Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10292 March 31, 1915

EUSTAQUIO CONCHADA, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Reyes and Millar and Mariano A. Albert for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for respondent.

ARAULLO, J.:

On May 19, 1914, the provincial fiscal charged Eustaquio Conchada with the crime of murder in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, then presided over by
the Honorable George R. Harvey, judge. The case against him having been duly prepared, he was
tried on July 23, 1914, before the same Court of First Instance of Tayabas, then presided over by the
Honorable Isidro Paredes and on that date included in the Fourteenth Judicial District by virtue of Act
No. 2347 of the Philippine Legislature which went into effect on the 1st day of the same month of
July and which provided for the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and of the Court of
Land Registration. Defendant was sentenced on September 23 of that year, 1914, by the same
judge, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, to the penalty of life imprisonment and consequently confined
in Bilibid Prison of this city of Manila under an order issued by said Honorable Isidro Paredes as
judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas.

During the course of the trial, defendant filed a motion praying that said court refrain from proceeding
further in the case and from sentencing him, and that it disqualify itself in favor of the competent
court, on the ground that it was not legally constituted, because said Act No. 2347, which had
created it, was contrary to the Organic act of the Philippines and therefore void, and said court and
the judge presiding therein lacked jurisdiction to try and decide the case and sentence him, because
such jurisdiction belonged to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, in
which the complaint had been filed and which still existed in the province. This motion was denied by
the court, with exception on the part of the defendant, and the trial was carried forward in the same
court presided over by the Honorable Isidro Paredes, who, as has already been said, rendered the
said judgment of conviction.

Later the attorneys Reyes, Millar, and Albert, representing the said Eustaquio Conchada, prayed this
Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the Director of Prisons to compel him to produce
said defendant and, after due hearing, to order his release or grant him a trial in a competent court.
After mentioning the facts already set forth, they virtually alleged that the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, fourteenth Judicial District, on September 23, 1914, against the
defendant was illegal, null and void, because: (1) The Philippine Legislature had no authority to
abolish or deprive of jurisdiction the Court of First of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, created by
the constitution, nor to substitute therefor another court of its own creation; (2) the Philippine
Legislature had no authority to dis miss or remove the judge of said Court of First Instance, which
had exclusive jurisdiction, as established by the constitution, of the crime specified in the complaint;
and (3) the judge of first instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, established by the Organic
Act, having first acquired jurisdiction over the cause of action and the person of the defendant, no
territorial law could validly compel the defendant-petitioner to submit to the jurisdiction of another
court created by the Legislature and presided over by a judge who held office subject to the will of
that Legislature.

After this court had directed that the respondent Director of Prisons show cause why the writ
of habeas corpussought should not issue, and the Solicitor General, representing ting the said
Director of Prisons, had submitted such arguments as he deemed proper, the hearing was had, and
counsel for the petitioner set forth in their brief that on the appeal they relied upon the following legal
propositions:

1. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to limit the jurisdiction of the constitutional
courts created by the Organic Act and still less to abolish, suppress, or destroy said courts.

2. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to remove the judges appointed under the
Organic Act to preside over the court created thereby, without abolishing the courts in which
they sit.

3. The Philippine Legislature, by Act No. 2347, has decreed the final extinction, abolition or
destruction of the constitutional courts created by the Organic Act, and has replaced or
supplanted them with other courts of its own creation.

4. The removal of the judges, along with all the officers and employees of the old courts, and
the limitation of their jurisdiction to certain causes pending, necessarily imply the destruction
or abolition of said courts.

5. The courts "organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally constituted and the judges
appointed by virtue of said Act lack jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner.

These five propositions rest upon the following hypotheses:

1. That the courts created by the Organic Act, or the law organizing the courts of justice of
the Philippine islands to wit, Act No. 136, passed on June 11, 1901, by the United States
Philippine Commission, are constitutional courts and that said courts have been replaced or
supplanted by the Philippine Legislature through Act No. 2347 with other courts of its own
creation.

2. That the same Philippine Legislature, through Act No. 2347, without authority therefor, has
limited the jurisdiction of the courts, characterized by petitioner's counsel as constitutional,
created by the Organic Act, and has abolished, suppressed, or destroyed said courts.

