2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: definition, nature, and concepts

B. Parts

C.Amendments and revisions

D.Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

E. General provisions

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine

B. State immunity
C. General principles and state policies

D. Separation of powers
E. Checks and balances

F. Delegation of powers

G. Forms of government

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Who may exercise legislative power
1. Congress

2. Regional/Local legislative power

 3. People’s initiative on statutes

a. Initiative and referendum

4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary

government
B. Houses of Congress
1. Senate

2. House of Representatives

a. District representatives and questions of apportionment

b. Party-list system (R.A. No. 7941)

C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications

D. Quorum and voting majorities

E. Discipline of members

F. Electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments

1. Nature

2. Powers

G. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
a. Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions

b. Bicameral conference committee

c. Limitations on legislative power

i. Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff

measures

ii. Presidential veto and Congressional override

2. Non-legislative
a. Informing function

b. Power of impeachment
 c. Other non-legislative powers

IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications

1. Presidential immunity

2. Presidential privilege
B. Powers
1. Executive and administrative powers in general

2. Power of appointment
a. In general

b. Commission on Appointments confirmation

c. Midnight appointments

d. Power of removal
3. Power of control and supervision
a. Doctrine of qualified political agency

b. Executive departments and offices

c. Local government units

4. Military powers
5. Pardoning power
a. Nature and limitations

b. Forms of executive clemency

6. Diplomatic power
7. Powers relative to appropriation measures
a. Validity of transferring savings between departments
8. Delegated powers
9. Veto powers
10. Residual powers
11. Executive privilege
12. Emergency powers
C. Rules of Succession

V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
 A. Concepts
1. Judicial power

2. Judicial review; requisites

a. Operative fact doctrine

b. Moot questions

c. Political question doctrine

B. Safeguards of Judicial independence

C. Judicial restraint

D. Appointments to the Judiciary

1. Judicial and Bar Council
E. Supreme Court
1. En banc and division cases

2. Procedural rule-making

3. Administrative supervision over lower courts

4. Original and appellate jurisdiction

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. Constitutional safeguards to ensure independence of
commissions

B. Powers and functions of each commission

C. Prohibited offices and interests

D. Jurisdiction of each constitutional commission

E. Review of final orders, resolutions, and decisions

1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions

2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions

VII. BILL OF RIGHTS (Article III of the 1987 Constitution)

 A. Fundamental powers of the state (police power, eminent domain,
taxation)
1. Concept, application and limits

2. Requisites for valid exercise

3. Similarities and differences

4. Delegation

B. Private acts and the Bill of Rights

The set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual,
and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of
those rights. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
“against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles”
[quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189]. Generally, any
governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also generally
self-executing.

Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private individuals. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. (Yrasegui v. PAL, G.R.
No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008).

Civil rights - Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense,
to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government.
They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc.. They are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.

Political rights - They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment
or administration of government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government [Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994].
 C. Due process – the rights to life, liberty & property

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 1, BILL OF RIGHTS (BOR) – it is a “catch all provision” (the “abuse of right” civil
law counter-part) and composed of

(1) Due Process Clause – invoked when it involves unreasonable acts of the government,
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, confiscatory; and
(2) Equal Protection clause – invoked when it involves discriminatory acts of the government
and its agents.

Due process means that:

1. There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislature;
2. It shall be reasonable in its operation;
3. It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
4. It shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the State or to all of a class. (People v.
Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939)

Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or
nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property
is concerned [Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163], The guarantee extends to aliens and
includes the means of livelihood [Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275].

5. Relativity of due process

Arises when the definition of due process has been left to the best judgment of our
judiciary considering the peculiarity and the circumstances of each case. In a litany
of cases that have been decided in this jurisdiction, the common requirement to be
able to conform to due process is fair play, respect for justice and respect for the
better rights of others. In accordance with the standards of due process, any court
at any particular time, will be well guided, instead of being merely confined strictly
to a precise definition which may or may not apply in every case.

Requirements of due process in judicial proceedings: Whether in civil or criminal judicial

proceedings, due process requires that there be:
1. An impartial and disinterested court clothed by law with authority to hear and
determine the matter before it.

NOTE: The test of impartiality is whether the judge’s intervention tends to prevent
the proper presentation of the case or the ascertainment of the truth.

2. Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the defendant or the property which is the subject
matter of the proceeding
 3. Notice and opportunity to be heard be given to the defendant
4. Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing, clearly explained as to the factual and
legal bases (Art. VII, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution)

Requisites of administrative due process:

1. The right to hearing which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence to support thereof.
2. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy.
3. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
4. Evidence must be substantial, which means relevant evidence as a reasonable man
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
5. The decision must have something to support itself.
6. Decision must be based on evidence presented during hearing or at least contained in
the record and disclosed by the parties.
7. Decision must be rendered in a manner that the parties can know the various issues
involved and the reason for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay vs CIR, Gr. No. L-46496,
February 27, 1940).

NOTE: When a regulation is being issued under the quasi-legislative authority of an

administrative agency, the requirements of notice, hearing and publication must be
observed. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, G.R. No. 119761, Aug. 29, 1996)

Instances when hearings are not necessary

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions
2. Abatement of nuisance per se
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies
4. Cases of preventive suspension
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner
7. Cancellation of the passport of a person charged with a crime
8. Suspension of a bank’s operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of
liquidity problems in such bank

6. Procedural and substantive due process (Aspect of due

process)

Substantive due process - This serves as a restriction on government's law- and rule-making
powers. The requisites are:

1. The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular

class, require the intervention of the state.
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 Procedural due process - Serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies of the government.

1. Impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matters before it.
2. Jurisdiction properly acquired over the person of the defendant and over property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
3. Opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence adduced.

2018 BAR: In People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, reiterated in People v. Medenilla, G.R.
Nos. 131638-39, March 26, 2001, even as the transcript of stenographic notes showed that the trial
court intensively questioned the witnesses (approximately 43% of the questions asked of prosecution
witnesses and the accused were propounded by the judge), the Supreme Court held that the
questioning was necessary. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel.
Likewise, in People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441, it was held that the judge should be given reasonable
leeway in directing questions to witnesses in order to elicit relevant facts; it is expedient to allow the
judge to question a witness so that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the
facts. Thus, in People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, reiterated in Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378, and in
People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761, the Supreme Court said that questions which merely clear up dubious
points and elicit relevant evidence are within the prerogative of the judge to ask.

In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316, the Supreme Court declared that “to be heard”
does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.

In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446,the Court held that publication is imperative to the validity
of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is
an indispensable part of due process.

1st Mark Jimenez/Marco Crispo Case ((Government of the United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban]):

 The request of US for the extradition of Mark Jimenez (Marco Crispo) pursuant to RP-
US Extradition Treaty coursed to DFA which transmitted the request to DOJ for initial
evaluation.
 Denial of Mark Jimenez’s request for the copy of the extradition request and supporting
documents is not a violation of his right to due process. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis, a class of its own. It is not similar to a criminal proceeding which will call in into
operation all of the rights of the accused as guaranteed in the BOR. Noted that the
request for his extradition is still in the initial evaluation, it is only but a soft restraint
on his right.
  Supreme Court said that upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether they are sufficient in form and substance, whether they comply with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. If no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the
other hand, if there is a prima facie finding, the judge must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at the scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. Thus, also, the grant by the judge of bail was deemed null and void, as
persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. Accordingly, in the Resolution
on the Motion for Reconsideration [December 17, 2002], the Supreme Court denied with
finality Mark Jimenez’ motion, saying that extradition is sui generis, and does not fall
within the ambit of the right to bail.

2nd Mark Jimenez Case:

 The ruling in Purugananwas modified in Government of HongKong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia,

jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, where the Supreme Court said that it cannot ignore
the modern trend in public international law which places primacy on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. In Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the Constitution, the principles set forth in the Declaration are part of the law of the
land. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

 Citing Chief Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion in Puruganan, the Court, in Government of
HongKong, adopted a new standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases,
denominated “clear and convincing evidence”. As Chief Justice Puno explained, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court for entitlement to bail.

NOTE: Presidential Decree No. 1069 is our Extradition Law. Extradition proceeding
differs from Criminal proceedings as follows:
 Criminal proceeding
(1) Involves the determination of guilt or innocence of
the accused.
(2) Require full time blown trial which is adversarial.
(3) Strict adherence to the Rules on Criminal
Procedure is observed.
(4) Quantum of evidence required is beyond
reasonable doubt.
(5) Judgment becomes executor after having attain
finality
Extradition proceeding
The guilt or innocence of the extraditee is not
determined. Hence, the constitutional rights that
are relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee
especially by one whose paper/request is
undergoing initial evaluation.
Summary in nature.
Application of Rules on criminal procedure in
extradition proceeding is construed liberally.
Mere prima facie evidence.
Our courts may decree a person extraditable but
it will still be the President to determine for finality.

7. Constitutional and statutory due process

Constitutional due process - Protects the individual from the government and assures him of his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings.

In Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753, the Supreme Court reiteratedthat the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Accordingly, the constitutional requirement
of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal, because the essence
of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one’s case.

It is doctrinally settled that theright to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003].
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render the same defective. The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case [Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288,
September 22, 2006], The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it [Benedicto v.Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]. It may be forfeited byinaction, and cannot be invoked
for the first time on appeal [People v. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8, 1997].

8. Hierarchy of rights
There is a hierarchy of constitutional rights. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights can
be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973).

9. Judicial standards of review

1) Deferential review – Laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest, without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and
examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be achieved
2) Intermediate review – The substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked into
and the availability of less restrictive alternatives is considered.
3) Strict scrutiny – The focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest
(Separate opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, Feb. 26,
2002)

NOTE: Given the fact that not all rights and freedoms or liberties under the Bill of Rights
and other values of society are of similar weight and importance, governmental regulations
that affect them would have to be evaluated based on different yardsticks, or standards of
review.

10. Void-for-vagueness doctrine

A law is vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution because:

1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
2. It leaves law enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (People v. de
la Piedra, G.R. No. 128777, Jan. 24, 2001)

Related to “overbreadth”, this doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is subject to
the same principles governing the “overbreadth” doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for
testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications [David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., cited in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, April
30, 2008].

The "void-for-vagueness" doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine can only be invoked against that species of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001)

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. (Ibid.)
 NOTE: The void-for-vagueness doctrine cannot be used to impugn the validity of a criminal
statute using “facial challenge” but it may be used to invalidate a criminal statute “as applied” to
a particular defendant.

