Inah del Rosario
The Ampil ruling was applied here: the place where
GR L-26341, Nov 27, 1968
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO VS. WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PABLO
Facts
Pablo, employed by IDECO, was shot about 20 meters
away from the main IDECO gate when he was on his way
home.
IDECO filed this appeal before the SC alleging that the
WCC erred (1) in holding that Pablo’s death occurred in
the course of employment and in presuming that it arose
out of the employment; (2) in applying the proximity
rule; (3) in holding that Pablo’s death was an accident
within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Issue Whether Pablo’s death comes within the meaning
of “arising out of and in the course of employment”
Ruling YES.
GENERAL RULE IN WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW
KNOWN AS THE GOING AND COMING RULE: IN THE
ABSENCE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AN EMPLOYEE
INJURED IN GOING TO OR COMING FROM HIS PLACE OF
WORK IS EXCLUDED FROM THE BENEFITS OF WCA.
Exceptions:
(1) Where the EE is proceeding to or from his work on
the premises of his ER
(2) Where the EE is about to enter or about to leave the
premises of his ER by way of the exclusive or
customary means of ingress and egress
(3) Where the EE is charged, while on his way to or from
his place of employment or at his home, or during
his employment, with some duty or special errand
connected with his employment; and
(4) Where the ER, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from
the place of employment.
IDECO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSAULT AGAINST
PABLO.
1. Although IDECO did not own the private road, the
main gate was the principal means of ingress and
egress. The private road leads directly to its main
gate. IDECO should be charged with security control
of the road. IDECO owed its employees a safe
passage to its premises.
2. The spot where Pablo was shot was immediately
proximate to IDECO’s premises. Moreover, Pablo
just finished his overtime work at the time and was
killed barely 2 minutes after dismissal from work.
the employee was injured being “immediately
proximate to his place of work, the accident in
question must be deemed to have occurred within
the zone of this employment and therefore arose
out of and in the course thereof.
3. Employment may be said to begin when the
employee reaches the entrance to the employer's
premises where the work is to be done; but it is
clear that in some cases the rule extends to include
adjacent premises used by the employee as a
means of ingress and egress with the express or
implied consent of the employer. (Bountiful Brick
Compnay vs. Giles; US case)
4. 2 minutes from dismissal and 30 meters from the
main IDECO gate are a reasonable margin of time
and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the IDECO’s premises. The IDECO employees
used the private road with its consent, express or
implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main
gate is in closed proximity to the IDECO's premises.
It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of
employment.
Workmen’s Compensation Act must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.
Liberally construed, Sec. 2 of the Act comprehends
Pablo’s death.
GR 90204, May 11, 1990
BELARMINO VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GSIS
Facts
Petitioner’s wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom
teacher in DECS for 11 years. While performing her
duties, 8th months pregnant, she accidentally slipped and
fell on the classroom floor. She continued to report to
school because there was so much work to do. 11 days
after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home. She suffered from
septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of
the vagina which was the cause of her death 3 days after
she was discharged from the hospital. She was 33 years
old, survived by her husband and 4 children (oldest is 11
years old; youngest newborn infant.)
A claim for death benefits was filed by the husband. This
was denied by the GSIS holding that septicemia post
partum is not an occupational disease, and neither was
there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted
by reason of her employment. The accident mentioned
could not have precipitated the death of the wife but
rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds
as a result of her delivery at home.
ECC’s resolution: affirmed the GSIS ruling.
Issue Is the petitioner entitled to death benefits?
Ruling YES
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
DISCRETION IN PREEMPTIVELY DENYING PETITIONER’S
CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS. Rule III, Sec. 1 of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury
resulting in disability or death of an employee:
Sec. 1. Grounds – (a) For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for
the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise,
proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after
January 1, 1975 and the resulting d isability or
death shall be compensable under these Rules.
OANIA’S DEATH FROM THE AILMENT IS COMPENSABLE
BECAUSE AN EMPLOYMENT ACCIDENT AND THE
CONDITIONS OF HER EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED TO
ITS DEVELOPMENT. The condition of the classroom floor
caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as
a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent
abdominal pains which culminated in the premature
termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences
to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her
premature delivery which caused the development of
post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall
therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that
set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her
demise.
Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in
the course of her employment as a classroom teacher,
hence, all the medical consequences owing from it: her
recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her
baby, her septicemia post partum, and death, are
compensable.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death
for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty.
Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social
justice for the lowly and underpaid public school
teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until
Government adopts measures to ameliorate their
economic condition and provides them with adequate
medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for
the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT
v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of
the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death
of his wife, the public respondents ignored this
imperative of Government, and thereby committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
GR 84307, April 17, 1989
HINOGUIN VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GSIS
Facts
Deceased, Hinoguin was a Sergeant stationed at the
Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion. He was
allowed by Capt. Besas to go on an overnight pass to
Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya to settle an important matter
thereat. Sgt. Hinoguin, and Cpl Clavo and Dft. Alibuyong
were allowed to take their issued firearms. Aritao was
considered as a critical place due to peace and order
problems regarding the NPA. Upon their arrival at Aritao,
they had several drinks. Aboard a tricycle, Dft. Alibuyong,
not noticing that his rifle’s safety lever was on “semi-
automatic” accidentally touched the trigger, firing a
single shot which hit Sgt. Hinoguin in the lower abdomen
which caused the latter’s untimely death.
An investigation conducted by the HW 14th Infantry
Battalion concluded that the shooting was purely
accidental.
Petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits
under PD 626, claiming that his son’s death was work-
connected and therefore compensable. This was denied
by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner’s son was not
at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of
the Philippine Army at the time of this death.
GSIS denied Petitioner’s MR.
Issue Is the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under
the applicable statute and regulations?
Ruling
ART. 167(G) OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED AND
SEC. 49(B) (1) OF RULE 1 OF THE AMENDED
IMPLEMENTING RULES ON EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION, THE TERM “EMPLOYEE” INCLUDES A
MEMBER OF THE AFP.
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. – (a) The
beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to
an income benefit if all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the
System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as
well as the injury or sickness which caused his
death.
His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death
occurred before the employee is duly reported for
coverage of the System.
ART. 167 OF THE LABOR CODE, DEFINES COMPENSABLE
INJURY AS “ANY HARMFUL CHANGE IN THE HUMAN
ORGANISM FROM ANY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND
IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT.” Rule III, Sec. 1(a)
reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds – (a) For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been
injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been
performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elseqhere,
the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.
THE DEATH OF HINOGUIN THAT RESULTED FROM HIS
BEING HIT BY AN ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF THE RIFLE
OF DFT. ALIBUYOG, AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS A SOLDIER OF ACTIVE DUTY
STATUS IN THE AFP AND HENCE COMPENSABLE.
SOLDIERS WERE AT THEIR WORK PLACE.
- The Amended IRR are intended to apply to all
kinds of employment, such rules must be read
and applied with reasonable flexibility and
comprehensiveness
- “work place” cannot be always literally applied
to a solder on active duty status
- soldiers secured lawful permission to be; this
cannot be different from a place where they are
required to go by their commanding officer
- 3 officers were on an overnight pass; they were
not on vacation leave
- they were required or authorized to carry their
firearms with which they were to defend
themselves if NPA attacked them
THE DEATH OF HINOGUIN OCCURRED IN LINE OF DUTY.
- A soldier on active duty is really on 24 hours a
day official duty status and is subject to military
discipline and military law 24 hours a day; he is
subject to the call and orders of his superiors
except when he is on vacation leave. Thus the
work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins
injury and death was not effectively precluded
by the simple circumstance that he was on an
overnight pass to go to the home of Dft.
Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. He
did not cease performing official functions
because he was granted a pass. While going to a
fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal
and some drinks was not a specific military duty,
he was nonetheless in the course of
performance of official functions. Indeed, it
appears to us that a soldier should be presumed
to be on official duty unless he is shown to have
clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or
condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave
may, it should be remembered, be
preterminated by superior orders.
- A soldier’s employment has risks which he has to
assume – hazards or risks inherent in his
employment as a soldier.
GR 128524, April 20, 1999
GSIS VS. CA AND ALEGRE
Facts
SPO2 Alegre was a police officer assigned to the PNP
station in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. He was driving his tricycle and
ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda
Commercial Complex when SPO4 Tenorio, Jr. confronted
him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre and SPO4
Tenorio fought which led to the fatal shooting of SPO2
Alegre.
superior to check on several personnel of his
command who were then attending a dance
party
3. ECC case involving P/Sgt. Alvaran – even if
not directed any directive or permission by a
superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong
Police Station, his presence there was
justified by the peacekeeping nature of the
matter he was attending to which was
bringing his son to the police station to
answer for a crime

Private Respondent filed for a claim for the death of her DEATH OF SPO2 ALEGRE IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
husband with GSIS pursuant to PD 626. GSIS denied the 1. The matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the
claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s time he met his death, was that of ferrying
death, he was performing a personal activity which was passengers for a fee
not work-connected. ECC affirmed the said decision. CA 2. He was not authorized nor he had the permission
reversed ECC ruling that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work- of a superior officer; neither was the matter of a
connected and thus compensable citing Nitura vs. ECC peacekeeping nature
and ECC vs. CA. 3. The 24-hour doctrine, as applied to soldiers and
policemen, serves more as an after-the-fact
GSIS comes before the SC on petition for review on validation of their acts to place them within the
certiorari on the ground that the death lacks the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket
requisite element of compensability which is that the license to benefit them in all situations that may
activity being performed at the time of death is work- give rise to their deaths. It should not be applied
connected. to all acts and circumstances causing the death
of a police officer but only to those which,
Issue: Is the death of SPO2 Alegre compensable? although not an official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character.
Ruling:
FOR THE INJURY/DISABILITY/DEATH TO BE
COMPENSABLE, THE INJURY MUST BE THE RESULT OF AN
EMPLOYMENT ACCIDENT SATISFYING ALL OF THE FF.
CONDITIONS:
1. The EE must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be;
2. The EE must have been performing his
official functions; and
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the EE
must have been executing an order for the
ER.

JURISPRUDENCE: DEATH BENEFITS FOR SOLDIERS OR

POLICEMEN WERE AWARDED FOR THOSE WHO WERE
VIRTUALLY WORKING ROUND-THE-CLOCK. In such cases
where death benefits were awarded, the SC attempted
in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the
absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work
and the incident that led to his death.
1. Hinoguin – deceased was permitted by his
superior to go to Atilan
2. Nitura – deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his
Lara de los Santos 
[G.R. No. 136200. June 8, 2000]
CELERINO VALERIANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope
of employment while the claimant was performing an act
reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or while
following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard
of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who
invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim
for compensability must be denied.
Facts
Celestino Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver.
On the evening of July 3, 1985, after having dinner with
a friend, Valeriano met an accident and was severely
injured when the vehicle he was on collided with
another.
Valeriano claimed for benefits from the GSIS which the
latter denied for being non-compensable. The the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and CA
sustained the system, reasoning that the injury resulted
not from an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment nor was it work-connected. Petitioner was
already dismissed from his regular 8-hour daily work.
Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called to report
for work anytime in case there is a fire, or that his
position is akin to that of a military man, a contention we
cannot support, still the circumstances leading to the
accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no
causative connection between the injury he sustained
and his work. Hence, this Petition.
Issues
A) WHETHER PETITIONERS INJURIES ARE COMPENSABLE
B) WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN
BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24-HOUR DUTY.
Ruling
A) For injury to be compensable, the standard of "work
connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury
and the resulting disability sustained by reason of
employment are compensable regardless of the place
where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the
time of the injury, the employee was acting within the
purview of his or her employment and performing an act
reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly
how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the
injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries
after pursuing a purely personal and social function --
having dinner with some friends -- is clear from the
records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his
work place; nor were they sustained while he was
performing an act within the scope of his employment or
in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with
the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his
injuries and consequent disability were not work-
connected and thus not compensable.
B) Petitioner argues that his claim for disability benefits
is anchored on the proposition that the exigency of his
job as a fireman requires a constant observance of his
duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have
been "on call" when he met the accident. He underscores
the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC and Nitura v. ECC] to
his case.
In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death
compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec
Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the
Philippine Army. After having gone elsewhere on an
overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a
fellow soldier. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand, died after
falling from a bridge during his trip back to his camp. At
the time of his death, he had just accomplished his
commander’s instruction to check on several personnel
of his command post who were then at a dance party.
Both cases espoused the position that the concept of
"work place" cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and
purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject to
military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his
superior officers at all times, except when he is on
vacation leave status
The circumstances in the present case do not call for the
application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the
rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot
be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither
at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of
his superiors when he met an accident. But the more
important justification for the Courts stance is that he
was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any
reasonable connection between his injuries and his work
as a firetruck driver.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990
SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES), respondents.
Facts
The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the
Central Bank of the Phils. His regular tour of duty is from
2:00 -10:00pm. On 18 June 1986, he rendered duty from
2:00 - 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security
guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the
petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 am of 19
June 1986. On his way home, the passenger jeepney he
was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a
result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono
Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later
transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where
he was confined until 25 July 1986.
Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD
626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the
GSIS for the reason that he was not at his work place
performing his duties when the incident occurred. The
condition for compensability had not been satisfied.
Upon review, respondent Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the decision for the same reason.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner's injury comes within the
meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of
and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's
Compensation Act).
Ruling
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his
station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular
time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so
petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission
to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence
on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular
homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the
journey.
the employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection to the accident.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance
to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in
Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the
decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of
the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection to labor.
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should
not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to
or after working hours and for a reasonable distance
before reaching or after leaving the employer's
premises.
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an
employee who was on his way from home to his work
station one day before an official working day, there is
no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury
occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he
had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the
street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law
liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees
Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation
Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford
relief to the working men and women in our society.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of

aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
(under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have
been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is
significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor
of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the
law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured
by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation
Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of
G.R. No. L-27588 April 28, 1969
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and
ROSARIO VDA. DE ROSANO respondents.
Facts
Stevedore Rosano had a heated verbal argument with
Valdez, another stevedore engaged by petitioner
corporation, over the possession of a platform used in
the loading and unloading of cargoes taken into or out of
the watercraft. Valdez gave up the platform after two
heated arguments one in the morning and one in the
afternoon, but not before he had uttered threats against
the life of Rosano. Later, informed that the barge they
were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with
two companions, boarded a passenger jeep bound for
Tondo. When he got off from the jeep near his house, he
was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed
him. Rosano died on the same day after being brought to
the hospital.
The widow, Rosario Vda. de Rosano, for herself and on
behalf of her 3 minor children filed with the Department
of Labor a formal claim for death compensation benefits
against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the
death of her husband, Pastor Rosano.
Issue
Whether or not the death of Rosano is compensable
considering that it came after he was outside the
company premises and not at work.
Ruling
We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved
sequence of events that took place on 30 November
1964 involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident
that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez
(who was thereafter accused and convicted) can be
traced to their disagreement over the possession of a
platform that was to be used in their work for petitioner
that although the altercation started in the morning the
same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon
and carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's
house, and there met and stabbed the latter when he
alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the
employer is exempt from liability under the Workmen's
Compensation law because the cause of death arose
outside of the company premises, whereas the quarrel
happened at the waterfront at Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that
the cause therefor shall take place within the place of
employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of
his employment, his protection "in the course of" the
employment usually continues, regard of the place of
injury.
Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries
sustained by an employee while in the course of his
employment, as the result of an assault upon his person
by another employee, or by a third person, no question
of the injured employee's own culpability being involved,
is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a
rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in
motion by the nature of the employment, or some
condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by
some other agency.
Where the facts, shown by the evidence found by the
referee and affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano
had been assaulted by the man with whom he had
quarrelled barely a half hour after leaving the place of
work where the quarrel occurred, in connection with the
possession of the platform to be used in unloading cargo,
without any independent agency or cause for the assault
being shown. As pointed out by Larson (Workmen's
Compensation Law, Vol. I, section 29.21) —
since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was
whether "the quarrel from origin to ending must be
taken to be one" it should make no difference how
widely separated the assault was from the employment
in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an
employment incident.
The fact remains that the petitioner failed to controvert
in due time the right of the claimants to compensation,
as required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now
well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of
giving of notice of injury and filing of claim within the
prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not
constitute a bar to compensation proceedings if the
employer, who had knowledge of the accident, failed to
controvert the claimant's right to compensation
pursuant to section 45 of the law. For such failure of the
employer to controvert the claimant's constitutes a
waiver (or a forfeiture by law) of its right to question the
validity and reasonableness of the claim and precludes
the setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses, such as
non-compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like.
Kadz Nitura
G.R. No. L-14827. October 31, 1960
CHUA YENG vs MICHAELA ROMA
FACTS: Santos Romeo was working for Chua Yeng as a
kargador in Cebu City. He went to Yeng’s house just
across the street from the warehouse to get a drink of
water. Reaching the kitchen while he was drinking, he
saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside.Santos made a
motion with his hand to drive it away, in the course of
which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June
26, 1958, Santos Romeo
died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that
the puppy was not owned by Yeng.
ISSUE: WON, under the circumstances narrated, the
death of the laborer is considered to arise "out of and in
the course" of his employment.
HELD: YES.
The rule is well established that — "Such acts as are
reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an
employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst,
hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself
from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the
employment, and injuries sustained in the performance
of such act are generally held to be compensable as
arising out of and in the course of the employment."
Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house
and not at his usual place of work for the reason that the
laborer was practically driven to that place through the
appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of
drinking water at the warehouse. SC did not regard the
act of driving away the puppy as a voluntary deviation
from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased
was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be
expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it
was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a
desire to protect the latter's property, that can not be
deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as
such
Compensation has been granted, even if the injury
occurred while the worker was not performing acts
strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an
activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing
an act in the interest of his employer. By analogy, the
deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water
to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see
a puppy eating some fried fish belonging to his employer;
and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion
with his hand to drive said puppy away.
Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social
legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect
social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally
construed in favor of the workingman.
G.R. No. L-22135. December 27, 1963
VISAYAN STEVEDORE-TRANSPORTATION CO. VS.
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION (WCC)
Facts: Graciano Gutana was a laborer of Visayan
Stevedore Transportation (VST) in its stevedoring
business at the Pulupandan wharf in Occidental Negros,
at a daily salary of P4.60. Sometime in May 1958, VST
undertook the loading of sugar on the Japanese ship
"Hiyeharu Maru" then anchored about two miles from
the coast of Pulupandan, and Gutana was one of the
more than seventy of its laborers assigned to do the
loading.
After taking their meal on board the ship, Gutana and
some of the laborers had to answer the call of nature by
the left side of a barge tied along the right side of the
Japanese ship, in view of the insufficiency of the sanitary
facilities on board. After relieving himself, and as he was
standing and buttoning up his pants, the raft "Narwhal"
came along the right side of the barge and bumped it,
causing it to hit the right side of the Japanese vessel.
Gutana was pinned by the end of the hatch cover of the
barge against the side of the vessel, thereby suffering
physical injuries which resulted in his death. VST
shouldered all the funeral expenses. A claim for
compensation for the death of Gutana was filed by the
widow of the deceased and their children.
Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Bacolod City,
rendered a decision awarding death compensation to
the claimants in the total amount of P4,000.00, plus
attorney's fees and costs which was affirmed by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission in its resolution.
Issue1: WON the claim for compensation had prescribed
having been filed more than three months after Gutana's
death.
Held1: NO. The case is covered by the provisions of
Section 24, Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, as
amended, which dispenses with the requirement of filing
a claim for compensation if the employer had voluntarily
made compensation payments. Under Section 8 of the
same act, burial expenses are considered as part of the
death benefits due to the heirs of a deceased laborer. It
appears in this case that petitioner had voluntarily paid
the burial expenses in connection with the burial of
Gutana. Consequently, the late filing of the claim for
compensation is not fatal.
Issue2: WON death of Gutana was due to his notorious
negligence.
Held2: NO. Due to the number of laborers engaged in the
loading work, the sanitary facilities on board the
"Hiyeharu Maru" were rendered inadequate, thus
compelling some of the laborers to answer the call of
nature by going down a barge tied along the right side of
the ship. The deceased Gutana was among those who
was forced to resort to this uncomfortable way of
relieving himself. Moreover, in the circumstances of this
case, it is but logical to consider the barge as an
extension of the premises where the laborers were
working. As already stated, they took their evening meal
on board the ship and were supposed to resume their
work (overtime work) a reasonable time thereafter. As,
because of this, they were not free to leave the vessel,
the accident must be deemed to be one arising out of, or
in the course of employment.
G.R. No. L-18438. March 30, 1963
PAEZ VS WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(WCC)
Facts: Paez and his wife were engaged in the business of
buying palay for the King Tong Seng Ricemill of Victoria,
Tarlac, with the latter supplying the capital of P1,000.00
to P2,000.00. The driver’s child became seriously ill so he
engaged the services of Marciano Barawid to substitute
him in undertaking the trip to Isabela, with the
understanding that he (Barawid), was to receive his pay
during his absence.
Barawid drove respondent's truck up to the Cabatuan
side of the Magat River to await for the palay that were
to be ferried from the Aurora side. On the same date,
instead of awaiting the palay on the Cabatuan side,
Barawid crossed the Magat River and joined on the
Aurora side in hauling the palay. After having collected
all the palay on the Aurora side, Apolonio (laborer) and
Barawid reached the river's bank at about 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, and both helped in loading three (3) bancas.
Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca
because same was already fully loaded, but to take
another the next morning. Barawid told him he was in a
hurry to return to Guimba, as he had to drive a new truck
of his brother-in-law. While in the midst of the Magat
River, the banca capsized and sunk, and Barawid was
drowned.
WCC Associate Commissioner ordered Paez to pay
Barawid’s claim for compensation and burial expenses.
Issue: WON the WCC erred in finding that the death of
Barawid arose out of and in the course of employment
and in not finding that the accident was caused through
the notorious negligence of the deceased.
Held: NO.
The activities performed by Barawid, we believe, were
incidental to his duties not only as driver but as
purchaser of the respondent who was engaged in the
business of buying and selling palay. It is reasonable to
expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid, to help a
co-employee in the performance of his duties. And even
granting, only for the sake of argument, that the acts
performed by the deceased were not strictly within the
bounds of his duties still he was, in the fullest sense of
the term, in the course of the employment. “Simply
stated, 'if the act is one for the benefit of the employer
or for the mutual benefit of both, an injury arising out of
it will usually be compensable." (Schneider's Workmen's
Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338).There is little to be
added to the above observations, except to state that
they are based upon the evidence and law on the
subject.
There is no showing at all that Barawid had deliberately
disregarded his safety; no intention was attributed to
him to end his life or that he wantonly courted death. He
wanted to return home as it was getting late, and even
helped in the loading and unloading of the palay to the
banca and truck, to finish the work that day. It is claimed
that the deceased wanted to return home, because he
was to drive the new truck of his brother-in-law, and he
was in such a hurry that he unheeded the suggestion of
his companion not to embark any more, as it was dark
and the banca was fully loaded. Conceding this to be
true, for the purpose of argument, (Barawid can no
longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death),
still the disregard of the warning, can not be considered
as a notorious negligence.
Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition, does
not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no
intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.
The deceased did not act with the full knowledge of the
existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would
counsel him to avoid such a case. That a banca loaded
with palay and 3 persons, at night time, would sink if one
person more was added to its weight, constituted merely
a miscalculation on the part of such person, if he thought
it would be safe for him to embark, the alleged
overloading notwithstanding Barawid's promptness in
accomplishing his duties, to enable him to attend his
personal interest thereafter, cannot be a valid reason to
deny him the right to be compensated.
Katya Chanyee
ENAO V EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts:
 Petitioner is a teacher
 She was ambushed while traveling to buy school
supplies
Issue
WON ECC erred in dismissing petitioner’s claim for
compensation of Income benefits due to injuries
sustained
Ruling
YES, ECC judgment set aside
Legal Basis:
Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.—(a) For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during
his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official
function.
Case at bar:
 The Petitioner intended to procure supplies and
other training aids which are needed facilities in
connection with her services as a school teacher
at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all
disputed.
 The companions of the Petitioner at the time of
the ambush have attested that they and the
Petitioner were at that time on their way to
Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing
supplies and other training and school aids
necessary for the furtherance of their services
as school teachers."
 There is no mention at an in the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission that this
particular assertion has been at all contradicted
or controverted by any evidence whatsoever
submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.
 Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any
evidence, then such statements of appellant's
witnesses would suffice to establish that the
multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained
by appellant and which caused her confinement
 The conjecture expressed in the decision of the
ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-
serving declaration of her witnesses "in
anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and
untenable. Petitioner could not have even
expected that respondent GSIS would resist her
claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries
she sustained is said to have been presented to
the Secretary of Education and Culture, through
the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division
of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City,
promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days
after the ambush incident and such claim was
not controverted by said public school officials.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner
was actually then performing her official functions, it
hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner
was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside
the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's
place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to
purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner
would necessarily have to leave the school premises
and her travel need not be during her usual working
hours. What is significant and controlling is that the
injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the
Court finds to be so.
MURILLO V MENDOZA
Issue 1
whether or not the Workmen’s Compensation Act covers
maritime accidents occurring in the Philippine waters
YES
"SEC. 38. Interisland trade. — This Act shall cover the
liability of the employers towards employees engaged
in the coastwise and interisland trade, and also in the
foreign trade when such is permissible under the laws of
the United States and the Philippine Islands."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The applicability of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to
accidents occurring in the Philippine seas has been
discussed for the first time in the case of Enciso v. Dy-
Liacco (57 Phil., 446 et seq.) , where the question was
decided affirmatively
Issue 2
whether or not Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No.
3812, includes responsibilities for damages arising from
unforeseen acts wherein no fault or negligence not
punishable by law has intervened
The workmen’s compensation acts are based on a new
theory of compensation distinct from the theories of
damages, payments under the acts being made as
compensation, not as indemnity
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the
Workmen’s Compensation Act was to secure workmen
and their dependents against becoming objects of
charity, by making a reasonable compensation for such
accidental calamities as are incidental to the
employment. Under such Act injuries to workmen and
employees are to be considered no longer as results of
fault or negligence, but as the products of the industry in
which the employee is concerned.
MUST ARISE OUT IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
Compensation for such injuries is, under the theory of
such statute, like any other item in the cost of production
or transportation, and ultimately charged to the
consumer. The law substitutes for liability for negligence
an entirely new conception; that is, that if the injury
arises out of and in the course of the employment, under
the doctrine of man’s humanity to man, the cost of
compensation must be one of the elements to be
liquidated and balanced in the course of consumption. In
other words, the theory of the law is that, if the industry
produces an injury, that cost of that injury shall be
included in the cost of the product of the industry.
Hence the provision that the injury must arise out of
and in the course of the employment (Mobile & O. R. Co.
v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d], 228, 229).
Under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812,
accidents are compensated independently of whether
or not the employer has incurred fault or negligence,
and the only exceptions thereto are the accidents arising
from the voluntary act of the injured person, those
resulting from the drunkenness of the employee who
had the accident, and those caused by the notorious
negligence thereof (section 4, Act No. 3428).
Issue 3
WON the death of Petitioner arose out of his
employment
YES
Taking into consideration all of these circumstances, it is
clear that his death is compensable under the law on
the ground that a causal relation existed between such
death and the conditions under which he had to
perform his employment. It is obvious that the typhoon
was the immediate cause of the sinking of the vessel
and that there existed no causal relation between it and
the employment of the deceased. It is evident, however,
that between the conditions and circumstances under
which the deceased discharged his employment and his
death, there existed the causal connection which makes
the accident compensable.
The doctrine is generally accepted that the employer is
not responsible for accidents arising from force majeure
or an act of God, as it is usually called, when the
employee has not been exposed to a greater danger than
usual. However, in the case of the deceased and in that
of a sailor, it cannot be denied that upon contracting
their services to navigate in the waters of the
archipelago, having to render extraordinary services in
cases of typhoon, they are exposed to greater risk than
usual, in comparison with other employees working on
land.
TALLER V INCHAUSTI
Issue
whether the death of Valentin Nava occurred in the
course of his employment, or was the result of the nature
of such employment
Legal basis: section 2 of Act No. 3428, which runs as
follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any
employee receives a personal injury from any accident
due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment
or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the
persons hereinafter specified.
This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812
so as to read as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any
employee receives a personal injury from any accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such
employment, or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the
sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

TFixing our attention then more particularly upon section

2 of Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the death of
Valentin Nava was not due to any illness directly caused
by his employment or the result of the nature of such
employment. We are of the opinion, however, that it
occurred in the course of his employment and "in
pursuance of the employment", as this expression is
used in the provision cited.
Contention of Respondents
inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was
acting within the scope of his duties only when his hand
was on the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in
actually guiding its motions.

Case at Bar
We are of the opinion that his duties should be
considered as having greater latitude. It is true that the
term indicative of his employment was that of
helmsman, but we think that his duties should be
considered as comprehending acts done by him in
helping to guide the ship.

