge flat to attack the fire again.
19. The first external assistance, a boat from STIRLING, arrived
alongside at 1143, and transferred a medical officer and a CPOMED.
At the same time, the Sea King helicopter from SUCCESS landed
another medical officer and medical and firefighting equipment.
20. At 1151, hose team 3 relieved hose team 2 and continued
fighting the fire from the top plates of the main machinery space.
Foam was pumped into the space through the funnel at 1153. At
1206, the hose team discovered the body of LSMT Meek on the top
plates adjacent to the port ladder to the middle plates. Hose team
1 relieved hose team 3 at 1210 and progressed down to the middle
plates and fought the fire from there. They found the bodies of
MIDN Pelly, POMT Smith and ABMT Carroll prior to reporting at
1232 that the fire was extinguished.
21. At 1218, HMA Ships SYDNEY, DARWIN and ADELAIDE were
seen approaching on the starboard side. Within two minutes of that,
the Fleet Base West tug TAMMAR passed a line to the forecastle.
The tow commenced with the ship about 150 metres from a shoal.
The towline parted at about 1250.
22. The civilian tug WAMBIRI which operates out of the Port of
Fremantle, had been standing by WESTRALIA since about 1220.
She connected up at 1314, despite some difficulties on
WESTRALIA’s forecastle in handling the heavy towing hawser. The
tow then resumed.
 23. At 1250, a medical team in breathing apparatus entered the
main machinery space to formally assess and identify the four
bodies. All were declared deceased by the medical officer from
SUCCESS. Five injured personnel were medevaced to St John of
God Hospital in the Perth suburb of Murdoch at 1350. One
additional person was treated on board for smoke inhalation and
there were a number of personnel similarly affected who did not
seek treatment.
5
24. The four deceased personnel were extricated from the main
machinery space over the period from about 1515 to 1730. This
task was undertaken by ship’s staff, the two medical officers,
medical personnel from SYDNEY, DARWIN, STIRLING and the Sea
Training Group.
25. The ship berthed at Fleet Base West at 1811. At about 1830, a
Reserve legal officer, a Disaster Victim Identification Team1, and a
forensic pathologist boarded the ship. A comprehensive inspection
of the main machinery space was conducted. Photographs were
taken, as well as a video film. Police conducted formal identification
procedures of the four deceased, and a number of flexible fuel
hoses were photographed and taken into custody by the Reserve
legal officer. Further inspections of the main machinery space were
conducted by police officers from the Arson Squad on the following
day.