D. Equal protection
1. Concept
All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. It does not forbid
discrimination as to persons and things that are different. What it forbids are distinctions based
on impermissible criteria unrelated to a proper legislative purpose, or class or discriminatory
legislation, which discriminates against some and favors others when both are similarly situated.

The Constitution, as a general rule, places the civil rights ofaliens on an equal footing with those
of citizens; but their political rights do not enjoy the same protection [Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,
16 Phil 534]. Statutes may validly limit exclusively to citizens the enjoyment of rights or
privileges connected with public domain, the public works, or the natural resources of the State.
The rights and interests of the State in these things are not simply political but also proprietary
in nature and so citizens may lawfully be given preference over aliens in their use or enjoyment.

2. Requisites for valid classification

The classification must
1. Rest on substantial distinctions
2. Be germane to the purpose of the law
3. Not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. Apply equally to all members of the same class. (People v. Cayat, GR. No. L-45987, May 5,
1939)

3. Standards of judicial review

The Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality or Principle of Altered Circumstance: A statute
may be valid at one time as applied to a set of facts but it may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances.

Test in determining compliance with the equal protection clause:

a) Rational Basis Test

b) Strict Scrutiny Test
c) Intermediate Scrutiny Test

a. Rational Basis Test

Applies to legislative classifications in general, such as those pertaining to economic or social
legislation which do not affect fundamental rights of suspect classes; or is not based on gender or
illegitimacy. The legislative purpose must me legitimate and the classification must rationally related
to the legislative purpose.
 Courts will not overturn government action unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the
court can only conclude that the government's actions were irrational. (Warren v. City of Athens,
411 F.3d 697, 710, 6th Cir. 2005)

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. This standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are
“presumed to be valid” largely for the reason that “the drawing of lines that create distinctions
is peculiarly a legislative task and unavoidable one.”

b. Strict Scrutiny Test

Applies to legislative classifications affecting fundamental rights or suspect classes.

It is applied when the challenged statute either:

1) Classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic;
2) Infringes fundamental constitutional rights; that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny. The presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such
legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates
otherwise. (Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. BSP, GR. No. 148208. December
15, 2004)

c. Intermediate Scrutiny Test

Provides that to withstand constitutional challenge, it must be shown that the law or policy being
challenged furthers an important government interest in a way that is substantially related to
that interest. It is generally applied in sex-based classifications, illegitimacy, sexual orientation
and free speech. (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190)

E. Searches and seizures

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

1. Concept
 Essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into ones’ private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.

In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 14 l. ed. 2D 510 [1965]), the United
States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right
has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within
the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. In the 1968 case of
Morfe v. Mutuc (22 SCRA 424, 444-445), we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy.

The SC clarified that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights. Other facets of the
right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and
17.

There are other zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws:

a) Civil Code, Chapter 2 (Human Relations) Article 26: prying into the privacy of another
residence, meddling, etc.;
b) Revised Penal Code (RPC): Revelation of secrets by an officer under Revised Penal Code
(Article 229-230); Revelation of trade and industrial secrets; Trespass to dwelling;
Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200); Secrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 1405); Intellectual
Property Code (RA 8293);
c) Rules of Court on Privilege Communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information.

2. Warrant requirement; requisites for a valid warrant

Requisites of a valid warrant:

a) Probable cause - Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in
themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof
[People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil 667; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33], For a search: “such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched” .
b) Determination of probable cause personally by the judge.
c) After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
d) Particularity of description - The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. General warrant is not allowed. It must be issued
pursuant to a specific offense.

General warrants - Warrants of broad and general characterization or sweeping descriptions which
will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.
Purpose of particularity of description in search warrants

1. Readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent the peace officers from
seizing the wrong items
2. Leave peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823)

Purpose of particularity of description in warrant of arrest: For warrant of arrest, this

requirement is complied with if it contains the name of the person/s to be arrested. If the name of
the person to be arrested is not known, a John Doe warrant may be issued. A John Doe warrant will
satisfy the constitutional requirement of particularity of description if there is some descriptio
personae which is sufficient to enable the officer to identify the accused.

Particularity of description for a search warrant is complied with when:

1. The description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
2. The description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure; or
3. The things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which
the warrant is being issued

NOTE: If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence other than those articles to prove said offense.
The articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence.

Properties subject to seizure

1. Property subject of the offense
2. Stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of the offense
3. Property used or intended to be used as means for the commission of an offense
4.
It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is within his control or possession

The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be searched, but
also the persons to be searched. In People v. Tiu Won Chua, G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003, the validity of
the search warrant was upheld despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched, because
the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and
subsequently implementing it. They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to
be searched, although they did not specifically know the names of the accused.

Searching questions - Examination by the investigating judge of the complainant and the latter’s
witnesses in writing and under oath or affirmation, to determine whether there is a reasonable ground
to believe that an offense has been committed and whether the accused is probably guilty thereof
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and he may be held liable for trial.

3. Warrantless searches
Instances of a valid warrantless search:
1. Visual search is made of moving vehicles at checkpoints

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified onthe ground that it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be moved quickly out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles
are also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided that such searches are made at borders or “constructive borders”, like checkpoints
near the boundary lines of the State.

