Regalian Doctrine

Concept

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA,
DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY
EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO
CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY,
DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT
P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA,
LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES,
PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY,
JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE
M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON,
JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE
S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID,
ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD
M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B’LAAN TRIBAL FARMER’S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE’S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with non indigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.”2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to
delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.”5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination.” They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
series of 1998;
“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the
State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.”7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining
the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted
to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5,
6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices
Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants

of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et
al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination.The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-
shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTACircular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing

Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSGcountered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSGstipulated on the following

facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in
Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and
other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the
titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,

with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and
those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance
with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their
lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands
as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.[19] The
trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic
then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration

that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo

Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification
of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated,
to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141,
OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in
G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as
amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent
laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation
to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47]Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.[48]Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine
if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands,
as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when
duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership
only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must
be actual, public, and adverse,[56]from the date of its inscription.[57] However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation
of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to
the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands
of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.[61] The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the
definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning
of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa
v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration
by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This
is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system
and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless
of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation
of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial
or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976discontinued the use of

Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree,
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands
under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree
on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall
be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an
agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases

did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it
into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts
would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as
timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts
ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally

released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is

misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7,
1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was
then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the
dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an

argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those
already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly
inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration

cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those
cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of
imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves
of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and,
by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoawas not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the
land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a
mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees
upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have
just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in
order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable
for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some
trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as
forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or
future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the
fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands
from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their
title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100]which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different

issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included
in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited
by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain
are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied

on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is
an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No.
705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay,
no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign
tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or

timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does not
by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau

of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind
the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but
sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely

exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a
15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular,
much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the
President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make
such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the
provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since
Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands
shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.

Republic,[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the
land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of
land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a)
is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of
public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of
determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within
the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands
under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801
did not convert portions of BoracayIsland into an agricultural land. The island
remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian
doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because
of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in
the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do

not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism
industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people
have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the
law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No.
141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right
to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions
imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House
of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are
needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968
in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much,
and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of
serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants.
With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human
lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155450

represented by the Regional
Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Present:
Regional Office No. 2,
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus - CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF Promulgated:
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,
Respondents. August 6, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S IO N

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September

2002[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of
decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September
2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan(trial court) issued
Decree No. 381928[4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents
Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of
7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On
19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayanissued
Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name
of spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were
issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of
the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private
respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate
the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject
property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the
issuance of Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to
conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was
found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the
Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the
same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as
certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and
occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot
2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time
immemorial.[8]

Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot2472 Cad-151 was only
released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land

Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for
the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the
proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of DecreeNo. 381928, petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles[9] on the ground that in 1930 the
trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property,
which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The
disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable
until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and
disposable.

On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private

respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of
jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that
petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision
sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint
was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38
of Act No. 496.[11] Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of
spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective
resolution of the case.Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in
interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind
against private respondents.[12]

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion,

annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions
which this court may annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available. The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are
jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two
(2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in
the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree,
Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around
2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been
erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June
2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or
Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the
provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those
in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the
proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act.[14] (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution,

the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies
are no longer available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of
jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayanhad jurisdiction to
adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original
proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then
Court of First Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural

grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of
decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the
grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of
decree.[15]

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the
Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the
public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to
adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said
tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance
of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null
and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Philippine constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto
in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the
inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and
erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds
of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the
said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and
void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was
seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which
petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioners failure to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available.

In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of

the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or
appealtherefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction
is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[18]

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of

the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint
were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[19]

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be

observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred
to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint
for the complete and proper determination of the case.

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to
spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that
the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and
disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner
admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property,
outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner
argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not
the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public
domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter
of the claim.[20]Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.[21]

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v.
Insular Government,[22] we ruled:

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands
owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se
alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general
or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by
any private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the

State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were
deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
classification maps[24] petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that
in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some
public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the
disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
2874,[26] which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed
portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of
Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands
which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession

which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property,
nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any
other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated,
have ceased to be so.However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same
have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published
or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as
lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by
the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This
exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands
were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise
reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in

Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private
parties.Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner
alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be
claimed under any existing law at that time.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to

annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land
registration court,because when the application for land registration was filed in
1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land.The Republic also alleged
that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for
was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then
vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The
Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable
would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been
impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid
law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above,
those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the
issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the
land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural
and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession
of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration
court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of
Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether
the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural,
timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural
and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a
certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings
in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court
declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is
now final and beyond review.