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIRE WAS FOUGHT

26. The fire was fought in three basic stages using sequentially, ‘first aid’ extinguishers, the
fixed main machinery space fire smothering system and hoses equipped with water wall and
foam nozzles. The fire was overhauled and extinguished, reflecting favourably on the
tenacity of the hose teams and the effectiveness of hose team training. The direct attack on
the fire was supplemented by boundary cooling and, later, the introduction of foam through
the funnel door.
27. Following the report of the fuel leak from the inboard side of the port main engine, an
attack hose with a foam nozzle was laid out on the middle plates. A 90 litre foam
extinguisher was also made ready. By 1033, the standing sea fire brigade had mustered in
the main switchboard room, but were not committed to the main machinery space. Foam
was not laid on top of the leaked fuel.
28. When the fire erupted at 1035, the Engineering Officer of the Watch alerted the bridge
and emergency stations was immediately piped. In the main machinery space, sailors
attempted to fight the fire using ‘first aid appliances’. The fire, however, was too fierce and
the use of extinguishers was ineffectual. The prepared hose and nozzle was not used.
29. The crew went to their emergency stations dressed in coveralls, anti-flash hoods and
gloves. The Engineer and support staff manned damage control headquarters. The aft and
forward damage control section bases were established. Almost immediately after the
machinery control room was evacuated, the Engineer advised the Commanding Officer to
CO2 drench the main machinery space. The Commanding Officer declined as he was
concerned that the missing personnel may still be alive within the main machinery space.
30. Hose teams were organised and dressed in Fearnought suits and open circuit
compressed air breathing apparatus. Smoke boundaries were established, fuel isolated and
ventilation closed down. At 1050, a hose team entered the main machinery space through
the fridge flat aft on 1 deck, using standard firefighting techniques for fighting major fires. At
1100, when it was clear that any person within the main machinery space could not have
survived, the Commanding Officer approved the release of the CO2 drench. At about 1101,
the hose team was withdrawn to allow the CO2 fixed smothering system to be operated.
31. The CO2 was released from the fire control room on 01 deck. Due to a malfunction in
the CO2 release system, only 50-65 per cent of the bottles were activated. About seven
minutes later, the remaining bottles were released manually. During this time, boundary
cooling was maintained around the main machinery space perimeter.
32. At 1126, about 15 minutes after the manual release of the CO2, the second of the three
fire teams re-entered the space to fight the fire. The three hose teams fought the fire over
the following hour, and during that time the four fatalities were located. The fire was
reported as extinguished at 1232.
33. The Board cannot say whether the CO2 extinguished the fire or not. The decision to re-
enter the main machinery space to fight the fire, after only fifteen minutes was, however,
premature and showed a lack of understanding of the way in which a fire extinguishing
system using oxygen depletion works. This lack of understanding increased the risk to the
ship and the hose teams.
34. While there is much to commend in the way the ship’s company fought the fire, the
Board is concerned at a number of important issues which are discussed in detail on in the
body of the report. The most significant issue was the lack of understanding by key
personnel of the ship’s CO2 system.
TRAINING AND COMPETENCE
35. All members of the ship’s company contributed, in some way or other, in successfully
overcoming the major main machinery space fire and in providing good medical care to the
casualties sustained.
36. Containment of the fire and major fire fighting efforts to combat it were ultimately
successful. The requirement for boundary cooling was well understood although
containment of the forward boundary of the fire (the bulkhead between the main machinery
space and aft pump room) was slow to be set up. Firefighting teams from both forward and
aft damage control section bases conducted major firefighting competently and with vigour.
37. Ventilation control was not well understood. The ship had developed a standard
operational procedure which involved closing both the supply and exhaust ventilation to the
main machinery space in the event of a fire. Although appropriate as preparation for use of
the CO2 drench, it prevented heat and hot gases from escaping, thus increasing the dangers
and difficulties faced by personnel re-entering the main machinery space to conduct search
and rescue and firefighting.
38. Ship knowledge, particularly of emergency systems, displayed by some officers and
senior sailors when giving evidence, was less than satisfactory.
39. Documentary evidence received by the Board indicate that 20-25% of the crew had not
received all the required pre-joining training for their billets. Additionally, approximately 10%
of the crew were not in-date for damage control training.
7
40. The ship had progressed annual continuation training satisfactorily, although some
training serials were not carried out as realistically as they might have been. Some
important damage control training serials had not been practiced regularly. Escape drills,
particularly using emergency life support respiratory devices, had not been regularly
practiced.
CAUSES OF THE FIRE
Source of fuel and ignition
58. The fire was caused by fuel spraying under pressure from a hole in a newly fitted flexible
fuel hose (Figure 2) on the starboard main engine coming into contact with a hot machinery
component. A contributing factor to the size of the fire was probably fuel that spilt some
minutes earlier from a similar leak from a hose on the port main engine. The supply of fuel to
the fire was reduced by the prompt shut down of the starboard engine; the isolation of
electrical power to the fuel boost pump and the operation of the remote fuel shut off valves.
There is a possibility that fuel draining from the return line fed the fire for some time, albeit at
a much reduced rate.