Searches conducted in checkpoints are lawful, provided the checkpoint complies with the
following requisites:
a. The establishment of checkpoint must be pronounced;
b. It must be stationary, not roaming; and
c. The search must be limited to visual search and must not be an intrusive search.

A checkpoint is akin to a stop-and-frisk situation whose object is either to determine the

identity of suspicious individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officers seek to obtain more information. (Valmonte v. De Villa, GR.83988, Sept. 29, 1989)

2. Search is an incident to a valid arrest

NOTE: An officer making an arrest may take from the person:

a) Any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the
offense
b) Was the fruit thereof
c) Which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping
d) Which might be used as evidence in the trial of the case

3. Search of passengers made in airports

NOTE: Given the minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel, these searches are
reasonable.

4. When things seized are within plain view of a searching party (Plain View Doctrine)

Supreme Court enumerated the elements of a valid seizure based on the “plain view”
doctrine, as follows:
(i) a prior valid intrusion based on the which warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(ii) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are;
(iii) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(iv) “plain view” justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search.

An object is in “plain view” if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object
seized is inside a closed package, the object is not in plain view and, therefore, cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
 then the contents are in plain view and may be seized [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136292, January 15, 2002].

5. Stop and frisk (precedes an arrest)

In Manalili v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the search as akin to “stop-and-frisk” which, in the landmark U.S. case,
Terry v. Ohio, was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observes
unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot.

The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the
latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer
must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or
contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for the principle to apply.

6. When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently

NOTE: For the valid waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and thirdly, that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right [De
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689]. “Consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is not
consent within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, in general the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose t rights are invaded, or one who is authorized to do
so in his behalf.

NOTE: Waiver is limited only to the arrest and does not extend to search made as an
incident thereto, or to any subsequent seizure of evidence found in the search. (People v.
Peralta, G.R. 145176, March 30, 2004)

7. Customs search
8. Exigent and emergency circumstances

NOTE: In People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, the raid of, and the consequent seizure of
firearms and ammunition in, the Eurocar Sales Office at the height of the December 1989
coup d’etat was held valid, considering the exigent and emergency situation obtaining. The
military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed, and
they had no opportunity to apply for a search warrant from the courts because the latter
were closed. Under such urgency and exigency, a search warrant could be validly dispensed
with.

4. Warrantless arrests
Instances of a valid warrantless arrest:
1. In flagrante delicto – The person to be arrested has either committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
2. Hot Pursuit – When an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
indicating, that the person to be arrested has committed it
3. Escaped Prisoner or Detainee – When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court)
4. Waiver – When the right is waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right
and knowingly decided not to invoke it.
5. Continuing offenses – A peace officer can validly conduct a warrantless arrest in crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof, or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State, which are in the nature of continuing crimes. Since rebellion is a continuing
offense, a rebel may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he is deemed to
be in the act of committing the offense at any time of the day or night. (Umil v. Ramos, 187
SCRA 311)

5. Administrative arrests
There is an administrative arrest when there is an arrest as an incident to deportation proceedings.

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of
any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charges against the alien:

1. Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of
false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the
immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry; [As amended by Republic Act No. 503, Sec. 13]
2. Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not
lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3. Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and
sentences for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years after his entry to the Philippines, or who, at any time
after such entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;
4. Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing
prohibited drugs; [As amended by Republic Act No. 503, Sec. 13]
5. Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is
connected with the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;
6. Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not
affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;
7. Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted as a non-immigrant;
 8. Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and
violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority or
who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates
or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or
who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching
such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or
otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9. Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sec.s forty-five of this Act,
independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, that in the
case of alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both
imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however, that the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head; [Paragraph added
pursuant to Republic Act No. 144, Sec. 3]
10. Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred
and fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of
1941**(now Alien Registration Act of 1950, Republic Act No. 562, as amended) or who,
at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the
provisions of the same Act; [Added pursuant to Republic Act No. 503, Sec. 13]
11. Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of
any criminal action which may be brought against him; [Added pursuant to Republic
Act No. 503, Sec. 13]
12. Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act
Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship; [Added pursuant to Republic Act No. 503, Sec. 13]
13. Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties to prevent
them from being attached or executed. [Added pursuant to Republic Act No. 503,
Sec. 13] (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940)

6. Drug, alcohol, and blood tests

A law requiring mandatory drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools is not
unconstitutional. It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right
to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. In sum:

1. Schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students;
2. Minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
3. Schools acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and
 4. Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just
and non-discriminatory. (SJS v. DDB, G.R. No. 157870, Nov. 3, 2008)

A law requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private offices is
not unconstitutional. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy
for employees—and students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Veronia case as “swift and informal procedures,” the probable
cause standard is not required or even practicable. (SJS v. DDB and PDEA, G.R. No. 157870, Nov. 3,
2008)

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with imprisonment. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless”. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being hauled before the prosecutor’s
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of R.A. 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (SJS v. DDB, G.R. No. 157870, Nov. 3, 2008)

F. Privacy of communications and correspondence

1. Private and public communications

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as wellas intangible, objects.
Read R.A. 4200 [Anti-Wire-Tapping Act].

In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, it was held that R.A.4200 clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication, to
secretly record such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make any
distinction. In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112, it was held that a telephone
extension was not among the devices covered by this law.