The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII
of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and
mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these
lands were subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution.[29] When the Commonwealth Government was established under
the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject
land, including the disputed portion,pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in
1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISSpetitioner Republic of
the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Purpose and Meaning

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

Vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between
the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the
25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of
the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the
owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose
it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it,
even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied
by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to
have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus
lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition
for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot,
including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all
the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or
a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a
title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding
for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs.
.Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action
and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American
Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving
notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and
to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the
very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise
and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the
real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a
direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that
future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can
not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act
No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the “torrens” system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the “Australian Torrens System,” at
page 823, says: “The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R.,
155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152;
Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)” Hogg adds however
that, “if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of
title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter
of the two certificates of title to be conclusive.” (See Hogg on the “Australian
torrens System,” supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in
his “Analysis of the Torrens System,” page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: “Where two certificates purport to include the same land the
earlier in date prevails. … In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or
whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder
of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country
do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land,
they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title” (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; “It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description “To all whom it may concern.”
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the “decree of registration” shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened
for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such
decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of
the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe
the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in
that way.

We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right
of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in
the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other
things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different
persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the
registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers
has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of
the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a
double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more
in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are
of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument
of the appellee. He says, among other things; “When Prieto et al. were served
with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they
became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose
their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set
up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to
hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts”.

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is
to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land
cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration
and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip
of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it
all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured
their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or
right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of
the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee
was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the
real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of
the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the
lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. “Through his failure to
appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted
to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Granting that he
was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose
the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of
fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment.
There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the
owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an “innocent
purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title,
or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections
38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be
protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of
available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of
the land to an “innocent purchaser.” That is to say, persons who had had a right
or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an “innocent purchaser,” by virtue of the provisions of
said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered
in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
“innocent purchaser,” as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who
have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate
in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him
to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to
an “innocent purchaser,” would such purchaser be included in the phrase
“innocent purchaser,” as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples
there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to
be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded
as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase “innocent purchaser,” in said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a “second original
certificate” ever be regarded as an “innocent purchaser,” as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee?
The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged
with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so
recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it
contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well
established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real
Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive

notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases,
341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be
absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages
to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea
of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May
a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a
bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge
of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take
notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as
the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the
law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The
conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical
to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public
record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from
the owner of the second original certificate be an “innocent purchaser,” when a
part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another,
not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should
not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase “innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an
“innocent purchaser” because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of
land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an “innocent purchaser” of the portion of the
land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the
record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry
there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order
to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase “innocent purchaser,” used in said sections, should be limited only to
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under
the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the
record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to
all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good
fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think
not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the
torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in
his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be
regarded as an “innocent purchaser” of said strip? Would his vendee be an
“innocent purchaser” of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants,
the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these
rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of
the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor
for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in
the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his
negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the
former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the
torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record
under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct
then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once
land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can
be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the
land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should
be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having
and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the
error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate
issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86787 May 8, 1992

MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA
PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA
NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA
SALANG, respondents.
Saturnino Bactad for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the
same issue, the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic,
Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the
possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the
private respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of
possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered
owners of the land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots were
part of the public domain and could not have been registered under the Torrens
system. All alleged long and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax
declarations in their names. Two of them maintained that they had acquired their
respective lots by virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on
inheritance.
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows:
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question,
necessarily have the lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner
of a land has a right to enjoy and possess it, and he has also the right to recover
and repossess the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428 –– New Civil Code
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing
in order to recover it.
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered
owners of the land in question have also the corresponding right to the recovery
and possession of the same. The defendants who are in physical occupancy of the
land belonging to the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly withhold the
possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the
land in question is unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery and
possession of the land they owned. The evidence presented by the defendants
claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land occupied by
them is within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves scant
consideration as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment the
land in question was titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a
part of the public domain as the same became the private property of the
registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in the
names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing that the land is
already titled to the plaintiffs. The registration of the land in the names of the
defendants with the Assessor's Office for taxation purposes and the payments of
real property taxes by the defendants can not and does not defeat the title of the
plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of the
land in question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not
ripen into ownership because the land is covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive
prescription will not be available to land titled under Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so
holds that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are
entitled to the possession of the same, and that the defendants who are
occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the latter,
are duty-bound to restore possession of the same to the titled owners, the herein
plaintiffs.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22,
1988. 2 Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then
came to this Court, urging reversal of the courts below.
They allege that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been
validly registered under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to
the rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is
traceable to an Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two
years ago. That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the
whole world. The resumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that
certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the
certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens
system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio,
it must be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. 3 Neither of these
requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the
certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and
disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved
scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an
administrative body cannot prevail against court decision declaring the land to be
registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any
other representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition
to the land registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title
on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the
entry of the decree of registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the
petitioners at this late hour. And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land
must also possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by
the private respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that
they have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right
to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have
a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and
continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect
contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is
an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens
system cannot lose it by prescription. 5
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once
the title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright
with use and has long become a settled rule of law.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot
invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the
constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.
A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at
the time he builds on it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because
they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject
lots.
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public
domain and even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of
Forestry. The land was in fact registered under the Torrens system and such
registration was constructive notice to the whole world, including the petitioners.
Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of checking such registration.
At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the
petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of
Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without
permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are
asking us to overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the
Torrens system and the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the
protection and peace of mind of the registered owner against illegal
encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take this drastic step
on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and
EMELITA MAGCAMIT, defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court * (now Court of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District,
Branch III, and of the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners
of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising
more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of
spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein
private respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This
sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale
was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private
respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the
execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being
credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli,"
and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of
title is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have
remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the
property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975,
said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez
authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National
Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the
property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid
indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale
of the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974.
The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale
was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of
absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in
July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas
spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same
property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena
Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is
the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute
deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974,
counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo to comply with their obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of
sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to pay the balance of
P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in
its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now the
owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject
property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner
filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of
Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the
petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in
possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said
property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under
such terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the
premises. (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that
it was never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs
therein) and the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser
in good faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and
that the title is now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action has'
already prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the
property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;
(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National
Grains Authority;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid pursuant to the
Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit "3", with legal interest thereon
from January 31, 1972 until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of
P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, an additional amount of Pl0,000.00 as moral
damages, another amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay
the costs of this suit. (Rollo, P. 35).
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court
to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed
of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of
transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the
names of plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas
and Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00
(Exh. 3) within thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No
damages and costs. (Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same
was denied. (Rollo, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the
parties were required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The
memorandum for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the
memorandum for the private respondents was filed on August 26, 1985 1 Rollo p.
192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the
agreement between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private
respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its
issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right
acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of
private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or
the 'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344
and (b) the deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was
not registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to
the buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is
contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of
the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of
registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of
repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood
to be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted
that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has
obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute
sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only
on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among
others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the
property in question or (b) to order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer
the ownership of the property in their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of
the Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the
ownership and the possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that
they have been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously,
publicly under a claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase
on December 2, 1971 (Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July,
1974 did the plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the property in
question (Rollo, p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration
of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in remnot in personam,
hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the
court may have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack
of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a
registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within
it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the
nature of or akin a to proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons,
known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court of appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing:
City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31;
Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar
vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents' right over the
property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to
spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some right
even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser
of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and
any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law.
Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those
mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate
of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs.
Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42
Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who appears
in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except
such purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in
question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay
vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the
exceptions provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced
against petitioner herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su
casato," avoid the possibility of losing his land." "An indirect or collateral attack
on a Torrens Title is not allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs.
Manila Railroad, 62 Phil. 467)."
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true
owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to
transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed
to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil. 444
[1938], emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in
procuring the registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their
application for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was
with complete knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who
retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a
certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding
delivery of said title to them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of
OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of contract between private respondents and the
Vivas spouses. Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it
shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage, of
the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of absolute sale much less
of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special Power of
Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and
the NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore,
the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under
Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public
auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the
land which was not even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor
present any witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED
OF MORTGAGE to show its being a mortgages in good faith and for value (Rollo, p.
110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to
go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property,
or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further
than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect
or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs.
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting
a mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as
security (Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570
[1985]), and where innocent third persons like mortgagee relying on the
certificate of title acquire rights over the property, their rights cannot be
disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 [1985]).
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling
that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they
be declared owners of the land in question can not prosper in view of the
doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System, because it is an
established principle that a petition for review of the decree of registration will
not prosper even if filed within one year from the entry of the decree if the title
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No.
1529, Sec. 32). The setting aside of the decree of registration issued in land
registration proceedings is operative only between the parties to the fraud and
the parties defrauded and their privies, but not against acquirers in good faith and
for value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to them the decree shall
remain in full force and effect forever (Domingo vs. The Mayon Realty Corp. et al.,
102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming, therefore, that there was fraud committed by the
sellers against the buyers in the instant case, petitioner NGA who was not privy
therein cannot be made to suffer the consequences thereof As correctly declared
by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful owner of the
property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered
to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that
there is absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value,
should reconvey the land to the private respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City, now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, G.R. No. 167232

INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO
PERALTA, JJ.
PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN,
DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and
HILARION MANONGDO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 31, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated
October 25, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216, dated November 8, 2001.

The Facts

Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu-

123169,[4] containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred
Forty-Six (240,146) square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik,
Novaliches, Quezon City (subject property). The property is included in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519,[5]entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in
favor of B.C. Regalado & Co. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C. Regalado to
petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago[6] for
services rendered by the latter to the former.

On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito P.
Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P.
Peralta, and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents)
filed a Complaint[7] for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and
all Titles derived thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc. against
B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M.
Brioso, Spouses Ciriaco and Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina
Allado, Eufrocina A. Maborang and Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario
Tabangcura, Spouses Oscar Ikalina and the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon
City. Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint[8] and a Second
Amended Complaint[9] particularly impleading DBT as one of the defendants.

In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of
the subject property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name,
and assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City
as of the year 1985. Respondents alleged that per Certification[10] of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital
Region (NCR) dated May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct
and on file in said office, and approved on July 23, 1948.

Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members, and the
other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of
the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. To
perfect his title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration
Decree), Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case docketed as
LRC Case No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.[11]

Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication

requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an
overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredos application, with the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been
conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT.

Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the
subject property. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the
preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject
property. They asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they gathered
that TCT Nos. 211081,[12] 211095[13] and 211132,[14] which allegedly included
portions of the subject property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However,
TCT No. 200519 only covered Lot503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-
Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifteen (22,615) square meters, and was different
from those mentioned in TCT Nos. 211081, 211095 and 211132. According to
respondents, an examination of TCT No. 200519 would show that it was derived
from TCT Nos. 14814,[15] 14827,[16] 14815[17] and T-28.

In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative
titles which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon
City where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then
offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C
Regalado and DBT through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used
(LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the
subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.

In his Answer[18] dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the
defense that at the time of registration, he found all documents to be in
order. Subsequently, on December 5, 1994, in his Motion[19] for Leave to Admit
Amended Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he admitted that he
committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered
only one lot, i.e. Lot 503.He averred that upon careful examination, he discovered
that TCT No. 200519 is composed of 17 pages, and actually covered 54 lots,
namely: Lots 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 582, 586, 655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299,
498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 493, 692, 776, 496, 785, 777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654,
660, 661, 663, 664, 665, 668, 693, 694, 713, 716, 781, 779, 784, 782, 787, 893,
1115, 1114, 778, 669 and 788, all of the Tala Estate. Other lots included therein
are Lot 890-B of Psd 36854, Lot 2 of (LRC) Pcs 12892 and Lot 3 of (LRC) Pcs 12892.
Thus, respondents' allegation that Lots 661, 664, 665, 693 and 694 of the Tala
Estate were not included in TCT No. 200519 was not true.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura
(Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer[20] with Counterclaim, claiming that
they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house and lot
covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision
developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent
Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a
case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which
rendered a decision[21]in their favor.