3. That the Philippine Legislature has removed, likewise without authority therefor, the judges
appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the courts created thereby.

From these hypotheses said counsel for the petitioner, after arguing at length in support of the
propositions laid down by them, deduce that the courts "organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally
constituted and that Judge Paredes, appointed under said Act, lacked jurisdiction to try and
sentence Eustaquio Conchada, the petitioner.

When the United States Philippine Commission on June 11, 1901, passed Act No. 136, the law
organizing the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands, the law known as "The Philippine Bill" —
that is, the Act of July 1, 1902 had not yet been passed by the Congress of the United States. The
organization of the courts of justice in the Philippine Islands and the definition of their jurisdiction by
means of act No. 136 were effected, as petitioner's counsel say, by virtue of or under the instructions
of the President of the United States. What was the organization of those courts of justice? How was
the jurisdiction thereof defined? The very Act, No. 136, categorically answers these queries.

Section 1 of said Act says:

Courts of justice shall be maintained in every province of the Philippine Islands in which civil
government shall be established; which courts shall be open for the trial of all causes proper
for their cognizance, and justice shall be therein impartially administered without corruption
or unnecessary delay.

Section 2 of the same Act says:

The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested in a Supreme
Court, Courts of First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with such special
jurisdictions of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as now are or hereafter may be
authorized by law.

With reference to the Courts of First Instance, section 48 of the same Act says:

There shall be in each province in which civil government has been or shall be organized
under the sovereignty of the United States, a Court of First Instance, in each of which a
judge shall preside, to be appointed by the Philippine Commission, to hold office during its
pleasure. Each judge so appointed shall preside in all Courts of First Instance in his judicial
district, which shall consist of such provinces as shall be hereafter by law designated to
constitute such judicial district.

Said section makes an exception with reference to the city of Manila, which is dealt with in the next
succeeding section, 49, in a way not pertinent here.

In treating of the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, section 55 of said Act says that it shall be
of two kinds, original and appellate, the next succeeding section, 56, mentioning among the first kind
that of trying and deciding all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding $100 may be imposed.

A simple reading of the provisions of the Act No. 136 is sufficient for understanding that its object
was to organize, or, rather, to create, the judiciary in this Philippine Islands under the system of
government established thereinby the United States of America in substitution for that which existed
when, by virtue of the treaty of Paris, sovereignty over said Islands was transferred by the Spanish
Government to the United States of America.

After the judiciary was organized, the jurisdiction corresponding to each of the divisions of that power
was assigned, and after the courts established by virtue of said Act No. 136 were already in
operation, the Congress of the United States passed the Act of July 1, 1902, known as "The
Philippine Bill," which, among other matters relating to the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands set forth in section 9 thereof:

That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as
shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said
 Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine
Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as may be hereafter
enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall
hereafter be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall receive the compensation heretofore prescribed by the commission until otherwise
provided by congress. The judges of the Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the
Civil Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission: Provided, That the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Courts
of First Instance shall not be changed except by Act of Congress.

It is therefore unquestionable that the Congress of the United States through the Philippine Bill
placed, as petitioner's counsel say, its high sanction upon the institutions already existing in said
Islands and definitely confirmed their existence, and it is also unquestionable that, with reference to
the organization of the judiciary — that is, to the institution for the administration of justice — said
Act approved and confirmed it, leaving it as it had been established by Act No. 136, while it sets forth
what appears in the section 9 above quoted with reference to the different divisions of that same
judiciary and to the appointment of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and the judges of the Courts of First Instance.

Said section ratified the jurisdiction which Act No. 136, prior to the Philippine Bill, has already
conferred upon the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance, and also clearly stated that such
Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance should thereafter have such additional jurisdiction as
might be conferred upon them by the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the power of
said Government to change the practice and method of procedure.