Anti-wiretapping act (RA 4200):

This law prohibits any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

It also prohibits any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person. Provided, that the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in sect. 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Under Sec. 3 of RA 4200, a peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, may
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 of the said law in cases involving
the crimes of:

1. Treason
2. Espionage
3. Provoking war and disloyalty in case of war
4. Piracy and mutiny in the high seas
5. Rebellion (conspiracy and proposal and inciting to commit included)
6. Sedition (conspiracy, inciting included)
7. Kidnapping
8. Violations of CA 616 (punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security)
Anti-Wiretapping Act only protects letters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the like.

2. Intrusion, when allowed

There is no longer a distinction between an inmate and a detainee with regard to the reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary to accommodate
institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, primarily internal security. As long as the
letters are not confidential communication between the detainee and his lawyer the detention
officials may read them. But if the letters are marked confidential communication between detainee
and lawyer the officer must not read them but only inspect them in the presence of detainees. A law
is not needed before an executive officer may intrude into the rights of privacy of a detainee or a
prisoner. By the very fact of their detention, they have diminished expectations of privacy rights.
(Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, Aug. 25, 2005)
The Supreme Court cited the US case of O’Connor v. Ortega, which ruled that government agencies,
in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in
the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search
and seizure. Moreover, he failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. (Pollo v. David
G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011)

Under the Cybercrime Law, cybersex is the willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of
a computer system, for favor or consideration. Petitioners expressed their fear that private
communications of sexual character between consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes
under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. The
argument of the petitioners are not valid. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress
on Sec.4(c)(i) of the law show a lack of intent to penalize a private showing between and among two
private persons although that may be a form of obscenity to some. The understanding of those who
drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to constitute
the crime of illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade,
and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography,
e.g., by webcam. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014)

Respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned that reporters who had copies of the compact disc
(CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
Act. Secretary Gonzales also ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped
conversation involving the President about fixing votes in 2004 national elections. The Court ruled
that the DOJ Secretary cannot use the Anti-Wiretapping act as a regulatory measure to prohibit
the media from publishing the contents of the CD. Further, the Court held that not every violation
of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. There are
laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression
of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which
should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality
of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of
the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted
by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their
violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose
breach can lead to greater evils. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15,
2008)

3. Writ of habeas data

A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Sec. 1, The Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Jan. 22, 2008)
The reliefs that may be obtained in the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent and in case of threats of the unlawful act, the relief may include a prayer for an
order enjoining the act complained of. A general prayer for other reliefs that are just and equitable
under the circumstances is also allowed.

A writ of habeas data may not be issued to protect purely property and commercial concerns. It
bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing rules. Writs of
amparo and habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer-a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment- are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. (Manila Electric Company v. Lim, GR. No. 184769, Oct. 5, 2010)

G. Freedom of expression
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Reinforced by Section 18(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution: “No person shall be detained solely
by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.”

1. Concept and scope

Scope of protected freedom of expression under the Constitution

1. Freedom of speech
2. Freedom of the press
3. Right of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances
4. Right to form associations or societies not contrary to law
5. Freedom of religion
6. Right to access to information on matters of public concern.

Protected speech includes every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded.
It includes motion pictures as well as what is known as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an
armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful picketing has also been included within the meaning of
speech.

Limitations of freedom of expression

It should be exercised within the bounds of laws enacted for the promotion of social interests and
the protection of other equally important individual rights such as:
1. Laws against obscenity, libel and slander (contrary to public policy)
2. Right to privacy of an individual
3. Right of state/government to be protected from seditious attacks
4. Legislative immunities
5. Fraudulent matters
6. Advocacy of imminent lawless conducts
7. Fighting words
8. Guarantee implies only the right to reach a willing audience but not the right to compel others to
listen, see or read

Rationale behind the provision on freedom of expression

Consistent with its intended role in society, it means that the people are kept from any undue
interference from the government in their thoughts and words. The guarantee basically flows from
the philosophy that the authorities do not necessarily know what is best for the people.
a. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint

b. Freedom from Subsequent punishment

2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations

a. Tests

b. Applications

3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine

4. Tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Private vs. government speech
8. Heckler’s veto
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment clause
a. Concept and basis

b. Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause

c. Test

2. Free exercise clause

3. Tests
a. Clear and Present Danger Test

b. Compelling State Interest Test

c. Conscientious Objector Test

I. Liberty of abode and freedom of movement
 1. Limitations

2. Right to travel
a. Watch-list and hold departure orders
3. Return to one’s country
J. Right to information
1. Limitations

2. Publication of laws and regulations

3. Access to court records

4. Right to information relative to:

a. Government contract negotiations

b. Diplomatic negotiations
K. Right of association

L. Eminent domain
1. Concept

2. Expansive concept of “public use”

3. Just compensation
a. Determination

b. Effect of delay
4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase
5. Miscellaneous application
M. Contract clause
1. Contemporary application of the contract clause
N. Legal assistance and free access to courts

O. Rights of suspects
1. Availability

2. Requisites

3. Waiver

P. Rights of the accused

 1. Criminal due process

2. Bail

3. Presumption of innocence

4. Right to be heard

5. Assistance of counsel

6. Right to be informed

7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

8. Right of confrontation

9. Compulsory process

10. Trial in absentia

Q. Writ of habeas corpus

R. Writs of amparo, habeas data, and kalikasan

S. Self-incrimination clause
1. Scope and coverage
a. Foreign laws
2. Application
3. Immunity statutes
T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners

U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishments

V. Non-imprisonment for debts

W. Double jeopardy
1. Requisites

2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals

3. Dismissal with consent of accused

X. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

VIII. CITIZENSHIP
Prior to the granting of Philippine Independence by the United States on July 4, 1946, the
Filipinos were deemed American nationals because they owed allegiance to the United States
but were not citizens thereof.