In maneuvering a vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it

is necessary for the ship's officers in charge of the
motions of the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and
the taking in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the deck
are acts properly incident to controlling the motion of
the vessel. It results that, when Nava found that one of
the third-class passengers had placed his bed on the deck
in a position where it was in his way, he acted within the
scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and
when the fatal assault was made upon him because of
that act, it must be considered that his death resulted
from an act done in the line of his duty.
Naf Kuit
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY vs.
GALICANO A. RIVERA and THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
FACTS:
The Batangas Transportation Co. appeals by certiorari
from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission dated June 27, 1958, holding said company
liable for compensation to its employee Galicano Rivera
for the loss of his left leg.
The loss of Galicano Rivera’s leg was due to the collision
of petitioner’s bus and a jeepney. As gleaned from his
petition and his brief, petitioner predicates his appeal on
the following:
1. that the injury suffered by respondent Rivera did not
arise out of his employment;
2. that the injury was due to Rivera's own "notorious
negligence";
3. that the Workmen's Compensation Commission
made conclusions which find "absolutely no support
in the evidence on record"; xxx
ISSUE: WON the injury is compensable
RULING: YES.
Since the injury was received while the claimant was
driving the bus; i. e., while performing the very duty he
was employed to perform, the injury clearly arose "out
of and in the course" of employment and is
compensable. As to the affirmative defense of
"notorious negligence", petitioner had the burden to
establish by substantial evidence the facts constituting
such kind of negligence, a task in which the record shows
he failed, since even the alleged excessive speed at which
claimant allegedly drove the bus is not proved.
DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION vs. HON. N.
BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.
FACTS: Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some
lumber from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally
overturned on the road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was
killed instantly together with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr.
On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen's
Compensation saw differently. He found no such
negligence, and awarded compensation. Fifteen days
after receiving copy of such award, the Davao Gulf
moved for reconsideration by the Commission as a
whole. It happened, however, that there was a rule of
the Commission which provided:
"Sec. 3. Disposition of Appeal. — The Commissioner to
whom an appealed case is assigned by the Chairman shall
decide the same on its merit. Either appellee or
appellant, or both, may seek the reconsideration of the
decision of a Commissioner by the Commission en banc
within 10 days from receipt of said decision."
So, pursuant to such rule, the Commission denied the
motion for being out of time.
ISSUE: WON Vicente’s death is compensable
RULING: YES. Accidents which are caused by the worn-
out condition of the motor vehicles, are compensable. In
our opinion, the truck was running fast just before
overturning because it was then on a slope, and (as
declared by the Commission) the "gear of the truck went
out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that
the brake "would not function." As to the fourth and fifth
circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says the
Company consented to or authorized the trip.
Concerning the non-registration of the truck in the Motor
Vehicle Of ce, and its defective condition — there is no
nding that the driver knew this at the time of driving.
Registration of the vehicle was not his concern.
As to the presence of members of his family in the
vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company
regulations, it is not certain that it caused the accident.
Indeed, as his wife and children were present, this driver
must have been extremely careful — not reckless. What
happened must have been unforeseen, it may only be
blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor
transport, or to "accident," for which the employer is
responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of
the deceased's regular duties as driver. (Sec. 2, Act No.
3428 as amended by Republic Act 772.)
The death was, consequently, compensable.
ISSUE: When is the “15-day period” for appeal
applicable?
RULING: The period of fifteen days for appeal provided
in Section 50 of Republic Act No. 772 refers to appeals
from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission to the Supreme Court, and not to appeals
from the decision of one Commissioner to the
Commission en banc.
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO
FACTS:
Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO,
while walking on his way home, was shot to death in
front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main
IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the
IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard
to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for
the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was
himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death.
ISSUE: Is “assault” compensable?
RULING: YES.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of
the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the
meaning of Sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that
"the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen,
an act for which the injured party is not legally
responsible."
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been
work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava,
supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling
the ship's cable and in coiling it on the deck of the boat
preparatory to passing it down a hatchway. He found the
space necessary for coiling the cable party occupied by a
folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger,
upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed.
Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way
and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger
exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece
of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this
point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and
stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged
compensable.
It has been said that an employment may either increase
risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-
matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind
of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs
comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as
that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying
or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed
to lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that
which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate
contact with the public, such as the job of a street car
conductor or taxi-driver; (2) jobs where the employee is
placed in a dangerous environment; and (3) jobs of
employees whose work takes them on the highway. On
the other hand, the employment itself may be the
subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as
where a supervisor is assaulted by a workmen he has
fired, or where the argument was over the performance
of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the
violence was due to labor disputes.
This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is
presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.
ISSUE: WON an injury sustained in an “access area” may
be treated as employer’s premises and is legally
compensable
RULING: YES.
That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very
close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employee's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so
intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the
chief means of entering the IDEGO premises, either for
the public or for its employees. The IDEGO uses it, if
extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of
passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of
easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was
using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDEGO
was under obligation to keep the place safe for its
employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the
employees might encounter therein, one of these
dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to
take the proper security measures over the said area
which it controls, the IDEGO is liable for the injuries
suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER
SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD vs. ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS
FACTS: Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of
Employment with petitioner.
Respondent, while carrying a heavy basketful of re
hydrant caps, felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain
that radiated down to the left side of his hips. After a few
days, the pain became severe, and respondent had dif
culty walking.
Dr. Almeda declared that respondent was unfit to work
at sea in any capacity as a seaman.
Petitioners received a letter dated December 16, 2003
from respondent's counsel, demanding the payment of
disability benefit.
Respondent stated he is entitled to a higher disability
benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, since his injury
resulted from an accident while carrying a basketful of
heavy fire hydrant caps on board the vessel.
Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay
him disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00,
among others.
Petitioner countered that it is the POEA Standard
Contract for Seafarers, and not the CBA, that governs this
case. They stated that Black's Law Dictionary defined
"accident" as an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected,
unforeseen or unlooked for event. They argued that
respondent's disability was not the result of an accident,
as respondent was merely performing his normal duty of
transporting re hydrant caps from the deck to the engine
workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps.
ISSUE: WON the disability suffered by respondent was
caused by an accident
RULING: NO.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as "[a]n
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence;
something that does not occur in the usual course of
events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, . . .
[a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not
attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or
misconduct."
The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word
"accident" as "[t]hat which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."
"Accident," in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its
ordinary sense, has been defined as:
[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an
event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual and
unexpected by the person to whom it happens . . . .
The word may be employed as denoting a calamity,
casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or
unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury
resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence;
any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes
injury, loss, suffering or death; some untoward
occurrence aside from the usual course of events."
The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent
was not an accident, but an injury sustained by
respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of re
hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The
injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that
is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous
event, because the injury resulted from the performance
of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected
the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying
heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened
in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as
unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous
with the term "accident" as defined above. aDECHI
ISSUE: Is the accident compensable?
RULING: YES.
Although the disability of respondent was not caused by
an accident, his disability is still compensable under
Article 13 of the CBA under the following provision:
A seafarer/of cer who is disabled as a result of any injury,
and who is assessed as less than 50% permanently
disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea
in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100%
compensation.
The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda
in his Medical Report for declaring respondent unfit to
work in any capacity as a seaman. Respondent is,
therefore, entitled to disability bene t in the amount of
US$90,000.00 under the CBA, thus:
A seafarer/of cer who is disabled as a result of any injury,
and who is assessed as less than 50% permanently
disabled, but permanently un t for further service at sea
in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100%
compensation.
KC Confessor
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES VS WCC (1956)
FACTS:
The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.(MIMA)
questions by certiorari the order of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s
award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador
for his accidental death.
Deceased Mamador together with other laborers of
MIMA boarded a truck belonging to the latter driven by
its employee Macunat on their way to their place of work
at the mine camp. The truck met an accident resulting in
the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.
Driver Macunat was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased. He has paid nothing however, to the latter.
MIMA is now denying its liability under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended. It maintains that this
claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, because
(a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased and
(b) an amicable settlement was concluded between
said heirs and Macunat.
ISSUE: w/n the criminal case and its outcome constituted
an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third
person, such election having the effect of releasing the
employer?
HELD: NO
Section 6 provides as follows:
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under
this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall
be optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue
such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in
accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such
compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall
succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering
from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case
the employer recovers from such third person damages
in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such
excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any
other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the
expenses of the employer and the costs of the
proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for
compensation or the amount of compensation to which
the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”
Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages
against the third person, it being alleged, without
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and
have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the
court. At any rate, we have already decided in Nava vs.
Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity granted the heirs in a
criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not
affect the liability of the employer to pay
compensation.
As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an
affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s
widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong
committed and not to bring him before the authorities
for prosecution.” Upon making such promise
— Petitioner argues — she elected one of the remedies,
(against the third person) and is barred from the other
remedy (against the employer). The contention may not
be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow promised was to
forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. Note further
that a question may be raised whether she could bind the
other heirs of the deceased.
CHAVEZ VS AMMEN TRANSCO (1955)
FACTS:
A.L. Ammen Transportation Co is a bus company. It had
a subsidiary station in the municipality of Tigaon, Albay,
provided with a shop for the repair of the company's
buses. Felipe Chavez, by occupation a mechanic, was
employed as such in this subsidiary station, which was
under management of Emilio Esperida. Mechanic Chavez
was examining an automobile placed in the grease-rack
and the car fell off the grease-rack and caught Chavez
under it causing his death.
Company argues that it had express ban to repair in the
shop any machine not belonging to the company. And
conformably thereto, it is further contended, Esperida,
who was in the shop when the car was brought, had it
removed therefrom. But, despite his express prohibition,
Chavez brought the car again to the shop, placed it in the
grease rack and started repairing it until it fell off and
caught him under it.
ISSUE: responsibility of an employer for an act
committed by its agent supposedly in violation of rules
and regulations promulgated and enforced by the
employer, which act resulted in the death of another
agent of laborer whose heirs now claim compensation
against the employer under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. (whether Chavez died in line of
duty?)

HELD: YES
While, according to the testimony of Emilio Esperida
defendant's shop in Tigaon does not accept outside jobs,
this is immaterial in-so-far as Felipe Chavez was
concerned. Felipe Chavez was an auto mechanic and was
under the immediate control and supervision and
orders of defendant's managing agent Emilio Esperida.

As such auto mechanic he had no choice but to obey the

orders of its managing agent. Any work performed by
Felipe Chavez in pursuance to the orders of defendant's
managing agent, necessarily arise out of and in the
course of the employment of the defendant. Felipe
Chavez had no discretion to choose the work which he
must perform for the company. His duty was to perform
such work as was required of him by defendant's
managing agent. To refuse the order of the managing
agent may result in the loss of his employment. If
defendant's managing agent had violated any company
rule prohibiting the performance of outside jobs, then he
alone must be held responsible to the company.

But certainly the defendant company relieve itself of its

obligation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on
the theory that its agent had violated the company
regulation. Defendant, as a corporation, necessarily
must rely on its agents, and it is from these agents that
the employees receive their orders. To accept
defendant's theory would enable it to evade its
responsibility in many cases under the Workmen's
Compensation Law on the ground that its agents had
exceeded, or acted beyond their authority. Such
certainly could not have been the intention of the law.

In conclusion, we hold that although the repair

attempted to be made on the Governor's car was in
technical violation of the rules of Company, such
violation was committed not by Chavez but by Esperida
himself, who from the standpoint of Chavez acted for the
company in ordering the repair, which order Chavez
could not well ignore. We, therefore, agree with the trial
court and hold that the heirs of Chavez may recover
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Whether the
company may recover the amount to be paid by it from
Esperida, we do not now attempt to determine.
Dane Viola
HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs. THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER
FACTS:
Romeo Suataron was killed by Benigno Duazo using the
former’s gun on January 29, 1952, while both under the
employment of the Hawaiian- Philippine Company, as
security guards or special policemen thereof.
After shooting Suataron, Duazo shot himself too by
placing the muzzle of the shotgun under his chin, near his
throat and pressed the trigger.
Investigations lead to the conclusion that the killer acted
without criminal intent and the death of Suataron was
purely accidental and was ruled to be a result of
horseplay or larking.
ISSUE: Are the widow and children of the deceased,
Romeo Suataron, entitled to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Act
RULING: YES. If the death of the deceased was the result
of horseplay or larking among employees the courts have
also declared the same as a compensable accident.
Sections 2 and 4 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic
Act No. 772, provide:
"SEC 2. Grounds for compensation. — When an
employee suffers personal injury from any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, or
contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly cause by
such employment, or either aggravated by or the result
of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter
specified. The right to compensation as provided in this
Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground
that the death, injury or disease was due to the
negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without
prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed
against the negligent party."
"SEC. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not
be allowed for injuries caused: (1) by the voluntary intent
of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or
another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the
laborer who had the accident; and (3) by notorious
negligence of the same."
It is not denied that the death of Romeo Suataron
occurred in the course of his employment and it was
ruled that the deceased was not guilty of notorious
negligence simply because a co-employee was able to
take hold of and play with his gun. If at all, he was merely
guilty of simple negligence as he was supposed to keep
the gun in his possession at all times whenever he was
on duty. But this should not in any way deprive him of his
compensation under the law.
MEÑEZ vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
FACTS:
Meñez was employed by the Department of Education &
Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31,
1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54
years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she
was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-
Binondo, Manila — near a dirty creek.
On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
with respondent Government Service Insurance System
ECC and GSIS contend that petitioner's ailments of
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the
occupational diseases listed as compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under
Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation;
and, that respondent ECC's decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical
findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on
the matter.
ISSUE: WON Meñez is entitled to disability benefits under
PD 626?
RULING: Yes.
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation clearly establish that for an illness to be
compensable, it must either be:
1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease; or
2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by
the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.
An occupational disease is one "which results from the
nature of the employment, and by nature is meant
conditions to which all employees of a class are subject
and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a
particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a
hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the
employment in general"
From the foregoing definition of occupational diseases or
ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be
considered as such occupational diseases. Being exposed
to emotional strains, stresses, and unhealthy
environment, these unwholesome conditions are
"normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards
peculiar to" the occupation of a public high school
teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis
and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of
petitioner's occupation as such public high school
teacher. The Court thus found petitioner to have
substantially shown that the risk of contracting her
ailments had been increased by unfavorable working
conditions.
Furthermore, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the
enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities
of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and
emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers
when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers
shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The
effects of the physical and nervous strain on the
teachers' health shall be recognized as compensable
occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja
vs. Republic, et al., L-43317, December 29, 1978).
VDA. DE INGUILLO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GSIS
FACTS:
Enrique V. Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as a
janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo,
Manila. He was in the government service for thirty-one
(31) years.
From 24 February to 5 June 1978, he was confined at the
Veteran's Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty
in swallowing of food, solid and liquid, accompanied by
chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and productive
cough." He died on 20 June 1978, at the age of 52, the
cause of death being attributed to "Terminal malignancy,
Poorly differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with
Bone and Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia"
The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo, filed a claim for
death benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on
the ground that the cause of death, cancer of the
esophagus, is not an occupational disease.
Petitioner's position is anchored on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule
on controversion, the presumption of compensability,
and the principle of aggravation.
Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in
the hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and
that he later died on 20 June 1978, and absent any
evidence as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the
new Labor Code that becomes the governing law. As
specifically provided in Article 208 of said Code, its
provisions cover "injury, sickness, disability or death
occurring on or after January 1, 1975." The recent case
of Rosales vs. ECC (G.R. No. 46443, June 28, 1988)
implemented that provision when it held that "in
workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is
determined by the date on which the claimant
contracted his illness."
The concepts relied on by petitioner under the former
Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, have ceased
to apply, having been expressly discarded under the
compensation scheme in the new Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the death of Inguillo is compensable under
the Labor Code
RULING:
Under the Labor Code, the ECC is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable
based on peculiar hazards of employment.
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation states:
"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."
In the recent case of Raro vs. Employees' Compensation
Commission (G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989), it was held
that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not
compensable. It is a disease that strikes people in
general. The nature of a person's employment appears
to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government Service
Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988), the preparing seats for pupils during school programs, as
Court further elucidated that unless it be shown that a well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing
particular form of cancer is caused by specific working him to occasional "wetting and chilling' from downpours
conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, and rains.
asbestos dust, etc.) it cannot be concluded that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was
disease. increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying
an additional condition for compensability.
However, ECC failed to adequately take into
consideration that there was another cause of death, While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to
which was "pneumonia." Under the same Annex "A" of consider pneumonia compensable do not concur, there
the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, is substantial compliance therewith, added to the fact
pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational disease "under that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules
all the following conditions:" may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who
has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy
"(a) There must be an honest and definite history of of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
wetting and chilling during the course of employment,
also industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib
fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other
deleterious substances in the place of work.
"(b) There must be a direct connection between the
offending agent or event and the worker's illness.
"(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon
(within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling
and fever should at least be twenty-four (24) hours after
the injury.
"(d) The patient must present one of the following
findings within a few days of the accident:

. (1) Severe chill and fever. 