Jurisdiction is the power or authority one has to govern and to execute the laws, and
especially the power with which judges are invested for administering justice — that is, for
trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering judgment in
accordance with the laws. (Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. 3, p.
743, ed. 1875. )

Jurisdiction, when applied to courts, is defined to be the power to hear and determine the
cause. (Wightman vs. Karsner, 20 Ala. , 446, 451; Pullman Palace Car Co. vs. Harrison, 25
South, 697, 699; 82 Am. St. Rep. , 68; In re Greenough St. , 32 Atl. , 427, 428;
State vs. Wakefield, 15 Atl. , 181, 183; and innumerable cases. )

In the meaning of the law, "jurisdiction" is the authority or power which a man hath to do
justice in causes of complain brought before him. (State vs. Whitford, 11 N. W. , 424, 426; 54
Wis. , 150. )

The term "jurisdiction,' when confined to the judicial department of the Government, means
the legal authority to administer justice. (Holmes vs. Campbell, 12 Minn. 221, 227, [141,
146]. )

"Jurisdiction" is "controlling authority; the right of making or enforcing laws or

regulations, the capacity of determining rules of action or use, and exacting
penalties; the function or capacity of judging or governing in general; the inherent
power of decision or control. " (People vs. Pierce, 41 N. Y. Suppl. , 858, 860. )

Jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes, and of doing justice in matters
of complaint. (State vs. Whitford, 11 N. W. , 424, 426; Wis. , 150. )
So there can be no doubt that in speaking in said section 9 of the Philippine Bill of the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of these Islands, the Congress of the United
States referred to the power of First Instance of these Islands are invested by Act No. 136, which
organized the courts of justice of these Islands, and to such as they might in the future be invested
with or as might be granted to them by the Government of the Islands, subject to the power of said
Government to change the practice and method of procedure; but in no way did it refer to the
districts or provinces wherein the Courts of First Instance or the judges appointed to exercise such
jurisdiction were then exercising it by virtue of Act No. 140, which was passed by the same United
States Commission in these Islands on June 12, 1901, prior to the Philippine bill itself; or, rather, this
Act did not refer to the place where said jurisdiction was to be exercised, or the particular extent of
territory in which it was then being exercised, or to the place or the particular extent of territory in
which it might be exercised, by virtue of the laws which might in the future be enacted for such
purpose by the Government of these Islands through the medium of the Philippine Commission or
Philippine Legislature. In short, the Congress of the United States did not in the Philippine Bill pay
any attention to the organization of the judiciary with reference to the creation and establishment of
judicial districts, or to the number of such districts, or, finally, to the number of provinces that should
be comprised in each district; it accepted the organization of the judiciary in this respect as had been
provided by said Act No. 140, and it did not restrict, limit, or modify the authority which the Philippine
Commission had exercised in said Act No. 140 in dividing the judicial territory of the Islands into
various districts, each of which embraced one or more provinces of the Archipelago, and in
establishing therein the Courts of First Instance, or courts of justice, in accordance with the provision
of section 1 of the same Organic Act, No. 136, nor did it attempt to assume authority or to establish
regulations or procedure to which the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature must
conform in its future exercise of that authority. Otherwise the said Congress would have stated, as it
did state in section 9 of the Philippine Bill in speaking of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of
the Courts of First Instance as well as the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, that the establishment
by the Philippine Government of judicial districts or the determination of the provinces to be
comprised in each district should be made subject to certain regulations or to the changes or
amendments which might be necessary in the future. Since the Congress of the United States in the
said Philippine Bill did not so state, it is evident that it left the Philippine Commission and the
Philipppine Legislature (which was created by the same Act and which succeeded said Commission
in the exercise of the legislative power) at liberty to enact such laws as said Legislature might deem
expedient or necessary to modify or change the division of the judicial territory of the Islands, as
effected under Act No. 140, and to establish new districts which might be included in such divisions
of the judicial territory, as has in fact been done, first by the Philippine Commission and afterwards
by the Philippine Legislature through the medium of Acts Nos. 450, 496, 501, 552, 867, 1345, 1708,
1952, and 2038, all these being Acts of which the Congress of the United States had knowledge, in
compliance with the provision in section 86 of the same Philippine Bill, without annulling them in the
exercise of the authority it naturally reserved to itself in that section.