CITIZENSHIP - It has broader meaning, embracing all who owe allegiance to a state,
whether democratic or not, without thereby becoming citizens. Because they owe allegiance
to it, they are not regarded as aliens; A term denoting membership of a citizen in a political
society, which membership implies, reciprocally, a duty of allegiance on the part of the
member and duty of protection on the part of the state.

NATIONALITY - It has broader meaning, embracing all who owe allegiance to a state,
whether democratic or not, without thereby becoming citizens. Because they owe allegiance
to it, they are not regarded as aliens.

A. Who are Filipino citizens

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

The following are considered citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are Filipino citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution:
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris;
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle,
before Tio Tam v. Republic, 25 Apr. 1957, G.R. No. L-9602.
c. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Act 2927)
d. Those who are citizens under the 1935 Constitution (Jus sanguini doctrine).
e. Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.
 NOTE: In Teotimo Rodriguez Tio Tiam v. Republic, 101 Phil. 195. Those declared as
Filipino citizens by the courts are recognized as such today, not because of the
application of the jus soli doctrine, but principally because of the doctrine of res
judicata.

Res Judicata does not set in citizenship cases except when:

1. Person’s citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a
material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing
2. With the active participation of the Solicitor General or his representative;
and
3. Finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Burca v.
Republic G.R. No. L-24252, Jan. 30, 1967)

Caram rule: Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Philippines of foreign
parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been elected to public office,
are considered Filipino citizens. (Chiongbian v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-2007, Jan. 31, 1949)

NOTE: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ had seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate. (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434,
Mar. 3, 2004)

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (The time to elect: within 3 years from
reaching the age of majority except when there is justifiable reason for delay)

Statutory formalities in selecting Philippine citizenship

a) A statement of election under oath;
b) An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;
and
c) Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest
civil registry. (Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. v. Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010)

The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply

only to legitimate children. in Serra v. Republic, 91 Phil 914, it was held that if the
child is illegitimate, he follows the status and citizenship of his only known parent,
the mother.

The right is available to the child as long as his mother was a Filipino citizen at the
time of her marriage to the alien, even if by reason of such marriage, she lost her
Philippine citizenship [Cu v. Republic, 89 Phil 473]; and even if the mother was not
a citizen of the Philippines at birth [Opinion, Sec. of Justice, s. 1948].
 4. Those naturalized in accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)

B. Modes of acquiring citizenship

1. By birth
a. Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship.
b. Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of the place of birth.
2. By naturalization – the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege
of a native-born citizen.
3. By marriage
NOTE: Jus sanguinis and by naturalization are the modes followed in the Philippines.

C. Naturalization and denaturalization

Naturalization - Act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.

Modes of naturalization:

a) Direct: Citizenship is acquired by:

(i) Individual, through judicial or administrative proceedings;
(ii) Special act of legislature;
(iii) Collective change of nationality, as a result of cession or subjugation; or
(iv) In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where
they are born.
b) Derivative: Citizenship conferred on:
(i) Wife of naturalized husband - Vests citizenship on the wife who might herself be
lawfully naturalized. She need not prove her qualifications but only that she is not
disqualified. (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, Oct. 4,
1971.) ;
(ii) Minor children of naturalized person
 Born in the Philippines – automatically becomes citizen
 Born abroad before the naturalization of the father:
- Automatically becomes citizen if the father is residing in the Phil at the
time of naturalization otherwise considered citizen only during minority
unless he begins to permanently reside in the Phil.
 Born abroad after parent’s naturalization – considered Filipino only provided
registered as such before any Phil consulate within 1 year after attaining
majority age and take oath of allegiance.

(iii) Alien woman upon marriage to a national;

(iv) The unmarried child whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of
age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of R.A. 9225
shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
Doctrine of indelible allegiance - An individual may be compelled to retain his original
nationality even if he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second
State whose nationality he has acquired.

Direct naturalization under Philippine laws:

a) judicial naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended – covers all aliens
regardless of class;
b) administrative naturalization under Rep. Act No. 9139; and
c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress, bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien.

Modes of becoming a citizen by naturalization

1. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139
2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 473, as amended
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, Jan. 29, 2007)

Qualifications for Administrative Naturalization (RA 9139):

1. The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
2. The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing
of his/her petition;
3. The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles
of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in
which he/she is living;
4. The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any
public school or private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not
limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children
of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
5. The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from
which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married
and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall
not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their
profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
6. The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of
the Philippines; and
7. The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Persons disqualified for Administrative naturalization (RA 9139):

1. Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
 2. Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault
or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such
war; and
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right
to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Qualifications for Judicial Naturalization (CA No. 473):

1. Not less than 18 years of age on the date of hearing the petition (as amended by RA
6809)

2. Resided in the Philippines for not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years, if;
a. Honorably held office in the Philippines
b. Established new industry or introduced a useful invention
c. Married to a Filipino woman
d. Engaged as teacher in Philippine public or private school not established for
exclusive instruction of a particular nationality or race, or in any branches of
education or industry for a period of not less than 2 years; and
e. Born in the Philippines

3. Character
a. Good moral character
b. Believes in the Constitution
c. Conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during his stay in the Philippines

4. Owns real estate in the Philippines not less than P5,000 in value; or has some lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation that can support himself and his family.