. (2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in
the side. 

. (3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged
expectoration. 

. (4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine
rales"

Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of

"difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was
accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of breathing,
fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some
of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which
by itself can also be a killer disease.

A review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will

show that they included the regular use of "deleterious
substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which
are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet
bowls and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing
connections. The deceased also performed other varied
manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping
school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of
dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms,
Allexa Campaner
EMILIA VDA. DE INGUILLO vs. EMPOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
Facts:
Petitioner’s husband, the late Enrique Inguillo, during his
lifetime worked as a janitor at E. Jacinto Elementary
School in Tondo, Manila. He was in the government
service for 31 years.
From Feb 5 to June 5 1978, he was confined at the
Veterans Hospital on “complaints of difficulty in
swallowing of food, solid and liquid, accompanied by
chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and productive
cough.” He died on June 20 1978 the cause of death
being attributed to “Terminal malignancy, Poorly
Differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone
and Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia”
Petitioner surviving spouse filed a claim for death
benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on the
ground that the cause of death, cancer of the esophagus,
is not an occupational disease. Petitioner appealed to
respondent ECC.
ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed petitioner’s
claim.
Petitioner’s position is anchored on the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule
on controversion, the presumption of compensability,
and the principle of aggravation.
Issue:
(1) WON the Workmens Comensation Act is applicable,
or is it the Labor Code which should apply
(2) WON the death of petitioner’s husband is
compensable under the Labor Code
Held:
(1) The Workmen’s Compensation Act is applicable.
Considering the deceased was confined in the
hospital from Feb 24 to Jun 5 1978, and later died at
Jun 20, and absent any evidence as to when his
ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code that
becomes the governing law. As specifically provided
in Art 208 of said code, its provisions cover “injury,
sickness, disability or death occurring on or after
January 1, 1975.” The recent case of Rosales vs. ECC
implemented that provision when it held that “in
workmen’s compensation cases, the governing law is
determined by the date on which the claimant
contracted his illness.
(2) Yes.
Art 167 (12) of the Labor Code defines compensable
sickness as:
"Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any
illness caused by employment subject to proof that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is
empowered to determine and approve occupational
diseases and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of
employment.
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation further amplifies:
"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."
Definitely, "esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and
cervical metastasis" can not be considered as an
occupational disease since it is not one of those listed
under Annex "A" of the mentioned Rules. In the recent
case of Raro vs. Employees' Compensation Commission,
it was held that cancer ailments, except for a specified
few, are not compensable. It is a disease that strikes
people in general. The nature of a person's employment
appears to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government
Service Insurance System, this Court further elucidated
that unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer
is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical
fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we can
not conclude that it was the employment which
increased the risk of contracting the disease.
We note, however, that respondent ECC failed to
adequately take into consideration that there was
another cause of death, which was "pneumonia." Under
the same Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a qualifiedly
occupational disease "under all the following
conditions:"
"(a) There must be an honest and definite history of
wetting and chilling during the course of employment,
also industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib
fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other
deleterious substances in the place of work.
"(b) There must be a direct connection between the
offending agent or event and the worker's illness.
"(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon
(within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling
and fever should at least be twenty-four (24) hours after
the injury.
"(d) The patient must present one of the following
findings within a few days of the accident:
(1) Severe chill and fever.
(2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side.
(3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged
expectoration.
(4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales" (ECC
Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1988).
Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of
"difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was
accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of breathing,
fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some
of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which
by itself can also be a killer disease. Further, a review of
the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that
they included the regular use of "deleterious substances"
such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled
when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and
unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The
deceased also performed other varied manual work such
as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors,
with the resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy
objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils
during school programs, as well as going to and from his
place of work thus exposing him to occasional "wetting
and chilling' from downpours and rains. The combination
of all these, coupled with the fact that the decedent was
working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area
characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy
pollution, must have lowered his resistance to fight the
microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of
contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased
by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an
additional condition for compensability.
While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to
consider pneumonia compensable do not concur, there
is substantial compliance therewith, added to the fact
that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules
may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who
has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy
of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor
EULALIO GALANIDA vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
Facts:
Petitioner Eulalio Galanida started working for the
government on November 8, 1948 as a
messenger/janitor at the Bureau of Agricultural
Extension Office in Tagbilaran City. Subsequently, he was
promoted to Clerk and, finally, to Administrative Officer
II of the Ministry of Agriculture until he retired on
December 10, 1983. Galanida's medical records reveal
that sometime in 1955, he complained of facial distortion
and numbness accompanied by the blurring of vision and
headache. According to the petitioner, he suffered
irregular sleep and heart palpitation, as well as pain in
both extremities for several years. From May 15 to 29,
1972, he was confined at the Bohol Provincial Hospital
for hemorrhoidectomy.
On January 18, 1983, the petitioner filed a claim for
disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626
with the GSIS. On March 9, 1983, the GSIS disapproved
the claim on the ground that the claimant's ailments are
not occupational diseases and there was no showing that
his work had increased the risk of contracting the same.
The petitioner elevated his case to the ECC and on
November 27, 1984, the ECC affirmed the decision of the
GSIS.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s claim should be granted
Held: NO
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, we find
no justifiable reason to reverse the decision of the ECC.
The petitioner's ailments were diagnosed to be the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) Bells Palsy — is an acute lower Motor Neuron Palsy
of the facial nerve, characterized by pain, weakness or
paralysis of the affected side of the face
(2) Anxiety Neurosis — is a progressive disintegration of
personal instability arising in the course of the
intercurrent illness.
(3) Peripheral Neuritis — is a syndrome of sensory motor,
reflect and basomotor reflex symptoms produced by
lesion of nerve root on peripheral nerves.
The above-mentioned diseases are not among those
listed as occupational diseases under Annex "A" of P.D.
626 nor has the petitioner shown proofs that the risk of
contracting the diseases was increased by his
employment's working conditions as Administrative
Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture in Manila as
provided by Section 1(b), Rule III, Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation. As we have repeatedly held,
the doctrines of aggravation and presumption of
compensability under the former Workmen's
Compensation Act are no longer provided by law under
the present social insurance scheme.
Considering that the illnesses are not occupational
diseases, it was, therefore, necessary for the petitioner
to present proof that he contracted them in the course
of his employment at the Ministry of Agriculture.
Unfortunately, he failed in this regard. In his petition for
review, the petitioner alleges that the "cleaning of rooms
as janitor and subsequently the amount of paperwork
thereby forcing him to render overtime, increased the
risk of contracting said ailments." This is a mere
allegation which needs to be proved. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.
Despite the request made by the respondent the
petitioner failed to submit evidence or proofs such as a
certification signed by the employer as to inclusive dates
of leave of absences or sick leaves, medical certificates,
hospital records and/or clinical records of
confinement/consultation so as to substantiate his claim
for compensation under P.D. 626. There is absolutely no
showing how the work of a janitor increased the risk of
contracting the petitioner's ailments.
Moreover, the petitioner's attending physician, Dr.
Segundo Racho categorically stated that the petitioner's
ailments are not work-connected. Hence, the
petitioner's claim for disability compensation under P.D.
626 has no factual basis.
Even if we applied the ruling in Corales v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, as contended by the
petitioner, his claim for compensation will still not
prosper.
The records show that the symptoms of the petitioner's
ailments upon which he could base his claim for
compensation under the Corales doctrine became
manifest in 1955. His right to claim for compensation,
therefore, accrued as early as that date. Hence, the law
to be applied under his contention would be the
Workmen's Compensation Act following the principle
that in workmen's compensation commission cases, the
governing law is to be determined by the date on which
the claimant contracted his illness. The right founded on
statute prescribes in ten (10) years which are counted
from the date of disability. In the instant case, the
petitioner alleged that in the years 1954-1955, he was
treated by several doctors and confined twice in the
hospital for the ailments earlier mentioned. He,
therefore, had until 1964-1965 within which to file his
claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. And even
if we counted the ten-year period from the date of his
hospitalization for hemorrhoidectomy on May 15 to 29,
1972, the claim filed only in January 18, 1983 is obviously
beyond the prescriptive period. Moreover,
hemorrhoidectomy has never been mentioned as the
basis of his claim. The petitioner, therefore, failed to
seasonably raise his claim for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, assuming its applicability.
CAROLINA CLEMENTE vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan
City) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
Facts:
Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for
ten (10) years a janitor in the Department of Health
(Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic,
Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14,
1976, due to his ailment of 'nephritis,' as per medical
certification of his attending physician. He was also
found to be suffering from such ailments as portal
cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's
Disease.
On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia
due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the
GSIS a claim for employees' compensation under the
Labor Code, as amended.
The GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the
ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases
taking into consideration the nature of his work and or
(sic) or were not in the least causally related to his duties
and conditions of work.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS'
denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her
husband were contracted in the course of employment
and were aggravated by the nature of his work.
Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the
Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct
contact with persons suffering from different skin
diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other
dirt which contributed to his ailment of Hansen's disease.
Petitioner stated that her husband's ailment recurred in
the course of employment presumably due to his direct
contact with persons suffering from this ailment.
The GSIS, on April 11, 1977, reiterated its previous denial
of her claim. On April 14, 1977, treating the request for
reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the
records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC.
On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS'
action of denial and rendered its own decision dismissing
petitioner's claim. Respondent ECC's decision was
anchored upon the findings that the ailments are not
listed as occupational diseases; that there was no
substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in
fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already
contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment.
As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases,
the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of
increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor
of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients
suffering from various kinds of skin diseases, including
Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years,
the deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings
and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was
during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful
diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and
nephritis.
On the other hand, the respondent ECC contends that
the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence
that the deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his
employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had
a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated possibly
by the nature of his employment and that there is no
evidence on record showing that the nature of the
deceased's employment was the direct cause of any of
his illnesses.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s contention (based on doctrine of
increased risk) should succeed
Held: Yes.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission
we held that:
"Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. There are no stringent criteria to follow.
The degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely
substantial evidence, which means, 'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion'. The claimant must show, at
least, by substantial evidence that the development of
the disease is brought largely by the conditions present
in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the
workmen's claim is based is probable”
In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to
sustain the petitioner's view.
The records disclose that in resisting the petitioner's
claim, the respondent Commission cited the following
medical authorities:
"Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated
with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of
nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia). Xxx
(medical bullshit)
"Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by
increased connective tissue that spreads from the portal
spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver
functions. Etiology, Incidence and pathology: Portal
cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life.
Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing if not a
primary etiology factor. Xxxx (other useless shit)
"Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary
tumor of the liver destroying the parenchyma arise (sic)
from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops
most frequently in the previous cirrhosis liver. Xxx (blah
blah)
"Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious
disease characterized by both cutaneous and
constitutional symptoms and the production of various
deformities and mutilations. The causative organism is
an acid fast rod. Xxxx (blah)
The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr.
Daniel Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees'
Compensation Department, in his letter dated February
4, 1977, denying
petitioner's claim, as follows:
"Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the
glomeruli or kidneys. It usually follows previous
streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory
tract. Because of this, it is always thought that nephritis
is the result of an auto-immune or allergic reaction to
infection, usually streptococcal."

The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the

theory of increased risk, We note that the major ailments
of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be
traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of
leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the
discharge from lesions of persons with active cases. It is
believed that the bacillus enters the body through the
skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and
throat.

The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As

janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was
exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial
diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients
with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in
order the hospital equipments that had been used. He
had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated
in the course of each working day. He was the employee
most exposed to the dangerous concentration of
infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner,
least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is,
therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr.
Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the
risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments.