From all of the foregoing it necessarily follows that the Courts of First Instance for these Islands,
which are the ones to which the appellant refers in the question raised on the appeal, are not
constitutional courts, or courts created by the Constitution, but by the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands, as territory not incorporated into the United States of America and governed by the
Congress of those States through the medium of the Act of July 1, 1902. This Act has come to be
the constitution of the Philippine Islands, and the fact that the creation of said courts was sanctioned
by that constitution did not convert them into constitutional courts in the sense understood and
maintained by petitioner's counsel — that is, in such manner that the Philippine Legislature cannot
act with respect to the division of the judicial territory without awaiting the consent or approval of
Congress, for the simple reason that Congress by virtue of the constitution of the Philippines did not
arrogate to itself or assume any authority on this point concerning the organization of the judicial
power, and, consequently, the courts have, by virtue of Act No. 2347, replaced or supplanted those
that had been previously established above, are also created by the Legislature by virtue of the
powers which said constitution confers upon it.

If, as has already been seen, jurisdiction is the power with which judges are invested to try civil and
criminal cases and to decide them or render judgment in accordance with the law, the increase in
the number of districts in the judicial division of the territory of the Philippine Islands and the
formation of each of these new districts by a larger or smaller number of provinces than those
assigned to each district by Act No. 140 and the other Acts mentioned above, as well as changes in
the designation of some of those districts and of some of the provinces comprised in the former
district for others finally designated in Act No. 2347, and the reduction in some of the new districts,
according to the same Act, of the number of provinces comprised, to the extent that the Fourteenth
Judicial District should include only the Province of Tayabas, which, with the Province of Batangas
had formed the Seventh Judicial District under Act No. 501 and prior thereto under Act No. 140 the
Sixth District, along with the Provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Principe and Infanta, and Polillo Island, do
not constitute limitation or increase of the jurisdiction of those courts, because the power and
authority to hear, try, and decide civil and criminal cases pertaining to each court are always the
same, and what was increased or diminished by said Act No. 2347 was the places wherein said
jurisdiction is exercised or the exercise of the jurisdiction itself with reference to the place in which it
is publicly manifested.

It is true that the word "jurisdiction" is also understood, according to Escriche in his work above cited,
"as the district or territory over which a judge's authority extends; and as the boundary of a place or
province; and likewise as the court in which justice is administered;" but this is not the sense in
which the word "jurisdiction" is used in section 9 of the Philippine Bill, as petitioner's counsel seem to
have understood in saying that the Philippine Legislature had no authority to limit the jurisdiction of
what they call the constitutional courts, created by the Organic Act, and in establishing as to the
grounds for the whole argument developed in their brief that the Philippine Legislature has by Act
No. 2347 limited such jurisdiction. Though that is the meaning commonly given to the word, it is
there employed in its strictly legal acception as defined above, for there can be no doubt that when
the Congress of the United States said in section 9 "that the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and
such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, etc. ,"
it referred only to the powers of the Supreme Court and of the Courts of First Instance to have
original and appellate jurisdiction of the case mentioned — the former by sections 16, 17, and 18,
and the latter by sections 55, 56, and 57, of Act No. 136 — and to perform the acts specified in some
of those sections. This is so perfectly plain that at the close of section 9 of the Philippine Bill it is
stated that the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance shall not be
changed except by Act of Congress — that is, that the power and authority of the Supreme Court
and of the Courts of First Instance with reference to said actions and to deciding the cases arising
thereunder shall be the same as stated in section 56, No. 4, of Act No. 136 — that is, original for the
Courts of First Instance, irrespective of the value of the property in controversy or the amount of the
demand, and appellate for the Supreme Court, according to section 18 of the same Act. It cannot be
altered except by act of Congress. And if petitioner's counsel have tried, in the second of the
hypotheses they have started from in laying down the five propositions contained in their brief, to
show that by Act No. 2347 in the Philippine Legislature has limited the jurisdiction, strictly speaking,
of the courts — that is, of the Courts of First Instance from among those in question — created by
the Organic Act, and the particular extent of the exercise of that jurisdiction by reason of the increase
of new judicial districts, they have also fallen into a flagrant inaccuracy, because the fact really is that
said Act No. 2347 contains no provision which alters or modifies the provisions in section 55, 56, and
67 of said Act for the organization of the judiciary.