59. Testing of the failed and other fuel hoses clearly demonstrated that the steel braiding
wires had failed due to fatigue after less than 40 hours operation. The failed hoses had
approximately 50 adjacent wires in 5 to 7 braids fractured leaving the internal teflon tube
unsupported.
Spill Pulse Pressure
60. What caused the flexible fuel lines to fatigue? Diesel engines with jerk pumps are known
to be prone to pressure pulses in the fuel system. The most likely source of the fatigue
loading was the action of the injector pump which releases spill pressure pulses into the
supply and return lines of the low pressure fuel system, with the magnitudes of high but
uncertain peak value. The presence of these pulses is well known by the engine
11
manufacturer and the International Maritime Organisation. There was no consultation with
relevant experts by the contractor, subcontractor or ship’s staff. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping
approval of the intended arrangements was not obtained as required in order to maintain the
ship’s certification, and as requested by the ship.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
71. The fire in HMAS WESTRALIA on 5 May 1998 was caused by diesel fuel from a burst
flexible hose spraying onto a hot engine component and then igniting. The hose was one of
a number of new flexible hoses supplied by the ship’s support contractor, ADI Limited, to
replace the original rigid pipes. In the Board’s view, the hoses were not properly designed
and were unfit for the intended purpose.
72. A change of this type should have been processed through the RAN configuration
change process as well as being approved by the ship’s classification society, Lloyds
Register. Both processes were bypassed, largely as a result of ignorance and
incompetence. Key personnel within the RAN, and more particularly ADI Limited, were not
adequately trained or qualified for the responsibilities placed on them. Regardless of the
scrutiny that was avoided by bypassing these approval processes, ADI Limited should have
taken steps to ensure that a safe, properly engineered product was supplied for a
demanding application; it demonstrably failed to do so.
73. The four personnel who died in the fire did so as a result of acute carbon monoxide
toxicity consequent upon inhalation of fire fumes. From the rapid increase in the magnitude
of the fire and consequent production of smoke and fumes, the Board is able to conclude
that incapacitation occurred within five minutes and death within 10 minutes of the outbreak
of the conflagration and well before the CO2 drench.

www.themastermariner.com/stcw-a-ii2/fire-on-board-ships/
PLEASE GO THROUGH THE WEB SITE

Marine Firefighting
Equipment
Marine Machinery, Engines & Controls / By Willie Scott / Marine
Engineering
As long as men have gone to sea in ships there has been a fear of
fire aboard; more so on the old wooden hulled sailing ships than
today’s modern ships. However major fires still occur on modern
ships accounting for a large number of lives lost, especially on
cruise ships and ferries.

Ship's engine rooms are the usual sources of shipboard fires;

either from a fire in the engine room, or an engine internal fire or
explosion causing a subsequent fire. The main portable means of
fire fighting equipment are the different types of hand held
extinguishers. These are located throughout the engine room at
different levels, along with hoses and hydrants supplied by the
seawater pumps. Fires in the engine internal spaces can be
attacked and extinguished using inert gas such as CO2, foam, or
water mist sprays.
The following sections examine the firefighting equipment used in
today's modern engine rooms. The first sections deals with the
common causes of fires in the engine room.

Common Causes of Shipboard

Fires
The causes of engine room fires can usually be traced back to a
lack of maintenance or bad watchkeeping practices. They are
usually caused by fuel spills, overheating components or careless
use of electric welding or gas brazing gear.
Oil Spills
It is imperative to combat the risk of engine room fires by
maintaining the fuel and lube oil systems, more so on diesel
engine ships than steam turbines; although I have had a few hairy
oil-fired boiler room moments where the donkey man has used
sawdust to mop up burner oil spills, instead of sand from the old
red-painted sand bucket. There must be constant vigilance
against leaking oil of any type, pipes and unions being especially
vulnerable. Any leaking or damaged fuel pipe should be reported
to the senior engineer immediately. There is not much you can do
about oil spraying onto a hot exhaust, except shut off the supply
and fight the fire, however but engine room housekeeping is
another matter, this is something that we can all participate in.

 Engine room Housekeeping

The engine room should be kept clean and tidy, free from
inflammable materials such as wooden crates, cardboard boxes,
oily rags and paper. Any oil spills cleaned up immediately and the
source investigated, repaired and logged. An engine room No
Smoking Policy should be enforced, which should stop people
stubbing out their cigarette ends in a sand bucket!

Repairs
The repair of components by welding and brazing is common
practice in ships engine rooms. However, both are potential fire
hazards, due to the electric-arcing of the welding rod and the
open flame on the brazing torch tip. There is also the additional
hazard when welding where the ensuing molten metal can fall
down through several floors into the bilges.
It is therefore imperative that the component for repair should be
brought to the engine room workshop. If this is not possible, then
a fire retardant blanket should be laid under the component to be
welded or brazed. A fire watcher should be employed to keep an
eye on the proceedings; with a set of extinguishers to hand.

Engine Room Fire Fighting

Equipment
 Engine room Sprinkler System
This is of the more modern type of water nozzles that actually
supply a very fine mist, rather than a flow of water. These systems
cover of different areas of the engine room, but not the
switchboard or the electrical generating component of the power
generators. The sprinkler system can be operated automatically
by sensors or manually by the engineer. This starts the water
booster pump and opens up the compressed air supply which can
be from dedicated high pressure air bottles or the engine air-start
receivers.
As we all know water is not normally used on oil fires but,
because fine mist is injected into the area it not only starves the
fire of oxygen, but also dissipates the smoke.