5. Speaks and writes English or Filipino and any principal Philippine dialects (as amended
by Sec. 6 Art. XIV); and

6. Enrolled minor children in any public or private school recognized by the government
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the curriculum,
during the entire period of residence prior to hearing of petition.

Disqualified from Judicial Naturalization (CA 473):

1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons which uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments
2. Persons defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas
3. Polygamists or believers of polygamy
4. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
5. Persons convicted of crime involving moral turpitude
6. Persons who, during residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos,
or did not evince sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions and ideals of
Filipinos
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof (no reciprocity)

Denaturalization - The process taken by a government to revoke the citizenship status of

an individual.

Grounds for denaturalization

1. Naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently or illegally
2. If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and
establishes residence therein
3. Naturalization obtained through invalid declaration of intention
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of parents either by neglecting
support or by transferring them to another school
5. Allowing himself to be used as a dummy

Effects of denaturalization
1. If ground affects intrinsic validity of proceedings, denaturalization shall divest wife
and children of their derivative naturalization
2. If the ground is personal; the wife and children shall retain citizenship.

D. Dual citizenship and dual allegiance

Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance.

In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, the Court clarified the “dual citizenship”
disqualification in Sec. 40, Local Government Code, and reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art.
IV of the Constitution on “dual allegiance”. The Court explained that “dual citizenship” as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification. This ruling is reiterated in Valles
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000.

Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as dual citizen. This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and
that he/she will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and
allegiance to the same. Such declaration under oath operates as an effective renunciation
of foreign citizenship [Mercado v. Manzano, supra.; Valles v. Comelec, supra.].
However, this doctrine in Valles and Mercado that the filing of a certificate of candidacy
suffices to renounce foreign citizenship does not apply to one who, after having reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, runs for public office. To comply with the provisions
of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state
in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship [Lopez v. Comeiec,
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008]. In Mercado, the disqualification was sought under another
law, Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, in which the Court defined the term “dual
citizenship” vis-a-vis the concept of “dual allegiance”, and at the time the case was decided,
R.A. 9225 was not yet enacted by Congress [Jacot v. Dal and Comeiec, G.R. No. 179848,
November 27, 2008].

RA 9225: “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” approved on August 29,
2003 provides that, upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic:
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship; and
2. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of said RA,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, does not constitute the
personal and sworn renunciation sought under Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225. It bears to emphasize
that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship. (Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, Nov.27,
2008)

The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements. It requires the
twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship. (Roseller De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180048,
June 19, 2009)

For a person who possesses dual citizenship by birth there is no need to comply with the
twin requirements of swearing an oath of allegiance and executing a renunciation of foreign
citizenship because he is a natural-born Filipino who did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. It is sufficed, if upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, he elects Philippine citizenship to terminate his status as person with dual
citizenship considering that his condition in the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different States. (Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, Feb. 19, 2009)

E. Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship

Grounds for loss of Philippine citizenship:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
 However, this is modified by R.A. 9225, entitled An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent (which took effect
September 17, 2003), which declares the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

2. Express renunciation of citizenship (expatriation); or

NOTE: The mere application or possession of an alien certificate of registration

does not amount to renunciation. (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26,
1999)

3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the constitution or laws of a foreign country

upon attaining 21 years of age; or

NOTE: Citizens may not divest citizenship when the Philippines is at war (Principle
of indelible allegiance).

4. Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

country; or

NOTE: It shall not divest a Filipino of his citizenship if: (a) the Philippines has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; (b) the
said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with its
consent provided that at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does
so only in connection with its service to said foreign country.

5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization (Denaturalization); or

6. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of the armed forces of the
Philippines in times of war; or

7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

Ways to reacquire citizenship:

1. Naturalization – mode of acquisition and reacquisition of Phil citizenship. The
process involves a very cumbersome and tedious one.
2. Repatriation
3. Direct act of Congress

Repatriation - Recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengzon v.
HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
 Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.

F. Natural-born citizens and public office

Government officials required to be natural-born Filipino citizens
1. President (Sec.2, Art VII)
2. Vice-President (Sec. 3, Art VII)
3. Members of Congress (Secs. 3 and 6, Art VI)
4. Justices of Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts (Sec. 7(1), Art VIII)
5. Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 8, Art XI)
6. Members of Constitutional Commissions
7. Members of the Central Monetary Authority (Sec. 20, Art XII)
8. Members of the Commission on Human Rights (Sec 17 (2), Art XIII)

See definition of natural-born citizens in Article V of the 1987 Constitution. See also
discussion under D-Dual Citizenship and Dual allegiance for Public Office.