On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner
and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by
B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-
interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property
had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his
application for registration; that the other respondents did not
allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the relief

prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the
action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.[22]
The RTC's Rulings

On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla),
rendered a Decision[23] in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the
testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he
was only 16 years old had not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and
cultivation of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept
of an owner vested in him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an
approved plan, Psu 123169; that the subject property was declared under the
name of Ricaredo for taxation purposes;[24] and that the subject property per
survey should not have been included in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name
of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura
failed to present satisfactory evidence to prove their claim. Thus, the RTC
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Certificate of Title No. 200519 and all titles derived thereat as
null and void insofar as the same embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169
with an area of 240,146 square meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering
defendant DBT Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorneys fees plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion[25] for Reconsideration, based on the
grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredos claim of open,
adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty
(30) years, and asserted that the subject property could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession because it is covered by TCT No. 200519.

While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed
away.

Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion[26] for Intervention and a Complaint in

Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit),
representing the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged
that the subject property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of
117,000 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139,
which belongs to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the
Complaint[27] in Intervention prayed that the RTCs Decision be reconsidered;
that the legitimacy and superiority of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject
property be declared as belonging to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de
Ocampo.

In its Order[28] dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto C.
Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarits Motion for Intervention
because a judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section 2,[29] Rule
19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] stating that there appeared to be a
need for a clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion for
Reconsideration.Thus, a hearing was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter,
supplemental memoranda were required of the parties.[31]Both parties
complied.[32] However, having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519
was not submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the
RTC directed DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on
August 21, 2001.[33] Respondents moved to reconsider the said directive[34] but
the same was denied.[35] DBT, on the other hand, manifested that a copy of TCT
No. 200519, consisting of 17 pages, had already been admitted in evidence; and
that because of the fire in the Office of the RD in Quezon City sometime in 1988,
DBT, despite diligent effort, could not secure an original or certified true copy of
said TCT. Instead, DBT submitted a certified true copy of Consolidated Subdivision
Plan Pcs 18345.[36]

On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an

Order[37] reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack
of merit. The RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land;
hence, a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or
notorious possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject property
could be acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already barred by
prescription and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when B.C.
Regalado registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed,
subdivided and sold the same to individual lot buyers.
On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[38] which
the RTC denied in its Order[39]dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents
appealed to the CA.[40]
The CA's Ruling

On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated
November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June
15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No.
200519 are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and
Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's
testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu
123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson
committed a procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted
evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never
raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision.
The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared to be
an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was
not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.[41]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which was, however, denied by

the CA in its Resolution[43] dated February 22, 2005.

Hence, this Petition.

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition:
I.

PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS ANSWER IS NOT A

WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.

II.

IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED
BUT BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.

III.

A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.

IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL

DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.

V.

MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[44]
Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the
arguments of the parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:

1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised
in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject
property?

Our Ruling

We answer the first question in the affirmative.

It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals[45] we ruled:

(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G.
97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14,
1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule
16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative
defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even
if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
found in the pleadings(Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a
defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez; 16 SCRA 270). What is
essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the
prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its
processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the
right to reverse itself, especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or
mistake in judgment, and adherence to its decision would cause
injustice.[46] Thus, the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001 could validly
entertain the defenses of prescription and laches in DBT's motion for
reconsideration.

However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous.
The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for
reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.

Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action

for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of
the RD constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the
discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of
registration.[47]

However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to

reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If
the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action
that is imprescriptible.[48] Thus, in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,[49] this Court held:

[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive

trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration
of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the
instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in their
testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that
Angelito bought a house within the subject property in 1987.[50]Thus, the
respondents are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title because
persons having legal, as well as equitable, title to or interest in a real property
may bring such action, and title here does not necessarily denote a certificate of
title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.[51]

Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held,

nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where
the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore,
laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject
property has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title
imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a
creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be
intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches will operate not really
to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a
right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.[52]

Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which
dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may
have been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of
DBT.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in

derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.[53]

Article 1126[54] of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46[55] of Act No. 496
(The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47[56] of P.D. No. 1529 (The
Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing
not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.
Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered
under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be protected.
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to
suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time
and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become
obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of
witnesses.[57]

Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is

baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of
ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed
by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides
that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of
possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.[58]

Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT
participated in the alleged fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within
the province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to re-
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence anew, we have the
authority to review and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower
courts when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the
appellate court.[59] In this regard, we reviewed the records of this case and found
no clear evidence that DBT participated in the fraudulent scheme. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[60]this Court gave due importance to the fact that the private
respondent therein did not participate in the fraud averred. We accord the same
benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is an innocent purchaser for value and
good faith which, through a dacion en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado,
acquired
ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under
Section 32[61] of P.D. No. 1529.
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the
debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing
to the creditor, who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an outstanding
debt. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an
objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the
contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price.[62]

It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold
to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value, relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no
knowledge of any defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce
a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the subject
property.[63] To disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged
continuous and adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to
the rights of the aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc
on the stability of the Torrenssystem of registration.

A final note.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of
the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of
manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the
registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of
the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of
land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.[64] Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property,
the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the
system will have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been
regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every
person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.[65]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

Chp 2 (Sec 4-13)

LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
2.Office of Registry of Deeds; General Functions

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432
and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two
(2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot No.
4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the
filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution
dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of
the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the
name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of
Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession
which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the
ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772
fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued
on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated
as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was
denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was
denied in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the
denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case
G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the
respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before
the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of
the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for
engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of
possession and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because
of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order '
to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant
petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case
No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R.
No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate
Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic
pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues
already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case
No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition
is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case
No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited
pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7,
1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First
Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and
that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the
same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and
void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision
Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466,
Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this
Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed
by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this
Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge
Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the
Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to
issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on
another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another
Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator
for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986
and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through
counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of
Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province
of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso,
Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of
possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its
Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to
register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order
of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986
which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986.
Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period
granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of
this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new
Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez,
private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a
motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986
and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772,
should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the
Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication
(by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772
and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo — 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in
G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of
our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the
execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate
action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with
the implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these
cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso
annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560,
T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case
(Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and
annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was
upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12,
1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the
new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in
another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of
is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners,
the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to
immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561
and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on
the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of
the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice
of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of
the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No.
15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs,
versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject
Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the
registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or
proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was
based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral
proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69,
Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme
Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987
order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice
of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier
declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or
annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No.
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides'
counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title
No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order
dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason
why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the
certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in
the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who
allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51,
Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and
Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge
Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other
co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No.
62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in
the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos
over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently
obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983
long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432
wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession
and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that
he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves
as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of
course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14,
RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p.
415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in
this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of
Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the
effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been
filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by
the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where
the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining
the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based
on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for
the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by
the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he
was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871
prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984
to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court
below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings
filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners
(the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in
the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the
light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendensin a torrens certificate
of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any
party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds
with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of
title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register
of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of
the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of
any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the
opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the
National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with
Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders
issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET
ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC
Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur
a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the
same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described
in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³)
portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225
hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective
or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of
three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect
to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ...
is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the
vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo,
this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said
undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan,
this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided
portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains
an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates
of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the
name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal
request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the
name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly
because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had
not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the
requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a
resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy,
the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described
in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided
portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers.
Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there
are now three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of
the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be
surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three
co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a
court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to
have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.ñet
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would
want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their
possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of
the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner
to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance
with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the
presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it
speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the
property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in
this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor
was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes
that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the
registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary
instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register
of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at
bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under
section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration
Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was
unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several
copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be
adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on
one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to
be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land
covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry
differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in
upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the
property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the
marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina,
"there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse
may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and
sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership
a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein — subject
of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied
that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation
executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which
justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion
of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say
more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same
land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the
character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the
different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of
donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the
rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices
of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered
by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of
May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered
conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New
Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the
existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial
settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be
procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their
father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan
on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate
of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the
respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent
reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the
petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by
appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land
Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the
petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will
lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire
on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights
over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to
register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of
deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to
their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid
excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require
that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby
be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or
constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of
registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first
be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co.
vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with
the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be
taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of
R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. —
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other
instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does
not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the
question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon
the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in
doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon
the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records
certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and
hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to
be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all
Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with
the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of
law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from
and after receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the
petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which
shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative
remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the
courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is
affirmed, at petitioner's cost