This Court has held in appropriate cases that the

conservative posture of the respondents is not
consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor
Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the
Constitution in favor of the workers. It clashes with the
injunction in the Labor Code that, as a rule, doubts
should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee.
Jane Borbe
NARAZO VS. ECC, GR. 80157
Geronimo Narazo was employed for 38 as Budget
Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of
Negros Occidental. When Narazo died, his medical
records show that he was confined 3 times and
thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive
nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy",
commonly known as "Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim
with the GSIS for death benefits for the death of her
husband, under the Employees’ Compensation Law (PD
626, as amended).
To establish compensability under the increased risk
theory, the claimant must show proof of reasonable
work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation.
The degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence as will
support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence.
The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget
Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the
detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and
review and/or examination of the budget of other
provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and
thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget
and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the
deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not,
delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt
the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and
pressure must have aggravated the situation.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it has been held that
the the cause of death of petitioner’s husband is work-
connected, so much so that petitioner is entitled to
receive compensation benefits for the death of her
husband. The petitioner can claim for benefits under PD
626 as amended.
LIMBO VS ECC AND GSIS, GR. 146891
Ruben T. Limbo was employed at Nestlé Philippines, as
Area Sales Supervisor. Sometime in 1994, Limbo was
confined for one week at the hospital where it was
discovered that he had chronic renal disease and he
underwent kidney transplant. Limbo filed a claim for
compensation benefits before the Social Security System
(SSS), invoking Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as
amended.
Under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
"for the sickness and the resulting disability to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions." Concededly, "end-stage renal
disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy" is not
among the Occupational Diseases. This, however, would
not automatically bar petitioner’s claim for as long as he
could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was
increased by his working conditions.
Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of
petitioner in this case, it is reasonable for him to develop
hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It should be
stressed that in determining whether a disease is
compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable
work connection. Petitioner here also submitted his
medical certificate.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, a physician’s report
is the best evidence of work-connection of workmen’s
ailments and can be the basis of an award even if the
physician was not presented as a witness. There is no
reason to doubt the findings of Dr. Mejia who is an expert
in her field of work. Verily, petitioner was able to show
that his ailment was work-related. Social Security
System was ordered to pay petitioner the compensation
benefits due him under P.D. 626.
RINO VS ECC AND SSS, GR. 132558
Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are
awarded only when the cause of death is listed as an
occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation
Commission, or when the claimant presents proof that
the working conditions increased the risk of contracting
the fatal disease.
Virgilio T. Riño Sr. was employed by Allied Port Services
Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. Sometime in 1992,
Virgilio collapsed while working. He was rushed to the
hospital. He was found to have been suffering melena,
fever, chills and abdominal pains, and died three days
later. The cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to
chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. His
wife filed a claim for death benefits before the Social
Security System (SSS).
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the beneficiaries of
an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause
of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by
the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment,
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions.
Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable
connection between the work of the deceased and the
cause of his death. There was no showing that the
progression of the disease was brought about largely by
the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner
presented no medical history, records or physician's
report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia,
renal failure or glomerulonephritis.
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño's
death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence,
petitioner should have presented substantial evidence,
or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion,
showing that the nature of her husband's employment
or working conditions increased the risk of uremia,
chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. This
the petitioner failed to do. Petition is denied.
SARMIENTO VS. ECC, GR. 65680
Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National
Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in
May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981
she was manager of the budget division. History of the
deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as
early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external
auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy
of the mass revealed cancer.
Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been
contracted by her during employment was service-
connected, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
Under the present law, a compensable illness means any
illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by
the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any
illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma
or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational
disease considering the deceased's employment as
accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget
division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his
wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her
working conditions increased the risk of her contracting
the fatal illness. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause
and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known.
Petition is denied.
HILARIA DABATIAN vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (General Services Department,
Cagayan de Oro City)
Facts:
At the time of his death, Sigfredo A. Dabatian was
employed as Garbage Truck Driver in the General
Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan
de Oro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned
mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the time of his death
his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to
6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered
from the evidence on record that the deceased was a
heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off
sleepiness.
Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees
to have been getting paler and weaker while at work
until the time he collapsed and became unconscious
while on his tour duty and was brought to his residence
by his companions. Despite hospitalization, he died two
weeks later on July 3, 1976.
A claim for income benefits under the Employee's
Compensation Program was filed by the widow. The GSIS
decided against the compensability of the claim on the
ground that decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not
definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed
under the present law on compensation. Neither was
there a showing that the same was directly caused by his
employment and that the risk of contracting the same
was increased by the working conditions attendant to
the deceased's employment.
ECC affirmed the GSIS ruling.
Issue:
WON under the premises the death of Sigfredo A.
Dabatian is compensable.
Held: NO.
The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976
when the old compensation law had already been
abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was
submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was
contracted prior to January 1,1975 in order to bring it
under the protective mantle of the old compensation
law.

The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished

the presumption of compensability and the rule on
aggravation of illness caused by the nature of
employment, the reason being — "to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work connected death or disability
. . . ." It was found, and rightly so, that the old law, the
Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or
balance between the competing interests of employer
and employee with respect to workmen's compensation.
The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen
since it was possible to stretch the work-related nature
of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.

Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee

to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness
or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have
resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as
an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or b)
any illness caused by employment subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.

Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of

occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission,
then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature
of her husband's work increased the risk of contracting
the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the
deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of
warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by
petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the ailment.

Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his

peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a
ground for compensation under the present law.
Ken Custodio
CASUMPANG VS. ECC
Nature: A petition to review the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission
Facts:
Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard. Upon its
conversion to a claim for income benefits for death
following the demise of said Jose Casumpang due to
Cancer of the Stomach, the claim is now being
prosecuted on appeal to this Commission by the herein
appellant-widow, Gliceria Casumpang. The System's
denial of the appellant's claim was predicated on the
ground that the cause of death is neither an occupational
disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of
occupation as Prison Guard.
The preponderance of mandatory legal postulate
requiring proof of causation once an ailment upon which
a claim is based is not considered an occupational
disease as defined and understood under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, would sub serve the
respondent System's findings that the above-titled claim
is not compensable.
Issue:
Whether or not cancer of the stomach is an occupational
disease and hence, compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended?
Held:
There is no dispute that prior to his demise Jose
Casumpang had ruptured duodenal ulcer with
generalized peritonitis. 'This condition according to
medical findings on record, worsened into cancer of the
stomach which disease finally caused his death. The
former ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976.
In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis
and melena which began in November 1975. In other
words, all of his ailments were after January 1, 1975. It is
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore,
which is applicable in this case and not the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
It is important to determine which law is applicable.
Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act
No. 3428 as amended. The claimant was relieved of the
duty to prove causation as it was then legally presumed
that the illness arose out of the employment under the
presumption of compensability. However, under the
new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption
of compensability have been stricken off by the
lawmaker as grounds for compensation. Cancer of the
stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming, vessels
was considered occupational only among woodworkers;
wood products industry carpenters, loggers and
employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
The complained illness is therefore not compensable
under the first group provided in the Labor Code.
Under the second ground for compensability, it should
be shown that an illness is caused by employment and
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. Petitioner did not demonstrate that
the adverse conditions mentioned above had direct
causal connection with his job which would develop into
cancer of the stomach.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
RODRIGUEZ VS. ECC
Facts:
Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a
public school teacher. On November 19, 1975 he went
on sick leave and was confined at the Hospital after
complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by
nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal
Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the
Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a surgical
operation which was performed on November 27,1975
but this proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on
December 2, 1975, he expired.
On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death
compensation under the Labor Code with respondent
Government Service Insurance System. The GSIS denied
the claim finding that the cause of the death of
petitioner's husband is not an occupational disease since
the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well as the
working conditions of his employment, could not have
directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his
subsequent death.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the deceased caused by
Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with
Obstruction of the Ascending Colon, is compensable?
Held:
The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence
concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor
Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death
benefits under Article 194, is that they must result from
an occupational disease. A compensable disease means
any illness accepted and listed by the Employees'
Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the
employment subject to proof by the employee that the
risk of contracting the same was increased by the
working conditions. If the disease is listed in the Table of
Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules
on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is
required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been held
that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is
required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. The fact that the cause of the disease
was not positively identified does not dispense with this
burden of proof.
It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged
by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not
enough to discharge the required quantum of proof,
liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the
disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which
developed in the deceased's colon may have been
growing for many years even before he was employed as
a teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what
really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of the
disease as described militates against a finding of a
causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have
caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither
satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the
activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the
regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have
been done every working day. It is safe to assume that
they were done only for certain limited periods of time
and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during
competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's
work as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or
greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-
styles. There is no showing that he did not engage in
other extraneous activities, aside from playing basketball
or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is
the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was
markedly obese, which circumstance may also have been
a causative or contributive factor considering the
etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
MORA, JR VS. ECC
Facts:
The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25,
1979 a telegraph operator of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Tacloban City. During the course
of her employment, and more particularly in January
1978, she complained of frequent epigastric pain
radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy conducted
at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed a
diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a
certain portion of the small intestine). She underwent
"exploratory laparotomy with resection of ileocaecal
junction" but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a
claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended,
with respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on
the ground that her ailment is not an occupational
disease considering her particular employment as
telegraph operator. Leticia Mora died.
Issue:
Whether or not the cause of death of the deceased is
compensable?
Held:
The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor
Code, PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness,
disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975.
The new law on employee's compensation makes
compensable disability or death arising from an ailment
under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the
illness is definitely accepted as an occupational disease
by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b)
when said illness is caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by the work conditions.
Thus, the New Labor Code particularly Art. 167 (1) as
amended by PD 1368, defining compensable illness,
provides:
(1) "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as
occupational disease listed by the Commission, or
any illness caused by employment subject to proof
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. For this purpose, the
Commission is empowered to determine and
approve occupational diseases and work-related
illnesses that may be considered compensable
based on peculiar hazards of employment.
The cause of the decedent's death is not listed in said
Annex "A" as occupational disease. To be compensable
thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the employment of the deceased.
But this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of
the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite
scientific advances on the matter, even professional
experts have not as yet determined its cause. However,
the requirement that the disease was caused or
aggravated by the employment or work applies only to
an illness where the cause can be determined or proved.
Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no
duty to prove the link exists. For certainly the law cannot
demand impossibility. Hence, the petition is granted.
OVENSON VS. ECC
Facts:
The late Serafin Ovenson started working in 1955 as
laborer in the Central Bank of the Philippines and later
on rose to various posts until he was appointed senior
trade analyst. His duties include: assisting the supervising
trade examiner in reviewing the verification,
examination and evaluation work made by a group of
trade analysts on reports of foreign sales, export
declarations/permits and mark-up computation reports
of embroidery exporters; preparing reports and
memoranda on findings relative to pricing, payment
terms and other conditions of sale which do not conform
to export regulations; preparing periodic
accomplishment reports and other duties that may be
assigned to him by his superior from time to time.
husband predisposed him to contract cancer of the
rectum.
The record reveals that the husband of the claimant
contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after 16 years
from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955.
Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical evaluation,
found that the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed
to genetic influence. Respondent ECC ruled that although
the true cause of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions
may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum and may
be aggravated during the course of employment if there
is sufficient proof presented by the claimant. But as ruled
by Us, this duty to prove exists only when the cause of
the disease is known. In a case like the present one, even
medical experts have not determined its cause, and
therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd
for the law to require impossibility. Thus, petition is
granted.

On March 29, 1981, Ovenson was confined at the Delos

Santos General Hospital due to on-and-off LBM which
started about one-and-a-half months before. Dr. Violeta
Roda, diagnosed his condition as "septicemia,
adenocarcinoma rectum and hypothyroidism." The claim
for death benefits filed by the widow under PD 626, as
amended, was denied by the respondent System based
on its medical evaluation that the fatal ailment, a
malignant new growth of the rectum which commences
in the mucous membrane and gradually invades the
deeper structure is attributed to genetic influence.

Issue:
Whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted by
Serafin Ovenson by reason of his employment?

Held:
Under the law 2 a "compensable sickness" means
1.) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the ECC, or
2.) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by
the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.

A cursory reading of the law shows that cancer of the

rectum is not listed by the ECC as one of the
compensable diseases. The next question therefore is
whether the working conditions of claimant's deceased
Manette Jaron
DE CLEMENTE v THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION (WCC)
Facts: Deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a
machine set-up man by Rattan. During his shift,
Clemente, while asleep, died of a heart failure. He was
survived by his widow and children who filed a claim for
death compensation benefits under the WCC.
The acting referee of the WCC rendered a decision in
favor of De Clementes. Upon motion of Rattan, the
decision of the acting referee was reversed. The
Commission upholds the allegations of Rattan that the
cause of death of the deceased commonly known as
"bangungot," is non-compensable, and that De
Clementes failed to establish the fundamental
preliminary link to connect the death of the deceased to
his work, thereby justifying a denial of the claim.
Issue: Whether the cause of the death of Ricardo had a
causal relation to the nature of his work while in Rattan's
employ.
Held: YES. The deceased was found to have died of
acute cardiorespiratory failure during his sleep,
commonly known as 'heart failure" and not of what
Rattan claims as "bangungot." While it is true that the De
Clementes failed to prove the causal link between the
cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his
work, yet, the Court cannot discount the probability that
his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his
illness that led to his death. Considering the nature of the
job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the
strenuous physical activity required in the performance
of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart, which
ultimately resulted in death.
To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the
death of the employee must be directly caused by his
employment or either aggravated by, or the result of the
nature of his employment. In the interpretation of this
rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect
to the compassionate spirit of the law as a social
legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely
requires is a reasonable work connection and not a
direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job
or working conditions present in the course of the
performance of one's duties. The degree of proof
required to establish work-connection between the
disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely
substantial evidence.
Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment,
there is a disputable presumption that the claim is
compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to
show causation as it is then legally presumed that the
illness arose out of the employment. The law presumes,
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,
that the claim for death or disability benefits is
compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial
evidence, the injury or sickness from the nature of the
employment is laid at the employer's door. So rigid is this
rule that, even where the cause of the employee's death
is unknown, the right to compensation subsists. The
reason for this is, that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the
working man. To give effect to this purpose, the Act must
be liberally construed in favor of the worker.
The exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is
not significant for, granted for the sake of argument that
the evidence of the claimant is insufficient to establish a
causal link between the nature of his employment and
his ailment under the provisions of Section 44 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, still, it is to
be presumed that the illness which supervened at the
time of his employment, either arose out of or was at
least aggravated by, such employment. This
presumption, rebuttable at its inception, becomes
conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer
to overcome the same.
GALANIDA v ECC
Facts: Eulalio Galanida works as a messenger/ janitor at
the Ministry of Agriculture. Subsequently, he was
promoted to Clerk and, finally, to Administrative Officer
II until he retired. His medical records reveal that he
complained of facial distortion and numbness
accompanied by the blurring of vision and headache.
According to Galanida, he suffered irregular sleep and
heart palpitation, as well as pain in both extremities for
several years. He was confined at the hospital for
hemorrhoidectomy.
Galanida filed a claim for disability benefits under PD No.
626 with the GSIS. GSIS disapproved the claim on the
ground that the claimant's ailments are not occupational
diseases and there was no showing that his work had
increased the risk of contracting the same. ECC affirmed
the decision of the GSIS.
Issue: Whether the diseases complained of by Galanida
are covered by GSIS.
Held: NO. The above-mentioned diseases are not
among those listed as occupational diseases under P.D.
626 nor has Galanida shown proofs that the risk of
contracting the diseases was increased by his
employment's working conditions as Administrative
Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture. Considering that
the illnesses are not occupational diseases, it was,
therefore, necessary for Galanida to present proof that
he contracted them in the course of his employment at
the Ministry of Agriculture. Unfortunately, he failed in
this regard. Galanida failed to submit evidence or proofs
such as a certification signed by the employer to
substantiate his claim for compensation under PD 626.
There is absolutely no showing how the work of a janitor
increase the risk of contracting his ailments. Moreover,
Galanida’s attending physician, categorically stated that
his ailments are not work-connected. Hence, his claim for
disability compensation under PD 626 has no factual
basis.
NAVALTA v GSIS
Facts: Before his death, Alberto Navalta was employed
as Port Administration Checker in the Office of the
Special Commissioner on Port Administration, Bureau of
Customs. His actual duties consisted of controlling
receipts, storing and distributing supplies and
equipment; conducting periodic inventory supplies,
materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and
unserviceable properties; and doing related work while
the deceased was assigned at a warehouse to assist in
the inventory of properties he suddenly complained of
extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he was
confined at the hospital for 19 days. He died in the
hospital due to cancer of the pancreas.
Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with
the GSIS. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal
ailment, cancer of the pancreas, is not an occupational
disease, the system denied compensation to the
claimant.
Navalta alleges that the deceased as a member of the
customs inventory team and later as port administration
checker was exposed to various cargoes stored inside
warehouses, which included carbons, ink, concentrated
toners and chemicals. Navalta argues that since the
deceased's cancer has spread to the gallbladder, it may
be concluded that papilloma of the bladder, which is
listed in the employee's compensation law as an
occupational disease, was one of the causes of his death.
Issue: Whether the cancer of pancreas an occupation
disease covered by GSIS.
Held: NO. The deceased's ailment is not an
occupational disease listed by the ECC. It becomes
incumbent upon Navalta to prove that the employee's
working conditions increased the risk of his contracting
the fatal illness. This task was not satisfactorily
discharged by Navalta.
As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown
origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed
or unemployed unless it be shown that a particular form
of cancer is caused by specific working conditions or
environment, it cannot be concluded that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the
disease.
CASUMPANG v ECC
Facts: Jose Casumpang, formerly works as Prison Guard
of the Bureau of Prisons died from cancer of the
stomach. A claim by his widow for income benefits
followed his death. The System denied the claims. The
denial of the claim was predicated on the ground that the
cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the
result of the deceased's nature of occupation as Prison
Guard.
Issue: Whether cancer of the stomach is an
occupational disease and hence, compensable under PD
626.
Held: NO. This case falls under the New Labor Code
(NLC). After a close perusal of the records of the case,
nowhere does it appear that Casumpang contracted his
disease or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are no
medical findings, reports, affidavits or any indication that
he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the
effectivity of the Labor Code which by liberal
interpretation may have worked in his favor.
There is no dispute that prior to his demise Casumpang
had ruptured duodenal ulcer with generalized
peritonitis. This condition according to medical findings
on record, worsened into cancer of the stomach which
disease finally caused his death. The former ailment was
officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976. In his medical
history, this was traced to hematemesis and melena
which began in November 1975. In other words, all of his
ailments were after January 1, 1975.
It is PD 626 which is applicable in this case and not the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is important to determine which law is applicable.

Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act
No. 3428 as amended, the claimant was relieved of the
duty to prove causation as it was then legally presumed
that the illness arose out of the employment under the
presumption of compensability.

However, under the new law, the principles of

aggravation and presumption of compensability have
been stricken off by the lawmaker as grounds for
compensation.

Under the NLC and Rules on Employees Compensation,

for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under the Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. Under the Labor
Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational
disease considering the decedent's employment as
prison guard.

Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood

forming, vessels was considered occupational only
among woodworkers; wood products industry
carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper
mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is
therefore not compensable under the first group
provided in the Labor Code.

Under the second ground for compensability, it should

be shown that an illness is caused by employment and
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. Petitioner claims that her deceased
husband escorted inmates to work in the hinterlands of
San Ramon; that at times he was overtaken by rain; that
he had to work at night in case of prison escapes, and
that he missed his meals owing to the nature of his
duties. It should be noted however, that said conditions
do not bring about cancer of the stomach. On the ailment
of Casumpang, the GSIS found that the evidence
submitted are not sufficient to establish that the ailment
is the direct result of occupation or employment as
Prison Guard
Stephen Gumban
G.R. No. L-62207 December 15, 1986
JUAN BONIFACIO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [Ministry
of Education & Culture] and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher
assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of
Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from
August, 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the
breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and
lungs which caused her death on 1978.
Dra. Corazon Yabes-Almirante of the Ospital ng Bagong
Lipunan certified that the late Lourdes Bonifacio
underwent radical mastectomy for cancer of the breast
in 1973. In 1976, when her ailment was noted to have
metastasized to her abdomen, she submitted herself to
an operation known as "exploratory laparotomy" in
March of the same year. On September 1, 1978, she
complained of "abdominal pain, abdominal
enlargement, vomiting, and failure to pass stools inspite
of laxatives." Upon operation it was found that her entire
gastrointestinal tract was enveloped by carcinoma.
Despite chemotherapy, she died on October 5, 1978
from carcinoma of the breast metastatic to
gastrointestinal tract and lungs.
Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626,
as amended, was filed by Juan with the GSIS. But it was
denied on the ground that the decedent's principal
ailment, carcinoma of the breast with metastases to
gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational
disease for her particular work as a teacher, nor is the
risk of contracting said disease increased by her working
conditions.
The ECC, on appeal affirmed the decision of the GSIS.
Now raised to SC
Issue:
W/N the principal ailment of Lourdes was an
occupational disease
Held: SC held that it was not.
A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Employees Compensation Commission, or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is
empowered to determine and approve occupational
diseases and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of
employment.
Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
accepted occupational disease fisted by the Employees
Compensation Commission, or any other sickness caused
by employment subject to proof by claimant that the risk
of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.
Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the
gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the
Commission as an occupational disease.
The cancer which affected the deceased not being
occupational in her particular employment, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's
working conditions increased the risk of her contracting
the fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to
satisfactorily discharge.
Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or
expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation
Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer
prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has
shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of
sickness or injuries which are not accepted or listed as
occupational by the Employees Compensation
Commission. As stated in Sulit vs. Employees
Compensation Commission [supra] "the Labor Code
abolished the presumption of compensability and the
rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the
employment.”
While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that
under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, the
doubt shall be resolved in favor of the laborer, we find
that the same has no application in this case since the
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for
doubt either in their interpretation or application.
G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988
TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS/PHILIPPINE WIRELESS,
INC., petitioner, vs. IGNACIO CASTRO, SR., SOFIA C.
CROUCH, IGNACIO CASTRO JR., AURORA CASTRO,
SALVADOR CASTRO, MARIO CASTRO, CONRADO
CASTRO, ESMERALDA C. FLORO, AGERICO CASTRO,
ROLANDO CASTRO, VIRGILIO CASTRO AND GLORIA
CASTRO, and HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
Facts:
On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of
plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other
plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the
same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch addressed a
telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. announcing
Consolacion's death. The telegram was accepted by the
defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after
payment of the required fees or charges.
The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion
was interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance.
Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the
deceased, then all residing in the United States, returned
for the burial.
When Sofia returned to the United States, she
discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant
to send, had not been received. She and the other
plaintiffs thereupon brought action for damages arising
from defendant's breach of contract. The case was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The only defense of the
defendant was that it was unable to transmit the
telegram because of "technical and atmospheric factors
beyond its control." 1 No evidence appears on record
that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the
plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit
the telegram.
CFI ordered TELEFAST to pay for damages. IAC affirmed
the CFI decision.
Issue: W/N TELEFAST is liable for damages
Held: SC said yes.
Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages."
Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done."
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent
Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a
fee, petitioner undertook to send said private
respondent's message overseas by telegram. This,
petitioner did not do, despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the
required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of
contravening its obligation to said private respondent
and is thus liable for damages.
This liability is not limited to actual or quantified
damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this
regard would result in an inequitous situation where
petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a
telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.
We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case
at bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate results of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission." (Emphasis
supplied).
Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to
gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering
private respondents had to undergo.
As the appellate court properly observed:
[Who] can seriously dispute the shock, the mental
anguish and the sorrow that the overseas children must
have suffered upon learning of the death of their mother
after she had already been interred, without being given
the opportunity to even make a choice on whether they
wanted to pay her their last respects? There is no doubt
that these emotional sufferings were proximately caused
by appellant's omission and substantive law provides for
the justification for the award of moral damages.
We also sustain the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as
compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing
the expenses she incurred when she came to the
Philippines from the United States to testify before the
trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing
its obligation, there would have been no need for this
suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony.
The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is
likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount
of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a
warning to all telegram companies to observe due
diligence in transmitting the messages of their
customers.
G.R. No. L-62300 September 25, 1987
ANGELITA TAÑEDO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Agrarian
Reform), respondents.
Facts:
Francisco Tanedo was a Janitor-Laborer in the District
Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Tarlac,
Tarlac. His duties included the cleaning of the comfort
rooms of the office and the watering of plants. Prior
thereto, he worked as laborer in the former Bureau of
Public Highways commencing in February, 1955, then as
"Capataz Timekeeper," and "Construction Capataz"
before transferring to the Agrarian Reforms Ministry on
June 29, 1972.
In December, 1976 he was found to be suffering from
"puffiness of face, pedal edema and progressive
abdominal enlargement." He was confined at the Central
Luzon Doctors Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed
as "renal insufficiency secondary to chronic renal
disease." An apparent recurrence of his illness caused his
hospitalization again, in January, 1978, this time at the
Tarlac Provincial Hospital. He however failed to respond
to the administered treatment; his condition gradually
retrogressed. In September, 1978 he sought and
obtained admission at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital
where, twenty days later, he finally died.
His widow, Angelita, filed a claim for death benefits with
respondent GSIS. GSIS denied her claim on the ground
that the disease which caused her husband's death,
"chronic glomerulonephritis," was not one of the
compensable illnesses under the law; this, on the basis
of the report (findings and recommendations) of its
Medical Director dated May 7, 1979. It overuled her
claim that the final diagnosis and effective cause of death
was "glomerulonephritis; renal hypertension and Koch's
pulmonary." Her MR denied, she raised to the ECC which
affirmed the decision. Now raised to the SC.
Issue:
W/N Angelita is entitled to the benefits she applied for
Held:
SC said she was not entitled to the benefits.
It is clear that in order that "sickness and the resulting
disability or death ... be compensable," the claimant
must show either:
1) that it is "the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of .. (the ECC) Rules with the conditions
set therein satisfied;" or
2) if not so listed, that "the risk of contracting the disease
is increase by the working conditions.
It being at once apparent that "chronic
glomerulonephritis" is not among the listed
compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce persuasive
proof that her decease husband's death was caused not
only by said disease but also and additionally by renal
hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's
pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had
founded her application for death benefits, and that,
additionally, "the risk of contracting" those diseases was
"increased by the working conditions" attendant upon
her husband's duties as janitor-laborer.
Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary
norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees
'compensation proceedings, petitioner has failed to
adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that
she has urged the GSIS and the ECC to make. What the
evidence does establish, as the ECC observes, is that the
disease and its complications from which petitioner's
husband died bore no causal relation to the nature of his
employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation
of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words
"simply a complication," and was "not brought about by
employment factors." We perceive nothing in the record
to warrant reversal of these findings.
G.R. No. L-46556 May 28, 1988
NAPOLEON O. CARIN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
Facts:
Napoleon O. Carin was a Special Counsel in the Fiscal's
office of Cebu City. Sometime in October 1975, he felt a
severe pain in his left leg while getting the expedientes of
cases scheduled for trial on that day. Napoleon’s illness
was subsequently diagnosed as ostemoyelitis. As
recommended by his physician, he underwent surgery
at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He was confined therein
from 1 to 5 December 1975.
On 12 May 1976, Napoleon filed a claim for income
benefits for his disability under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended, with the Government Service
Insurance System. His claim was denied by the System on
the ground that the cause of his disability was neither an
occupational disease nor caused by his employment and
that the risk of contracting the same was not increased
by his working conditions. Reconsideration of the claim's
denial was likewise denied.

He appealed to the Employees' Compensation

Commission which, on 15 June 1977, affirmed the GSIS
decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N Napoleon is entitled to the benefits applied for

Held: SC said no he is not entitled to the benefits asked

for. SC sustained the finding of the respondent
Employees' Compensation Commission that Napoleon
failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that his
illness was caused by his employment or that the risk of
contracting it was increased by his working conditions.
Under the new law on employees' compensation, or
Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the sickness or
illness is not an occupational disease, as in the present
case, to be compensable, proof must be adduced that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.

The evidence presented by Napoleon does not, in any

way, show a reasonable connection between his ailment
and the nature of his employment nor a direct causal
relation between his employment and the illness he
suffered.

Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in

compensation claims, still, Napoleon failed to show with
substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably
work-connected, to be entitled to compensation.

Further, Napoleon’s contention that the rule of

compensability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, is a revival of the old law on workmen's
compensation or Act 3428, particularly Section 44
thereof, which recognized the presumption of
compensability, is not meritorious.