Neither it is true that the Philippine Legislature has by Act No. 2347 abolished, suppressed, or
destroyed the courts to which the appellant's counsel refer, to wit, the Courts of First Instance in
these Islands, created by the Act organizing the judiciary, for an organism is not destroyed,
abolished, or suppressed by varying its original form, and said Act has done nothing more than
make a new division of the judicial territory by increasing the number of districts and by including
only one, or two or more provinces in each district, but preserving the Courts of First Instance in
each province, according to the purport of the prescription in section 1 of said Judiciary Act, or, what
amounts to the same thing, has reorganized the Courts of First Instance of the Islands without
altering the organism thereof or the system of which they form a part, and without also depriving
them of any portion of the jurisdiction conferred upon them from the time of their creation.

For the same reason it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of those same courts has been limited to
certain causes pending, as has occurred in the present case, according to petitioner's counsel, with
relation to the case instituted against said petitioner, Eustaquio Conchada, by virtue of the provisions
of section 24 of said Act No. 2347, in that it was tried and decided by a judge other than the one who
presided over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District when the complaint
was filed against him, for the cause was submitted to the same Court of First Instance of Tayabas
wherein the complaint had been filed, and was tried in said court, belonging then to the Fourteenth
District, presided over by the judge who had jurisdiction to try it, as successor and continuator of the
judge who preceded him, having the same jurisdiction as the former in his character of judge of the
Court of First Instance of said province, and it cannot thereby be understood that any jurisdiction
was taken away from said court or from the judge who had formerly officiated therein.

It is true that section 7 of Act No. 2347 of the Philippine Legislature provided that the judges of the
Courts of First Instance, judges-at-large, and judges of the Court of Land Registration should vacate
their positions on the date when said Act went into effect, but the same section went on to say
further that the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, should
make new appointments of judges of the Courts of First Instance and auxiliary judges in accordance
with the provisions of that Act. So that the ceasing to hold their respective positions in the cases of
the judges to whom said section referred is not and cannot be considered really as a removal or
dismissal of said judicial officers, as petitioner's counsel characterize it, but a measure related to the
new division of the judicial territory into a greater number of districts and the assignment to each
district of different provinces — in some of them, of the provinces that composed the districts
theretofore existing — which made necessary the new appointment of the respective judge for each
district, an appointment which the Governor-General of the Islands, with the advice and consent of
the Philippine Commission, was empowered to make, according to section 9 of the Act of Congress,
the Philippine bill, nor can it be in any way maintained, as petitioner's counsel contend, that the
ceasing of said judges to hold their positions, call it removal or not, has necessarily implied the
destruction, abolition, or suppression of the courts in which they discharge their duties, for the court
as an entity is one thing and the person of the officer who exercises his jurisdiction therein is
another.

The case cited by petitioner's counsel on page 23 of their brief (People vs. Dubois, 23 Ill. , 498), in
support of their contention to the effect that the Philippine Legislature had no authority, according to
the Philippine Bill, to reorganize the Courts of First Instance of the Islands and that in doing so it
violated said Act — that is, the constitution — making null and void both the ceasing of the old
judges to hold their positions as well as the appointment of the new, effected by virtue of said Act
No. 2347, shows that error into which said counsel have fallen and the erroneous hypotheses on
which they have based their whole argument.

In fact, the seventh section of the fifth article the constitution of the State of Illinois provides:

The State shall be divided into nine judicial districts, in each of which one circuit judge shall
be elected by the qualified voters thereof, who shall hold his office for the term of six years,
 and until his successor shall be commissioned and qualified: Provided, The General
Assembly may increase the number of circuits to meet the future exigencies of the State.

The question that arose in the case cited, People vs. Dubois (23 Ill. , 498), is the following: "Can the
legislature expel a circuit judge from his office by creating a new district, and taking from him the
territory which constitute his district?"