IX. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. General principles

B. Modes of acquiring title to public office

C. Modes and kinds of appointment

D. Eligibility and qualification requirements

E. Disabilities and inhibitions of public officers

F. Powers and duties of public officers

G. Rights of public officers

H. Liabilities of public officers

1. Preventive suspension and back salaries

2. Illegal dismissal, reinstatement and back salaries

I. Immunity of public officers

J. De facto officers

K. Termination of official relation

 L. The Civil Service
1. Scope

2. Appointments to the civil service

3. Personnel actions
M. Accountability of public officers
1. Impeachment

2. Ombudsman (Sections 5 to 14, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution, in relation to R.A. No. 6770, or otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989.")
a. Functions

b. Judicial review in administrative proceedings

c. Judicial review in penal proceedings

3. Sandiganbayan
4. Ill-gotten wealth
N. Term limits
X. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. General principles

B. Administrative agencies
1. Definition

2. Manner of creation

3. Kinds
C. Powers of administrative agencies
1. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) power
a. Kinds of administrative rules and regulations

b. Requisites for validity

2. Quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) power
a. Administrative due process

b. Administrative appeal and review

c. Administrative res judicata

3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing, and rate-fixing powers
D. Judicial recourse and review
 1. Doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction

2. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

3. Doctrine of finality of administrative action

XI. ELECTION LAW
A. Suffrage

B. Qualification and disqualification of voters

C. Registration of voters

D. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

E. Political parties
1. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties

2. Registration
F. Candidacy
1. Qualifications of candidates

2. Filing of certificates of candidacy

i. Effect of filing

ii. Substitution of candidates

iii. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificates

iv. Nuisance candidates

v. Petition to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy

vi. Effect of disqualification

vii. Withdrawal of candidates

G. Campaign
1. Premature campaigning

2. Prohibited contributions

3. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda

4. Limitations on expenses
 5. Statement of contributions and expenses
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
1. Composition

2. Powers
I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law

1. Petition not to give due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy

2. Petition for disqualification

3. Petition to declare failure of elections

4. Pre-proclamation controversy

5. Election protest

6. Quo warranto
J. Prosecution of election offenses (EXCLUDE: penal provisions)
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING LAWS:
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881 as
amended)

Election Automation Law (R.A. No. 8436 as amended by

R.A. No. 9369)

XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. Public corporations
1. Concept
a. Distinguished from government-owned or controlled
corporations
2. Classifications
a. Quasi-corporations

b. Municipal corporations
B. Municipal corporations
1. Elements

2. Nature and functions

 3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, merger, or
dissolution
C. Principles of local autonomy

D. Powers of local government units (LGUs)

1. Police power (general welfare clause)

2. Eminent domain

3. Taxing power

4. Closure and opening of roads

5. Legislative power
a. Requisites for valid ordinance

b. Local initiative and referendum

6. Corporate powers
a. To sue and be sued

b. To acquire and sell property

c. To enter into contracts

i. Requisites

ii. Ultra vires contracts

7. Liability of LGUs

8. Settlement of boundary disputes

9. Succession of elective officials

10. Discipline of local officials

a. Elective officials
i. Grounds

ii. Jurisdiction

iii. Preventive suspension

 iv. Removal

v. Administrative appeal

vi. Doctrine of condonation

b. Appointive officials
11. Recall
12. Term limits
XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
A. Regalian doctrine

B. Nationalist and citizenship requirement provisions

C. Exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources

D. Franchises, authority, and certificates for public utilities

E. Acquisition, ownership and transfer of public and private lands

F. Practice of professions

G. Organization and regulation of corporations, private and public

H. Monopolies, restraint of trade and unfair competition

XIV. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Concept of social justice

B. Commission on Human Rights

XV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND

SPORTS
A. Academic freedom

XVI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Concepts
1. Obligations erga omnes

2. Jus cogens

3. Concept of ex aequo et bono

B. Relationship between international and national law

C. Sources of obligations in international law

D. Subjects
1. States

2. International organizations
3. Individuals
E. Basic principles of diplomatic and consular law

F. General principles of treaty law

G. Nationality and statelessness

H. Doctrine of state responsibility

I. Jurisdiction of States
1. Basis of jurisdiction
a. Territoriality principle

b. Nationality principle and statelessness

c. Protective principle

d. Universality principle

e. Passive personality principle

2. Exemptions from jurisdiction
a. Act of State doctrine

b. International organizations and its officers

J. Treatment of aliens
1. Extradition
a. Fundamental principles

b. Procedure

c. Distinguished from deportation

K. International Human Rights Law
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights
L. Basic principles of international humanitarian law
1. Categories of armed conflicts

a. International armed conflicts

b. Internal or non-international armed conflict

c. War of national liberation

2. R.A. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity)
M. Law of the sea
1. Baselines

2. Archipelagic states
a. Straight archipelagic baselines

b. Archipelagic waters

c. Archipelagic sea lanes passage

d. Regime of islands
3. Internal waters

4. Territorial sea

5. Exclusive economic zone

6. Continental shelf
a. Extended continental shelf
7. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
N. Basic principles of international environmental law
1. Precautionary principle

IMPORTANT NOTES:

The listing of covered topics is not intended and should not be used by
law schools as a course outline. This listing has been drawn up for the
limited purpose of ensuring that the Bar candidates are guided on the
coverage of the 2018 Bar Examinations.

All laws, rules, issuances, and jurisprudence pertinent to every subject

and its listed topics as of June 30, 2017 are examinable materials within
the coverage of the 2018 Bar Examinations.

Principles of law are not covered by the cut-off period stated herein.