The principle of presumption of compensability no

longer obtains under the new law on Employees'
Compensation.
Febray Suico
DE JESUS VS ECC
FACTS:
Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine
National Railways (PNR). De Jesus worked every other
day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16
hours starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the
following day.
She was hospitalized several times and was diagnosed
with chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia
and modular pulmonary metastases which is also known
as lung cancer.
Ester P. de Jesus died of her ailments and Petitioner Jesus
de Jesus, the deceased's husband, filed a claim for death
benefits under P.D. 626, as amended.
The claim was denied by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the
deceased's ailments were not occupational diseases
under the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner may claim death benefits. NO
RULING:
Since the ailments of the deceased manifested
themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law
governing the petitioner's claim is the New Labor Code.
Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section
I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must
be the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the
condition of the deceased's work increased the risk of
her contracting the diseases which caused her death.
After a careful examination of the case, we find the
petitioner's claim without merit. The petitioner has failed
to prove by competent evidence that the risk of
contracting said diseases was indeed increased by the
working conditions concomitant with the deceased's
employment.
The allegations have not been substantiated by the
petitioner. While this court has always maintained that
the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims
for compensation (Neri v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 127 SCRA 672), the basic rule that a mere
allegation is not evidence (Topweld Manufacturing, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9,
1985; Lagasca v. de Vera, 79 Phil. 376) should not be
disregarded.
As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement
that the deceased's working condition "contributed
immeasurably to the insidious development of her lung
lesion" and that her 11 unusual and prolonged working
hours finally sapped her strength leading to physical
exhaustion" which, together with diabetes and anemia,
provided a "groundwork for pulmonary metastases"
(Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease rather
than its direct causation.
Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended, which provided for the concepts of
"presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" it
was possible to stretch the work related nature of an
ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.
In this case, however, there is no dispute that the
governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to
settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U.
Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, GSIS,
Metro Manila, G.R. No. L45662, August 20, 1985),
discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's rights to
receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability.
CARVAJAL VS ECC
FACTS:
The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign
Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of San Julian,
Eastern Samar. While typing tax declarations and making
entries in their books, which were her duties aside from
campaigning for tax collections, she suffered from
bleeding per vaginum due to incomplete abortion.
The husband (Petitioner in this case) filed his claim for
benefits for the death Of his wife with the respondent
Government Service Insurance System under P.D. No.
626, as amended.
GSIS denied petitioners claim which was affirmed by ECC.
ISSUE:
WON the death of petitioner’s wife is compensable. YES.
RULING:
Under Article 1167 (I), Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, a "compensable sickness means (1) any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the ECC; or (2) any illness caused by employment subject
to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions."
Records reveal that petitioner's wife while working as
Campaign Clerk in the Treasurer's Office of San Julian,
Eastern Samar, suffered "two attacks of vaginal bleeding
and hypogastric pain" attributing said ailment to the
lifting of heavy tax declaration books, due to abortion
incomplete.
This opinion of the decedent's physicians is in accord
with the findings/analysis of medical authorities which
read as follows:
Pregnant women become tired more readily, therefore,
the prevention of fatigue must be stressed very
emphatically. The body is made up of various types of
cells, each type with a specific function. Depletion of
nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and fatigue causes
certain reactions in the body that are injurious.
(Maternity Nursing 12th Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder
and Mastroianni, Jr.).
It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be
employed in the following types of occupation and they
should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more
sedentary works:
(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy
work;
(b) occupation involving continous standing and moving
about. (One of the Standards for Maternity Case and
Employment of Mothers recommended by the Children's
Bureau of the United States). (Rollo, p. 12,).
Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the
influence of periodicity as the uterine muscle reaches a
certain state of detention; or in various accidents as a
fall, strain or overmuscular exertion when the uterus
reacts and expels its load. (Emphasis supplied; "Anatomy
and Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181).
Therefore, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer (ECC
Record, p. 20) that there was no causal relation between
the ailment of petitioner's spouse and the nature and/or
conditions of his wife's employment cannot overcome
the substantial evidence submitted by petitioner .
BANDILA SHIPPING VS ABALOS
FACTS:
Respondent Marcos C. Abalos entered into a contract of
employment with petitioner Bandila Shipping, Inc. (BSI)
as fourth engineer for an ocean-going vessel. Prior to
embarkation, Abalos underwent pre-employment
medical examination and was found to be "fit for sea
service."
After some time, respondent Abalos felt excruciating
pain in his stomach while he was on duty. He tried to
tolerate it until he got off but he was unable to sleep
because of severe pain. He was found unfit for duty and
recommended his repatriation.

Abalos filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
disability benefits, unexpired portion of his contract,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
against petitioner BSI. Persuaded by the opinion of a
company-designated physician that cholecystolithiasis
was not work-related, BSI denied liability.
ISSUE:
WON Abalos’ cholecystolithiasis or gallstone is
compensable. NO.
RULING:
Since cholecystolithiasis or gallstone has been excluded
as a compensable illness under the applicable standard
contract for Filipino seafarers that binds both
respondent Abalos and the vessel’s foreign owner, it was
an error for the CA to treat Abalos’ illness as
"work-related" and, therefore, compensable. The
standard contract precisely did not consider gallstone as
compensable illness because the parties agreed,
presumably based on medical science, that such
affliction is not caused by working on board ocean-going
vessels.
Nor has respondent Abalos proved by some evidence
that the nature of his work on board a ship aggravated
his illness. No one knew when he boarded the vessel that
he was sick of gallstone. By the nature of this illness, it is
highly probable that Abalos already had it when he
boarded his assigned ship although it went undiagnosed
because he had yet to experience its symptoms.
 duties of his employment and that the risk of contracting
If respondent Abalos had instead been sick of asthma said ailments was increased by the working conditions.
and the shipping company knew of it even as it assigned He is entitled to permanent total disability
him to do work that exposed him to allergens, then it can compensation.
be said that the company assigned him work that
aggravated his illness. Here, however, he himself was
unaware that he had gallstone until excruciating pains
manifested its presence for the first time when his vessel
was sailing the seas.

MIRASOL VS ECC

FACTS:
The petitioner, Eligio P. Mirasol, while in good health,
was appointed as classroom teacher on August 1, 1945
in the public school in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The
petitioner was given additional assignment as District
Vocational Coordinator. It was the petitioner's duty to
visit monthly all the district schools. On August 25, 1973,
he experienced for the first time symptoms of malignant
hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis. His retirement
was brought about by ailments diagnosed as high blood
pressure and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees.

The petitioner applied for compensation benefits under

P.D. No. 626 to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) in 1976.
GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the ailments of
hypertension and rheumatic infection, both knees, are
not occupational diseases.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s ailments are compensable. YES.

RULING:
It is a fact that part of the duties of the petitioner was to
make monthly visits to various schools which are not
accessible by road. To reach these mountainous schools,
the petitioner had to hike through muddy ricefields and
climb slippery mountains during sunny and rainy days.
During these monthly visits, the petitioner fell down
many times because of the slippery paths in the ricefields
and trails in the mountains. The ailments of hypertension
and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees, must have been
caused by the exposure to the elements of the petitioner
and his falling down many times while hiking in muddy
ricefields and on slippery mountain trails under all kinds
of weather conditions on his way to the barrio schools
not accessible by road.

There is sufficient substantial evidence of record to show

that the ailments of the petitioner were caused by the
Stella Amistad
ROSALES vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GSIS and DBP
FACTS
Rosales, at the time of his retirement on July 31, 1976,
was an employee of DBP as a Collateral and File Clerk.
Prior to holding said position, he held the positions of
clerk-typist, clerk stenographer and collection clerk. On 6
to 10 April 1976, he was confined in the UST Hospital for
Rheumatoid Arthritis.
Rosales filed with GSIS a claim for employees'
compensation under PD No. 626. His application was
denied. He twice moved to reconsider the denial of his
claim with the GSIS, but the latter denied both motions
for reconsideration.
On appeal, Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC)
affirmed the denial in toto.
ISSUE: W/N Rosales is entitled to such claim? NO.
RULING
Under PD No. 626 [which took effect on 1 January 1975]
for an illness to be compensable, it must be one
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by working
conditions.
The ECC denied the claim because Rheumatoid Arthritis
was not an occupational disease, and that, as required by
law, Rosales failed to show proof that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by his working
conditions. In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC
properly applied PD No. 626.
In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is
determined by the date on which the claimant
contracted his illness. Thus, where an ailment
supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the
governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act.
On the other hand, where an ailment occurred after 1
January 1975, the new law on Employees'
Compensation applies.
Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find
nothing in the allegations as to when Rosales contracted
the disease. For failure to do so, and having filed his claim
under PD. No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted
the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1
January 1975.
VILLONES vs. ECC, GSIS (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
AND CULTURE)
FACTS
Rolando M. Villones was employed as a secondary school
teacher in the Department of Education and Culture
assigned at Dayhagan Barrio High School. On September
2, 1975, he died of pulmonary tuberculosis.
His father [herein petitioner] filed with the GSIS a claim
for income benefits for the death of his son under the
provision of PD No. 626, attaching thereto the following
documents:
 a photocopy of the decedent's death certificate
 a medical certificate showing that deceased was
on sick leave from December 4 to 20, 1972 due
to influenza;
 a medical certificate issued by the Municipal
Health Officer certifying that he examined
Rolando M. Villones on July 19, 1972 and found
him to be physically and mentally fit for
employment;
 a certification from the principal of the
deceased’s duties as secondary school teacher
On March 9, 1976, the GSIS Medicare-Employees'
Compensation denied the claim on the ground that
although Pulmonary Tuberculosis was listed as an
occupational disease, petitioner failed to satisfy other
conditions in order to be compensable; that is “the
employee manifesting this disease should have an
occupation involving close and frequent contact with a
source or sources of tuberculosis infection by reason of
employment…” and the nature of the deceased’s duties
as teacher and the working conditions did not expose
him to such sources.
On February 17, 1977, the Employees' Compensation
Commission (En Banc) affirmed the denial.
"Pulmonary Tuberculosis having been ruled out as an
occupational disease in the occupation in which the
deceased was engaged in, appellant is repudiating
pulmonary tuberculosis as the cause of death. Appellant
insisted that the Municipal Health Officer might have
erred in indicating in the Death Certificate that his son
died of Pulmonary Tuberculosis, there being no autopsy
conducted…”
"As correctly ruled by the GSIS, the nature and conditions
of the deceased's employment could have just
aggravated his physical condition. Aggravation of a pre-
existing illness is, however, no longer compensable
under the present Employees' Compensation Program"
ISSUE: W/N Villones is entitled to the claim for
compensation of his son’s death? YES
RULING:
Considering the undisputed nature of the deceased's
employment, it becomes inevitable for him to be in
constant contact with people who may be afflicted with
PTB, which is a highly communicable disease, and it is not
surprising that he should contract tuberculosis so that
from December 4 to 20, 1972 he was forced to go on sick
leave. When he was able to resume work, he was again
exposed to same working conditions thus aggravating his
illness until he suddenly died on September 2, 1975 of
sever hemoptysis due to PTB.
It must be pointed out that as early as December 4 to 20,
1972, the deceased Villones was already entitled to
disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness
prevented him from reporting to his work for more than
three (3) days; and under such a situation, his employer
(Department of Education and Culture) was obligated
under Section 37 of the same Act to file a notice of illness
with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and to
manifest its intention of whether or not to controvert his
right to compensation.
There is no showing that respondent employer has
complied with its duty under Sections 37 and 45 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, of filing
with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a notice
of the initial illness of its employee, Rolando Villones, as
well as his subsequent death on September 2, 1975, and
of controverting the right to compensation within the
prescribed period of fourteen (14) days from the
occurrence of the disability or death, or within ten (10)
days from knowledge thereof.
It cannot be denied that respondent employer had
knowledge of the illness of the deceased Villones
because he applied for sick leave from December 4 to 20,
1972, as well as knowledge of the subsequent death of
Rolando Villones on September 2, 1975 because he died
on a regular working day; hence, the fact of death could
not have escaped the notice or knowledge of the
principal and or supervisor. Such knowledge by the
principal and/or supervisor, being agents of the
respondent employer, is deemed in law as knowledge of
the respondent employer.
Failure to comply with said sections constitutes a
renunciation of the employer's right to controvert the
claim, resulting in the waiver of all its non-jurisdictional
defenses, such as the non-compensability of the claim.
Finally, the grant of compensation benefits to herein
petitioner will not be impaired even if he (petitioner
himself) entertains doubts as to the real cause of the
death of his son when he stated that no autopsy was
made nor was there anybody who actually examined the
deceased prior to or after his death. At any rate,
pulmonary tuberculosis is concededly one of the causes
of hemoptysis. Even unexplained deaths, the occasion
and circumstances of which are unknown or
undetermined, are usually deemed compensable, as long
as there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-
connection, a causal relation between the death and the
employment. And, in case of doubt in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, the same shall be resolved in favor of the
laborer (Art. 4, PD No. 442, as amended; Art. 1702, New
Civil Code).
ZOSIMO CAPACIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Bureau of Public Schools)
FACTS:
Capacio was an elementary grade public school teacher
assigned in Barrio Matambong, Palapag, Northern
Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher and
progressed to that of a regular teacher. His service
covered a span of 33 years.
Since March 19, 1973, he had been suffering from peptic
ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis. On August 13,
1974, he retired at the age of 60.
Immediately upon retirement he was called to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission Regional Office
in Samar for medical check-up. After the lapse of almost
a month, he was treated up to September 15, 1974.
An EKG— was conducted on August 13, 1974 [his last day
of teaching]. Another EKG examination of petitioner was
made on July 22, 1975.
He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling
sickness. He was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as
sickness compensation and reimbursement of medical
and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975.
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission, upon review, reversed the
aforesaid award:
"…claimant had alleged to have been sick…on March 19,
1973 and stopped working on August 13, 1974. It is sad
to note however, that nowhere in the records could [do]
we find any documentary evidence which would
substantiate claimant's allegations…[T]he first and last
treatment was conducted only on September 15, 1974,
which was one month after the employer-employee
relationship had ceased to exist. [While EKG results are
attached in record], the same should not be given any
evidentiary value, it appearing that it was conducted only
last July 22, 1975. Of course, there is a showing that
claimant was on leave from July 22 to August 13, 1974,
there is no showing that it was on account of the illness
subject of this claim.”
“This Commission is further convinced that claimant
retired not as a result of any disabling illness, but rather
with the sole aim and purpose of enjoying the benefits
afforded him by the Retirement Law after rendering 33
years of service with the government and reaching the
age of 60."
ISSUE: W/N Capacio is entitled to his claim? YES
RULING:
The records of the case reveal that the petitioner
suffered from peptic ulcer, hypertension and
schistosomiasis. Feeling that he could not withstand the
rigors and continuous strain of his teaching job with his
assignment in a remote barrio which entailed the
stamina of walking for one and one-half hours, he retired
on his 60th birthday. All along he could have served the
whole length of a normal civil service tenure of work with
the retirement age of 65. His daily hike from the town
proper passing through rivers, creeks, streams and rough
roads, trails and woodland affected his health.
There is on record the fact that after retirement, he
immediately filed his claim for sickness compensation
with the Department of Labor Regional Office No. 9,
Workmen's Compensation Unit in Tacloban City. He
submitted himself to medical examination by the
physician of the Workmen's Compensation Unit. After
this examination, the medical officer studied his case and
then ordered that the petitioner be hospitalized in
Tacloban City.
These facts show that the illness of the petitioner
occurred during the course of his employment.
The petitioner took the Commission to task for not taking
into consideration the mandatory provision of Section
45, Act No. 3428, as amended, wherein the employer (in
this case the Bureau of Public Schools) is given up to 14
days from disability, or 10 days after it had knowledge of
the alleged illness, to controvert the right of the
claimant; otherwise, by operation of law, the employer
waives or renounces the right to dispute its liability for
said compensation.
Regarding the point of presumption of compensability,
we had occasion to rule that the presumption of
compensability shifts the burden of proof on the
employer to show the contrary. Where the illness
supervened during the time of employment, there was
rebuttable presumption that the illness arose out of or at
least was aggravated by the employment.
As to the contention that petitioner's illness was not
work connected as he got sick after his retirement: There
is no proof that the respondent was able to overcome
the presumption under Section 44 of Act No. 3428 that
the illness or injury either arose out of, or was at least
aggravated by his employment. Moreover, the
petitioner's ailment occurred while he was an employee
— a teacher working under the hazardous conditions of
that far-flung town. There is a showing that his illness
was caused or was aggravated by his teaching duties. He
got his schistosomiasis from his daily hike to his place of
work, the barrio school.
As regards a teacher's ailment, We had occasion to say
that:
"Presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive
by reason of employee's employment as barrio school
teacher and working conditions which increased the risk
of contracting her illness and failure of employer to rebut
presumption.”
"Reasonable work connection, not direct causal relation
between the disease and employment is the only
requirement to establish compensability, and actual
proof of causation is not necessary to justify
compensability."
In one of our latest rulings on employment
compensation of teachers, We opined:
"The teachers shall be protected against the
consequences of employment injury in accordance with
existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous
strain in the teacher's health shall be recognized as
compensable occupational diseases in accordance with
existing laws."
ZOZOBRADO vs. ECC and GSIS (Ministry of Public
Works)
FACTS:
Roque Zozobrado, petitioner herein, began working for
the then Bureau of Public Highways at Cebu City on
October 20, 1958 as civil engineer aide.
On April 16, 1959, he was transferred to the then Bureau
of Public Works at Marawi City where promoted to
Associate Civil Engineer in 1961, Senior Civil Engineer in
1966, Supervising Civil Engineer in 1968, and District
Engineer on March 23, 1971 until he retired on
September 1, 1979 from the Ministry of Public Works at
age 63 due to glaucoma and cataract.
Petitioner filed a claim for total and permanent disability
with the GSIS based on the following clinical history:
 December 1967: glaucoma operation (OS) of the
left eye.
 August 1970: glaucoma operation (OD) of the
right eye.
 May 1978: he had an operation for "cataract,
mature (OS)," and submitted himself for lens
extraction at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in
Cebu City.
GSIS denied the claim on the ground that under PD No.
626 (as amended) glaucoma and cataract are not
occupational diseases.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. He averred that
his eye ailment can be considered to have emanated
from his employment because his work entailed constant
use of his vision.
GSIS reiterated its previous denial. It emphasized that on
the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner there
is no showing that the ailment contracted directly arose
or resulted from the nature of his employment.
ECC, on appeal, affirmed the GSIS decision:
We took into consideration appellant's
averment…however, [these] are not sufficient bases to
establish proof that appellant's risk of developing
cataract was increased by his working conditions. Senile
cataract is an ailment to which all persons are exposed
regardless of whether they are employed or not, its
etiology being attributed to degenerative changes or
aging. While it may be argued that 'cataract' is listed by
the Commission as an occupational disease, appellant's
case cannot fall under this classification since his
occupation did not subject him to frequent and
continued exposure to the glare or rays from molten
glass or redhot metal which is the criterion for
compensability of cataract.
ISSUE: Is Zozobrado entitled to his claim? NO.
RULING:The applicable law at the time petitioner
contracted the cataract in 1978 is the Labor Code.
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation embodied therein explicitly
provides:
"SECTION 1. xxx xxx xxx
(c) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."
The doctrine of "presumptive compensability” in the old
Workmen's Compensation Law that when an illness
supervenes during the course of employment it is
deemed to have either arisen out of or been aggravated
by petitioner's employment has been abandoned.
Under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the
present law on compensation, the listed occupational
diseases are compensable when the conditions
contained therein are met, and certain diseases are
allowed to be compensable whenever the claimant can
prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the conditions of the employment of the deceased. As
to the degree of proof required, the claimant must show
at least by substantial evidence that the development of
the disease is brought largely by the conditions present
in the nature of the job.
Petitioner's eye ailment is "cataract, senile OS" of the left
eye. Senile cataract is not a listed occupational disease.
Neither does it have any causal connection with his work
as District Engineer in Marawi City. It is due to
degenerative changes accompanying the aging process.
It is not generated by strain on the eyes, as petitioner
claims. Nor was the risk of contracting it aggravated by
the nature of his duties or his working conditions. It is a
physiologic process occurring after the fourth decade of
life and to which everyone is exposed whether employed
or not. The claim for disability benefits, therefore, was
correctly denied by public respondents.
Nestle Amparo
EDUARDO LAGINLIN, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CANLUBANG
SUGAR ESTATE, C.J. YULO and SONS, respondents.
Facts:
 Eduardo Laginlin started his employment with
the Canlubang as a field worker on 12 December
1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane and
weed the sugarcane plantation owned by
respondents, working seven (7) days a week.
 While working, Eduardo started to suffer an
illness which, according to the diagnosis of
Canlubang's physician, Dr. Bunye, was
pulmonary tuberculosis.
 Eduardo was treated as an outpatient and was
given free medicine by Canlubang while he
continued to perform his work. Despite said
treatment, his health failed to improve, and as a
consequence, Dr. Bunye recommended his
retirement and, on that basis, he was retired
effective 30 January 1970, receiving a disability
retirement benefit in the amount of P1,800.00.
 On 15 February 1975, Eduardo filed a claim for
disability benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for the ailment which he
contracted as a result of his employment
 The hearing officer decided in Eduardo’s favor.
 Canlubang appealed said decision to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
 The Commission reversed the decision of the
hearing officer
Issue:
Whether or not the sickness of Eduardo is work related.
Held: YES
Ample jurisprudence has now been established that,
where the illness or disease was contracted by the
employee in the course of his employment, said
employee is entitled to disability compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compensability is
presumed where illness supervened during employment
and, with the presumption of compensability of illness,
the burden of proof is shifted to the employer and the
employee is relieved of the duty to show causation.
An x-ray examination is not even essential to prove the
claim of the petitioner for disability compensation due to
illness which he contracted while under the employ of
private respondents. In fact, it was private respondents'
company physician who examined the petitioner and,
finding him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis,
made a recommendation for petitioner's retirement
before he reaches the retirable age under the law. In
view of the approval by private respondents of the
petitioner's early retirement, the fact of his disability was
placed beyond question or doubt.
Furthermore, the disease of tuberculosis is an
occupational disease or work-connected in such
occupations, as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land
inspector and other similar occupations; hence
compensable.
Also, the evidence necessary to destroy the legal
presumption of compensability must do more than
create a doubt. It should be such as a reasonable mind
must accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Where an employee was forced to retire at an early age
due to his illness, and illness persisted even after
retirement, resulting in his present unemployment, such
condition amounts to total disability which should entitle
him to the maximum benefits allowed by law. The fact
that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his
employer does not bar him from being entitled to a
disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of
the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the
retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching
the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the
Act is to compensate the worker for his actual loss, for
his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work
which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On the
other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help
the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support
and as a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the
employer.
GILBERT QUIZORA, Petitioner, vs. DENHOLM CREW
MANAGEMENT (PHILIPPINES), INC., Respondent.
Facts:
 In 1992, Denholm, a domestic manning agency
that supplied manpower to Denklav Maritime
Services, Ltd. (Denklav), a foreign maritime
corporation, hired the services of Gilbert Quizora
(petitioner) to work as a messman on board the
international vessels of Denklav (MV Leopard).
 After the expiration of his contract with "MV
Leopard," petitioner was lined up for another
assignment to a different vessel, but he was later
 disqualified for employment and declared unfit Further, varicose veins may be caused by trauma,
for sea duty after he medically found to have thrombosis, inflammation or heredity. Although the
varicose veins. exact cause of varicose veins is still unknown, a number
 Gilbert filed with the LA a complaint for payment of factors contribute to it which include heredity,
of disability benefits, medical expenses, advance aging, prolonged standing, being overweight,
separation pay, damages, and attorney’s fees. hormonal influences during pregnancy, use of birth
 LA, after due hearing, rendered a decision control pills, post-menopausal hormonal replacement
dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of therapy, prolonged sitting with legs crossed, wearing
merit. tight undergarments or clothes, history of blood clots,
 On appeal, the NLRC issued its Resolution dated injury to the veins, conditions that cause increased
September 20, 2004 reversing the LA’s decision pressure in the abdomen including liver disease, fluid in
and ordering respondent company to pay the abdomen, previous groin injury, heart failure, topical
petitioner his disability compensation in the steroids, trauma or injury to the skin, previous venous
amount of US$60,000.00. surgery and exposure to ultra-violet rays.
 On September 8, 2010, the CA rendered a
decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and Lastly, the fact that respondent passed the company’s
reinstating the LA Decision. The CA explained PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the past
that since having varicose veins was not among the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not
those listed as occupational diseases under intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, petitioner examination of an applicant’s medical condition. The
bore the burden of proving that such ailment PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at
was brought about by his working conditions. sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state
of health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work"
Issue: declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a
Whether or not the sickness of Gilbert is work related. conclusive proof to show that he was free from any
ailment prior to his deployment.
Held: NO
Unfortunately for Gilbert, he failed to prove that his
varicose veins arose out of his employment with
respondent company. Except for his bare allegation that
it was work-related, he did not narrate in detail the
nature of his work as a messman aboard Denklav’s
vessels. He likewise failed to particularly describe his
working conditions while on sea duty. He also failed to
specifically state how he contracted or developed
varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his
working conditions aggravated it. Neither did he present
any expert medical opinion regarding the cause of his
varicose veins. No written document whatsoever was
presented that would clearly validate his claim or visibly
demonstrate that the working conditions on board the
vessels he served increased the risk of acquiring varicose
veins.