Engine room Fire Extinguishers

There are four main types of fire extinguishers all colored red
nowadays, with a different colored band around the top of the
body, denoting the type of medium it contains. They are operated
by removing the protective pin, before pulling the trigger smartly.

Fire extinguishers are usually stored in a container together as

shown below in a group of four; one of each type. The containers
are positioned at different levels in the engine room at high fire
risk locations.

The four types are,

1. Dry Powder Fire Extinguisher– it has a black band around

the body and is used for extinguishing electrical and liquid
fires.
2. Foam Fire Extinguisher – this has a yellow band around
the body and is used for extinguishing oil fires.
3. Water Fire Extinguisher – this has a red band contained
between two thin white bands around the body. It is used
to extinguish paper, wood and cloth.
4. CO2 Fire Extinguisher – this has a black band around the
body and is used to extinguish electrical and liquid fires.
Remember, only the Dry Powder and CO2 extinguishers should be
used on electrical fires.

Fire Hydrants and Hoses


These are positioned throughout the engine room; a fire axe is
sometimes alongside the fire hoses. The hydrant valves should be
opened; hoses run out and discharged to the bilges at regular
intervals to ensure operation.

 Aqueous Film Forming Foam

Known as AFFF and (pronounced A triple F) was developed in the
sixties and is a great innovation to firefighting not only in ships
engine rooms, but on oil and gas platforms worldwide. AFFF is
supplied in its own containers and added to an AFFF storage tank
and is operated by pressurized seawater. The seawater mixes
with the specialist liquid and exits the 11/2" rubber hose through a
brass nozzle as a pressurized film of thick, viscous foam. This is
directed to the base of the fire, quickly smothering the flames,
dissipating the heat, smoke and fumes.

Prevention and Control

The two main causes of engine room fires are scavenge fires and
crankcase explosions occurring on the main diesel engines. Both
can be detected and prevented if discovered early enough. The
scavenge fire is detected by high exhaust temperature, paint
peeling of the scavenge door or the Mate phoning down to inform
us of black smoke and sparks emitting from the flue.
The much more serious crankcase explosion is caused by a build
up of lube-oil mist inside the crankcase. This triggers the oil-mist
detector and the alarm will sound, giving the engineer enough
time to slow down the engine allowing it cool. In the event of an
explosion, the explosion relief devices on the crankcase doors will
lift. This device prevents injury from a flying crankcase door; the
fine wire mesh in the relief valve taking the heat out of the flames,
reducing the risk of fire. The explosion door re-closes
immediately, preventing any entry of fresh oxygen entering the
crankcase promoting further explosion and fire.
Both the above hazards have similar fire control methods;
injection of CO2 or water mist into the scavenge space and
injection of CO2 into the crankcase. The inspection doors must
remain shut until the relevant components and spaces have
cooled down.

Firefighting Team and

Equipment
This is a dedicated team with a team leader in charge, who attend
regular courses when on leave. The team is usually made up from
members of the crew, engine room and deck officers. They
practice fire drill, evacuation and rescue operations regularly on
the deck, accommodation and engine room areas.

Breathing Apparatus Set

The BA set consists of an oxygen tank which is strapped to the
firefighters back, supplying a full face mask with oxygen.

Personal Protection
This consists of loose fitting fire retardant clothes, fire retardant
boots and a yellow fireman's safety helmet; team leader having a
red band around his helmet.

SAFETY EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATE-

ONE ABANDON SHIP DRILL - ONE FIRE DRILL – ATLEAST ONE

EVERY MONTH
IF MORE THAN 25% OF THE CREW CHANGED( HAVE NOT
PARTICIPATED IN A DRILL IN THE PREVIOUS MONTH), WITHIN
24 HOURS.

