SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon FACTS:

City Branch ET AL, respondents In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the
May 2, 1988 premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered
into among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it
Facts:
was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of
Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA-QC who conducted demonstrations. The said the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of
demonstrations were tumultuous. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other classes to the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second them in view of their participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening
semester of school year 1986-1987. The President of the Student Council filed a complaint with professors were sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.
the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council
Officers and student leaders. The student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, ISSUE:
requesting for a written statement of the school’s decision regarding their enrolment. Another Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students to the President, Board of Trustees, to enrol and of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming, HELD:
hence this petition.
The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not
Issue:
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the
Whether or not students were denied of due process for failing to give notice and hearing courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment
(procedural) and failing to decide without bias or prejudice (substantive)? of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s
Decision: administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of
letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against them.
Petition dismissed. a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers,
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. during and when the investigation was going on.
Thus after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of
with the students or with the intervening teachers. The charge of denial of due process is
untenable, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity
another contract with said students and teachers. to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when
parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the
minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process
are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case. Records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the
outset satisfied conditions No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had
evidently not been completed with.
PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
FACTS:
Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the
second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant
to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented
as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the
purchase of shabu.
The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in
QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same
was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began
to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and
began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried
marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.
Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review
the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate
their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the
said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible
as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that
the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the
plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the
warrant.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in
evidence against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view
doctrine.
HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain
view when it was seized.
RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of
drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure
of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further
contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or
uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has
decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of
the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug
paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the
evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no
longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were
wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence
against Salanguit.
GR No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001
FACTS:
Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accused-appellant
Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a
poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale
took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-
appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant
was later issued.
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house.
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
HELD:
Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was
taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto
because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-
appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part,
with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs
which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.
The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the
marijuana in this case. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view
doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises
within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence
and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the
cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. The marijuana bricks were
wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
FACTS:
A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started
searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two
bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko
for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court
convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8,
respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUES:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug
paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain
view doctrine.”
HELD:
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at
all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed
to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in
an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-
95-64357 only.
Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997
Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in
front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves
and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked
him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and
allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be
further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in
any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the
place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
respondent court.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN RE LAURETA
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using
contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the
case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the
Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in
fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the
Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that
Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division
on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again
addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to
another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the
Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found
guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further
Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry
under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of
the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation
of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the
three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of
its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
Marcos v. Manglapus travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a
177 SCRA 668
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
FACTS:
The Court allowed the government’s ban on Marcos’ and his family’s return. Both the majority and dissenting
This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. opinions cited the UDHR.
Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668; 1989
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines. This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
HELD:
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill
it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on the of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23)
ISSUE:
The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive HELD:
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travelfrom the Philippines to other
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the rightto travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law,
She has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the
abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration : residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 669, G.R. No. 88211 (1989) right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our
Though the right to return to one's country is not constitutionally protected, it is a generally accepted Constitution as part of the law of the land.
principle of international law, and thus a part of domestic law. It is not, however, an absolute right. Public The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
interest grounds may limit it. return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
The petitioner, former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, was deposed. Near death, he wished to return to the President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
Philippines. The new president, Corazon C. Aquino, refused. The Supreme Court considered the petitioner's away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
petition for mandamus. The petitioner argued it was unconstitutional to forbid him from returning under the The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
guarantees of due process, the liberty of abode, and the right to travel. The petitioner also argued that his instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
right to return to the Philippines was guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government argued that the right of the State to
national security trumped individual rights. The Court said, "It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to
them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power
although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power
during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary
power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according
to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not
defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the
power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to
Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution
(Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President)
and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present
one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
to prove that they can stir trouble from afar decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
4. Honasan’s failed coup protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
Victory Liner vs. Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321; March 10, 2004
FACTS:
On March 2, 2000, while a Victory Liner bus was cruising along the National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it
accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all
the funeral and burial expenses. VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement where the heirs
executed a Release of Claim and an Affidavit of Desistance in favor of VLI and the driver Reino De la Cruz.
However, two or Marciana's sons executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay against De la Cruz. On the strength of the
document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan.
On March 13, 2000, Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and
fixed his bail at P50, 000 to be posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police to immediately impound the
bus involved in the accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,
000.
On June 23, 200, VLI filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Judge
Bellosillo. The complaint claimed that Judge Bellosillo (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus
and requiring it to post a cash bond for the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his authority when it revoked the
surety bond of one of VLI's driver Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case No. 9373; and (c) knowingly rendered an unjust and
oppressive order when he increased the bond to P350, 000 and required it to be posted in cash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds.