This question was answered as follows: "The bare reading of the constitution [of the State of Illinois]
must convince every one that it intended to prohibit such a proceeding. It was the intention of that
instrument to place the judges entirely above and beyond the legislative control or interference,
except by impeachment or address, as provided for in the twelfth section of the fifth article. It is the
constitution which creates the office of circuit judge, and not the legislature. All the latter can do is to
create new judicial districts, the constitution in advance having created the office of circuit judge for
such district. "

The syllabus of said decision states: "The office of circuit judge is created by the constitution, which
also fixes the term. The legislature may increase the number of circuits, but cannot deprive a judge
of his office and compensation by creating new circuits of the territory from which he was elected.
Once elected, he holds his office under the constitution, unless removed by address or
impeachment. "

And in citing the said case petitioner's counsel have quoted on page 23 of their brief from pages 507
and 508 [vol. 23] of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, as follows: "When the office of judge is
created by the constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature (State vs. Scott, 9 Ark. , 270);
but when created by statute under authority of the constitution, it may be abolished by statute and
the incumbent deprived of his office. Thus the legislature cannot expel a circuit judge from his office
by creating a new district and taking from him the territory that constituted his district.
(People vs. Dubois, 23 Ill. , 498. )"

In the Illinois case cited above, the State constitution had fixed the number of judicial districts into
which the State should be divided, the time each circuit judge should hold his office, and had
provided, furthermore, that the circuit judge of each district should be chosen through election by the
qualified voters of the State.

According to the statement of facts given in the decision mentioned, the legislature of the State of
Illinois on February 11, 1859, passed an act creating the twenty-third judicial circuit and providing
that the county of Bureau should be added to and form a part of the ninth circuit, thus leaving Judge
Ballou, who was holding office by election and should have held it under the constitution for six
years, without territory wherein to perform his duties or exercise jurisdiction, or, what amounts to the
same thing, thus removing or dismissing him from said office; and this was the point decided in that
decision in a favorable sense by granting the mandamus sought, on the grounds already explained
that the legislature could increase the number of circuits but could not deprive a judge of his office or
of his compensation through the creation of new circuits in the territory for which he had been
elected, and that after election he occupied the office under the authority of the constitution and
could only be removed therefrom by address or impeachment.

It is perfectly understood that the act passed by the legislature of Illinois to the effect already set
forth was unconstitutional, illegal, and null and void, for by reason of the provision in such act that
the county of Bureau should form part of the ninth circuit, the same law creating another judicial
circuit as the twenty-third, Judge Ballou was removed from the office he was holding before the
expiration of the terms of six years, the time that he was entitled to hold it, as no address or
proceedings in impeachment had been effected under the authority of the State constitution, which,
in the seventh section of its fifth article, contained provision for making the designation for such
office of circuit judge — that is, through the medium of election by the qualified voters of the State.

Neither in Act No. 136, the law organizing the courts of justice in the Philippine Islands, nor in the Act
of July 1, 1902, the constitutional law or constitution of the Philippines, is there any provision which
fixes or indicates the time during which the judges of the Court of First Instance of the Islands are
entitled to hold such office, the former Act merely stating in its section 48 that the judge appointed by
the Philippine Commission shall hold office during its pleasure. Neither is there in the Act organizing
the judiciary or in the Philippine Bill any provision which fixes the precise number of districts of the
judicial territory of the Philippines and the number of provinces to be included in each district, it being
merely stated in section 1 of aid Act that "courts of justice shall be maintained in every province in
the Philippine Islands in which civil government shall be established," and in section 48 thereof that
"there shall be in each province in which civil government has been or shall be organized under the
sovereignty of the United States, a Court of First Instance, in each of which a judge shall preside, to
be appointed by the Philippine Commission," and that "each judge so appointed shall preside in all
Courts of First Instance in his judicial district, which shall consist of such provinces as shall be
hereafter by law designated. "

Act No. 140 was the first to designate the judicial districts and the provinces to be included in each
district.

Thereafter and successively, first by the Philippine Commission and afterwards by the Legislature,
various laws were enacted modifying the above-cited Act No. 140 with reference to the division of
the judicial territory, the designation and numbering of districts, and the provinces that should form
part of each district, nor has the Congress of the United States, as has also been said above,
declared any of said laws to be null and void, which implies that they were all approved by that
Congress.

So there is no similarity at all between the case decided by the supreme court of Illinois in
People vs. Dubois (23 Ill. , 498) and the case at bar.