1. SCOPE
This Procedure defines the general directions for managing the potential emergency
situations, identified by the Company, which are likely to occur and that might affect the
safety of persons, of the ship and her cargo, or to cause damage to the environment. It
defines the drills and the exercise to prepare the crew to deal with any emergency situation
on board.
WARNING
In case of an emergency, the crew’s main duty
is to limit and minimize damages to people, to the environment, to the ship and her cargo. 2.
PROCEDURE 2.1 General criteria
The Company has identified those potential emergency shipboard situations, which pose an
immediate threat to the safety of the personnel, the environment and the ship, and has
established instructions and procedures to overcome them, and appropriate measures to
respond at any time to emergency situations involving vessels. For any potential emergency
listed in this procedure, Company has established appropriate emergency plan and
emergency checklist,
which provide instructions to the ship’s command to face these situations.
Other emergency situations may be identified through the analysis of accidents, serious
failures and hazardous situations (see also dedicated
OP-SAF-03
and
OP-SAF-06
), in which case instructions, plans and procedures will be
prepared by the Company and sent to the vessel’s command.
The SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions, and other national and international rules and
regulations, require periodic drills
and exercises to be carried out in order to train the vessel’s personnel to deal with these
situations. These rules and
regulations require periodic tests to be carried out on equipment, systems and appliances
(for navigation, communication, lifesaving and firefighting, etc.) in order to verify their
availability and correct functioning. In case of serious pollution or risk of pollution, the
instructions given with the SOPEP (in accordance with the Reg. 26 of MARPOL), or with the
VRP/NT-VRP (for ships within the USA territorial waters, in accordance with the OPA 90),
have to be followed.
Note
: SOPEP is annually reviewed by the Safety Superintendent, the DPA and concerned
department, making use of the suggestions and evaluation arising from the result of the drill
carried out on board of Company vessels, and from the monitoring of any change in the
regulations en force, and evaluating the result of annual ship shore emergency plan. VRP is
reviewed by Q.I. on behalf of DPA (analyzing the result of drills and new regulations). All
managed vessels are supplied with the "Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan
(SOPEP)"
. Ships trading with the USA are additionally provided with the "Vessel Response Plan
(VRP)
" (or NT-VRP as necessary) in accordance with the USCG Oil Pollution Act 1990. These
plans foresee procedures and actions, by the shipboard and shore personnel, having the
purpose to limit the damage to the environment in emergency situations such as collision,
stranding etc.

The involved personnel shall be prepared to deal with these situations, and therefore
exercises and drills have to be carried out to this purpose as per Company scheduled drill
program issued to all vessels. It is the responsibility of the Master to verify that the
scheduled tests and drills are regularly carried out, and to program further drills if deemed
necessary. The drills, exercises and tests carried out on board shall be recorded and
appropriate record books shall be provided to this purpose.
OP-SAF-04

SHIPBOARD EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN

rev.: 3 issue: 09/17
Page 2 PREMUDA
2.2 Responsibility
In the event of accident or emergency situations on board, the following responsibilities are
assigned: The
Master
shall take total control of the ship during all shipboard accidents and emergency
situations.He is also responsible for the training of onboard personnel to face emergencies.
The
Chief Engineer
will take control of all machinery spaces during accidents or shipboard emergencies. The
Chief Officer
will take control of all deck operations, e.g. fire party, clearing away life saving equipment
and lifeboats, anchoring, tow lines etc., during accidents or shipboard emergencies. The
Second Officer
will assist the Master on the bridge or as otherwise ordered during accidents or shipboard
emergencies. He/she is the designed GMDSS operator in emergency. The
Second Engineer
will assist the Chief Engineer, or as otherwise directed during accidents or shipboard
emergencies including taking soundings of tanks, bilges etc.
2.2 Emergency procedures
If a ship is involved in an emergency situation, the Master has the responsibility to take
whatever action he sees fit to minimize risks and to save life. In deciding if assistance is
required, the Master should always assume that the conditions will worsen and take
whatever action is necessary as soon as possible. The Masters must summon assistance in
good time in the event that the ship is in danger. The Coast Guard or rescue authorities and
other ships can be alerted. Whatever the emergency, the Company should be informed as
soon as is practicable. It is generally in the best interests of the Company and the Master if
the first report of any accident or incident comes to the Company directly from the Master
and not from a third party. This however does not detract from the Master complete authority
and duty to take whatever steps he deems necessary to ensure safety and the pollution
prevention. The Master should be guided at all times by his primary responsibilities, which
are for the safety of those entrusted to his care, the safety of the ship, the safety of the cargo
and the protection of the marine environment. All other considerations are secondary to
these. In a salvage situation, the Master remains in command even when salvors are
appointed. While the Master and his crew should make all efforts to assist and co
–
operate with the salvors, the Master may override their advice if he has good cause. A
detailed record of any salvage services received should be kept. In any casualty situation it
is probable that the ship will be contacted in one way or other by radio, television or press
representatives to answer questions or make statements. The Master, the Officers and the
crew have to refer all such questions and requests for statements to the Company. For
details see dedicated

Jump to search
The general emergency signal is a signal used on board ships in times of emergency.