Also, respondent company can argue that petitioner’s

eight (8) years of service with it did not automatically
mean that he acquired his varicose veins by reason of
such employment. His sea service was not an unbroken
service. The fact that he never applied for a job with any
other employer is of no moment. He enjoyed month-long
"sign-off" vacations when his contract expired. It is
possible that he acquired his condition during one of his
"sign-off" periods.
Bessadel Dulay
FLAVIANO NEMARIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education
and Culture), respondents.
Facts:
 Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom
teacher in November, 1948.
 From September 8-25 1978, Rosario Nemaria
was confined at the Southern Islands' Hospital,
Cebu City, for on and off severe abdominal pains,
anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of
cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of
the breast.
 These ailments did not respond to medications
and she died on October 16, 1978. She was at the
time of her death 58 years of age. The service
record of the decedent shows that she rendered
government service for about thirty years.
 Alleging that the cause of his wife's death was
due to her employment as a classroom teacher,
Flaviano filed with the respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), a claim for
death benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626 as amended.
 GSIS through its medical evaluation and
underwriting denied the claim. Flaviano
appealed his case to the now respondent
Employees Compensation Commission for
review.
 Employees Compensation Commission affirmed
the decision of respondent GSIS denying the
petitioner's claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not Flaviano’s wife's death is compensable
under Presidential Decree No. 626.
Held: YES
It is not disputed that the ailments of the deceased were
not listed/enumerated under Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation with respect to public
school teachers but petitioner anchors his claim under
the theory of "increased risk," that is, when said illness is
caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working
conditions.
To establish compensability of the claim under the
theory of increased risk under Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of
P.D. 626, the claim must show proof of reasonable work
connection and not necessarily a direct casual relation.
Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely
substantial, which means "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation. There are no stringent criteria
to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is
merely substantial evidence. Thus, it has been ruled that
a reasonable work-connection is all that is required or
that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions
Both petitioner and respondents are in accord that
although the cause of liver cancer is not known, still it has
been found to be mostly associated with liver cirrhosis
which in turn is caused by alcoholic ingestion plus
impaired nutrition; that a high percentage of hepatoma
has been discovered also in Asia and Africa which was
found to be due to certain hepatic carcinogens digested
in food stuffs.
The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a
municipality several kilometers away from the provincial
capital, rendered her services for more or less twenty-
nine (29) years. She started in November 1948 as
classroom teacher assigned in the poblacion of Badian,
Cebu and from thence she was assigned to the
Municipality of Ronda, Cebu, which is a blighted area,
where she continued to discharge her duties as
classroom teacher. Under those circumstances, the
possibility would not be remote, that she suffered
impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural
area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before
being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she
was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly
were ingested therein.
Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was
in good health when she entered the government
service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted
for insurance purposes by the Government Service
Insurance System. The conclusion is therefore inevitable,
that the decedent's ailments developed during her
employment while working under conditions which
predisposed her thereto.
The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine
compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as
occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by
employment where the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions thereof (2nd
paragraph, Art. 208, P.D. 626). The Court has ruled that
cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease,
may be deemed work-connected. Moreover, in the case
of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held
that under the law, it is not required that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth
development or acceleration of claimant's illness to
entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that
his employment had contributed even in a small degree.
Also, the measurement that the disease was caused or
aggravated by the employment or work applies only to
an illness where the cause can be determined or proved.
Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no
duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot
demand an impossibility.
Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often
discovered when it is too late, the possibility that its
onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor
Code cannot be discounted. As a consequence the
presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
cannot be totally disregarded.
EULALIO MORA JR., in representation of his deceased
wife, LETICIA ADOR MORA petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of
Telecommunication), respondents.
Facts:
 Leticia Mora was a telegraph operator of the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City.
 During the course of her employment, she
complained of frequent epigastric pain radiating
to the periumbilical region.
 Biopsy conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in
Tacloban City revealed a diagnosis of
adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a
certain portion of the small intestine).
 She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with
resection of ileocaecal junction" but her ailment
continued to recur.
 She filed a claim for disability benefits under PD
626, as amended, with respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS).
 The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on
the ground that her ailment is not an
occupational disease considering her particular
employment as telegraph operator.
 Not satisfied, she sent a letter to the Chairman
of respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople,
requesting for a review of her case. She averred
that her cancer should be considered by the
system as work-connected since she acquired
the same during her sixteen (16) years of
employment.
 On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal
to the ECC which was prosecuted by her husband
after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that
the illness which caused Leticia Mora's death is
not work-connected.
Issue:
Whether or not the sickness of Leticia is work-connected.
Held: YES
The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor
Code, PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness,
disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975.
The new law on employee's compensation makes
compensable disability or death arising from an ailment
under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the
illness is definitely accepted as an occupational disease
by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b)
when said illness is caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by the work conditions.
The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said
Annex "A" as occupational disease. To be compensable
thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the employment of the deceased.
But this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of
the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite
scientific advances on the matter, even professional
experts have not as yet determine its cause.
Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown
to and or undetermined even by medical science, the
requirement of proof of any casual link between the
ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized
so that those who have less in life will have more in law
The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a
condition for an award of compensation that the
claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or
origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by
medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk of
contracting the same enhanced by his working
conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible
one, specially considering that said claimant is most
probably not even conversant with the intricacies of
medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the
material resources to employ medical experts to
demonstrate the connection between the cause and the
disease. Considering the liberal character of employment
compensation schemes, the impossible condition should
be deemed as not having been intended and/or
imposed.

Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or

aggravated by the employment or work applies only to
an illness where the cause can be determined or proved.
Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no
duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot
demand an impossibility (Flaviano Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission and Government
Service Insurance System.