The Illinois legislature could not, without violating the constitution of that State, on the occasion of
providing for or modifying the organization of the judicial territory thereof that forms part of a circuit, a
certain county, that of Bureau, and of creating a new district, could not, we repeat, remove Judge
Ballou from his office or dismiss him, thus depriving him of the jurisdiction he exercised in the
territory for which he had been duly elected, but the Philippine Legislature could, without violating the
law organizing the judiciary in the Philippine Islands or the Philippine Bill passed by Congress on
July 1, 1902, the constitution of the Philippines, by means of Act No. 2347, reorganize the judicial
territory of the Islands by creating new districts, changing the numbers of those that previously
existed, including in each district one or more provinces, whether or not they were those which
formed part of the districts previously created by Act No. 140 and the others already enumerated.
Furthermore, by reason of this organization, it could provide that the judges should cease to hold
their respective offices in accordance with the previous organization and that new judges should be
appointed to hold them in the districts newly created by virtue of such reorganization, for neither the
law organizing the judiciary nor the Philippine Bill contains any provisions fixing the number of
districts of which the division of the judicial territory of the Philippines must necessarily consist, nor
the provinces or the number thereof which must be included in each district, nor has it limited or
restricted the power of the Legislature or of the Government of the Philippines in connection with the
organization of the judiciary with respect to the Courts of First Instance, nor has it laid down any
rules to which their actions must conform in the exercise of such power, the Governor-General
having been expressly empowered, as we have already seen, by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, to
appoint the judges of the Courts of First Instance with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission. All this clearly demonstrates that said Courts of First Instance are not constitutional
courts, and the hypothesis from which petitioner's counsel have started in their brief being incorrect,
the whole argument advanced by them to show that Act No. 2347, which provides for the
organization of the Courts of First Instance of these Islands, is illegal and null and void, falls through.
Moreover, without going beyond that same law organizing the courts of justice of these Islands and
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Bill, we have a plain demonstration of the
difference between the constitutional courts and those which are not such, a difference which exists
between the Courts of First Instance of these Islands and the Supreme Court thereof.

The appointment of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court is made,
according to said section 9 of the Philippine Bill, by the President of the United States of America
with the advice and consent of the Senate, a provision which repeals that of section 8 of the said Act
organizing the judiciary which states that the Justices, including the Chief Justice, of the Supreme
Court should be appointed b the Commission and should hold office during its pleasure. The
Supreme Court, according to the same section 8 of the Act organizing the judiciary, shall consist of a
Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, and the same section provides the number of Justices
necessary to form a quorum and to try any case within its jurisdiction, as well as the number of them
whose concurrence is necessary to pronounce a judgment; section 11 of the same Act authorizes
the Supreme Court to hold sessions, not only in Manila, but also in Iloilo and Cebu, provisions of
said Judiciary Act which, not having been modified by Congress in the Act of July 1, 1902, have
been ratified and sanctioned thereby, and so the Supreme Court of the Philippines had become a
constitutional court, and the Philippine Legislature cannot enact laws upon the subject of this
formation, the appointment of the Justices that compose it, or the place where it must hold its
sessions. Hence it was necessary for Congress to adopt the joint resolution of April 9, 1910, which
petitioner's counsel mentioned in their brief, in order that this Supreme Court might hold sessions in
Baguio, a joint resolution which it is not necessary to secure from the Congress of the United States
to enable the Court of First Instance for one district to be transferred to another district or to enable
the judge of the Court of First Instance of one district to hold sessions in a different district, it being
sufficient that the Legislature so provide. And this is the clearest demonstration that the Supreme
Court and the Courts of First Instance do not, as petitioner's counsel have maintained in their brief,
have the same status from the constitutional point of view.

In conclusion, since Act No. 2347 of the Legislature, whereby the reorganization of the Courts of
First Instance of these Islands was provided for, is not illegal and null and void, and the said courts
are legally constituted by virtue of said reorganization, the Honorable Judge Isidro Paredes had
jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner. Eustaquio Conchada, for the crime of murder and to
order, as he did, the imprisonment of said defendant by virtue of the sentence imposed upon him.

It is therefore held that there is no ground for issuing to the Directors of Prisons the writ of habeas
corpus applied for the counsel for said petitioner. So ordered.

Torres and Johnson, JJ. , concur.

Moreland and Trent, JJ. , concur in the result.