The signal is composed of seven or more short blasts followed by one long blast on the ship's
whistle and internal alarm system. Within 24 hours of embarkation of all passengers, the crew
will conduct a mandatory muster drill in which the General Emergency Signal is sounded. The
purpose of the drill is to educate passengers of emergency procedures should an actual
emergency occur. The signal alerts passengers of an emergency so that they will begin proper
procedures in which all persons collect their life jackets and proceed to their assigned muster
stations.

There is also an abandon ship alarm which is used should it become necessary to abandon ship,
after all other efforts have been exhausted. This signal is given audibly by the ship's Master (aka
Captain) over the PA system. It is never given by automatic means or with recorded media.

Requirements on General Alarm Systems according to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS)
Convention:

1. General Alarm Systems on the Open Deck of New Cargo and Passenger Ships according to
the SOLAS Chapter III, Reg. 6.4.3

and the Life Saving Appliances (LSACode), App. 7, Reg. 7.2 the signals issued via the general
alarm system shall be audible

in all accommodation and normal working spaces of the crew as well as on the open deck.

The sound pressure level shall be in compliance with LSA-Code 7.2.1.2 - “Recognisability of
Audible Alarms”- such that the alarm level is 10 dB(A) over the ambient level.

It shall be possible to trigger the alarms both via an automatic signal generator or by hand. The
alarms may be interrupted temporarily by announcements made over the loudspeaker
installation.

On the open decks of cargo ships, the signals are triggered by the automatic signal generator
and generated by the general alarm system can either be produced by the whistle or by sirens.
The sirens shall be located at uniform distances spread over the open deck. It shall be possible
to interrupt the driving of the whistle by the automatic signal generator by means of a non-locking
pushbutton or a switch or a locking pushbutton.

According to SOLAS Ch. 6.4.2 the general alarm system shall be capable of operation from the
navigating bridge and also from other “strategic points”.

Triggering of the automatic signal generator shall only be provided on the navigating bridge. A
“strategic point” has been accurately defined in LSA Code, App. 7.2.
General Alarm on the Open Deck and Broadcast Systems (Loudspeaker Installations) on
Existing Passenger Ships.

The alarm shall be audible in all accommodation spaces, all normal working spaces of the crew
and on all open decks, and its sound pressure level shall be at least 75 dB(A) or 10 dB(A) above
the ambient noise level (see LSA-Code App.7.2 and IMO Alarm Code, No. 4.11). The
accommodation spaces also include the cabins and living areas as well as the public spaces of
the passengers.

MAINTENANCE PLAN:
FIRE MAINS- PUMPS, HYDRANTS, HOSES, NOZZLES, ISC
FIXED FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEM
FIXED FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM- FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES
AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER
VENTILATION SYSTEMS
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN OF FUEL SUPPLY
GENERAL EMERGENCY ALARM SYSTEM
EMERGENCY ESCAPE BREATHING DEVICES
FIRE FIGHTER’S OUTFITS

INERT GAS SYSTEMS

DECK FOAM SYSTEM
FIRE SAFETY ARRANGEMTNS FOR CARGO PUMP ROOM
FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTORS

FIRE CONTROL PLANS

GA TO BE EXHIBITED PERMANAENTLY
PARTICULARS OF FIRE DETECTION- FIRE ALARM-SPRINKLER
FIRE EXTINGUISHING APPLIANCES
MEANS OF ACCESS- DIFFERENT COMPARTMENTS
VNTILATING SYSTEMS
FAN CONTROL POSITIONS
POSITIONS OF DAMPNERS- IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
DUPLICATE OUTSIDE THE DECK HOUSE

HUMAN BEHAVIOUR- TRAINING- DRILLS