HELD:
Yes, Judge Bellosillo is administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on accused Reino De la Cruz in
Crim. Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case No. 9373.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge must primarily consider the following factors: a)
Financial ability of the accused to give bail; b)Nature and circumstances of the offense; c) Penalty for the offense
charged; d) Character and reputation of the accused; e) Age and health of the accused; g) Probability of the
accused appearing in trial; h) Forfeiture of the bonds; i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail shall
not be required. In implementing this mandate, the accused's financial capability should particularly be
considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so to a man charged with a like offense, where the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Although
permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was capable of posting a cash bail bond of
P50, 000 and P350, 000, respectively. The bail fixed is all the more excessive because it was in the form of cash. While
cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused.
Victory Liner vs Judge Bellosillo
Facts:
Judge Reynaldo Bellosilo was the presiding Judge of Orani, Bataan MCTC and ating Judge in Dinalupihan, Hermosa
Bataan.
On March 2, 2000 one of the bus of Victory Line was cruising along the national highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it
accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales who died a day after. Victory Liner Bus Inc.
shouldered the funeral and burial of Marciana Morales and on March 6, 2000 entered into an Agreement with the
heirs of Marciana Morales. On March 14, 2000 upon the payment of VLI to the heirs of Marciana Morales they
executed PINAGSAMANG SALAYSAY between VLI and the heirs though their authorized representative Faustina M.
Antonio executed Release of Claim and affidavit of Desistance in favour of VLI and Reino dela Cruz, driver of VLI.
However, on March 3, 2000, 2 of the sons of Marciana Morales who are also a signatories in the executed
agreement with VLI already filed a criminal case against the driver Rieno dela Cruz of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On March 13, 2000 after the Preliminary examination, Judge Bellosillo ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest of
Dela Cruz and fixed his bail of P50k in cash and ordered the Chief of Police of Bataan to impound the bus involved
in the accident which could be released only upon posting bail of P50k.
On March 30, 2000, VLI paid cash bond under protest and upon showing the official recipt to the chief of police the
impounded of bus was released. Again, the Judge ordered the Chief of Police to explain in writing why did they
released the bus without court order. The bus was re-impounded and on April 18, 2000 by virtue of Judge BEllisillo’s
order.
On June 20, 2000 VLI filed with Office of the Court of Administration against Judge Reynaldo Belosillo claiming his
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for impounding the bus and required VLI to post bond for the release , GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS AUTHORITY when it revoked the srety bond of driver Edwin Serrano, RENDERED UNJUST AND OPPRESSIVE ORDER
when he ordered the bail to be increased from 50k to 350k and required it to be posted in cash, GUILTY OF
INACATION for failing to resolve the petitiuon of VLI despite of the time lapse .
The respondent justifies his action in his comment, that the bail he required for VLI was to pay the damagaes by way
of subsidiary liability in case of insolvency, the cash requirement for bail according to him was required for it was the
prayer of the prosecution and it is his iscretion as Judge as to what for of payment of the bail as per the Rules of
Court., the increase bail from 50k to 350k was ordered because the driver was already a fugitive.
Issue: Whether the imposition of cash bond and requiring the accused to pay in cash tantamount to grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, excessive bail , unjust and oppressive?
Held
The Supreme Court held that Judgec Bellosillo was wrong in increasing the bail bond of driver Serrano
unconscionably from 60k to 350k . Although Serrano and Dela Cruz was regular worker of VLI they are not capable
of paying cash bond of P50k and 350k respectively.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody that right to bail except offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua provides, that in fixing the amount of bail, the Judge must primarily consider the following
factors:
1. Financial ability of the accused to post bail
2. Nature and circumstance of the offense
3. Penalty for the offense charged
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. The weight of evidence against the accused
6. Age and health of the accused
7. Probabilitty of the accused appearing in trial
8. Forfeiture of the bonds
9. The fact that the accused was a fugitive when arrested
10. The pendency of the cases in which the accused is under bond
The amount of bail should, therefore be reasonable at all times. It must be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail should
not be required.
The Rules of Court allowed the payment of Bail bond in cash in leu of Surety Bond, but the choice belong to the
accused. Moreover under 2000 Bail Bond Guide of DOJ, crimes of Reckless iImprudence resulting in homicide and
with violation of LTO Traffic Code, bail shall be 30k regardless of the number of deaths.
The Supreme Court charge Judge Bellosillo guilty for ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive bail
bonds on Dela Cruz ans Serrano’s case and respondent Judge was ordered to pay a fine of P10k FROM HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS.